SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 12, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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JICT
SECRET
The Review Staff
Acting Deputy
Senate select Coxiitt
once is made to
xwell Senate Se
of curit
co of Security fi
1 2 AIM 1975
or Ad.Wi
7 August 17
ct Cosd ttee
a copy of c4,s
$ en ARTICHOIE.
2. orwarded herewith are three copies of certain
the requested documents. These documents have bean saatizt
lu cordance witl established procedures. Copies of additiaaal
requested ARTICUOKE documents have previously been forwari3J,
and the remaining documents will be forwarded as seen as proc-
essing can be completed.
Att
ibution:
& 2 - Addressee w/3 sanitiz d atts
1 - A/DDA w/o att
1 - D/Security w/o att
1 - OS Registry w/o att
1 - SAG w/1 unsanitized att
1 - DD/PSI (1 sanitized & 1 unsanitized att)
OS/PSI/SAG/ :jan (12August75)
W. 0
Of
no
ty
SECRET
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30 November 1961
Ed:
Attaehed is an article which you will note,L.Tpeared in
NEWSWEEK of 4 Decenber 1961.
Pul and / consider this very interesting because, as
you will recall, in ,.tolout 1930 we had in the ARTICHOKE a
considerable interest in the hypospray.
If you recall, we aide an effort to hve it tested z.md
used but if nenory serves me correctly it was frowned upon
by some of your medic:.l coller.11es for v,trious ,rd sundry
resona. If you reeal, we titount it cuite possibly could
be used in the '71:' tori;, possiiaf a cenerA. -aesthetic
type of thing for kidn:_ppine; or for other equally esoteric
.reasons. Anywy, the upuhop of it ws tbt-t .L1. couple of
p?Ters were written, nd Ire got no4lere, probbly because
we didn't have support at this time.
We note in there th:t OTASBINSKY c1ins he' was decorated
by the Order- of the Red Banner, and Paul Arici I feel under
the cireumstances thA the least that caihi be done for us
is an Ex4doyee Amared of dollar and abrlf cash. Anyvr?
without attaching this note to it, youmdzht find it inter-
esting to show this. to Dr. Tietjen et al.
Oh, well
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111,11,e11, V. znbil, Frankfurt -Main
Assassin Stashinsky: Poison gun
A Killer's Confession
One of the cold war's most fascinating
murder mysteries was solved last week
?or was it? These were .the facts:
On the night of Oct. 1,511959, the body
of a 50-year-old Ukrainian anti-Commu-
nist. named Stefan Bandera was discov-
ered in his Munich home, slumped across
the stairs, dead. It looted like a heart
attack, but an autopsy showed Bandera
had been poisoned with cyanide.
Well aware that Bandera was the
chief of a Ukrainian 'Insurgent Army"
that hoped, one day, to invade Russia,
his German friends assumed his assassi-
nation had been ordefed in Moscow.
But until last week no (-me could be sure.
Then the West Germans announced that
a former Russian citizen had surrendered
to the police.
The killer's name?or so he said?was
Bogdan N. Stashinsky, His employer:
The Kremlin. Himself a Ukrainian,
Stashinsky had murdercil his victim with
a speciallv_hufft squirt guirThat iirecTr
spray of vaporized cyanide at such
pressure iliat it_penetrated-the skin, kill-
_inc instantly ankleaving no, mark on the
corpse., As a reward, Stashinsky claimed?
roThave been decorated with the Order
of the Red Banner by the boss of Rus-
sia's secret-police.
Why did Stashinsky surrender?
His own story is that his wife per-
suaded him to. Mrs. StaShinsky, an East
German girl, disliked living in .Moscow.
When she became pregnant, the secret
police allowed her to -gro home to East
Berlin to have her baby.. The baby died
last Aug. 8 and, in despair, the Stashin-
skys fled West just ibtfore the border
was closed on Aug. 1.1. -
But Stashinsky's conisssion to murder
meant possible life impaiionment. So why
had he given himself otp? The only ex-
planation police could offer was that a
worse fate awaited him in the East.
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Det Wes,
As you renlize? our interest in the case is in connection with
the APEICHME-type netivity cnrried out by nppnrently the militnry
in connection with this case. We have tellzed to mod elso
to our sonrces here, but we have been unnble to came up vita nny in.
formntion concerning this pnrticular activity or the individwnla
pcxticipnting in it in nny way* is convinced, thnt the drug
is not the P-1 but is possibly an larThetnmine type.
