[LISTING OF MFRA, LDXS AND LTRS (ATTACHED)]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000200110001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 15, 1980
• Content Type: LIST

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STAT
STAT
REQUEST TO SPEAK, PRESENT A PAPER, OR PARTICIPATE IN A PUBLIC MEETING
1. Title of Presentation F, Nature of Meeting:
Sino-Soviet Relations Briefing to be given at the Strategy Sub-Panel
Meeting
Present Briefing and Participate in Panel Meeting
2. Name of Institution/Title of Meeting:
Strategy Sub-Panel Meeting, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca
3. Location:
Monterey, California
4. Time:
28-29 July
Name and Position. of NIC Requester:
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
Identified as CIA? Yes Agency-sponsored? No
7. Dollar Cost to NIC (approx):
none (funaed by CNO Executive Panel)
8. Class ified/Lg (Delete one; if classified, indicate level.)
Top Secret (possibly SI/TK)
9. Other Pertinent Information: Q,tw?
vs/~4
airman, National Intelligence 'ounm l (Date)
STAT
Yjw
STAT
Coor inator or Academic ? J elation')
Date)
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AGENDA FOR STRATEGY SUB-PANEL MEETING
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
28-29 JULY 1980
28 JULY 1980
TIME SUBJECT BRIEFER
0900 Introductory Remarks Prof. Wohlste.tter/?
Intelligence Brief TBD
(General)
Strategy Brief CAPT Patton
Working Lunch/Executive
Session
Intelligence Brief
(Regional military
capabilities)
1400 Sino-Soviet Relations
1600 Executive Session
29 JULY 1980
0900 Outlook for PRC Prof. Buss (NPGS)
1000 Outlook for Japan Prof. Olsen (NPGS)
1100 The Koreas Prof. Olsen/
Dr. Wikner
1200 Lunch
1300 Executive Session
1700 Adjourn
ENCLOSURE (1)
STAT
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LIST OF ATTENDEES FOR STRATEGY SUB-PANEL MEETING
AT THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA.
ON 28-29 JULY 1980
Prof. Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman)
The Honorable Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs
Mr. Fred Hoffman, RAND Corporation
Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of Assessment, OSD
Prof. P. J. Parker, Department of National Security, NPGS
Prof. Henry Rowen, Graduate School of Business, Stanford U.
Prof. Raymond Tanter, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, Smithsonian
Dr. N. Fred Wikner, BDM Corporation
GUESTS
ADM R. L. J. Long, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Mr. Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
STAT National Intelligence Officer/Far East,
Central Intelligence Agency
Prof. Claude Buss, Adjunct Professor, NPGS
Prof. Edward Olsen, Adjunct Associate, NPGS
HOST: RADM John H. Ekelund, Superintendent, NPGS
ENCLOSURE (2)
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 TO: (Officer designation, room .number, . and
:GREY
OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
'INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.
DATE 18 July .1980
AT
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a SECRET ?
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
1 July 1980
SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on Asia with Soviet and South Korean Officials
1. On 20 June 1980 the Foreign Policy Research Institute in
Philadelphia sponsored a one-day conference on Soviet-American relations
in the Far East, dealing primarily with Korea. The conference, which
was an invitational affair, strictly off-the-record, was noteworthy
because of the willingness of Soviet and South Korean officials to
meet together with US government and academic specialists for a frank
discussion of contentious security issues in the Far East.
2. The Soviet officials were Dr. Valentin Berezhkov and Dr. Victor
Trifonov of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and Dr. Alexander Primakov
of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations. The South Korean official
was Dr. Byung Suk Min, one of three political officers at the South
Korean Embassy who apparently follows US foreign policy toward the USSR,
China and the Third World. A list of the other participants is attached.
3. Dr. Trifonov responded to General Stilwell's presentation on
the recent Soviet military build-up in the Far East by asserting (1)
that the major change in the Far East in the past two years has been the
effort by the US to reassert its supremacy in the area and (2) that the
USSR has not done significantly more during this time than it had gradually
been doing before that to meet the US military challenge in Asia. He
said the USSR is very concerned about US efforts to include China in the
US-Japan alliance and to improve China militarily and economically. He
recalled China's urging the USSR in earlier years to take a firmer line
against the US and Moscow's refusal to do this -- a major cause of Sino-
Soviet differences in the first place.
