APPROVAL OF PERSONAL SERVICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 90
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 6, 1979
• Content Type: MF

25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
NFAC 6594-79
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Budget and Fiscal Officer, NFAC
VIA Chief, Administrative Staff, 'NFAC
Contract Personnel Division, OP
National Intelligence Officer
for China-EAP
SUBJECT Approval of Personal Services Expenses
1. This is to request funding for a one=day consultation,
which took place on 5 December 1979.
a member of the Political Science De?artment at the US Military
Academy, briefed Agency and Community persons on his recent
visit to the PRC.
2. Personal services will be paid for at the maximum rate
of II plus transportation and other expenses. Income
taxes are not to be withheld from the requested compensation.
Chief, Planning, Management S Evaluation Staff
APPROVED:
Special Contracting Officer, OP
Distribution
1 - Addressee
1 - C/PMES/NFAC
1 - CP/OP
2 - CAR
1 - NIO/Ch-EAP Chrono
1 - `IIO/Ch-EAP File
1 - NFAGA - or Release 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B60100R000.200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 12 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 SECRET
Approved ~r Release 2005/01 P83BO1WOR000200180001-5
NFAC 6567-79
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
5 December 1979
25X1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for China-EAP
25X1
25X1
SUBJECT East Asia-Pacific Monthly Warning Meeting
The following items are suggested for consideration:
II
1. South Korea -- The general view is that the martial law
authorities are doing a good job managing the transition to a
new government in Seoul. Analysts noted, however, that much of
what has been done thus far has been symbolic or promisory. All
agreed that a failure of the leadership to deliver measurable
progress toward reform at a reasonable pace could produce a
return to serious tension between the government and the
opposition. No consensus could be drawn on what a prudent
schedule for reform might look like. Some analysts think the
leadership must produce concrete results within 90 days, while
others sugcest the constitutional reform process could take two
years.IUI
2. North Korea -- The DIA analyst noted indications and
warning anomalies in North Korea continue -- diplomatic recalls,
drop in training activity, and unexplained explosions along the
DMZ -- but the group a reed these were not sufficiently unusual
to sound the alarm
3. Japan -- The analysts did not challenge State's repre-
sentative's thesis that Ohira can probably survive up to the
upper house election next summer. The new cabinet is not
substantially weaker than past Japanese cabinets, the factional
25X1 Approved For ReleasSeECR0EET/A~-- 6I -RDPOS BOO! 00 -
 SECRET
Approve or Release 2005/0 RDP83?100R000200180001-5
conservatives would make much difference.
balance is typical, and there are no tough Diet fights coming
up with the possible exception of the budget interpellatiorrs:
None of the analysts feel a coalition government in Japan is
imminent, and several doubted a coalition between moderates and
4. Indochina -- Analysts continued to express concern over
the influx of Kampuchean refugees in Thailand. One estimate now
projects that the total could reach 1.5 million. Everyone was
impressed by Vietnamese efforts to consolidate their hold on
Western Kampuchea. There was less agreement over the role the
Chinese might ultimately play and the ability of the Thais to
control the refugees and border area. Difficulties associated
with managing the refugee population which covers armed Kampuchean
resistance elements that are conducting cross border operations
against the SRV, and the creation of a Thai-Vietnamese frontier
should the SRV gain effective control of Kampuchea raises policy
implications which go beyond supplying food and medicine. Analysts
think the danger of SRV forays into Thailand aimed at neutralizing
Kampuchean resistance have increased, but they are hard-pressed to
project the tactics and intensity of those attacks. Several OSI
analysts are now convinced reports that the SRV has used chemicals
against Kampuchean forces are true and a collection program has
been initiated to get proof.
Approved For ReleaEECRET/01/06. CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 ~vrv
Approve or Release 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Distribution:
1 each - DCI
DDCI
ER
DD/NFA
NIO/W
NI0/Ch-EAP
(w/Cover Memo)
NIO/Ch-EAP
NSC Coordinator
ES/PB
SRP
NI0/NESA
NIO/GPF
NIO/AF
NI0/USSR-EE
NI0/PE
NIO/SP
NIO/LA
NI0/WE
NIO/NP
NIO/SS
D/OCO
DD/OC0
D/OCR
D/OER
D/OGCR
D/OPA
D/OSI
D/OWI
D/OIA
D/OSR
NFAC/RES/RSG
OER/EAP
OPA/EA
C/DDO/EA
25X1
IN i.U
FBIS
OIA/LFD
OSR/EAP
NFAC/REG
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 THE DIRECTOR OF
I(iAj FI I"M~005/01/06: CIA-RDP> 100R000200180001-5
Herewith is the formal letter from
State requesting the CIA study on
Soviet activities in the Southwest Pacific.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved For Release 20051a1106r IA-RDP83B00100R0002001
THE DIREC OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 7 December 1979
NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR
The NSC paper and our comments
(Tab B) and the Memorandum on the
Refugee Food Problem (Tab F) will
be provided over the weekend.
pproved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R00020018
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Approved For lease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B0010 000200180001-5
SECRET NFAC 6623-79
X1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessmentfc-~
FROM : I
National Intelligence Officer
for China-EAP
X1
SUBJECT SCC Meeting on Kampuchean/Thailand
Security Situation
1. Action Requested: Review talking points and related
materials covering issues to be discussed at the SCC meeting
scheduled for 10 December at 1000 hours.
2. Background: Concern has been building up at high levels
of the US Government over the problems posed for US policy by
the vast influx of Kampuchean refugees into Thailand and by the
impending Vietnamese offensive in Western Kampuchea intended to
seal off the Thai border and eliminate "once and for all" anti-
Vietnamese resistance forces, principally those controlled by
Pol Pot but including other lesser forces as well. As you know,
we issued an Alert Memorandum on this subject on 7 December.
Specifically, its message is that as Vietnamese pressure on the
Thai builds, the Thai government will turn to the US for support,
possibly invoking the Manila Pact, and also to the Chinese. If
in the Thai view neither US or Chinese support is sufficient,
they may feel impelled to seek an accommodation with Vietnam.
