CHINA-VIETNAM-USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 19, 1979
• Content Type: MF

TOP SECRET 25X1
Approved I ogIeai6 kO 01 rdIIA11T8GBO( .000300020012-9
Washington. D. C. 20505
25X1
Copy No.
19 January 1979
ALERT MEMORANDUM
83
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council
SUBJECT: China-Vietnam-USSR
Attached for your information is an alert memorandum on
China-Vietnam-USSR. The Chinese appear to be completing a
deployment of forces and a propaganda groundwork that will
enable them to take military action against Vietnam at a
time of their choosing. There are formidable political ob-
jections to such action but considerations of prestige appear
to play an important part in Chinese calculations. Should the
Chinese initiate action, a drive into Vietnam followed by re-
latively rapid withdrawal is the most likely option. Action
could occur even before Vice Premier Deng's visit to the US.
Soviet response to a Chinese attack on Vietnam will be con-
tingent on the extent and severity of the Chinese action.
25X1
Attachment:
NI IAN 79-10002J
25X1
TOP SECRET
25X1
L1 25X1
 TOP SECRET
Approved (oq*lease 2004/01/2 - cO00300020012-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
Copy No.
19 January 1979
ALERT MEMORANDUM
CHINA-VIETNAM-USSR
Since our Alert Memorandum of 5 January, which warned
of possible direct Chinese military action against Vietnam,
China has continued its military buildup along the Sino-
Vietnamese frontier. The manner of the buildup, its timing
and the mix of forces involved suggest offensive rather than
defensive preparations. Chinese propaganda is building a
case that the Vietnamese are intruding on Chinese territory,
and Chinese officials abroad are spreading the word that
China is prepared to "strike hard" in retaliation for Viet-
namese troublemaking. A few officials have asserted that
China is deliberately seeking an occasion to "teach the Viet-
namese a lesson." In sum, the Chinese appear to be completing
a deployment of forces and a propaganda groundwork that will
enable them to take military action against Vietnam at a time
of their choosing. F-1
There are formidable political objections to such action.
The Chinese must weigh the impact of military action on Sino-
US ties and the risk of undermining domestic support in the
US for the normalization arrangements just worked out. China
must also consider pos-sible-Soviet reaction to any action
against Vietnam, as well as the effectiveness of the Cambo-
dian resistance. Considerations of Chinese prestige and a
desire not to be considered a "paper tiger" by nations in
Southeast Asia, on the other hand, appear to play an impor-
tant part in Chinese calculations. These points have particu-
larly been stressed by the more candid Chinese officials. I
25X1
25X1
25X
25X11
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
 TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1
, Approved
lease 2004/01 /20 : CIA-RDP83B00~000
Should the Chinese initiate action against Vietnam, they
would certainly attempt to avoid a protracted conflict with
their southern neighbors. A drive into Vietnam territory,
limited in time and distance, followed by a relatively rapid
withdrawal, in the manner of China's 1962 conflict with India,
is the most likely option. We still cannot rule out more
forceful action nor can we rule out a miscalculation that
would make an early Chinese withdrawal difficult, thus ex-
tending and raising the level of action. The Chinese could
strike at any time -- even before Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping25X1
(Teng Hsiao-ping) arrives in the US.
Soviet media, while maintaining a drumfire of criticism
of Peking for border provocations against Vietnam and for
using military pressure, including troop concentrations, in
an effort to "intimidate" Vietnam, have avoided addressing
the contingency of direct Chinese military action against
IN Vietnam 1
ess characterizing it as imminent
The failure of Soviet media to raise the Chinese attack
contingency, relieving Moscow of the need to address the
question of Soviet response, suggests either that the Soviets
do not regard it as a serious possibility, or if they do,
that they wish to avoid committing themselves to any par-
ticular course of action in response. In any case, they have
not issued any clear public warning designed to deter Peking.
TOP SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
 25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For* lease 2004/01
25X1
001 000300020012-9
f
25X1
We believe the Soviet response to any Chinese attack on
Vietnam will be contingent on the extent and severity of the
Chinese action and its political effects. The USSR may con-
clude that a shallow and short-lived Chinese incursion would
not threaten important Soviet interests and might generate
important political benefits for Moscow and Hanoi without
requiring more than demonstrative measures of support for
Vietnam, short of direct military action. Such measures
might include consultations, additional conspicuous aid, a
naval show of force, and troop movements on the Soviet side
of the border. A deeper and more sustained Chinese invasion
would be more likely to evoke more significant Soviet actions.
These might include demonstrative air and ground patrolling,
and ultimately to some sort of military action, probably
measured, for example, reoccupation of one or more of the
Sino-Soviet border river islands now held by the Chinese. ^ 25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
 Approved For lease 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B001 (W00300020012-9'
Top Secret
The Director of Centra me igence
Washington, D. C 20505
ALERT MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council
SUBJECT. China-Vietnam
opy
5 January 1979
Attached for your information is an alert memorandum
on China-Vietnam.
