ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 352
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 20, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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94TH CONGRESS
1st Session
J REPORT
No. 94-465
ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS
INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS
AN INTERIM REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WITH
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
VIEWS
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIE,9
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee
WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennnsylvania
GARY HART, Colorado
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, Jr., Chief Counsel
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Counsel to the Minority
AUDREY HATRY, Clerk of the Committee
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CONTENTS
Page
Prologue--------------------------------------------------------- xIII
1. Introduction and Summary_____________________________________ 1
A. Committee's Mandate______________________________________ 1
B. Committee Decision To Make Report Public------------------ 2
C. Scope of Committee's Investigation --------------------------- 2
D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions-----------------------. 4
1. The Questions Presented__________________________________ 4
2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots---------- 4
3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on The Issues of Author-
ity and Control_____________ 6
II. Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation ------ 9
A. Policy Development and Approval Mechanism----------------- 9
B. The Concept of "Plausible Denial"_ ---------------------- 11
III. Assassination Planning and Plots________________________________ 13
A. Congo --------------------------------------------------13
1. Introduction-------------------------------------------- 13
2. Dulles Cable to Leopoldville: August 26, 1960--------------- 14
3. CIA Encouragement of Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"
Lumumba-------------------------------------------- 16
4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba------------------------- 19
(a) Bissell/Tweedy Meetings on Feasibility of Assassinating
Lumumba----------------------------------------- 19
(b) Bissell/Scheider Meetings on Preparations for Assassinating 20
"An African Leader"-------------------------------
(c) Scheider Mission to the Congo on an Assassination
Operation----------------------------------------- 21
(d) Congo Station Officer Told to Expect Scheider: Dulles
Cables About "Elimination" of Lumumba------------- 22
(e) Assassination Instructions Issued to Station Officer and
Lethal Substances Delivered: September 26, 1960------ 24
(f) Hedgman's Impression That President Eisenhower Ordered
Lumumba's Assassination--------------------------- 25
(g) Steps in Furtherance of the Assassination Operation------ 26
(i) Hedgman's Testimony About Confirmation from
Headquarters of the Assassination Plan ----------- 26
(ii) "Exploratory Steps" _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ ._ - - 27
(iii) The Assassination Operation Moves Forward After
Scheider's Return to Headquarters: October 5--7,
1960------------------- -- 29
(iv) Headquarters Continues to Place "Highest Priority"
on the Assassination Operation------------------ 30
(h) Tweedy/Bissell Testimony: Extent of Implementation;
Extent of Authorization----------------------------- 33
(i) Tweedy's Testimony About the Scope of the Assassi-
Operation-------------------------------
nation 33
(ii) Bissell's Testimony About Moving the Assassination
Operation From Planning to Implementation-_-_-_ 36
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III Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued
A. Congo--Continued
5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot
and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Their Agents in the Psge
Congo------------------------------------------------ 37
(a) Mulroney's Assignment in the Congo -------------------- 37
(i) Mulroney's Testimony That He Went to the Congo
After Refusing an Assassination Assignment From
Bissell---------------------------------------- 37
(ii) Bissell's Testimony About the Assignment to
Mulroney------------------------------------ 40
(iii) Mulroney Informed of Virus in Station Safe Upon Ar-
riving in Congo: November 3, 1960______________ 41
6 v) Mulroney's Plan to "Neutralize" Lumumba--------- 42
(b) QJ/WIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December
1960--------------------------------------------- 43
(c) WI/ROGUE Asks QJ/WIN to Join "Execution Squad":
December 1960------------------------------------ 45
6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing
About Lumumba's Death in Katanga Province ------------ 48
(a) Lumumba's Imprisonment After Leaving U.N. Custody:
November 27-December 3, 1960- ------------------- 48
(b) Lumumba's Death----------------------------------- 49
7. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassination Plot
Was Authorized---------------------------------------- 51
(a) High-Level Meetings at Which "Getting Rid of Lumumba"
Was Discussed ------------------------------------ .. 53
(1) Dillon's Testimony About Pentagon Meeting: Summer
1960--------------------- 53
(ii) Robert Johnson's Testimony That He Understood
the President to Order Lumumba's Assassination
at an NSC Meeting---------------------------- 55
(iii) Special Group Agrees to Consider Anything That
Might Get Rid of Lumumba: August 25, 1960----- 60
(iv) Dulles Reminded by Gray of "Top-Level Feeling"
That "Vigorous Action" was Necessary in the Congo:
September 7-8, 1960___________________________ 62
(v) Dulles Tells NSC That Lumumba Remains a Grave
Danger Until "Disposed Of": September 21, 1960__ 62
(b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials ---------- 64
(c) Bissell's Assumptions About Authorization by President
Eisenhower and Allen Dulles________________________ 65
(d) The Impression of Scheider and Hedgman That the
Assassination Operation Had Presidential Authorization- 67
B. Cuba ------------------------------------------------------ 71
1. The Assassination Plots ------------------------------------- 71
(a) Plots: Early 1960------------------------------------- 72
) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image______________ 72
(ii) Accident Plot----------------------------------- 72
{ii) Poison Cigars----------------------------------- 73
(b) Use of Underworld Figures-Phase I (Pre-Bay of Pigs) - _ _ _ 74
(i) The Initial Plan--------------------------------- 74
(ii) Contact with the Syndicate ------------------------- 75
(iii) Las Vegas Wiretap-------- _ _ _ _ _
(1) CIA Involvement in the Wiretap_______________ 77
(2) Consequences of the Wiretap___________________ -79
(iv) Poison is Prepared and Delivered to Cuba---------- 79
(c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II (Post-Bay of Pigs) - - 82
(i) Change in Leadership ----------------------------- 82
(n) The Operation is Reactivated--- _______________ 83
(d) Plans in Early 1963---------- ------------------------ 85
(e) AM/LASH -----------------------------------------86
(z) Origin of the Project ______------------------------ 86
(ii) The Poison Pen Device ------------------------ 88
(iii) Providing AM/LASH with;Arms___________________ 89
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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued
B. Cuba-Continued
2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Author- Page
ized Within the Central Intelligence Agency?______________ 91
(a) The Question Presented_______________________________ 91
(i) Dulles------------------------------------------ 92
(ii) McCone---------------------------------------- 92
(b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize the Initial Plots
Against Castro?____________________________________ 92
(i) Dulles' Approval of J.C. King's December 1959 Mem-
orandum-------------------------------------- 92
(ii) Dulles' January 1960 Statement to the Special Group- 93
(iii) Meetings in March 1960__________________________ 93
(iv) Recision of Accident Plot in July 1960_____________ 94
(v) Briefing of Dulles on Use of Underworld Figures in
September 1960-------------------------------- 94
(1) Evidence Concerning What Dulles Was Told ----- 94
(2) Evidence Concerning When the Briefing Occurred- 97
(vi) Edwards' Communications to the Justice Department
in 1961 and 1962_______________________________ 97
(vii) General Cabell's Remarks to the Special Group in
November 1960 --------------------------------- 98
(c) Did John McCone Know of or Authorize Assassination
Plots During His Tenure as D CI?-------------------- 99
(i) McCone's Testimony_____________________________ 99
(ii) Testimony of Helms, Bissell and Other Subordinate
Agency Employees_____________________________ 100
(iii) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About the
Assassination Plots_____________________________ 102
(iv) The Question of Whether General Carter, McCone's
Deputy Director, Learned About the Underworld
Plot and Informed McCone_____________________ 106
(v) The August 1963 Briefing of McCone--------------- 107
3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au-
thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency? ------ 108
(a) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside the
Central Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Admin-
istration------------------------------------------ 109
(i) Summary--------------------------------------- 109
(ii) Richard Bissell's Testimony_______________________ 110
(1) Lack of Personal Knowledge___________________ 110
(2) Assumptions Concerning Dulles---------------- 111
(iii) Testimony of White House Officials---------------- 111
(1) Gordon Gray________________________________ 111
(2) Andrew Goodpaster__________________________ 112
(3) Thomas Parrott______________________________ 113
(4) John Eisenhower----------------------------- 113
(iv) Documentary Evidence___________________________ 114
(1) Inspector General's Report____________________ 114
(2) Contemporaneous Documents ------------------ 114
(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside
the Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy
Administration____________________________________ 116
(i) Pre-Bay of Pigs Assassination Plot----------------- 117
(1) Bissell's Testimony Concerning His Assumption
That Dulles Told the President______________ 117
(2) Bissell's Testimony Regarding His Own Actions_ 118
(3) Kennedy Administration Officials' Testimony-_-- 119
(4) The Question of Whether Assassination Efforts
Were Disclosed in Various Briefings of Adminis-
tration Officials____________________________ 120
a. Briefing of the President-Elect --------------- 120
b. Discussion with Bundy on "Executive Action
Capability',----------------------------- 121
c. Taylor/Kennedy Bay of Pigs Inquiry-------- 121
(5) Conversation Between President Kennedy and
Senator George Smathers____________________ 123
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III- Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued
B. Cuba-Continued
3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au-
thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?-Con.
(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside of
the Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy
Administration-Continued
(i) Pre-Bay of Pigs Assassination Plot-Continued
(6) The Question of Whether the President or the
Attorney General Might Have Learned of the
Assassination Effort from the Cuban Partici- Page
pants------------------------------------- 124
(7) The Question of Whether the Assassination Opera-
tion Involving Underworld Figures Was Known
About by Attorney General Kennedy or
President Kennedy as Revealed by Investiga-
tions of Giancana and Rosselli--------------- 125
a. 1960------------------------------------- 125
b. 1961 ------------------------------------- 126
c. 1962------------------------------------- 129
(1) Did President Kennedy Learn Anything
About Assassination Plots as a Result of
the FBI Investigation of Giancana and
Rosselli?---------------------------- 129
(2) The Formal Decision to Forego Prosecution- 131
(a) Events Leading Up to a Formal Brief-
ing of the Attorney General____ __ 131
(b) Briefing of the Attorney General on
May 7, 1962--------------------- 131
(aa) The Attorney General Was Told
That the Operation Had
Involved an Assassination
Attempt____________________ 132
(bb) Evidence Concerning Whether
The Attorney General Was
Told That the Operation Had
Been Terminated------------- 132
(ii) Post-Bay of Pigs Underworld Plot-MONGOOSE
Period---------------------------------------- 134
(1) Events Preceding the Establishment of MON-
GOOSE-- -------------------------------- 135
a. The Taylor/Kennedy Board of Inquiry ------- 135
b. National Security Action Memorandum 100 of
October 5, 1961, and the CIA Intelligence
Estimate-------------------------------- 136
c. President Kennedy's November 9, 1961. Con-
versation with Tad Szule ----------------- 138
d. President Kennedy's Speech of November 16,
1961 ----------------------------------- 139
(2) Operation MONGOOSE______________________ 139
a. The Creation of Operation MONGOOSE--__. 139
(1) The Special Group (Augmented) (SGA)_-- 140
(2) General Lansdale Named Chief-of-Oper-
ations of MONGOOSE-------------- 140
(3) CIA Organization for MONGOOSE----_- 140
b. Lansdale's Theory and Objective for MON.
GOOSE--.------------------------------ 140
c. Bissell's Testimony Concerning Presidential
Instructions to Act More Vigorously- ------ 141
d. The January 19, 1962 Special Group Meeting- 141
e. General Lansdale's MONGOOSE Planning
Tasks---------------------------------- 142
f. Lansdale's Rejection of a Suggestion that a Prop-
aganda Campaign Including Rewards for
Assassination, Be Explored---------------- 144
g. The control System MONGOOSE Operations_ 144
h. The Pattern of MONGOOSE Action --------- 146
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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued
B. Cuba-Continued
3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au-
thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?-Con.
(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside of
the Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy
Administration-Continued
(ii) Post-Bay of Pigs Underworld Plot-MONGOOSE
Period-Continued
(3) Evidence Bearing on Knowledge of and Author- Page
ization for the Assassination Plot, Phase II - - - _ 148
a. Helms' Testimony Concerning Authority----- 148
(1) Helms' Perception of Authority---------- 148
(2) Helms' Testimony Concerning the Absence
of a Direct Order and Why He Did Not
Inform Administration Officials-------- 150
(3) Helms' Perception of Robert Kennedy's
Position on Assassination-------------- 150
(4) Helms' Testimony as to Why He Did Not
Obtain a Direct Order________________ 151
(5) Helms' Perception of the Relation of
Special Group Controls to Assassination
Activity----------------------------- 152
b. Harvey's Testimony Concerning Authority--__ 153
(1) Harvey's Perception of Authority-------- 153
(2) Harvey and the Special Group (Aug-
mented) ----------------------------- 153
c. Testimony of Kennedy Administration Of-
ficials ----------------------------------- 154
(4) The August 10, 1962 Special Group (Augmented)
Meeting----------------------------------- 161
a. The ContemVoraneous Documents ----------- 161
1) Lansdale s August 13, 1962 Memorandum-_ 161
(2) Harvey's August 14, 1962 Memorandum____ 162
(3) The Minutes of the August 10, 1962 Meeting- 162
(4) The August 10 Meeting----------------- 163
b. The Testimony---------------------------- 164
(1) Testimony About the August 10 Meeting-_ _ 164
?) McCone------------------------- 164
b) Harvey -------------------------- 164
c) Goodwin------------------------- 164
d) McNamara---------------- ---- 165
(9) Testimony About Events After the August
10 1962 Meeting___________________ 165
a) lcCone------------------------- 165
b) Harvey-------------------------- 165
c) Elder----------------------------- - 165
d) Lansdale------------------------- 165
(3) Testimony of Reporters About Lansdale's
Comments on the August 10 Meeting__ _ 167
M The Martin Report_______________ 168
The O'Leary Report______________ 169
(iii) The Question of Whether the AM/LASH Plot (1963-
1965) Was Known About or Authorized by Admin-
istration Officials Outside the CIA --------------- 170
(1) Kennedy Administration's Policy Toward Cuba
in 1963------------------------------------ 170
a. Organizational Changes ---------------------- 170
b. Discussion of the Contingency of Castro's
Death---------------------------------- 170
e. The Standing Group's Discussion of United
States Policy Toward Cuba--------------- 172
d. The Special Group's Authorization of a Sabo-
tage Program Against Cuba--------------- 173
e. The Diplomatic Effort to Explore an Accom-
modation with Castro____________________ 173
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111. Assassination Planning and Plots--Continued
B. Cuba-Continued
3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au-
thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?-Con.
(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside of
the Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy
Administration-Continued
(iii) The Question of Whether the AM/LASH Plot (1963-
1965) Was Known About or Authorized by Admin-
istration Officials Outside the CIA--Continued
(2) Testimony on the Question of Authorization for Page
the AM/LASH Poison Pen Device ------------ 174
a. The October Meeting with AM/LASH and the
Use of Robert Kennedy's Name Without
Obtaining His Approval_________________.. 174
b. The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November
22, 1963---------------- ----------------- 175
(3) The Question of Authorization in the Johnson
Administration_____________________________ 176
a. Summary of the Assassination Activity------- 176
b. The Issue of Authorization---. ---------------- 176
c. The Covert Action Program Against Cuba in
1964-1965------------------------------ 177
d. The Special Group Investigation of Reported
Castro Assassination Plots by Cuban Exiles- 177
e. Helms' Report to Rusk_____________________ 178
f. Helms' Briefing of President Johnson on the
1967 Inspector General's Report ----------- 179
(4) Helms' Testimony on Authorization in the
Johnson Administration---------------- ---- 179
C. Institutionalizing Assassination: The "Executive Action" Capa-
bility,_..------------------------------------------------- 181
1. Introduction----__ -------------------------------- 181
2. The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization, or
Knowledge of the Executive Action Project_______________ 182
3. The Question of Authorization or Knowledge of the Executive
Action Project by the DCI----------------------------- 187
4. The Question of Whether Project ZR/RIFLE Was Connected
to Any Actual Assassination Plots----------------------- 187
(a) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy--------------- 188
(b) Bissell's Instruction to Harvey to Take Over Responsibility
for Underworld Contact : November 1961- - - - - - - - - - - - - 188
(c) Use of QJ/WIN in Africa______________________________ 189
D. Trujillo _.-------------------------------------------------- - 191
1. Summary----------------------------------------------- 191
2. Background--------------------------------------------- 191
3. Initial Contact With Dissidents and Request for Arms------- 192
(a) Dissident Contacts_____________ ----------------------------------- 192
(b) The Request for Sniper Rifles_________________________ 193
4. Summer and Fall of 1.960--------------------------------- 194
(a) Diplomatic Development-Withdrawal of United States
Personnel -----------------------------------------
(b) Dearborn Reports Assassination May Be Only Way To
Overthrow Trujillo Regime__________________________
(c) Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate----------------
(d) CIA Plans of October 1960____________________________
(e) December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Actions---_
5. January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of "Limited Supplies
of Small Arms and Other Material"_____________________
(a) Memorandum Underlying the Special Group Action 197
6. January 20, 1961-April 17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration
through the Bay of Pigs)_______________________________ 197
(a) Specific Events Indirectly Linking United States to Dissi-
dents' Assassination Plans__________________________ 198
(i) Assassination Discussions and Requests for Ex-
plosives --------------------------------------- 198
194
195
196
196
196
196
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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued
D. Trujillo-Continued
6. January 20, 1961-April 17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration
through the Bay of Pigs-Continued
(a) Specific Events Indirectly Linking United States to Dissi-
dent's Page
Assassination Plans-Continued
(ii) The Passage of Pistols---------------------------- 199
(1) Pouching to the Dominican Republic------------ 199
(2) Reason for the CIA Instruction Not To Tell Dear-
born 199
--------------------------------------
(3) Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?-___-- 2(iii) Passing of the Carbines-------------------------- 200
(1) Request by the Station and by Dearborn and Ap-
proval 200
by CIA----------------------------
(2) Were the Carbines Related to Assassination? _ - _ _ 200
(3) Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials 201
in Washington---------------------------
(iv) Requests for and Pouching of the Machine Guns------ 201
(1) Requests for Machine Guns___________________ 201
(2) Pouching of Machine Guns Approved by Bissell__ 202
(Bay Officials
31, 1961 American
(b) Knowledge of . April 17, 1961 May Senior
of 1 Pigs Throughf Trujillo 202
7
___________ __- - ------ 205
Assassination)-----------------------------------------
(a) Decision Not` to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccessful
United States Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort - - - _ 205
(b) Further Consideration of Passing' Machine Guns --------- 207
- (c) Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961- _ - - _ 208
(d) Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns ---------
(e) Dearborn in Washington for Consultation-Drafting of 209
Contingency Plans---------------------------------
(f) Cable of May 29, 1961-------------------------------- 212
8. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter__________________ 213
(a) Trujillo Assassinated--------------------------------- 213
------ --- ------------------- 213
(b) Cables to Washington--------------------------------
(c) Immediate Post-Assassination Period------------------- 214
217
E. Diem -----------------------------------------------------
--__---__ _-- 217
Summary -----------------------------------------------
-------------------------------- -
2. The Abortive Coup of August 1963________________________ 217
3. The November 1963 Coup------------------------------
F. Schneider-------------------------- --- 225
1. Summary-----------------------------------------------
---------- ------------- ----- ---------- 225
2. The President's Initial Instruction and Background --------- 227
(a) September 15 White House Meeting____________________ 227
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ 229
b) Background: Tracks I and II --------------------------
(c~ CIA Views of Difficulty of Project_____________________ 232
3. CIA's Implementation of Track II_________________________ 233
(a) Evolution of CIA Strategy---------------------------- 233
(i) The "Constitutional Coup" Approach -------------- 233
(ii) Military Solution________________________________ 234
(b) The Chile Task Force_______________________ ------ 235
(c) Use of the U.S. Military Attache and Interagency Relations- 235
(d Agents Who Posed as Third Country Nationals ---------- 238
(e Chief of Station-------------------------------------- 239
4. C A Efforts to Promote a Coup --------------------------- 239
(a) The Chilean Conspirators_____________________________ 239
(b) Contacts Prior to October 15_________________________ 240
242
(c) October 15 Decision Decision----------------------------------
(d) Coup Planning and Attempts After October15 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- _ 243
(e) The Shooting of General Schneider--------------------- 245
(f) Post October 22 Events----------------------------- 246
5. CIA/White House Communication During Track 11 ---------- 246
(a) September-----------------------------------------
(b) October ------------ 248
(d) Did Track II End?--- ------------ ---------------------- 253
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Page
IV.. Findings and Conclusions______________________________________ 255
A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves -------------------- 255
1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots t
Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ -- 255
2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed as a Result of Assassinatic n
Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States----------- 256
3. American Officials ncouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Whk 4
Resulted in the Deaths of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider__.. - 256
4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be
of Crisis Proportions------------------------------------ 256
5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their
Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders ------------ 256
6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in
Assassination Efforts___________________________________ 257
B. Conclusions Concernin the Plots Themselves----------------- - _ 257
1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination------ 257
(a) Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated 1)y
the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking I ,
Overthrow Local Governments ----------------------- 257
(b) The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots Occurred
Explains, But Does Not Justify Them _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 258
2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld
Figures for Their Criminal Talents_______________________ 259
C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and Contro" _ 260
1. The Apparent Lack of Accountability in the Command and
Control System Was Such That the Assassination Plots Could
Have Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization- _ - _ 261
2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Wer
Authorized--------------------------------------------- 261
(a) Diem----------------------------------------------. 261
(b) Schneider----------------------- ------------------- 262
(c) Trujillo--------------------------------------------- 262
(d) Lumumba ------------------------------------------ . 263
(e) Castro---------------------------------------------- 263
3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination, Operations Per
ceived Assassination to Have Been a Permissible Course of
Action------------------------------------------------. 264
4. The Failure in Communication Between Agency Officials its
Charge of the Assassination Operations and their Superiors io
the Agency and in the Administration was Due to: (a) Thc+
Failure of Subordinates to Disclose Their Plans and Opera
tions to Their Superiors; and (b) The Failure of Superiors ii=
the Climate of Violence and Aggressive Covert Actions Sana -
tioned by the Administrations to Rule Out Assassination as :,,
Tool of Foreign Policy; To Make Clear to Their Subordinat+: ,
That Assassination Was Impermissible; Or To Inquire Fur
ther After Receiving Indications That It Was Being Coi -
sidered ----------------------------------------------- 267
(a) Agency Officials Failed on Several Occasions to Reveal this
Plots to Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufflcien
Detail and Clarity__________________________________ 267
(i) Castro-----------------------------------------. 267
(ii) Trujillo ----------------------------------------- 270
(iii) Schneider--------------------------------------- 272
(b) Administration Officials Failed to Rule Out Assassination
As a Tool of Foreign Policy, To Make Clear to The,.-
Subordinates That Assassination Was Impermissible i w
To Inquire Further After Receiving Indications Tho',
Assassination Was Being Considered------------------ 273
(i) Trujillo-------------------------------------- - 273
(ii) Schneider --------------------------------------- 273
(iii) Lumumba --------------------------------------- 273
(iv) Castro----------------------------------------- 274
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.IV. Findings and Conclusions-Continued
C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and
Control-Continued
5. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination
Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record To Create the
Risk of Confusion, Rashness and Irresponsibility in the Page
Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Were Most Page
Necessary ---------------------------------------------
The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of
Plausible Denial---------------------- -- ------- 277
(b) The Danger of Using" Circumlocution" and "Euphemism"- 2278
78
(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions--------------- 278
(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization------------------
(e) The Problems Connected With Creating New Covert 279
Capabilities--------------------------------------
V. Recommendations--------------------------------------------- 281
A. General Agreement That the United States Must Not Engage in 281
Assassination--------------------------------------------
--_____ --------- -
------------------------ -
B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination________________________ 282
C. The Need for a Statute------------------------------------- 282
------------------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
Epilogue-------------- 285
Statement of Joinder ----------------------------------------------286
Appendix A---------------------------------------------------- 289
Appendix B----- 291
---------------
-
-
- A.- Hart------------------------------ 297
Separate Views of Senator Philip-
Additional Views of Senator Robert Morgan-------------------------- 299
Additional Views of Senator Howard II. Baker, Jr--------------------- 303
Additional Views of Senator Barry Goldwater_________________________ 341
Supplemental Views of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr--------------- 345
Abbreviations of Citations------------------------------------------ 347
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PROLOGUE
The events discussed in this Interim Report must be viewed in the
context of United States policy and actions designed to counter the
threat of spreading Communism. Following the end of World War II,
many nations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under Communist
influence or control. The defeat of the Axis powers was accompanied
by rapid disintegration of the Western colonial empires. The Second
World War had no sooner ended than a new struggle began. The
Communist threat, emanating from what came to be called the "Sino-
Soviet bloc," led to a policy of containment intended to prevent fur-
ther encroachment into the "Free World."
United States strategy for conducting the Cold War called for
the establishment of interlocking treaty arrangements and military
bases throughout the world. Concern over the expansion of an aggres-
sive Communist monolith led the United States to fight two major
wars in Asia. In addition, it was considered necessary to wage a relent-
less cold war against Communist expansion wherever it appeared in
the "back alleys of the world." This called for a full range of covert
activities in response to the operations of Communist clandestine
services.
The fear of Communist expansion was particularly acute in the
United States when Fidel Castro emerged as Cuba's leader in the
late 1950's. His takeover was seen as the first significant penetration
by the Communists into the Western Hemisphere. United States
leaders, including most Members of Congress, called for vigorous
action to stem the Communist infection in this hemisphere. These
policies rested on widespread popular support and encouragement.
Throughout this period, the United States felt impelled to respond
to threats which were, or seemed to be, skirmishes in a global Cold
War against Communism. Castro's Cuba raised the spectre of a Soviet
outpost at America's doorstep. Events in the Dominican Republic
appeared to offer an additional opportunity for the Russians and
their allies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the stra-
tegic center of the African continent, and the prospect of Communist
penetration there was viewed as a threat to American interests in
emerging African nations. There was great concern that a Communist
takeover in Indochina would have a "domino effect" throughout Asia.
Even the election in 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was seen
by some as a threat similar to that of Castro's takeover in Cuba.
The Committee regards the unfortunate events dealt with in this
Interim Report as an aberration, explainable at least in part, but not
justified, by the pressures of the time. The Committee believes that it
is still in the national interest of the United States to help nations
achieve self-determination and resist Communist domination. How-
ever, it is clear that this interest cannot justify resorting to the kind
of abuses covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee has resolved
that steps must be taken to prevent those abuses from happening again.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This interim report covers allegations of United States involvement
in assassination plots against foreign political leaders. The report
also examines certain other instances in which foreign political leaders
in fact were killed and the United States was in some manner involved
in activity leading up to the killing, but in which it would be incorrect
to say that the purpose of United States involvement had been to
encourage assassination.
. The evidence establishes that the United States was implicated in
several assassination plots. The Committee believes that, short of war,
assassination is incompatible with American principles, international
order, and morality. It should be rejected 'as a tool of foreign policy.
Our inquiry also reveals serious problems with respect to United
States involvement in coups directed against foreign governments.
Some of these problems are addressed here on the basis of our investi-
gation to date; others we raise as questions to be answered after our
investigation into covert action has been completed.
We stress the interim nature of this report. In the course of the
Committee's continuing work, other alleged assassination plots may
surface, and new evidence concerning the cases covered herein may
come to light. However, it is the Committee's view that these cases
have been developed in sufficient detail to clarify the issues which are
at the heart of the Committee's mandate to recommend legislative
and other reforms.
Thorough treatment of the assassination question has lengthened
the Committee's schedule, but has greatly increased the Committee's
awareness of the hard issues it must face in the months ahead. These
issues include problems of domestic and foreign intelligence collection,
counterintelligence, foreign covert operations, mechanisms of com-
mand and control, and assessment of the effectiveness of the total
United States intelligence effort. The Committee intends, nevertheless,
to complete, by February 1976, its main job of undertaking the first
comprehensive review of the intelligence community.
A. COMMITTEE'S MANDATE
Senate Resolution 21 instructs the Committee to investigate the full
range of governmental intelligence activities and the extent, if any,
to which such activities were "illegal, improper or unethical." In
addition to that broad general mandate, the Committee is required
to investigate, study and make recommendations concerning various
specific matters, several of which relate to the assassination issue.'
I Por example, S. Res. 21 requires the Committee to study and investigate the following :
The extent and necessity of * * * covert intelligence activities * * * abroad ;
[Thel nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intel-
ligence activities ;
The need for improved, strengthened, or consolidated oversight of United States
Intelligence activities by the Congress (* * * and the need for new legislation.
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Although the Rockefeller Commission initiated an inquiry into re-
ported assassination plots, the Commission declared it was unable, for
a variety of reasons, to complete its inquiry. At the direction of the
President, the Executive Branch turned over to the Select Committee
the work the Commission had done, along with certain other documents
relating to assassination.
B. COMMITTEE DECISION TO MAKE REPORT PUBLIC
This report raises important questions of national policy. We believe
that the public is entitled to know what instrumentalities of their Gov-
ernment have done., Further, our recommendations can only be judged
in light of the factual record. Therefore, this interim report should be
made public.
The Committee believes the truth about the assassination allegations
should be told because democracy depends upon a well-informed elec-
torate. We reject any contention that the facts disclosed in this report
should be kept secret because they are embarrassing to the United
States. Despite the temporary injury to our national reputation, the
Committee believes that foreign peoples will, upon sober reflection,
respect the United States more for keeping faith with its democratic
ideal than they will condemn us for the misconduct revealed. We doubt
that any other country would have the courage to make such
disclosures.
The fact that portions of the story have already been made public
only accentuates the need for full disclosure. Innuendo and misleading
partial disclosures are not fair to the individuals involved. Nor are
they a responsible way to lay the groundwork for informed public
policy judgments.
C. SCOPE OF COMMITTEES INVESTIGATION
Investigating the assassination issue has been an unpleasant duty,
but one that the Committee had to meet. The Committee has compiled
a massive record in the months that the inquiry has been underway.
The record comprises over 8,000 pages of sworn testimony taken from
over 75 witnesses during 00 hearing days and numerous staff inter-
views. The documents which the Committee has obtained include raw
files from agencies and departments, the White House, and the Presi-
dential libraries of the Administrations of former Presidents Dwight
Eisenhower, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.2
We have obtained two types of evidence : first, evidence relating to
the general setting in which the events occurred, the national policy of
the time, and the normal operating procedures, including channels of
command and control ; and second, evidence relating to the specific
events.
A Senate Committee is not a court. It looks to the past, not to deter-
mine guilt or innocence, but in order to make recommendations for the
future. When we found the evidence to be ambiguous-as we did on
i When the name of a participant in the plot did not add to the presentation and its
inclusion may have placed in 1eopardy his life or livelihood. the Committee. on oee9siOn.
resorted, on balance, to the use of an alms or a general description of the individual or
his position.
s The Committee has served both general and specific document remiests upon the
Executive Branch. The Administration represented to the Committee that it has pro-
duced all the relevant documents.
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some issues-we have set out both sides, in order that the evidence may
speak for itself.
Despite the number of witnesses and documents examined by the
Committee, the available evidence has certain shortcomings.
Many of the events considered occurred as long as fifteen years
ago. With one exception, they occurred during the administra-
tions of Presidents now dead. Other high officials whose testimony
might have shed additional light on the thorny issues of authori-
zation and control are also dead. Moreover, with the passage of
time, the memories of those still alive have dimmed.
The Committee has often faced the difficult task of distinguishing
refreshed recollection from speculation. In many instances, wit-
nesses were unable to testify from independent recollection and
had to rely on documents contemporaneous with the events to
refresh their recollections. While informed speculation is of some
assistance, it can only be assigned limited weight in judging spe-
cific events.
Although assassination is not a subject on which one would expect
many records or documents to be made or retained, there were, in
fact, more relevant contemporaneous documents than expected.
In addition, in 1967 the Central Intelligence Agency had made
an internal study of the Castro, Trujillo and Diem assassination
allegations.' That study was quite useful, particularly in suggest-
ing leads for uncovering the story of the actual assassination
activity. Unfortunately, the working papers relating to that in-
vestigation were destroyed upon the completion of the Report,
pursuant to instructions from CIA Director Richard Helms.
(Memorandum for the Record, 5/23/67) These notes were de-
stroyed because of their sensitivity and because the information
they contained had already been incorporated into the Report. In
fairness to Director Helms, it should be added, however, that he
was responsible for requesting the preparation of the Inspector
General's Report and for preserving the Report.
Some ambiguities in the evidence result from the practice of
concealing CIA covert operations from the world and perform-
ing them in such a. way that if discovered, the role of the United
States could be plausibly denied. An extension of the doctrine of
"plausible deniability" had the result that communications be-
tween the Agency and high Administration officials were often
convoluted and imprecise.2
The evidence contains sharp conflicts, some of which relate to basic
facts. But the most important conflicts relate not so much to basic
facts as to differing perceptions and opinions based upon relatively
undisputed facts. With respect to both kinds of conflicts, the Com-
mittee has attempted to set forth the evidence extensively so that it
may speak for itself, and in our section on findings and conclusions,
we suggest resolutions for some of the conflicts. However, because
1 Those studies were made at the direction of CIA Director Richard Helms to provide
him with information to answer questions from President Johnson. The President's ques-
tions concerning Castro were provoked by a Drew Pearson newspaper column in
March 1967. The column alleged that the CIA had attempted to kill Castro using the
Mafia. The President also asked Helms for information concerning possible United States
involvement in the assassinations of Trujillo and Diem.
2 For a full discussion of this doctrine, see pages 11-12.
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the Committee's main task is to find lessons for the future, resolving
conflicts in the evidence may be less important than making certain
that the system which produced the ambiguities is corrected.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The Committee sought to answer four broad questions :
Assassination plots.-Did United States officials instigate, attempt,
aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots to assassinate foreign leaders?
Involvement in other killings.-Did United States officials assist
foreign dissidents in a way which significantly contributed to the
killing of foreign leaders?
Authorization.-Where there was involvement by United States
officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such activities
authorized and if so, at what levels of our Government?
Communication and control.-Even if not authorized in fact, were
the assassination activities perceived by those involved to be within
the scope of their lawful authority? If they were so perceived, was
there inadequate control exercised by higher authorities over the
agencies to prevent such misinterpretation?
2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE PLOTS
The Committee investigated alleged United States involvement in
assassination plots in five foreign countries : 1
Country Individual involved 2
Cuba ----------------------------------------- Fidel Castro.
Congo (Zaire) --------------------------------- Patrice Lumumba.
Dominican Republic---------------------------- Rafael Trujillo.
Chile ----------------------------------------- General Rene Schneider.
South Vietnam--------------------------------- Ngo Dinh Diem.
The evidence concerning each alleged assassination can be sum-
marized as follows : 3
Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire).-In the Fall of 1960, two CIA
officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons
were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward
gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba
was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence
that the United States was in any way involved in the killing.
Fidel Castro (Cuba).-United States Government personnel plotted
to kill Castro from 1960 to 1965. American underworld figures and
, In addition to the plots discussed in the body of this report, the Committee received
some evidence of CIA Involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia
and "Papa Doe" Duvalier of Haiti. Former Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell testi-
fied that the assassination of Sukarno had been "contemplated" by the CIA, but that plan-
ning had proceeded no farther than identifying an "asset" whom it was believed might be
recruited to kill Sukarno. Arms were supplied to dissident groups in Indonesia, but, accord-
ing to Bissell, those arms were not intended for assassination. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 89)
Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to CIA Director John McCone, testified that the Di-
rector authorized the CIA to furnish arms to dissidents planning the overthrow of Haiti's
dictator, Duvalier. Elder told the Committee that while the assassination of Duvalier was
not contemplated by the CIA, the arms were furnished "to help [the dissidents] take what
measures were deemed necessary to replace the government," and it was realized that
Duvalier might be killed in the course of the overthrow. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 79)
2 Assassination plots against the Cuban leadership sometimes contemplated action
against Raul Castro and Che Guevarra. In South Vietnam Diem'4 brother Ngo Dinh Nhu
was killed at the same time as Diem.
, Section III contains a detailed treatment of the evidence ap .each county .
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Cubans hostile to Castro were used in these plots, and were provided
encouragement and material support by the United States.
Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic).-Trujillo was shot by Do-
minican dissidents on May 31,1961. From early in 1960 and continuing
to the time of the assassination, the United States Government gen-
erally supported these dissidents. Some Government personnel were
aware that the dissidents intended to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and
three carbines were furnished by American officials, although a request
for machine guns was later refused. There is conflicting evidence con-
cerning whether the weapons were knowingly supplied for use in the
assassination and whether any of them were present at the scene.
