(Sanitized) [NIO/EA CHRONO 2 THRU 30 JUNE 80]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 2, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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25X1
1 Memo to DCI from JHH, dtd 2 Jun 80
Subj: USSR (NFAC 3930-80/1)
2 Note to DCI from JHH, dtd 3 Jun 80
Subj: NFIB talking points for Sino-Soviet Estimate
3 Talking Points, dtd 3 Jun 80
Subj: China: Guidelines & Goals for the 80's
4 NFAC Notice, dtd 5 Jun 80
Subj: Title Change to NI0/EA
25X1 5
6 Ltr to Prof Moskowitz dtd 5 Jun 80
25X1 9-ubj : Ltr from
7 Draft to Ambassador, dtd 9 Jun 80
25X1 8 Note forl Idtd 10 Jun 80
Subj: Proposed travel for 0/NI0/EA
9 Form to D/S from HLH, dtd 12 Jun 80
Subj: Request to Speak
25X1
10
11 Note to Mr. Diehl from JHH, dtd 19 Jun 80
Subj: Employment info
25X1 12
13 Memo to D/S from HLH, dtd 25 Jun 80
Subj: Contact with Foreign National (NFAC 4547-80)
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P
ROUTING'AND TRANSMITTAL VP
TO:?(Name, office symbol, room number,
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Signature
Coordination
Justify
Date .
50- TiurAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
/p~1(Q.+G~,,AFR@a~~eB~A(1"5/De1./06 : AQQ~OR0002001
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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
building, Agency/Post)
~. DCI
Initials
Date
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4.
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Note and Return
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Prepare Reply
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See Me
omment
Investigate
Signature
Coordination
Justify
The attached has been provided to D/OCO
where it will be read by selected officers.
DO NOT use this form RD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
STAT and similar actions
FROM: (Name, org. s
Executive Y
Room No.-Bldg.
7E-13, Hgs.
5041-102 OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
{t U. S. Gov*rnment Printing Office: 1979-281-184/8 FPMR (41 CFR 101-11.206
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 ?
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
Attached are the talking points for our
Sino-Soviet Estimate which will be considered
at NFIB on Thursday, June.
I will be present as will
for a prebrief at your convenience.
cc: DDCI
DD/NFA
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 SECRET
9 0FMR0200120001-1
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Origin of the Estimate
-- Has been on the books for several years. Decision taken
in house to look at Sino-Soviet problem in wake of Mao's
death, presumptive removal of Brezhnev from active
politics, and growing Chinese ties with US.
-- Initial crack at drafting taken under Jim Lilley's
auspices, but great difficulty in producing usable
draft, finding suitable drafter.
-- Drafting responsibilities finally undertaken by0
(prior to his retirement). Draft subsequently
Principal Conclusions
-- Probabilities strongly favor continuity over change.
Changes are likely to be minimal, but there is one chance
in ten of larger changes toward either conflict or
significant improvement in the relationship.
-- China is likely to be the key actor if changes occur;
nevertheless, forces keeping Beijing on its present track
are powerful. Soviet leadership -- current and probable
future -- interested in some amelioration of dispute,
but not prepared to pay price for it.
-- Soviets do not appear to have desire or intention to
attack China unless severely provoked. Most likely
trigger for conflict, should it arise, in Indochina.
-- Significant moves toward rapprochement probably would be
started by China. This unlikely, but present policy may
not enjoy universal support. Overtures would probably
follow Beijing's reassessment of international situation.
-- US is central factor in calculations of both Moscow and
Beijing. Chinese hope for wide range of US help (which
Soviets fear) but would probably live with less than
optimum.
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 Community Views
-- There were no serious disagreements in coordination
and the Estimate contains no footnotes.
-- DOD may ask that language indicating uncertainty of
our judgments which appear at end of Estimate also be
incorporated in Introduction (last sentence of para 2).
We have not polled the entire Community on this minor
change but would not resist addition of a clause --
"which reflects a considerable degree of uncertainty" --
after the first two words in last sentence of para 2.
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 NO. 1-28 5 June 1980
TITLE CHANGE
National Intelligence Council
Effective immediately, the tit ational Intelligence Officer
for China-East Asia Pacific is renamed National Intelligence Officer
for East Asia.
Bruce C. Clarke, r:
Director
National Foreign Assessment Center
Distribution "A" (1-6)
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
I recently received a letter from Plat Thayer describing your
interest in developing interchange between Harvard scholars and
our analysts on Korea. As you might expect,. we have been spending
a good deal of time on Korea lately and while we always derive
benefit through discussions with our associates in academe, your
suggestion is particularly timely.
Nat may have told you about our conference on Japan this past
April. Unfortunately, I am afraid we have neither the money nor
time to.repeat that experience. While I am not in a position to
make a commitment, it might be possible to arrange a short informal
program - say two days - in July with about five attendees from each
side. If such a program has appeal, please let me know. Would it be
better to meet here or in. Cambridge? I look forward to hearing from
you.
Sincerely,
Professor Karl Moskowitz
Assistant Professor of Korean Studies
Harvard University
2 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
ational Intelligence Officer
for China - East Asia Pacific
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SCHOOL F, Release
INTERNATIO STUDIES
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
1740 MASSACHUSETTS A VENUE, N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
April 29, 1980
National Intelligence Officers
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear John,
Last week, after lecturing at the Law School at Harvard,
I was approached by Professor Moskowitz, who is an Assistant
Professor of Korean Studies in the Bast Asian Law Center
Professor Moskowitz
or not it Would be possible to arrange some
sort of interchange between the Harvard scholars interested
in Korea and the government intelligence analysts interested
in Korea. I told him. that I would send his name and address
on to you. It seems like a good way to bolster morale among
the agency hands and might also give them an opportunity of
learning what is going on in Korean research among the
universities.