The SCC meeting was called to address these concerns, to review
all the political and military factors involved including a
possible Chinese role, to discuss the refugee situation and steps
being taken to provide relief, and to make recommendations for
US policy responses.
I
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON DEC 99
Derived from Multiple
Approved For Release 2005/0A ,FIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 SECRET
Approved For lease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83BOOl 000200180001-5
3. The agenda for the SCC meeting is attached. As indicated,
you will be expected to address: a) the question of the prospects
for Thailand/SRV hostility and, b) along with State, the Chinese
role. Your talking points on a) follow along the lines of our Alert
Memorandum, but go beyond this memorandum to outline some of the
constraints operating on Hanoi which would cause it to hold back
from launching heavy attacks on Thailand, as opposed to conducting
relatively minor border penetrations in hot pursuit of Kampuchean
units. (State, in fact, took a footnote in the Alert Memorandum
noting that there are as yet no signs that Vietnam intends to attack
Thailand.)
25
6. Under agenda item 6, "New Approaches to Kampuchean Relief,"
there is a reference to a safe haven concept. State's thought is
to get the Vietnamese to agree on the establishment of zones in
Approved For Release 2005/01/Q? jp yO-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 SECRET
Approved Forlease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B001 W 00200180001-5
Agenda for SCC on Kampuchea/Thailand: Security Situation
Monday, 10 December 1979
1. Prospects for Thailand/SRV Hostility (CIA brief)
2. Nature of US Security Commitment to Thailand
(State lead, also DoD)
3. US Response to Additional Thai Request for US
Military Assistance (DoD)
4. Chinese Role (CIA/State)
5. Status of Kampuchean Relief Efforts (State)
- Thru Phnom Penh & Thailand
6. New Approaches to Kampuchean Relief (State)
- Talk re air drop (ZB's idea)
25X
8. Recommendations
Approved For Release 2005ft00 RC A:.f2DP83B00100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved For* ease 2005/CRIA-RDP83B001c00200180001-5
BRIEFING NOTES
KAMPUCHEA-VIETNAM-THAILAND
Vietnamese troops will soon begin large-scale sweep operations
along the Thai-Kampuchea border in an attempt to eliminate Pol Pot and
resistance this dry season. Vietnam has score 20 divisions and as many
as 200,000 troops in Kampuchea, and one-third are near the Thai border.
Vietnamese and Thai gunners have exchanged artillery fire, and a Viet-
namese battalion recently entered Thai territory on its own initiative
while in "lot pursuit" of Pol Pot guerrillas. There is tenuous - evidence.
that larger Vietnamese forces could be preparing to drive across the
border to attack Pol Pot bases and sanctuaries in Thailand, and this
lead to serious clashes with Thai units stationed near the frontier. The
eight Thai regiments in the area are no match for the Vietnamese forces.
CHINA-VIETNAM-LAOS
China does not appear to be preparing for a major "second-lesson"
against Vietnam, but Chinese troops snipe at Vietnamese patrols, Chinese
aircraft overfly the frontier, and logistical activity continues as China
keeps the pressure on the Vietnamese. China has strengthened its forces
opposite Vietnam but the 10 divisions and 150,000 or so troops are far
fewer than were there in February. Moreover, Vietnam has massively aug-
mented its border forces over the past six months and now has 18 to 26
divisions and 200,000 to 250,000 troops in the North. The Vietnamese
should be able to handle any Chinese thrust into Vietnam, but they could
not stop an attack into northern Laos.
Approved For Release 2 SEGR : CIA-RDP B00100R000200180001-5
X1 F -1 +
[l 25
 Approved Forlease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B001,000200180001-5
xi
Military Forces and Refugee Concentrations: Kampuchea
Vietnamese
Pol Pot
Thai
(on border)
20 Divisions
200,000 Troops
12-14 Divisions/Brigades
30,000 Troops
6 Regiments
12,000 Troops
South
China
Sea
Refugee Camps
? I 000 persons
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 Approved For#lease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B001I 0002001 80001-5
xi
Military Forces: Sino-Vietnamese Border
Military Forces
China 10 Division Equivalents
150,000 Troops
Vietnam 18-26 Divisions*
200,000 - 250,000 Troops
?8 Divisions unlocated
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 NID
Approved Fo0lease 200 /0 Alden Rl1981001( 00200180001-5
Top Secret
KAMPUCHEA: Harsh Vietnamese Policies
The Vietnarnese appear to be pursuing policies designed to
starve or-drive out Kampucheans living in areas controZZed by the
Heng Samrin puppet government.
The distribution of international relief stocks to
Kampucheans is being limited, and Red Cross and UN offi-
cials say that large quantities of undistributed food are
piling up in Phnom Penh. Other obstacles that the Viet-
25)
25
relief supplies for their own use. I 25X
Refugees recently arriving in Thailand report that
the Vietnamese have been mining rice paddies, forbidding
access to fields, and killing Kampucheans attempting to
gather ripening rice. Vietnamese forces apparently have
also been taking food out of the countr and confiscating
tional relief personnel in Kampuchea, and curtailing
movement of relief officials already in the country.
namese have placed in the way of relief efforts include
refusing to permit trucking of supplies from Thailand,
limiting air access, restricting the number of interna-
Some 400,000 to 500,000 refugees have fled to the
Thai border area in recent months--the highest total ever.
Refugees once came primarily from western Kampuchea, but
many are, now fleeing Heng Samrin - controlled areas in
the central and eastern provinces. The refugees report
that the same deteriorating food and health conditions
exist in those provinces as in the areas controlled by
Pol Pot's forces in the west. There are also reports
that ethnic Chinese are being segregated and forced out
of the country. II
Expulsion of large numbers of Kampucheans will fa-
cilitate Vietnamese efforts to gain total control of
Kampuchea and to establish a long-term presence. The
presence of Vietnamese agricultural brigades, instruc-
tions to Vietnamese military cadre that they would be in
Kampuchea for 10 to 15 years, and pervasive Vietnamese
control over governmental functions in occupied areas
are further indications of Hanoi's intent.