We thirt,t1w.-t through your sources, and particularly your interest
in the Agentense, you night be nble to obtnin technical infarmntion
in this connection. While it isreceizedthnt entreme cnre must
be used in seehinn this informntion since the-cnblcs all indicate
this is most sensitive nai our sources on lam-scene must not be ex*
posed, wennevertheless believe that some sort_ of inquiry could be
mde so thz:.t vie could subsequently len.= the-nAure-of the drugs
vsed nnd the techniques.
If the tedhnical reports cnnnot be obtaneia or et least a resume
of these reports, perhnps the nnmes of the. ..xticipating personnel.
could be obtained and ve could examine them to see if we had nay point
Of contact. .
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We nre most anxious to learn the nature of this operation, pnz.
ticulnrly kince there as some success indicAod and. the Arai a.PParentlY
is considering using it vrorld.vide, Which as you recall is in direct
contrest to their previously stated position= using chemicals in
connection with interrogation.
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STATI NTL
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UNCLASSIFILD RESTRICTED -CONFICENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO I INITIALS
DATE
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pL.P. e-_- d
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FROM
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INITIALS
DATE
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APPROVAL INFORMATION n SIGNATURE
ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
COMMENT fl PREPARATION OF REPLY 0 DISPATCH
CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION . FILE
. REMARKS: , I
LAA.A0L.-;" ' P? .
GicpE cm-Inr:hrrIAL ,^TED UNCLASSIFIED
? .
l'J47
:6-63704-1 u. S. tuvE Ft SI UT PUNTING OFfiCE
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Farther information on the Security Office position is
that Security hes felt that the use of drues under any cir?
cumstances is daneeroue and that such use should only be made
after it has been clearly determined that other reans of
obtaining the information are unsuccessful. The Security
approach to the problem is as folloes.
1. ARTICROXF techniques involving the use of any type
drugs should only be undertaken after it has been determined
that the action is necessary in the National interest and its
use outweighs the inherent dangers involved.
2. The consideration of the use of ARTTOPOtE-techniques
should first be considered from the standpoint of the locale.
of the operation, the political climate of the aeoeraehical
area involved, the daneers of eublicity, the aennebility of
-facilities for carrying out the operation, and whether reasonable
security can be expected in the course of the operation.
3., raving satisfied the above elements, Security feels
that the technique to be used and the drug to be employed is
a decision arrived at lased on the peculiar aircemstanees of
each case considering the health of the individual,' the
availability of the individual to the opposition after the
operation, the personal characteristics of the individual,
and the nature of the information to be obtained. The selec?
tion of the drug to be Used has always been at the determina?
tion of the Medical Division.
4. The above considerations having teen met, Security
then insists upon a highly organized and carefully controlled
operation to carry out the ARTIONOIT Mission with authority
granted to the ARTICTIOKIT Team for (a) the radical Officer to
stop the operation if it appears warranted from a medical
standpoint and (b) Security to stop the operation if itappears
there are uncontrollable security developments.
5. . Security stronely feels that the Aare -decisions
should be arrived at throueh full coordinative of the interested
parties brineine in medical, security, end erea division con?
siderations, and not at any time through the
of any one single component without relationship to the others.
Security has always maintl it is fallacic,u3
to believe that one drug serves all purposes atd can 'cf.) ue
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as a stock item. Further, Security insists that the applica?
tion of drugs in A1TIC70X7 techniques ala: s be through a
medical officer present at all times during the proceedin7s.
Security is interested in any new drug that is developed and
feels that a series of drur7s should he available for use as
the circumstances determine. Lastly, Security regards the
use of drugs which may possibly affect the health of an
individual as an activity which can have the most serious
unfavorable repercussions if the operation is ill planned
or compromised, and recognizes at the same time that the
information derived from the use of drurs is largely limited.
The Security Office would welcome any conference where this
problem could be further discussed.
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ILLEGIB
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25 (a lysergic acid derivative and referred to as P-1)
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has not been used in intnrrno.ation work involving ictual cases. Security, however,
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is familiar with at least some of the P-1 experimental work carried on by TSS,
although Security has not been briefed on any new discoveries or techniques, par-
c(tnirl
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? ?