Ngo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam).-Diem and his brother, Nhu,
were killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese
Generals' coup. Although the United States Government supported
the coup, there is no evidence that American officials favored the
assassination. Indeed, it appears that the assassination of Diem was not
part of the Generals' pre-coup planning but was instead a spontaneous
act which occurred during the coup and was carried out without
I T sited States involvement or support.
General Rene Schneider (Chile).-On October 25, 1970, General
Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted three days earlier while re-
sisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered
an obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the
office of President of Chile. The United States Government supported,
and sought to instigate a military coup to block Allende. U.S. offi-
cials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equipment to
various military figures who opposed Allende. Although the CIA con-
tinued to support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the record
indicates that the. CIA had withdrawn active support of the group
which carried out the actual kidnap attempt on October 22, which
resulted in Schneider's death. Further, it does not appear that any
of the equipment supplied by the CIA to coup plotters in Chile was
used in the kidnapping. There is no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider
or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider
would be shot during the abduction.
Assassination capability (Executive action).-In addition to these
five cases, the Committee has received evidence that ranking Govern-
ment officials discussed, and may have authorized, the establishment
within the CIA of a generalized assassination capability. During these
discussions, the concept of assassination was not affirmatively dis-
avowed.
Similarities and differences among the plots.-The assassination
plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were rela-
tively small and none of which possessed great nol?tical or military
strength. Apart from that similarity, there were significant differences
among the plots :
(1) Whether United States officials initiated the plot, or were
responding to requests of local dissidents for aid.
(2) Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill a forewn
leader, or whether the leader's death was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of an attempt to overthrow the government.
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The Castro and Lumumba cases are examples of plots conceived by
United States officials to kill foreign leaders.
In the Trujillo case, although the United States Government cer-
tainly opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United
States officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose
aim clearly was to assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them, this country
was implicated in the assassination, regardless of whether the weapons
actually supplied were meant to kill Trujillo or were only intended as
symbols of support for the dissidents.
The Schneider case differs from the Castro and Trujillo cases. The
United States Government, with full knowledge that Chilean dis-
sidents considered General Schneider an obstacle to their plans,
sought a coup and provided support to the dissidents. However, even
though the support included weapons, it appears that the intention
of both the dissidents and the United States officials was to abduct
General Schneider, not to kill him. Similarly, in the Diem case, some
United States officials wanted Diem removed and supported a coup
to accomplish his removal, but there is no evidence that any of those
officials sought the death of Diem himself.
3. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON TIIE ISSUES OF
AUTIIORITY AND CONTROL
To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context, two
points must be made clear. First, there is no doubt that the United
States Government opposed the various leaders in question. Officials
at the highest levels objected to the Castro and 'Trujillo regimes,
believed the accession of Allende to power in Chile would be harmful
to American interests, and thought of Lumumba as a dangerous force
in the heart of Africa. Second, the evidence on assassinations has to
be viewed in the context of other, more massive activities against
the regimes in question. For example, the plots against Fidel Castro
personally cannot be understood without considering the fully au-
thorized, comprehensive assaults upon his regime, such as the Bay
of Pigs invasion in 1961 and Operation MONGOOSE in 1962.
Once methods of coercion and violence are chosen, the probability
of loss of life is always present. There is, however, a significant differ-
ence between a coldblooded, targeted, intentional killing of an indi-
vidual foreign leader and other forms of intervening in the affairs of
foreign nations. Therefore, the Committee has endeavored to explore
as fully as possible the questions of how and why the plots happened,
whether they were authorized, and if so, at what level.
The picture that emerges from the evidence is not a clear one. This
may be due to the system of deniability and the consequent state of
the evidence which, even after our long investigation, remains con-
flicting and inconclusive. Or it may be that there were in fact serious
shortcomings in the system of authorization so that an activity such
as assassination could have been undertaken by an agency of the United
States Government without express authority.
The Committee finds that the system of executive command and con-
trol was so ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what levels
assassination activity was known and authorized. This situation
creates the disturbing prospect that Government officials might have
undertaken the assassination plots without it having been uncon-
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trovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the Presi-
dents. It is also possible that there might have been a successful "plaus-
ible denial" in which Presidential authorization was issued but is now
obscured. Whether or not the respective Presidents knew of or author-
ized the plots, as chief executive officer of the United States, each must
bear the ultimate responsibility for the activities of his subordinates.
The Committee makes four other major findings.' The first relates
to the Committee's inability to make a finding that the assassination
plots were authorized by the Presidents or other persons above the
governmental agency or agencies involved. The second explains why
certain officials may have perceived that, according to their judgment
and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The
third criticizes agency officials for failing on several occasions to dis-
close their plans and activities to superior authorities, or for failing to
do so with sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Adminis-
tration officials for not ruling out assassination, particularly after cer-
tain Administration officials had become aware of prior assassination
plans and the establishment of a general assassination capability.
There is admittedly a tension among the findings. This tension re-
flects a basic conflict in the evidence. While there are some conflicts
over facts, it may be more important that there appeared to have been
two differing perceptions of the same facts. This distinction may be
the result of the differing backgrounds of those persons experienced in
covert operations as distinguished from those who were not. Words of
urgency which may have meant killing to the former, may have meant
nothing of the sort to the latter.
While we are critical of certain individual actions, the 'Committee
is also mindful of the inherent problems in a system which relies on
secrecy, compartmentation, circumlocution, and the avoidance of clear
responsibility. This system creates the risk of confusion and rash-
ness in the very areas where clarity and sober judgment are most nec-
essary. Hence, before reviewing the evidence relating to the cases, we
briefly deal with the general subject of covert action.
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II. COVERT ACTION AS A VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Covert action is activity which is meant to further the sponsoring
nation's foreign policy objectives, and to be concealed in order to per-
mit that nation to plausibly deny responsibility.
The National Security Act of 19471 which established the Central
Intelligence Agency did not include specific authority for covert opera-
tions. However, it created the National Security Council, and gave
that body authority to direct the CIA to "perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the
National Security Council may from time to time direct." At its first
meeting in December 1947, the NSC issued a top secret directive grant-
ing the CIA authority to conduct covert operations. From 1955 to
1970, the basic authority for covert operations was a directive of the
National Security Council, NSC 5412/2.2
This directive instructed the CIA to counter, reduce and discredit
"International Communism" throughout the world in a manner con-
sistent with United States foreign and military policies. It also directed
the CIA to undertake covert operations to achieve this end and de-
fined covert operations as any covert activities related to propaganda,
economic warfare, political action (including sabotage, demolition and
assistance to resistance movements) and all activities compatible with
the directive.3 In 1962, the CIA's General Counsel rendered the opin-
ion that the Agency's activities were "not inhibited by any limitations
other than those broadly set forth in NSC 5412/2." (CIA General
Counsel Memorandum 4/6/62)
A. POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL MECHANISM
In his 1962 memorandum, CIA's General Counsel made it clear that
the CIA considered itself responsible for developing proposals and
plans to implement the objectives of NSC 5412/2 4 The memorandum
also stated that even in developing ideas or plans it was incumbent on
the Agency not only to coordinate with other executive departments
and agencies, but also to "obtain necessary policy approval." The Com-
mittee has been faced with determining whether CIA officials thought
1 (P.L. 80-253).
2 Today the basic authority for CIA covert action operations is National Security
Decision Memorandum 40, which superseded NSC 5412/2 on February 17, 1970.
8 By contrast NSDM 40 of 1970 described covert actions as those secret activities
designed to further official United States programs and policies abroad. It made no
reference to communism.
a The memorandum stated :
"CIA must necessarily be responsible for planning. Occasionally suggestions for action
will come from outside sources but, to depend entirely on such requirements would be
an evasion of the Agency's responsibilities. Also, the average person, both in government
and outside, is thinking along normal lines and to develop clandestine cold war activities
properly, persons knowing both the capabilities and limitations of clandestine action must
be studying and devising how such actions can be undertaken effectively."
With respect to policy approval. the General Counsel said :
"Both in developing ideas or plans for action it is incumbent upon the Agency to obtain
necessary policy approval, and for this purpose these matters should be explored with
proper officials in other departments and agencies, particularly in the Departments of
State and Defense, so the determination can be made as to whether any one proposal
should go to the Special Group or higher for policy determination."
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it was "necessary" to obtain express approval for assassination plans
and, if so, whet her such approval was in fact either sought or granted.
Beginning iii 1955, the responsibility for authorizing CIA covert
action operations lay with the Special Group, a subcommittee o t the
National Security Council composed of the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence. the
Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs. Today this group is known as the 40 Committee,
and its membership has been expanded to include the Chairman o p" the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. During 1962 another NSC subcommittee was
established to oversee covert operations in Cuba. This subcomni atee
was the Special Group (Augmented) ; its membership included the
Special Group, the Attorney General, and certain other high oft c ials.
In exercising control over covert operations, the 7 activities, Group was
charged with considering the objectives of proposedpactivities, deter-
mining whether the activities would accomplish the objectives, as-,ess-
ing the likelihood of success, and deciding whether the activities v ould
be ``proper" and in the national interest. The Chairman of the Spee.cial
Group was usually responsible for determining which project . re-
quired Presidential consideration and for keeping him abrewn.r, of
developments.
Authorization procedures, however, have not always been clear and
tidy, nor have t hey always been followed. Prior to 1955, there were few
formal procedures. Procedures from 1955 through 1963 were c.Jiar-
acterized in an internal CIA memorandum as "somewhat cloudj' and
* * * based on value judgments by the DCI." (Memorandum for' the
Record, C/CA/PEG, "Policy Coordination of CIA's Covert A+aion
Operations", 2/21/67)
The existence of formal procedures for planning and implementing
covert actions does not necessarily rule out the possibility that of her,
in ore informal procedures might be used. The granting of authori ? y to
an executive agency to plan covert action does not preempt Pres den-
tial authority to develop and mandate foreign policy. Formal pro-
cedures may be. disregarded by either high Administration officio Is or
officers in the (.,'IA. In the Schneider incident., for example, President
Nixon instructed CIA officials not to consult with the 40 Committee
or other policy-making bodies.' In the plot to assassinate Castro using
underworld figures, CIA officials decided not to inform the S ecial
Group of their activities. One CIA operation, an aspect of which was
to develop an assassination capability, was assigned to a senior case
officer as a sper.rial task. His responsibility to develop this capability
did not fall within the Sppecial Group's review of covert operations,
even though this same officer was responsible to the Special G !'oup
(Augmented) on other matters.
The Central Intelligence Agency also has a formal. chain of "em-
inand. At the top of the structure of the CIA is the Director of Central
Intelligence (3 )CI) and his immediate subordinate, the Deputq Di-
rector of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Together they are respoltBible
for I: he administration and supervision of the Agency. Beneatl the
DC I:, and directly responsible to him, are the four operational 'am-
polients of the agency. During the period covered by this report .. the
L The special Gr*Irp was renamed the 303 Committee in 1e64. In 1970 its nan= was
changed again-th9:; time to the 40 Committee.
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component responsible for clandestine operations was the Directorate
of Plans, headed by the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) 1 The
Directorate of Plans was organized around regional geographic divi-
sions. These divisions worked with their respective overseas stations
(headed by a Chief of Station (COS)) in planning and implementing
the Directorate's operations. The divisions which played a part in the
events considered in this report were the Western Hemisphere Divi-
sion (WH) which was responsible for Latin America, the African
Division (AF), and the Far Eastern Division IFE).
In addition to the regional divisions, the Directorate of Plans also
included three staff level units which provided some oversight and
coordination of division projects. The staff units had no approval
authority over the divisions. However, they could criticize and suggest
modifications of projects sponsored by divisions. The three staffs were :
Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action.
When functioning in accordance with stated organizational pro-
cedures, the Directorate of Plans operated under a graduated approval
process. Individual project proposals generally originated either from
the field stations or from the divisions and were approved at varying
levels within the Directorate, depending on the estimated cost and
risk of the operation. Low-cost, low-risk projects could be approved
at the Deputy Director for Plans level; extremely high-cost, high-
risk projects required the approval of the DCI. Covert action pro-
posals also required approval of the Special Group.
Also within the Directorate of Plans was a Technical Services
Division (TSD) which developed and provided technical and support
material required in the execution of operations. A separate Direc-
torate, the Directorate of Support, handled financial and adminis-
trative matters. The 'Office of Security, a component of the Directorate
of Support, was largely responsible for providing protection for
clandestine installations and, as discussed at length in the Castro
study, was occasionally called on for operational assistance.
B. TiiE CONCEPT of "PLAUSIBLE DENIAL"
Non-attribution to the United States for covert operations was the
original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of "plausible
denial."
Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates that this con-
cept, designed to protect the United States and its operatives from
the consequences of disclosures, has been expanded to mask decisions
of the President and his senior staff members. A further consequence
of the expansion of this doctrine is that subordinates, in an effort to
permit their superiors to "plausibly deny" operations, fail to fully
inform them about those operations.
"Plausible denial" has shaped the processes for approving and eval-
uating covert actions. For example, the 40 Committee and its predeces-
sor, the Special Group, have served as "circuit breakers" for Presi-
dents, thus avoiding consideration of covert action by the Oval office.
"Plausible denial" can also lead to the use of euphemism and cir-
cumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other
i The Directorate of Plans is presently called the Directorate of Operations, and is
headed by the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO).
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senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it dis-
closed. The converse may also occur; a President could commit ucate
his desire for it sensitive operation in an indirect, circumlocutioui man-
ner. An additional possibility is that the President may, in fact, Pot be
fully and accurately informed about a sensitive operation becaI se he
failed to rec:cive the "circumlocutious" message. The evidenr?~l dis-
cussed below reveals that serious problems of assessing intent as d en-
suring both control and accountability may result from the k se of
"Plausible denial."
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III. ASSASSINATION PLANNING AND THE PLOTS
A. CONGO
1. INTRODUCTION
The Committee has received solid evidence of a plot to assassinate
Patrice Lumumba. Strong hostility to Lumumba, voiced at the very
highest levels of government may have been intended to initiate an
assassination operation; at the least it engendered such an operation.
The evidence indicates that it is likely that President Eisenhower's
expression of strong concern about Lumumba at a meeting of the Na-
tional Security Council on August 18, 1960, was taken by Allen Dulles
as authority to assassinate Lumumba.' There is, however, testimony
by Eisenhower Administration officials, and ambiguity and lack of
clarity in the records of high-level policy meetings, which tends to
contradict the evidence that the President intended an assassination
effort against Lumumba.
The week after the August 18 NSC meeting, a presidential advisor
reminded the Special Group of the "necessity for very straight-
forward action" against Lumumba and prompted a decision not to
rule out consideration of "any particular kind of activity which might
contribute to getting rid of Lumumba." The following day, Dulles
cabled a CIA Station Officer in Leopoldville, Republic of the Congo,2
that "in high quarters" the "removal" of Lumumba was "an urgent
and prime objective." Shorty thereafter the CIA's clandestine serv-
ice formulated a plot to assassinate Lumumba. The plot proceeded to
the point that lethal substances and instruments specifically intended
for use in an assassination were delivered by the CIA to the Congo
Station. There is no evidence that these instruments of assassination
were actually used against Lumumba.
A thread of historical 'background is necessary to weave these broad
questions together with the documents and testimony received by the
Committee.
In the summer of 1960, there was great concern at the highest
levels in the United States government about the role of Patrice
Lumumba in the Congo. Lumumba, who served briefly as Premier
of the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm by United
States policymakers because of what they perceived as his magnetic
public appeal and his leanings toward the Soviet Union.
Under the leadership of Lumumba and the new President, Joseph
Kasavubu, the Congo declared its independence from Belgium on
June 30, 1960.3 In the turbulent month that followed, Lumumba
'Indeed, one NSC staff member present at the August 18 meeting, believed that he
witnessed a presidential order to assassinate Lumumba.
2 Since the period in which the events under examination occurred, the names of many
geographical units and governmental institutions have changed. For instance, the nation
formerly known as the Republic of the Congo is now the Republic of Zaire and the present
capital city, Kinshasa, was known then as Leopoldville. For the sake of clarity in dealing
with many of the documents involved in this section, the names used in this report are
those which applied in the early 1960's.
s For detailed reporting of the events in the Congo during this period, see the New
York Times, especially July 7, 1960, 7 :3 ; July 14, 1960, 1 :1 ; July 16, 1980, 1 :1 and
3 :2 ; July 28, 1960, 3 :7 ; September 3, 19603 :2 ; September 6, 1960, 1 :8 ; December 3,
1960, 1 :8 ; January 18, 1961, 3 :1 ; February 14, 1961, 1 :1.
(13)
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threatened to invite Soviet troops to hasten the withdrawal of Belgian
armed forces. The United Nations Security Council requested Bel-
gium's withdrawal and dispatched a neutraIVfor_ce to the Congo to pre-
serve order. In late July, Lumumba visited Washington and received
pledges of economic aid from Secretary of State Christian Herter. By
the beginning of September, Soviet airplanes, trucks, and technvians
were arriving in the province where Lnmumba's support was
strongest.
hi mid-September, after losing a struggle for the leadership of the
government to Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff .r ~ I' the
Congolese armed forces, Lumumba sought protection from the t-sited
?\Nations force; in Leopoldville. Early in December, Mobutu 's l3 oops
captured Lull umba. while he was traveling toward his stronghold at
Stauleyville 1'+ud imprisoned him. On January 17, 1961, the evatral
government of the Congo transferred Lumumba to the custoi .y of
authorities in Katanga province, which was then asserting ih-, own
independence from the Congo. Several weeks later, Katanga and hori-
ties announced Lunnlmba's death.
Accounts 0L1 the circumstances and timing of Lumumba's death ~,ary.
The United Nations investigation concluded that Lumumba was
killed on January 17, 1961.1
2. DI)1.LES CABLE TO LEOPOIAVILLE: AUGUST 26, 1960
The Congo declared its independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960.
Shortly thereafter, the. CIA assigned a new officer to its Leopcslilville
Station. The "Station Officer" 2 said that assassinating Lunlumba
was not discu sed during his CIA briefings prior to departing for the
Congo, nor during his brief return to Headquarters in connection with
Luiumba's visit to Washington in late July. (Hedgman, S/:11/7.5),
pp. 8-9)
During Ai gust, there was increasing concern about Lumusnba's
political strength in the Congo among the national security policy
makers of the Eisenhower Administration.3 This concern wa:; nur-
tured by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA Headqu;irt.er?s
by the Station Officer :
EMBASSY ANI) STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CI,:SSIC
COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT. MANY FtaRCES
AT WORE HERE : SOVIETS * * * COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. AL-
THOUGH l)IFFICUT,T DETERMINE MAJOR INFLUENCING FAt'1`ORS
TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWER, DECISIVE PFCRIOD
NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY CO t[MIE
OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING
POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER ( )NGO
AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE A;TION
TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA. (CIA Cable. Leopoldville to Director,
8/18/60)
Report of thr Commission of Investigation. U.N. Security Council, Official lhecords.
Supplement for }lctober, November, and December, 11/11/61, p. 117. (Cited hereinafter
as ',U.N. Renort, 11/11/61.'t
Victor Redgg~aurn was one of the CIA officers in Leopoldville attached to tr +? Congo
Station and Wirt 1 - referred to hereinafter as "Station Officer."
"See Section T, infra, for a full discussion of the prevailing anti-Lumumba 'ttitude
in the United ill. tee government as shown by minutes of the National Security 'ouncil
and Special Group and the testimony of high Administration officials.
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This cable stated the Station's operational "objective [of] replacing
Lumumba with pro Western Group." Bronson Tweedy, who was Chief
of the Africa Division of CIA's clandestine services, replied that he
was seeking State Department approval for the proposed operation
based u on "your and our belief Lumumba must be removed if pos-
sible." CIA Cable, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60) On August 19,
DDP Richard Bissell, Director of CIA's covert operations branch,
signed a follow up cable to Leopoldville, saying : "You are authorized
proceed with operation." (CIA Cable, Director to Leopoldville,
8/19/60)
Several days later, the Station Officer reported :
ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU WITH PLAN
ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA * * * KASAVUBU REFUSED AGREE SAY-
ING HE RELUCTANT RESORT VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER
SUFFICIENT STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, Leopold-
ville to Director, 8/24/60)
On August 25, Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles at-
tended a meeting of the Special Group-the National Security Coun-
cil subcommittee responsible for the planning of covert operations.' In
response to the outline of some CIA plans for political actions against
Lumumba, such as arranging a vote of no confidence by the Congolese
Parliament, Gordon Gray, the Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs reported that the President "had expressed
extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward
action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined
were sufficient to accomplish this." (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60)
The Special Group "finally agreed that planning for the Congo would
not necessarily rule out `consideration' of any particular kind of activ-
ity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.11 (Special
Group Minutes, 8/25/60)
The next day, Allen Dulles signed a cable 2 to the Leopoldville
Station Officer stating :
IN HIGH QUARTERS HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION
THAT IF [LUMUMBAI CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE
INEVITABLE WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST
PAVE THE WAY TOICOMMUN ST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH
DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN
AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY.
CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN
URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT UNDER EXISTING
CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT
ACTION. (CIA Cable, Dulles to Station Officer, 8/26/60) S
detail In the Section testimony 7 (a) (ii), infraigntflcance for
Is discussed moeting and
The Issue August 2Zth
authorization Special
the i
That meeting was preceded by an NSC meeting on August 18, at which an NSC staff
executive heard the President make a statement that impressed him as an order for the
assassination of Lumumba. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 6-7) The testimony about this NSC
meeting is set forth in detail at Section 7 (a) (it), intra.
Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are a relative rarity In CIA
communications and call attention to the importance and sensitivity of the r. atte^ dis
cussed. By contrast, cable traffic to and from CIA field stations ro,itinely refers to the
sender or recipient as "Director" which simply denotes "CIA Headquarters."
'The bracketed words in cables throughout this section signify that a cryptonym.
pseudonym, or other coded reference has been translated in order to maintain the security
werel provided to the Committee bytthe CIACReview aStaff and by various witnes.es~ation~
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The cable said that the Station Officer was to be given "wider t uthor-
itv"-along the lines of the previously authorized operation to ,(',place,
Lumumba with a pro-Western group--"including even more ,.ygres-
sive action if it can remain covert . . . we realize that tar,: ets of
opportunity may present themselves to you." Dulles' cable al,, o au-
tllorize(I the expenditure of up to $100,000 "to carry out an,', crash
programs ozi which you do not, have the opportunity to consultk tIQS,"
and assured !lie Station Officer that the message had been "see it and
approved at competent level" in the State Department. (CIA Cable,
8/26/60) The cable continued:
TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO Bl, CON-
SULTED. YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CONCURRENCE. IF IN AN";' PAR-
TICULAR CASE, HE DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED Yt =F CAN
ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT 141RMIT
REFERR,A L HERE.
This cable raises the question of whether the DCI was conteml,lating
action against; Lumumba for which the United States would ),ant to
be in a position to "plausibly deny" responsibility. On its fi14?e, the
cable could have been read as authorizing only the "remno,, tl" of
Lumumba from office. DDP Richard Bissell was "almost certaii "that
}ri+ was info ?iried about the Dulles cable shortly after its transti fission.
file testified that it was his "belief" that the' cable was a cii, umlo-
cutious means of indicating that the President wanted Lurrrumba
killed.' (Bissel1, 9/10/75, pp. 12, 33, 64-65)
Bronson Tweedy testified that he may have seen Dulles' cl. We of
August 26, before it was transmitted and that he "might eve!! have
drafted it." Tweedy called this cable the "most. authoritative state-
inent" on the "policy consensus in Washington about the need for the
removal of Lumumba" by any means, including assassination. I f e said
that he "never knew" specifically who was involved in formulatiiiti this
policy. But lw believed that the cable indicated that Dulles Lid re-
ceived authorization at the "policy level" which "certainly * * *
would have involved the National Security Council." Tweedy tc:4tified
that the $16),000 was probably intended for "political operations
against Lumumba * * * not assassination-type programs." (Tweedy,
101/9/75 I, p. 5, II, pp. 5-7,24,26)
3. CIA ENCOURAGEMENT OF CONGOLESE EFFORTS TO "ELIMINA? Ell
LXTMUMBA
On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Premix; r Lu-
nmumba from the government despite the strong support for Lumumba
in the Congolese Parliament. After losing the ensuing power sti iiggle
with Kasavubii and Mobutu, who seized power by a military c+,tp on
September 11. Lumumba asked the United Nations peace-keeping
force for protection.
The evidence indicates that the ouster of Lumumba did not all:.viate
the concern about him in the United States government. Rather. CIA
and high Administration officials 2 continued to view him as a t'ireat.
See Section 7(c), infra for additional testimony by Bissell on the question of au-
ihr,rizgtion for the assassination effort against Lumumba. Bissell testified, inl, - aria,
that Dulles would have used the phrase "highest quarters" to refer to the Preside,:r.
2A detailed treatment of the expressions of continued concern over Lumumba it the
National Security Council level is set forth in Section 7, infra.
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During this period, CIA officers in the Congo advised and aided
Congolese contacts known to have an intent to assassinate Lumumba.
The officers also urged the "permanent disposal" of Lumumba by some
of these Congolese contacts. Moreover, the CIA opposed reopening
Parliament after the coup because of the likelihood that Parliament
would return Lumumba to power.
The day after Kasavubu deposed Lumumba, two CIA officers met
with a high-level Congolese politician who was in close contact with
the Leopoldville Station. The Station reported to CIA Headquarters :
TO [STATION OFFICER] COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSI-
TION IS ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE CONGOLESE,
POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD AND IMPLIED MIGHT
PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to
Director, 9/7/60)
The cable also stated that the Station Officer had offered to assist
this politician "in preparation new government program" and as-
sured him that the United States would supply technicians. (CIA
Cable, 9/7/60)
As the struggle for power raged, Bronson Tweedy summarized
the prevalent apprehension of the United States about Lumumba's
ability to influence events in the Congo by virtue of his personality,
irrespective of his official position :
LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVERRIDING FAC-
TOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION EACH TIME IT SEEMS
HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPOR-
TUNITY HAVE LAST WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVAN-
TAGE. (CIA Cable, Director to Leopoldville, 9/13/60)
The day after Mobutu's coup, the Station Officer reported that he
was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "eliminate" Lumumba
due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have been strengthened
by placing himself in U.N. custody, which afforded a safe base of
operations. Hedgman concluded : "Only solution is remove him from
scene soonest." (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 9/15/60)
On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met with a
leading Congolese senator. The cable to CIA Headquarters concern-
ing the meeting reported :
!CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE SUPPLY
SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP * * * TROOPS RECENTLY ARRIVED [LEO-
POLDVILLE] AREA * * * [THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PRO-
VIDE CORE ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT
ACTION * * * [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES LUMUMBA MUST
GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS [ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER]
BUT WILLING MAKE PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINA-
TION LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 9/17/60)
The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "he would ex-
plore possibility obtaining arms" and he recommended to CIA head-
quarters that they should :
HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT NEAREST BASE PEND-
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ING [UNITED STATES] DECISION THAT SUPPLY `VARIL.INTED
AND NECESSARY. (CIA Cable, 9/17/60)1
Several days later, the Station Officer warned a key Congolese leader
about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporter;, and :
"Urged arrc t or other more permanent disposal of Lurnuin )a, Gi-
zaenga, and Mulele." (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 9;'20/61)
(,iizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who led his sup-
porters while Lumumba was in U.N. custody.
Throughout the fall of 1960, while Lumumba remained,a.ii U.N.
protective custody,3 the CIA continued to view him as a seriou ; polit-
ucal threat. One concern was that if Parliament were re-open and
the moderatos failed to obtain a majority vote, the "pressures for
[Lumumba'.,] return will be almost irresistible." (CIA Cable', Leo-
poldville to Director, 10/26/60).3 Another concern at CIA Head-
quarters wa:; that foreign powers would intervene in the Corr:.~o and
bring Lumiilnba to power. (CIA Cable, Director to Leopoldville,
1i ) / 17/60) Lnmumba was also viewed by the CIA and the Aci rninis-
t:ration as a -talking horse for "what appeared to be a Soviet effort to
teke over tl,' Congo." (Hedgrnan, 8/21/75, pp. 10, 45)'
After Lumumba was in U.N. custody, the Leopoldville Static;e con-
ti titled to ma 1 ntain close contact with Congolese who expressed -I desire
to assassinate Lumumba.' CIA officers encouraged and offered to aid
these Congolese in their efforts against Lumumba, although t?kiere is
t This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale planning at CIA ii adquar-
terrr for clandestine paramilitary support to anti-Lumumba elements. On October 4, 1960,
Richard Bissell acid Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which th, Station
Officer was instroated not to discuss with State Department representatives or opr-rational
contacts :
[IN] VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS [CL1 ] CON-
DUCTING ('c)NTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CONGO AT REQUEST FOLIC) ECIIE-
LONS. TH PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION 1N WAY
rIJNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLANDESTINE SUPPORT TO Er,,l tIENTS
IN ARMED OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA. CONTEMPLATED ACTION INc LUDES
PROVISION ARMS, SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING Tc ; ANTI-
LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS. (CIA Cable, Director In Leopoldville, 10/6/60)
Roth Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy confirmed that the CIA continued to view
Lnmumba as a threat even after he placed himself in U.N. custody. (Bissell, 9/10,75, pp.
6.5-69. 79: Tweedy, 9/9/73, pp. 48-50) Two factors were mentioned consistently in testi-
mony by governpnent officials to substantiate this view : first, Lumumba was a sp I hinding
orator with the ability to stir masses of people to action; and second, the U.N. forces di
no+ restrain Lui3ou nba's freedom of movement and the Congolese army surroundi?:g them
wc-rc often lax In maintaining their vigil. (Mulroney, 9/11,175, pp. 22-24; Dillon. 1/2/75,
n. 49) As CIA officer Michael J. Mulroney put it, the fact that Lumumba was it United
Ni,tions custody "slid not result in a cessation of his political activity." (Mulroney, 111/75,
p. 23)
A CIA Cable from Leopoldville to the Director on November 3, 1960 returnoI to this
th"me : the opening of the Congolese Parliament by the United Nations is opposed recause
it 'WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LUMUMBA TO POWER."
See Section 7. infra, for a treatment of the expression of this viewpoint at h'i:h-level
policy meetings.
weedy expres>;rd an even broader "domino theory" about the impact of Lrinntmba's
II.'Ilir-hir) in the f'ongo noon events In the rest of Africa
"I'he concern v; ith Lumumba was not really the concern with Lumumba as a person.
It was concern At this very pregnant point in the new African development rwithl
rh+ effect on thc~ balance of the Continent of a disintegration of the Congo. [ I It was
the .'enerat feelit-, that Lumumba had it within his power to bring about this dissolu-
tion. r+nd this wnr the fear that It would merely be the start-the Congo, after all .vas the
lar_est geographi_t] expression. Contained in it were enormously important men~ral re-
sonroes * * * . The Congo itself, is adjacent to Nigeria, which at that point ens con-
Ad -,red to he ono of the main hones of the future stability of Africa. [I]f tiro Congo
hind fallen, then tine chances were Nigeria would be seized with the same infection,
This was why Washington * * * was so concerned about Lumumba, not becaii there
w . something ttbique about Lumumba. but It was the Congo." (Tweedy. 10/9/75 11 o. 42)
Congolese In contact with the CIA "IMPLIED HE TRYING HAVE [LU-11trMBA1
);,[,PD BUT A]IDFD THIS MOST DIFFICULT AS TOR WOULD HAVE BE DC 'r B''
A1i'RICAN WITII \O APPARENT INVOLVEMENT WHIT]' MAN." (CIA Cable, I eopold-
sille to Director, 0)/28/60)
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no evidence that aid was ever provided for the specific purpose of
assassination.
Summary
In the Summer of 1960, DDP Richard Bissell asked the Chief of
the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy, to explore the feasibility of
assassinating Patrice Lumumba. Bissell also asked a CIA scientist,
Joseph Scheider, to make preparations to assassinate or incapacitate
an unspecified "African leader." According to Scheider, Bissell said
that the assignment had the "highest authority." Scheider procured
toxic biological materials in response to Bissell's request, and was then
ordered by Tweedy to take these materials to the Station Officer
in Leopoldville. According to Scheider, there was no explicit require-
ment that the Station check back with Headquarters for final approval
before proceeding to assassinate Lumumba. Tweedy maintained, how-
ever, that whether or not he had explicitly levied such a requirement,
the Station Officer was not authorized to move from exploring means
of assassination to actually attempting to kill Lumumba without re-
ferring the matter to Headquarters for a policy decision.
In late September, Scheider delivered the lethal substances to the
Station Officer in Leopoldville and instructed him to assassinate Pa-
trice Lumumba. The Station Officer testified that after requesting and
receiving confirmation from CIA Headquarters that he was to carry
out Scheider's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps" in
furtherance of the assassination plot. The Station Officer also testified
that he was told by Scheider that President Eisenhower had ordered
the assassination of Lumumba. Scheider's testimony generally sub-
stantiated this account, although he acknowledged that his meetings
with Bissell and Tweedy were the only bases for his impression about
Presidential authorization. Scheider's mission to the Congo was pre-
ceded and followed by cables from Headquarters urging the "elimi-
nation" of Lumumba transmitted through an extraordinarily restricted
"Eyes Only" channel-including two messages bearing the personal
signature of Allen Dulles.
The toxic substances were never used. But there is no evidence that
the assassination operation was terminated before Lumumba's death.
There is, however, no suggestion of a connection between the assassi-
nation plot and the events which actually led to Lumumba,'s death.'
(a) Bissell/Tweedy Meetings on Feasibility of Assassinating
Lumumba
Bronson Tweedy testified that Richard Bissell initiated a discussion
with him in the summer of 1960 about the feasibility of assassinating
Patrice Lumumba, and that they discussed the subject "more than
once" during the following fall. Tweedy said the first such conversa-
tion probably took place shortly before Dulles' cable of August 26,
instructing the Station Officer that Lumumba's "removal" was a "high
priority of our covert action." 2 Whether his talk with Bissell was
1 See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about the circumstances surround-
ing Lumumba's death in Katanga.
See Section 2, supra.
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"shortly before or shortly after" the Dulles cable, it was clear to
Tweedy that the two events "were totally in tandem." (Tweedy,
9/9/75, pp. 14-15; 10/9/75 II, p. 6)
Tweedy testified that he did not recall the exact exchange but the
point of the conversation was clear :
What Mr. Bissell was saying to me was that there was agreement, policy
agreement, In Washington that Lumumba must be removed from tike position
of control and influence in the Congo * * * and that among the possibilities of
that elimination was indeed assassination.
* * * The purpose of his conversation with me was to initiate correspondence
with the Station for them to explore with Headquarters the possibility of * * *
assassination, or indeed any other means of removing Lumumba from
power * * * to have the Station start reviewing possibilities, a'?,sets, and
discussing them with Headquarters in detail in the same way we would with any
operation. (Tweedy, 10/9/75 II, pp. 6, 8)
Tweedy was "sure" that in his discussions with Bissell poisoning
"must have" been mentioned as one means of assassination that was
being considered and which the Station Officer should explore.
(Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 26-27)
Tweedy testified that Bissell assigned him the task of working out
the "operational details," such as assessing possible agents and the
security of the operation, and of finding "some solution that looked
as if it made sense, and had a promise of success." Tweedy stilted that
Bissell "never said * * * go ahead and do it in your own good time
without any further reference to me." Rather, Tweedy operated under
the impression that if a feasible means of assassinating Lumumba
were developed, the decision on proceeding with an assassination
attem)t was to be referred to Bissell. (Tweedy, 10/9/75 1, pp. 7,
17-18
Tweedy stated that he did not know whether Bissell had : onsulted
with any "higher authority" about exploring the possibilities for as-
sassinating Lumumba. Tweedy said, that generally, when he received
an instruction from Bissell :
I would proceed with it on the basis that he was authorized to give me in-
structions and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered
to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 13)'
(b) Bisseti/.Scheider Meetings on Preparations for Assassinating "An
African. Leader"
Joseph Scheider 2 testified that he had "two or three conversations"
with Richard Bissell in 1960 about the Agency's technical capability
to assassinate foreign leaders. In the late spring or early summer,
Bissell asked Scheider generally about technical means of assassina-
tion or incapacitation that could be developed or procured by the CIA.
1 When asked whether be considered declining Bissell's assignment to move coward the
assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy responded :
TWEEDY : I certainly did not attempt to decline it, and I felt, in view of the position of
the government on the thing, that at least the exploration of this. or possibility >f removing
Lumumba from power in the Congo was an objective worth pursuing.