Professor .Moskowitz's address and phone number is as
follows:
Karl Moskowitz
Assistant Professor of Korean Studies
Harvard University
2 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138
Telephone: (617)
. 495-3451
Sincerely,
V
Nathaniel B. Thayer
Director of Asian Studies
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 THE DIRECTOR F
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
10 June 1980
NOTE FOR:
FROM NIO for East Asia
Per your request, attached is the
proposed travel for our staff.
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FOREIGN TDY TRAVEL PROJECTION
1 July 1980 - 31 December 1980
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
CQftice)
TAT
4 ,
China, Southeast third quarter'80 area familiarization
Asia (for 3 weeks)
Indonesia, Philippines third quarter '80
and North Asia (for 3 weeks)
China, Southeast first quarter '81
Asia (for 2 weeks)
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LAST AGENCY-
SPONSORED AREA
TRAVEL VISITED
January 80
Mar-Apr 80
January 80
 ~og IQT'~l
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/East Asia
FROM
NIC AdMin Officer
SUBJECT . Foreign Travel Projection --
1 July 80 - 31 December 1980
1. The attached form is to be used for any foreign TDY trips
projected for the period 1 Jul 80 - 31 Dec 80. The D/NFAC has
requested that you categorize the projected trips(see attached memo.)
2. The trips submitted on the 1 Apr - 30 Sep 80 Foreign Travel
Projection for yourself to China and SE Asia and to
Indonesia, Philippines, and N. Asia should be included on the attached
form for review.
3. May I please have your response by COB 10 June. The Acting
Chairman, NIC will review all travel proposals.
xi
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!X AT T T T C AT T z A
NFAC NOTICE
No. 22-1
FOREIGN AND DCNESTIC TRAVEL
NFAC N 22-1..
Present and anticipated Congressional restrictions require that NFAC
manage its travel programs to fulfill the highest priorities. Effective
with the last quarter of FY 1980, DD/NFAC will review all foreign travel
projections on a quarterly basis, each time looking ahead 6 months.
Projections should categorize foreign trips according to foreign travel
elements in the outline below. The reports should reach DD/NFAC, through
the NFAC Planning, Management, and Evaluation Staff, no later than one
week prior to the beginning of each quarter. Individual office reports
should be forwarded to PMES'30 days prior to each new quarter and include
a short, explanatory statement of requirement for each foreign trip.
A. Travel in direct support to analysis, such as:
1. Research trips in support of specific projects that are
incorporated in D/NFAC-approved research programs;
2. Summer Replacement Program;
3. Coordination of memos with Embassies and Stations, when
coordination by pouch or cable could not produce the
desired result;
4. Active participation in or support to conferences/delegations
dealing with primary areas of NFAC research and analysis;
5. Biographic research trips and publications procurement
problem solving trips, when such trips are requested by
Stations and Embassy officers managing these programs;
6. Contract monitoring;
7. Briefings/debriefings, especially when high-level foreign
officials request briefing/debriefing services; when such
activities are critical to the production of intelligence
on priority areas or topics; and in other exceptional cases
as warranted.
CONFIDENTIAL
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0 - 1 0
B. Indirect support to analysis, such as:
1. Area familiarization;
2. Industrial/military orientation;
3. General biographic collection or publications procurement
trips, except as noted in category (A) above;
4. Attendance at conferences, except as noted in category (A)
above;
5. Collection/requirements activities;
6. Organized recruiting activities geared toward hiring
specifically identified highly qualified candidates for
professional positions.
These categories and the quarterly reports are designed to be-valuable
management information tools. Although we do not project domestic travel
on a quarterly basis, when resources are limited or constrained by
Congressional direction, both foreign and domestic travel may be restricted
by category, with exceptions granted only by D/NTFAC or DD/NFAC.
All portions of this notice are classified CONFIDENTIAL.
nice C. Clarke, Jr.
Director
National Foreign Assessment Center
Distribution "A" (1-6)
25X
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REQUEST TO SPEAK, PRESENT A PAPER, OR PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC MEETING
1. Title of Presentation $ Nature of Meeting:
To participate in a meeting at the Foreign Policy Research Institute
on the topic "Soviet-American Cooperation in the Northeast Asian
Region". To lead an informal discussion at the meeting.
2. Name of Institution/Title of Meeting:
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
3. Location:
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
4. Time:
20 June 1980, 0900 - 1700,
S. Name and Position of NIC Requester:
STAT ssistant NIO/EAP
6. Identified as CIA? Yes Agency-sponsored? No
7. Dollar Cost to NIC (approx):
None
8.cd/Unclassified (Delete one; if classified, indicate level.)
9. Other Pertinent Information:
25X1 APPROVE:
25X1 CONCUR:
,qrl
(rCairman, National intelligence Council)- Date)
(Coordinator for Academic Relations
18 JUN 1986
(Director of ecurity Date
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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
3508 Market Street Science Center
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
(215) EV 2-0685
William R. Kintner
President
May 12, 1980
STAT
I am writing to invite you to a one-day meeting in Philadel-
phia on June 20, 1980, on the topic of "Soviet-American Co-.
operation in the Northeast Asian Region."