Attachment:
25X1
NI 1AM 79-10001
25X1
25X1.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-R
Top Secret
 Copy
5 January 1979
ALERT MEMORANDUM
CHINA-VIETNAM
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
National Intelligence Officers
Beijing's inability to forestall the Vietnamese invasion
amounts to a major setback to Chinese prestige and security in-
terests. The Chinese likely feel compelled to demonstrate in
some tangible way their determination to resist any further ex-
pansion of Vietnamese "hegemony" and shore up China's credibil-
ity as an Asian power. To this end the Chinese are preparing
to support resistance forces based in the western half of Kam-
puchea and hope to embroil Vietnam in a costly and protracted 25X1
military involvement in Kampuchea. 0 25X1
Appreved Release _29-9- 41994
Peas 2004/01/20 CIA-RDP83B001qW 00300020012-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
25X1
 Approved For lease 2004/01/20: CIA-RDP83B001(W00300020012-9
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
In considering their next move, the Chinese must weigh
the political and economic costs of a protracted military con-
flict with Vietnam. The Chinese may choose to engineer a
strong localized demonstration of Chinese power along the fron-
tier--perhaps the temporary occupation of disputed territory
as they did in India in 1962. But we cannot rule out more force-
ful action such as Chinese airstrikes deeper into the country.
Nor can we rule out miscalculation that could 1 to a level
of conflict both sides would prefer to avoid. I 25X1
If the Chinese escalate the level of hostilities, we would
expect Moscow to respond first by conspicuously stepping up its
military aid to Vietnam, by making a naval show of force off
the coast of Vietnam, perhaps even a port visit, and by holding
high-level consultations under Article Six of the recently con-
cluded Friendship Treaty. If none of the above appeared to be
deterring the Chinese, the Soviets might then begin a campaign
of intimidation along the Sino-Soviet border--including demon-
strative military air and ground patrolling, military maneuv,e~
and ultimately, some sort of limited military provocation.
25X1
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
25X1
 Approved For 'ease 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP831300100989MR991N$
PROCEDURES FOR PREPARING AN ALERT MEMORANDUM
Attached are interim technical procedures for producing
Alert Memoranda. NIO/W wants to emphasize that these memo-
randa normally have a high priority and should be produced
and disseminated as quickly as possible.
1. Alert NFAC Registry that an Alert Memorandum is being prepared and give
them an approximate time when they can expect it.
2. Get an Alert Memo # from NFAC Registry.
3.. If codeword, get appropriate # from NFAC Registry.
4. Give NFAC Registry a copy of the Alert Memorandum distribution (see
attachment) on which you have filled in the appropriate office designations
on Pages 2, 3 and 4.
5. The length of the Alert Memorandum will be kept to a minimum; therefore it
is the responsibility of the appropriate NIO secretary to type the copy.
6. When the Alert Memorandum is typed, include on the first page the standard
footnote which explains the purpose and reason for an Alert Memorandum (see
attachment). (This footnote will be modified and reduced in size in the
near future.)
7. The Alert Memorandum package will consist of the Alert Memo itself with a
covering memo for the DCI's signature transmitting the document to the NSC
(see attachment).
8. The correct clearance procedure for an Alert Memorandum is as follows:
A. Appropriate NIO
B. NIO for Warning (can be omitted when matter is urgent)
C. Director, NFAC
D. DDCI
E. DCI (for signature)
9. NFAC Registry will be responsible for the following procedures:
A. Issuing appropriate Alert Memo and Codeword numbers.
B. Xeroxing the copies for distribution.
C. Xeroxing coversheets (if appropriate).
D. Distributing copies both inside and outside the Agency.
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
 (CLASSIFICATION)
Approved For~ease 2004/01/20: CIA-RDP83BOO10~00300020012-9
The Director of Central Intelligence
(Date)
ALERT MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council
SUBJECT : (Alert Memo Title)
Approved For Release 2004/01/20: CIA-RDP83BqD4pOR00~3~00029012-9
(CLASSIFICATION)
 Approved For0ease 200/ I: - qRP3BOO1O OO300020012-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
ALERT MEMORANDUM*
(Title)
*The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director
of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. The Alert
Memorandum was in use from 1974 through 1976 and the procedures for this intel-
ligence alerting device were last approved by the United States Intelligence
Board on 9 January 1975. I recently reorganized the warning structure within
the Intelligence Community and appointed a National Intelligence Officer for
Warning to oversee the development of procedures and to assist the Community in
developing an increased awareness of its warning responsibilities. The revival
of the Alert Memorandum is undertaken as a part of those responsibilities. Com-
ments on the procedures for warning should be addressed to the National Intel-
Zigence Officer for Warning STAT
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
(CLASSIFICATION)
 Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300020012-9