Q : Including killing him?
TwaEDY: yes. I suspect I was ready to consider this * * * Gettingrid of him was an
objective worth pursuing, and if the government and my betters wished to pursue it, pro-
fessionally, I was perfectly willing to play my role in it, yes * * * Having to ?1 it all over
again, it would be my strong-recommendation that we not get into it. (Tweedy, 110/9/75, II,
pp. 39-41)
'During the events discussed in the Lumumba case. Joseph Scheider served as Special
Assistant to the DDP (Bissell) for Scientific Matters. Scheider holds a degree in bio-
organic chemistry. (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 13, 25-29)
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Scheider informed Bissell that the CIA had access to lethal or poten-
tially lethal biological materials that could be used in this manner.
Following their intial "general discussion," Scheider said he discussed
assassination capabilities with Bissell in the context of "one or two
meetings about Africa." (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 6-7, 41)
Scheider testified that in the late summer or early fall, Bissell asked
him to make all preparations necessary for having biological materials
ready on short notice for use in the assassination of an unspecified
African leader, "in case the decision was to go ahead." 1 Scheider
testified that Bissell told him that "he had direction from the highest
authority * * * for getting into that kind of operation." Scheider
stated that the reference to "highest authority" by Bissell "signified
to me. that he meant the President." 2 (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 51-55,
58; 10/9/75, p. 8)
Scheider said that he "must have" outlined to Bissell the steps
he planned to take to execute Bissell's orders. (Scheider, 10/7/75,
R. 58) After the meeting, Scheider reviewed a list of biological mate-
rials available at the Army Chemical Corps installation at Fort
Detrick, Maryland which would produce diseases that would "either
kill the individual or incapacitate him so severely that he would be out
of action." (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 63-64; 10/9/75, pp. 8-9, 12)3
Scheider selected one material from the list which "was supposed to
produce a disease that was * * * indigenous to that area [of Africa]
and that could be fatal." (Scheider, 10/7/75, p. 63) Scheider testified
that he obtained this material and made preparation for its use :
We had to get it bottled and packaged in a way that it could pass for some-
thing else and I needed to have a second material that could absolutely in-
activate it in case that is what I desired to do for some contingency. (Scheider,
10/7/75, p. 64)
Scheider also "prepared a packet of * * * accessory materials," such
as hypodermic needles, rubber gloves, and gauze masks, "that would
be used in the handling of this pretty dangerous material." (Scheider,
10/7/75, p. 59)
(c) Scheider Mission to the Congo on an Assassination Operation
Scheider testified that he remembered "very clearly" a conversation
with Tweedy and the Deputy Chief of the Africa Division in Sep-
tember 1960 which "triggered" his trip to the Congo after he had pre-
pared toxic biological materials and accessories for use in an assassi-
nation operation. (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 41, 65) According to
Scheider, Tweedy and his Deputy asked him to take the toxic materials
to the Congo and deliver instructions from Headquarters to the Sta-
tion Officer : "to mount an operation, if he could do it securely * * *
to either seriously incapacitate or eliminate Lumumba." (Scheider,
10/7/75, p. 66)
1 Schelder said it was possible that Bissell subsequently gave him the "go signal" for
his trip to the Congo and specified Lumumba as the target of the assassination operation.
(Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 65, 113-114; 10/7/75, p. 8) Scheider had a clearer memory, how-
ever of another meeting, where the top officers of CIA's Africa Division, acting under
Bissell's authority, actually dispatched to the Congo. (See Section 4(c), infra)
9 See Section 7(d), infra for additional testimony by Scheider about the question of
Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba.
3 Sehieder said that there were "seven or eight materials" on the list, including tularemia
("rabbit fever"), brucellosis (undulant fever), tuberculosis, anthrax, smallpox, and
Venezuelan equine encephalitis ('sleeping sickness"). (Scheider, 10/7/75, p. 64 ; 10/9/75.
P. 9)
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Scheider said that lie was directed to provide technical support
to the Station Officer's attempt to find a feasible means of carrying
out the assassination operation :
They urged me to be sure that * * * if these technical material; were
used * * * I was to make the technical judgments if there were any reasons the
things shouldn't, go, that was my responsibility. (Scheider, 10/7/75, p. C1)1
According to Scheider, the Station Officer was to be responsible for
"the operations aspects, what assets to use and other non-technical con-
siderations." Scheider said that in the course of directing him to carry
instructions to the Station Officer in the Congo, Tweedy and his Dep-
uty "referred to the previous conversation I had with Bissell," aliil left
Scheider witl>, "the impression that Bissell's statements to me in our
previous meeting held and that they were carrying this message from
l issell to me." (Scheider, 10/9/75, pp.13,15, 69)
Although he did not have a specific recollection, Scheider stated that
it, was "probable" that he would have "checked with Bissell" to vali-
date the extraordinary assignment he received from Tweedy and
his Deputy, if indeed he had not actually received the initial iusign-
ment itself from Bissell. (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 113-114)
After being informed of Scheider's testimony about their meeting,
and reviewing the contemporaneous cable traffic, Tweedy stated that
it was "perfectly clear" that he had met with Scheider. He assumed
that he had ordered Scheider to deliver lethal materials to the Lirt?pold-
ville Station Officer and to serve as a technical adviser to the Station
Officer's attempts to find a feasible means of assassinating Lumumba.
(Tweedy, 1.0;99/75 I, pp. 18-21; 10/9/75 II, D. 9)
Tweedy said that his Deputy Chief was the only other person in
the Africa Division who would have known that the assassination of
Lumumba Bias being considered. (Tweedy, 9/9/75. p. 64) Tweedy as-
sumed Scheider had "already been given his marching orders to go to
the Congo by Mr. Bissell, not by Inc." (Tweedy, 10/9/75 II, p. 11)
Scheider testified that he departed for the Congo within a woek of
his meeting with Tweedy and his Deputy (Scheider, 10/9/75, p. 15)
(d) Congo k' ration Ofli'cer 7'o7id To Expect Scheider: Dulles !fables
About "Is limination" of Lumumba
On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed himself
in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping force in
Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy sent a cryptic
cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting between the
Station Officer and "Joseph Braun," who was traveling to the Congo
When asked if he had considered declining to undertake the assignment to provide
technical support 1o an assassination operation, Scheider stated :
, , I think that my view of the job at the time and the responsibilities I had way in the
context of a silent war that was being waged, although I realize that one of my stances
co aid have been * * * as a conscientious oblector to this war. That was not my view. I felt
that a decision had been made * * * at the highest level that this be done and that as
unnleno_ant a responsibility as it was, it was my responsibility to carry out my part r,,` that."
(Scheider, 10/9/75, p. 63)
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on an unspecified assignment. Joseph Scheider testified that "Joseph
Braun" was his alias and was used because this was "an extremely
sensitive operation." (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 78, 80) The cable in-
formed the Station Officer :
["JOE"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT * * * WILL ANNOUNCE
HIMSELF AS "JOE FROM PARIS" * * * IT URGENT YOU SHOULD
SEE ["JOE"] SOONEST POSSIBLE AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL
FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO
YOU. (CIA Cable, Bissell, Tweedy to the Station Officer, 9/19/60)
The cable bore the codeword "PROP," which indicated extraordi-
nary sensitivity and restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to
Dulles, Bissell, Tweedy, and Tweedy's Deputy. The PROP designator
restricted circulation in the Congo to the Station Officer. (Tweedy,
10/9/75 I, pp. 14-15; II, pp. 9, 37)
Tweedy testified that the PROP channel was established and used
exclusively for the assassination operation. (Tweedy, 10/9/75 II, p.
37; 10/9/75 I, pp. 48-49) The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the Sta-
tion Officer that the PROP channel was to be used for :
ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OF, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD
ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF. (CIA Cable, 9/19/60)
Tweedy testified that the fact that he and Bissell both signed
the cable indicated that authorization for Scheider's trip to the
Congo had come from Bissell. Tweedy stated that Bissell "signed
off" on cables originated by a Division Chief "on matters of particular
sensitivity or so important that the DDP wished to be constantly
informed about correspondence." Tweedy said that Bissell read much
of the cable traffic on this operation and was "generally briefed on the
progress of the planning." (Tweedy, 10/9/75 I, pp.14, 54)
The Station Officer, Victor Hedgman testified ton clear, independent
recollection of receiving the Tweedy/Bissell cable. He stated that in
September of 1960 he received a "most unusual" cable from CIA Head-
quarters which advised that :
someone who I would have recognized would arrive with instructions for
me * * * I believe the message was also marked for my eyes only * * *and
contained instructions that I was not to discuss the message with anyone.
He said that the cable did not specify the kind of instructions he was
to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any way." (Hedgman,
8/21/75, pp. 11-13,43)
Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy cable, Tweedy sent another
cable through the PROP channel which stated that if it was decided
that "support for prop objectives [was] essential" a third country na-
tional should be used as an agent in the assassination operation to
completely conceal the American role.' (CIA Cable, 9/22/60) Tweedy
testified that "PROP objectives" referred to an assassination attempt.
(Tweedy, 10/9/75 I, p. 30) Tweedy also indicated to the Station
Officer and his "colleague" -Scheider :
1 Tweedy also expressed reservations about two agents that the Station Officer was
considering for this operation and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL
CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL." (CIA
Cable, 9/22/00) This is probably a reference to agent OJ/WIN, who was later dispatched
to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections 5(b)-5(c), infra.
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YOU AND COLLEAGUE 1 UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ OVER
YOUR SIIOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTU? ITIES.
OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN]
ROLE, UNLESS OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH
MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY ENTERTAIN
ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE BASED OUR HIGH R1IGARD
BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/~S0)
On September 24, the DCI personally sent a cable to Leopoldville
stating :
WE WISI GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LU-
MUMBA FRONT ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNM'^1NTAL
POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOPOLDVILLE, SETTINE HIM-
SELF IN TANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, Dulles to Leo-
poldville, 51/24/60)
Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in Pre sident
Eisenhower's presence at an NSC meeting.'
Scheider recalled that Tweedy and his Deputy had told him that
the Station Officer would receive a communication assuring him that
there was support at CIA Headquarters for the assignment Scheider
was to give him. (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 88-90)
(c) Assassiiuition Instructions Issued to Station Officer and lethal
Substa? lies Delivered: September 26,1960
Station Officer Hed man reported through the PROP chann 4 that
he had contacted Scheider on September 26. (CIA Cable, Leopo dville
to Tweedy, 9/27/60)
According to Hedgman :
ITEDGMAN: It is my recollection that he advised me, or my instructions were,
to eliminate LmnumLa.
Q : By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?
HEDGMAN : Yos, I would say that was * * * my understanding of the primary
means. I don't think it was probably limited to that, if there was some other way
of * * * removing him from a position of political threat. (Hedgman, 5 /21/75,
pp. 17-18)
Fledgman said that he and. Scheider also may have discussed non-
lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat". 1 tut he
could not "recall with certainty on that." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, l). 28)
Scheider testified:
I explained to him [Station Officer] what Tweedy and his Deputy had 1 Ad me,
that Headquarters wanted him to see if he could use this [biological] capability
I brought against Lumumba [and] to caution him that it had to be dole * * *
without attribution to the USA. (Scheider, 10/9/75, p. 16)
The Station Officer testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask,
and a syringe" along with lethal biological material from Scheider,
who also instructed him in their use.3 Hedgman indicated thA this
I Tweedy Identified Schelder as the "colleague" referred to in this cable. (Tweedy, 10/
9/75 I, p. 32) Scheider was en route to the Congo at this point.
z Dulles' statezi,ent at the NSC meeting of September 21, 1960 is discussed in retail at
Section 7(a)(v),in.tra.
3 Scheider testified that he sent the medical paraphernalia via diplomatia, pouch.
(Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 59, 99)
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paraphernalia was for administering the poison to Lumumba for the
purpose of assassination. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-21, 24) Scheider
explained that the toxic material was to be injected into some substance
that Lumumba would ingest : "it had to do with anything he could get
to his mouth, whether it was food or a toothbrush, * * * [so] that
some of the material could get to his mouth." (Scheider, 10/7/75, p.
100)
Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted to
use of the toxic material provided by Scheider. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p19
He testified that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to
Scheider as an alternative to poisoning. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 19,
27-29) Scheider said it was his "impression" that Tweedy and his
Deputy empowered him to tell the Station Officer that he could pursue
other means of assassination. (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 100-101) Sta-
tion Officer Hedgman testified that, although the selection of a mode
of assassination was left to his judgment, there was a firm requirement
that:
[I]f I implemented these instructions * * * it had to be a way which could
not be traced back * * * either to an American or the United States govern-
ment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19)
Hedgman said Scheider assured him that the poisons were produced
to : [leave] normal traces found in people that die of certain diseases."
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)
Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great surprise"
when it first became clear that Scheider had come to discuss an assas-
sination plan. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30) He told Scheider he "would
explore this." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46) and left Scheider with the
impression "that I was going to look into it and try and figure if there
was a way * * * I believe I stressed the difficulty of trying to carry
out such an operation." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 47) Scheider said that
the Station Officer was "sober [and] grim" but willing to proceed with
the operation. (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 98,121)
The Station Officer's report of his initial contact with Scheider was
clearly an affirmative response to the assignment and said that he and
Scheider were "on same wavelength." (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to
Tweedy, 9/27/60) Hedgman was "afraid" that the central govern-
ment was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation
with Lumumba, and said :
HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECU-
RITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60)'
(f) Hedgman's Impression That President Eisenhower Ordered
Lumumba's Assassination
Station Officer Hedgman testified that Scheider indicated to him that
President Eisenhower had authorized the assassination of Lumumba.2
i Scheider interpreted this cable to mean that Hedgman was informing Headquarters :
"that he has talked to me and that he is going to go ahead and see if he could mount
the operation * * * [H]oe believes we ought to do it, if it is going to be done, as quickly
as we can." (Scheider, 10/7/75, p. 121)
a See Section 7(d), infra, for a more detailed treatment of the testimony of the Station
Officer and Scheider on the question of Presidential authorization for the assassination
of Lumumba.
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Hedgman had it "quite strong recollection" of asking about the source
of authority far the assignment :
IIFDoMAN : I must have * * * pointed out that this was not a common or usual
Agency tactic * * * never in my training or previous work in the Agencti had 1
ever heard any references to such methods. And it is my recollection I asked on
whose authority these instructions were Issued.
Q : And what did Mr. Scheider reply?
IIEDOMAN : It is my recollection that he identified the 'President * * *' and I
cannot recall whether he said "the President," or whether he identified him by
name. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 30-31)
Hodgman explained that Scheider told him "something to the ^ffect
that the President had instructed the Director" to assassinate Luiaium-
ba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 32, 34~
Scheider stated that he had an `independent recollection" of tolling
the Station Officer about his meetings with Bissell, Tweedy, and
Tweedy's Deputy, including Bissell's reference to "the highest, au-
thority." (Sclieider, 10/7/75, p. 102) Scheider believed that he let the
Station Officer with the impression that there was presidential aut hori-
zation for an assassination attempt against Lumumba. (Scliaider,
10/7/75, pp. 190, 102-103)
(g) Steps in Furtherance of the Assassination Operation
(i) Hedgman's Testimony About Confirmation From Headquarters
of the Assassination Plan.
Hedgman's testimony, taken fifteen years after the events in ques-
tion and without the benefit of reviewing the cables discussed above,
was compatible with the picture presented by the cables of a fully
authorized and tightly restricted assassination operation. The only
variance is that the cables portray Hedgman as taking an affirmative,
aggressive attitude toward the assignment, while he testified that his
pursuit of the operation was less vigorous.
The Station Officer testified that soon after cabling his request
for confirmation that he was to carry out the assassination assign vent,
he received a reply from Headquarters, which he characterizt,d as
follows:
I believe I re4aeived a reply which I interpreted to mean yes, that he was the
messenger and his Instructions were * * * duly authorized. (Hedgman, 8/'211/75,
pp. 37-38)
Despite the ca .yptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con-
vinced that yc:s, it was right," but he had no "desire to carry out these
instructions." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50, 106) Hedgman stated:
"I think probably that I would have gone back and advised that I intended to
carry out and suught final approval before carrying it out had I been going to
do it, had there been a way to do It. I did not see It as * * * a matter vhich
could be accomplished practically, certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52)
Hedgman said that his reason for seeking a final approval would have
been to receive, assurances about the practicality of the specific made of
assassination that he planned to use. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 53)
All CIA officers involved in the plot to kill Lumumba testified that,
by virtue of the standard operating procedure of the clandestine ,erv-
ices, there wa:s;: an implicit requirement that a field officer check back
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with Headquarters for approval of any major operational plan., More-
over, Hedgman's cable communications with Headquarters indicate
that lie consistently informed Tweedy of each significant step in the
formulation of assassination plans, thus allowing Headquarters the
opportunity to amend or disapprove the plans. The personal cable
from Dulles to the Station Officer on August 26, made it clear, how-
ever, that if Lumumba appeared as a "target of opportunity" in a
situation where time did not permit referral to headquarters, Hedge-
man was authorized to proceed with the assassination.
The Station Officer testified that for several months after receiv-
ing Scheider's instructions lie took "exploratory steps in furtherance
of the assassination plot." He sent several cables to CIA Headquarters
which "probably reflected further steps I had taken," and stated that
his cables to Headquarters were essentially "progress reports" on his
attempts to find access to Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 50,
59-60)
The cable traffic conforms to the Station Officer's recollection. For
two months after Scheider's arrival in the Congo, a regular stream of
messages assessing prospects for the assassination operation flowed
through the PROP channel between Headquarters and Leopoldville.
(ii) "Exploratory Steps"
On the basis of his talks with Scheider, Station Officer Hedgman
listed a number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba.
At the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent be used
in the following manner :
HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER. WOULD THUS
ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE.
(CIA Cable, 9/27/60)
Tweedy testified that "Big Brother" referred to Lumumba.
(Tweedy, 10/9/75 II, p. 13) Tweedy and Scheider both said that this
cable indicated that Hedgman's top priority plan was to instruct his
agent to infiltrate Lumumba's entourage to explore means of poison-
ing Lumumba. (Tweedy, 10/9/75 I, p. 38, II, pp. 13-14; Scheider,
10/7/75, pp. 124-125) The Station Officer reported that lie would begin
to follow this course by recalling the agent to Leopoldville, and in-
formed Headquarters :
BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY
INDICATED * * * PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED
ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60)
Scheider testified that at this point the Station Officer was reporting
to Headquarters that he was proceeding to "go ahead" to carry out
Scheider's instructions as quickly as possible. (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp.
121-123) Tweedy's Deputy stated that the form of the Station Officer's
request would have satisfied the standard requirement for confirmation
of an operational plan :
* * * it is my professional opinion that, under normal operational procedure
at that time, the Station Officer would have been expected to advise .Head-
quarters that he was preparing to implement the plan unless advised to the
contrary. (Deputy Chief, Africa Division, affidavit, 10/17/75, p. 5)
1 See Tweedy, 1D/9/75, I, pp. 10, 24-27 ; Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 39, 51-53 ; Scheider,
10/7/75, p. 92; Deputy Chief, Africa Division, affidavit, 10/17/75, p. 5.
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On September 30, the Station Officer specifically urged Headquarters
t o authorize "exploratory conversations" to launch his top priority
plan :
NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAIL-
ABLE. ii11ST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING OP OR ACU1 PIING
CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.
* * * (IN] VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT AL'!,, URGE
HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO 'i)ETER-
MINE 114' [AGENT] WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AC`INT OR
CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICA ! , BASIS
AND NUT REVEAL PLANS.) IF HE APPEARS WILLING iCCEPT
ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO
HIM.
* * * REQUEST HQS REPLY [IMMEDIATELY]. (CIA Cable, Leopold-
ville to Tweedy, 9/30/60)
Headquai ters replied:
YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALK` WITH
[AGENTI TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE kCTIVE
AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE * * * IT DOES APPEAR FR I t HERE
THAT OF POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE [THIS AGENT] IS Bt].T * * *
WE WILL WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY YOUR INITIAL ASS1 SMENT
HIS ATTITUDE AS WELL AS ANY SPECIFIC APPROACH'4 THAT
MAY EMERGE * * * APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPRO i.CH TO
PROBLEM. "HOPE * * * FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cabl(-, Deputy
Chief, Africa Division to Leopoldville, 9/30/60)
Tweedy and his Deputy made it clear that the agent w,`s being
viewed as it potential assassin. (Tweedy, 10/9/75 I, p. 41; Deputy
Chief, Africa Division, affidavit, 10/17/75, p. 4) Tweedy State! l that it
would have been proper for his Deputy to issue this cable aul I iorizing
the Station Officer to take the assassination operation "one s+ep fur-
ther" and it was "quite possible" that Richard Bissell was informed of
this directive. (Tweedy,10/9/ 15 I, pp. 42-43)
On October 7, the Station Officer reported to Headquarters on his
meeting with the agent who was his best candidate for gainili access
to Lumumba :
CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [AGh T] * *
AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES [AGENT] SUGG~E'TED SO-
LUTION RECOMMENDED BY IIQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP
BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY
WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE. (('A Cable,
Station Officer to Tweedy, 10/7/60)
The Station Officer testified that the subject "explored" was tht; agent's
ability to find a means to inject the toxic material into Lumumla's food
or toothpa:4 e :
I believe t7at I queried the agent who had access to Lumumba, arnd his en-
tourage, in d(,tall about just what access he actually had, as opposed to speaking
to people. In other words, did he have access to the bathroom, did he bu, ve access
to the kitchen, things of that sort.
I have a recollection of having queried him on that without specifyiiig why I
wanted to know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48,60)
The Stal ion Officer said that he was left with doubts about the wis-
dom or practicality of the assassination plot :
[Certainly I looked on it as a pretty wild scheme professionally, a did not
think that it * * * was practical professionally, certainly, in a short tL ae, if you
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were going to keep the U.S. out of it * * * I explored it, but I doubt that I ever
really expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 11)
(iii) The Assassination Operation Moves Forward After Scheider's
Return to Headquarters : October 5-7,1960
Despite the Station Officer's testimony about the dubious practicality
of the assassination operation, the cables indicate that he planned to
continue his efforts to implement the operation and sought the re-
sources to do so successfully. For example, he urged Headquarters to
send an alternate agent :
IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES] BAR HIS PARTICI-
PATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH
QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to
Tweedy, 10/7/60)
Tweedy cabled the Station Officer that he "had god discussion
your colleague 7 Oct"-referring to a debriefing of Scheider upon his
return to the United States. Tweedy indicated that he continued to
support the assassination operation and advised (Tweedy, 10/9/75
II, pp. 48-49) :
BE ASSURED DID NOT EXPECT PROP OBJECTIVES BE REACHED
IN SHORT PERIOD * * * CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD
COUNTRY NATIONAL OPERATIVE WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,
SHOULD BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER
HE MIGHT PLAY ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS.
IF YOU CONCLUDE HE SUITABLE AND BEARING IN MIND HEAVY
EXTRA LOAD THIS PLACES ON YOU, WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH
[TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP * * *
UNDER YOUR DIRECTION. (CIA Cable, Tweedy to Station Officer,
10/7/60) 1,
According to the report of the Station Officer, Joseph Scheider left
the Congo to return to Headquarters on October 5 in view of the
"expiration date his material" (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Tweedy,
10/7/60)-a reference to the date beyond which the substances would
no longer have lethal strength. (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 132-133) The
cable from the Station Officer further stated that :
[JOE] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS.
[STATION OFFICER] PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA
Cable, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60)
Notwithstanding the influence of the Station Officer's October 7 cable
that some toxic substances were left with Hedgman, Scheider specifi-
cally recalled that he had. "destroyed the viability" of the biological
material and disposed of it in the Congo River before he departed for
the United States on October 5, 1960. (Scheider, 10/7/75, pp. 133, 117,
135-136; 10/9/75, p. 20) In the only real conflict between his testi-
mony and Schieder's, Hedgman testified that the toxic material was
'see Sections 5(b)-5(c), infra, for a detailed account of the activities in the Congo of
two "third country national" agents: QJ/WIN and WI/ROGUE. See Section 5(a), infra,
for discussion of the temporary duty assignment in the Congo of senior case officer" Michael
Mulroney.
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not disposed of until after Lumumba was imprisoned by the (Jongo-
.lese in early December. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 85-86) 1
The central point remains that the Station Officer planned o con-
tinue the assassination effort, by whatever means, even after Scleider's
departure. (Scheider?,. 10/7/75, p. 143) Scheider was under the 'enpres-
sion that the Station Officer was still authorized to move ahead with
an assassination attempt against Lumumba at that point., alth+ dy said
that he never had occasion to doubt Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding, "I would
trust his memory and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 311)
' Tweedy explained his difficulty in recalling the assassination operation :
"[T]he things that I recall the-most vividly about all my African experiences v- re *
the things I was basically concerned with all the time. which was putting this )ivision
together and tree' rest of It. When it comes to operational detail I start getting fuzzy
and you would have thought with something like thinking about 'Air. Lumumba in these
terms that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I cai assure
yin this wasn't the case." (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 34)
For a detailca treatment of Tweedy's testimony on Scheider's assignment to the Congo
and the assassination operation against Lumumba, see Sections 4(a)-(g), sup,-a.
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35
Tweedy characterized the entire assassination operation as "explor-
atory":
This involved the launching of the idea with the field so they could make the
proper operational explorations into the feasibility of this, reporting back to
Headquarters for guidance. At no point was the field given carte blanche if they
thought they had found a way to do the job, just to carry it out with no further
reference. (Tweedy, 10/9/75 II, p. 22)
He testified that the period of exploration of access to Lumumba re-
mained "a planning interval and at no point can I recall that I ever
felt it was imminent that somebody would say `go'." (Tweedy, 9/9/75,
pp. 18-19)
Tweedy stated that, despite his inability to specifically recall his
directive to Scheider, lie would not have given the Station Officer an
instruction "to use this [toxic] material and go ahead and assassinate
Lumumba, as if * * * that is all the authority that was necessary."
He said that :
Under no circumstances would that instruction have been given by me without
reference to higher authority up through the chain of command * * * my higher
authority, in the first instance, would be Mr. Bissell * * * and I know Mr. Bissell
would have talked to Mr Dulles. (Tweedy, 10/9/76 I, pp. 17-18; 10/9/75 II, pp.
25,33)
It is difficult to reconcile some of the cables and the testimony of
Scheider and Hedgman with Tweedy's testimony that there was "no
misunderstanding' that the PROP operation was purely exploratory
"continency planning" and that no authorization was granted for
attempting an assassination without checking back with headquarters.
For example, Dulles' August 26 directive appeared to indicate wide
latitude for making operational decisions in the field "where time does
not permit referral" to Headquarters.
Tweedy testified that sending a potentially lethal biological ma-
terial with a short period of toxicity to the Congo did not mean that
the Station Officer was empowered to take action without seeking
final approval from Headquarters.
TWEEDY : If, as a result of the Station focusing on the problem for the first
time, as a result of Headquarters' request, they had come up with a plan that
they thought was exceedingly solid and which Headquarters approved, it is not
surprising, perhaps, that we wanted the materials there to take advantage of
such * * * an unlikely event.
Q : Because Scheider took lethal materials to the Congo with him that had such
a short period of lethality, were you not contemplating at that time that the
operation might well move from the exploration phase to the implementation
phase just as soon as Scheider and Hedgman determined that it was feasible?
TWEEDY : I think I would put it quite differently. I think that I would say that
we would have been remiss in not being in a position to exploit, if we reached
the point where we all agreed that the thing was possible. (Tweedy, 10/9/75 I,
pp. 49-50)
The dispatch of toxic material and medical paraphernalia to the
Congo certainly demonstrates that the "exploration" of the feasibility
of assassinating Lumumba had progressed beyond mere "assessment"
and "contingency planning."
Tweedy further disagreed that the Station Officer's October 7 mes-
,sage that he would "continue try implement op[eration]" signified
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Ihat the Officer was prepared to proceed to "implement" an as.rissina-
I ion attempt :
He would continue to explore the possibilities of this operation and ontinue
to report to Headquarters. That is all this means. It does not mean that * * *
lie would try lo pull off the operation without further reference to Head uarters
* * * [H]e was to continue to explore it'to determine whether or not tL re was
vi feasible meatus. (Tweedy, 10/9/75 11, pp. 14-15)
Finally, Tweedy's recollection that a "go ahead" on the assays nation
operation was never imminent is brought into question by thw, cable
he sent for Hedgman's "Eyes Only" on October 15 to assure him
that there .Nwas a policy-level consensus that Lumumba's "disli,osition
spontaneously becomes number one consideration" and that the a'ROP
operation "remains highest priority." (CIA Cable, Tweedy to ation,
]0/15/60)
0i) Bissell'., Testimony About Moving the Assassination Operation
From Planning to Implementation
Richard Bissell testified that lie did not remember discussing the
feasibility of assassinating Lumunlba with Bronson Tweedy. but it
seemed "entirely- probable" to him that such discussions took place.
Bissell, who did not review the cable traffic, said he "may have given
Tweedy specific instructions about steps to -further an assassination
plan, but he did not remember doing so. He said that seeking infor-
mation from the Station Officer about access for poisoning oIr assas-
sinating Lumumba by other means would "almost certainly"` have
been a "major part" of his "planning and preparatory activil.but
ho had no specific recollection of cable communications on this st;bject.
Ile did recall that the Station Officer had all agent who suplp xsedly
had direct access to Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 3, 4, 6-8, s0)
Bissell testified that lie "most certainly" approved any cable ; that
Tweedy sent. to the Station Officer seeking information abou9: gain-
ing access to Lumumba because in "a matter of this sensit. vity,"
Tweedy probably would have referred cables to him for final dis; )itch.
But Bissell added :
I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral authorization from me. would have
had the authority to send such a cable without my signing off on it. (Rl:issell,
9/10/75, p. 8)
Bissell's failure to recall discussing his assignment to Michael
Mulroney t v` ith Tweedy provided a basis for his speculatiot : that
Tweedy might also have been unaware of the true purpr.;e of
Scheider's vi it. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 20-22)
Bissell did not recall cables concerning Scheider's mission, am con-
firming that Scheider's instructions were to be followed ; but h r; said
"this sounds highly likely * * * I would expect, given the "lack-
ground, that t lie confirmation would have been forthcoming." (Bissell,
9/10/75, p. 48)
Bissell said that it was "very probable" that he discusses the
assassination of Lumumba with Scheider, who was then his fence
advisor. On a number of occasions he and Scheider had discussed "the
availability of means of incapacitation, including assassination." Al-
though he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed thit, if
I Bissell's assignment to Mulroney is discussed in Sections 5 (a) (1) and 5(a)(ii), infra.
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Scheider went to the Congo, Bissell would have approved the mission,
which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of Lu-
mumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 14, 60, 18, 20, 44)
Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy in
the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo. He characterized "the
act of taking the kit to the Congo * * * as still in the planning stage."
(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 35, 49). He acknowledged, however, that:
It would indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials--a specific
kit * * * of this sort-out to a relatively small Station, unless planning for their
use was quite far along. (Bissell, 9/10/7, p. 37)
Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he had
sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to move from
the stage of planning to implementation. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 60-61)
Although he did not have a specific recollection, Bissell assumed that
if Scheider had instructed Hedgman to assassinate Lumumba, Scheider
would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by Bis-
sell and the assassination plot would then have "passed into an imple-
mentation phase." (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 39, 41, 49)
5. THE QUESTION OF A CONNECTION BETWEEN TIIE ASSASSINATION PLOT
AND OTHER ACTIONS OF CIA OFFICERS AND THEIR AGENTS IN THE
CONGO
Michael Mulroney, a senior CIA officer in the Directorate for Plans,
testified that in October 1960 he had been asked by Richard Bissell to
go to the. Congo to carry out the assassination of Lumumba. Mulroney
said that he refused to participate in an assassination operation, but
proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba away from the
protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in the hands of
Congolese authorities. (Mulroney, 6/9/75, pp. 11-14)
Shortly after Mulroney's arrival in the Congo, he was joined by
QJ/WIN, a CIA agent with a criminal background.' Late in 1960,
WI/ROGUE, one of Hedgman's operatives approached QJ/WIN
with a proposition to join an "execution squad." (CIA Cable, Leo-
poldville to Director, 12/7,/60)
It is unlikely that Mulroney was actually involved in implementing
the assassination assignment. Whether there was any connection be-
tween the assassination plot and either of the two operatives-QJ/
WIN and WI/ROGUE-is less clear.
(a) Mulroney's Assignment in the Congo
(i) Mulroney's Testimony That Ile Went to the Congo After Refus-
ing an Assassination Assignment From Bissell
In early October, 1960, several PROP cables discussed a plan to
send a "senior case officer" to the Congo to aid the overburdened Sta-
tion Officer with the assassination operation.2 Shortly after the Sta-
I See Part III, Section c, of this Report for a discussion of the CIA's use of QJ/WIN
In developing a stand-by assassination capability in the Executive Action project.
2 See Section 4(g), supra, for full treatment of these cables.
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tion Officer's request on October 17, for a senior case officer to concen-
trate on the assassination operation. Bissell broached the subject with
Mulroney. At the time, Mulroney was the Deputy Chief of an e ctraor-
dinarlly secret unit within the Directorate of Plans. (Mu.]?oney,
6/9/75, p. 8)
Mulroney testified that in October of 1960, Bissell asked Lim to
undertake tic mission of assassinating Patrice Lumumba :
MULRONEY :lie called me in and told me he wanted to go down to the. elgian
Congo, the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate Lumumba * * *.
Q : What did you understand him to mean by eliminate?
MuLRONEY : To kill him and thereby eliminate his influence.
Q : What wa i the basis for your interpreting his remarks, whatever his pre-
cise language, as meaning that he was talking about assassination ratbo'r than
merely neutral zing him through some other means?
MULRONEY; It, was not neutralization * * * clearly the context of our t,aik was
to kill him. (Mulroney, 6/9/M, pp. 11-12, 19, 43)
Mulroney testified :
I told him that I would absolutely not have any part of killing Lumu1stla. He
said, I want you to go over and talk to Joseph Scheider. (Mulroney, 6/9/76, P. 12)
Mulroney ::aid that it was "inconceivable that Bissell would :direct
suwh a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles"
I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles in such' an important issue,
but it was not discussed [with me], nor did he purport to have higher authority
to (lo it. (Mulroney, 9/9/75, pp. 15, 44)
Mulroney then met promptly with Scheider and testified that l e was
"sure that W. Bissell had called Scheider and told him I was cii ming
over" to his office. Scheider told Mulroney "that there were for or
fire * * * lethal means of disposing of Lumumba * * *. One 44 the
methods was a virus and the others included poison." Mulroney said
that, Scheider "didn't even hint * * * that he had been in the ('ongo
and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo." (Mul-
roney, 6/9/75, pp. 12-13; 9/11/T5, pp. 7-7A)
Mulroney testified that after speaking with Scheider :
I then left his office, and I went back to Mr. Bissell's office, and I told aim in
no way would I have any part in the assassination of Lumumba * * * and
reasserted in absolute terms that I would not be involved in a murder R ,,tempt.
(Mulroney, 9/11/75, p. 43) '
Mulroney ~.,tid that in one of his two conversations with 1,issell
about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy to commit
murder being done in the District of Columbia might be in vio'ation
when asked uI the conclusion of his testimony to add anything to the record hat he
felt was necessary to present a full picture of the operation against Lumumba, Mulroney
volunteered a statement about the moral climate in which it took place:
.All the people that I knew acted in good faith. I think they acted In the light
maybe not their consciences, but in the light of their concept of patriotism. [T]hey i It that
this was in the best interests of the U.S. I think that we have to much of tt; ' 'good
German' in us, in that we do something because the boss says it is okay. And t:aey are
not essentially evil people. But you can do an awful lot of wrong in this.
"? * * This is such a dishonest business that only honest people can be in it. Thy t Is the
only thing that will save the Agency and make you trust the integrity of wlot they
report * * *. An intelligence officer * * * must be scrupulous and he must bo moral
* * * he must iiave personal Integrity * * *. They must be particularly cons. ous of
the moral element in Intelligence operations." (Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp. 57, 61)
l.arlier in his testimony, Mulroney succinctly summarized his philosophical 01r?osition
to assassinating Lumumba: "murder corrupts." (Mulroney, 9/11/75, p. 9)
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of federal law." He said that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect.