We are hoping to gather a small and relatively informal group
of American, Soviet, and Korean scholars, in order to discuss
some of the more salient issues of peace and security in North-.
east Asia in mid-1980. We believe that the fractured dialogue
between Soviets and Americans on political-military issues has
progressed to dangerous levels, and that a meeting such as
this one may help to establish some measure of agreement be-
tween the participants on the nature of current security
challenges in Northeast Asia, particularly on the Korean
peninsula..
This meeting is part of the ongoing studies at the FPRI on
security issues in Northeast Asia, and in contrast to other
parts of our program, there will be no papers formally pre-
sented -- although several background papers by participants, will be distributed beforehand as a basis of discussion, and,
certain participants will be asked to give introductory sum-
maries of the situation -- and the proceedings will be entirely
off-the-record. The agenda will focus on the current situation
in the morning, and in the afternoon, we shall discuss emerging
and prospective contacts for reducing tensions.
We believe that you could make an invaluable contribution to
the proceedings of this distinguished group of 15-20 people.
We would cover all of your travel costs, and if your travel
arrangements required you to stay in Philadelphia overnight,
we would cover the costs.
The program will begin on June 20th at the Foreign Policy
Research Institute with the first session opening at 10:00 A.M.,
with coffee and doughnuts available after 9:00 A.M. We shall
have a luncheon served, and continue with meetings in the
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 STAT
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May 12, 1980
afternoon until 5:00 P.M. For those who wish to remain, we
shall have an informal dinner and opportunity to talk at
leisure in the evening.
If you have any questions, do give me a call. I trust that
I shall receive an affirmative response shortly.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
William R. Kintner
STAT
.Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
WRK: deg
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO:
ROOM NO. I ut m
I FEB 55 241
REPLACES FORM 36-6
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 THE DIRECTCDF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
STAT
Here is the item that I mentioned to
you over the telephone on 13 June.
Warm regards.
STAT
Sincerely,
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 IV. 6 Jun 80
STAT Clandestine) Voice of the Malayan Revolution in Malmo to Malaysia and Singapore
1030 GMT 24 May 80
[First installment of statement of the Indonesian Communist Party Central Committee dele-
gation in connection with PKI 60th founding anniversary: "Unite and Struggle for Democratic
Rights and Social Justice for the People and for Complete Independence and National Libera-
tion"--read by announcer]
[Text] On 23 May 1980, our beloved and highly respected Indonesian Communist Party [PKI]
was exactly 6,0 years old. The birth of the PKI is not an isolated event. The PKI was
founded through the objective demand of the Indonesian people following the success of the
Socialist October Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the spread of Marxism-Leninism in
Indonesia. 19arxism-Leninism, the revolutionary ideology for the liberation of oppressed
people, has been merged with the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian working class.
It was this process of merger that led to the founding of the PKI, a main force in the
struggle of the Indonesian people for national independence and socialism. With the birth
of the PKI, the revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people began a new page in its
history, With the full strength of the Indonesian people, the PKI went on struggling
for a new, free and democratic Indonesia.
in these 60 years, the PKI, a revolutionary proletarian party, has firmly and unyieldingly
held high the banner of struggle against colonialism, imperialism and feudalism for national
independence, liberation, democracy and socialism. The PKI's 60 years were 60 years of
struggle to realize the noble mission of history it is shouldering, 60 years of unyielding,
heroic, revolutionary struggle. During the Indonesian people's struggle against Dutch
colonial rule, the PKI led a national rebellion from 1926 to 1927 which shook the foundation
of Dutch colonial rule and reflected the strong desire of the Indonesian people for inde-
pendence.
During the occupation of Indonesia by the Japanese military fascists, the PKI, along with
other patriotic and anti-fascist forces, carried out a heroic and courageous resistance.
The struggle of the PKI and other patriotic forces played an act,ve_ and major role in
hrin8ing about the declaration of independence of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945.
Indonesian communists wholeheartedly took an active_ part in the armed struggle, along with
all the patriotic forces of-the Indonesian people, t ddefend independence against the
armed aggression of the combined British and Dutch colonialists.
From 1950 to 1965, during President Sukarno's rule, the PKI was an important force in the
Indonesian people's efforts to continue the struggle for complete national independence in
the political, economic, military and cultural fields as well as for broad democratic
freedom for the people at that time. The Indonesian people also played an active and
prominent role in the international arena, defending the right to independence of every
nation against imperialism and colonialism in all forms as manifested in the 10 principles
of the Afro-Asian conference in_Banil,png in 1955.
The course of struggle followed by the PKI is not a course strewn with flowers, but a
complex one full of thorns and obstacles; a course that has been consciously adopted and
followed with the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of the best sons of the Indonesian
working class and revolutionary people. The imperialist, feudalist and reactionary
cliques of the country were scared to death of the PKI and hated it. They therefore tried
all means and tricks to destroy it. During its long history, the PKI experienced three
white terrors from the imperialists and the reactionary clique in the country which served
them. The white terror committed by rightest generals was the most cruel and savage in
the history of modern Indonesia.
