THE HUA-DENG RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000100080065-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: January 25, 1979
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
25 January 1979
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Hua-Deng Relationship
The unusual circumstances surrounding the elevation
of Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng) in 1976 to the posts of party
chairman and premier form the basis of an uneasy relation-
ship between the younger Hua and the hard-nosed veteran
Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping). Htia's career had flourished
in 1975 under Deng's de facto stewardship of both the party
and government, but Hua would not have risen so far so
fast had Deng not been upended by the leftist Gang of
Four in April 1976. Official Chinese decisions at that
time established a clear link between Hua's rise and
Deng's fall. This link remains a sore point in the
relationship between the two men, but there are differences
as well over the implementation of specific policies and
active competition for control over the instruments of
power. The relationship has evolved through several
stages and now seems to have settled into one in which
the two leaders will cope with their differences in some-
what more muted fashion than has been the case in the
past. With Deng's preeminence clearly established,
neither seems prepared 'to attempt to oust the other from
power.
This memorandum was prepared by the East Asia-Pacific Division
of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis in response to a
request from the Department of State. Questions and comments may
be addressed to
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Background
The Chinese now freely admit that with the declining
health of Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-tai) in 1975,
and the frail condition of Chairman Mao Zedong (Mao
Tse-tung), Deng, then fifth ranking party leader and
senior vice premier in the government, was in de facto
charge of the party and government. In early 1975,
Hua, who had come to the capital in 1971 from Mao's home
province to assume a role in the national leadership,
was named a vice premier, put in charge of security, and
maintained an active role in overseeing agricultural
and scientific work. He was clearly being groomed for
bigger things, and this process was carried out, with no
apparent discord, under Deng's leadership. 25X1
After Zhou Enlai's death in January 1976, the Gang of
Four, which had been opposing Deng on personal and policy
grounds for several years, stepped up its efforts to
prevent his succession to the premiership. In this,
they may have had at least the tacit approval of Mao.
The party was sharply divided--Deng had almost as many
enemies as friends in the leadership at the time--and
could not agree to name either Deng or the Gang of Four's
candidate to the premiership. Hua was chosen as a compromise
and named "acting" premier.
The Gang of Four then escalated its attacks on Deng,
and by late March it became necessary for the party to
decide formally on Deng's fate. Deng's supporters organized
a show of support on Chinese memorial day in the guise
of commemorating the late Zhou, Deng's patron. The Gang's
intervention in this endeavor led to rioting by millions
of people in the capital. The rioting was blamed on
Deng and was the official reason for his ouster. The Gang
was nevertheless thwarted in its efforts to profit by
Deng's demise when Hua was named premier and "first"
vice chairman of the party, thus making him the logical
choice to succeed the ailing Mao as chairman. When Mao
died in September, Hua became chairman, the only person
in Chinese communist history to hold both the party chairman-
ship and the premiership.
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Had Deng not overplayed his hand by organizing a
public show of support, he might have weathered the Gang's
April assault and could then have become premier.
Although Hua was by then an important figure, he clearly
rose higher as a result of Den is ouster than he would
have otherwise.
Deng's Return
Deng's return was a foregone conclusion once the
Gang of Four was arrested in October 1976. The process
was made difficult, however, by the opposition of some
who had crossed swords with Deng in the past and were
afraid that the always vengeful Deng would take action
against them. These people formed a natural alliance with
Hua, who was a pleasant change from Mao: unassuming in
his ways, his accessibility, low-key in his approach.
Hua's personal traits, however, were not enough to win
him large numbers of political supporters throughout
the party hierarchy. He knew he was no match for Deng,
whose forceful personality and huge network of personal
and political allies throughout the nation could enable
him to eclipse Hua. The new chairman, realizing he could
not block Deng's return--indeed that would only add to
his problems if he tried--stalled for time in order
to more firmly lay down roots within the party. Others
uneasy about the prospect of Deng's return may have been
bolder in actually trying to prevent it. In any event,
the delaying tactics were added to Deng's list of grievances
against some in the leadership and probably did not serve
to endear Hua to him either.
Deng returned in July 1977, in advance of a timetable
established by Hua earlier in the year. The party adopted
resolutions restoring Deng to all the positions he had
held before his 1976 demise and confirming Hua as party
chairman. The adoption of the two resolutions at the
same time was ipso facto acknowledgement that Deng's
return had raised questions about the legitimacy of
Hua's position, questions related directly to the decisions
of April 1976 ousting Deng and elevating Hua in his stead.
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Deng had to agree to some conditions upon his return.
He pledged his loyalty to Hua as party chairman--although
not as premier--and announced that he was Hua's "good
assistant," thus subordinating himself to Hua but under-
scoring his own vital role. He also agreed to refrain
from seeking revenge against those who may have opposed
his return or who had differed with him in the past.
The latter stipulation was important to Hua, not necessarily
because he had reason to fear that Deng would try to unseat
him but because those Deng was likely to turn against
were Hua's main supporters in the upper reaches of the
party. That these people were united more in their
opposition to Deng than in their loyalty to Hua was
less important than their ability to furnish Hua with
some measure of support at crucial party meetings.