- CIA, DIA, NS.4 -
5 To Secret
cem er
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
25X
25X
I 25X
 N1D
Approved Fo0lease 205//1%' A-R 3B001 p000200180001-5
?
VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA-THAILAND: Border Situation
Thailand seems to be adopting a firmer defensive posture in re-
gard to the f r.tin tuning place in ~:~mr~chea, and Vietnam is send-
ing reinforcements tlo the Thai border urea. 0 25X
troop movements in Kampuchea.
Vietnamese and Thai forces continue to exchange ar-
tillery fire across the Thai-Kampuchean border. Thai
reconnaissance units continue to monitor Vietnamese
technicians--also are building at least one helicopter
pad near the border, presumably to support helicopter
reinforce divisions already near the Thai frontier.
Vietnamese forces--possibly assisted by Soviet
Vietnamese forces are preparing for larger clearing
operations against Pol Pot's resistance forces and other 25X
anti-Vietnamese resistance groups in western Kampuchea.
Units from Vietnam's 4th Corps are moving westward to
severe shortages of food, medicine, and munitions.
Pol Pot's units in all parts of Kampuchea are con-
tinuing to evade the Vietnamese. Democratic Kampuchean
guerrillas isolated east of the Mekong River since last
December may be withdrawing westward to sanctuary areas
north of the Cardamom Mountains where adequate supplies
are available. The two divisions of Pol Pot's forces
operating in northeastern Kampuchea have experienced
3 Top Secret
2 :1ovemher 1 ()7()
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 NID
Approved For lease 2005N 1 A-RDP93B001 p000200180001-5
THAILAND-US: Security Commitment
Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak plans to ask the US to clarify
and publicize its commitment to defend Thailand in the event of a
25X
Thai officials believe a major Vietnamese incursion
is increasingly likely, and they fear that Hanoi's
perception of a lack of US resolve to defend Thailand
could encourage such an attack. According to a well-
placed source, Kriangsak evidently believes a strong
public US warning along the lines of US actions and
statements following the death of South Korean President
Pak would be the best deterrent. 25X
Kriangsak's heightened concern about an invasion
follows reports of increased cross-border shelling by
the Vietnamese during the past week. On Sunday,
Vietnamese antiaircraft artillery allegedly fired on
an unarmed Thai reconnaissance plane. The Thai Air
Force has been ordered to retaliate in response to future
attacks on reconnaissance flights. Kriangsak has also
instructed the Army to respond with 105-mm artillery to
any new shelling of Thai territory. 25X
Vietnam publicly maintains that its forces will
not intrude upon Thai territory. In an interview on
Tuesday, Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach claimed
that Thailand had pledged not to aid Pol Pot and that
the Vietnamese would not resort to hot pursuit. He de-
clined to comment on whether he considered these as-
surances reciprocal. 0 25X
Top Secret
I T97)
November
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
25X
 0
NID
Approved Fo0lease 265/iFwf- WRl5P9:9B001 p000200180001-5
Top Secret
X1
X1
41
THAILAND-KAMPUCHEA: Potential Refugee Flood
A massive new influx of refugees into Thailand that would over-
whelm Thai refugee facilities and severely test Bangkok's recently
announced lenient policies toward Khmer refugees may be in the off-
ing,
Reports from various sources estimate there are at
least 300,000 and possibly as many as 750,000 refugees
along the Thai border inside Kampuchea. They are fleeing
a near-total lack of food in western Kampuchea. Contin-
ued Vietnamese military operations in the border area
would probably drive them into Thailand.
Some 150,000 to 200,000 refugees are believed to be
in groups inside Thailand but not in organized refugee
camps. About 50,000 Khmer refugees are in UN-operated
refugee camps, in addition to 145,000 from Laos and 7,900
The rapid rise in the number of refugees may quickly
overwhelm Thai support facilities. Thai and United Na-
tions refugee officials have plans for makeshift holding
centers with a maximum capacity of 300,000 persons. Con-
struction has only just begun on some; none are finished.
The main center, planned to accommodate 200,000 refugees,
h
mot
--- - -
n
been
A massive refugee influx now would test the confi-
dence expressed by Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak in his
nation's ability to deal with refugees "in the future"
and would aggravate longstanding ill feelings between
Thai and Khmer along the border. Some 88,000 Thai living
near the border have already been forced from their homes
by unsettled conditions. Antagonism will rise if further
military activity and more refugees continue to dispossess
Thai residents. -CIA, DIA, NSA-
Top Secret
ovember 1979
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
25X
25X
25
25
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 Approved P giRelease 20
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
28 November 1979
Airdrop of Food Supplies to Kampuchea
A unilateral airdrop of food to concentrations of
refugees in western Kampuchea would provide a dramatic
demonstration of US humanitarian and moral commitment. A
successful drop along the border, such as in the area
north of Sisophon west of Provincial Highway 69 to Phum
Thma Puok, would ensure that a significant amount of supplies
reached needy individuals who are deliberately being
neglected by the Vietnamese and the puppet Heng Samrin
government. An airdrop would eliminate the need to work
through the Phnom Penh authorities. Channeling aid through
the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea would
imply defacto recognition and also allow the Vietnamese to
use aid as a weapon in their campaign to bring the country
under control.
A unilateral airdrop would be vehemently opposed by
Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea, however,
and could have serious political and military consequences.
An operation to supply concentrations of the most seriously
stricken refugees would directly threaten efforts to suppress
resistance by denying food to Kampucheans outside Vietnamese
control. The region in greatest need of relief is also
This pa er, based on information as of 28 November 1979, was
prepared by East Asia Pacific Division, Office of
Political Analysis, with contributions from the Office of Geographic
and Cartographic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the
National Photographic Interpretation Center. Comments and queries
should be addressed to the Chief of the Southeaot Asian Branch, OPA,
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
ARD METHODS INVOLVED
Approved For Release 2@Q.5/O1 &x U -RDP8 100100R000200180001-5
 Approved Fpr..,Release 2010?Y1RQc;jC14- 0% R000200180001-5
S
the area most actively contested militarily at present. An
airdrop--or any direct relief effort in this part of the
country--is certain to be regarded as a deliberate attempt
to aid anti-Vietnamese forces.