(Mulroney, 6/9/75,1).14)
Although he refused to participate in assassination, Mulroney
agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize"
Lumumba "as a political factor" (Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp. 43-44)
I said I would go down and I would have no compunction about operating
to draw Lumumba out [of UN custody], to run an operation to neutralize his
operations which were against Western interests, against, I thought, American
interests. (Mulroney, 6/9/75, p. 13)'
Although Mulroney did not formulate a precise plan until he
reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:
MULRONEY : I told Mr. Bissell that I would be willing to go down to neu-
tralize his activities and operations and try to bring him out [of UN custody]
and turn him over to the Congolese authorities.
Senator MONDALE : Was it discussed then that his life might be taken by the
Congolese authorities?
MULRONEY : It was, I think, considered * * * not to have him killed, but then it
would have been a Congolese being judged by Congolese for Congolese crimes.
Yes, I think it was discussed. (Mulroney, 6/9/75, p. 38)
According to Mulroney there was a "very, very high probability"
that Lumumba would receive capital punishment at the hands of the
Congolese authorities. But he "had no compunction about bringing
him out and then having him tried by a jury of his peers." (Mulroney,
6/9/75, pp. 24, 14)
Despite Mulroney's expressed aversion to assassination and his
agreement to undertake it more general mission to "neutralize"
Lumumba's influence, Bissell continued pressing him to consider an
ilssassina*ion operation :
In leaving at the conclusion of our second discussion * * * he said, well, I
wouldn't rule out that possibility-meaning the possibility of the elimination
or the killing of Lumumba * * *. In other words, even though you have said
this, don't rule it out * * *. There is no question about it, he said, I wouldn't
rule this other out, meaning the elimination or the assassination. (Mulroney,
9/11/75, p. 45)
Mulroney distinctly recalled that after his second discussion with
Bissell, he met with Richard Helms, who was then Deputy to the DDP
and Chief of Operations in the clandestine services division, in order
to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of record
(Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp. 44-45) :
[I]n the Agency, since you don't .gave documents, you have to be awfully canny
and you have to get things on record, and I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I
said, hick, here is what Mr. Bissell proposed to me, and I told him that I would
under no conditions do it, and Helms said, `you're absolutely right.' (Mulroney
6/9/75, pp. 15-16)
Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such a conversation
with Mulroney and he assumed that Mulroney's version of their con-
versation was correct. (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23) 2
1 Bissell also recalled that, after discussing assassination with Mulroney, Mulroney went
to the Congo "with the assignment * * * of looking at other ways of neutralizing
Lumumba." (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 53)
helms testified that he did not inquire further into the subject of this conversation
in any way. He did not recall why Mulroney had gone to the Congo or what his mission
was. (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33)
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William Harvey was Mulroney's immediate superior at that time
He testified .
Mr. Mulroney came to me and said that he had been approached by Richard
Bissell * * * to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives= 4 which
was the elimination of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined
to undertake this assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9)
Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell tld him
that he had asked Mulroney to undertake such an operation. (1 larvey,
6/25/75, p. 9)
Tweedy's Deputy, who aided in making preparations for Mulroney's
trip to the Congo, recalled that Mulroney had "reacted negatively" to
Bissell's request to undertake an assassination operation. ( Deputy
Chief, Africa Division affidavit, 10/17/75, p. 2) He stated:
Despite the fact that Mulroney had expressed a negative reaction t+z this as-
signment, it vvas clear to me that when Mulroney went to the Congo, exploration
of the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba was part of his assignment from
Bissell. As far as I know, Mulroney was not under assignment to attempt to assas-
sinate Lumumba, but rather merely to make plans for such an operation. (Deputy
Chief, Africa Division affidavit, 10/17/75, p. 2)
In Tweedy's mind, Mulroney's eventual mission to the Coi go was
also linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba
rather than to a general plan to draw Luinumba out of U.N. custody.
(Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 24, 26)
Mulroney testified, however, that because he was "morally ropposed
to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have explored the weans by
which such access could be gained, nor would he have undertaken a
mission to the Congo to assess an assassination operation ev en if it
were directM. by someone else. (Mulroney, 9/11/75, p. 26)
Mulronev~ said that he departed for the Congo within foray-eight
hours of his second discussion with Bissell. (Mulroney, 9/11,15, pp.
4556)
(ii) Bissell's Testimony About the Assignment to Mulroney
Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and Mulroney discussed
the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell, 6/9/75,
pp. 74-75) and that Mulroney reacted negatively. (Bissell, 9/11/75,
p. 18) Accordingly to Bissell, Mulroney said that assassination "was
an inappropriate action and that the desired object could be accom-
plished better in other ways." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54)
Bissell's testimony differs from Mulroney's account on only one
important point-the degree to which Bissell's initial assig) tnent to
Mulroney contemplated the mounting of an operation as opposed to
contingency planning. Mulroney flatly testified. that Bissell requested
him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first testimony on the subject,
l3issell said that he asked Mulroney "to investigate the possi}tility of
killing Lumumba." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55,. 75) In
a later appearance, however, Bissell stated that. Mulroney "1.!ad been
asked to plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba. Bissell,
(1/10/75. p. 24)
1 Harvey wow later centrally involved in the Castro case and the Executive Acf,,n project.
See Parts III (TI) and Part IlI(C), {njra.
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Bissell said that after his conversations with Mulroney, he con-
sidered "postponing" the assassination operation :
I seem to recollect that after this conversation with him, I wanted this put
very much on the back burner and inactivated for quite some time. Now that
doesn't rule out the possibility that some action through completely different
channels might have gone forward. But the best of my recollection is, I viewed
this not only as terminating the assignment for him, but also as reason for at
least postponing anything further along that line. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 25-26)
(iii) Mulroney Informed of Virus in Station Safe Upon Arriving in
Congo : November 3, 1960
On October 29, the Station Officer was informed that Michael Mul-
roney would soon arrive in Leopoldville "in furtherance this project."
(CIA Cable, Deputy Chief, Africa Division, to Station Officer
10/29/60) On November 3, Mulroney arrived in Leopoldville. (CIA
Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 11/4/60) Hedgman said it was "very
possible" that he regarded the dispatch to the Congo of a senior officer
as a signal that CIA Headquarters was "dissatisfied with my han-
dling" of Scheider's instructions. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42)
Hedgman had only a general picture of Mulroney's assignment :
I understood it to be that-similar to mine, that is, the removal or neutraliza-
tion of Lumumba * * * I have no clear recollection of his discussing the assas-
sination. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54)
Station Officer Iledgman said that he did not recall if Mulroney
indicated whether he was considering assassination as a means of
"neutralizing" Lumumba. Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions,
I may have assumed that he was" considering assassination. Generally,
however, the Station Officer perceived Mulroney as unenthusiastic
about his assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 55, 56, 88-89)
When Mulroney arrived in the Congo, he met with the Station Of-
ficer, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe." (Mul-
roney, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16) Mulroney said he assumed it was
a "lethal agent," although the Station Officer was not explicit :
I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio shot up to date. (Mulroney,
6/9/75, pp. 16, 37)'
Mulroney said that he did not recall the Station Officer's mention-
ing the source of the virus, but :
It would have had to have come from Washington, in my estimation, and I
would think, since it had been discussed with Scheider that it probably would
have emanated from his office. (Mulroney, 6/9/75, p. 28)2
Hedgman did not recall discussing Scheider's trip to the Con o with
Mulroney, but "assumed" that he did so. (Hedgman, 8/21/5, pp.
60-61)
I Mulroney added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes. "It would have
been in the custody of the State Department" personnel, not the CIA Station. (Mulroney,
6/9/75, p. 36)
2 When Mulroney was informed about Hedgman's testimony concerning Scheider's trip
to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba, he said, "I believe absolutely in its credi-
bility. Mulroney found nothing in the facts as he knew them nor in Hedgman's character,
to raise a question about that testimony. He regarded Iiedgman as "an honest and
a decent man-a totally truthful man." (Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp: 19, 53, 56)
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Mulroney was "certain" that the virus had arrived before be did.
(Mulroney, +3/9/75, p. 24) He was surprised to learn that such ,I: virus
Was at the Leopoldville Station because he had refused an assassina-
tion mission before departing for the Congo. (Mulroney, 6/9/75.? p. 17)
Mulroney, stated that he knew of no other instance where L CIA
Station had possessed lethal biological substances. He assumed that
its purpose was assassination, probably targeted againt Lumumba
(Mulroney, 9/11/75, p. 50)
My feeling ieflnitely is that it was for a specific purpose, and was jus not an
all-purpose capability there, being held for targets of opportunity, unspecified
targets. (Mulroney. 9/11/75. p. 49)
Mulroney said that the Station Officer never indicated that 1Z1.1 'coney
was to employ the virus, that he "never discussed his assass i kiation
effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (Mulroney, 9/ 11/75,
pp. 52, 54)
While Station Officer Hedgman had no direct recollection ,rf dis-
cussing the assassination operation with Mulroney, he "assumed" that
he haT at least mentioned the problem of gaining access to Lui raumba
for the purpose of assassinating him. (Hedgman., 8/21/75, pp. t5, 60)
Mulroney was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hei lgman
about his ccanversations with Bissell concerning the assassination of
Lumumba. (11 fulroney, 9/11/75, p. 46) Hedgman, however, O id not
recall learning this from Mulroney. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 56)
Mulroney said that his discussions of assassination with HeJgman
were general and philosophical, dealing with "the morality of assassi-
nations." (Mulroney, 9111/75, pp: 46, 54)
From my ppint of view I told him I had moral objections to it, not just qualms,
but objections. I didn't think it was the right thing to do. (Mulroney, it/11/75,
p. 9)
When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward ass;tssina-
tion based oil those discussions, Mulroney said :
He would not have been opposed in principle to assassination in the lr terests
of national security * * *. I know that he is a man of great moral perception
and decency and honor * * *. And that it would disturb him to be ,engaged
in something like that. But I think I would have to say that in our conver';ations,
my memory of those, at no time would he rule it out as being a possibility.
(Mulroney, 9/11/71 5, p. 18)
(b)) Mulraney's Plan to "Neutralize" Lumumba
After Mulroney arrived in the Congo, he formulated a plrin for
"neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from the custody
of the U.N. force which was guarding his residence :
Mulroney : j Sv] hat I wanted to do was to get him out, to trick him out, if
I could, and then turn him over * * * to the legal authorities and let hii i stand
trial. Because lie had atrocity attributed to him for which he could yi?ry well
stand trial.
Q : And for which he could very well have received capital punishlgetit?
Mulroney: Yes. And I am not opposed to capital punishment. (1[^.,lroney,
9/11/75, pp. 20 .21)1
I When Mulr ncy's mission to draw Lumumba out of the hands of the U.N. was +'lescribed
to C. Douglas 1UIllon, who was Undersecretary of State at that time, Dillon testl4ed that
ii conformed to United States policy toward Lumumba. (Dillon, 9/21/75, p. 50)
According to an earlier report from the Station Officer, it was the view of tim Special
l.epresentative of the Secretary General of the United Nations that arrest by C,,ngolese
authorities was "JUST A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA." (CIA Cable, Station
Officer to Direc]or, 10/11/60) The Station Officer proceeded to recommend Lu+numba's
arrest in the sane cable:
STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS ^~RREST
LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE THREAT TO ST.BILITY
CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM SCENE.
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To implement his plan, Mulroney made arrangements to rent "an
observation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely en-
sconced." He also made the acquaintance of a U.N. guard to recruit
him for an attempt to lure Lumumba outside U.N. protective custody.
(Mulroney, 6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21) Mulroney said that he cabled
progress reports to CIA Headquarters, and kept the Station Officer
informed about his activities. (Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp. 26-27, 56)
Mulroney arranged for CIA agent QJ/WIN, to come to the Congo
to work with him :
What I wanted to use him for was * * * counter-espionage. * * * I had
to screen the U.S. participation in this * * * by using a foreign national whom
we knew, trusted, and had worked with * * * the idea was for me to use him as
an alter ego. (Mulroney, 6/9/75, pp. 19-20)
In mid-November two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA Head-
quarters to send QJ/WIN :
LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE IMMEDIATE EX-
PEDITION OF QJ/WIN TRAVEL TO LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable, Leo-
poldville to Director, 11/13/60; see also 11/11/60)
The cables did not explain the "operational circumstances."
(b) QJ/WIN's Mission in the Congo : November-December 1960
QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background, re-
cruited in Europe. (Memo to CIA Finance Division, Re : Payments to
QJ/WIN, 1/31/61) In November 1960, agent QJ/WIN was dis-
patched to the Congo to undertake a mission that "might involve a
large element of personal risk." (CIA Cable, 11/2/60)1
A cable from Headquarters to Leopoldville stated :
In view of the extreme sensitivity of the objective for which we want
[QJ/WIN] to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to
do * * *. Instead, he was told * * * that we would like to have him spot,
assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use * * *.
It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the final
decision to use [him]. (CIA Cable, 11/2/60)
This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained at the
station : "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic necessary notes
and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA Cable, 11/2/60)
QJ/WIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960, and re-
turned to Europe in late December 1960. (CIA Cable, 11/29/60; CIA
Cable Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60)
Muironey described QJ/WIN as follows :
MULEONEY : * * * I would say that he would not be a man of many scruples.
Q : So he was a man capable of doing anything?
MULRONEY : I would think so, yes.
Q : And that would include assassination?
MULRONEY : I would think so. (Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp. 35-36)
But Mulroney had no knowledge that QJ/WIN was ever used for
an assassination operation. (Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42)
i An additional purpose in dispatching QJ/WIN was to send him from the Congo to an-
other African country for an unspecified mission. QJ/WIN's mission to this country is not
explained in the cable traffic between CIA Headquarters and the various stations that dealt
with him.
There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJ/WIN completed this operation.
Mulroney said he had no knowledge of any assignment that would have taken QJ/WIN
to this other country. (Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp. 32-33) William Harvey stated that he
recalled that QJ/WIN might have been sent to an African country other than the Congo,
but Harvey was "almost certain that this was not connected in any way to an assassina-
tion mission." (Harvey affidavit, 9/14/75, p. 5)
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Mulroney said that, as far as he knew, he was the only C1.X officer
with supertvisory responsibility for QJ/WIN, and QJ/WIN did not
report independently to anyone else. When asked if it was possible
that QJ/WIN had an assignment independent of his operations for
Mulroney, he said :
Yes, that Aa possible-or it could have been that somebody contacted him after
lie got down there, that they wanted him to do something along the Thies of as-
sassination. I don't know. (Mulroney, 9/11/75, pp. 28, 29)
Mulroney- discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" L4~cause it
would be a departure from standard CIA practice by placing an agent
in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervisin r officer.
(Mulroney, 9,/11/77 5, p. 29)
Despite ;1'Culroney's doubt that QJ/WIN had an independent line of
responsibility to Station Officer Hedgman, Hedgman's Novs inber 29
cable to Tweedy reported that QJ/WIN had begun implemt~nting a
plan to "pierce both Congolese and U.N. guards" to enter Lu iumba's
residence and "provide escort out of residence." (CIA Cable., Station
Officer to Tweedy, 11/29/60) Mulroney said, that he had directed
QJ/WIN to make the acquaintance of the member of U.N. force.
(Mulroney, 9/11//75, p. 21) By this point, Lumumba had already
left U.N. custody to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyvi=le. This
did not deter QJ/WIN :
VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJ/WLN ANXIOUS (O 'STAN-
LEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY IHIMSELF
WITHOUT USING ANY APPARAT. (CIA Cable, 11/29/60)
It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassii ation as
well as abduction. Headquarters replied affirmatively the i2a',xt day
in language which could have been interpreted as an assa-; ination
order:
CONCUit QJ/WIN GO STANLEYVILLE WE ARE PIi:,)PARED
CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJ/WIN BUT WOULD LIBi+, YOUR
READING ON SECURITY FACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULi) THIS
PLACE [UNITED STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable, Chief of
Africa Division to Station Officer, 11/30/60)
Mulroney said that QJ/WIN's stay in the Congo was "cog r.tensive
with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I did.."' (Mul-
roney, 6/g/-45, p. 19)
In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJ/WIN"; activi-
ties in the Congo, William Harvey, Mulroney's immediate sul erior in
the Directorate of Plans, noted : "QJ,/WIN was sent on this l,rip for
a specific. highly sensitive operational purpose which has ben com-
pleted." (Memo for Finance Division from Harvey, 1/11/6 3 ) Mul-
roney explained Harvey's reference by saying that once Linnumba
was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for the
mounting of the project * * * had become moot." When asked i t he and
QT,/WIN were responsible for Lumumba's departure from 1'.N. cus-
tody and subsequent capture, Mulroney replied: "Absolut ty not."
(Mulroney, 9/11/75, p. 35)1
1 Harvey did not recall the meaning of the memorandum, but be assumed tha. the mere
fact that Mulroney had returned from the Congo would have constituted the "cc,npletion"
of QJ/WIN's Mission. (Harvey affidavit, 9/14/75, p. 2)
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Despite the suggestive language of the cables at, the end of Novem-
ber about the prospect of "direct action" by QT/WIN and an indica-
tion in the Inspector General's Report that QJ/WIN may have been
recruited initially for an assassination mission 1 there is no clear evi-
dence that QJ/WIN was actually involved in any assassination plan
or attempt. The Inspector General's Report may have accurately re-
ported a plan for the use of QJ/WIN which predated Mulroney s re-
fusal to accept the assassination assignment from Bissell. But there is
no evidence from which to conclude that QJ/WIN was actually used
for such an operation.
Station Officer Hedgman had a "vague recollection" that QJ/WIN
was in the Congo working for Mulroney. But Hedgman did not recall
why QJ/WIN was in the Congo and said that QJ/WIN was not one of
his major operatives. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 35) Bissell and Tweedy
did not recall anything about QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo. (Bis-
sell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54,61)
Harvey, whose division "loaned" QJ/WIN to the Congo Station,
testified :
I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJ/WIN's trip to the Congo and,
subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know specifically what
QJ/WIN did In the Congo. I do not think that I ever had such knowledge * * *.
If QJ/WIN were to be used on an assassination mission, it would have been
cleared with me. I was never informed that he was to be used for such a mission.
(Harvey affidavit, 9/14/75, pp. 3-4)'
A 1962 CIA cable indicates the value the CIA accorded QJ/WIN
and the inherent difficulty for an intelligence agency in employing
criminals. The CIA had learned that QJ/WIN was about to go on
trial in Europe on smuggling charges and Headquarters suggested :
IF * * * INFOR[MATION] TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASH
CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJ/WIN FOR OUR
PURPOSES. (CIA Cable, 1962)
(c) WI/ROGUE Asks QJ/WIN to Join "Execution Squad"; Decem-
ber 1960
The only suggestion that QJ,/WIN had any connection with assas-
sination was a report that WI/ROGUE, another asset of the Congo
Station, once asked QJ/WIN to join an "execution squad."
WI/ROGUE was an "essentially stateless" soldier of fortune, "a
forger and former bank robber." (Inspector General Memo, 3/14/75) 3
L The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJ/WIN had been recruited earlier
* * * for use In a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of Patrice Lumumba)
to be run by Michael Mulroney." (I.G. Report, p. 38)
As explained above, Bissell and Mulroney testified that Mulroney had refused to be
associated with an assassination operation. See sections 5(a) (ii) and (iii).
a Harvey stated that the memoranda concerning QJ/WIN were robably written for
his signature by the officer who supervised QJ/WIN's activities in Europe. (Harvey affi-
davit, 9/14/75, P. 1, 4)
Harvey said that I. later discussions he held with Scheider concerning the develop-
ment of a general assassination capabilityi Scheider never mentioned QJ/WIN's activities
in the Congo, nor did Scheider refer to hs own trip to Leopoldville. Harvey also stated
that before the formation of that project, QJ/WIN's case officer had not previously used
him "as an assassination capability or even viewed him as such." (Harvey affidavit, 9/14/
75. np 7, S) See discussion in Part III. Section C.
This information was derived from a report on WI/ROGUE's assignment to the
Congo preppared by a former Africa Division officer on March 14, 1975 at the request of
the CIA OfRce of the Inspector General.
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The CIA sent him to the Congo after providing him wit I. plastic
surgery and a toupee so that Europeans traveling in the Coir ro would
not recognize him. (LG. Memo, 3/14/75) The CIA charwcterized
'WI/ROI U E as a man who "learns quickly and carries oua any as-
signment without regard for danger." (CIA Cable, Africa Di vision to
Leopoldvi;]le, 10/27/60) CIA's Africa Division recommen, 4ed WI/
ROGUE as an agent in the following terms :
He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he l- given an
assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but -accessary
because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, ai~3l he will
dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pan ; of con-
science. In a word, he can rationalize all actions.
Station Officer Hedgman described WI/ROGUE, as "a man with a
rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, it least."
;Hedgman used him as "a general utility agent" because "I felt we
needed surveillance capability, developing new contacts, various
things." Hedgman supervised WI/ROGUE directly and did 'tot put
him in touch with Mulroney. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-91
A report on agent. WI/ROGUE, prepared for the CIA. Izrypector
General's Ollice in 1975, described the training he received :
On 19 Septe) raber 1960 two members of Africa Division met with him I discuss
"tin operatiox u1 assignment in Africa Division." In connection with thit assign-
ntent, WI/ROc.UE was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical
i ntmunization. (LG. Memo, 3/14/75)1
The report also outlined WI/ROGUE's assignment to the Congo
a:nd recorded no mention of the use to which WI/ROGUE'S "iiiedica]
immunization" training would be put :
In October J960 a cable to Leopoldville stated that * * * Headquarter ~ [had]
* * * intent to use him as utility agent in order to "(a) organize and ct wduct a
surveillance team; (b) intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and {;;) exe-
ciite other assignments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be
restricted to Leopoldville." (I.G. Memo, 3/14/75)
WI/ROGI"E made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopold-
ville on DecA'.inber 2, 1960. Hedgman instructed him to "build cover
during initial period ;" and to "spot persons for [a] surveillance team"
of intelligence agents in the province where Lumumba's support, was
strongest. (CIA Cable, 12/17/60)
Soon thereu fter Hedgman cabled Headquarters :
QJ/WIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WI/ROGUE REPORT-
I'D * * * WI/ROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUST''rESS.
STATION I WNIED ANY INFO ON WI/ROGUE.. 14 DEC QJ/WI RE-
PORTED WI/ROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOL-
LARS PER .MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE ,IEM-
BER "EX +]CUTION SQUAD." WHEN QJ/WIN SAID HE NO ,' IN-
TERESTEIn that would disappear without a trace. (O.C. a, 30/75,
p. 116) The Tnspector General's Report cited the Support Cl Fief as
stating that the Agency had first considered a "gangland-sty I kill-
ing" in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana reps ltedly
opposed the idea because it would be difficult, to recruit sorneouie for
such a dank^r'ous operation, and suggested instead the. use of I :,oison.
( I.G. Report, p. 25)
Edwards rejected the first batch of pills prepared by TSD i ,.cause
they would' not dissolve in water. A second batch, containing
toxiiar, "did the job expected of them" when tested on monkeys.
(I.G. Report, pp. 25-26; O.C. 5/30/75, p. 43) The Support Chief
received the pills from TSD, probably in February 1961, with assur-
ances that they were lethal,' and then gave them to Rosselli. (O.C.,
5/30/75, p. 13)
The recoj'd clearly establishes that the pills were given to a Cuban
for delivery to the island some time prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion
in mid-Apri11961. There are discrepancies in the record, howev, r, con-
cerning whether one or two attempts were made during that period,
and the previse date on which the passage[s] occurred. The In pector
General's ]Report states that in late February or March 1961, losselli
reported to the Support Chief that the pills had been delivere,l to an
official close to Castro who may have received kickbacks fl~. 'm the
gambling interests. (T.G. Report, p. 23) The Report states t hat the
official returned the pills after a few weeks, perhaps because lie had
lost his position in the Cuban Government., and thus access to Castro,
before he received the pills. (I.G. Report, p. 2S) The Report ce tcludes
that yet another attempt was made in April 1961, with the id of a
leading figure in the Cuban exile movement.
Rosselli )ind the Support Chief testified that the Cuban of inial de-
scribed by i rte Inspector General as having made the first attei lpt was
indeed involved in the assassination plot, and they ascribed hi,r: failure
Co a case of "cold feet." (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 24; O.C. 5/8o/175, p.
44) Rosselli was certain, however, that only one attempt to ass bssinate
Castro had been made prior to the Bay of Pigs,' (Rosselli, 6,/:l/75, p.
`~6) and the Support Chief and Maheu did not clarify the nmtter. It
is possible 1 ten, that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was ni ade, and
that the Cuban exile leader was the contact in the United Sty fes who
n the Inspector General; Report
arranged for the. Cuban described in-
to administer the poison.
In any event, Rosselli told the Support Chief that Traffic.tnte be-
lieved a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement l tight be
able to accomplish the assassination. (I.G. Report, p. 29)' The Inspee-
' Records of the TSD still extant when the I.G. Report was written in 1007 indicate
that the pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to the Support Chic' sometime
thereafter.
2 The Support Chief testified that he met this Cuban only once, and that after the
meeting A. uban told Rosselli :
Look, I on't know isic] like the CIA and you can't tell me that this ay isn't a
CIA man." he Support Chief recalled, "I don't know whether I showed it or, what, but
he suspected that I wasn't what I was represented to be." (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 2L'.)
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tor General's Report suggests that this Cuban may have been receiving
funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing
u ambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies" in Cuba after the over-
throw of Castro. The Report speculated that the Cuban was interested
in the assassination scheme as a means of financing the purchase of
arms and communications equipment. (I.G. Report, p. 31)
The Cuban claimed to have a contact inside a restaurant frequented
by Castro. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 21) As a prerequisite to the deal, he
demanded cash and $1.000 worth of communications equipment. (I.G.
Report, pp. 31, 32; O.C., 5/30/75, p. 23) The Support Chief recalled
that Colonel J. C. King, head of the Western Hemisphere Division,
gave him $50,000 in Bissell's office to pay the Cuban if he successfully
assassinated Castro. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 17-21) The Support Chief
stated that Bissell also authorized him to give the Cuban the requested
electronics equipment. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 20-24)
Bissell testified that he did not doubt that some cash was given to
the Support Chief, and that he was aware that the poison pills had
been prepared. Bissell did not recall the meeting described above,
and considered it unlikely that the Support Chief would have been
given the money in his office. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 40) The Inspector
General's Report, relying on an Office of Security memorandum to the
DDCI dated June 24, 1966, as well as on an interview with the person
who signed the voucher for the funds, placed the amount passed at
$10,000. (I.G. Report, pp. 31-32) If the Inspector General's conclu-
sions were correct, the funds which Bissell allegedly authorized were
probably the advance payment to the Cuban, and not the $150,000 that
was to be paid to him after Castro's death.
The record does clearly reflect, however, that communications equip-
ment was delivered to the Cuban 1 and that he was paid advance money
to cover his expenses, probably in the amount of $10,000. (I.G. Report,
p. 32) The money and pills were delivered at a meeting between
Maheu, Rosselli, Trafficante, and the Cuban at the Fountainebleau
Hotel in Miami. As Rosselli recalled, Maheu :
* * * opened his briefcase and dumped a whole lot of money on his lap * * *
and also came up with the capsules and he explained how they were going to be
used. As far as I remember, they couldn't be used in boiling soups and things like
that, but they could be used in water or otherwise, but they couldn't last for-
ever. * * * It had to be done as quickly as possible. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 21)2
A different version of the delivery of the pills to the Cuban was
given to the Committee by Joseph Shimon, a friend of Rosselli and
Giancana who testified that he was present when the passage occurred.
Shimon testified that he had accompanied Maheu to Miami to see the
third Patterson-Johansson World Heavyweight Championship fight,
which took place on March 12, 1961. (Shimon, 9/20/75, -pp. 6-8)
According to Shimon, he, Giancana, Rosselli, and Maheu shared a
.suite in the Fountainebleau Hotel. During a conversation, Maheu
stated that he had a "contract" to assassinate Castro, and had been
1 The Support Chief testified that a man from the communications office delivered the
communications equipment that the Cuban had requested to Miami. (O.C., 5/30/7.5. ~pp . 20)
Maheu recalled delivering an automobile which he had been told contained commAinic'Rtt0ns
equipment to an empty lot. (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 52)
2 Maheu denied that this dramatic event ever occurred. and did not recall being present
at a meeting at which the pills were passed. (Maheu, 7/29/75, pp. 40-41). Maheu did
recall that the Support Chief showed him the pills in an envelope and told him that th(
pills would be given to a Cuban. (Maheu, 7/29/75, p. 40)
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provided with a "liquid" by the CIA to accomplish the task. (?)himon.
9/20/75, p. 9) 1 Shimon testified that Maheu had said the liqu i, l was to
be put in Castro's food, that Castro would become ill and die r'ter two
or three days, and that an autopsy would not reveal what ha ,l killed
him. (Shimon, 9/20/75, pp. 9-10)
Shimon testified that the Cuban was contacted outside t17,,; Boom
Boom Room of the Fountainebleau Hotel. Shimon said that Rosselli
left with the Cuban, and that Maheu said, "Johnny's going ti, handle
everything, this is Johnny's contract." (Shimon, 9/20/75, p. 11)
Shimon testified that Giancana subsequently told him "I am t of in it,
and they are asking me for the names of some guys who used o work
in casinos. * * * Maheu's conning the hell out of the CIA." (?'himon,
9/20/75, p. 12)
Shimon testified that a few days later, he received a ph'>ne call
from Maheu, who said : "* * * did you see the paper? Castro's 11. He's
goin to be sick two or three days. Wow, we got him." (Shimon,
9/20/75, p.12)2
Rosselli testified that he did not recall Shimon's having been present
when the pills were delivered to the Cuban. (Rosselli, 9/22/%-i, p. 5)
Maheu recalled having seen the fight, with Rosselli and Gianc^,:na, but
did not recall whether Shimon had been present, and denied that the
poison had been delivered in the lobby of the Fountainebleau. Maheu
9/23/75, pp. 14-15)
The attempt met with failure. According to the Inspector General's
Report, Edwards believed the scheme failed because Castro topped
visiting the restaurant where the "asset" was employed. Mal: _~.u sug-
gested an alternative reason. He recalled being informed that a s"ter the
pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had t4 be re-
ceived before in fact they were administered." (Maheu, 9/23/75, p. 42)
He testified that he was informed by the Support Chief sometiiiie after
the operation that the Cubans had an opportunity to admini ter the
pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra or Raul Castro,' ,ut that
the "go signal" never came. (Maheu 7/29/75,
pp. 43-44, 60-61) Maheu
did not know who was responsible for giving the signal. (Mahe;, 9/23/
p 44-45) The Cuban subsequently returned the cash and to e pills.
( O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 19-20; Memo, Osborn to I)CI. 6/24/66)
The date of the Cuban operation is unclear. The Inspector Cl oneral's
Report places it in March-April 1961, prior to the Bay of Pig (I.G.
Report, p. 29) Shimon's testimony puts it around March 1", 1961.
Bissell testified that the effort against. Castro was called off a N ter the
Bay of Pith, (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 52) and Maheu testified that he had
no involvement in the operation after the Bay of Pigs. ( \laheu,
9/23/75, p. 50) The Support Chief however, was certain that. it oc-
cured during early 1962. (O.C., 5/30/751 pp. 47-48)
(c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II (Post Bay of Pigs)
(i) Change h ri Leadership
The Inspector General's Report divides the gambling syndicate
operation into Phase I, terminating with the Bay of Pigs,- an(! Phase
1 Maheu said that the poison, which he was shown on one occasion by the Supp:-rt Chief,
consisted of five or six gelatin capsules filled with a liquid. (Maheu, b/23/75, pf'. 35-36)
Rosselli described the poison as "capsules." (Rosselli, 9/22/75, p. 4)
' The Committee has been unable to locate the newspaper account described 43 Shimon.
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II, continuing with the transfer of the operation to William Harvey
in late 1961.1 The distinction between a clearly demarcated Phase I and
Phase II may be an artificial one, as there is considerable evidence that
the operation was continuous, perhaps lying dormant for the period
immediately following the Bay of Pigs.2
In early 1961, Harvey was assigned the responsibility for establish-
ing a general capability within the CIA for disabling foreign leaders,
including assassination as a "last resort." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 73;
Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 34-35) The capability was called Executive
Action and was later included under the cryptonym ZR/RIFLE. Ex-
ecutive Action and the evidence relating to its connection to the
"White House" and to whether or not it involved action as well as
"capability" is discussed extensively infra in Section (III) (c), p. 181.
Harvey's notes reflect that Bissell asked him to take over the
gambling syndicate operation from Edwards and that they discussed
the "application of ZR/RIFLE program to Cuba" on November 16,
1961. (I.G. Report, p. 39) Bissell confirmed that the conversation took
place and accepted the November date as accurate. (Bissell, 7/17/75,
pp. 12-13) He also testified that the operation "was not reactivated,
in other words, no instructions went out to Rosselli or to others * * *
to renew the attempt, until after I had left the Agency in February
1962." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 52-53.) Harvey agreed that his conversa-
tion with Bissell was limited to exploring the feasibility of using the
gambling syndicate against Castro. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60)
Richard Helms replaced Bissell as DDP in February 1962. As such,
he was Harvey's superior. The degree to which Helms knew about and
participated in the assassination plot is discussed in the section of this
Report dealing with the level to which the plots were authorized
within the Agency.
(ii) Tile Operation 18 Reactivated
In early April 1962, Harvey, who testified that he was acting on
"explicit orders" from Helms, (Harvey, 7/11/75, 18), requested
Edwards to put him in touch with Rosselli. (Edwards memo,
5/14/62) The Support Chief first introduced Harvey to Rosselli in
Miami, where Harvey told Rosselli to maintain his Cuban contacts,
but not to deal with Maheu or Giancana, (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 50; Ros-
selli, 6/24/75, pp. 27-30) whom he had decided were "untrustworthy"
and "surplus." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65) The Support Chief recalled
that initially Rosselli did not trust Harvey although they subse-
quently developed a close friendship. (O.C., 5/30/75, p. 52)
1 Harvey had a long background in clandestine activities. At the time the gambling
syndicate operation was moved under Harvey's supervision, he was responsible for a
number of important activities and soon thereafter was selected to head of Task Force
W, the CIA component of the Kennedy Administration's cover effort to oust Castro.
2 Harevy said that he took over a "going operation" from Edwards (I.G. Report, p. 42;
Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 67) and emphasized that: "I would like to make as clear as I can
that there was no Phase 1. Phase 2 in this. This is an ongoing matter which I was
injected into * * *. (Harvey, 6/25/756 p. 90)
Continuity was provided by retaining the Support Chief as the case officer for the
project well into May 1962. During Interviews for the Inspector General's Report, the
Support Chief recalled that there was "something going on" between the Bay of Pigs and
Harvey's assumption of control (I.G. Report, p. 43). When testifying before the Com
mittee, the Support Chief firmly recalled several trips to Miami in the fall of 1961. an,'
"right up to the time I turned it over to Harvey I was in and out of Miami." (O.C.
5/30/75, pp. 89-90)
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Harvey, the Support Chief and Rosselli met for a second time in
New York on April 8-9, 1962. (I.G. Report, p. 43) A notat on made
durin this time in the files of the Technical Services Division indi-
cates that four poison pills were given to the Support Chief on 1pril 18,
1962. (LG. Report, pp. 46-47) The pills were passed to Hai, ey, who
arrived in Miami on April 21, and found Rosselli already n touch
with the same Cuban who had been involved in the pre-Ba o of Pigs
pill passa~,? e. (I.G. Report, p. 47) He gave the pills to Ro. ,elli, ex-
plaining that "these would work anywhere and at any time v' 'th any-
thing." (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 31) Rosselli testified that he told Harvey
that the Cubans intended to use the pills to assassinate Che GMucvara as
well as Fidel and Raul Castro. According to Rosselli's to =timony,
Harvey approved of the targets, stating "everything is all rig Itt, what
they want t o do." (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 34)
The Cuban requested arms and equipment as a quid pro quo for
carrying out the assassination operation. (O.C.. 5/30/75, pl. 53-54)
With the help of the CIA's Miami station which ran cover l, opera-
tions against Cuba (JM/1VAVE), Harvey procured explosi .'s, deto-
nators, rifles, handguns, radios, and boat radar costing abort $5,000.
