COMMENTS ON THE SWS MEMO DATED 22 DFECEMBER 1978, SUBJECT: THE US-CHINA NORMALIZATION AGREEMENT: A WARNING PERSPECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300030014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: December 28, 1978
• Content Type: MF

Approver Release Q04/D6/29E JA-RDP83BWOR000300030014-6
NFAC No. 5870-70
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
28 December 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer
for Warning
FROM: James R. Lilley
National Intelligence Officer for China
SUBJECT: Comments on the SWS Memo dated 22 De-
cember 1978, Subject: The US-China
Normalization Agreement: A Warning
Perspective
1. The alarm raised in the SWS memo is justified but
the reasoning is flawed. The evidence does not support the
assumption that a Chinese tougher attitude on Vietnam rose
out of normalization.
2. What should be of some concern to us are recent
Chinese moves
-- To condition cadres and population as well
as the outside world to bolder moves by the Chi-
nese against the Vietnamese in Indochina.
-- The severing of rail traffic between the two
countries.
-- The increasing stridency of Chinese rhetoric.
-- The defensive build-up of an air base in the
area.
State Dept. review completed
S E C R E T
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3. It is a war of nerves. The Chinese are warning the
Vietnamese not to go too far in Cambodia or they could be hit
in a number of places, the Spratleys, the North Vietnamese-
Chinese border area,-.Laos, or the Gulf of Tonkin. The Chi-
nese do not have the best cards to play but they have a knack
for this game of posturing and pressure (ask State and NSC).
Attachment:
Two Reports
Jame R. Lilley
Orig. $ 1 - Addressee, w/att.
1 - NIO/USSR, w/att.
1 - ORPA/CH, w/att.
2 - NIO/CH, w/att.
1 - NFAC Reg.., w/att.
NIO/CH-JRLilley:fmt
Distribution:
28 December 1978
25
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CONFIDENTIAL
FRP:
4:"TION: NONE INFO: ODPS -S, RF, FILE, CEX-3, CR/FE, CRG/EA,
CTS-2, D/FBIS-2, DCD-31 EA-6, EPS/EG-2, IAD/CAS-3, .IAD/IC, IAD/PE,
NVAC/CH, NIO/I ~) NIO/EAP, NIO/ST, OGCR-2, OGCR/ER-2, ORPA/AMERS,
n AA/CH-4, OR-P /II-2, ORPA/R0-2, ORPA/SEA-2, ORPA/USSR-4, OSI/PPB,
Q.5R/EF, OSR/RA, OSR/SE, OSR/SF, SE, (56/W)
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Pp RUEAIIB
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op RUMJPG 04304 3601209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM USLO PEKING
TD RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3282
Tr.FFO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8154
RisMTBK/AMEMBASSY
BANGKOK 1023
R!JnUTH CHINA SEA.
COMMENT: THE ESCALATION OF CHINESE RHETORIC SUGGESTS A
'RC DECISION TO HEIGHTEN PRESSURE ON THE SRV, FOR REASONS
PRESUMABLY RELATED TO VIETNAMESE ACTIONS IN KAMPUCHEA OR ALONG
CONFIDENTIAL
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THE SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER.. AT THE SAME TIME, THE: DECEMBER
EDITORIAL'S FOCUS ON THE DISPUTE OVER THE SOUTH CHINA
SFA ISLANDS RAISES'THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHINESE RETALIATORY
MOVE IN THIS AREA. AN ATTACK ON A VIETNAMESE OUTPOST IN THE
SvRATLYS, FOR INSTANCE, WOULD UNDERSCORE THE PRC'S CLAIM
TO THIS PORTION OF THE POTENTIALLY OILeRiCH SOUTH CHINA SEA,
RUT WITHOUT VIOLATING THE PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL''S PROUD
STATEMENT THAT SINCE 1949 "THE PRC HAS NOT SEIZED AN INCH
OF TERRITORY FROM OTHERS,"
t, NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE POWERFUL DETERRENTS TO SUCH
RTSKY ACTION ON THE PRC'S PART. ONE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF
~FFEAT. WE ARE NOT. PREPARED FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT HERE TO
SPECULATE ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS OF THIS KIND OF
ATTACK, BUT SUCH A MOVE WOULD REPRESENT A CONSIDERABLY MORE
..gTFFICULT OPERATION THAN THE TAKEOVER OF THE PARACELS FROM
GvN FORCES IN 1974. A SECOND DISADVANTAGE WOULD BE THE INTERe
NATIONAL COMPLICATIONS. AN ATTACK ON THE VIETNAMESE SPRATLYS
Wr)ULD ALARM THE PHILIPPINES, WHICH HOLDS SOME NEIGHBORING
7$LANDS (AS DOES THE ROC), AND PROBABLY OTHER SOUTHEAST
ASIAN NATIONS AS WELL. IT WOULD WORRY THE JAPANESE, WHOSE
DISPUTE WITH CHINA OVER THE SENKAKUS IN SOME WAYS RESEMBLES
THE SPRATLY SITUATION. IT WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF SOVIET
INVOLVEMENT. AND IT COULD CAUSE AN ADVERSE REACTION IN THE
L)3ITED STATES, WHERE IT.MIGHT BE LOOKED UPON AS A SIGN THAT
CHINA'S LEADERS FELT THAT NORMALIZATION HAD GIVEN THEM A
FREE HAND TO PURSUE EXTERNAL AMBITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
Ty ACCORDINGLY, THE PROBABILITY OF SUCH A MOVE DOES NOT
APPEAR HIGH, BUT U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES MAY NISH TO KEEP
&-CAREFUL WATCH OVER THE AREA DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS
&ND BE ALERT TO UNUSUAL PRC SHIP MOVEMENTS IN THE:SOUTH
CHINA SEA, WOODCOCK
ND OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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