4. Dr. Berezhkov spoke to the issue of Afghanistan, insisting that
the Soviet invasion was a local action and not the precursor of Soviet
military expansion in Asia. He said the Soviets had chosen to help the
'progressive forces' in Afghanistan, even though these forces were in the
minority. He repeatedly emphasized the ideological element in the Soviet
25
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?
SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on Asia with Soviet and NFAC #4654-80
South Korean Officials
decision to invade, refuting Professor Scalapino's observation that the
Soviets had essentially been confronted with a choice between seeing a
regime that they supported defeated or invading. Berezhkov took exception
to any interpretation of the Brezhnev doctrine as implying that the USSR
would never allow a country to abandon socialism and revert to capitalism.
He cited Chile, Indonesia, and Egypt as examples of this happening without
a Soviet response. However, in the case of Afghanistan, he said that
ideology had in fact played a major role in Soviet actions.
5. Professor Scalapino's observations on the current scene in
South Korea support the views expressed by Korea watchers in the govern-
ment -- that there is simply no consensus of opinion in South Korea on
a military vs. a civilian government. He believes that there are real
philosophical differences between the major players as to whether or
not democracy really can work in Korea and, thus, a major gulf of mis-
understanding and distrust between the various factions. The Soviets
had little to say about South Korea except that they would never agree to
any major power scheme on 'cross recognition' of the two Koreas over
Kim I1-song's objections. They showed no enthusiasm for improving relations
with South Korea, however, either through increased trade or expanded
contacts of an official or unofficial nature. They were defensive about
earlier Soviet actions in admitting South Korean officials into the USSR,
insisting that they had no alternative since these officials were attending
meetings of international organizations, such as the World Health Organiza-
tion, in Moscow. They tried to play down the significance of these moves
in terms of Soviet-South Korean relations.
6. Along this line, it was conspicuously noticeable that the Soviet
and South Korean officials made no effort to be friendly or to converse with
one another. Although Dr. Trifonov and Dr. Min were seated directly across
the table from one another at lunch, they did not appear to speak to each
other.
7. On the subject of North Korea, the Soviets were surprisingly frank
in acknowledging their serious differences with Kim II-song. Although Dr.
Trifonov has previously tried to convince US officials that the North Koreans
privately supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he made no such
pretense at this meeting. He concurred in the general view that it was another
in the long list of issues in dispute between the two countries. On other
occasions, he has described Moscow's relations with Pyongyang as "friendly --
though they might be better," but at this meeting he agreed with the general
characterization of Soviet-North Korean relations "as being not much better
than Sino-Soviet relations, except for the absence of public polemics and a
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?
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SECRET
SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on Asia with Soviet and NFAC #4654-80
South Korean Officials
border dispute." He said that he was convinced that Kim did not want a war
in Korea, that Kim has.told the Soviets this repeatedly and the Soviets
believed him. He thought that Kim was actually somewhat fearful of South
Korean military intentions at this point, considering, for instance, the
possibility that Gen. Chon might provoke an incident to justify his
consolidation of power in the South.
8. Trifonov acknowledged that the Soviets do not want to see any
improvement in US-North Korean relations and, for that reason, are against
bilateral US-North Korean talks, which Kim wants. The Soviets would see
any breakthrough in US-North Korean relations as contributing to closer
Chinese-North Korean relations, which they think are already too close. He
showed no interest in the possibility of US-North Korean trade, although
he acknowledged that all the other major powers are trading (in some cases,
secretly and through third parties) with the other Korea -- the Chinese
and Soviets are trading with South Korea, the Japanese with North Korea,
and the two Koreas trading (through a third party) with one another.
25
Attachment:
List of Participants
as stated above
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Conference
on
Soviet-American Cooperation
in the
Northeast Asian Region
June 20, 1980
Dr, Valentin Berezhkov
Dr. Richard E. Bissell
Dr. Hilary Conroy
Professor George Ginsburgs
~Dr. Helen-Louise Hunter
Dr. William R. Kintner
Dr. Roy U.T. Kim
Dr. Chang-sik'Lee
Dr. Edward A.'Olsen
Dr. Alexander Primakov
Dr. Robert :A. .Scalapino
General Richard Stilwell
Dr. John J.;Stremlau
Dr. Frank Trager
Ambassador Francis Underhill
Ambassador'Robert Straus z-Hupe
Dr.' Victor Trifonov
Dr. Byung Suk R1in
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SECRET
200
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SUBJECT: Exchange of Views on Asia with Soviet and
South Korean Officials
DISTRIBUTION
1
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1
- AC/NIC
1
- NIO/EA
(Chrono)
1
- NIO/EA
(file)
1
- OSR
/Kor
ea 3F2
9
1
- OPA
/EAP
5G32
1
- OER
/Ch.