(I.G. Report, p. 49) Harvey and the chief of the JM WAVE
station rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name and delivered
the equipment to a pay-king lot. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 63) The keys
were given to Rosselli, who watched the delivery with the ,4+uppor?t
Chief from across the street. (O.C., 5/30/75, pp. 92-93) The talrckload
Of equipment was finally picked up by either the Cuban or Iosselli's
agent. (I.G. Report, pp. 49-50; Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 40) Hart v testi-
fied that the arms "could" have been for use in the assay ination
attempt, but that they were not given to the Cuban solely or that
purpose. (I arvey, 7/11/75, p. 9)
Rosselli kept Harvey informed of the operation's progressss. Some-
I ime in May 1962, he reported that the pills and guns had ar.-ived in
Cuba. (Harvey, p. 64; Rosselli, 6/24/75, pp. 34, 42-13) On
June 21, he told Harvey that the Cuban had dispatched a three-man
team to Cuba. The Inspector General's report described the team's
mission as ",ague" and conjectured that the team would kill Crtstro or
recruit other:; to do the job, using the poison pills if the oppc f?tunity
Lrose. (I.G. Report, 6/2/75, p. 51)
Harvey met Rosselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 19!'&12. The
Cuban was reported to be preparing to send in another thrkee: man
team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Harvey was told that tl e pills,
referred to as "the medicine," were still "safe" in Cuba. (1 tarveY,
6/25/75, p. 103 ; I.G. Report. p. 51)
Harvey testified that by this time lie had grave doubts about'tchether
the operation would ever take place, and told Rosselli that "th( re's not
Much likelihood that this is going anyplace, or that it should Ire con-
tinued." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 104) The second team never -4t for
Cuba, claiming that "conditions" in Cuba were not right. (I.G. report,
pp. 51-52) During early January 1963, Harvey paid I:,osselli
$2,700 to defray the Cuban's expenses. (LG. Report, p. 52). h Iar?vey
terminated the operation in mid-February 1963. At a i:,eet.ing
with Rosselli in Los Angeles, it was agreed that Rosselli woul l taper
off his communications with the Cubans. (I.G. Report, pp. 52-53)
Rosselli testified that he simply broke off contact with the Cubans.
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However, he never informed them that the offer of $150,000 for
Castro's assassination had been withdrawn? (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 45)
The agency personnel who dealt with Rosselli attributed his motiva-
tion to patriotism 2 and testified that he was not paid for his services.
According to the Support Chief, Rosselli "paid his way, he paid his
own hotel fees, he paid his own travel. * * * And he never took a
nickel, he said, no, as long as it is for the Government of the United
States, this is the least I can do, because I owe it a lot." (O.C., 5/30/75,
p. 27
Edwards agreed that Rosselli was "never paid a cent," (Edwards,
5/30/75, p. 16) and Maheu testified that "Giancana was paid nothing
at all, not even for expenses, and that Mr. Rosselli was given a pittance
that did not even begin to cover his expenses." (Maheu, 7/29/75,p.68)
It is clear, however, that the CIA did pay Rosselli's hotel bill during
his stay in Miami in October 1960.3 The CIA's involvement with Ros-
selli caused the Agency some difficulty during Rosselli's subsequent
prosecutions for fraudulent gambling activities and living in the
country under an assumed name.4
(d) Plans in Early 1963
Two plans to assassinate Castro were explored by Task Force W,
the CIA section then concerned with covert Cuban operations, in early
1963. Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), Chief of the Task Force,
asked his assistant to determine whether an exotic seashell, rigged
to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro commonly went
skin diving. (Assistant, 9/18/75, p. 28) The idea was explored by the
Technical Services Division and discarded as impractical. (Helms,
6/13/75, p. 135; I.G. Report, p. 77)
A second plan involved having James Donovan (who was negotiat-
ing with Castro for the release of prisoners taken during the Bay of
Pigs operation) present Castro with a contaminated diving suit.'
(Colby, 5/21/75, pp. 38-39)
I "Q: As far as those Cubans knew, then the offer which they understood from you to
come from wall Street was still outstanding?
"A : I don't know if they still think so * * * I didn't see them after that to tell them
that. (Rosselli, 6/24/75, p. 45)"
2Rosselli claims that he was motivated by "honor and dedication." (Rosselli, 6/24/75,
p. 59)
In 1943, Rosselli had been convicted of extorting money from motion picture producers
to insure studios against labor strikes, and during the period of his contacts with the CIA,
Rosselli was deeply involved in hotel and gambling operations in Las Vegas. (File R-505,
Summary of FBI Documents) It is possible that he believed cooperating with the govern-
ment in the assassination operation might serve him well in the future.
s FBI reports reveal that Rosselli's expenses at the Kennilworth Hotel, where he was
registered from October 11-30, 1960, under the name of J. A. Rollins, were paid by Maheu.
FBI file summary p. 101 Maheu's expenses were reimbursed by the CIA.
4In May 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Rosselli for living in the United States
under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia. (Rosselli,
whose true name is Filippo Saco, was born in Italy and was allegedly brought illegally into
the United States while still a child.) Rosselli contacted Edwards. who informed the
FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the Bureau," but was afraid that gangsters
might kill him for "talking." (Memo, Osborn to FBI, 5/27/66) After Rosselli was
arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills in 1967,
he requested Harvey, who had left the Agency, to represent him. (Memo for Record by
Osborn, 12/11/67) Harvey contacted the Agency and suggested that it prevent the prosecu-
tion. (Osborn Memo, supra) Rosselli was subsequently convicted of violating United States
interstate gambling laws. In 1971, the CIA approached the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, Department of Justice, to "forestall public disclosure of Rosselli's past
operational activity with CIA" that might occur if deportation proceedings were brought.
(Letter. CIA to Select Committee, 7/21/75) It was agreed that CIA would be kept informed
of developments in that case. The deportation order is presently being litigated in the
courts.
5 Donovan was not aware of the plan.
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The Inspector General's Report dates this operation in January
1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as Chief of Task Fi rce W,
although it is unclear whether Harvey or Fitzgerald concei ,,ed the
plan. (LG. Report, p. 75) It is likely that the activity took place
earlier, sirwe Donovan had completed his negotiations by the
middle of January 1963. Helms characterized the plan as "cockeyed."
(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135)
The Technical Services Division bought a diving suit, ducted the
inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin dlsen e (Ma-
aura foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a
tabercule brcclllus. The Inspector General's Report states that f he plan
was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving: suit on
his own initiative. (I.G., Report, p. 75') Helms testified that thc, diving
suit never left the laboratory. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135)
(e) AM/LASH
(i) Origin of the Project
In early 1961, a CIA official met with a highly-placed Cubant official
to determine if the Cuban would cooperate in efforts aga nst the
Castro regime. (I.G. Report, p. 78) The Cuban was referred to by
the cryptonym AM/LASH.1 The meeting was inconclusive, but led to
subsequent meetings at which AM/LASH agreed to cooperate With the
CIA.
The CIA regarded AM/LASH as an important "asset" inside
Cuba. As a? high-ranking leader who enjoyed the confidence of Fidel
Castro, AM/LASH could keep the CIA informed of the internal
workings of the regime. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp. 23, 40) It, was also
believed thus; he might play a part in fomenting a coup within Cuba.
I; Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 431 2
From the first contact with AM/LASH until the latter part of
1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain i a Cuba.
IIis initial requests to the CIA and FBI for -aid in defectingwere re-
buffed. (I.G. Report, pp. 80, 82-83) When Case Officer 1 1o+ned the
operation in. June 1962, his assignment was to ensure that AA1 /LASH
would "stay in place and report to us." (Case Officer 1, 8/11/7)), p. 38)
At a meeting in the fall of 1963, AM/LASH 1 sta.t-d that
he would remain in Cuba if he "could do something really significant
for the creation of a new Cuba" and expressed a desire to plan the
"execution" of Fidel Castro. (Case Officer 1 Contact Repent) The
subject of assassinating Castro was again discussed by AM /LASH
and the case officer at another meeting a few days later. The he case
officer's contact report states that assassination was raised in dis-
cussing Ahl/LASH's role in Cuba, and that AM/LASH we, visibly
upset. "It was not the act that he objected to, but merely the choice of
'The Conw,ittee has taken the testimony of the two case officers invoked in the
AM/LASH project. Case officer 1 dealt with AM/LASH through September 196.3?; Clime
officer 2 continued until mid-1965. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75. p. 11) The Committee has
agreed not to divulge their names as they are still in active service with the : ency.
2 AM/LASH was the major "asset" in the AM/LASH operation. During this. period the
CIA also sponsored a separate operation to "penetrate the Cuban military ti, encourage
either defections or an -attempt to produce information from dissidents, r perhaps
even to forming a group which would be capable of replacing the then pros, nt govern-
ment in Cuba, (Case Officer 1, 8/11/75, pp. 18, 22) The case officers for AM/',ASH werr
also involved In this second related program.
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the word used to describe it. `Eliminate' was acceptable." (Case Officer
1, Contact Report)
Each case officer testified that he did not ask AM/LASH to assassi-
nate Castro. The record clearly reveals, however, that both officers
were aware of his desire to take such action. A cable to Headquarters
reporting on a 1963 meeting with AM/LASH stated :
Have no intention give AM/LASH physical elimination mission as requirement
but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own
initiative.'
At a meeting late in the fall of 1963, AM/LASH again raised the
possibility of defecting, but indicated that he would be willing
to continue working against the Castro Regime if he received firm
assurances of American support. According to Case Officer 2, AM/
LASH requested military supplies, a device with which to protect
himself if his plots against Castro were discovered, and a meeting
with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp.
48-49)
Desmond Fitzgerald, Chief of the Special Affairs Staff,' agreed to
meet AM/LASH and give him the assurances he sought. The Inspec-
tor General's Report states that Fitzgerald consulted with the DDP,
Helms, who agreed that Fitzgerald should hold himself out as a
personal representative of Attorney General Kennedy. (I.G. Report,
P. 89 3
Helms testified that he did not recall the conversation with Fitz-
gerald. He also said that he had not consulted the Attorney General
and speculated that his reason for not having done so might have been
because "this was so central to the whole theme of what we had been
trying to do * * * (find someone inside Cuba who might head a gov-
ernment and have a group to replace Castro). This is obviously what
we had been pushing, what everybody had been pushing for us to try
to do, and it is in that context that I would have made some remark
like this." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 117)
Helms recalled that he told Fitzgerald to "go ahead and say that
from the standpoint of political support, the nited States govern-
ment will be behind you if you are successful. This had nothing to do
with killings. This had only to do with the political action part of it."
(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 131)
Fitzgerald met AM/LASH in late fall 1963 and promised him
that the United States would support a coup against Castro. (Case
1 Case Officer 1 testified that AM/LASH discussed "eliminating" Castro, although he
attributed such remarks to AM/LASH's "mercurial" nature, and stated that no specific
plans for The Case Officer assassinations over the AM/LASH (project in September/1963 reca recalled being
briefed by Case Officer 1 on AM/LASH's belief that Castro's assassination was a necessary
first step in a coup. (Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 28.)
The second AM/LASH Case Officer described the context in which AM/LASH generally
raised the topic of assassination :
"You also must recognize that AM/LASH was a rather temperamental man whose tem-
perament was of a mercurial nature and whereas he may have said something like this in one
fit of pique, be would settle down and talk about organizing a regular military coup in the
next breath." (Case Officer 2 8/1/75, p. 29)
2The Special Affairs Staff (SAS) was the name given to Task Force w in early 1963
when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as head of the covert Cuban operations. The AM/LASH
Case Officers reported directly to Fitzgerald.
a The contact plan for the proposed meeting stated : "Fitzgerald will represent self as
personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign city) for spe-
cific purpose meeting AM/LASH and giving him assurances of full support with a change
of the present government in Cuba."
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Officer 2, S/1/75, p. 60) 1 When later interviewed for the f isppector
General's Report, Fitzgerald recalled that AM/LASH repeatedly re-
quested an assassination weapon, particularly a "high-powt fed rifle
with telescopic sights that could be used to kill Castro from a dis-
tance." Fitzgerald stated that he told AM/LASH that the United
States would have "no part of an attempt on Castro's life." (.G. Re-
port, p. 90) Case Officer 2 recalled that AM/LASH raised the pros-
pect of assassinating Castro, but did not propose an explicit plan.
(Case Officer 2, 8/1/75, pp. 62, 85) AM/LASH was, however, "con-
vinced than Castro had to be removed frolic power before a coup could
be undertWken in Cuba." (Case Officer 2,8/1/75, p. 61)
AM/LASH also requested high-powered rifles and grenades:,. (Case
Officer 2, 8/1/75, p. 77) A memorandum by Case Officer 2 states :
C/SAS [Fitzgerald] approved telling AM/LAS]3 he would be given a cache
inside Cuba, Cache could, if he requested it, include * * * high-pow 1115 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000200090002-0
An early reply will be appreciated in order that we may promptly inform the
Criminal Division of CIA's position in this matter.`
As a result of this request, the CIA did object to the prosecution of
those involved in the wiretap case, thereby avoiding exposure of
Giancana's and Rosselli's involvement with the Agency in an assassi-
nation plot. We now turn to events which occurred during April
and May 1962 which culminated in the formal decision to forego
prosecution in the wiretap case.
(2) The Formal Decision to Forego Prosecution.
(a) Events Leading up to a Formal Briefing of the Attorney
General.
A memorandum for the record of April 4, 1962, reflects that Ed-
wards met with Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to the CIA, on March 28
or 29 and told Papich that :
Any prosecution in the matter would endanger sensitive sources and methods
used in a duly authorized intelligence project and would not be in the national
interest. (Edwards' memorandum, 4/4/62)
A memorandum for Assistant Attorney General Miller from
Hoover dated April ?10,1962, stated that Edwards :
Has now advised that he has no desire to impose any restriction which might
hinder efforts to prosecute any individual, but he is firmly convinced that prose-
cution of Maheu undoubtedly would lead to exposure of most sensitive infor-
mation relating to the abortive Cuban invasion in April 1961, and would result
in most damaging embarrassment to the U.S. Government. He added that In
view of this, his agency objects to the prosecution of Maheu. (Memo, Hoover to
Miller, 4/10/62)
On April 16, 1962, Lawrence Houston, CIA General Counsel, met
with Miller.2 Houston reported to Edwards that Miller envisioned
"no major difficulty in stopping action for prosecution." Houston
offered to brief the Attorney general, but said that he "doubted
if we would want to give the full story to anyone else in the De-
partment," and Miller did not desire to know the "operational details."
On April 20 Houston told Miller's first assistant that he was request-
ing Justice not to prosecute "on grounds of security," and asked to
be informed if it was necessary to brief the Attorney General. (Memo,
Houston to Edwards, 4/26/62)
In the latter half of April 1962 William Harvey, head of the CIA's
anti-Castro effort, gave poison pills to Roselli for use in the post-Bay of
Pigs assassination effort against Fidel Castro using underworld
figures.
(b) Briefing of the Attorney General on May 7,1962.
An entry in Attorney General Kennedy's calendar for May 7, 1962,
states "1:00-Richard Helms." 3 At 4:00 the Attorney General met
I This memorandum is peculiar in two respects. First, the CIA had already orally
objected to prosecution on two occasions. Second, Hoover was quizzing the CIA on behalf
of the Department of Justice, a task that would normally be performed by the Depart-
ment's Criminal Division.
2 Houston testified that he did not remember these meetings. (Houston, 8/2/75, p. 3)
Miller recalled only that Houston had spoken to him about a wiretap and possible CIA
embarrassment. (Miller, 8/11/75, p. 16)
aHelms testified that he did not recall meeting with the Attorney General on May 7
and his desk book does not reflect any such meeting. When asked if he had ever met with
the Attorney General to set up a knowingly inaccurate briefing, Helms testified that he
had not and that if he had, he would certainly remember it because "I would have been
coniving or colluding, and I have no recollection of ever having done anything like that."
(Helms, 9/16/75, p. 8)
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with Houston and Edwards to be briefed on the CIA operation in-
volving Mallon, Rosselli, and Giancana. The briefing was at the At-
torney General's request. (I.G. Report, p. 62a)
On May 9, 1962, the Attorney General met with Director II cover.
Hoover prepared a memorandum for the record dated May 10.. 1962,
recounting what was said at that meeting. On May 11 the At!ilorney
General requested Edwards to prepare a memorandum of the % fay 7
briefing. Edwards, with Houston's assistance, prepared a lemo-
randum dated May 14, 1962, relating what had transpired at the \f ay 7
briefing Also, on the same day, Edwards had a telephone convey. ation
with William Harvey. As a result of that conversation, Edwards
prepared an internal memorandum for the record dated May 14 1962,
which falsely stated that the operation involving Rosselli w l,i then
being terminated.
(aa) The Attorney General Was Told That the Operation. Had
I'ie'olved an .,l ssassination Attempt
Houston testified that the operation was described to the Ati orney
General as al, assassination attempt.. (Houston, 03/2/75, p. 14) When
interviewed for the Inspector General's Report in 1967, Edwards
said he briefed Kennedy "all the way." (LG. Report, p. 62a) A riemo-
randum by Hoover of a conference with Kennedy on May 9, twi days
after the briefing states:*
The Attorney General told me he wanted to advise me of a situation in the
Giancana case which had considerably disturbed him. He stated a few drys ago
he had been advised by CIA that in connection with Giancana, CIA haO hired
Robert A. Maheu, a private detective in Washington, D.C., to approach Gh;nncana
with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire some gunmen to go into CA,a and
to kill Castro. (Memorandum from Hoover, 4/10/62)
(bb) Evidence Concerning Whether the Attorney General Was
Told That the Operation Had Been Terminated
Houston, who said that he was told about the use of underworld
fi gures for the first time by Edwards a few weeks before the briefing
of the Attorney General, testified that it was his "understanding.; that
the assassination plan aimed at Castro had been terminated com-
pl,Aely," and t hat Kennedy was told "the activity had been term, hated
as of that time:." (Houston, 6/2/75, pp. 13, 15) Edwards testifie, 1 that
he had also believed at the time of the briefing that the operatic r had
been concluded and that he had so informed Kennedy. (Edwards,
5/30/75, p. 16) ' The memorandum of the briefing prepared b,, Ed-
wards describes the operation as having been "conducted during,, the
period approximately August. 1960 to May 1961." It further stags:
After the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through Mti;ieu to
Rosselli to call off the operation and Rosselli was told to tell his princij) = I that
the, proposal to pay one hundred fifty thousand dollars for completion -f the
operation had been definitely withdrawn. (Memo from Edwards, 4/14/62
Harvey, who was informed of the briefing by Edwards, could not recall ?-hether
Ed wards told him that the Attorney General had been briefed that the operation h.:d been
terminated. (rrarvey, 6/25/75, p. 99)
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Based upon interviews with Houston and Edwards, the Inspector
General's Report concluded that :
The Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate operation had
already been reactivated, nor, as far as we know, was he ever told that CIA had
a continuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements. (I.G. Report, p. 65) 1
Houston and Edwards recalled that Kennedy was upset that the CIA
had used Giancana. Houston testified :
If you have seen Mr. Kennedy's eyes get steely and his jaw set and his voice
get low and precise, you get a definite feeling of unhappiness. (Houston, 6/2/75,
p. 14)
In his memorandum of the meeting with the Attorney General two
days after the briefing, Hoover recalled :
I expressed great astonishment at this in view of the bad reputation of Maheu
and the horrible judgment In using a man of Giancana's background for such a
project. The Attorney General shared the same views. (Memo from Hoover,
5/10/62)
Hoover's May 10 memorandum further states that the Attorney Gen-
eral said that' CIA admitted that they had assisted Maheu in making
this installation and for these reasons CIA was in a position where it
could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana and
Maheu." 3
According to Edwards, at the end of the briefing, Kennedy said : "I
want you to let me know about these things," or words to that effect.
(Edwards, 5/30/75, p. 17) Houston recalled that Kennedy said:
In very specific terms that if we were going to get involved with Mafia per-
sonnel again he wanted to be informed first * * *. I do not remember his com-
menting about the operation itself. (Houston, 6/2/75, p. 14) 4
Hoover recorded that two days after the briefing, the Attorney Gen-
eral told him that :
He had asked CIA whether they had ever cleared their actions in hiring Maheu
and Giancana with the Department of Justice before they did so and he was ad-
vised by CIA they had not cleared these matters with the Department of Justice.
He stated he then issued orders to CIA to never again in the future take such
steps without first checking with the Department of Justice. (Memo from Hoover,
5/10/62)
Edwards testified that at the time of the Kennedy briefing, he did
not know that the CIA was still utilizing its underworld contacts,
1 In a section entitled "The Facts As We Know Them," the I.G. Report stated that
Attorney General Kennedy "was briefed on Gambling Syndicate-Phase One after It was
over. He as not briefed on Phase Two." (I.G. Report, p. 118)
'The Hoover memorandum indicates two reasons for Attorney General Kennedy's dis-
pleasure. First, the CIA had put itself into a position where "it could not afford to have
any action taken against Giancana or Maheu." Second. Hoover: "Stated as he [Kennedy]
well knew the `gutter gossip' was that the reason nothing had been done against Giancana
was because of Giancana's close relationship with Frank Sinatra who, in turn. claimed
to be a close friend of the Kennedy family. The Attorney General stated he realized this
and it was for that reason that he was quite concerned when he received this information
from CIA about Glancana and Maheu." (Sinatra is not the President's friend discussed In
the preceding subsection.)
Despite the Attorney General's concern that prosecutions of parties involved in the tip
might be foreclosed in the future, both Giancana and Rosselli were in fact prosecuted later
for crimes unrelated to the tap.
I In the CIA memorandum of the briefing prepared by Edwards, Edwards wrote that "at
the time of the incident, neither this Agency nor the undersigned knew of the proposed
technical installation."
4 Houston testified that Kennedy insisted "There was not to be any contact of the
Mafia * * * without prior consultation with him." (Houston. 6/2/75, p.37) When inter-
viewed in 1967 for the Inspector General's Report. Houston had recalled Kennedy as 89y-
ing: "I trust that if you ever try to do business with organized crime again--with
gangsters-you will let the Attorney General know." (L 0. Report, p. 62a)
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(Edwards, 5/30/75, p. 16) even though the operation had been re-
activated under the Directorate of Plans, and in early April 1962,
poison pills had been given to Rosselli.
As concluded by the CIA itself in the Inspector General's 7;w,eport,
Edwards' statement that he was not aware of these develop' '.. nts is
implausible. In the memorandum of May 14, 1962, prepared Tor the
Attorney General, Edwards stated that Harvey had asked him to ar-
ra.nge a contact with Rosselli, and that a meeting had been :et for
April 9. The Inspector General's Report observed :
When the Attorney General was briefed on 7 May, Edwards knew that Harvey
had been introduced to Rosselli. He must also have known that his suh+nrdinate,
the Support Cbief, was in Miami and roughly for what purpose (altho igh Ed-
wards does not now recall this). (I.G. Report, p. 65) 1
Harvey testified that Edwards knew the operation was still iii effect
and that Edwards told Harvey about the briefing of. the Attorney
General shortly afterwards. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 98-100)
In the internal memorandum for the record dated May 1?), 1962,
written the same day as the memorandum of the Attorney General's
briefing, Edwards stated :
On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any
plans for the use of Subject (Rosselli) for the future.
Harvey testified that the memorandum "was not true, and t'olonel
Edwards knew it was not true." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 97) Eetwards
confirmed that he was aware at that time that Harvey was 'It.rying"
to assume control of the operation. (Edwards, 5/30/75, p. 19)
Harvey testified that Edwards' entry would cause the record t o show
incorrectly that the operation had been terminated, when in fact it had
not been. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 102) Harvey's reasons explaining the
decision to "falsify" the record were :
* * * if this ever came up in the future, the file would show that on < :uch and
such a date be was advised so and so, and he was no longer chargeahle with
this. * * * (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 100)
This was purely an internal document for use in closing out this operation as
far as the Office of Security and its Director, that is its Chief, person. fly, was
concerned. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 102)
To bring this operation under some sort of sensible control, determine what
it was, and attempt to insulate against what I consider a very definite potential
for damage to the agency and to the government. (Harvey, 6/25/75, 1' 101)
When questioned about the fact that the Attorney General li.td been
i old that the operation had been terminated when in fact it w as con-
tinuing, Helms testified :
* * * I am not able to tell you whether this operation was ongoing, whether
it had really been stopped, whether it had been fairly stopped, whether there
was fun and games going on between the officers involved as to, we wll create
a fiction that it stopped or go ahead with it. I just don't recall any of those
things at all x ' *. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 109)
(ii) Post-Bay Of Pigs Underworld Plot-MONGOOSE P, riod
This section discusses evidence bearing on whether the post Bay of
zs operation to assassinate Castro involving underworld ti;;,ures-
ich began. in April 1962, and continued at least through the Cuban
?apich presumably continued to receive reports from the CIA on Harvey's .nbsequent
meetings with Rosselli.
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missile crisis in October of that year-was authorized or known about
by Administration officials outside of the CIA.
This issue must be considered in light of the differing perceptions
of Helms and his subordinates, on the one hand, and of other members
of the Kennedy Administration, including the Director of the CIA,
on the other. While Helms testified that he never received a direct
order to assassinate Castro, he fully believed that the CIA was at all
times acting within the scope of its authority and that Castro's
assassination came within the bounds of the Kennedy Administration's
effort to overthow Castro and his regime. Helms said that he inherited
the Rosselli program from Bissell, and, due to its sensitive and unsav-
ory character, it was not the type of program one would discuss in
front of high officials. He stated that he never informed McCone or
any other officials of the Kennedy Administration of the assassina-
tion plot. However, McCone and the surviving members of the Ken-
nedy. Administration testified that they believed a Castro assassination
was impermissible without a direct order, that assassination was out-
side the parameters of the Administration's anti-Castro program, and
each testified that to his knowledge no such order was given to Helms.
An understanding of the Kennedy Administration's 1962 covert ac-
tion program for Cuba is essential to an evaluation of the testimony
on the issue of authorization. That program, which was designed to
overthrow the Castro regime, and the events in 1961 leading up to it
are discussed below. A detailed exposition of the testimony then
follows.
(1) EVENTS PRECEDING TILE ESTABLISHMENT OF MONGOOSE
A. TIIE TAYLOR/KENNEDY BOARD OF INQUIRY
On April 22, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the President
requested General Maxwell Taylor to conduct a reevaluation of "Our
practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary,
guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which fall short of outright war."
Taylor was to give special attention to Cuba (Letter to Maxwell
Taylor, 4/22/61) and Robert Kennedy was to be his principal col-
league in the effort.
The resulting review concluded :
We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term
living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric
community as a dangerously effective exponent of Communism and anti-Amer-
icanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected
governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics. * * *
It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all
presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military,
economic and propaganda action against Castro. (Report to the President,
6/13/61, Memo No. 4, p. 8)
It is clear from the record, moreover, that the defeat at the Bay of
Pigs had been regarded as a humiliation for the President personally
and for the CIA institutionally.
By July 1961, the Special Group had agreed that "the basic objec-
tive toward Cuba was to provide support to a U.S. program to develop
opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the
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U.S." (Mem(o for the Record, 7/21/61) Occasional harassment op-
erations were mounted during the summer but there was no + verall
strategy and I ittle activity.
B. ti ATIONAL Sl:OURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 1 00 OF OCTOBER 5, 19C, 1 , AND
THE CIA INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
In the, fall of 1961 the Kennedy Administration considered the con-
sequences of Castro's removal from power and the prospects for I. Tnited
States military intervention if that occurred. Two studies wei~e pre-
pared. National Security Action Memorandum 100 (NSAM 100) di-
rected the State Department to assess the potential courses of action
open to the TTnited States should Castro be removed from the Cuban
scene, and to prepare a contingency plan with the Department of De-
fense for military intervention in that event. The CIA prepo red an
"I ntelli rence IA' stimate" on the "situation and prospects" in Cnlra. The
focus ofthesc: studies was on the possible courses of action open. to,the
United States in a post-Castro Cuba, rather than on the means that
might bring about Castro's removal. It does not appear, however, that
assassination was excluded from the potential means by which Castro
might be removed .
On October 5, 1961, McGeorge Bundy issued NSAM 100 e otitled
"Contingency Planning for Cuba." It was addressed to the Secretary
of State and stated in full :
In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State
Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency.
The Special Group Minutes of October 6, 1961, state that the
Group was told that in addition to an overall plan for Cuban
covert operations, "a contingency plan in connection with the possible
removal of Castro from the Cuban scene" was in preparation. (I'Iemo-
randum for the Record of Special Grout) meeting, 10/6/f!6 1) An
October .5, 11,461 Memorandum for the Record by Thomas Parrott, Sec-
retary to the Special Group, states that Parrott informed the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs that "what was wanted
was a plan ii gainst the contingency that Castro would in some way or
other be removed from the Cuban scene." Parrott's memorandum
stated that in preparing the plan, "the presence and positions o f Raul
(Castro) and Che Guevara must he taken into account," and that
General Taylor had told Parrott he preferred "the President' ; inter-
est in the matter not be mentioned" to the Assistant Secre.tai v. This
memorandum also said that "on the covert side, I talked to Tracy
Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furni ;hed as
soon as possible an what is going on and what is being planne,a."
The CIA's Board of National Estimates (which was not part of
the Directorate of Plans) prepared a study entitled "The Situation and
Prospects in Cuba." 1 The CIA estimate was pessimistic about the
1The Inspeci,rr General apparently had access to an earlier draft of this 117telligence
e.4timate. (LG. Report. n. 4) In reporting that many CIA officers interviewed 'ir, the I.G.
investigation stressed that "elimination of the dominant figures in a covernn.rnt * *
V" PI not nccessrrily cause the downfall of the government," the Report stated : C'his point
was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CTA Araft naner .f October
1,1431, which wp initiated in response to General Maxwell Taylor's desire fora er,'stingency
n1nn. The paper took the Position that the demise of Fidel Castro. from whnti~.re* cause,
would offer lithe opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and S?rviet Bloc
control." (I.G. 1:eport. p. 4)
The CIA has been unable to locate the draft paper referred to in the Inspector General's
Report.
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137
success of a Cuban internal revolt, and found that Castro's assassi-
nation would probably strengthen the Communist position in Cuba.
After reviewing the economic, military, and political situation in
Cuba, the CIA estimate concluded that the Castro regime had suffi-
cient popular support and repressive capabilities to cope with any
internal threat. The concluding paragraph of the estimate, entitled
"If Castro Were to Die," noted that :
His [Castro's] loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would have
an unsettling effect, but would almost certainly not prove fatal to the re-
gime * * * [I]ts principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in
the face of a common danger. (Estimate, p. 9)
The CIA study predicted that if Castro died, "some sort of power
struggle would almost certainly develop eventually," and, regardless
of the outcome of such a struggle, the Communist Party's influence
would be "significantly" increased.' (Estimate, p. 9)
Bundy testified that the contingency referred to in NSAM 100 and
the related documents was "what would we do if Castro were no longer
there, and that "clearly one of the possibilities would be assassina-
tion.; 7/11/75, p. 77) However, Bundy emphasized that
NSAM 100 represented an effort to assess the effect should Castro
be removed from power by any means (including assassination) but
"without going further with the notion [of assassination] itself." 2
(Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 77) Bundy contended that the President was not
considering an assassination, but rather "what are things going to
be like after Castro?" (Bundyy, 7/11/75, p. 81) 3
Taylor testified that lie had no recollection of NSAM 100 or of the
events described in the related documents. (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 18)
Based on his review of the documents, Taylor testified that "it sounds
like purely a political consideration of the sequence of power in
Cuba" 4 and he emphasized that "never at any time" did lie raise the
question of assassination with Parrott, or with anybody else. (Taylor,
7/9/75, p. 19)
Special Group Secretary Parrott testified that the request for a
plan reflected in his memorandum of October 5, 1961, and the refer-
ence in that memorandum to the "contingency that Castro would in
some way or another be removed from the Cuban scene", reflected
interest in a contingency study for Castro's removal, but by means
"short of being killed." (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 83)
'A cover
crit ci zed thememorandum
estimate's assessmLansdale ent tthat r "it is highly imeproCIA estimate bable that an to exRobert ensivHopi, a r
uprising could be fomented" against Castro as a "conclusion of fact quite outside the area
of intelligence." Lansdale stated that the estimate "seems to be the major evidence to he
need to oppose your program" (referring to the proposed overall MONGOOSE operation).
(Memo, Lansdale to Robert Kennedy, 11/62, p. 1) As discussed in detail at p. 140,
Lansdale's basic concept for the MONGOOSE program was to overthrow Castro through
an internal revolt of the Cuban people.
2 "If people were suggesting this to you and you were curious about whether it was
worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it without going any further with that
notion itself would be to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they thought
would happen if Castro were not there any longer." (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 79)
2 Bundy explained : "* * * it was precisely to insulate the President from any
false inference that what he was aaking about was assassination. It is easy to confuse the
question, what are things going to be like after Castro, with the other question, and we
were trying to focus attention on the information he obviously wanted. which is, what
would happen if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the frame of mind of
thinking that he was considering doing it." (Bundy. 7/11/75. n. 81)
4 Taylor said he was puzzled by the wording of NSAM 100 and the related documents
and stated, ' I just cannot tie in the language here with a plausible explanation." (Taylor,
7/9/75, p. 18)
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C. PRESIDENT KJ N NEDY'S NOVEMBER 9, 1961 CONVERSATION WITH TAD S7ITLC
In early November 1961 Tad Szulc 1 was asked by Richard Goodwin,
a Special Assistant to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney
General Robed. Kennedy on November 8 to discuss the situation in
Cuba. The niei ting was "off-the-record." Szu1c attended as a fried
of Goodwin's, .i,ild not as a reporter. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 24) During
the meeting w i th Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on "the
situation in Cuba following the [Bay of Pigs] invasion [and] the
pros and cons of some different possible actions by the United States
Government in that context." (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 25) According to
Szulc the subject of assassination was not mentioned during this
meeting. (Szuh!, 6/10/75, p. 31)
At the close. of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szulc to meet
with the President. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 25) The next day Szulc,
accompanied by Goodwin, met with President Kennedy for over an
hour in the Oval Office.2 (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 25) Szulc recalled that
the President discussed "a number of his views on. Cuba in the wake
of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning my
conversations with Premier Castro, and * * * what the United States
could [or] might do in * * * either a hostile way or in establishing
some kind of a dialogue * * *" (Szulc, 6/10/75, pp. 25-26)
;zulc testified that after this general discussion, the President irked
"what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated?" 3
(Szulc, 611017i.5, pp. 26, 27; Szulc Notes of conversation with Presi-
dent. Kennedy, 11/9/61) Szulc testified that he replied that an as4assi-
nation would not necessarily cause a change in the Cuban syst.eni? and
that it was Szi:tlc's personal view that the United States should zirrt be
party to murders sand political assassinations. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 26)
Szulc said that the President responded, "I agree with you com-
pletely." Szuh' stated :
Ile [President Kennedy] then went on for a few minutes to make the point
how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons
should never be in a situation of having recourse to assassination. (Szulc, 6/10/
75, p. 27)
Szulc's notcr> of the meeting with the President state :
;rFK then said he was testing me, that he felt the same way-he added "I'm
glad you feel the same way"-because indeed U.S. morally must not be part
[sic] to assassinations.
7FK said he raised question because he was under terrific pressure from
advisers (think he said intelligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro
murder. sed [sic] he was resisting pressures. (Szulc note of conversatioe with
President Kennedy, 11/9/61)
I Tad Szulc wry, a reporter in the Washington Bureau of the New York Time. Szulc
hail visited Cuba in May-Tune 1961, following the Bay of Pigs Invasion. During tho' course
of that trip, Szulc had a "series of very long conversations" with Castro. (Szulc, 6110/75,
p. _14)
Goodwin testified that President Kennedy met frequently with members of t'i , press
anri others who were experts in various fields, but that it was "possible" that the meeting
with Szule may have been an occasion for the President to consider Szulc for a position
in the Administration. (Goodwin, 7/18/75, pp. 29-30)
On November 2, 1961, Goodwin had addressed an "eyes only" memorandum to the
Pr,'sident and t))ue Attorney General outlining a suggested organization for what became
tb' MONGOOSE operation. Goodwin proposed five "staff components." including "intelli-
gence collection." "guerrilla and underground," and "propaganda." The memorandum
stated : "As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence
from the Times fond work on this one--although we should check with (UTSIA 711rectorl
Ea Morrow and Dick Bissell." (Memo, Goodwin to the President and the Attorney (eneral,
11/2/61, p. 2)
, Szule made notes of the conversation with President Kennedy as soon as be r+'turned
to his office. President Kennedy's question regarding a Castro assassination snpesrs in
quotation marks in Szulc's notes, which were made the same day from "reasonably fresh"
memory, (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 30)
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Szulc stated that it is "possible" and he "believed" that President
Kennedy used such words as "someone in the intelligence business,"
to describe the source of the pressure for a Castro assassination. (Szulc,
6/10/75, p. 29) The President did not specifically identify the source
of the pressure. (Szulc, 6/10/75, p. 27)
There is no evidence other than Szulc's testimony that the Presi-
dent was being pressured. This lack of evidence was particularly
troublesome since everyone else questioned by the Committee denied
ever having discussed assassination with the President, let alone having
pressed him to consider it.