The Target Area
Some 30,000 Vietnamese and.Heng Samrin forces are
stationed in and around the area. All three Vietnamese
divisions there should have some antiaircraft artillery, but
the precise location of these highly mobile weapons is not
known. -Such artillery has been reported at Sisophon and
Nimit as well as Samrong to the northeast. The Vietnamese
have. air surveillance radar installations at Battambang and
Siem Reap to detect aircraft crossing the border. We do
not know whether they have radar-guided antiaircraft artillery.
Radar units at Siem Reap, Battambang, and possibly Sisophon
are of a type associated with surface-to-air missiles, and
SAM-2's and SAM-3's have been reported in the Battambang and
Siem Reap areas. Vietnamese ground units may also be equipped
with shoulder-fired SAM-7's. The appearance of US aircraft
over Indochina would certainly elicit a strong response from
the Vietnamese. Cargo planes would need fighter escort, and
loses of US planes and personnel from hostile fire would be
likely.
Who Gets the Food?
Troops on either side would not hesitate to interdict
air-dropped supplies intended for refugees or to seize any
food which unarmed civilians might be able to reach first.
The probability of violent clashes over the supplies would
be high. In a largely forested environment, waste would be
great, and there could be no accounting for distribution.
-2-
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RnR83HQ0100R000200180001-5
Top Secretl II
2U1
 Top Secret A.,
Approved Fore ease 2005/01/06: CIA-R 000200180001-5
Dropping small, scattered packages of food rather than large
pallet loads would increase chances that the food would reach
the civilian population. Given the high likelihood of hostility
prospects for continuing an airdrop over an extended period
are poor. The odds on success and survival would rapidly
diminish after the first few sorties, however.
An alternative and potentially more effective approach
would be to make use of the non-Communist Khmer Serei re-
sistance groups that control many of the refugee camps in
the western border region. These forces have fairly easy
access to markets in Thailand and claim to have distributed
some relief on their own already. They could provide a
conduit for food at many., points along the border, fulfilling
the requirement for an operation of limited geographic
scope without aircraft. Overt US involvement could thus
be kept to a minimum. Nevertheless, any aid program trespassing
on Kampuchea runs the risk of inspiring Vietnamese reprisals
against the intended recipients.
Political Implications
The Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea
insists that it alone must distribute all aid. Through
conscious design and inherent .ineptitude, relief is not
reaching the people who need it most. An airdrop in the
western border area might solve some of the humanitarian
problems, but the Phnom Penh regime will regard such an
operation as a violation of its sovereignty.
In a backlash to such unilateral US action, the Heng
Saririn government could stiffen its terms for accepting aid
which now is being pressed upon it by a variety of international
agencies. Aware of this possibility, aid organizations
patiently negotiating with Phnom Penh might also oppose the
uninvited humanitarian gesture.
Top Secret
0
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved For4eas%*,@W1/06 : CIA-RDP83B0010600200180001-5
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.20505
10 DEC 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbignew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT Vietnamese Starvation Policy in Kampuchea
The three items attached are in response to your
request of 6 December 1979 for a discussion of the
Vietnamese Starvation Policy in Kampuchea and Soviet
Support of that Policy.
S/
Frank C. Carlucci
Attachments: 3
As Stated
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON DEC85
Derived from Multiple
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 L ~i' `, ~ 25X1
Approved Foreease2005 A-RDP83B00l0S002O0f80 -5
8 December 1979
SUBJECT: Harsh Vietnamese Policies in Kampuchea
1. Since their occupation of Kampuchea, Socialist Republic of Vietnam
(SRV) policies have been to control food supplies to the civilian population
and to allow a refugee movement to Thailand.
2. The current constraints to international relief efforts to distribute
food to the Kampucheans are a furtherance of earlier actions to deny food.
Rice, draft animals, and livestock, as well as dismantled machinery and
irrigation pumps, were observed being shipped into Vietnam between January
and April. No food rations were distributed after April and the people were
left to forage or exist on the small amounts of food they could grow quickly.
In October, SRV troops were confiscating rice obtained in house-to-house
searches in the western areas of the country and were shipping draft animals
out of the country. Recent Kampuchean refugees to Thailand claim that the
Vietnamese are mining rice paddies, forbidding access to fields, and killing
Kampucheans attempting to gather.ripening rice.
3. The distribution of international relief supplies has been limited
by the Vietnamese to selected people in and around Phnom Penh; government
cadres and workers have received minimal quantities of food. The relief
agencies have been hindered in their efforts to mount a food aid program by
SRV/PRK refusal to open a truck route from Thailand; by allowing air access
only to Phnom Penh; by restricting the number of international relief personnel
in Kampuchea (ICRC/UNICEF are permitted only 11 persons in-country); and by
curtailing movement of the relief officials already in the country. According
to the ICRC officials, there are serious discrepancies between the amounts of
food aid delivered and the amount actually distributed.
4. The increased flow of refugees to the Thai border camps in the past
few months attests to the miserable conditions affecting the majority of the
Khmers. Some 725,000 people are in the Thai camps and most of them have
arrived since October (see photos G, H). Refugees once came primarily from
western Kampuchea, but many are now fleeing Heng Samrin-controlled areas in
the central and eastern provinces. The refugees report that the same deter-
iorating food and health conditions exist in those provinces as in the areas
controlled by Pol Pot's forces in the west. No harassment b SRV troops is
reported by the refugees as long as war zones are avoided. II
5. Most of the Khmers in Kampuchea are clustered around Phnom Penh and
in camps surrounding the cities and towns east of the Mekong (photos A through
The people are denied access to housing in the cities and are consequently
forced to live in makeshift shelters or flee to Thailand. Refugees from these
25X
25X
25X
25X
25X
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-F2DP83B00100R000200180001-5
 U; %~Ltv RL I
Approved For ease 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B0010 0020
camps indicate that although they had heard that food aid was available,
they knew of no one who had actually received the food. While some food
is undoubtedly available to people concentrated around the cities, people
in the countryside apparently have no food. The choice for them is to
either head towards Thailand, locate in a camp where the Vietnamese are
supplying food, or starve. Furthermore, the lack of basic farming provisions,
the disrepair and breaks in irrigation dikes, and insecurity in the country-
side make prospects bleak for the individual farmer to be able to grow enough
1 3W
6. Harsh Vietnamese policies toward the Khmers are probably designed
to facilitate efforts to gain total control over Kampuchea and to establish
a long-term presence. By restricting the remaining Khmers to camps around
the cities, the Vietnamese are able to exert better control over the population.
