WARNING ASSESSMENT: CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070028-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: January 31, 1980
• Content Type: MF

xi
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
VIA Deputy Director for National Foreign Asses
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP
SUBJECT Warning Assessment: China
The following items were considered by the Community Repre-
sentatives at the meeting on 21 January:
No increase in tensions along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian
borders had been observed; order of battle on both sides remained
essentially unchanged, with no special preparations perceived. While
there had been a step-up in Soviet aerial surveillance of the border
areas, the Chinese had not reacted. The Soviets had undertaken a
rotation of troops in Mongolia which involved a larger number of
flights than on previous occasions, but no particular significance
was attributed to this development. F I
Impact of the Afghanistan situation on Sino-Soviet relations
was noted in the fact that the Chinese had deferred at least until
later this year the resumption of the Sino-Soviet talks on mutual
relationships. (The annual talks on navigation along the Amur and
Ussuri rivers were to resume on 5 February, however.) The Chinese
press had strongly attacked the Soviet involvement, and Huang Hua
in Pakistan had said that Chinese would assist both Pakistan and
the Afghan resistance forces. Analysts agreed that Chinese aid to
Afghan dissidents would not be direct Nut would go via Pakistan.
In any event, the route through the Watkhan corridor was probably
snowbound this time of year. No increase in Chinese air strength at
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
fields nearest Afghanistan had been seen.
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Relating Afghanistan to the Sino-Soviet border situation, the
Soviets had included the Transbaikal MR among nine such districts
which had been called on to furnish troops to replace reservists
called up for the move into Afghanistan. It was possible that the
Far Eastern MR would also be called upon to furnish troops. 0
Further relating to Afghanistan developments, it was observed
that the Soviets had attacked Huang Hua's visit to Pakistan, which
occurred just after Secretary Brown's visit to China, as evidence
of Sino-US "collusion." The presence in China of a Pakistani military
mission was commented upon; the mission's purpose was reportedly
to check on the availability of Chinese weaponry, including PIG-21's.
(Analysts questioned the willingness of the Chinese to provide PIG-21
aircraft given the limited number in the Chinese AOB.) Sixteen
Chinese MIG-19's (F-6's) had been delivered to Pakistan in January.
Finally, analysts called attention to Chinese concern over the
role of India, with consequent attention to the need for improving
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2. Indochina Situation
There was considerable discussion of the apparent failure of the
Vietnamese offensive against Kampuchean resistance forces in the
Thai-Kampuchean border area to materialize. A Vietnamese troop
strength of seven to nine divisions in this general area was reported,
but the strategy of the Pol Pot forces evidently was to avoid combat
and move away from the borders, thus making Vietnamese operations
difficult. It was further possible that the Vietnamese had reached
the conclusion that there was no unity among the various Kampuchean
groups and hence no real threat.
Another possibility addressed was that Vietnam's perceptions of
the international scene had a bearing on the situation, e.g., the
possibe involvement of the US and the Chinese if Vietnamese operations
spilled over into Thailand and stirred up Thai resistance. Vietnam
and. Moscow may well have heeded US warnings sent to both. China
was perhaps already taking credit for pinning the Vietnamese down
along the Sino-Vietnam border. Vietnam may in addition have made an
assessment of the strength of Thai and ASEAN reactions. In this
regard, some adjustments in the Thai/ASEAN position toward accommodating
Vietnam had been observed, which could have generated a degree of
Vietnamese response. Q
One point of view held that the Soviets may have influenced Vietnam
to cool the situation in the light of Soviet moves in Afghanistan.
Admiral Gorshikov was in Hanoi on 22 December, the date of the Vietnamese
offensive supposedly was to begin (Vietnamese Army Day), and could have
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passed along a message to the Vietnamese. Soviet pressure could
have been exerted through the logistical support being given to
Vietnam by the USSR; some effects on Vietnam of diminished Soviet
logistical support had already been observed in the wake of Thai
curtailment of Soviet overflights to Vietnam.
Nevertheless, it was emphasized that Soviet military assistance
to Vietnam was continuing, most notably in the arrival in that
country of Fitter ground support aircraft (the SU-7, not the SU-17).
Conceivably what we were witnessing now was just a temporary hiatus
in Vietnamese operations, with the anticipated offensive still to
come. The fact that Vietnam was still spread out and pinned down in
Kampuchea, with consequent drain on its manpower and economic
resources, could hardly be pleasing to the Vietnamese. L
3. Chinese Internal Situation
Analysts commented on the apparent development of a conservative
trend in China's handling of its internal affairs, as marked by Deng
Xiaoping's 17 January speech (which criticized inter alia "big
character posters"). Deng himself might have come under pressure
from colleagues concerned with public order and discipline to back
away from some of the more liberal positions he had taken earlier
on individual rights. However, Deng's tactics had been to press
forward on an issue, move back when resistance was encountered, and
then make a new thrust. He was now pressing cadre reform from within
the Party, and may have felt it expedient to take a softer line on
other questions while handling the very sensitive matter of cadre
reform. F1
New faces were reported as appearing at the Party Center,
representing leaders identified with Deng Xiaoping. One such was
Zhao Ziyang (brought in from Xichuan), who could be slated for a
senior position in the Party Secretariat. It was speculated that
if such were the case, Deng was possibly seeking to create in the
Secretariat an alternate center of power to the Politburo. Leadership
trends were likely to become clearer later in 1980, when the 5th Plenum
of the 11th Party Congress was expected, followed by the 12th Party
Congress. A final evaluation of the Cultural Revolution could be
expected from these meetings as well as indications of leadership
changes. II
No serious threats to Party unity, national stability, and the
personal position of Deng Xiaoping were believed to exist at this
time. It was noted that military modernization had not become
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a contentious issue, and that the military had been surprisingly
quiet in the face of the lower order of priority assigned to
modernization of the PLA. ^
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