Goodwin recalled that, after President Kennedy asked Szulc for
his reaction to the suggestion that Castro be assassinated, President
Kennedy said, "well, that's the kind of thing I'm never going to do."
(Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 3) Goodwin said that several days after the
meeting he referred to the previous discussion of assassination and
President Kennedy said "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we
would all be targets." (Goodwin, 7/18/75. pp. 4, 11)
D. PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S SPEECH OF NOVEMBER 16, 1961
A few days after the meeting with Szulc and Goodwin, and some
six weeks after the issuance of NSAM 100, President Kennedy de-
livered a speech at the University of Washington, in which he stated :
We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror,
assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises. (Public Papers of the
Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 724)
(2) OPERATION MONGOOSE
A. THE CREATION OF OPERATION MONGOOSE
In November 1962 the proposal for a major new covert action pro-
gram to overthrow Castro was developed. The President's Assistant,
Richard Goodwin, and General Edward Lansdale, who was exper-
ienced in counter-insurgency operations, played major staff roles in
creating this program, which was named Operation MONGOOSE.
Goodwin and Lansdale worked closely with Robert Kennedy, who
took an active interest in this preparatory stage, and Goodwin ad-
vised the President that Robert Kennedy "would be the most effective
commander" of the proposed operation. (Memo, Goodwin to the Pres-
ident, 11/1/61, p. 1) In a memorandum to Robert Kennedy outlining
the MONGOOSE proposal, Lansdale stated that a "picture of the situ-
ation has emerged clearly enough to indicate what needs to be done
and to support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba." (Memo,
11/15/61)
At the end of the month, President Kennedy issued a memorandum
recording his decision to begin the MONGOOSE project to "use our
available assets * * * to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime."
(Memo from the President to the Secretary of State, et a]., 11/30/61)
The establishment of Operation MONGOOSE resulted in important
organizational changes.
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(1) The Special Group (Augmented) (SGA)
A new control group, the Special Group (Augmented) (SGA) was
created to oversee Operation MONGOOSE. The SGA comprise the
regular Special Group members (i.e., McGeorge Bundy, Alexis John-
son of the Department of State, Roswell Gilpatric of the Department
of I)efense, John McCone, and General Lyman Lemnitzer of the .l pint
Chiefs) augmented by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and t ten-
eral Maxwell Taylor. Although Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary
of I)efense Me\Tamara were not formal members of the Special G , oup
or the Special Group (Augmented), they sometimes attended
meetings.
(2) General Langdale named Chief-of-Operations of MONGOOSE
As a result of the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy distrr sted
the CIA and believed that someone from outside the Agency w;:; re-
T uired to oversee major covert action programs. Rather than apl point
is brother, Robert Kennedy, to head MONGOOSE, as proposed by
Goodwin, President Kennedy gave General Edward Lansdale the task
of coordinating the CIA's MONGOOSE operations with those oi' the
Departments of State and Defense. Lansdale had developed it reputa-
tion in the Philippines and Vietnam for having an ability to deal with
revolutionary rrsurgencies in less developed countries. Kennet iv ap-
pointed General. 'Taylor Chairman of the Special Group Augme lsted.
Robert Kennedy played an active role in the MONGOOSE Oper,,tion,
a role unrelated to his position as Attorney General.
(3) CIA Organization for MONGOOSE
In late 1961 or early 1962, William Harvey was put in char -,e. of
the CIA's Task Force W, the CIA unit for MONGOOSE (~? ,era-
tions. Task Force W operated under guidance from the Special (, coup
(Augmented) and employed a total of approximately 400 people at
CIA headquarters and its Miami Station. McCone and Harvey were
the principal CIA participants in Operation MONGOOSE. Although
Helms attended only 7 of the 40 MONGOOSE meetings. he w?u; sig-
nificantly involved, and he testified that, he "was as interestet!" in
MONGOOSE as were Harvey and McCone. (Helms, 7/18/75, h. 10)
B. LA I SDALE'S THEORY AND OBJECTIVE FOR MONGOOSE
]n the fall of 1961, Landale was asked by President Kennedy to
examine the Administration's Cuba policy and. to make. recomm nda-
tions. Lansdale testified that, he reported to President Kennedy that
"Castro * * * had aroused considerable affection for himself' per-
sonally with the Cuban population * * 'h" (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 4),
and that the United 'States "should take a very different course" from
the "harassment" operations that had been directed against Castro
up to that time. (Lansdale, 7/8/75. p. A) Lansdale informed the
President that, these prior United States operations were conceived
and led by Americans. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 5) In contrast, Larr:dale
proposed in Operation MONGOOSE that the United States work
with exiles, particularly professionals, who had opposed Batista and
then became disillusioned with Castro. (Lansdale, 7/S/75, pp. 4,
10--11) Lansdale's ultimate objective was to have "the people them-
selves overthrow the Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered
efforts from outside Cuba." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 41)
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Lansdale's concept for Operation MONGOOSE envisioned a first
step involving the development of leadership elements and "a very
necessary political basis" among the Cubans opposed to Castro. (Lans-
dale, 7/8/75, p. 11) At the. same time, he sought to develop "means to
infiltrate Cuba successfully" and to organize "cells and activities in-
side Cuba * * * who could work secretly and safely." (Lansdale,
7/8/75, p. 11) Lansdale's plan was designed so as not to "arouse pre-
mature actions, not to bring great reprisals on the people there and
abort any eventual success." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 11)
C. BISSELL'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO ACT
MORE VIGOROUSLY
According to the Assistant to the head of Task Force W, sometime
early in the fall of 1961, Bissell was "chewed out in the Cabinet Room
of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General
for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting
rid of Castro and the Castro regime." (Assistant, 6,/18/75, p. 8)
The Assistant said Bissell told him about the meeting and directed
him to come up with some plans. (Assistant, 6/18/75, .pp. 8, 36-37)
Bissell did not recall the White House meeting described by the As-
sistant, but agreed that he had been, in essence, told to "get off your ass
about Cuba." (Bissell, 7/25/75, pp. 37-38)
Bissell was asked whether he considered that instruction authority
for proceeding to assassinate Castro.'He said, no, and that "formal and
explicit approval" would be required for assassination activity (id.,
38-39). Bissell also said that there was in fact no assassination ac-
tivity between the pre-Bay of Pigs/Rosselli operation and his depar-
ture from the Agency in February 1962.
D. THE JANUARY 1.9, 1962 SPECIAL GROUP MEETING
On January 19, 1962, a meeting of principal MONGOOSE partici-
pants was held in Attorney General Kennedy's office.' (McManus,
7/22/75, p. 6) Notes taken at the meeting by George McManus, Helms'
Executive Assistant, contain the following passages :
Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible.
"* * * a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority in U.S. Gov-
[ernmen]t. No time, money, effort-or manpower Is to be spared."
"Yesterday * * * the President had indicated to him that the final chapter
had not been written-it's got to be done and will be done." (McManus memo
1/19/62, p. 2)
McManus attributed the words "the top priority in the U.S. Gov-
[ernmen]t-no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared" to the
Attorney General. (McManus, 7/22/75, pp. 8-9)
Helms stated that those words reflected the "kind of atmosphere"
in which he had perceived that assassination was implicitly authorized.
`4Helms, 7/17/75, pp. 60-61) McManus agreed that Robert Kennedy
was very vehement in his speech" and "really wanted action," but
1 Those attending included the Attorney General, Lansdale, McManus, General Craig,
representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Don Wilson of USIA, Major Patchell of the Secretary
of Defense's office, and Frank Hand of CIA. It is probable that DDP Helms was also
present.
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McManus disagreed with Helms' perception, stating that "it Bever
occurred to me" that Kennedy's exhortation included permission to
assassinate CastroiNor did the spirit of the meeting as a whole leave
McManus with the impression that assassination was either contem-
plated or authorized. (McManus, 7/22/75, pp. 9-10) 1
E. GENERAL LANSDALE'S MONGOOSE PLANNING TASKS
On January 18, 1962, Lansdale assigned 32 planning tasks to the
agencies participating in MONGOOSE. In a memorandum to the
working group members, Lansdale emphasized that "it is our ;sob to
put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effec-
tively. This demands a change from the business as usual and a hard
facing of the fact that we are in a combat situation-where we have
been given full command." (Lansdale memorandum, 1/20/62)
The 32 tasks comprised a variety of activities, ranging fro a in-
telligence collection to planning for "use of U.S. military force to
support, the Cuban popular movement" and developing an "opera-
tional schedule for sabotage actions inside Cuba." 2 In focusi,ig on
intelligence collection, propaganda, and various sabotage ae. lions,
Lansdale's tasks were consistent with the underlying strate;ry of
MONGOOSE to build gradually towards an internal revolt of the
Cuban people.
Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Attorney General Ken-
nedy on January 18, 1962, with a handwritten note stating : "r iy re-
view does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you ; I felt
you preferred informing the President privately." Lansdale te^ ~tified
that this sensitive work did not refer to assassinations and tl:at he
"never took up assassination with either the Attorney General ?sr the
President." He said that he could not precisely recall the nature of this
"sensitive work" but that it might have involved a special trip he made
under cover to meet Cuban leaders in Florida to assess their political
strengths. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 30)
In a memorandum to the Attorney General on January 27. 1962,
Lansdale referred to the possibility that "we might uncork the ouch-
down play independently of the institutional program we a.re spur-
ring." (Memo, Lansdale to Attorney General, 1/27/62) Lansdale
' There was a great deal of evidence showing that Cuba had a high priorit,r in the
Kennedy Adminiastration, and the very existence of a high-level group like the Special
Group (Augment,-d) further demonstrated Cuba's Importance. McNamara stated Vint "we
were hysterical shout Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter." (In the same
context. McNamara stated "I don't believe we contemplated assassination.") (Mr amara.
7/22/75, p. 93) Similarlyy. General Lansdale informed the members of his intt ,agency
committee that MONGOOSE "demands a change from business-as-usual and a hart facine
of the fact that you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command."
(Lansdale Memo 1/20/62)
On the other ]rand, Theodore Sorensen testified that "there were lots of top priorities.
aid it was the job of some of [us] to continually tell various agencies their t'n:rticular
subject was the; trip priority" and althouFb Cuba was "important" it was "fairly y,.ll down
on the list of the President's agenda.' (Sorensen. 7/21/75. p. 12) For exam5r when
President Kenne,ly was told that his first letter to Khruschev in the secret eorresrondenee
which lasted tWr' or three years would be "the single most important document ,on will
write durin your Presidency." President Kennedy said, "Yes, we get these story day
over here." (Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 12)
2 Parrott sart,stically characterized Lansdale's plans as follows :
"I'll give you ;ine example of Lansdale's perspicacity. Fie had a wonderful plan for get-
ting rid of Castro. This plan consisted of spreading the word that the Second Ceollection of the August 10, 1962 meeting. The memorandum was prompted by a
telephone call from the newspaper columnist, Jack Anderson, who at that time was pre-
paring a column on Castro assassination attempts, implicating President Keti edy and
Robert Kennedy. After talking with Anderson on the telephone at Robert Kennedy's
request, McCone dictated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated, in hart,
several MONGOOSE meetings on August 8. 9, or 10, 1962, "I recall a suggestion being
made to liquidat a top people in the Castro regime, including Castro."
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meeting,' but he was unable to say "with any certainty" who raised the
subject. (Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 8) 2
(d) McNamara
McNamara testified that although he did not recall assassination
being discussed at the SGA meeting, he did remember having ex-
pressed-opposition to any assassination attempt or plan when he spoke
with McCone several days later. (McNamara, 7/11/75, pp. 7, 8)
(2) Testimony about Events After the August 10, 1962 meeting
(a) McCone
McCone testified that lie called McNamara after receiving Lans-
dale's August 13 Memorandum and :
* * * insisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn because no decision was
made on this subject, and since no decision was made, then Lansdale was quite
out of order in tasking the Central Intelligence Agency to consider the matter.i
McCone said that McNamara agreed that Lansdale's Memorandum
should be withdrawn' for the same reason. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 39)
(b) Harvey
Harvey's demand that the words "liquidation of leaders" be excised
from Lansdale's memorandum and his further statement that "the
Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments
or study on this point," raise an important question. Did Harvey mean
that the SGA was not considering assassination or merely that the
subject should not be put in writing? When Harvey was asked "was it
x In _-staff interview prior to his testimony, Goodwin recalled the date of the meeting
at which a Castro assassination was raised as falling in early 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. ndum
of Staff M n tesaof the August 10,t 1962wmeeeet Goodwin, L Lansdale and Harvey memoranda the
August 13 and 14, respectively, Goodwin testified that he had "misplaced the date of the
m
eeting in my own memory." (Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 7.) In placing the incident on August
10,
recolle 1962 n Goodwin now have. stated It's a w littof course, le better han the e arlierr aone,obute it'shnot certaint
(Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 8)
In a magazine article in June 1975, Goodwin was quoted as stating that at one of
the meetings of a white House task force on Cuba it was McNamara who said that
"Castro's assassination was the only productive way of dealing with Cuba." (Branch and
Crile, "The Kennedy Vendetta," Harpers, July, 1975, p. 61). In his testimony on July 18,
1975, Goodwin said : "that's not an exact quote" in the article, and explained : "I didn't
tell [the author of the magazine article] that it was definitely McNamara, that very
possibly it was McNamara. He asked me about McNamara's role, and I said it very well
could have been McNamara." (Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 33)
Goodwin told the Committee : "It's not a light matter to perhaps destroy a man's
career on the basis of a fifteen year old memory of a single sentence that he might have
said at a meeting without substantial certainty in your own mind, and I do not have
that" (Goodwin, 7/18/75, pp. 34-35). It is difficult to reconcile this testimony with
Goodwin's testimony that he told the author of the article that McNamara might very
well have made the statement about assassination at the August meeting.
3 McCone's 1967 Memorandum stated : "Immediately after the meeting, I called on
Secretary McNamara personally and reemphasized my position, in which he heartily
agreed. I did this because Operation MONGOOSE-an interdepartmental affair-was
under the operational control of [the Defense Department] ^ * * "
4 McNamara confirmed this plan-
ning should be un er aken." (McNamara, 7/11/75, p. 8.) Headed : "I have no knowledge
or information about any other plans or preparations for a Castro assassination." (Mc-
Namara, 7/11/75, p. 7)
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understood in pan unwritten way that [assassination] was to proceed,"
he replied:
in to my ktv,wledge, no * * *. If there was any unwritten understuriding
on the part of the members of the Special Group concerning this, other than
whit. was said ti1: the meeting, I do not know of it * * *. (Harvey, 7/11/-, 0, pp.
:30 31)
1larvey said that shortly after the meeting, McCone informer!; him
thief he had told McNamara that assassination should not be disci ssed.
M(Cone also t)ld McNamara that involvement in such matters i tight
result in his own excommunication. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 25)
(c) Elder
Walter Eldc-r, McCone's Executive Assistant, was present when Mc-
Owe telephollc'd McNamara after the August 10 meeting. Elder testi-
fied that McCune told McNamara "the subject you just brought =tp, I
think it is highly improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is
no- an action t flat should ever be condoned. It is not proper for its to
din -uss, and I intend to have it expunged from the record." (Elder,
8i i -1/ 75, p. 23''t
l' lder testified that this was the essence of the conversation; but
tli i C he distint f ly remembered "several exact phrases, like `would itot be
cordoned' an' `improper'." (Elder, 8/13/75, pp. 23, 24) 1
M1feCone spoke with Harvey in Elder's presence after rect';ving
Li, nsdale's A rigust 13 memorandum. According to Elder, "AI( Cone
rrlttde his views quite clear in the same language and tone * * 'c that
he ised with Mr. McNamara." (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 25) Elder te;tified
that Harvey did not then tell. McCone that Harvey was engage?l in a
Castro assassination effort. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 25)
Elder also described a meeting held in his office with Helms shortly
after the Met 'one/Harvey/Elder meeting. Elder stated:
told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling to Mr. McNamara
aunt Mr. Harve that assassination could not be condoned and would rtot be
approved, Fur(hermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement that it w4odd be
unthinkable to r,seord in writing any consideration of assassination because' it left
th'y impression that the subject had received serious consideration uy ir oerit-
mi-i tal policynr>ikers, which it had not. Mr. Helms responded, "I under rand."
'r { - point is theft I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr. McCone's >pposi-
tic n to assassin" Lion. I know that Mr. Helms could not have been under ar..v mis-
alittrehension about Mr. Mc-Cone's feelings after this conversation. rElder
Atlidavit, 8/26/75, p. 2)
Tlelms, after reading Elder's affidavit, told the Committee diet he
hid no recollection of the meeting. (Helms, 9/16/75, P. 16)
(d) Lansdale
Lansdale recalled that the subject. of Castro's assassination hurl sur-
f:.ced at. the %ugust 10 meeting. He testified that the "consensus was
* * * hell no on. this and there was a very violent reaction." (Lai, dale,
Elder said hi- heard the entire telephone conversation via a speaker phone, tFe said
th ,r McNamara -lust more or less accepted what Mr. McCone said without con dent or
rr- -ender.- (Elder, 8/13/75. p. 24)
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7/8/75, p. 20) Lansdale was questioned as to why he subsequently
asked Harvey for a Castro assassination plan :
Senator BAKER. Why did you, three days later if they all said, hell no, [go]
ahead with it?
General LANSDALE. * * * the meeting at which they said that was still on a
development of my original task, which was a revolt and an overthrow of it
regime. At the same time, we were getting intelligence accumulating very quickly
of something very different taking place in Cuba than we had expected, which
was the Soviet technicians starting to come in and the possibilities of Soviet
missiles being placed there * * * At that time, I thought it would be a possibility
someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take
action such as that [assassination]1 (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 21)
Lansdale stated that he had one brief conversation with Harvey
after the August 13 memorandum in which Harvey stated "he would
look into it * * * see about developing some plans." Lansdale said 1h that
was the last he ever heard of the matter. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 124)
Lansdale stated that as the Cuban Missile Crisis developed, MON-
GOOSE "was being rapidly shifted out of consideration" and thus
"I wasn't pressing for answers * * * it was very obvious that another
situation was developing that would be handled quite differently in
Cuba." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 124)
Lansdale testified that he was "very certain" that lie never discussed
a Castro assassination plan or proposal with Robert Kennedy or with
President Kennedy. He said that he had asked Harvey for a plan
without having discussed the matter with anyone :
Senator BAKER: * * * did you originate this idea of laying on the CIA a require-
ment to report on the feasibility of the assassination of Castro or did someone
else suggest that?
General LANSDALE : I did, as far as I recall.
Senator BAKER: Who did you discuss it with before you laid on that require-
ment?
General LANSDALE: I don't believe I discussed it with anyone.
Senator BAKER: Only with Harvey?
General LANSDALE: Only with Harvey.
Senator BAKER: Did you ever discuss it with Helms?
General LANSDALE : I might have, and I don't believe that I did. I think it was
just with Harvey.
Senator BAKER: Did you ever discuss it with Robert Kennedy?
General LANSDALE: No, not that I recall.
Senator BAKER: With the President?
General LANSDALE: No. (Lansdale, 7/8/75, pp. 19-20)
(3) Testimony of Reporters About Lansdale's Comments on the Au-
gust 10 Meeting
During the Committee's investigation, reports concerning the
August 10 meeting and Landsdale's request. for a Castro assassination
plan appeared in the press. One report was based on statements made
by Lansdale to David Martin of the Associated Press and another
on Lansdale's statements to Jeremiah O'Leary of the Washington
Star-News. Because there was conflict between Lansdale's testimony
l' ?Q, * * * Why, if it is true that assassination idea was turned down on August 10, did
you send out your memo on A ugust 13? I don't remember the reasons
General LANSDALE. I don't recall that thoroughly,
why I would.
Q. Is it your testimony that the August 10 meeting turned down assassinations as a
subject to look into, and that you nevertheless asked 1~r. Harvey to look into it?
General LANSDALE. I guess it is, yes. The way you put it to me now has me baffled about
why I did it. I don't know." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, pp. 123-124)
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to the Cornwittee and what lie was reported to have told Mali in and
l )'Lea , tl ie Committee invited both reporters to testify. Nfartin
testified under subpoena. O'Leary appeared voluntarily biii stated
I hat the policy of his newspaper against disclosing news soul, -es pre-
eluded him from elaborating on the contents of a prepared str ement,
'ee hich he read under oath. O'Leary stated that his news reps) t "rep-
resents accurately my understanding of the relevant inform z.tion I
obtained fiiun news sources." (O'Leary, 9/26/75, p. 5)
(a) The Jfl artz:ra Repcrrt
The lead paragraph of Martin's report stated :
Retired Ma,. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale said Friday that acting or orders
from President john F. Kennedy delivered through an intermediary, 1?' devel-
oped plans. for, removing Cuban Premier Fidel Castro by any means iirciuding
as ssassination.
Martin terl ified that this paragraph was an accurate reflec~ ion of
}i'ii conclusion based on the totality of his interview with r Tisdale
mi. May 30, P175. (Martin, 7/24/75, pp. 19-20) Lansdale testifit~ I that.,
alter reading Martin's story, lie told the reporter that `?voi:r first
a'ratence is n of only completely untrue, but there is not a sing)i thing
ill your, stor that says it is true." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 65)
in view of Martin's testimony that, the report's lead paragraph was
a "Olle usion based on his total interview with Lansdale, it hould
ba' noted that the remainder of Martin's story does not state that Lans-
daa le was ord 'red by President Kennedy or the Attorney General to
develop plan, for Castro's assassination. The report quotes Lt1 isdale
at stating "I was working for the highest authority in the land * * *
tlla> President." and then states that Lansdale said he did nor deal
directly with the. President, but "worked through" an intermi'diary
who was more intimate with the President, than. Bundy.' The Com-
mittee notes that the phrases "working for" and "working thr-rugh"
tie not carry I he same meaning as the lead paragraph's conclusio'i that
Lansdale WW "acting on orders" to develop a Castro assassit ition
plate. Subsequent paragraphs in the Martin report indicate that Lans-
dale told the rl'porter that the decision to undertake assassinatioi. plan-
ning was his own; Lansdale so testified before I:he Committee. At cord-
in,,: to the. Malin article, Lansdale said that assassination was "aRe, of
do, means he considered," that he believed assassination would near; have
hoot "incoml I#ible" with his assignment, and that lie just
w;rnted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities." Martin sia3-d he
did not ask i,aansdale specifically if Lansdalo had acted on carders
1 e.r~.arding an assassi.nation plan, nor did Lansdale volunteer that ififor-
iua l ion. Patlior, Martin asked Lansdale "Who were you we _ king
fo12
I.ansdalo refuted to provide Martin the Intermediary's tunic for the record. Pt Conr-
n i IEe did not a 1; Martin about Lansdale's off-the-record statements out of resji ',-t for
the a?onfide nHall ty of news sources (Martin, 7/24/75, p. 18)
2 tlartin teatifie that his interview with Lansdale involved two questions What
wt r' you [Lansdal,'l doing in August 1962?" (Martin, 7/24/75, p. 16), and (2) "Vii:' were
you working for?' (Martin 7/24/75. p. 17) Martin stated that in discussing Lan dale's
tell ,ties in Augu t 19(12, Lansdale stated, "I just wanted to see if the U.S. had art. such
sit Lilities" and a ,it Ihis included "assassination" as well as other means of di'. using
of I rstro? As to V if, second question "Who were you working for?" Lansdale repii."l "on
ti ai project I wt' working for the highest authority in the land." (Martin, f. :4/75.
p. le
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In a subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975, Martin said he asked
Lansdale specifically, "Were you ever ordered by President Kennedy
or any other Kennedy to draw up plans to assassinate Castro?
(Martin, 7/24/75, p. 21) Martin testified that Lansdale replied "no"
and that his orders were "very broad." (Martin, 7/24/75, p. 21)
Martin further testified that in the June 4 conversation he asked Lans-
dale whether "any assassination planning you did was done on your
own initiative," and that Lansdale replied "yes." (Martin 7/24/75,
p. 21) Martin stated his belief that Lansdale's statements on June 4
were at variance with his prior statements on May 30. (Martin 7/24/75,
p. 21) It is, of course, possible that since Martin posed different ques-
tions in the two conversations, he and Lansdale may have misunder-
stood each other.
(b) The O'Leary Report
O'Leary's report began :
Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale has named Robert F. Kennedy as the
administration official who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project to
work out all feasible plans for "getting rid of" Cuban Prime Minister Fidel
Castro.
Lansdale, in an interview with the Washington Star, never used the word
"assassination" and said it was not used by Kennedy, then the attorney general.
But he said there could be no doubt that "that project for disposing of Castro
envisioned the whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the Cuban leader to
assassinating him."
O'Leary's report contained the statement that "Lansdale said lie was
contacted by Robert Kennedy in mid-summer of 1962 * * *." O'Leary
told the Committee that this reference modified the reference in the
lead paragraph of his report. (O'Leary, 9/26/75, p. 13)
Lansdale testified that he had submitted a statement to the Wash-
ington Star News stating that O'Leary's report was "a distortion of
my remarks." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 61) Lansdale said he told the
newspaper that: "perhaps someplace in the planning there is some-
thing about what to do with a leader who would threaten the lives of
millions of Americans [with Soviet Missiles] * * * but I can say I
never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from Robert
Kennedy about taking action against Castro personally." (Lansdale,
7/18/75, pp. 61-62)
Lansdale testified that he told O'Leary that, he did take orders from
Robert Kennedy, but made clear that "Kennedy's orders to him were
on a very wide-ranging type of thing." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 62)
After the story appeared, the * * * Washington Star asked me what wide-
ranging things were you talking about?
I said there were economic matters and military matters and military things
and they were very wide-ranging things. I said perhaps all O'Leary was think-
ing of was assassination. I was thinking of far wider than that. (Lansdale,
7/8/75, pp. 62-M)
The O'Leary report states :
Lansdale said he is certain Robert Kennedy's instructions to him did not in-
clude the word "assassination." He said the attorney general, as best he could
recall, spoke in more general terms Qf exploring all feasible means and practicali-
ties of doing something "to get rid of" Castro.
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(iii) THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE AM/LASH PLOT (191j3-1965)
WAS KNOWN ABOUT OR AUTHORIZED $Y ADMINISTRATION (.OFFICIALS
OUTSIDI: THE CIA
This section examines evidence relating to whether..officie is in the
Kennedy or Johnson Administrations were aware of or authorized
the CIA's use of AM/LASH as a potential assassin. The question is
examined in light of the policies of those Administration: toward
Cuba as well as the evidence bearing more directly on the authoriza-
tion issues.
The evidence falls into a pattern similar to that described in the
discussion of post-Bay of Pigs activity in the. Kennedy Adi ainistra-
tion. Administration officials testified that. they had never been in-
formed ahaout the plot and that they never intended to r uthorize
assassination. Richard Helms, on the other hand, testified thtt he had
believed that assassination was permissible in view of the coartinuing
pressure to overthrow the Castro regime exerted by the ?i~spective
Administrations and the failure of either Administration to place
limits on the means that could be used to achieve that end,.
(1) KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD CUBA IN 196
."t
a. Organ izationa/ Changes
The MONGOOSE Operation was disbanded following th Cuban
Missile Crisis, and an interagency "Cuban Coordinating Colrrmittee"
was established within the State Department with responsibility for
developing covert action proposals. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 1 C8) The
SGA Was rbolished, and the Special Group, chaired by Iti+,George
Bundy, re a=sulned responsibility for reviewing and approvui., covert
actions in (1aba. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148)
United States policy toward Cuba in 1963 was also formulated in
the National Security Council's Standing Group, the succe.+ ar to the
14,'xecutive Committee which had been established for the Missile
Crisis. Members of the Standing Grou) included Robert 1 ennedy,
Robert Mc `~ amara, John McCone, McGeorge Bundy and 9 heodore
`.orensen.
Four ast,acts of the Kennedy Administration's 1963 CuLt policy
are discussed below: (1) the Standing Group's discussion of possible
developments in the event of Castro's death; (2) the Standing
(Troup s discussion of policy options; (3) the covert action )rogram
:rpproved t)y the Special Group; and (4) the diplomatic rifort to
explore the possibility of reestablishing relations with Cas! ro. The
first three took place in the spring or early summer of i 63; the
fourth-titre effort to communicate with Castro--occurred at t he same
time the CIA offered AM/LASH the poison pen device for n:7astro's
a) ssassination.
h. Disco ? on of the Contingency of Ca8tro's Death
In the spring of 1963, Bundy submitted to the Standing g lroupp a
rnemora.nd) m entitled "Cuba Alternatives" which discusse ' possible
new directions" for American policy toward Cuba. (Bundy Memo
randu n), 4 "31/63) The memorandum distinguished betweei, events
which might occur independently of actions taken by the United
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States, and those which the United States might "initiate." Listed
under the first category was the possibility of Castro's death. In May
1963, the Group discussed this contingency and found that the possi-
bilities for develo ments favorable to the United States if Castro
should die were `singularly unpromising." (Summary Record of
Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63)
When Bundy's memorandum was first discussed by the Group in
April, Robert Kennedy proposed a study of the "measures we would
take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shoot-
ing down of a U-2." (Summary Record of Standing Group Meeting,
4/23/63) Bundy's follow-up memorandum, an agenda. for a future
Standing Group discussion of Cuban policy, listed contingency
planning for Castro's death under a category comprising events not
initiated by the United States, e.g., "occurrence of revolt or repression
in the manner of Hungary," "attributable interference by Castro in
other countries," and "the reintroduction of offensive weapons."
(Bundy Memorandum, 4/29/63)
After the Standing Group's meeting on April 23, 1963, the CIA's
Office of National Estimates was assigned the task of assessing pos-
sible developments if Castro should die. (Memorandum for Members
of the Standing Group, 5/2/63) The resulting ,paper analyzed the
forces likely to come into play in Cuba after Castro's death, includ-
ing the roles of his top aides, Raul Castro and Che Guevara, and
possible Soviet reactions. (Draft Memorandum by Office of National
Estimates titled "Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in
the Event of Castro's Death," pp. 2-5) The paper concluded that "the
odds are that upon Castro's death, his brother Raul or some other fig-
ure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over con-
trol" 1 The paper warned : "If Castro were to die by other than natural
causes the U.S. would be widely charged with complicity, even though
it is widely known that Castro has many enemies."
The paper also identified several courses of action open to the United
States in the event of Castro's death, ranging from no United States
initiatives, action to support a government in exile, quarantine and
blockade, and outright invasion.
On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group discussed this paper. The
Group decided that "all of the courses of action were singularly un-
promising". (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting
No. 7/63, May 28, 1963 )
Bundy testified that the Standing Group "certainly posed the ques-
tion" in the Spring of 1963 of what would happen if Castro died or
were killed. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 130) However, he said that he had
no recollection of Castro's assassination being considered by the Stand-
ing Group when that contingency was discussed. (Bundy, 7/11/75,
p. 14)2
Bundy said that one reason for having requested the estimate was
to make a record establishing that the United States should not be
i The paper also saw little chance that a government favorably disposed toward the
United States would be able to come to power without extensive United States military
support: "Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive U.S. help in order
to win, and probably U.S. military intervention."
2 Bundy did recall that over the period 19,61 to 1963 "the subject of a Castro as-
sassination was mentioned from time to time by different individuals," but he said that
he was not aware of "much discussion in the Spring of 1963 on that subject." (Bundy,
7/11/75, p. 140)
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"fussing" with assassination, and that assassination was not a sound
policy. (Bundy}-, 7/11/75, p. 142)
Bundy said that it was not unusual to assess the implications of a
foreign leader's death, and named Stalin and De Gaulle as examples.
In the case of Castro, Bundy said he felt it was only prudent i o at-
tenlpt to assess a post-Castro Cuba since Castro was such a "dominant
figure." (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 145)
c. The Statuldng Group's Discussion of United States Policy Toward
Cuba
The Standing Group's documents indicate it continued to assume
the desirability of harassing Cuba, but recognized that there were
few practical measures the United States could take to achieve Cas-
tro's overthrow.
In his April. 21 memorandum on "Cuban Alternatives" Bundy
identified three possible alternatives: (1 forcing "a non-Communist
solution in Cuba b all necessary means,' (2) insisting on "major but
limited ends," or (3) moving "in the direction of a gradual develop-
ment of some form of accommodation with Castro." (Bundy Memo-
randum, 4/21/63, p. 3) These alternatives were discussed at the Stand-
ing Group meetings on April 23 and May 28,1963.
Sorensen participated in these meetings. Ile testified that the
"widest possible range of alternatives" was discussed, but that
"assassination was not even on the list." (Sorensen, 7/21/75, 1). 4)
He said that options such as forcing "a non-Communist solution in
Cuba by all necessary means"
* * * could not have included or implied assassination. Instead, it expressly
referred to the development of pressures and gradual escalation of tho con-
frontation in Cuba to produce an overthrow of the regime, including a willing-
ness to use military force to invade Cuba. Such a course was obviously not
adopted by the ]'resident, and in any event expressed an approach far different
from assassination. (Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/75)1
The record. of the first Standing Group discussion of Bundy's
memorandum shows that a number of alternatives (none of which
involved assassination) were considered but no conclusions were
reached.
The Standing Group again met on May 28, 1963. McCone argued
for steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplemented by
sabotage to "create a situation in Cuba in which it would be possible
to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting to overthrow
Castro." (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Met?tinng,
5/98/63) McNamara said that sabotage would not be "coclu-
sive" and suggested that "economic pressures which would. upset
Castro" be studied. Robert Kennedy said "the U.S. must do somet hing
against Castro, even though we do not believe our actions would bring
him down." (id.) Bundy summarized by stating that the task: was
"to decide nos what actions we would take against Castro, acknowl-
1'The Bundy memorandum also used the phrase "all necessary measures" to describe
the steps the American Government was willing to take to "prevent" a direct military
threat to the United States or to the western Hemisphere from Cuba. Sorensen explained
the meaning of this phrase in the context of the April 23 discussion of Kennedy Adminis-
tration policy. "[this phrase] could not by any stretch of semantics or logic hove in-
cluded assassins on or any other initiative. It reflected the purely defensive i sture
implemented six months earlier when long-range missiles and other offensive w capons
were placed in Cub," (Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/7-5)
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edging that the measures practical for us to take will not result in his
overthrow." (id.)
d. The Special Group's Authorization of a Sabotage Program
Against Cuba
During the first six months of 1963, little, if any, sabotage activity
against Cuba was undertaken.' However, on June 19, 1963, following
the Standing Group's discussion of Cuba policy in the spring, Presi-
dent Kennedy approved a sabotage program.2 (Memorandum for the
Special Group, 6/19/63) In contrast to the MONGOOSE program,
which sought to build toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963
covert action program had a more limited objective, i.e., "to nourish a
spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant
defections and other byproducts of unrest." (id)
After initial approval, specific intelligence and sabotage operations
were submitted to the Special Group for prior authorization. On Octo-
ber 3, 1963, the Special Group approved nine operations in Cuba, sev-
eral of which involved sabotage. On October 24, 1963, thirteen major
sabotage operations, including the sabotage of an electric power plant,
an oil refinery, and a sugar mill, were approved for the period from
November 1963 through January 1964. (Memorandum, 7/11/75,
CIA Review Staff to Select Committee, on "Approved CIA Covert
Operations into Cuba")
e. The Diplomatic Effort to Explore an Accommodation with Castro
As early as January 4, 1963, Bundy proposed to President Kennedy
that the possibility of communicating with Castro be explored.
(Memorandum, Bundy to the President, 1/4/63) Bundy's memo-
randum on "Cuba Alternatives" of April 23, 1963, also listed the
"gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro"
among policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, 4/21/63) At a meet-
ing on June 3, 1963, the Special Group agreed it would be a "useful
endeavor" to explore "various possibilities of establishing channels
of communication to Castro." (Memorandum of Special Group meet-
ing, 6/6/63)
In the fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor to the
United States Delegation to the United Nations with the rank of
Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 3) Atwood testified that from
September until November 1963, he held a series of talks with the
Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations to discuss opening negotia-
tions on an accommodation between Castro and the United States.