The Vietnamese recruit farmers from the camps to work on collective farms as
part of production solidarity teams, a hated concept to the Khmers after the
four years of Pol Pot control. The presence of Vietnamese agricultural brigades
and instructions to Vietnamese military cadre that they would be in Kampuchea
for 10 to 15 years are further indications of Hanoi's intent. 25X
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved Foraease 2005 C - DP83B0010 -W ------------
xi
xi
xi
SUBJECT: The Soviets and Kampuchean Relief
1. The Soviets are supporting the Vietnamese in their efforts
to deny food aid to the opponents of the Heng Samrin regime in
Kampuchea and have been unyielding in their opposition to the notion
of establishing a "land bridge" relief effort through Thailand. US
and other Western demarches to the Soviets to encourage greater
Hanoi/Phnom Penh cooperation with international relief efforts have
met the rebuff that the issue is an internal affair that must be
handled with the Phnom Penh authorities. The Soviets are somewhat
more sensitive than the Vietnamese to the negative international
repercussions of Vietnamese policy toward Kampuchea, however, and
will find it more difficult to oppose or frustrate the "safehaven"
concept. But ;Moscow is unlikely to approve any U`T Security Council
mandate to establish a permanent UN presence along the Thai-Kampuchean
border.
2. Graphic evidence of the Soviet support of the Vietnamese
food denial policy was provided by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in a
conversation with Counselor Nemetz at the State Department on
15 November. Dobrynin said that although the "Kampuchean and
Vietnamese" were Marxists they had their own brand of " Oriental
Communism'1 and would do things in their own way. Dobrynin emphasized
that we would have to accept the fact that there was a war on, and
that the Vietnamese and Phnom Penh forces would do nothing to strengthen
the remnants of the Pol Pot forces, even if this meant suffering for
thousands. II (See State Cable #298308, dated 17 November 1979.)
3. The Soviets are, of course, not opposed to international
relief for the Heng Samrin regime. In fact, they probably are being
truthful when they maintain that they pressed the Vietnamese and their
Kampuchean allies to accept international relief. For one thing,
whatever the West provides, the Soviets themselves would not have to.
For another, acceptance of some international relief might mitigate
the damage to broader Soviet and Vietnamese interests in Asia caused
by the notoriety of Hanoi's food denial policies. Finally, there is
the chance that cooperation with international relief efforts might
enhance the Heng Samrin regime's international standing and result
in additional recognitions by other governments.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 X1
X1
Approved For a ease 206
RDP83B 010OR000200180001-5
4. Moscow has responded to international criticism of its own
indifference to the suffering of the Kampuchean people by providing
some details on the extent of its aid to Kampuchea thus far this year.
The most detailed account was contained in a TASS broadcast in
English on 21 November, echoing a Phnom Penh claim that the Soviets
had provided about $100 million in economic assistance that included
159,000 tons of food. US embassies in Moscow and Bangkok question
whether Soviet food deliveries of this magnitude have reached Kampuchea.
5. The International Red Cross (ICRC) chief in Phnon Penh told
Ambassador Abramowitz on 3 November that as of that date Moscow had
delivered only 18,000 tons of focdstuffs and 50 trucks for the Kampuchean
relief effort -- a figure consistent with what we know of Soviet
shipping to Kampuchea. Soviet relief supplies have been entering the
country via the ports of Kompon Som and Phnom Penh
and the airport at Phnom Penh.
6. Activity at Kompong Som has picked up at recent days; between
5 December and 8 December five additional cargo ships have arrived.
One of these was identified as a Soviet "Skulptor" class roll-on/
roll-off ship carrying some 100 vehicles/pieces of equipment. No
personnel or military equipment was discernible in the port area.
Some half dozen Soviet freighters have called at Kompong Som over the
previous three months. Moscow has also dispatched dockworkers from
four Soviet Far Eastern ports to Kompong Som to help unload supplies
X1
TOP SECRET
25X
25X
25X
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 r
Approved Forlease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B001019 00200180001-5
SUBJECT: The Agricultural Situation in Kampuchea
1. Information current as of late October-early November indicates
that very little land in Kampuchea is currently being cropped and that
agricultural activity of any kind is at a virtual standstill. The absence
of agricultural activity in key cropping areas, at a time when the main rice
crop should be maturing, offers convincing evidence that Vietnamese and
Heng Samrin government statements concerning the amount of land currently
planted to rice are grossly exaggerated.
2. About nine percent of Kampuchea's farmable land -- which can be
immediately planted to crops -- now is being cultivated.* About one-third
of this cultivated land is planted to rice and another third possibly growing
rice. The remaining land is either devoted to other crops or is in a non-
growth stage of agricultural activity, such as harvesting. In aggregate
terms this suggests that land now planted to rice amounts to between 65,000
and 112,000 hectares -- far less than the 550,000 to 570,000 hectares claimed
by the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin government officials. In more normal times,
approximately 1.1 to 1.2 million hectares would be in rice at this time of
the year.
3. Signs of normal agricultural activity are minimal or absent throughout
the country: there are few draft animals available; irrigation canals and
drainage ditches are often clogged with silt or mud; and dike walls have broken
down. In places where crops are being grown, they are almost always limited
to fields in or immediately adjacent to villages while more distant fields are
left uncultivated.
