TRANSMITTAL OF REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300080005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 26, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Ntiationcl In!a{Iigence Officers
26 March 1979
TO: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director, National
Foreign Assessment
FROM:
National Intelligence Officer
for China
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Report
. Transmitted herewith is the report on
the current situation in Indochina, as
per your request. It.was coordinated
with the NIO for East Asia and internally
in ORPA.
Attachment:
Report, as stated
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee, w/att.
1 - DDCI, w/att.
1 - DD/NFA, w/att.
2 - NIO/CH, w/att.
1 - NFAC Reg., w/att.
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Indochina: Phase II
1. Fighting along the China-Vietnam border has now all
but ceased, and the withdrawal of Chinese forces which was
announced by Beijing on 5 March is virtually complete.
Nevertheless, tensions along the border and in the Indochina
region as a whole remain high and prospects for any relaxation
in the immediate future appear dim. Until the final stages
of the fighting between China and Vietnam only those two
countries and Kampuchea were directly involved, but now Laos
has been drawn in as a protagonist. Further back the Soviet
Union has maintained -- and even stepped up -- its activities
in support of Vietnam and has also been conducting a series
of unusually large-scale maneuvers in areas of the Soviet
Union and Mongolia adjacent to the Sino-Soviet border. Al-
though Phase I in Indochina, that of active combat, appears
over, a new phase is developing which at the minimum will be
characterized by intensive political maneuvering (possibly
backed by some use of force) and at worst could result in a
resumption of hostilities on a scale greater than before.
2. Chinese Military Position: The Chinese troops
which participated in the Vietnam Fighting are now occupying
positions close to the China-Vietnam border with most units
within 10 kilometers of the. border. We estimate that 8 full
Chinese armies plus elements of 2 additional armies (about 420.
thousand men) are now concentrated in positions near the border.
There are no indications of any Chinese units being returned
to their original bases. In addition, approximately 800 Chinese
combat aircraft remain at the 10 airfields in China closest
to the border.. The Chinese are equally capable of renewing
an attack on Vietnam or putting up a very strong defense
against any Vietnamese attack against.China.
3. Vietnamese Military Position: Just as the Chinese
announced their troop withdrawal from Vietnam, the Vietnamese
ordered a nation-wide mobilization and began what we believe
to be a significant effort to reinforce their troops along the
border. The national mobilization continues in effect, as does
the reinforcement effort. Vietnamese units facing the Chinese
as the fighting ended consisted of 2 and perhaps as many as 4
main force divisions, together with 7 economic construction
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divisions. Since then, the entire Vietnamese II Corps has
been ordered northward. This involves the movement of 1 divi-
sion from Kampuchea (the Kompong Som area) and 2 divisions from
Laos. Forces from elsewhere in both Kampuchea and South Viet-
nam are also believed to be moving up in considerable strength.
An estimated 50,000 Vietnamese troops are now in the north,
with an additional 50,000 now moving in. Vietnam is also up-
grading the equipment in the hands of these troops. Unfor-
tunately, firm data on the composition and size of the Viet-
namese order-of-battle is lacking.
4. To fill the vacuum left behind in Kampuchea, the
Vietnamese are sending in conscripts, many from South Vietnam,
and amalgamating miscellaneous battalion and regimental-size
units into new divisions. Specialists to full out the ranks
of these divisions are being supplied through the mobilization,
which has thus far not involved wholesale recruitment into
the military. The ad hoc arrangements Hanoi has taken to
fill the gap in Kampuchea indicates that Vietnam remains
determined to hang on to that country.
5. Laos: A new element in the equation is Laos, which
until the eve of the Chinese withdrawal had apparently hoped
to maintain at least a minimal relationship with China despite
its close ties to Vietnam. However, after both the Soviet
and Vietnamese accused the Chinese of attempting to intrude
into Laotian territory, the Lao joined the anti-China chorus
and are presently echoing all the accusations against Beijing
which emanate from Moscow and Hanoi. They have in addition
demanded the cessation of all Chinese road-building activity
in Laos and the removal of all Chinese construction personnel.
The Chinese say they will comply and deny the accusations
against them.
6. The reasons are obscure for the rather abrupt activa-
tion of Laos as an issue between China and Vietam but it can
be speculated that Vietnam (and the USSR) wanted to find an
area where the "hegemonist" label could be pinned on the Chi-
nese, and also to drive Laos closer into the "unity of Indo-
chinese peoples" which Vietnam is seeking to establish under
its tutelage. By injecting Laos into Sino-Vietnamese rela-
tions, Vietnam may be moving China towards undertaking efforts
to stir-up anti-government elements in Laos -- an accusation
which they have already and (probably incorrectly) made
against China.