Atwood said that at the outset he informed Robert Kennedy of these
talks and was told that the effort "was worth pursuing." (Atwood,
7/10/75, pp. 5-9) Atwood said he regularly reported on the talks to the
White House and to Adlai Stevenson, his superior at the United
Nations. (Atwood, 7/10/75, pp. 6-7) Atwood stated that he was told
' At an April 3, 1963 meeting on Cuba, Bundy stated that no sabotage operations were
then underway because the Special Group "had decided * * * that such activity is not
worth the effort expended on it." (Memorandum of Meeting an Cuba, 4/3/63)
The sabotage program was directed at "four major segments of the Cuban economy,"
(1) electric power; (2) petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (3) railroad and
highway transportation and (4) production and manufacturing. (Memorandum for the
Special Group, June 19, 1963, p. 1.) Operations under this program were to be conducted
by CIA-controlled Cuban agents from a United States island off Florida and were to
complement a similar effort designed to "develop internal resistance elements which
could carry out sabotage." (id)
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be Bundy that; President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing to wards
au opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet fort and
pt chaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting b the same cache described above, of an electronic detonating
device with remote control features, which could be planted by the dissidents in
such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo henchmen. This might neces-
sitate training and introducing into the country by illegal entry, a trained
technican to set the bomb and detonator. (Emphasis added.) (CIA Memo,
10/3/60)
(e) December 1960 Special Group plan of covert actions
On December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered and approved a
broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces. The plarr, pre-
sented by Bis-;ell, envisioned support to both Dominican exile groups
and internal dissidents. The exile groups were to be furnished money
to organize 'and undertake anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts iliid to
refurbish a yacht for use in paramilitary activities, Bissell emphasized
to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not, of them-
selves, bring about the desired result in the near future, lacki_n~, some
decisive strobe against Trujillo himself." (Special Group Minutes,
12/29/60)
6. JANUARY 12, 1961 SPECIAL GROUP APPROVAL OF "LIMITED SUPPLIES OF
SMALL ARMS AND OTHER MATERIAL"
On January 12, 1961, with all members present,' the Special Croup
met, and, according to its Minutes, took the following action with
respect to the Dominican Republic :
Mr. Merchant: explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited
'applies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents
inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be
managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation
into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved
the project. (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)
% The members of the Special Group were at the time : Livingston Merchant,. Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs ; Gordon Gray, Advisor to the President for
~~1*~tional Seeuri~ Affairs ? John N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense ; and Allen Dulles,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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(a) Memorandums underlying the Special Group action
On January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to Under
Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandum, sent through
Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reported the disillusion-
ment of Dominican dissidents with the United States for its failure
to furnish them with any tangible or concrete assistance. Further, it
reported :
Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supply them with "hard-
ware" of various types. This has included quantities of conventional arms and
also, rather persistently, they have asked for some of the more exotic items
and devices which they associate with revolutionary effort. (Memo, Mann to
Merchant, 1/12/61)
Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if he approved,
for discussion by the Special Group, the provision of token quantities
of selected items desired by the dissidents. Mann specifically men-
tioned small explosive devices which would place some "sabotage
potential" in the hands of dissident elements, but stated that there
"would be no thought of toppling the GODR [Government of Do-
minican Republic] by any such minor measure." (Memo, Mann to Mer-
chant, 1/12/61) This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by
Mann's Special Assistant for CIA liaison.
A covering memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwarding
Mann's memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special Group
meetin. Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that the Special
Group `agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo" and that the Secretary
of State was informed of that decision by late afternoon on Janu-
ary 12, 1961. (Memo, Scott to Merchant, 1/12/61)
'There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group, other
than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly and repeatedly
expressed a desire for arms and explosives to be used by them in assas-
sination efforts.,, While it is, of course, possible that such information
was passed orally to some or all of the members of the Special Group,
and perhaps even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no
documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware which would
establish this to be the case.
On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower Administration,
Consul General Dearborn was advised that approval had been givei1
for supplying arms and other material to the Dominican dissidents.
(Cable, HQ. to Station, 1/19/61) Shortly thereafter, Dearborn in.
formed the Special Assistant that the dissidents were "delighted"
about the decision to deliver "exotic equipment." (Cable, Dearborn tp
Special Assistant, 1/31/61)
6. JANUARY 20, 1961-APRIL 17, 1961 (THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
THROUGH THE BAY OF PIGS)
On January 20, the Kennedy Administration took office. Three
of the four members of the Special Group (all except Allen Dulles)
retired.
1 Various CIA cables, including those dealing with the sniper rifles, indicate that
copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulies.
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Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 1.7, 1961,
a number of significant events occurred. These events included i iee.t-
ings with Dominican dissidents in which specific assassination 'lans
were discussed, requests by dissidents for explosive devices, the pas-
sage by United States officials of pistols and carbines to dissidel t s in-
side the Dominican Republic and the pouching to the Dominica, Re-
public of machine guns which had been requested by the dissidents for
use in connection with an assassination attempt.' These events ar+m dis-
cussed below under subheading (a).
Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of these event. pos-
sessed by senior American officials is treated thereafter. As used btnrein,
"senior American officials" means individuals in the White House or
serving as members of the Special Group.
(a) Specific events indirectly linking United States to dissiriients'
assassination plans
(i) Assassination Discussions and Requests for Explosives
At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City on Feb-
ruary 10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly by disc ident
leaders that "the key to the success of the plot. [to overthro+k; the
Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of Trujillo." (CIA N1emo
for the Record, 2/13/61) Among the requests made of the CIA by
dissident leaders were the following :
(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute the death of
Trujillo.
(b) Cameras and other items that could be used to fire. pro-
j ectiles.
(c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on tho palm
of one's h and and transferred to Trujillo in a handshake, c:i using
delayed lethal results.
(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a distance of sev-
eral miles. (Id.)
Other methods of assassinating Trujillo proposed by dissidents at the
February 10 or February 15 meetings included poisoning Trin_ji lo's
food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, and attacking, , him
with firearm and grenades. (CIA Memos for the Record, 2/13/61,
2/16/61)2
The dissidents' "latest plot," as described in the February CIA
memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerful Bomb,
which could be detonated from a nearby electric device, along the
route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)
On March 13 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republic asked
for fragmentation grenades "for use during the next week or so."
This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters on Mai oh 14,
1961, and was followed the next day by an additional regw,A for
50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid-fire weapons, and 10 64-mm.. anti-
guns was denied i,nd the guns were never passed.
2There Is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to any or these requosts and
th" CIA officer drafted the Februa 13 Memorandum
the questions raisedoby the dissidents did not require an answertated the view that some of
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tank rockets. This further request was also passed on to CIA Head-
quarters. (Cable, Station to HQ, 3/15/61) There is no evidence that
any of these arms were supplied to the dissidents.
The documentary record makes clear that the Special Assistant at
the State Department was also advised of related developments in a
March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complained that
his spirits were in the doldrums because :
* * * the members of our club are now prepared in their minds to have a
picnic but do not have the ingredients for the salad. Lately they have devel-
oped a plan for the picnic, which just might work if they could find the proper
food. They have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more, and we are not
prepared to make them available. Last week we were asked to furnish three
or four pineapples for a party in the near future, but I could remember noth-
ing in my instructions that would have allowed me to contribute this ingredient.
Don't think I wasn't tempted. I have rather specific guidelines to the effect that
salad ingredients will be delivered outside the picnic grounds and will be brought
to the area by another club. (Letter, Dearborn to Special Assistant, 3/16/16)
After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests in
the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn concluded dur-
ing his testimony before the Committee that the "pineapples" were
probably the requested fragmentation grenades and the restriction
on delivering salad ingredients outside of the picnic grounds was, al-
most certainly, meant to refer to the requirement, of the January 12
Special Group decision that arms be delivered outside the Dominican
Republic. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, pp. 25-27)
(ii) The Passage of Pistols
(1) Pouching to the Dominican Republic
In a March 15, 1961 cable, a Station officer reported that Dearborn
had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue to several dissidents.
In reply, Headquarters cabled : "Regret no authorization exists to
suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms," and indicated
that their reply had been coordinated with State. (Cable, HQ to Sta-
tion, 3/17/61) The Station officer then asked Headquarters to seek
the necessary authorization and noted that at his last two posts he
had received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and, there-
fore, he knew it could be done. (Cable, Station to HQ, 3/21/61) Two
days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were
being pouched. However, the Station was instructed not to advise
Dearborn. (Cable, HQ to Station, 3/24/61). 1
(2) Reason for the CIA instruction not to tell Dearborn
A Station officer testified that he believed the "don't tell Dearborn
the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending
of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be
unnecessarily discussed. (Didier, 7/8/75, pp. 78, 79) Dearborn said
he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew the Station had
no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/20/75, p. 33).
1 The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events,
concludes that :
"There is no indication in the EM/DEED operational files that the pistols were actually
pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request
for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 80)
This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters
to Station cable, which provides :
`Pouching revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do
not advise (name Dearborn deleted) this material being pouched. Explanation follows."
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(3) Were the pistols related to assassination?
Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes
completely unrelated to any assassination activity. (Dearborn, 7/29/
75, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican
contact who lived in a remote area and who was concerned for the
safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearbol?a testi-
fied that he. had believed the man's fears were well-founded a ad had
promised to seek a pistol.,
Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols
to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 196:1, CIA memor andum,
unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that twi m of the
three pistol;; were passed by a Station officer to it United Stater citizen
who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident
group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently
conducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether
one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols evc-ntually
came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they wore used
in connection with the assassination, remain open questions.
Both Dearborn and the Station officer testified that they i?+,garded
the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and that they never
considered them to be connected, in any way, with the there current
assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 70; Didier, 7/8/75., pp. 38,
73) However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired a: to the
purpose fo: which the handguns were sought and the Station's cable
stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to di sidents.
(Cable, Station to HQ, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961, cable ad-
vising that the pistols were being pouched was sent in response to a
request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an w!~assina-
tion effort. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that
little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing
these weapons to would-be assassins.
(iii) Passing of the Carbines
(1) Request by the Station and by Dearborn and approval by CIA
In a March 26, 1961, cable to CIA Headquarters, the Stati,n asked
for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber M1 ~ ?arbines.
The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy oxsonnel
after the United States interrupted formal diplomatic relations in
August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concern ?d in the
proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn, 7/29/75.
pp. 42, 43) On March 31, 1961, CIA Headquarters cabled approval of
the request to pass the carbines. (Cable, IIQ to Station, 3/31/61)
(2) Were the carbines related to assassination?
The carbines were passed to the action group contact on April 7,
1961. (Cable, HQ to Station. 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their
way into the hands of one of the assassins. Antonio de la Maza.. (Cable,
Station to HQ, 4/26/61; I.G. Reports, pp. 4:6, 49) Both Dearborn
I Dearborn lr. clear in his recollection that he asked the station officer to n ,quest only
one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/2'0/75, pp. 30, 31) The station officer on the other hand, testified
that ifhis cal?les requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must har ,'' asked for
three pistols. (Did-ter 7/8/75, p. 72)
The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package. (Cables, HHQ !o Station,
3/21/81, 3/'24/81) and Dearborn testified that, what he believed to be ttlw one gun,
came "wrappitd up" and that he passed it. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, p. 30)
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and a Station officer testified that the carbines were at all times viewed
as strictly a token show of support, indicating United States support
of the dissidents' efforts to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn, 7/29/75,
pp. 46-48; Didier, 7/8/75, p. 39)
(3) Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials in Washington
There is no indication that the request or the passage of the car-
bines was disclosed to State Department officials in Washington until
several weeks after the passage. In fact, on April 5, Headquarters re-
quested its Station to ask Dearborn not to comment in correspondence
with State that the carbines and ammunition were being passed to the
dissidents. This cable was sent while a Station officer was in Washing-
ton, and it indicated that upon his return to the Dominican Republic,
he would explain the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had
not commented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence
with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Cable, Station
to HQ, 4/6/61)
Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his
April 6 cable, that someone in the State Department had been con-
sulted in advance and had approved the passage of the carbines.
(Dearborn, 7/29/75, p. 44)
(iv) Requests for and Pouching of the Machine Guns
(1) Requests for Machine Guns
The Station suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an
M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961. (Didier, 7/8/75, pp. 63, 64;
cable, Station to HQ, 3/15/61) The request was raised again in
March but no action was taken. On March 20, 19612 the Station cabled
a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying
their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar
means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or
transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Cable, Station to
HQ, 3/20/61)
The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified,
in the Station cable, as being sought for use in connection with an
attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the
apartment of his mistress and, according to the Station cable :
To do they need five M3 or comparable machine guns, and 1500 rounds ammo,
for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job.
(Id.)
In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination
was wrong. The Station was told that precipitous or uncoordinated
action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and
the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solu-
tions." It was Headquarters' position that :
* * * we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents
until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support [assassination] 1
effect a change in the regime, and cope with the aftermath, (Cable, HQ, to
Station, 3/24/61)
The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver
machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed
1 Word supplied by CIA previously sanitized cable.
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it capability to receive them, but that security considerations precluded
use of United States facilities as a carrier.' Soon thereafi.er, on
April 6, 1961, while a station officer was in Washington for coasulta-
tion with hleadquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican
Republic and :
* * * especially on the insistence of the mMOTH (dissident] leaders that they
be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (spe-
cifically, five M3 .45 SMG's) (CIA Memo for the Record, 4/11/61)
(2) Pouching of Machine Gum Approved by Bissell
On April 7, 1961 a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and. Certi-
fication was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four 11'13 ma-
chine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority ba ~.is for
issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection." ( Pouch
Restriction 1 '1'aiver Request, 4/7/61)
The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, 'Western Hemisphere
Division, _fui. ther provided :
A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the
action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important
group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determina-
tion to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took
the form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited
arms and assistance to them provided they develop the capability to ret. ve it.
Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets
capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels
such as air drops or sea infiltration. (Id.)
The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as D1.)P, on
A ril '10, 1961. (Id.)
Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, issued a memorandum,
also on April 10, which stated :
Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets or arms in the Dominicsin Re-
public taken without his approval. (Elder Memo, 4/10/61')
The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not then know
that an air drop of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that conse-
quently pouching of the arms had been approved.
The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and
were received by the Station on April 19, 1961.3 (LG. Report, p. 42;
Cable, Statiol to HQ, 4/19/61)
(b) Knowledge of senior American officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)
On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons, but a it month
after the generalized approval of the passage of arms by the prior
Administration, a meeting of the Special Group was held with Messrs.
McNamara, (Ailpatric, Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell and General
Cabell in attendance.
The minutes state that :
1 This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and
ammunition were being pouched.
'Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigsshot i dnvasios-n or
on of
Cuba, was intends to make sure that there were "no unusual lanes
any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic" prior to the Cpuba invasion, r Sider,
8/13/75, p. 51)
' Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns never passed
into the hands of the dissidents.
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203
Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the
new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by.the predeces-
sor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which
antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue. (Special
Group Minutes, 2/14/61)
In the course of the discussion, the following point, among others,
was made :
Dominican Republic--Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for
higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor govern-
ment to Trujillo. (Id.)
The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Dominican Re-
public had been one of the matters on which Dulles and Bissell briefed
the new members.
What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as it is unclear
from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to which the Special
Group was informed concerning the means by which the 'dissidents
planned to 'accomplish the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Spe-
cifically, it is not known if the new members of the Special Group
were told that the dissident group had expressed the desire to assas-
sinate Trujillo. Nar is it known if the Special Group was advised
that the State Department representative in the Dominican Republic
had made the assessment that the Dominican government could,
ould not
be overthrown without the assassination of Trujillo.
Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection of the details of
the February 14 briefing and he was unable to say whether or not
the method of overthrow to be attempted by the dissidents was dis-
cussed. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 101, 102) Robert McNamara, one of
the new members of the Special Group in attendance for the briefing,
had no recollection as to the specificity in which the Dominican Re-
public was discussed at the February 14 meeting. He did not recall
any mention by either Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassi-
nate Trujillo. (McNamara affidavit, 7/11/75)
February memoranda
The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum on Feb-
ruary 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning progress to assure
an orderly takeover "should Trujillo fall." The memorandum advised
that:
Our representatives in the Dominican Republic have, at considerable risk
to those involved, established contacts with numerous leaders of the under-
ground opposition * * * [and] * * * the CIA has recently been authorized to
arrange for delivery to them outside the Dominican Republic of small arms
and sabotage equipment. (Memo, Rusk to President Kennedy, 5/15/61)
This reference to recent authorization for delivery of arms indi-
cates that Secretary Rusk had received some briefing concerning events
in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961 Special Group deci-
sion to provide arms to anti-Trujillo elements. Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary
William Coerr; and the Special Assistant continued in their respective
positions throughout the transition period. The Committee has
been furnished no documents indicaatin that Secretary Rusk or
Under Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to the inten-
tions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions of which
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the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly had knowledge. In-
deed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was not personally so adv sed.
(Rusk 7/10/75, pp. 41,42)
On'ebruar , 17 1961, Richard Bissell sent. a briefing paper ofn the
Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's
National Security Advisor. The paper, requested by Bundy for "higher
authority," made note of the outstanding Special Group.approva for
the provision of arms and equipment to Dominican dissidents, and
stated that the dissidents had been informed that the United Slates
was prepared to provide such arms and equipment as soon as they
developed the capability to receive them.
The briefing paper also indicated that dissident leaders ha+l in-
formed CIA of "their plan of action which theyfelt could be imple-
mented if the3 were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives., and
remote control detonation devices." Various witnesses have testified,
however, that. supplying arms for 300 men would, standing. alone,
indicate a "non-targeted" use for the arms (i.e., a paramilitary or
revolutionary implementation as opposed to a specifically targeted
assassination use). (Bissell, 7/29/75, p. 80)
Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that :
* * * it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the time of the memorand9im to
Mr. Bundy that these dissident groups were, and had for a long time, been
hoping they could accomplish the assassination of Trujillo. As a matter o;? fact,
the request, sine' some seven or eight months earlier, was a perfectly clee ~ indi-
cation of that, 5,) that fact was not new knowledge. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 1e2)
When asked why the memorandum did not include the fact that
the. dissidents,, intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissell replied:
I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not remember what considerations !roved
me. I don't know whether it was because this was common knowledge rnd it
seemed to me unnecessary to include it, or as you are implying, then- was
an element of concealment here. I would be very surprised if it were the tatter,
in this case. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 101)
In response to questions concerning the' lack of information in the
February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to which tlie re-
quested arms might likely be put by the dissidents, Bissell stated.:
* * * I would say that the Agency's failure, if there be a failure here was; [not]
to state in writing that the plans of the dissidents would Include assassination
attempts. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 99)
Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the assessment
that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo and the internal
opposition, `which will end either with the liquidation of Trujillo
and his cohorts or with a completeroll up of the internal oppo: ition."
In this regard, the fear was expressed that existing schedules for the
delivery of weapons to the internal opposition might not be sufTh iently
timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be given
to caching the requested arms and other materials. (Memo, Bissell to
Bundy, 2/17/61)
Thus, by the middle of February 1961, the senior members of the
new Administration (and in view of the "for higher authority" !nature
of Bundy's request, presumably President Kennedy himself' were
aware of the outstanding Special Group approval for the pass ige of
arms and other materials to opposition elements within the Domini-
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can Republic. There was no modification or recision of the "inherited"
Special Group approval and it would seem fair, therefore, to regard
the approval as having been at least acquiesced in by the new
Administration.
During March and early April 1961, operational levels within both
the CIA and the State Department learned of increasingly detailed
plans by the dissidents to assassinate Trujillo. There is no evidence
that this information was passed to the White House or to any
member of the Special Group, except Allen Dulles., Similarly, there
is no evidence that the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the
pouching of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was dis-
closed to anyone outside of the CIA during this period.2
7. APRIL 17, 1961-MAY 31, 1981 (BAY OF PIGS THROUGH TRUJILLO
ASSASSINATION)
Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts were
made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican Republic to
dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassination attempt. These
efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo were the result of instruc-
tions from CIA Headquarters and were prompted by concern over
filling the power vacuum which would result from Trujillo's death.
The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but permis-
sion to pass them to the dissidents was never given and the guns never
left the Consulate.
Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a contin-
gency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.
The day before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received a cable
of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy. The cable ad-
vised that the United States must not run the risk of association with
political assassination, since the United States, as a matter of gen-
eral policy, could not condone assassination. The cable further advised
Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of material assistance to the
dissidents and to advise them of United States support for them if
they were successful in overthrowing the Trujillo government. The
cable also reconfirmed the decision not to pass the machine guns.
(a) Decision not to pass the machine guns and unsuccessful United
States attempt to stop assassination effort
By April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had failed. As a result,
there developed a general realization that precipitous action should
be avoided in the Dominican Republic until Washington was able
to give further consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo over-
throw and the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11/75,
p. 113) A cable from Headquarters to the Station, on April 17, 1961,
advised that it was most important that the machine guns not be
passed without additional Headquarters approval.
i Copies of CIA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable describing the plan to
assassinate Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress, were apparently sent to the office
of the Director of Central Intelligence.
9 Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols were being pouched was
sent to the Director's office, Dulles apparently did not receive copies of the cables
approving passage of the carbines or pouching of the machine guns.
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The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic on April. 19,
1961, and He:dquarters was so advised. The earlier admonition that
the machine guns should be held in Station custody until further notice
was repeated in a second cable from Headquarters, sent April 20,
1961. This decision was said to have been "based on judgment that
filling a vacuum created by assassination now bigger question than
ever view un$ettled conditions in Caribbean area." (Cable, H?) to
Station, 4/20/(i)
The dissidents continued to press for the release of the machine
guns and their requests were passed on to Headquarters in cables from
Dearborn and from the Station. (Cables, Station to HQ, 4/25/61) On
April 25, 1961., the Station advised Headquarters that an AmeF ican
living in the Dominican Republic and acting as a cut-out to the +dii.ssi-
dents had informed the Station that Antonio de la Maza was going to
attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2. The Station
also reported that this attempt would use the three carbines passed
from the American Consulate, together with whatever else was avail-
able. (Id.)
In response to the April 25 cable, Headquarters restated that. there
was no approi,al to pass any additional arms to the dissidents an.tl re-
quested the Station to advise the dissidents that the United States was
simply not prepared at that time to cope with the aftermath of the
assassination. (See C/S comments. Cable, Station to HQ, 4/27/61)
The following day, April 27, 1961, the Station replied that, based +.pon
further discussions with the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S.
government not now prepared to cope with aftermath will dissaade
them from attempt." (Cable, Station to HQ, 4/27/61)
Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that an effort be made to turn
off the assassiiation attempt and testified that efforts to carry oi;;d., the
instructions were unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him
that this was t heir affair and it could not be turned off to suit the con-
venience of the United States government. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, p.. 52)
On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the dissi-
dents had reported to him the assassination attempt was going to take
place during the first week of May. The action group was reported to
have in its possession three carbines, four to six 12-guage shotgutn, and
other small arms. Although they reportedly still wanted the machine
guns, Dearborn n advised Headquarters that the group was going t o go
ahead with what they had, whether the United States wanted them to
or not. (Cable, Station to HQ, 4/30/61)
Dearborn's cable set forth the argument of the action group that,
since the United States had already- assisted the group to some e ;tent
and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance of releasin the
machine guns would not change the basic relationship. The cable con-
cluded :
Owing to far-reaching political implications involved in release or non-rz lease
of requested items, Headquarters may wish discuss foregoing with sta? De-
partment. (Id.)
Beginning with Dearborn's April 30 cable, there was a fi.irly
constant stream of cables and reports predicting Trujillo's imminent
assassination. Certain of these reports predicted the specific date or
dates on which. the assassination would be attempted, while others
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spoke of the attempt being made at the first propitious opportunity. In
addition to cables sent directly to CIA Headquarters, the substance
of these assassination forecasts was circulated throughout the intelli-
gence community and the higher echelons of the government in the
form of intelligence bulletins. These bulletins did not, however, con-
tain references to any United States involvement in the assassination
planning.
As a result of these reports, Robert Kennedy had a discussion with
Allen Dulles, apparently sometime in the early part of May, and
thereafter "looked into the matter." (June 1, 1961, dictated notes of
Robert F. Kennedy.)' Robert Kennedy reportedly called the Presi-
dent and it was "decided at that time that we'd put a task force on
the problem and try to work out some kind of alternative course of
action in case this event did occur." Robert Kennedy's notes state
that at the time he called the President, "He [the President] had
known nothing about it [the reports of Trujillo's imminent assassi-
tion]." (Id.)
There is no record as to the specificity with which Allen Dulles
discussed the matter of Trujillo's predicted assassination with Robert
Kennedy. Dulles was, of course, fully informed at this time both
as to the relationship between State Department and CIA represent-
atives in the Dominican Republic and the dissidents planning Tru-
jillo's removal, and, also, of the weapons which had been furnished
to the dissidents and those which they were then requesting for use
in connection with the assassination effort.
(b) Further consideration of passing machine guns
In response to Dearborn's cable, a cable was drafted at CIA Head-
quarters authorizing passage of the machine guns. The cable which
was sent to Allen Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dis-
patch, provided :
Since it appears that opposition group has committed itself to action with
or without additional support, coupled with fact ref. C items [the carbines]
already made available to them for personal defense ; station authorized pass
ref. A items [the machine guns] to opposition member for their additional pro-
tection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft Cable, HQ to Station, 5/2/61)
The cable was never sent.
In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characterized his
reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns as
* * * having made already a considerable investment in this dissident group
and its plans that we might as well make the additional investment. (Bissell,
7/22/75,p.127)
The following day, May 3, 1961, the Deputy Chief of the Western
Hemisphere Division of dIA, who frequently acted as liaison with the
State Department in matters concerning covert operations in the
Dominican Republic, met with Adolph Berle, Chairman of the Inter-
agency Task Force on Latin America.
A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that the CIA officer
informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republic wished
1 These notes were dictated by Robert Kennedy on June 1, 1961, after he learned of
Trujillo's assassination.
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to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose. The memo-
randum continued:
on cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Tru-
jillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. [The CIA officer] wanted to :now
what the policy should be.
I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the geaieral
sentiment. But we did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination
plots anywhere, roily time. [The CIA officer] said he felt the same way. (iterle,
Memo of Convera! Lion, 5/3/61)
Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent. to Wymberly Coerr. the
Acting Assistant Secretary for hater-American Affairs, and to the
Special Assistatt.
Both the CTA officer and the Special Assistant-, who had bera in
almost daily contact with each other since August of 1960, had teen
advised of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact the
CIA officer, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed cable
of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.
(c) Special group meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961
On the day following the Berle-CIA officer meeting, the Special
Group met and, according to the Minutes :
The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot. He sail we
never know if one of these is going to work or not, sand asked what is the status
of contingency planning should the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this Joint
is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed at a high level in tb very
near future. (Special Group Minutes, 5/4/61)
Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes crakes
subsequent analysis as to the scope. of matters discussed specule t.ive.
It is not known to what extent and in what. detail Allen Dulle ; re-
ferred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo plot. Certainly., the
most recent report, of such a plot was Dearborn's April 30 cable -dis-
closing an imminent assassination attempt potentially utilizing JJi ited
States-supplied weapons.
On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the situation
in the Dominican Republic and, according to the Minutes:
. Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the
release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Re-
public. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these: arms
should not be pessed. The members showed no inclinatioh to take a coiatrary
position at this time. (Special Group Minutes, 5/18/61)'
(d) Fi.na requests by dissidents for ma.clivne gums
On May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department (attention
Acting Assist.snt Secretary Coerr) with an urgent request from the
dissidents for the machine guns. The cable advised that the asses cinn-
tion attempt was-scheduled for the night of May 16 and that, while the
chances of suc cess were 80 percent, provision of the machine uns
would reduce the possibility of failure. The dissidents repo edly
1 There was no meeting of the 8oeefal Group at w itch the Dominican Republ9.k was
discussed between :'Siam 4 and May 18. The language attributed to General Cabe]] as to
whether the feeltbig of the Qroup remained not to pass the arms. tends to suggest
that the question o? passing these arms must have been raised prior to the May is tiroup
meeting, perhaps at: the May 4, 1961 meeting,
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stressed to Dearborn that if the effort failed, due to United States re-
fusal to supply the machine guns, the United States would be held
responsible and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he
had informed the dissidents that., based on his recent conversations in
Washington, he was reasonably certain that authorization could not
be obtained for handing over machine gun. (Cable, Dearborn to De-
partment, 5/16/61)
A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent the
same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him to con-
tinue to take the same line until he received contrary instructions
which clearly indicated they had been cleared in advance by the State
Department* itself. This cable from State was approved by Under
Secretary Bowles. (Cable, Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)
An officer in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division referred to
Dearborn's May 16 request in a memorandum he sent to the Special
Assistant on the same date and asked to be advised as to the Depart-
ment's policy concerning passage of the machine guns. The CIA
officer noted that when this request was last taken to the Department,
Berle made the decision that the weapons not be passed. ((Memo to
ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)
Devine responded to the CIA officer's memorandum on the same day,
advising him that the Department's policy continued to be negative
on the matter of passing the machine guns.l The CIA officer's atten-
tion was directed to the January 12,1961 Special Group limitation con-
cerning the passage of arms outside of the Dominican Republic. A
copy of the Special Assistant's memorandum to the CIA officer was
forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State, to the atten-
tion of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott. (Memo, Special Assistant
to [CIA officer], 5/16/61)
(e) Dearborn in Washington for consultation-drafting of
contingency plans
At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961, the
question of United States policy toward the Dominican Republic was
considered and it was :
Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency
and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in
Haiti or the Dominican Republican. Noted the President's view that the United
States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what govern-
ment would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multi-
lateral. (Record of Actions by National Security Council, 5/5/61) (Approved by
the President, 5/16/61)2
Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was recalled to
Washington to participate in drafting of these contingency plans and
recommendations. Dearborn was in Washington at least from May 10
through May 13,1961.
1 By May 27, 1961, Dearborn was advising the State Department that the group was
no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that it must make do with what
it had. (Cable, Dearborn to State, 5/27/61)
2 As noted supra, p. 207, the President. prior to his May 16 approval of the NSC Record
of Actions, had been informed by Robert Kennedy of the reports that Trujillo might
be assassinated. Richard Goodwin of the White House staff had also received, prior to
May 16, a CIA memorandum which disclosed that Dominican die idents, intending to
'neutralize" Trujillo, had been supplied by the U.S. with certaiTt weapons and had
sought further weapons.
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While in Wrc.shington, Dearborn met with. State Department per-
sonnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger of the
White House 4aff. When testifying before the Committee, he was
unable to recall the substance of his discussions with Goodwin and
Schlesinger, aside from his general assumption that the current situa-
tion in the Dominican Republic was discussed. He did not recall any
discussion with Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those
which had been passed to the dissidents or those which were being
sought. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, pp. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at
the White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin
had been reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Domini-
can. Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood.
(Dearborn, 7/29/75, p. 62)
On May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft document
which set forth ways in which the U.S. could overtly aid and-enc.our-
age the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted that means of stepping
up the covert program were considered in separate papers. ('Dearborn
draft document of May 11, 1961) This Dearborn. draft of May 11,
19611, was appa rently used as a basis for portions of the "GDominw ican
Republic-Contingency Paper" discussed below.
Two documents entitled, `Program of Covert Action for the Dornin-
ican Republic;' were provided to the Committee staff from State De-
partment files. Each appears to be a draft of the covert activities
paper describedin Dearborn'sMa 11, 1961 memorandum. One draft
recommended en expanded U.S. offer to deliver small explosive devices
and arms. (Document indicating it was attached Ito "Dominican Re-
public-Contingency," dated 5/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308) The
other draft is very similar except that it concludes that delivery of
arms within the Dominican Republic to members of the underground
is not recommended. (Document from State Department files bearing
No. 310)
Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which the
Special Assistantbelieves he wrote. It listed eight numbered points in-
eluding the following :
1. The U'SG sh,,uld not lend itself to direct political assassination.
2. U.S. moral posture can ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the mrld.
3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying the weapons, effectiras the
delivery, and then turning over only the final execution to (unskilled) local
triggermen.
4. So far we hti ve seen no real evidence of action capability. Should we entrust
ourselves and our reputation to this extent in the absence thereof?
7. Can we afford a precedent which may convince the world that our diplomatic
ponnches are used to deliver assassination weapon? (Document from the state
Department files bearing No. 313)
The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the likelihood
that any such involvement by the United States would ultimately be
rev aaied.
On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to t nder
Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Programt'. Au-
thorized With Respect to the Dominican Republic." That docionent
outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert assistan a to
Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommendation as to
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further policy, suggested that the Special Group review the outstand-
ing approvals and communicate to interested agencies the status of
such authorizations. (State Dept. document from Coerr to Bowles,
5/15/61)
During this period a document dated Ma 13, 1961, was prepared at
the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereafter circul-ated within
the State Department.' This document, entitled "Program of Covert
Action for the Dominican Republic" reported :
CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo, a very
limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requests from
the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their
projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three
(3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means
to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed
support.
This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to anyone
on the White House staff of. the fact that arms had been passed to dis-
sidents in the Dominican Republic.
The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above quoted
material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize" is underscored.
Goodwin testified before the Committee that he circled the above para-
graph when first reading the memorandum because the information
concerning passage of the arms was new to him and struck him as
significant. (Goodwin, 7/18/75, pp 48, 49)
Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which Require
Additional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicated
that the CIA had a supply of four.45 caliber machine guns and a small
number of grenades currently in the direct custody of the Station in
Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing these weapons to
the internal opposition "for their use in personal defense attendant to
their projected efforts to remove Trujillo" could be developed by the
Station. The memorandum made no recommendation to approve or
disapprove passage of these weapons. (Id.
On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another memoran-
dum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and Contingency
Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been received by Bundy from
the State Department. Attached was an underlying document which
began:
Recent reports indicate that the internal Dominican dissidents are becoming
increasingly determined to oust Trujillo by any means, and their plans in this
regard are well advanced.
The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirable for
the United States to be identified with and to support the elements
seeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachment recommended that Con-
sul General Dearborn inform the dissidents that if they succeed "at
their own initiative and on their own responsibility in forming an
acceptable provisional government they can be assured that any rea-
sonable request for assistance from the U.S. will be promptly and
favorably answered." (Documents from State Dept. files bearing Nos.
279-286)
1 See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy of Goodwin
memorandum.
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(f) Cable of May 29,1961
A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requesting urgew State
Department guidance, was forwarded to Richard Goodwin. :1t the
specific request of Goodwin, the State Department replied to Dear-
born on May 17, and advised him to keep in mind the President' view,
as expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, ti tat the
United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo efore
knowing what government would succeed him. (Cable, Departxa gent to
Dearborn, 5,/17/61)
Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, Pointing out that for )ver a
year State Department representatives in the Dominican Republic
had been nurturing the effort to overthrow Trujillo and had iv;sisted
the dissidents in numerous ways, all of which were known to the De-
partment. It was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether
United State's will initiate overthrow of Trujillo." Dearborn invited
:fitrther guidance from State.
In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State Depart-
ment drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a conflict b, -tween
two objectives :
ii) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit: among
DR dissidents n nd liberal elements throughout Latin America ;
(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic
and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.
It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that "a`ormer
objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter." (Draft Cable,
Department to Dearborn, 5/24/61-not sent)
This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary
Bowles with the comment that Goodwin considered it "too negative"
and that he vw ould try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present omor-
row morning." (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61)
A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy 'begins
Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meet-
ing of the Spe44al Group, I am forwarding you s draft telegram which wir would
like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supple-
menting the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved coni'angency
p) sa ns.
The minutes of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961, do not,
however, reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic. If, as
Bowles' memorandum suggests, a discussion concerning the Damini-
can Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is not known wiaat the
discussion involved or what decisions, if any, were made.
Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to the pro-
posed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testified that it
was his intent in revising the cable to communicate to Dearborn. Presi-
dent Kennedy's personal belief that the United States "* * * didn't
want to do anything that would involve us further, the United States
further, in ;any effort to assassinate Trujillo." (Goodwin, 7.;10/75,
32)
I At the same time, Goodwin's draft raised the issue of further covert
action and transfer of arms to the dissidents and advised Dearborn to
hold out the arms as being available to the dissidents pending their
ability to receive them.