SUBJECT: The use of Drugs or Chemicals in Unconventional Interrogation
For a number of years prior to 1952 the use of drugs or chemicals Oltruth
serum") in unconventional interrogation was studied by the Office of Security,
generally speaking, acting in cooperation with OST, who prior to 1952 was the
coordinating point of this type of activity within the Agency. Drugs and
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hypnosis were experimentally tried by the Office of Security as early as 1949-50
by an SO Team under a project then known as BLUEBIRD and as earlY as 3.951 aetwally
interrogations in using drugs were conducted by a combined team of Security Office
and Medical Division h ersonnel. '-uriy,e, when operational control of the ao.oalled
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ARTICHOp work was passed to the Security Office, drugs were used in a number or
cases at all times supported by the Medicil Division,t all-under-the so-callifirFGIB
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ARTICHOKE Program. This type of interrogation has been carrleti-en at rare Ior j inter-
u JH
.a.L0,up ,?1,1.-..t. .1.720,A-vi 4.iebni 1
ii. 1.1111Uer w.requesi as Iran me lieut. AATIAJ OKE
i
interrogation being presented to Security in 1957, although no actual work Was
done during that year.-
ILLEGIB
In all of the above ARTICHOKE cases the use of the drug or chemical (except
in certain expenmental work with the U.S. Navy the drugs or chemicaSAND
involved were determined by the Medical Division and the Medical officers present
during actual ARTICHOKE operations. The drug determined upon was always chosen
by the liedical personnel after very careful study of the subject's physical and
_
mental condition and with all Security provisions satisfied. cARTICT-TOKE-date,
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ticularly in connection with P-1 in at least a year. The Security position ha5X1
411;)C4 , . .
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been stated many times previously in that under ARTICHOKE documents they were
charged with the responsibility of carrying out in operational use unconventional
1IGIB
interrogations involving drugs and chemicals. security further has held ha
any use of OW. drugs or chemicals in interrogation is dangerous and that only
with full cooperation, knowledge, consent and with the actual physical handling
,rilkLE@Ib
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e responsibility in
of the drug medical officeL=i;=ia ARTICHOKE techniauee used.
Security office has always considered that TSS had
this connection not only for the discovery of new material for use in ARTICHOKE
but for new techniques and new ideas in this connection. The Security Office
also relt tnat it was the responsibility of 051 to very-eereimIly screen all
intelligence material, scientific data in foreign countries, etc.2 for nett
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techniques, new. drugs, or aoasaa of drugs or chemicals.= connection with inter-
rogations.
For the record it should be noted that the term new drugs or chemica tilirm-R
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never been defined, nor has there been any but uinformalfl reporting in connection
with research on new drugs or chemicals or 1 tecnniques. rurtner tne becurity
Office has never engaged in experimental work along these lines reept in a
ILLEGIB
general sense in the field of hypnosise pans,some general study in the area of
new drugs and chemicals for information purposes only.
In the actual use of drugs or chemicals for interrogation purposes certain
elements have always been considered by the Office of Security. Among these are
the following:
1. The Security Office will undertake ARTICHOKE if the national interest
overweighs the inherent dangers involved, the chance of unfavorable publicity,
or that the end results cannot be acheived by other more standard means.
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2. The Security Office, in carrying out ARTICHOKE, acts only if
a decision to interrogate under drugs is agreed on by all interested parties,
if Medical, concurrence is ootainel and finally full approval has been given
by Chief, Ops.
3. Every element has been considered before ARTICHOKE is carried out.
Every element is-very ,carefully weighed-and the chances of-success are studied
carefully,. The locale of the operation is studied, the political environment
of the area is considered. The chances of publicity, the available facilities
for the operation, the general security of the operation in every aspect.
The question of whether or not the individual will have knowledge of the
ARTICHOKE operation after it has been completed and the ultimate disposition
of the individual. All-are weig4ed :bekore ARZTCHOIS 4..s. yarned (mt.
The Security Office has not determined what drug shall be used, but has
accepted the advice of the Medical Division in each case. The problem of exactly
what information is desired is also studied to determine whether or not a particu-
lar drug is most suitable and again this has been left to the Medical Division,
although the Security Office ig-informed of most drugs and chemicals in this area.
Even hypnosis has not been attempted except iir000peratlth with the Medical Officers
present and with their guidance and assistance. As stated previously, always the
_ .
physical and mental condition of the Subject has been carefully studied prior to
the actual use of ARTICHOKE.
It is the specific policy of the Security Office that ARTICHOKE will only be
it used under very highly controlled circumstances with every element studied and with
every weakness guarded against and when possible withal chances of unfortunate
accidents or publicity are eliminated.
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The Security Office believes that a conference again setting out responsi-
bilities and safe guards in connection with the use of drugs or chemicals or any
other element in unconventional interrogation is a good idea. The Security Office
believes at this time all current information should be disclosed and all knowledge
of new chemicals, new drugs, new techniques or ideas should be discussed and
studied.
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r - s's;
STANDARD """ "3. pproved For Rhilease 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP830104*416t18000t10008-6i ;4
ce Memorandum ?