Open Differences
After an initial display of solidarity, Hua and
Deng began to openly show their differences. Some of
these moves were symbolic, others were more substantive.
Included in the symbolic gestures were the failure of
the two to appear together and the publication in the
party's official newspaper of a photograph in which the
upraised arm of Hua completely blocked from view the face
of Deng. Such gestures are designed to send signals to
others in the party and do not occur without careful
staging.
On a more issue-oriented level, Hua and Deng differed
over the scope of the campaign against followers of the
Gang of Four. Hua wanted a limited effort, not only
because he feared creating a volatile political situation
but also because many would-be victims, having risen to
prominence like him during the Cultural Revolution, were
potential supporters. Consequently, he repeatedly inter-
vened to support Beijing (Peking) party boss Wu De
(Wu Te), who was under Deng's fire for being the last
senior official to attack him by name in 1976, for having
called a halt to the demonstrations in April 1976, and
probably for attempting to forestall his return. Wu
had been in political trouble at least as early as January
1977, even before Deng's return, but Hua's apparent support
for him and other beleaguered officials slowed Deng's
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In public forums Deng and Hua made speeches that took
sharply different tacks. At a science conference in
March 1978, Deng virtually relieved scientists of any
responsibility to prove their political reliability
and gave them carte blanche to pursue research unencumbered
by party regulation; Hua reiterated the more standard
line that scientists must follow the correct political
line to remain in good standing. At a conference in
June, Deng unveiled his own "ideology"--one that in fact
eschewed rigid adherence to any ideology but put a
premium instead on practical approaches to problem-solving.
In this, he outlined the need to revise or ignore the
teachings of Mao or other communist theoreticians. This
speech was the basis of the upswing in the effort to
desanctify Mao. Hua has been less willing--for the obvious
reason that he is the embodiment of the Mao le acy--to
cast Mao's teachings to the winds. 25X1
Unequal Partnership
Today the two men seem willing--perhaps in the
interest of economic progress--to air their differences
in more subtle ways. At a central committee plenum last
month, for example, an unpublished speech by Hua called
for "closing" the campaign against Gang of Four followers
and "shifting" work to the economic modernization pro ram
positions probably not endorsed by Deng. 25X1
Deng wants a sweeping purge of those he fears do
not fully support the modernization policies. He is
willing to risk the instability this could cause in the
short term to insure the continuation of the modernization
drive in the future. The more cautious Hua seems less
willing to take the immediate risk. He also may be more
reluctant than Deng to embark on certain controversial
economic policies--particularly those calling for large
foreign involvement--for fear that a backlash could develop
if the economic program does not make the hoped-for gains.
The plenum dealt at length with the modernization question
but did not publicly endorse the specific foreign trade
policies China has been considering. 25X1
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The communique released at the conclusion of the
plenum seemed to issue a rebuke to Deng by warning that the
personal views of leading officials must not be regarded
as instructions. Often Deng has issued instructions in
his own name on personnel and other politically sensitive
matters and has made decisions without consulting with
others. On the other hand, the plenum's call to lower the
profile of individual leaders has affected Hua more than
anyone else--he has not been called since the plenum by
his usual title "wise leader." Thus, the slimmist trngs
of a personality cult have been denied him. a i 25X1
The treatment of visiting foreign dignitaries
indicates that Hua and Deng occupy separate but roughly
equal slots in the leadership. Unlike the practice in
Mao's day when first Zhou Enlai and later Deng would
accompany the visitor to his session with Mao, thereby
acknowledging Zhou's and Deng's clear subordination to
him, Deng does not accom an visitors to their meetings
with Hua.
The appointment of a close Deng associate, the 63
year old Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-pang), as secretary-general
of the party sheds further light on the Hua-Deng relationship.
Hu is now in charge of the party's daily affairs. If
Deng had full confidence in Hua, he would not have felt
a need to. put his own protege into the post. Hu is in a
strong position to pose a serious challenge to Hua after
Deng's passing.
Ironically, Deng's current position in the leadership
could be more useful to Hua than will be Deng's death.
Neither Hu nor anyone else will challenge Hua with Deng
around; that is Deng's role and he has performed it well.
But the one factor that made Hua an ideal compromise choice--
his lack of a huge personal power base--will leave him
vulnerable to threats to his position over the longer
term.
Deng's public disavowal of his interest in the
premiership, while it does not in itself preclude a
move against Hua, makes one less likely. At this point,
Deng hardly needs the title, although he undoubtedly wanted
it very much in the past. The fact that the 74 year old
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Deng is ma)Cing the long trip to Washington rather than
the 57 year old Hua is proof enough of who the more
important man is. Deng's public comments on the need
to have the younger Hua as premier leave the impression--
probably not unintended--that Hua in fact serves by Deng's
leave. Therefore, so long as Deng does not mount an
effort to unseat Hua, his position is secure. it will
be less secure when this unusual "protector" leaves the
political scene.
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