 Using the 30 September 1965 movement as a pretext, they carried out indiscriminate mass
killings against hundreds of thousands of coma*rinists and noncommunists, ordinary men
and women and even innocent children and babies. Hundreds of thousands of others were
thrown into jails and forced labor camps, such as on Buru Island and other places, and
persecuted and abandoned until death, or left to suffer for dozens of years. Some of
them who had spent dozens of years in jail were brought to court and arbitrarily
sentenced to death or given life or long-term imprisonment contrary to the elementary
principles of justice. The purpose behind this was to justify the white terror as part
of a plot by rightist generals to seize power.
But, in the process of the judicial proceedings and through undeniable facts, the
generals! clique was. exposed as the rea1_culprit. They accused the PKI of attempting
a coup d+etat to overthrow the government of President Sukarno, but they were the ones
who se g etly and cruelly killed the principal leaders of the PKI who supported President
Sukarno. They seized power from President Sukarno and estal~]Se~a mii ar fascist
regi_m_e which dragged the Indonesian people into miserzy. They persecuted Bung [Brother]
Karno,-resulting in his death.
It was the rightist generals who committed_easozigainst the president, the supreme
commander, and abused what they called the supersemar [11 March order] of 1966 and
forced the already screened Provisional People's Consultative Assembly to convene a
session to cover their unconstitutional action with a constitutional coat. The Suharto
.m ilitctry_fasc~at_.regimp carried out indiscriminate mass killings, persecuted hundreds
of thousands of people without judicial process, arbitrarily revoked the most elementary
nationality rights, trampled on human rights and social justice and on the Pancasila
and the 1945 Constitution.
Under dangerous and dift'icult conditions, the PKI Politburo Central Committee seriously
assessed the historical experiences and studied the weaknesses and mistakes of the oppor-
tunist and revisionist PKI leadership, which allowed the counterrevolutionary force to
deal a blow to and int'lict heavy damage on the PKI and other revolutionary movements in
general. Through self-criticism conducted in September 1966, the PKI Politburo Central
committee corrected mistakes and showed a way out by adopting a new PKI three-fold program
as a weapon to defeat the enemy and win the revolution. The self-
restored the PKI to its revolutionary course, was a manifestation of the bold determination
and unity of the Indonesian communists to stand up again to continue the revolution.
In November 1967, the PKI Politburo Central Committee formulated the npw party-.program.
Under the new program, the PKI analyzed Indonesian society and concluded that under
the present circumstances, Indonesian society was regarded as a neo-imperialist colony,
especially of the U.S. imperialists and semifeudalists. Based on this conclusion, the
new PKI program determined the Indonesian revolution at the present stage as the peapple's
democratic revolution, an anti-imperialist and antifeudalist revolution of the masses
that is democratic in character. The program clearly designated the target of revolution,
the task and course of revolution and the capability of the working class to lead the
main revolutionary forces and other Indonesian revolutionary elements.
The new PKI program was a strategic guidance for revolutionary workers, peasants and
intellectuals, patriotic small traders, fishermen and national entrepreneurs and other
democratic groups in their revolutionary struggle for the liberation from imperialist,
feudalist and bureaucratic capitalist oppression and exploitation.
 The conclusion of the Politburo self -criticism and the new PKI program have shown the
correct course and strategic tasks of struggle in all stages of the Indonesian people's
democratic revolution. The conclusion will guide the Indonesian communists in their
struggle. Meanwhile, new changes and developements at home and on the international scene
have compelled the Indonesian communists to further assess more valuable experiences
and designate correct policies and tactics for the implementation of the conclusion of
the self-criticism and the new program in accordance with the prevailing situation and
characteristics of the Indonesian revolution. By so doing, the complex and protracted
revolutionary struggle will advance step by step toward certain victory.
1'orl j the enemy continues to spread propaganda that the PKI has been crushed; but the
PKI can never be eliminated because it has its str?err.,th and roots in the working people
and soil of Indonesia itself. The PKI aspirations are identical to the aspirations,
demands and fundamental interests of the Indonesian working people. The PKI stands and
straggles along with the people for freedom and justice. The Suharto regime was installed
through the power of arms and imperialist support from abroad. This cannot be denied.
Although the generals in important government posts have been given a civilian cloak
and their fascist military regime has been covered with what they called Pancasila
democracy, the people themselves have been deprived of their democratic rights. Political
parties and mass organizations, which had played an important role in uniting the
Indonesian people during the struggle to win national independence, have been banned and
dissolved.
Cfinfa;:r and--andemoeratic actions bring about resistance.
In facing the forthcoming general elections in 1982, the existing political parties and
other political forces have already voiced their opposition to the Suharto regime's
general elections law, which continues to adopt the old undemocratic election system
that fails to guarantee the principles of a direct, public, free and secret ballot.
One-third of the People's COnsultativeAssembly members will be appointed to represent
the Indonesian Armed Forces, while a big majority of the people will again be deprived
of their voting rights.
It has become obvious that, like the previos general elections in 1971 and 1977, the
6u.harto clique will continue to use force to suppress all forces and groups which oppose
it in order to ensure the continuation of its power through the so-called general
elections. Addressi.rg a military commanders' meeting in Pakanbaru, Suharto once again
strongly threatened the political parties. Under the pretext of protecting the 1945
Constitution and the Pancasila, he warned political parties against adopting nationalism
and religion as their party ideologies, alleging that they are against the 19-.5
Constitution and the Pancasila.
It IS O u1.ous that the ban against the PKI and communism is a prelude to the dissolution
and ban of political parties and other religious and nationalist-oriented groupings.