UNITED. STATES GOVERNMENT
TO : Chief/SAS
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SUBJECT: Artichoke Materials and Apparatus -- Transfer of
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DATE: 14 October 1957
Authorization is requested for transfer of Artichoke
materials and apparatus held by the writer to
C/MS/PCD SSS for his permanent retention or destruction as de-
termined by his professional opinion.
In view of present working agreements between SAS/OS and
the Medical Division, requirements for any future Artichoke cases
can be obtained through as required, hence storage of
materials and apparatus in . is unnecessary and hazardous.
Attached is an itemized list of Artichoke materials and
apparatus now held by the writer.
? 6.- ic7)
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Serotonin Creatinine Sulfate - Code No. 87900 Lot. No. 544b -.1 Bot.
LSD-25; Sandoz them. Works - 11 Boxes, 6 ampuls ea.
Sodium Amytal - White unlabeled - 37 vials
Sodium Pentothal - Yellow unlabeled - 21 vials
Amytal Sodium, ampuls In original package, Lily Bo. 3d01 b271-513y4b 37 ampuls
Penthothal Sodium, Abbott, List A?. 315d, 0.5 Gm. 12 vials
Serpasil, Ciba, 0.25 mg. 25 tablets
Thorazine, Smith, Kline & French Research Labs, Code: CS 4949 HS? #30275, 10 Grams
Dial with Urethane Ciba, 131702, 2 cc. size, 2 Boxes, 5 ampuls ea.
Chloral Hydrate, 88-070, 8.3'50 30 Grams
Amytal Sodium, Lily No. 222 9264-512967, 150 capsules
Dial (diallylbarbituric) Ciba 100 tablets
U-4905 (2854-1HJ-19) Upjohn Co. Research Labs, 1 vial - 133.7 mg.
Coramine, Ciba, 61636, 25 ampuls, 1.5 cc size
Caffeine and Sodium Benzoate, Sharpe and Dohme, L. ampuls 0.5 gm. ea.
Desoxyn Hydrochloride, Abbott, List No. 3376, 4 ampuls 20 mg. ea.
Benzedrine Sulfate, Smith, Kline and French. 51 Boxes - 6 20-mg. ampuls ea.
Phenobarbital, Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, 100 Tablets (approx.) 0.0324 gm. ea.
Morphine Sulfate, soluble hypodermic, 1/8 gr. 20 ampuls
Scopolamine hydrobromide, hypodermic, 1/100 gr., 20 ampuls
1/8 oz. of what is presumed to be Mariahuana extract.
1 Hypodermic Syringe - 1/10 cc - B D Luer-lok
3 10 cc Ideal Lock Hypodermic Syringes
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO ARTICEOKE Representatives
FROM : Director of Security
SUBJECT: ARTICHOKE; Restatement of Program
DATE 16 July 1953
1. Reference is made to attached SO memorandum dated
21 November 1952 addressed to the Assistant Director, OSI;
Chief, hedical Staff; and Chief, OTS, the subject?-"Project
ARTICHOKE."
2. Reference is also made to the informal conference
held Thursday, 9 July 1953 with
land the writer present.
3. At the above-mentioned conference held 9 July 1953,
Colonel Edwards stated he felt in view of the expanding work
being carried out in all fields in the ARTICHOKE program and
with the Constantly enlarging numbers of contacts and consult-
ants and the imminent possibility of experimental work being
undertaken both in the United States and overseas, it would be
well to redefine the specific interests and activities of all
those working with the Project ARTICHOKE and bring up to date
and set out for examination the present and future plans of
each group engaged in this work. Colonel Edwards said he felt
that in order to prevent duplication of effort and to increase
and stimulate interest and activity on behalf of ARTICIOKE,
and particularly to bend every effort to find new methods, new
techniques, new chemicals, etc. which would work to the benefit
of this Agency, all parties interested should re-examine their
work and understand clearly how each group would work with and
support the activities of the others involved in the ARTICHOKE
program.
4. The basic memorandum referred to in Paragraph 1 above
very clearly sets forth in general terms the responsibilities of
the Eedical Staff, of OTS, OSI and of 3) in connection with the
ARTICHOKE program. This memorandum also affixes and assigns in
general terms the various responsibilities af the participating
groups and affirms that these responsibilities had been concurred
in previously in a staff study dated 29 August 1952.
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5. Colonel Edwards further stated in the above-mentioned
conference that there were many places where responsibilities
would lie jointly between various participating groups and there
would be a great deal of overlapping since it appeared obvious
the field was tremendous and the effort now covered so many
diverse activities.