4. Regionally, agricultural activity is most extensive in the southeastern
portion of Kampuchea where control by the Heng Sainrin government and Vietnamese
forces is best established. Even here probably only 12 percent of the farmable
land is being cultivated. Near Phnom Penh and in the area south of the capital
only about 5 percent of the farmable land is cropped. The situation is worse
in the northwestern portion of the country where Vietnamese forces are still
fighting with Pol Pot's guerillas and Free Khmer forces. Here less than
3 percent of the farmable land is being cultivated.
5. Since the main Kampuchean rice crop is normally harvested during
the December-February period, the small amount of land now in cultivation
indicates that only a very meager harvest can be expected. This would provide
enough rice to last 2 to 5 weeks -- supplies that probably would be consumed
*Farmable land constitutes only about 65 percent of all land that might 25X
be cropped. The remaining 35 percent consists of fields not readily available
for planting because of flooding and damage to dikes, drainage ditches, and
irrigation caAp~foved For Release 2005/01/06 : CI -RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved Forleae'101O'1/06 q
"' sufficient for 3.5 to 5.5 months.
All of the above paragraphs are classified TOP SECRET I
as soon as they come off the fields. Using the crop area figures claimed
by the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin government officials would provide rice
Approved For Release 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 proved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001=5,-'I
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence
Attached for your information are my
notes from the 10 December 1979 SCC meeting
on Thailand/Kampuchea Security Situation.
cc: DD/NFA
DD/'NFAC
DDO
NIO/China-EAP
Distribution
1 each - Addressee
1 - NSC/CS
12'- NIO/China-EAP
1 - C/DDO/EA
1 - NFAC Reg
THE DIREWJR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 12 December 1979
proved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved Foelease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83BOO VIM 2UMM 1-5"
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
5X1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Publications Review Board
THROUGH Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Assistant ationa Intelligence Officer
for China
25X1
25X1
25X1
SUBJECT Request to Submit Article for Publication
1. I request permission to submit for publication the atta
2. When approved,
intends to submit the articles for
publication in China Quarterl .
3. The versions of these articles herewith submitted were produced
based on research from open sources in this country, Taiwan, Japan, and
Hong Kong. They were prepared prior investigation of
classified material in Agency archives. None of the material is
therefore classified.
presume the Agency as facilitating work on this project and he may indicate Agency funding of the project. He will append, if appropriate,
the standard disclaimer indicating the views expressed are his own and
Attachments (3)
As Stated
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved r Release 2005/01/06 'CIA-F2DP83B00100 R000200180001-5
0
SUBJECT: Request to Submit Article for Publication
5X1
I have reviewed the attached articles, to the best of my
knowledge have found them to be unclassified, and approve them
for publication.
25X1
25X1
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
r? :s tEc 1979
Date
2 6 DEC 1979
ZI Deputy Director, National Foreign Date
Assessment
Distribution
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - C/NIC
2 - NIO/China-EAP
1 - C/PRB
1 - NFAC reg
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 pprove
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Dear Ty:
Thanks for the materials on SALT II, which I have
read with interest (and agree with in many respects).
I would be happy to hear from you concerning further
discussions of issues of concern to us all.
Also, let me turn your kind offer to be helpful
around -- please call on us for any assistance which
we may be able to render.
It was good to meet you, and best regards.
Sincerely,
Mr. Tidal W. McCoy
Assistant for National Security Affairs
Office of Senator E.J. Garn
5121 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 J. (JAKE) GAR pproved F.elease 2005/O' %O6-_ClA-RDP83BOO,R000200180001-5
UTAH COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
5121 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING BANKING. HOUSING AND
TELEPHONE: [phone] URBAN AFFAIRS
JEFF M. BINGHAM
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
*JCnzfea ,State's ,Senate INTELLIGENCE
December 6, 1979
5X1
25X1
na Intelligence Officer
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC
0
The program on "The Future of Sino-Soviet Relations" was
most interesting, and I enjoyed the opportunity to visit
with you. The kind of thinking represented by the dis-
cussion is most useful to those of us who are running
around "putting out fires".
I hope to call you soon for a lunch and chat. If I or
Senator Garn can be of help to you.,., or the Agency, please
call upon us.
For your information, I am enclosing some materials on
the SALT II Treaty.
With best wishes for a Happy Holiday Season.
Sincerely,
Tidal 14. /McCoy
Assis a t for
Natio l Security Affairs
TM/nf
Enclosure
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved =Release 2005/0f/06: CIA-RDP83B001QOR000200180001-5
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
q. '
National Intelligence Officers
NOTE FOR: Michel Oksenberg
NSC Staff
14 December 1979
Attached are the documents we discussed
this morning.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 w
POUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, Initials
building, Agency/Po ,
(Coordination
REMARKS
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)
prove For Release 2005/01/06: IA-RDtr _
U S GOVERNMENT PRI NG OFFICE: 1979 -281-18411 FPMR (41 CF
ti
'
dIbI2&18303?-5
101-11.206
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 15 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 SECRET NFAC 6818-79
Approved Fo.lease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83BOOl 000200180001-5
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer
for China-EAP
SUBJECT SCC Meeting on Kampuchean/Thailand
Security Situation, 18 December 1979
1. Action Requested: Review talking points and related
materials covering issues to be discussed at the SCC meeting,
which is scheduled for 18 December at 1000 hours.
2. Background: This SCC meeting is a follow-up to the
10 December meeting on the same subject. At the 10 December
session and at a subsequent Working Group discussion on 11
December a number of issues requiring further action were
identified and reflected in the Agenda for 18 December.
3. You will be asked to provide an assessment of the latest
developments, and State will also be asked to comment. Your
talking points are at Tab A.