This, in fact, is against Article 28 of the 1.945 Constitution, which guarantees the
freedom of political parties to adopt their own ideology. This is also contrary to the
Pancasila concept of Bung Karno, which unified the Indonesian People's diversified
xe1,.gLen, beliefs, tribes and ethnological origins.
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 Since the army is exploited by the Suharto regime as its principle tool to suppress the
people and its elements are allowed to squeeze the people through large-scale corruption
to enrich themselves, the army is hated and feared while its image is gradually dropping
in the eyes of the people. In order to overcome this situation, the Suharto regime is
launching a campaign of so-called integration between the armed forces and the people.
However, despite this, dissatisfaction exists within the armed forces. Privates, non-
.commissioned officers and middle-ranking officers feel. and know the deep ravine which
separates their daily life from the luxurious life of corrupt generals, Likewise, there
are also forces within the armed forces which are opposed to undemocratic policies and
actions which are disadvantageous to the people's interests.
The dissatisfaction and anxiety among various groups in society continue to develop. They
have made,-public appeals in their respective areas, sent representatives to meet with
officials and members of the district and provincial assemblies, and have launched various
daring and widespread campaigns against the Suharto regime's policies and actions which
harm the people's interests. The workers demand higher incomes; guarantees for their
pension and other social securities; oppose dismissal; demand freedom and democratic
rights and the right and freedom to form organizations and stage strikes.
Pilots and the ground personnel of the Garuda Indonesian Airways have courageously staged
protest demonstrations and strikes, fighting for the improvement of their welfare and against
suppression and exploitation by bureaucratic capitalists. Since 1979, peasants in various
districts have launched widespread struggles to defend, seize back and register their
farmlands. The struggle of the peasants in Siria-ria in north Sumatra and in (Jenggawah)
in East Java was a prominent manifestation of the awakening and resistance of the peasants.
The growing resistance of the peasants reflects the fact that today, land ownership and
exploitation of peasants by feudalists in rural areas is becoming serious.
The peasants and broad masses are now demanding that the basic agrarian law and the pro-
duction sharing law introduced during the Sukarno regime in line with the demands of the
peasants and other democratic forces, but frozen since the Suharto regime took over the
government, be once again reinstituted. In order to protect and improve their livelihood,
the peasants are demanding freedom to form organizations and the suspension of the (words
indistinct) policy which prohibits political activities in rural areas. The fishermen
are unceasingly launching their struggle against the exploitation of their marine source
of living by foreign capitalists and monopolists.
Indonesian stts are carrying out a continuous_.str_uggle, opposing the policy which
denies freedom of assembly and political activities among students. The concept introduced
by the Suharto regime on the so-called normalization of campus life and the formation of
students coordination bodies has been continuously opposed by the students. Their raging
struggle and awareness of their position and role as defenders of the motherland and hope
of the nation reflect the aspirations of the Indonesian people. Various groups among
the broad Indonesian masses, politicians and intellectuals are worried and restless. They
are demanding an improvement in the country's worsening situation. They demand the adoption
of a domestic policy which holds patriotism, democracy and national unity high and a truly
free, active and anti-imperialist foreign policy similar to the-one adopted and implemented
during the Sukarno regime.
The Indonesian people oppose the Suharto regime's policy in aggressing against and annexing
the East Timor Democratic Re9ublic and trampling upon the rights of independence of the East
Timor people. The Indonesian people sport the struggle of the East Timor people under
FRETILIN's leadership to defend their national independence.
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 STAT
The increasing foreign capital investments which have drained Indonesia's natural resources,
the increasing amount of foreign loans; the spreading of bureaucrats' and new landlords'
capital; the rampant corruption, such as the case of PERTAMINA and the Palapa [satellite
project] the increasing gap separating a small group of rich people from tens of millions
of poor people; and the increasing number of unemployed and semi-employed people, are
all proof of the lies of Suharto regime's so-called development, which he said is to serve
for the improvement of the national economy and the people's welfare. All these will be-
come an objective factor and basis for the awakening of the Indonesian people of various
groupings and strata of life to unite and fight for the democratic rights and social jus-
tice of the people, and for complete freedom and national independence.
,.."rt e..: 4? .Q .;" (A I') n C ~~, it? -P.Ss.vs 'COi1jt c ?
CFHINESE NATURALIZATION, ECONO C POLICIES MEETING RESISTANCE
[Text.] Jakarta, 5 Jun (A,JJP)--Extremist groups have been stepping up anti-government
activities in Jakarta, ANTARA NEWS AGENCY reported today. Political feelings in the
city were running high with the increasing rumours accusing the government of having failed
to carry its economic policies, the agency quoted Jakarta military command sources as
saying.
(?RRacist) movement have been on the increase with certain official quarters refusing to
give citizenship cards to Chinese wishing to adopt Indonesian nationality under tEe cur-
rent naturalisation scheme, ANTARA said. It was the first disclosure that activities
opposing the government had been on the rise in Jakarta, the centre of political activity.
Home Minister Gen Amir Machmud described the extremists as "madmen" who refused to admit
the achievements in the political and economic fields.
Meanwhile the Jakarta evening newspaper TERBIT [as received] today carried complaints
by certain Chinese in Bandung, W,,st Java, who wanted to become Indonesian citizens. One
had to pay up to 25,000 rupiahs (about 40 U'.S. dollars) to obtain a certificate of good
conduct from the local police station, the paper said.