6. It is felt that a restatement of the aims of ARTICHOKE
is essential at this time. Briefly, these basic aims may be
stated as follows:
a. To perfect techniques utilizing existing drugs, hypnosis,
and other elements for the extraction of-information from
individuals whether willing or not.
b. To provide field teams for testing, experimenting and re-
fining techniques utilizing currently known and recommended
new materials for the extraction of information from in-
digenous personnel under field conditions.
c. In coordination with TSS and the Medical Staff arrange for
research and experimentation within the facilities of
.those two components for the development of means for the
control of the activities and mental capacities of individ-
uals whether willing or not.
d. Conduct liaison and initial research in fields and areas not
within the immediate canabilities of TSS and the Medical Staff
for the development of ideas and possible means of exerting
control over the activities and mental capacities of individ-
uals.
e. Control the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques and serve
as the support element to the operational components in the
use of such techniques.
f. Explore means through indoctrination and training of preventing
the enemy from gaining control over the activities and mental
capacities of Agency personnel.
g. Serve as the coordinating element among all components for
the Agency on those matters concerning the operational use
of ARTICHOKE techniques.
h. Arrange for the exchange of information concerning ARTICHOKE
techniques and research and development among those elements
primarily concerned as OSI, TSS, Medical Division, DDP and
Security Office.
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i. Conduct authorized liaison with other components of govern?
ment in the ARTICHOKE field and arrange for liaison
responsibility through the Agency component having the
most pertinent interest in new projects or activities in
other departments having bearing on the overall ARTICHOKE
project.
7. It should be recognized that there are many facets of pos?
sible ARTICHOKE interest which have never been adequately explored
from the standpoint operational ARTICHOKE use. TSS and the Medical
Division will be expected, from the framework of their capabilities,
to conduct the basic research as to whether or not such elements have
any possible application to operational use for ARTICHOKE purposes.
The introduction of new ideas and new techniques are the responsibility
of all components concerned and should be presented by each component
with as much background material as is possible. In this capacity
the Security Office will maintain contact and liaison with scientific
and technical specialists in these fields for the basic development of
ideas and the suggestions of new means for possible use in ARTICHOKE.
Such action will be conducted in fu/1 coordination with the other
interested components to insure that there is no duplication of effort.
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brigwv.eim tawaras
Colonel, GSC
oesetaN -slolot
A
tik
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SrgiCUITY
KEKORANDUM Ka: Assistant Director, 031
Chief, :':edical Staff
Celery-CT:3
SUPAT;;CT
Project ARTICHOKE
21 November 1952
1. Reference is made to the staff study dated 29 August 1952 from
Assistant Director/A to DD/Py DD/I and 'e/A. The staff study hs been
concurred in by the aenropriste officers wherein the responsibility for
Project AieTICHeil;;; has been allocated as follows:
a. Overall.responsibility for the project should be
transferred from C3I to
b. L130 should call upon the research and support
facilities of CIA -ledical Staff and of the Office of
Technical services as required.
c. Liaison with the Research and Development Doard
and with the Service components should be the responsiUlity
of IWO..
d. Responsibility for the evaluation of foreign intent,.
gence aspects of the project should remain in 031.
2. In conformity with the above allocation of responsibility for
Project keTICW:2;, LISO delegates responsibility for the implementation
of this project as follows:
a. 'The Chief, Medical Staff should be responsible for medical
research in support of this eroject which shall consist of research
of a basic and operational nature determined by Chief, eedical Staff,
as appropriate and necessary within the scope of his facilities in
support of t is project. In addition, Clliefy Medical etaff will
conduct researc and furnish operational sueport in resoonse to
requests by II:0 and within the limits of facilities available to
the :ledical Staff. iZecues s by iaso mill consist of specific
elements of research, laterials and personnel in support of opera?
tional use of ;reject
b. Chief of Cii has advised that in view of lacs of faciliti,s
and other reauireeents, his et:If is not in a ios-11,1,,n to uneertake
full?scale support of thie program as outlined. in aeuiteony eTj
advises it win not urrlertel:e operatiens tis nroject on its
mei hut will restrict itself to 1.:_or tcry toe rec. mentation. In accordance with tis unuerseareding el.; will coneucty
1--"ang
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within limit tins of their facilities, research in the basic
fields of science in sup-ort of tis project. In aidition, OTS
will conduct, within linitcti.ns of their facilities, specific
research, other than medical, reeuested by Te130 in support of
operational aspects of 2roj,ct IL TraioT.4
3. Liaison with the Research and Development Board in support
of tAs Project will be the responsibility of -a3 -under an arrangement
already effected by OTS.