25X
ORIGINAL CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON DEC 99
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 Approved For lease 2005/01TCIA-RDP83B001W 00200180001-5
25X
5. The rest of the agenda deals with means of deterring
greater Vietnamese pressure on Thailand, as follows:
a. Development of safehaven concept. State is asking
a number of countries to make unilateral declaration favoring
safehavens into which refugees could be moved without fear
of Vietnamese attack, and to gain Waldheim's support as
well. State continues to favor as a step toward safehavens
the disarmament of all Kampuchean resistance forces located
in refugee camps north of Aranyapratet (the Pol Pot forces
to the south would not be touched because of the "Chinese
connection"), but appears to overlook the fact that among
these units are a growing number trained by the Thai with
Chinese backing. "Neither the Thai nor the Chinese want to
impair the ability of resistance forces to block the
Vietnamese from consolidating control over Kampuchea. There
are, though, some armed units led by people best described
as "crazies."
b. Increasing flow of food supplies into Kampuchea.
State will talk about relief efforts inside Kampuchea and
through' Thailand. There may also be discussion of a proposal
to airdrop supplies to refugees inside Kampuchea or send
high visibility truck convoys through Thailand to the border.
OGCR has provided you with imagery and descriptions of improved
port and transportation facilities in Kampuchea which could
improve distribution of relief supplies. Soviet help has been
evident, e.g., in providing trucks. However, it is important
to note that if these improvements could benefit the distribution
of refugee aid, they will.also strengthen Vietnam's logistical
support for operations against the DK and other Kampuchean
resistance forces, including those based in Thailand. At Tab D
are the OGCR items and an OCO item pointing out the logistical
importance of these same developments to Vietnamese military
operations.
c. US responses to Thai requests for aid. State will
review what is being done, which involves stepped-up military
assistance as well as economic help.
Approved For Release 2005/01IMCTA-RDP83B00100 R000200180001-5
 SECRET
Approved For*lease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83BOO1OW 00200180001-5
d. Approaches to Hanoi. State has been maintaining
intermittent contact with the Vietnamese in New York and
elsewhere and may bring the SCC participants up-to-date.
e. Approaches to the PRC. State and Defense will
discuss what position on Thailand/Kampuchea/Vietnam, if
any, Secretary Brown should take on his visit to China.
f. Pressures on Moscow. The President has sent a
letter to Brezhnev concerning the "dangerous situation
which now exists on the Thai-Kampuchean border," which
points out the grave threat to peace posed by Vietnamese
incursions into Thailand, notes that the US could not
remain indifferent to an expansion of the conflict due
to our close relationship to Thailand and obligations
under the Manila Pact, and urges Brezhnev to use his
influence with the Vietnamese to ensure that their troops
do not again violate Thai territory. This letter is at
Tab E. State may review the possible Soviet reaction
and any further actions contemplated.
g. Approaches to ASEAN. We have been in consultation
with the ASEAN countries to help keep them united and
their spines stiffened against Vietnam. An ASEAN Foreign
Minister's declaration of 14 December indicates they are
still holding together on the joint demand for a withdrawal
of all "foreign forces" from Kampuchea. They have also
called for a UN team to visit the Thai-Kampuchean border
area and for an international conference on Kampuchea.
Foreign Minister Rithauddeen of Malaysia will visit Hanoi
to discuss resolution of the situation. However, the
Indonesians are wavering (they fear China more than Vietnam)
and there is some pessimism among other members over Pol Pot's
chances of survival coupled with some feeling that Pol Pot
should be replaced by a leader more acceptable to world and
Kampuchean opinion -- a move opposed by the Chinese. State
will discuss. At Tab F is an OPA item on this subject.
h. Other US Actions. Defense will review our military
assets in the region and possible steps to improve our
position.
6. The meeting will close with recommendations and decisions
on further moves to deal with this situation.
Approved For Release 2005/01 pAA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 SECRET
Approved For1lease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B00l 00200180001-5
7. To recapitualte, your talking points and other materials
for the SCC meeting are as follows:
Tab A -- Talking Points keyed to Agenda Item 1.
Tab B -- NSC Paper on Kampuchea/Thailand Situation
with our Comments
Tab E -- Text of Presidential Letter to Brezhnev
Tab F -- ASEAN Foreign Minister's Statement and OPA
Commentary
Tab G -- Minutes of the 10 December SCC Meeting.
Tab H -- OSR Conclusions
All Portions of this
Document are SECRET.
25X
25X
Approved For Release 2005/01/&6C:R IBA-RDP83B00100 R000200180001-5
 Approved Folease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B001( 00200180001-5
Distribution
Copy
1 -
DCI
2 -
DDCI
3 -
ER
4 -
NSC Coordinator
5 -
DD/NFA
6 -
NIO/China-EAP
Chrono
7 -
NIO/China-EAP
File
8 - NFAC Reg
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 Approved For lease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B001 00200180001-5
SEA i
Agenda for 18 December SCC Meting on Thailand-Cambodia Situat-4on
1. Assessment of latest developments (CIA and State) (U)
2. Means of deterring development of greater pressure on
Thailand
a. Development of safJhaven concept (State)
b. Increasing flow of. food supplies into Cambodia (State)
co US responses to Thai requests for aid (State)
d. Approaches to Hanoi (State)
e. Approaches to the PRC (State and Defense)
f. Pressures on Moscow (State)
g. Approaches to Aaea~ (State)
h. Other US Actions (Defense' (S)
3. Recosnaendations (U) I
SEd proved For Release 2005//6 CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
v ew on December 14. VV I
 25X
Approved Fo*lease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B0010 00200180001-5
TALKING POINTS SCC MEETING
1. The situation along the Thai./Karnpuchean border remains tense as the
Vietnamese continue preparations for their offensive in western
Kampuchea expected to begin 22 December.
-- According to intercepted corrinunications, the Vietnamese plan to
send reconnaissance patrols into Thailand to identify resistance
concentrations and supply routes.
DK headquarters has been
moved deep inside Thailand.
25X
-- Thai units in the border area have serious manpower and supply
problems and could not counter a serious Vietnamese attack.
-- The Thai would like the UN to station civilian teams in the
refugee enclaves in hopes this would help deter a Vietnamese attack.
II. An unconfirmed report
states that Khieu 25X
Samphan has replaced Pol Pot as Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea.
-- If true, such a change would be cosmetic only intended to facilitate
efforts to form a united front and to make the DK more palatable to
international supporters such as ASEAN.