The government has set August 17, Indonesia's National Day, as the last day for registra-
tion by those wishing to accept the naturalisation scheme. However, the scheme appears
tQ..Jave,nv .... ttractedmany Chinese-to register themselves because they have to __ ve- ribes
to the officials in charge.
STAT ~Takarta Domestic oervice in Indonesian 1200 GMT 5 Jun 80
[Text] At the invitation of Foreign Ministry Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, Yugoslav Foreign
Minister Josip Vrhovec is expected to arrive in Jakarta on Saturday [7 June]. Minister
Mochtar said in Jakarta today that his talks with the Yugoslav foreign minister will deal
with the internal problems of the nonaligned movement. He said Indonesia and Yugoslavia
are among the founders of the nonaligned movement who are persistent in their efforts to
maintain the movement's purity and keep it free from big power rivalry.
NETHERLANDS ENVOY'S DEATH--Jakarta, 30 May (ANTARA)--2hie Netherlands Embassy announced
Friday [30 May] that Netherlands Ambassador to Indonesia Paul R'enardel de Lavalette
passed away on 29 May. [Excei.rnt] [Jakarta ANTARA in English 0278 GMT 30 May 80 BK]
 2,.3 I? cz
INDONESIA
VVOOPE CARRIES PART TWO OF INDONESIA CP STATEMENT
Clandestine) Voice of the Malayn Revolution in Malay to Malaysia and Singapore
lv--)u GMT 27 May 80 [Second and last installment of 23 May statement by the Indonesian Communist Party Cen-
tral Committee delegation in connection with PKI's 60th founding anniversary: "Unite and
Struggle for Democratic Rights and Social Justice for the People for Complete Independence
and National Liberation"--read by announcer]
[Text] At the end of 1979, the Suharto regime claimed that it had released the last
group of Indonesian Communist Party [PKI[ political detainees and were only detaining
a small group of the Category A detainees who would be brought to court for trial. So
far, it has always kept the number of political detainees and the location of their de-
tention camps secret. Apart from this the regime continues to make new arrests and de-
tain persons suspected of PKI activities as well as members of other opposition groups,
including student activists.
The release of the political detainees by the Suharto regime was not out of goodwill or
humanitarian consideration, but stemmed from political and economic difficulties at home
and abroad. The release of the political detainees was carried out to win support
the Indonesian people and to reduce pressure against the Suharto Regime by political op-
ponents from various groups, who also demand democratic freedom, and the guarantee ofop
fundamental human rights and who oppose arbitrary arrests and detention, particularly
of PKI political detainees, who were detained for dozens of years without their )gilt
being proved.
With the release of the political detainees, Suharto has speculated that he w
to carry out manipulations and political intro ell and defe
his power. The Indonesian people, however, willecertainl efforts to strengthen and defnd
intrigues of the Suharto regime. y guard against these political
On the international scene, they have tried to cover up their undemocratic, dirty faces
in order to ensure that they will continue receiving loans from Western creditor coun-
tries. However, they have been widely exposed, particularly by people in those Western
creditor countries. But, the former political detainees are not completely free. Tens
of thousands of those who had been detained for dozens of years under physical and mental
torture before being released are still being restricted, discriminated against and de-
prived of their political freedom and right to obtain a livelihood. They and their fami-
lies are facing serious difficulties.
together with the Indonesian people, welcome their return to society and salute them
for their sacrifices and struggles
tion hairs. We support during their dozens of years in jails and concentra-4
their endeavors and struggles to overcome the new difficulties C 0
they are confronting. We, together with the Indonesian people, demand that restrictions
and discrimination against the released political detainees be removed and that they be
given full rights as Indonesian citizens as j~4S~
stitution, provided for in Article 27 of the 1945 Con-
We, and whoever else has a feeling of Justice, demand that all political prisoners, still
detained in Jails and detention camps, as well as those who have been unfairly sentenced,
be immediately and unconditionally released.
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 The reactionary clique continues. to ,instigate anti-Chinese rai_sm in the country.
Their action is parallel to the criminal aim of theSoviet and Vietnamese hegemonies
to split the unity of peoples in Southeast Asian countries. The reactionary racists
have tried to draw a lesson from and copy the barbatc anti-Chinese Vietnamese authori-
ties, who expelled hundreds of thousands of overseas Chinese and Vietnamese of Chinese
origin and put them to sea after extorting and robbing them.
We must prevent such a tragedy from happening in Indonesia, since it would seriously
harm the national interests of the Indonesian people. We must adopt a policy of national
unity and equality for all citizens without discriminating against their tribal and other
ethnological origins, religious and political beliefs, and guarantee their fundamental
human rights in accordance with the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila. The Indonesian
people must heighten their vigilance and strengthen their unity to combat the racist
policy seeking _to split national_ unity, which will only benefit the reactionary clique
and the ambitious Soviet hegemonists.
The recent international situation is tumultuous, tense and complicated. The rivalry to
dominate the world between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union,
is sharpening.
The Sgy~et_backed Vietnamese._itlv_asion of Kampuchea and its threats against Thailand and
other Southeast Asian countries were followed by the open Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
which has threatened Pakistan and Iran and the entire Persian Gulf and Middle East region
and has led to a serious international crisis. The danger of a war spreading, which
could lead to a new world war, has become obvious and the main source of the danger of
such a war is Soviet hegemonism.
Using the slogan of socialism, Marxism-Leninism and natural allies, and by pretending
to support the struggle of people throughout the world against U.S., Western European
and Japanese imperialism, the Soviet social-i_mp_erialiststried to trick and deceive the
peoples of the world. The Soviet Union+s propaganda of detente attempts to divert people+s
attention from its own aggressive acts, which have made the situation worse rather than
better.