Trade
3GO7
1
- OCR/
FEP
AC/Kore
a - 1H1816
1
- DDO/
C/E
A - 5D00
-
1
- DDO/
EA/
Korea
K
Lusiation -
tate Department/EA/Korea - Room 5315 State
1 - State/INR/REA NA - Room 8840 New State
1 - NSC
1 - DIA s imates Plaza 1012
1 - NFAC Registry
25X1 NIO/E /lJulyl980
NFAC #4654-80
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1. Warning of a North Korean Attack on the South:
An estimate of the warning time attack strategies and indicators
that would presage an attack against South Korea by North Korea.
2. Integration of Japan into the Broader World Scene:
A discussion of domestic and internal factors that affect Japan's
increasing role in the world economy, global security and international
politics.
3. Outlook for ASEAN as a Viable Regional Organization:
A discussion of the forces that will bind ASEAN together or cause it
to flounder as a regional organization with purpose and utility.
4. Outlook for Indonesia in the 1980's:
An examination of increased restiveness among Indonesians toward
the Suharto regime. and the opportunity afforded the opposition by the
general election scheduled in 1982.
5. China in the 1980s:
Will estimate the direction Chinese policies are likely to take over the
next decade, with particular reference to political stability, chances of
modernization success.
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When L resented our tentative plans
for pro ucsng interagency papers in .the
July 1980-June 1981 period to NFIBon.12 June,
he promised to~return-to a later NFIB meeting
with a more definitive'list providing a
brief description of the ground.we intended
to cover in.each projecteY=
n-order to"beable?to do this;:would you
please provide me with a one-sentence::
"scope note" on each of your. projects shown
on the attached listing? MayI please have
such statements by COB Tuesday.:2..Julyj
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THE ' DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC. //4671-80
11 July 19 80 .
ational Intelligence Officer for. East Asia.:.
FROM:
11. At the request of Bob Rich, chief of-the-Korea desk, State,.
I' arranged a CIA briefing on North and South . Korea for Congressman
Solarz' staff, in preparation for the congressman's trip to both
Koreas in mid-July. The briefing was held at Headquarters on
30 June 1980.
2. Dr. Ralph Clough,'who will'accompany Congressman Solarz to
North Korea,. attended the briefin along with Stanley Roth, legislative
25X1 'assistant to Solarz. Dr. Clough, is on the faculty of the
Institute for Sino-Soviet-Studies at George Washington University
The following NFAC analysts participated-in the briefing:
4. That evening, I attended another briefing of Congressman
Solarz, Dr.-Clough and Mr. Roth at-.the congressman's home in McLean.
The dinner-meeting was arranged by Bob Rich at State and was attended
by Mr. Rich and Don Gregg of the NSC. The discussion was almost
exclusively. about North Korea, with only a brief mention of current
developments in South Korea at the end of the evening.
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"Assistant'National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
5. We have pointed out to Congressman Solarz (through Ralph
Clough) that the inclusion of two journalists - a New York Times
correspondent in Tokyo and a Time magazine correspondent in Beijing --
will provide an unparalleled propaganda opportunity to the North
Koreans that they can be expected to exploit to the fullest. Both
journalists have been included in the four-man delegation at Solarz'
initiative. We have otherwise not taken a position pro or con the
trip, but have simply provided briefings on North Korea.
25
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - 0LC
1 NFAC Registry
1 - NIO/EA (chrono)
1 - NIO/EA (file)
25X1 NIO/EA
r 1Jul;T ' 5
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC #4705-80
2 July 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment
25X1 THROUGH:
25X1 FROM:
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: China Policy Support Center Memorandum
1.. Attached is a copy of a memorandum prepared by the China
Policy Support Center (a recently-organized component of the China
Branch, OPA/EA) which was distributed to me as one of a number of
recipients, including Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and DAS Arnacost
in State, DAS Platt in Defense, and Roger Sullivan on the NSC Staff.