-- The ASEAN foreign ministers reconfirmed their diplomatic support
of the DK at a meeting last Thursday, but behind the scenes, sane
,ASEAN leaders are suggesting it is time to consider alternatives such
as Sihanouk or another non-Communist leader.
III. Refugee reports confirm earlier indications that the Vietnamese are
using food as a weapon to pacify Kampuchea.
-- The Vietnamese distribute minimal food even in areas they control
and prevent shipments to other areas.
-- Refugees believe supply--7 ire being diverted to Vietnamese military
unimproved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved For lease 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B0011 00200180001-5
NSC Paper has not yet been
received.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved For ease 2Od5/d1/06': CI
Relief Aid to Kampuchea
D
10000200180001-57-0 b
The ports of Phnom Penh and Kompong Som, and the Phnom Penh
ly entry points open to western relief assistance
Approximately 10 ships have called at Kompong Som
since early December, and the amount of equipment in open storage
has increased markedly. Most of the ships have been Soviet freighters,
and much of the cargo appears to be trucks, small vehicles, and other
bulk items. Ships that have arrived over the past several days were
unloaded promptly. Earlier reports indicate that the warehouses in
Kompong Som and Phnom Penh are nearly full and that 80 to 90 percent
of all aid received is still in storage. As of December 7 over
20,000 tons of rice, supplied by international relief agencies, has
been delivered to Kompong Som, and 2,500 tons to Phnom Penh. The
recent arrival of large numbers of trucks should ease the movement
of relief supplies to other areas of Kampuchea.
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved For ease 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100*0200180001-5
VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Logistic Activity
the Vietnamese have reopened a portion of the rail line
between Phnom Penh and Sisophon. The railroad, which
had been unusable since the Vietnamese invasion, will im-
prove Hanoi's ability to move bulk cargo and large quan-
tities of supplies to central and western Kampuchea.
In early September the Vietnamese o ened the rail line
between Kompong Som and Phnom Penh.
The railroad improvements will enhance Vietnam's
capability to distribute foreign relief to western Kampu-
chea; there is no indication to date, however, that the
Vietnamese intend to do so. The rail system passes
through contested areas and could be interdicted by Pol
Vietnam, with Soviet assistance, is improving its capability
to provide logistic support to its forces in Kampuchea, especially
in areas west of the Mekong giver. 25X
25X
Pot's forces.
25X
25X
The Vietnamese have been using trucks and Soviet air-
craft to move military hardware. Soviet merchant ships
recently delivered nearly 500 motor vehicles--including
'e~ eps, buses, and trucks--to the port at Kompong Som.
Fighting is continuing along the Thai-Kampuchean
border. According to a recent Vietnamese military report,
the Vietnamese are planning to form a 20-man combat team
to go into Thailand, possibly opposite the Preah Vihear
area of Kampuchea, and lay 400 to 500 mines. The Vietnam-
ese are building several helicopter pads along the Kampu-
chean side of the border and are clearing obstacles at
the Tonle Sap Airfield. II -CI'_, DIA, NSA- 25X
3 Top Secret
1, December 1979 25X
Approved For Release 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83BOO100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 Approved For per se 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B001001 0200180001-5
X1
SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting
The communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations after their meeting Friday in Kuala
Lumpur attempted to convince Vietnam that ASEAN is united in oppos-
ing its actions in Kampuchea while ?a reeing to open a dialogue with
the Vietnamese to seek a solution. II
Malaysian Foreign Minister Rithauddeen was delegated
to visit Hanoi to discuss resolution of the Kampuchean
situation, which the Foreign Ministers noted jeopardizes
the stability of the entire region. The ministers sup-
ported Thailand's request for a UN team to visit the
Thai-Kampuchean border and called for implementation of
the UN resolution to convene an international conference
on Kampuchea. The communique acknowledged that the ASEAN
states have always had reservations about Kampuchean
leader Pol Pot's regime, but said that withdrawing recog-
nition of his government would be tantamount to approving
Reports of growing pessimism about Pol Pot's chances
by Thailand and other ASEAN members had suggested that
the Foreign Ministers might recommend changing diplomatic
support to another resistance leader. Thailand report-
edly planned to propose backing Son Sann, leader of a non-
Communist resistance group along the Thai border, but
Singapore strongly favors Prince Sihanouk, whom the Thai
flatly oppose. This disagreement plus concern that other
states might consider abandonment of Pol Pot as de facto
recognition of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime
probably explains the compromise language of the communi-
que. Any erosion of ASEAN diplomatic support would en-
courage other Third World states to switch recognition to
Heng Samrin.
The Foreign Ministers probably also hope the communi-
que will discourage Hanoi's attempts to sow dissension
among them over Kampuchean policy. Vietnam has been try-
ing especially to cultivate Indonesia, which is the least
happy with ASEAN policy in Kampuchea because it aligns
the group with China. Jakarta's overwhelming interest in
strengthening ASEAN, however will probably keep it from
breaking ranks publicly. -CIA, DIA, NSA- 25
Top Secret
17 December 1979
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5
 -
ii ' i. %: i - E !;' p. ST ?~
- i`if 2 ? I H - ? r ?r 'fi. R j 4- -N-f y 1i 4S T j -i-
'_. ~ i l / r L A a :.` :: r :. f r t .. f -i .? d ~ .i . L L h i. j.- T S 1 -
k
~y
. -r~~..r ~?}, ~ i i j;4 ~?t?,~Tf'~? cr.t e1~v~-~i ~~a Llsf'k~_Ei r:'ei~ TYf.l .*t :^!yi Z 4 i .r^. ~7ATT:~s.
IL... ~i.:7z
+R - . r r^t ~?l~ r; ?sr.r T?^tz? r. fir; n rri rU~ R..'r~s. rckkr.t'=r f ..> ~-~'r i r t O`s.. t ..r .-s.*.-.. gnt - r?rLr;_ei
^ s-f!i,. !? ;,o; ~; ~T.},."lv s; "l.?,i' ~tt.i~?-r ,?t W.
i~rt ~s?'t