But, its support of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and its own invasion in A
tan have opened the eyes of people to the aggressive features of the Soviet social _mAnis-
perialists. People throughout the world have denounced the Soviet and Vietnamese aggres-
sion. They are becoming aware that it is no different from the Soviet Invasions of
Czechoslovakia, which formed part of the Soviet occupation of East European countries,
Mongolia and the Japanese northern islands. The occupation of Eastern Europe is directed
against Western Europe, while the occupation of Mongolia and Japanese northern islands
is directed against China and Japan.
By-using Cuba and Vietnam, the Soviet Union has also carried out military infiltration
of African and Asian countries, such as Angola, Ethiopia and the Indo_china_.c.ountnies,
and burned them into stepping stones for broadening its expansion on the two continents.
Through an aggressive collusion with Vietnam under the cloak of friendship and coopera-
tion, including military cooperation, the Soviet Union has encouraged the Vietnamese
hegemonists and expansionists, who placed Laos and Kampuchea under their control. By
using this method, the Soviet Union has tried to dominate Southeast Asia and the Strait
of_Mal.ac.oa and at the same time has carried out an anti-China policy because it regards
China as the biggest obstacle to its hegemonist ambition.
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 Under these circumstances, it would be a_ grave
which has mistal~_e_andda_ngeons ~re_gard V etnam,
s amb itions of regional hegemonis_m supported by the Soviet Union
Vize zone t against
whfeki the so-called Chinese threat from the_rIorcurityth., territorial ierristthorieal Soviet segriUnityo, nand national
utes a dir
ab `coiisttect threatto the se
independence and people's sovereignty of countries in Southeast Asia.
In facing this situation the peoples and countries in Southeast Asia, firmly upholding
the principles of self-determination and opposing all outside interference, are united
in supporting the Kampuchean people's struggle against the Vietnamese invasion and the
Afghan people's struggle against Soviet aggression. The peoples and countries in South-
east Asia are united in heightening their vigilance against the danger of Soviet aggres-
sion, either directly or through the use of Vietnamese troops. They are aware of the
position of Southeast Asia as one of the zones of rivalry and a target of Soviet global
strategy apart from its strategis targets in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East region.
It is a fact that once Soviet and Vietnamese aggressor troops invade the territory of
another sovereign state, they will never withdraw
the so-called -- ------ _~roluntarily. Therefore, the demand for
political and peaceflzl settleme t-
of the Kampuchean and Afghan conflicts
without the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese and Soviet troops from the two Icountries
ymeans the recognition of the Heng Samrin and the Babrak Karmal regimes
tby the people of both countries, and the justification of the Soviet andwVietnamesepposed
aggression.
The tweak"at;{;''ttide reflected in the so-called political and peaceful settlement is in
reality similar to the attitude taken during the Munich pact which led to an even bigger
disaster.
The Soviet Union has recently intensified its energetic efforts to infiltrate and dig
its claws into Indonesia. The Soviet Union is waiting for an opportunity to dominate
Indonesia by cultivating Indonesian revisionist renegades and other pro-Soviet groups
in various fields--including certain press circles which they can influence--as well as
political circles, civil and military officials through shrewd, refined methods and
bribery and by exploiting the dissatisfaction among the people of various strata against
the Suharto regime.
This situation calls for all forces who love the motherland to
strengthenjunity,/ heighten
vigilance and make the necessary preparations to confront the danger of Soviet and Viet-
namese hegemonism to defend national independence and sovereignty. Unity and vigilance
must also be strengthened and heightened against the dangerous role of their lackeys who
have both openly and secretly intensified their activities.
The Vietnamese claim over Indonesian territory off the atuna Islan is like a cymbal
which has awakened the Indonesian people. S v
from their bases at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay andinttherIndian Ocea b twa Sof th ehStr its e -a
of Malacca pose a real threat to the Southeast Asian countries,
including ay of the Straits
lIndonesia.
In the international arena, people throughout the world and the Third World countries
have carried out unyielding struggles against the two superpowers--the Soviet Union and
the United States--to defend their rights for independence, political and economic free-
dom, control and exploitation of their natural resources as well as their right to conduct
international trade. The nonaligned movement, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin
America, constitutes an effective force to fight domination, suppression, subversion,
intervention and aggression by the superpowers.
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 lease 20A5/04!b_&_ ?CIA-RDp33B
.bO0Q~f 20A0`1 ~1
Since the nature of Soviet aggression has become obvious, peoples and countries through-
out the world have strengthened their unity and heightened their vigilance against the
danger of Soviet hegemonism in order to prevent a new world war and to safeguard peace.
The People?;_Republicof China-is playing an active and major role in the international
arena __to unify all forces that can be unified to launch the struggle; The
of the Chinese people to*launch the four modernizations socialist develo me t prpepondrteaw oil
also raise its capability and contribution to the struggle and strengthen the sup of
the struggles of peoples of various countries for national liberation, democracyandt of
socialism.