This particular memorandum is one of a series produced by the China
Policy Support Center over the past several months on a number of
China-related topics. None of these were coordinated with me before
leaving the building, nor as far as I can tell with anyone else in
CIA, such as the other NFAC Offices or NIOs, and distribution in all
cases embraced. the highly-placed policy officers just noted.
2. I, of course, have no problem with analysts working on China
maintaining contact with interested officers in other parts of the
USG, and responding to queries for information or evaluations concerning
Chinese developments. It has been my understanding, however, that type-
script memoranda of this nature should be coordinated with the NIO if
they are addressed to policy officers and contain estimative judgments
or policy implications. In this particular instance I have no quarrel
with the positions taken in the memo, but I can foresee situations
arising wherein I might have some fairly important substantive differences.
Thus, a certain amount of confusion could be created in the minds of the
recipients if a memo issued in the name of the Central Intelligence
Agency and hence carrying the cachet of the Agency is later questioned
by me or by others in this building such as another NIO or OER, OSR, or
OSWR. '
25X1.
. SECRETI
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SUBJECT: China Policy Support Center Memorandum NFAC #4705-80
3. I also wonder about the propriety of the China Policy Support
Center's sending out commentaries and the like in the absence of a
specific request. My understanding of the Center's purpose, as obtained
from Mike Oksenberg who stimulated its establishment, is that it was
intended to be a backstopping operation for US Government officials
engaged in negotiations with the Chinese - a repository of information
relevant to these negotiations as derived both from our own experiences
and those of other countries, and a place where answers to important
negotiating questions can be quickly obtained. I doubt that Mike intended
the Center to be a self-directed think-tank operating outside the normal
pattern of CIA activities. It should be noted that the NID on about
the same date as this memo.carried a very similar item.
4. Again, I have no desire to squelch independent initiative or
to interfere with normal contacts between analysts and consumers. I do
believe, however, that a greater degree of coordination on the activities
and output of the Center would be in order.
Attachment:
Memorandum, dated 17 June 1980
Subject: Reported Soviet Offer
to China
1 - DD/NFA w/attach-merit
1 AC/NIC "
1 NIO/EA (chrono)
1 NIO/EA (file)
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
18 July 1980
My apologies for the delay in answering your letter of
11 June -- a bit of leave plus the usual resultant pile-up of
paperwork have intervened. At any rate, your suggestion for
bringing together some of your Korean specialists and some of
the analysts from here sounds eminently workable. The timing
also would be about right; early October or a date not too long
afterwards.
What I would propose is to bring up three or four people
who have been working on political and economic matters and let
you work us into your schedule. If you have any particular
suggestions as to what subjects you would wish to see covered,
please let me know. Perhaps you might wish to touch upon the
foreign relations of the two Koreas as well as internal
developments, and strategic considerations could be addressed
as well.
STAT
In short, however you would like to arrange the sessions
would be fine. with us. Let me know your thoughts at your
convenience. and if you wish to telephone, I can be reached at
Sincerely,
Professor Karl Moskowitz
Department of East Asian Languages
and Civilizations
Harvard University
2 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
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HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF EAST ASIAN LANGUAGES AND CIVILIZATIONS
2 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138
TELEPHONE [phone]
June 11, 1980
g nce icer tor
China-East Asia Pacific
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Ambassador Holdridge:
Thank for your letter of June 5. I am pleased that you share
I nterest in developing some interchange between your
analysts and Harvard scholars on Korea.
Though certainly timely, a program such as you suggested for July
would be difficult to arrange this summer. I will soon be leaving for
a few month's research in Korea and Japan, and so will another Korea
scholar here whom I would expect to participate in any meeting we
might arrange.
Actually, when I spoke to " I had something much more simple in
mind. I run a colloquium series on Korea at Harvard, and I am interested
in inviting one of your Korea analysts to speak to the Korea Colloquium
on some aspect of his or her work. Both to promote mutually beneficial
interchange and, somewhat separately, to show students and scholars here
that their knowledge and skills regarding Korea have important applica-
tions outside of academics, I have been inviting people in government
and private industry whose work concerns Korea to speak to the Colloquium.