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7. Kampuchea: Militarily and politically, conditions
in Kampuchea remain essentially unchanged: the Vietnamese
forces occupy the cities and tons but the Pol Pot forces
control large areas of the countryside and are effectively
interdicting Vietnamese lines of communication. The Pol Pot
forces have problems of their own, focussing.on shortages of
food, arms and ammunition. The Vietnamese are suffering sig-
nificant casualties and are hard-pressed to maintain what
hold on Kampuchea they possess; their difficulties are likely
to be magnified as veteran Vietnamese troops being withdrawn
are replaced by conscripts and scratch divisions. So far, at
least, the Vietnamese have been unable to establish anything.
approaching a credible Kampuchean administration under the
Heng Samrin regime set up under their auspices. Khmer resi-
dents of Vietnam with some degree of literacy are now being
rounded up and sent into Kampuchea to form the nucleus of a
civil government, but their numbers (and competence) are
hardly sufficient..
8. It has become evident that Pol Pot fighting a
geurrilla war against the Vietnamese is no improvement over
Pol Pot running the Kampuchean government from Phnom Penh --
his forces are assuring that the populace does not cooperate
with the Vietnamese invaders by means of bloody reprisals
rather than through winning hearts and minds. These methods
appear effective and coupled with the historical Kampuchean
hatred of Vietnamese will probably continue to keep the Viet-
namese forces isolated. Meanwhile, supplies are reaching the
Pol Pot forces via Thailand, which has evidently set aside an.
island in the Gulf of Thailand near Kampuchea as a central
point where material can be off-loaded from Chinese ships and
transferred to the interior of Kampuchea.
9. The Soviet Role: The Soviet naval presence in the
South China Sea waters a jacent to North Vietnam is being main-
tained, with a 10-12 ship task force on station south of Hainan
and elements from this force occasionally visiting Haiphong
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have asked the Vietnamese for base rights, "logistical support
points," and portcalls by Soviet ships on an ad hoc basis.
Other reports say the Vietnamese have rejected the Soviet
base request, but there is evidence the Soviets are, in fact,
providing seaborne logistical support to Vietnam (alligator
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class LSTs have both brought in supplies from the USSR and,
in at least one instance, ferried military cargo from Ho Chi
Minh City to Danang). "Support points" might be legitimately
requested by the Soviets to sustain this effort. A Soviet
airlift is also continuing, with flights by Soviet AN-12s and
other types of transports arriving in Hanoi and Danang from
the USSR on a regular basis. We have seen evidence of new
shipments of SA-3 equipment. MIG-21s have also been flown
in aboard Soviet transports. The Soviets, however, have not
really offered all-.out support, material or verbal, to their
erstwhile allies, and the.Vietnamese are rumored to have com-
plained about this.
10. The Soviet-Vietnamese relationship is probably in
a process of evolution. There are reports that Pham Van Dong
visited Moscow for several days in early March. . Presumably
discussions between the two parties are continuing on the
scale and nature of Soviet aid to Vietnam, as well as on the
scope of the future Soviet presence there, e.g., access to air.
and naval facilities at Danang, Can Ranh Bay, or other sites.
The Vietnamese may have second thoughts about the role they
wish the Soviets to assume based on the price they would be
expected to pay. If history is any judge, the price would be
high: in 1958, during the Taiwan Strait crisis, Soviet offers
of assistance to China were tied to demands for base rights
as well as virtual control of the Chinese navy (Beijing turned
the "offer" down). As noted, the Vietnamese may have already
rejected a Soviet bid to establish bases, but it is still too
early to see what kind of a sustained presence, if any, the
Soviets will emerge with.
11. The Soviets have also attempted to influence develop-
ments in Indochina by conducting unprecedentedly large-scale
military maneuvers along the Sino-Soviet border. In a major
exercise, the Soviets have flown in an airborne unit from the
Western Soviet Union, activated a new Front Headquarters, took
equipment out of storage, and upgraded a Category III, or cadre,
division to take part in a maneuver in Mongolia. This opera-
tion concludes an airborne landing in central Mongolia. The
Soviets appear to have two aims in view: to test their own
preparedness arrangements, and to demonstrate graphic ' ally to
the Chinese that they have the muscle to inflict great harm
on China -- a demonstration that, significantly, in taking
place only after the fighting in Vietnam has subsided.