4. Responsibility for evaluation of foreign in.ellieence aspects
of 'reject A will rain with eeI.
5. lax will conduct liaison with the Service components concerned
in this problem and in relatiela to operational aspects of eroject
6. CT3 anri. 1-edical Staff each have established liaison with the
Service components in conformity with their respective fields of respon-
sibilities end it is foreseen t2t research conducted by CT3 and -edical
Staff in sunport of vroject AeiICKCY... will incluie liaison with the eervIce
components in tnis re-ard. For the sake of clarification, Ife:0 will restrict
its liaison to operational aspects of XeT1CH eLe and,CT3 and 1-:edical Staff
will restrict their liaison, as regards AeT1C:el.? to the research fields.
In order to prevent duplication and some crossing of channels, coordination
and excher7e of ieformation in tis regard will be necessary between the
three elements concerned.
7. In order that information and activities -may be appropriately
discussed, 'as? will call monthly meetings of iedical btaff? CIS and ree'O.
8. In order to provide facilities for the actual use of ARTICHOKE,
MO will budget for adirecruit personnel for tele establishmeet of at
least two teams.
9. Concurrence in the above allocation of responsibilities is requested.
Sheffield 3dwards
Coloeel, 13-3C
Security Ciffileer, CIA
411, 1, f -se31
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DRAFT
SECRET
Security Information
? MEEORANDUM TO: ARTICHOKE Representatives
FROM : Director of Security
SUBJECT : ARTICHOKE; Restatement of Program
1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 26 November 1952 addressed
to AD/OSI; Chief, Medical Staff; and Chief, OTS from Security Officer,
CIA, subject "Project ARTICHOKE."
2. In accordance with discussions at the July and August ARTICHOKE
meetings, it is felt that a restatement of the alma of ARTICHOKE is
essential at this time, together with a re-definition of the functions of
the ARTICHOKE participants. Also included in this restatement will be
certain additions to principles stated in above-mentioned memorandum.
that have been agreed on in meetings of ARTICHOKE representatives during
the past several months:
3. Aims:
a. Perfect techniques utilizing existing drugs, hypnosis and other
elements for the extraction of information from individuals
whether willing or not.
b. Provide field teams for testing, experimenting and refining
techniques utilizing currently known and recommended new
materials for the extraction of information from indigenous
personnel under field conditions.
c. In coordination with TSS and the Medical Staff arrange for
research and experimentation within the facilities of these
two components for the development of means for the control
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whether willing or not. abtit
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Security k 0
d. Conduct liaison and initial research in fields and areas not
within the immediate capabilities of TSS and the Medical Staff
for the development of ideas and possible means .of exerting
control over the activities and mental capacities of individuals.
e. Control the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques and serve
as the support element to the operational components in the
use of such techniques.
f. Explore means through indoctrination and training of preventing
the enemy from gaining control over the activities and mental
capacities of Agency personnel.
g. Serve as the coordinating element among all components for the
Agency on those matters concerning the operational use of
ARTICHOKE techniques.
h. Arrange for the exchange of information concerning ARTICHOKE
techniques and research and development among those elements
primarily concerned, as OSI, TSS, Medical Division, WI, and
Security Office.
i. Conduct authorized liaison with other components of government
in the ARTICHOKE field, and arrange for liaison responsibility
through the Agency component having the most pertinent interest
in new projects or activities in other departments having
bearing on the overall ARTICHOKE project.
4. Functions:
a. The Chief, Medical Staff, should be responsible for medical
research in support of this project which shall consist of
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research of a basic and operational nature determined by Chief,
Medical Staff, as appropriate and necessary within the scope of
his facilities in support of this project. In addition, Chief,
Medical Staff, will conduct research and furnish operational
support in response to requests by the Security Office and
within the limits of facilities available to the Medical Staff.
Requests by the Security Office will consist of specific
elements of research,naterials and personnel in support of
operational use of Project ARTICHOKE. The Chief, Medical Staff,
will provide medical support for ARTICHOKE field teams.
b. TSS will conduct, within limitations of their facilities,
.research in the basic fields of science' in support of this
project. In addition, TSS will conduct, within limitations
of their facilities, specific research, other than medical,
requested by the Security Office in support of operational
aspects of Project ARTICHOKE.
c. Liaison with the Research and Development Board in support
of this Project will be the responsibility of TSS under an
arrangement already effected by TSS.
d. Responsibility for evaluation of foreign intelligence aspects
of Project ARTICHOKE will remain ulth OSI.
e. Security Office will conduct liaisun with the Service com-
ponents concerned in this problem and in relation to opera-
tional aspects of Project ARTICHOM,
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Security Information
f. TSS and Medical Staff each have established liaison with the
Service components in conformity with their respective. fields
of responsibilities and it is foreseen that research conducted
by TSS and Medical Staff in support of Project ARTICHOKE will
include liaison with the Service components in this regard.