The current objective situation at home has encouraged the Indonesian people from various
strata and groups, workers, peasants, fishermen, poor urban dwellers, intellectuals,
cultural workers, youths and students, patriotic and democratic forces of various poli-
tical beliefs to strengthen their unity against.the political suppression and economic
exploitation by the imperialists, bureaucratic capitalists and feudal landlords repre-
sented by the S}iharto regime in order to ensure their democratic rights and social jus-
tice, complete independence and national freedom. :.'.
rr . ~. /~~a ~. ~sw;
Developments on the international scene, particularly the situation in Southeast Asia,
have encouraged all patriotic and democratic forces to hgJ_gbte4 _yigJJlanca and, strengthen.
national unity_against_growing Soviet_hegemonism to defend Indonesian national independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The situation at home and in the international
arena at present demands that Indonesian communists be firmly united, hard working, dilli-
gent, persevering, courageous and careful in rebuilding the PKI as a Marxist-Leninist
party which can fulfill its historical mission to lead the Indonesian people's liberation dye.,.
struggle.
:at
Guided by the directives and principles of strategy and tactics for the Indonesian revo-
lution, as mentioned in the Politburo self-criticism and the party program for the Indo-
nesian people's democracy, the PKI must be intelligent and energetic in determining con-
crete policies and tactics in line with the objective and subjective conditions based on
concrete analysis of the situation of the party as well as domestic developments in rela-
tion to the international situation. The preseDt_t_sk f Indonesian communists and revo-
lutions is to foster close relations with the masses and join them in their struggle
They must be able to adopt measures in line with the objective conditions and the level
of consciousness of the masses. 'They must develop and gradually promote the struggle
of the masses.
Only when the PKI can correctly assess its experiences and overcome its weaknesses, will
the masses place their trust in the PKI, which is a source of strength that can never be
destroyed. We must unceasingly eliminate subjectivism, the past mistakes of PKI oppor-
tunists and revisionists and the greed and (word indistinct] of the small bourgeoisie,
which have seriously damaged the party and revolution. The party must carefully study
the great changes in the economic and political fields and in class relations within
Indonesian society. The party must s qay the growth of the new feudal landlords, the
bureaucratic capitalists and compradors as well as their links with the imperialists.
The party must also study the conditions of all classes within Indonesian society which
have been economically and politically explotted by the imperialists, [word indistinct],
compradors and feudal landlords.
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 INDONESIA
Based-QXatbe concrete anal
within Indonesian societ analysis of the situation of the classes and their inter-relations
Y, we,can determine the correct and acceptable
tactics and directives to wage the struggle, In short, the
master and implement Marxism-Ie political line,
study, whole party must seriously
creative wa The p arty has to im- o_Ze -Thought` not i
~__ r o solve the integration off theunin a dogmatic, but
LeninismMao redo versal truth of Marxism-
Thought __ universal a with ons and situation of Indonesian
toward
revolution toward Victory , In recalling the conctherete cexperiences of the PKI over the
years, we bow our heads in deep respect to the hundreds of thousands of Indonesian co
Past 60
fighters, patriots and democratic elements from all rank who have wholeheartedly
edly
sacrificed their lives in the great struggle for the liberation of f the Indonesian We salute all communists, People,
oleheartebeliefs who, under difficult vconditions
cantand
struggle for a progressive and democratic Indonesia, , continue to
convey most sincere thanks from the Indonesian communists and revolutionary the solidarity shown b On this occasion, we
theoughi it show by the
hevcommunists, progressive elements and revolutionarey communists, given much support and encouragement to the Indonesian
patriots, democratic elements and all revolutionary
Y people in their struggle,
all forces of the Indonesian people! Fight for democratic rights and social
Justice, for complete independence and
democratic forces! national liberation! Unite, all
the PKI! fight the threat of Sovi patriotic and
Long liv N
e
arxism-Leninism"Mao Ze Lo
\__ dong Thoushtl Long live
[Signed] The delegation of the PKI, Chairman:
Committee and member of the P 1.Yusuf AJitoro
KI Central Committee Polio,, P' secretary of the Central
23 May 1980,
- /a2J'
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yy Yl J P C jot ?c fal J
cak4isuoti {-r M t, f~w t~(C! ~s ~? k,
n)-Lr.~rI
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 Approve r Release 2005/01/06 : Cl P83BI000R000200120001-1
THE DIRECT OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
25XXr Mr.
0
I apologize for the delay in getting
this information to you -- I put your name
and address in a jacket which I haven't
worn since the Young President's Meeting.
Anyway I hope that this will be of use to
you.
STAT
t or as sia
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 CE NTRAL .,11m7'EL1! IGENC;E .AGENC~
WAS'HINGTONa: i~ 210 5 0'Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1
.OFFICIAL BUfiINES5
PG NALTYFOR PRIVAT:.UBC{,-,$900
Js
STAT
POSTAGE .AN D.. r EEB. l7AI D
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200120001-1
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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 Approved Release 2005/01/06: CIA-RDP83B0W0R000200120001-1
Conference
on
Soviet-American Cooperation
in the
Northeast Asian Region
June 20, 1980
STAT
Dr. Valentin Berezhkov
Dr. Richard E. Bissell
Dr. Hilary Conroy
Professor George Ginsburgs'
Dr. William R. Kintner
Dr. Roy U.T. Kim
Dr. Cho.ng-sik* Lee
Dr. Edward A.'bisen
Dr. Alexander Primakov
Dr. Robert.A..Scalapino
General Richard Stilwell
Dr. John J'." Stremlau
Dr. Frank Trager
Ambassador Francis Underhill
Ambassador Robert Straus z-Hupe
Dr.' Victor Trifonov
Dr. Byung Suk Min
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