Since I am also quite interested in establishing the sort of interchange
which:*.you proposed, I would like to suggest a combination of the two
which I think might be convenient and productive for both of us. My idea
is that a small group of your Korea analysts come to Harvard for a day
of private, informal meetings with our Korea specialists. In the evening
one or two of the analysts could speak to the Korea Colloquium on a topic
of their choosing. This could be done at any`_time during the school year
as long as you can give me at least two weeks advance notice. Harvard's
academic year begins on September 15, so the earliest likely date would
be the first week of October. If the informal meetings prove beneficial,
and I assume they will, then we could arrange more meetings from time
to time and with or without colloquia tie-ins.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Asst. Prof
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP DArE 3"-J'u1y 1980
TO:
I L-
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
FYI: PLEASE RETURN
I I - e~ro
00,
FROM: NIO/EA
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
7E62
HOS
FORM RFEB M 55 1)4 REPLACES FORM 96-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
18 July 1980
STAT
SUBJECT : Suggested East Asia Topics for Discussion at
the PRC(I) Meeting
The following are the suggested East Asia topics for discussion
at the upcoming PRC(I) Meeting.
-- The increasing strains in US-Indonesian relations and the
possible effects of these strains on Indonesia's attitude
toward ASEAN, Hanoi, and the USSR. Are we taking Indonesia
too much for granted, as Suharto appears to believe?
-- What is the Administration's policy on military assistance
to friendly countries in the East Asia region in terms of
grant aid, FNS sales, IMET, and economic support?
(This question is put fo*_zaard because what appears to be
inadequate military assistance has for years colored our
relations with a number of countries, notably Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea.)
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
STAT
21 July 1980
ME"10RAi1DUN FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT Representative Solarz's Visit to North Korea
1. Action Requested: None, this memorandum is for ::our
information only.
2. Background: Representative Stephen Solarz (D-NY) ended his
first of a kind, four-day visit to North Korea on 20 July. Given the
unprecedented nature of the visit, you might be asked to comment on
it during meetings outside Headquarters this week.
3. Our preliminary judgment is that North Korean President
Kim I1 Song offered up little by way of departure from es-ablished
policy when he met with Solarz in Hamhung on 18 July. Kin apparently
laid his emphasis on US-North Korean exchange visits by scholars and
artists and, according to press reports, Solarz said he would alert
interested groups in the US. We suspect from this aspect of the
Solarz visit that the North Koreans are currently putting their
emphasis on "peoples diplomacy" with the US. This gambit is a
strategy that was practiced with a good effect by the Chinese for many
years prior to normalization of relations with the US, and it is
possible Pyongyong may be receiving some encouragement from Beijing
to follow a similar path. The intent would be, of course, to erode
over time the US policy of not dealing directly with North :Korea in
the absence of representatives from South Korea, taking particular
advantage of current US disillusionment over political trends in the
South.
4. Indeed, Kim evidently made it plain that his policy of not
engaging in tripartite US-South Korean-North Korean talks on the future
of the Korean Peninsula remains in effect. He did, refer to
the possibility of permitting exchanges of letters bet-.ee North and
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South and family visits to take place -- concessions on minor issues
which might suggest flexibility while leaving the basic hard-line
policies unchanged. In fact, it was indicated to Solarz by Kim II Song
and others that they viewed dimly the prospects for direct talks with
the military-dominated government of the South which are scheduled to
resume on 20 August.
Distribution
1 each - DCI
DDCI
ER
DD/NFA
DD/NFAC
C/NIC
Action Staff
NI0/EA Chrono
NI0/EA File
NFAC Reg
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FAC 5162-80
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
22 July 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Political Analysis
THROUGH National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
STAT FROM
SUBJECT Request for Leave Without Pay
In keeping with the arrangement that was made as to my
part-time schedule of work, I request leave without pay from
4-29 August 1980. 1 will return to work on 2 September 1980.
cc: NIC Admin Officer
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
24 July 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Secretary of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs
STAT
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT Atlas of the People's Republic of China
1. I am informed by Dr. James Lynch, Director of the Agency's
Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, that they are
already in the process of updating the CIA Atlas on the PRC.
However, the process will probably take some time and thanks to the
complexity of changing all place names and other geographic cites
to pinyin romanization, a publication of the revised atlas will not
be before next year.
2. Dr. Lynch has been provided with a copy of your memorandum
to me so as to be apprised of your comments concerning the
"Historical Perspective" on pages 74-75.
cc: D/OGCR.
S
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