? For the sake of clarification, Security Office will restrict
its liaison to operational aspects ofAETICHOKE and TSS and
Medical Staff will restrict their liaison, as regards
ARTICHOKE, to the research fields. In order to prevent
duplication, and some crossing of channels, coordination and
.exchange of information in this regard mill bp necessary between
the three elements concerned.
g. DD/P will provide a representative to attend ARTICHOKE meetings.
This representative will furnish necessary operational guidance
and Support from DD/P standpoint for implementation of
ARTICHOKE.
h. Representatives designated by DD/P; AD/OSI; Director of Security;
Chief, Medical Staff; and Chief, OTS shall constitute the
ARTICHOKE Committee.
i. The ARTICHOKE Committee will meet monthly or more often as
necessary when such meetings are called by the Director of
Security or his representative.
j. In order to provide facilities for the actual use of ARTICHOKE,
Security Office has budgeted for and is recruiting personnel
for the establishment of at least two teams .i0
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Secur,ty iniortilatiort
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SECURITY INFhjiJ
AFT
MEMORANDUM FOR: ARTICHOKE COMMITTEE
It is recommended that the following form and content be accepted
and approved as being the Aims and Responsibilities in the ARTICHOKE
program.
1. The Director of Security shall be responsible for the ARTICHOKE
program.
2. The aims of the ARTICHOKE program are as follows:
?
a. To perfect techniques utilizing existing drugs,. hypnosis, and
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other elements for the extraction of information from individuals
whether willing or not.
b. To explore means through research indoctrination and training
for preventhig the enemy from gaining control over the activities and
mental capacities of Agency personnel.
c. When necessary and consistent with Agency policy and operational
security, support CIA operations through the use of ARTICHOKE tech-
niques.
3. The following responsibilities and functions will apply to the
ARTICHOKE program:
a. The Director of Security will be responsible for the general di-
rection, administration and execution of the ARTICHOKE aims as de-
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fined in 2.a, -b and -c, above.
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s7.cuniTY INFORMATION
b. The Director of Security will provide field teams for testing,
experimenting and refining techniques utilizing currently known and
recommended new materials for the extraction of information from
indigenous personnel under field conditions.
c. The Director of Security will arrange, in coordination with
TSS and the Medical Staff, for research and experimentation within
the facilities of those two components for the development of means
for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals
whether willing or not.
d. The Director of Security will conduct liaison and research in
fields and areas not within the immediate capabilities of TSS and the
Medical Staff for the development of ideas and possible means of
exerting control over the activities and mental capacities of indivi-
duals.
e. The Director of Security will control the operational use of
ARTICHOKE techniques and serve as the support element to all op-
erational components in the use of such techniques.
f. The Director of Security will serve as the coordinating element
among all components for the Agency on those matters concerning the
operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques.
g. The Director of Security will arrange for the exchange of in-
formation concerning ARTICHOKE techniques and research and de-
velopment among those elements primarily- concerned as OSI, TSS,
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Medical Division, DD/P and Security Office.
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h. The Director of Security will conduct authorized liaison with
other components of government in the ARTICHOKE field and arrange
for liaison responsibility through the Agency component having the
most pertinent interest in new projects or activities in other depart-
ments having bearing on the overall ARTICHOKE project.
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SUBJECT: The use of Drugs or Chemicals in Unconventional Interrogation
For a number of years prior to 1952 the use of drugs or cheeicals &truth
serum") in unconventional interroeetion was studied by the Office of Security,
generally speakine, actin' in cooperation with OSI? who prior to 1952 was the
coordinating point of this type of activity within the Aeency. Drugs and
hypnosis were exeorimentally tried by the Office of Security as eorly as 19149-50
V an FIO Teem under a project ti= keown as ;11,n3LID and as early as 1951 actuk:11:
interrceations in usine drues were conducted by a coebine teae of Secrete Office
and Medical Division person 1. In 1952, alien operational control of the so-call
ATICFG work was passed to the Security Office, dras were used in a number of
cases at all ties supported by the Medicil Division, all. under the so-called.