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12. Political Track: When the Chinese announced their
withdrawal they also called for negotiations with Vietnam to
resolve outstanding border problems, and the Vietnamese ac-
cepted at the Vice Foreign Minister level provided the Chinese
withdrew completely from Vietnamese territory--or what Viet-
nam now claims as Vietnamese territory, defined under the
rubric of "historic borders." The Vietnamese claim that Chi-
nese troops are still on their soil--as many as 100,000 troops
in 16 spots. The Vietnamese further allege that the Chinese
have shifted some of the border markers into Vietnam's terri-
tory. The discrepancies are probably trivial, but if Vietnam
wishes to hold up talks, which are supposed to begin March 29
in Hanoi and move later to Beijing, they have established a
pretext.
13. By delaying the talks the Vietnamese presumably
would want to see world opinion turn more against the Chinese
due to "aggression" and occupation of Vietnamese territory,
thus putting China at a disadvantage.. On the other hand, they
.are not going to get much if any support for their idea that
the Chinese evacuate territory they have held for over 30 years
in order to enter into talks. For their part, the Chinese
probably would like to introduce other elements such as Kampu-
chea into the proceedings and this, too, the Vietnamese prob-
ably would wish to avoid. It is therefore problematical
whether the border negotiations will actually get beyond the
formalities and into matters of substance for some time to come.
14. A number of countries outside Indochina, including
the ASEAN nations, Australia, and New Zealand, have been active
in the political arena and have, among other things, considered
the possibility of convening a new Geneva conference to address
Indochina questions, perhaps including establishment of a
coalition government in Kampuchea. (An ASEAN-sponsored reso-
lution before the UN"Security Council calling for the with-
drawal of all "foreign forces" from the countries of Indochina
was vetoed by the Soviets. The Chinese voted for the resolu-
tion, having already removed their troops.) Although not much
hope of success is being held out by those concerned, there is
a possibility, at least, that at some point Vietnam and the
USSR might agree to some sort of international conference, and
eventually a coalition government in Kampuchea as well. The
Chinese would be happy to see a forum of this nature develop
if it could be focussed on the Vietnamese occupation of Kampu-
chea, but foresee many difficulties ahead, especially in get-
ting Vietnamese and Soviet agreement. This in turn would
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require the Vietnamese to admit their inability to bring Kampu-
chea under their control.. Possibly a more active political
scene might have to await further developments on the battle-
field in Kampuchea.
15. An actor who has yet to emerge on the stage is
Prince Sihanouk, who remains in Beijing but is resisting Chi-
nese efforts to become titular head of a "united front" Kampu-
chean resistance against the Vietnamese. Sihanouk is refusing
to work together with Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan,
and instead would like to see a "neutral" Kampuchean regime
established entirely without Pol Pot -- one which would main-
tain good. relations with both China and Vietnam. The Chinese
would probably be prepared to accept a Kampuchean neutrality
something like Sihanouk envisages, a situation that would give
them less than they had in 1975-78 but would leave the Viet-
namese with much less than they have today. However, their
problenin inducing a political arrangement remains either
getting rid of Pol Pot or inducing him to step into the back-
ground to open the stage for Sihanouk. Pol Pot, now heading
a successful Kampuchean resistance, seems unlikely to agree.
16. Conclusion: In sum, although the fighting between
Vietnam an China has subsided to a very low level and the
threat of an enlarged conflict for the moment appears re-
duced, the conflict in Indochina is by no means over. Viet-
nam is looking for ways to repair its damaged image while
clinging to Kampuchea, and the Soviets are backing them.
While political contacts between the Vietnamese and the Chi-
nese may yet ensue,-the spectre of further fighting remains
as well. Sihanouk has not yet assumed an influential role.
The Soviet Union may have advanced its strategic and political
interests in Vietnam, and retains the option of applying
major military pressure against the Chinese along the Sino-
Soviet border. At the moment, the Chinese find themselves
in the best position of all, having left the Vietnamese over-
extended militarily and weakened economically. The Chinese
may now hope to see Vietnam drain its resources as a result.
The crucial decisions for the future lie in Vietnamese hands.
They will have to decide whether they can afford continuation
of the current situation and a great dependence on Moscow, or
some degree of accommodation with Beijing.
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