A TIMM Proram. This type of interne ation has been carried on at rare inter-
vals up until 1956 (?) with a number of rlezuests from the field for AeTIGeOKS
interrogation being presented to Security in 1957$ although no actual work was
done- durine that year.
In all of the above AaTI=KE cases .the use af the drug or chemical (except
in certain expenmental work with the U.S. Navy in mmany) the dru:s or cilenicals
involved were detemined by the Medical Division anti the Medical officers present
during actual ARTIC'JOIC operations. The drug detereined upon was always chosen
1?the eedical perso'nel after very careful study el the subject's physical and
mental condition nd with all 'ecurity provicion ssisiicd. .Ti=, On to (tete,
while familiar with the LSD-25 (a lye-n/-1c acid der6erative and referred to as P-1)
has ect been uI in trrontion work involvin actleal cases. :-ecurite? 'owev,e,
is familier with at least some of the P-1 experimeeriel work carried on by TSS,
although Security has not been briefed on apy new discoveries or techniques, par-
tic 11ftrcilKERICEIVARewiCR4T2i11ibCMCeT8-0a1042R000800010008-6
^rition has
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been stated nany tiles previously in that under kRTIC7OKE docunents they were
charged with the responsibility of carrying out in operationel use unconventional
interrogations involving drugs and chenicals. Security further has held that
any use of the drugs or chemicals in interrogation is dangerous and thdronly
with full cooperation, knowledge, spnsent and with the actual physical handling
of the drug le, medical officers did the AVII:,70Ke techniques be used. rhe
Security office has always considered that r,S had a reserve reseonsibiiity in .
this con ection not only for the discovery of new eaterial for use in Lieu, OK&
but for new techniques and nee ideas in this connection. The Security Office
also felt thet it was the respeneibility of-On to very carefully screen all
inkellieence material, scientific data in foreign countrtese.etc., for new
techniques, new "drues, or access of drues or chemicale.in connection with inter?
rogations.
For the record it should be noted that the term new drues or chemicals has
never been defined, nor has there been any but *informal" reporting in connection
with research on new drugs or chemicals or new techniques. Further the Security
Oifice has never engaged in experimental work alcseg- these lines except in a
general sense in the field of hypnosis, plus some general study in the area of
new drugs,and chemicals for information purposes -vny.
In the actual use of drus or chemicals for interroeation eureores certain
elements have always been considered by the Office of Security. hmone tese are
the followines
1. The Security Office will undertake itaTTC7OKE if the national interf7c.,
overweighs the inherent dangers involved, the chance of unfavorable ,rablicL_
or that the end results cannot be acheivtd by other more standard means.
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2. The Security Office, in carrying out ARTIGLICKE, acts only if
a decision to interrogate under drugs is agreed on by all interested parties,
if Medical concurrence is obtained and finally full approval has been eivtn
b, Chief, Ops.
3. Every element has been considered before AilICHOKE is carried out.
Every eleeent is very carefully welhed and the chances of success are stud1ef
carefully. The locale of the operation is studied, the political environmeae
of the area is considered. The Chances of publicity, the available facilWes
for the ooeration, the general security of the operation in every aspect.
The question of whether or not the individual will have knowledee of the
ALTICLOKE operation after it has been eomeleted and the ultimate dis osition
of the individual. All are weifhed before UTICIIO:L is carried out.
The Security Office has not detemined what drug shall be used, but has
accepted the advice of the Medical rivis ion in each case. The problem of eXactly
what information is desired is also studied to determine whether or not a ?articu-
lar drug is most suitable and Rain this has been lett to the Medical Division,
although the Secprity Office in informed of most drags and chemicals in this area.
Even hypnosis Ips not been attempted except in cooperation with the Nedical Officcaa
present and with their guidance end assistance. As stated previously, always the
physical and mental condition of the Subject has been carefully studied prior to
the actual use of ARTICHOKE.
It is the specilic policy of the ,ecurity C2fice teat KRTTOHOKE will only 1,
used under very highly controlled circumstinces with every element studded and -
every weakness guarded againet and when possible withsll chances of unfortunate
aceideets or publicity are ellmineted.
sutla
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The security 0ice believes thpt a conference ar,ain setting ,,ut res-onsi-
bilities and safe guards in connection with the use of drus or cherTCeals or any
other element in unconventional interroration iF a good idea. Thr Security.7'ff1ce
believes at this time all current information should be disclosed and all lc,owled
of new chemicals, new drugs, new techniques or ideas should be discussed and
studied.
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tlqr?
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PROJECT - ARTICHOKE
BASIC PAPER
23. November 1952
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