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It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised by. Goodwin, (1) to
express the desire to remain in the good graces of the dissidents who, it
was believed, would constitute the new government following Trujillo's
assassination, and (2) to avoid any action which might further involve
the United States in the anticipated assassination. This dual purpose
is clearly evident in the cable which advised :
* * * we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since
U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principal
is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. (Emphasis added)
* * * * * *
Continue to inform dissident elements of. U.S. support for their position.
According to Goodwin, the italicized material was inserted in the
cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy. (Goodwin,
7/10/75, pp. 22, 23)
With respect to the four machine guns which were in the Consulate
and which had been repeatedly requested by the dissidents, the cable
advised Dearborn that the United States was unable to transfer these
arms to the dissidents. Dearborn was instructed
Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be
unsafe. In actual fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little
purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassi-
nation attempt.
The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Ken-
nedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (Cable, Department to
Dearborn, 5/29/61)
(a) Trujillo assassinated
Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and
assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassina-
tion closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to
American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on
to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department.
(Cable, Dearborn to Department, 4/30/61) The assassination was con-
ducted by members of the action group, to whom the American car-
bines had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available
indicates that one or more of the carbines was in the possession of the
assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I.G. Report, pp. 60-61)
This evidence indicates, however, that the actual assassination was
accomplished by handguns and shotguns. (I.G. Report, p. 61)
(b) Cables to Washington
After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul
General Dearborn and the CIA Station sent replies. According to
Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change
in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn,
7/29/75, p. 74)
He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying :
* * * we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate Trujillo, that is all right.
But we don't want anything to pin this on us, because we aren't doing it, it is
the Dominicans who are doing it. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, p. 104)
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Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always
been his per ,oral belief : that the U.S. should not be involved in an
assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be si rictly
a Dominican affair. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, pp. 100--101)
In contrast, the CIA Station officer did regard the cable a mani-
festing a charge in U.S. policy, particularly on the question of supply-
ing arms. (Didier, 7/8/75, p. 120) He believed the May 29 cab'e was
the final word in United States policy on this matter and consequently
felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of
offering material support to the dissidents, and had adopted c new
position of withholding such support. His responsive cable to ![lead-
quarters state ed :
HQ aware extent to which U.S. government already associated with as! :,tssina-
tion. If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in
assassination preparation must be withdrawn. (Cable, Station to HQ, 5/30/61)
Immediately following the assassination, all CIA personnel in the
Dominican Republic were removed from the country and within a few
days Consul (eneral Dearborn was back in Washington. The Sta Le De-
partment cabled the CIA station in the Dominican Republic to 1, stray
all records concerning contacts with dissidents and any related in otters,
except not to destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable
to Dearborn. (Cable, HQ to Station, 5/31/61)
(c) Imarrzdiate post-assassination period
The United States Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick
to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated, and
the. United States communication's network transmitted the report to
President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary, Pierre
Salinger, rna+le the first public announcement of the assassinatio i, pre-
ceeding by se veral hours release of the news in the :Dominican Rel -ublic.
Secretary of State Rusk testified that when he learned of Sal nger's
announcement he was most concerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son
Ramfis was ,also in Paris and he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first
learning of his father's death from the press secretary to the President
of the United States, might reason that the United States had l:,een in
some way involved and he might therefore try to retaliate a ainst
President Kennedy. (Rusk, 7/10/75, pp. 32-33)
Following the assassination, there were several high-level meetings
in. Washingtan attended by President Kennedy, Vice President John-
son, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamar n, At-
torney General Kennedy, and many lower-level officials who 6 .11 been
involved in the Dominican Republic operation. The meetings consid-
ered the cris.i in the Dominican Republic, caused by Trujilldti assas-
si nation, and attempted to ascertain the facts concerning the de:ree of
tU nited States involvement in the assassination. The passage of carbines
to the dissidents was discussed at one such meeting. (State Department
Memorandum for the files, 6/1/61)
On June 1, 1961, Robert Kennedy dictated four pages of personal
notes reflecting his contemparaneous thoughts on the situation in the
Dominican Republic. A review of these notes evidences considerable
concern regarding the lack of information available in Washington
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as to events in the Dominican Republic.'- The notes end with the
following statement :
The great problem now is that we don't know what to do because we don't (sic)
what the situation is and this shouldn't be true, particularly when we have known
that this situation waS pending for some period of time.
There is no indication or suggestion contained in the record of
those post-assassination meetings, or in the Robert Kennedy notes, of
concern as to the propriety of the known United States involvement
in the assassination. Nor is there any record that anyone took steps
following Trujillo's assassination to reprimand or censure any of the
American officials involved either on the scene or in Washington, or
to otherwise make known any objections or displeasure as to the
degree of United States involvement in the events which had tran-
spired. Whether this was due to the press of other matters, including
concern over Trujillo's successor and the future government of the
Dominican Republic, or whether it represented a condonation or rati-
fication of the known United States involvement, is uncertain.
In any event, when, some years later, the project covering American
involvement in changing the government of the Dominican Republic
was terminated by the Agency, the project was described in Agency
documents as a "success" in that it assisted in moving the Dominican
Republic from a totalitarian dictatorship to a Western-style
democracy.
1Robert Kennedy's concern, immediately following the assassination, with the Agency's
inability to provide first-hand information from the Dominican Republic as to popular
support for the anti-Trujillo group the extent of fighting, if any, in the country, and
the likelihood of the dissidents seizing control of the country, was also discussed in a
1962 CIA report.
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1. SUMMARY
South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo
Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese generals on
November 2, 1963. Evidence. before the Committee indicates that the
United States government offered encouragement for the coup, but
neither desired nor was involved in the assassinations. Rather, Diem's
assassination appears to have been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese
generals, engendered by anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put
himself in the custody of the leaders of the coup.
On one occasion, General Duonq Van Minh ("Big Minh") outlined
to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and another brother,
Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being considered for changing
the government in the near future. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
and Deputy Chief of Mission William Trueheart 1 were informed of
this possibility by the Saigon Chief of Station, who recommended that
"we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot,
since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a
protracted struggle which would rip the Army and the country
assunder." (CIA cable, Saigon Station to DCI. 10/5/63) Upon being
informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated "[w]e
cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting as-
sassination," and the second directed that the recommendation be with-
drawn because "we cannot be in position actively condoning such
course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefor."
(CIA cable, DCI to Saigon, 10/5/63; CIA cable, DCI to Saigon,
10/6/63)
2. THE ABORTIVE COUP OF AUGUST 1963
On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Hue fired
on Buddhists celebratinL Buddha's 'birthday (and carrying the Bud-
dhist flag contrary to edicts proscribing the flying of religious flags)
killing nine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nation-
wide Buddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in the
Diem regime.2
On May 18, United States Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting met
with Diem and outlined steps which the United States desired him to
take to redress the Buddhist grievances and recapture public confi-
I'Trueheart is currently a consultant to the Select Committee.
2 Senator Gravel Edition The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Department History of
United States Decision-tusking on Vietnam. pp. 207-208. Volume II, Beacon Press. Boston
bassy(hereinnafter Meck in, in his book. Mi sion Public Affairs An1Inti ate Account of
the U.S. Role in Vietnam. Doubleday and Company, 1965 (hereinafter cited as Mecklin),
at pages 158-60 described the vulnerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration
during this period noting that it "offered a classic opportunity for a Communist sleeper
play."
(217)
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deuce. These steps included admitting responsibility for the Hue in-
cident, compensating the victims, and reaffirming religious equality
in the country. On June 8, Madame Nhu, the wife of Diem's brother,
Nhu, publicly accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Com-
munist agents. Trueheart, in the absence of Ambassador Nolting; pro-
tested her remarks to Diem and threatened to disassociate the T Tnited
States from any repressive measures against the Buddhists in the fu-
ture. (Pentagon Papers, p. 308) Shortly thereafter, Madame Nh it com-
mented on the self-immolation of Quang Due and other Buddhist
monks by stating that she would like to furnish mustard for the monks'
barbecue. Or June 12, Trueheart told Diem that Quang Due's suicide
had shocked the world and again warned that the United States would
break with leis government if he did not solve the Buddhist problem.
(Pentagon Papers, p. 208)
Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon,' testified that the Buddhist
uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought down the, Diem
regime. (Conein, 6/20/75, pp. 42-44) These events led the United
States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering pressure on
Diem such as the United States has seldom before attempted with a
sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)
By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had agreed
on the necessity for a coup.2
In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Noltin g, Diem
agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to the Bud-
dhists. This statement took the form of an interview with the eelumn-
1st, Marguerite Higgins, in which Diem asserted that his policy toward
the Buddhists had always been conciliatory and asked for harmony and
support of the government.
Shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963, Nhu ordered forees loyal
to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting marl3.s and
sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were incurred and
1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise and
viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's promises to
Nolting. (Pentagon Papers, p. 210) 3
On August 24, 1963, the State Department sent a cable (Depte1243 )
to the new :ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. The tele-
gram was prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State Avere];.l Harri-
man, and was approved by President Kennedy. (Pentagon Payers, p.
235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take "prompt dramatic
actions" to redress the grievances of the Buddhists :
We must at same time also tell key military leaders that US woul?l find it
impossible to continue support GVN [South Vietnamese Government] militarily
and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize re-
1 Conein testified that he had known the generalq involved in the coup "f)r many
years. Some of them I had known back even in world war II. Some of then: were in
powerful positions, and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis, not as a
government official." (Conein, 6/20/75, p. 17.)
2 Conein's After-Action Report stated that : "The majority of the officers including
General Minh desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from te political
scene in Sout{t Vietnam ar d exile. As to Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, ?ltere was
never dissention. The attitude was that their deaths along with Madame Ngo 11+Snh Nhu,
would be welcomed." (Clonein After-Action Report, 11/1/63, p. 10.)
3Conein testified thhat the raids might have been timed to occur when no kmerican
Ambassador was in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few days before and his replacement,
Henry Cabot Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein, 6/20/75, p. 21).
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quires removal of the Nhus from the scene. We wish. give Diem reasonable
opportunity to remove Nhus but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to
accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also
tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any
interim period of breakdown central government mechanism * * *. Concurrently
with above, Ambassador and country teams should urgently examine all possible
alternative leadership and mtake detailed plans as to how we might bring about
Diem's replacement if this should be'come necessia ry.
A cable on August 25 reported the result of a conference among
a station representative, Lodge, Trueheart, General Harkins [Com-
mander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) ] and
General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243
"as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their
best to carry out instructions," (I.G. Report, C, p'p. 7-8) but believed
that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the
government.
Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in
South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids and
absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the
United States contemplated suspending aid to the South Vietnamese
Government.' (Pentagon Papers, p. 2112) Later on that same day,
Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officer Cbnein and
another CIA officer were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh,
respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but
to remind them that "We cannot be of any help during initial action
of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose."
(DCI to Saigon, 8/2'6/63) .
A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins
to confirm to the Vietnamese generals that the United States would
support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not
involve United States armed forces. Lodge was authorized to suspend
United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, 8/29/63) A cable
from the President to Lodge on the same day stated :
I have approved all the messages you are receiving from others today, and I
emphasize that everything in these messages has my full support. We will do
all that we can to help you conclude this operation suveessfully. Untdl the very
moinent of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a
contingent right to change course and reverse previous inStructionss. While fully
aware of your assessment of the consequences of such a reversal, I know from
experience that failure is more destructive than an appearance of indecislon.
I would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such change as I must also
bear the full 'responsibility for this operation and its consequences. (Cable,
President Kennedy to Lodge 8/29/63)
In a reply cable, Lodge stated :
1. I fully understand that you have the right and responsibility to change
course at any time. Of course I will always respect that right.
2. To be successful, this operation must be essentially a Vietnamese affair
with a momentum of its own. Should this happen you may not be able to control
it, i.e., the "go signal" may be given by the geneiaals. ('Gable, Lodge to President
Kennedy, 8/30/63)
I In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated
our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals' effort achiev-
ing surprise." Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter,
thus giving the kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman. 8/26/63).
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A cable from Saigon dated August 31,1963, stated :
This particular coup is finished. Generals did not feel ready and did not have
sufficient 1*14ance of forces. There is little doubt that GVN [South Vie namese
Government] aware US role and may have considerable detail. (CIA e able, Sta.
,to Hq. 8/31/63)
Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later relations
between the United States representatives and the generals. Bid; Minh,
who had initial doubts about the strength of American support, grew
in confidenc(,..
3. THE NOVEMBER 1963 CoiTP
American dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became increasingly
apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell, in a television
interview, stated that Congress might cut aid to South Vietnam if
the Diem government did not change its course. (Pentagon Papers,
p. 214) Lodge suggested a study to determine the most effectii-e. meth-
ods of cutting aid to topple the regime. (Pentagon Papers, p.
214) On September 12, with White House, approval, Senator Church
introduced a resolution in the Senate condemning the Soulli. Viet-
namese Government for its repressive handling of the Buddhist prob-
lem and calling for an end to United States aid unless the oppressive
measures were curtailed. (Pentagon Papers, pp. 214-215)
In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem were
considered by the Administration. The first contemplated increasingly
severe pressure to bring Diem in. line with American policy; the second
involved acquiescing in Diem's actions, recognizing that Diem and
Nhu were inseparable, and attempting to salvage as much as possible.
It was decided to adopt the first proposal, and to send Secretary of
Defense McNamara and General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to
Vietnam. (Pentagon Papers, p. 215)
On October 2, 13IcNamara and Taylor returned to Washington and
presented their findings to the National Security Council. Their re-
port confirmed that the military effort was progressing favorably, but
warned of the dangers inherent in the political turmoil and recom-
mended bringing pressure against Diem. This pressure would include
announcing the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops by the end of
the year, ending support for the forces responsible for the pagoda
raids, and continuing Lodge's policy of remaining aloof from the
regime. The report recommended against a coup, but suggested that
alternative leadership should be identified and cultivated. The recom-
mendations were promptly approved by the :President. (Pentagon
Papers, pp. 215-216)
On October 3, Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup
was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if
it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action one of which
was the assassination of Diem's brothers, Nhu and Can. (Conehn,
6/20/75, p. 25; cable, Saigon to Director, ].0/5/63) The Station
cabled on October 5 that it had recommended to Lodge thaf "we do
not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the
other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a pro-
tracted struggle." (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63)
1 The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units
and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyali~,t units.
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A cable from the CIA Director to Saigon responded that :
(W) e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or support-
ing assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stop-
ping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We
certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves
by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position
re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is
hands off. "However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan."'
McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the
Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was to assemble
all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report
it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it."
(McCone, 6/6/75, p. 62) He believed the United States should main-
tain a "hands off attitude." (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 62) McCone testified:
I felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had
great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring
all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support
throughout, the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember then
very clearly, was that "Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had
one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not." By
that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we
would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might
last several years and indeed it did. (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 62-M)
McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the Presi-
dent, but rather "whether we should let the coup go or use our influ-
ences not to." He left the meeting believing that the President agreed
with his "hands-off" recommendation. (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 62-63)
McCone cabled the Station on October 6:
McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning
assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position ac-
tively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility
therefore (0aible, CIA to Saigon, 10/6/63)
In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled Headquarters :
Action taken as directed. In addition, since DOM Trueheart was also present
when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation
at McCone's instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodge com-
mented that he shares McCone's opinion. (Cable, Saigon to CIA, 10/7/63)
Conein, the 'C'IA official who dealt directly with the Generals,2
testified that he was first told of McCone's response to the assassina-
tion alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20. (Conein,
6/20,/75, p. 35) Conein testified (but did not so indicate in his detailed
After-Action Report) that he then told General Don that the United
States opposed assassination, and that the General responded, "Al-
right, you don't like it, we won't talk about it anymore." (Conein,
6/20/75, p. 36)
1 Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone.
Colby testified :
"Q. So you were on notice as of that date that the Director personally opposed any
luolvement by the CIA in an assassination?
"COLBY. I certainly was." (Colby 6/20/75~ pp. 67)
2 Conein described his role as follows : " My job was to convey the orders from my Am-
bassador and the instructions from my Ambassador to the people who were planning the
coup, to monitor those individuals who were planning the coup, to get as much information
so that our government would not be caught with their pants down." (Conein, 6/20/75,
pp. 38-39)
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The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his ways.
On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV operations chief)
informed Secr?atary Thuan that the United States was suspending aid
to t he Special Forces units responsible for the pagoda raids until they
were transferred to the field and placed under Joint General Staff
(JGS) command. (Pentagon Papers, p. 217) On October 27, Lodge
traveled to Dalat with Diem, but did not receive any commitment from
Diem to comply with American requests. (Pentagon Papers, p. 219)
On October 28, Conein met with General Don, who had recd^.ived
assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United States. Don
said that he would make the plans for the coup available to the Am-
bassador four hours before it took place, and suggested that Lodge not
change his plans to go to the United States on October 31. (LCI, Re-
port, C p. 37; Pentagon Papers, p. 219)
On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was power-
less to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely in Vietna nnese
hands. General Harkins disagreed and cabled his opposition try the
coup to General Taylor. (Pentagon Papers, p. 220) A cable'rom
Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed White House concern
and stated that "[w]e cannot accept conclusion that we have no power
to delay or discourage a coup." (Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30:/63)
A subsequent cable on that same day from Washington instructed
Lodge to intercede with the Generals to call off the coup if hroo did
not, believe it would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict, non-
involvement and somewhat less strict neutrality." (Pentagon Papers,
p. 220)
Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved in the
coup began to deploy around Saigon. The Embassy was given only
four minutes warning before the coup began. (Cable, MACV to ioint
Chiefs of Staff, 11/1/63) An aide to Don told Conein to bring all
available money to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Conein
brought 3 million piasters (approximately $42,000) to the headquar-
ters, which wa,- given to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay
death benefits to those killed in the coup. (Conei.n, 6/20/75, p. 72)1
Conein was at the Joint General Staff headquarters during most of
the coup. (I.G. Report, C, pp. 41-42) At 1:40 p.m., the Generals pro-
posed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed him and Nhu safe
departure. (Con.ein After-Action Report, p. 15) The palace was sur-
rounded shortly afterwards, and at 4 :30 p.m. the Generals annolr aced
the coup on thu radio and demanded the resignation of Diem and Nhu.
Diehl called Lodge and inquired about the United States' posi i.lon.
Lodge responded that the United States did not yet have a view. and
expressed concern for Diem's safety. (Pentagon Papers, p. 221)
According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and Diem
did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be bombed. Minh
then phoned I-iem. Diem refused to talk with him and Minh ordered
the bombing of the palace. Troops moved in on the palace, but Diem
still refused to capitulate. Minh offered Diem a second chance to sur-
3Passing money to the coup leaders was considered sometime prior to the coup. On
October 29. Lodge abled that a request for funds should be anticipated. (Cables, Lodge to
State. 10/29/63, and 10/30/63) Conein received the money on October 24, and kept rt in a
safe in his house.
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render half an hour later, telling him that if he refused he would be
"blasted off of the earth." Shortly before nightfall an air assault was
launched on the Presidential Guard's barracks. (Conein After-Action
Report, 11/1/63, pp. 17-18)
At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General Don
at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to surrender if he
and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport. Shortly afterwards,
Diem offered to surrender unconditionally and ordered the Presi-
dential Guard to cease firing. According to Conein, an escort for Diem
appeared in front of the palace at 8 :00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were
not present. (Conein After-Action Report, 11/1/63, p. 24)
Conein testified that he left the JGS headquarters amidst prepara-
tions by the Vietnamese generals to house Diem and Nhu there under
proper security. After his return home he received a telephone call
and was told to come to the Embassy. At the Embassy he was told that
orders had come from the President of the United States to locate
Diem. He -further testified that he returned to JGS headquarters about
10:30 a.m. and asked General Big Minh where Diem was. After some
discussion, Conein stated, Minh said that they were behind the General
Staff Headquarters, but professed that they had died by their own
hand. Minh offered to show the bodies to Conein but Conein declined
because he feared that doing so might damage United States interests.
(Conein, 6/20/75, pp. 55-57).
The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.l There is
no available evidence to give any indication of direct or indirect in-
volvement of the United States.'
'? Conein speculated that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel from the palace and
fled to a Catholic Church in Cholon. He opined that an informant must have identified
them and called the General Staff headquarters. (Conein After-Action Report, 1/11/63,
p. 23) A CIA source stated that Diem and Nhu had left the palace the previous
evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at the church at 8:00 on the morning
of November 2. Ten minutes later they were picked up by soldiers and forced into an army
vehicle. (Cable, Saigon to State, 11/2/63) Minh originally told Conein that Diem and
Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein doubted that Catholics would have taken their
own lives in a church. (Conein, 8/20/75, p 56) The Inspector General's Report states
that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two
photographs of the bodies of Diem and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied
behind their backs. (LG. Report, C, pp. 43-44) The source reported that Diem and Nhu had
been shot and stabbed while being conveyed. to the Joint General Staff headquarters.
2It must be noted that on October 30, 1963. Ambassador Lodge notified Washington
that there might be a request by key leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saigon as a
point for evacuation. (Cable, Saigon to Washington, 10/30/63) Conein was charged
with obtaining the airplane. Between 6 :00 and 7:0 0 on the morning of November 2, Minh
and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to a Station
Officer at the Embassy who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for
the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified
that a Station representative told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that
offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were
no aircraft immediately available that had sufficient range to reach a potential country
of asylum. (Conein, 6/20/75, p. 54)
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On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality
in Chiles Presidential election.' Since no candidate had received A ma-
jority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a
joint session of its Congress decide between the first an4second place
finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro-
forma. The Congress had always selected the candidate who received
the highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint ses-
sion was October 24, 1970.
On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA
Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in. Chile would not be
acceptable to the United States. The CIA was instructed by President
Nixon to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile
to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency. The Agency was to
take this action without coordination with the Departments of State
or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile.
While coup possibilities in general and other means of seeking to pre-
vent Allende's accession to power were explored by the 40 Committee
throughout this period, the 40 Committee was never informed of this
direct CIA role. In practice, the Agency was to report, both for infor-
mational and approval purposes, to the President's Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, or his deputy.
Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts
with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those
Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of
strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both be-
fore and after a coup.
One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators in
Chile was the strong opposition .to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted the constitutional
process be followed. As a result of his strong constitutional stand, the
removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the
coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General
Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap
him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19,1970,
by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively
supporting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day,
' Dr. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in Chile, was a
candidate of the Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition was made up of Communists, Social-
ists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-pro-
claimed Marxist and was making his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were
Rodomiro Tomic Romero, candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge
Alessandri Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party. Dr. Allende won 36.3%
of the popular vote ; Alessandri was second with 35.3% of the vote. Dr. Allende's margin
of victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of 3 million votes cast in the election. The
incumbent President, Eduardo Frei Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-
election. Chilean law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves.
(225)
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again unsuccessfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970,
machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group
that had failed on October 19. That same day General Schneider was
mortally wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The
attempted kidnap and the shooting were apparently conducted by con-
spirators other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons
earlier in the day.
A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers,
both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and
to kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA
had contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted
of conspiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carry-
ing out the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider
were associates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially
been thought by the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA
discouraged General Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such
as General Camilo Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General
Viaux was convicted by the military court and received a twenty-year
prison sentence for being the "intellectual author" of the Schneider
kidnap attempt. General Valenzuela was sentenced by the military
court to three years in exile for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent
Allende's assumption of office. The military court found that the two
Generals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting.
The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider
(all of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:
1. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible
way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Al-
lende from coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat.
2. All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean mili-
tary entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or
another.
3. United States officials continued to encourage and support Chil-
ean plans for a coup after it became known that the first step would
be to kidnap General Schneider.
4. Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19,
the other on October 20. Following these attempts, and with knowl-
edge of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and am-
munition to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General
Schneider.
5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 22, apparently conducted
by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied,
General Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in
the abortive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability,
not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean mili-
tary court which investigated the Schneider killing determined that
Schneider had been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun
was at the scene of the killing.1
1 The Committee has not been able to determine whether or not the machine gun at the
scene of the Schneider killing was one of the three supplied by the CIA.
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22.7
6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct instruc-
tion from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment a
coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about
whether the White House was kept it foi?ned of, and authorized, the
coup efforts in Chile after October 15. On one side of the conflict is
the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on
the other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White
House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in
Chile on October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified-and
Haig agreed-that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically
approved, CIA coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other
hand, have testified that their activities in Chile after October 15
were known to and thus authorized by the White House.'
This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable
to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves un-
answered the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting
pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup
activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/
Haig view).
2. THE PRESIDENT'S INITIAL INSTRUCTION AND BACKGROUND
(a) September 15 White House meeting
On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for
National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard
Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The
topic was Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that
meeting reflect both its tenor and the President's instructions :
One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile !
worth spending
not concerned risks involved
no involvement of Embassy
$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
full-time Job-best men we have
game plan
make the economy scream
48 hours for plan of action.
In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms re-
called coming away from the meeting on September 15 with :
* * * [the] impression * * * that the President came down very hard that he
wanted something done, and he didn't much care how and that he was prepared
to make money available.* * * This was a pretty all-inclusive order. * * * If I
1 The basic issue is whether or not the CIA informed the white House of its activities.
In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized. No one who testified believed
that the CIA was required to seek step-by-step authorization for its activities; rather the
burden was on the white House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA
seemed unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that if the CIA had proposed a persua-
sive plan to them, It almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA did not believe
it needed specific white House authorization to transfer weapons to the Chileans ; in
fact, CIA Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas Karamessines testified that he did not formally
approve the transfer, but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the
Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to Karamessines'
subordinates that he would approve their decision to do so. He believed he probably was
informed before the weapons actually were sent.
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ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that
day.' (Helms, 7/15/75, pp. 6, 10, 11)
However, none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was with-
in the guidelines Helms had been given.
Senator HART of Colorado.... did the kind of carte blanche mandate you
carried, the marshall's baton that you carried out in a knapsack to stop Allende
from assuming office include physicial elimination?
Mr. HELMS. Well, not in my mind, because when I became Director, I had
already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business
when I was Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and I think they
will tell you this.
The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting
at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he
related to his colleagues his understanding of the President's in-
structions :
2. The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an
Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the United States. The President
asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him.
The President authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Further, the
Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments
of State or Defense. (Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 9/16/70)
Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with
President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms.2 Although
Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as pre-
cise as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that :
* * * the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting was to urge Helms to
do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated. (Kissinger, 8/12/75,
p. 13)
* * * * * * *
It is clear that President Nixon wanted him [Helms] to encourage the Chilean
military to cooperate or to take the initiative in preventing Allende from taking
office. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 12)
Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion
on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Head-
quarters to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of
his new directive :
3. Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Parlia-
mentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective. (Cable
236, Hq. to Sta., 9/21/70)
* * * * * * *
1 Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with President Nixon
may have been triggered by the presence of Augustin Edwards, the publisher of the
Santiago daily El Mercurio, in Washington. That morning, at the request of Donald Ken-
dall, President of Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast
with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversation was the political
situation in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio and other anti-Allende forces. According
to Mr. Helms :
I recall that prior to this meeting [with the President] the editor of El Mercurio had
come to Washington and I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the hotels
here, this having been arranged through Don Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Com-
pany. * * * I have this impression that the President called this meeting where I have
my handwritten notes because of Edwards' presence in Washington and what he heard
from Kendall about what Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and what was
happening there. (Helms, 7/15/75, pp. 4-5)
2 The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard testimony, are in
substantial agreement about what President Nixon authorized on September 15, namely
CIA involvement in promoting a military coup d'etat in Chile. There is not, however,
agreement about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House-and
hence what was authorized by the latter-in the week between October 15 and the shooting
of General Schneider on October 22. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report.
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B. (Track Two)-This is authority granted to CIA only, to work toward a
military solution to problem. As part of authority we were explicitly told that
40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were not to be told of this
Track Two nor involved in any matter. (Cable 240, Hq. to Sta., 9/21/70)
(b) Background : TrackB I and II
United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile
did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the
CIA.' For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's
agenda. At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the pred-
ecessor of the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether any-
thing should be done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential
election in Chile. At that time, Director Helms pointed out that "an
election operation will not be effective unless an early enough start is
made." 2 On March 25, 1970, the 40 Committee approved a joint Em-
bassy/CIA proposal recommending that "spoiling" operations-
propaganda and other activities--be undertaken by the CIA in an
effort to prevent an election victory by Allende's Popular Unity (UP)
Coalition. A total of $135,000 was authorized by the 40 Committee for
this anti-Allende activity. On June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to
Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a two-phase proposal to the Depart-
ment of State and the CIA for review. The first phase involved an
increase in support to the anti-Allende campaign. The second was a
contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort in Congress to persuade
certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970." On June 27, 1970, the 40
Committee increased funding for the anti-Allende "spoiling" opera-
tion to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador Korry's second proposal
was deferred pending the results of the September 4 election.
The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a
plurality of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon
issued his instruction to Director Helms on September 15.3 At both
these meetings the question of U.S. involvement in a military coup
i Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale politioal action programs in Chile
began with the 1964 Presidential election. As in 1970, this was, in part, in response to the
perceived threat of Salvador Allende. Over $3 million was spent by the CIA In the 1964
effort. (Colby, 7/14/75, p. 5)
' This and other references to 40 Committee discussions and actions regarding Chile
are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the CIA entitled Policy
Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean
Presidential Election," dated October 9, 1970. On August 25, 1975 we subpoenaed all
White House/National Security Council documents and records relating to the effort
b the United States Government to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming office. On
september 4, the Committee received 46 documents from the White House relating to
Chile covering the period September 5 to October 14, 1970.
$ Following the September 4 election, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence circulated
an intelligence community assessment of the impact of an Allende government on U.S.
national interests. That assessment, dated September 7, 1970, stated :
Regardin_ gg threats to TJS. Interests, we conclude that :
1. The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however.
be tangible economic losses.
2. The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an
Allende government.
3. An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psychologi-
cal costs :
a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende
government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that it would create in other
countries. We do not see, however, any likely threat to the peace of the region.
b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S.
and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist Idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/
"Situation Following the Chilean Presidential Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelli-
gence, (9/7/70)
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against Allende was raised. Kissinger stressed the importance of these
meetings when he testified before the Committee :
I think the meeting of September 15th has to be seen in the context of two
previous meetings of the 40 Committee on September 8th and September 14th
in which the 40 Committee was asked to look at the'pros and cons and the prob-
lems and prospects of a Chilean military coup to beorganized with United States
assistance. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 5)
According to the summary of the 40 Committee meeting on Septem-
ber 8, the following was discussed :
* * * all concerned realized that previous plops for a Phase II would have to
be drastically redrawn. * * * The DCI made the point, however, that congres-
sional action against Allende was not likely to succeed and that once Allende was
in office the Chilean opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse rapidly.
While not advocating a specific course of action, the Director further observed
that a military golpe against Allende would have very little chance of success
unless undertaken soon. Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported
this view. * * * At the close of the * * * meeting the Chairman directed the
Embassy to prepare a "cold-blooded assessment'! of:
(1) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved should a Chilean
military coup be organized now with U.S. assistance, and
(2) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved in organizing an
effective future Chilean opposition to Allende. (CIA Memorandum/Policy Deci-
sion Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean
Presidential Election, 10/9/70)
< Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee's request for a
cold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We [the
Embassy] believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat
not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation
of national chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went
on to say that "Our own military people [are] unanimous in rejecting
possibility of meaningful military intervention in political situation."
He concluded by stating : "What we are saying in this `cold-blooded
assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action
with the Chilean military are nonexistent.". (Memorandum/Ambas-
sador's Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Pres-
ent Chilean Situation, 9/12/70)
The CIA's response was in the same vein. Kissinger's assistant for
Latin American affairs on the NSC staff summarized the CIA's
"cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss : "Military action is
impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize power. We
have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup " (Memorandum
for Dr. Kissinger/Chile-40 Committee Meeting, Monday-Septem-
ber 14, 1970)
On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports
and what action was to be taken :
Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared review of political and
military options in the Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy and
Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Committee focused on the so-called
"Rube Goldberg" gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the Congress
on October 24th, resigning thereafter to leave Frei constitutionally free to run
in a second election for the presidency.
Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President Frei to see if he
would be willing to commit himself to this line of action. A contingency of
$250,000 was approved for "covert support of projects which Frei or his trusted
team deem important." It was further agreed that a propaganda campaign be
undertaken by the Agency to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover.'
usinghit which 0arose--bribing Chilean congressman was never against spent. The only propos for
perceived to be unworkable.
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(CIA Memo/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the
September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 10/9/70)
Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and Presi-
dent Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government
efforts to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two
tracks.' Track I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40
Committee, including the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean
congressmen as well as propaganda and economic activities. These
activities were designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile
to prevent his assumption of power, either through political or mili-
tary means. Track II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to
President Nixon's September 15 order and were directed towards
actively promoting and encouraging the Chilean military to move
against Allende. In his testimony before the Committee, Kissinger
stressed the links between Tracks I and II :
* * * There was work by all of the agencies to try to prevent Allende from
being seated, and there was work by all of the agencies on the so-called Track
I to encourage the military to move against Allende * * * the difference between
the September 15th meeting and what was being done in general within the
government was that President Nixon was encouraging a more direct role for
the CIA in actually organizing such a coup. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 13)
Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month after Sep-
tember 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formally
excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader
and broader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and
other "ap ropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized
to intensify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess their
willingness to support the "Frei gambit"-a voluntary turn-over of
power to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible to
run for President in a new election. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions
Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970
Chilean Presidential Election, 10/9/70)
In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary
Charles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated that
in order to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schnei-
der would have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary." 2
i The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House officials
who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the CIA: The Com-
mittee sent letters to various senior officials inquiring if they were, In fact, not'knowledge-
able of the Track II activities. Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William
Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U Alexis Johnson, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member for Latin America Viron P.
Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Ray. S.
Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago Harry W. Shlaudeman. The Commitee
has received written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky Shlaudeman and
Cline. All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track II activity
at the time ; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a general way, from his sub-
ordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from former associates at the CIA. In
oral communications with Committee staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have
indicated they were unaware of Track II.
2 In this same situation report Ambassador Kerry related a message that he had sent
to President Frei through his 1 efense Minister indicating the economic pressures that
would be brought to bear on Chile should Allende assume office :
Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende.
Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the
Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come
to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. Hence, for Frei to
believe that there will be much of an alternative to utter misery, such as seeing Chile
muddle through, would be strictly illusory.
The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and the Chilean military was a
persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions and of instructions to the field.
Helms' notes from the September 15 meeting with the President included the notation
"make the economy scream." Economic leverage was the primary topic of a September 18
White House meeting involving Kissinger, Helms and Karamessines.
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(Situation Report, Korry to Meyer and Kissinger, 9/21/70) In testi-
fying, Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated the degree to which
"
Track I and Track II were merging, that is to say, that individuals on
Track I were workin on exactly the same problem as the CIA was
working on Track II.' (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 21)
Ambassador Korryy's activities in Chile between September 4 and
October 24 support Kissinger's view that the line separating Track I
and Track II often became blurred. For example, the Ambassador was
authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if
Allende were seated, the military could expect no further military
assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his
own recommendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean
military that all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the Congressional election on October 24. On
October 7, Ambassador Korry received the following cable from
Washington, apparently authorized by the 40 Committee :
2. * * * you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military
through the channels available to you that If a successful effort is made to block
Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been
forced to make in Chilean MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed
MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces. * * * If any steps the military should take
should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver
support and material that might be immediately required. (Cable 075517, Hq. to
Sta., 10/7/70)
The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by
instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that
Track II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objec-
tive in mind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that
the CIA's direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active
promotion and support for a coup without President Frei's involve-
lent, were to be known only to a small group of individuals in the
White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track II matters
were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasons of secur-
ity." (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, the CIA's
Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA contact
with the White House on Track II matters, testified on his understand-
ing of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador Korry
were excluded from Track II :
That was not a decision that we made. But the best I can do is suggest that
there was concern about two things. Number one, that there might be serious
objections lodged, for example, by the State Department particularly if Track II
were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting. And the only other thing I
can contribute to that is that It was felt that the security of the activity would be
better protected if knowledge of it were limited. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 122)
(c) CIA views of difficulty of project
On one point the testimony of the CIA officials who were involved
in Track II is unanimous : they all said they thought Track II was
unlikely to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the
Agency to the top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do
the impossible, that the risks and potential costs of the project were
too great. At the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit
Presidential order, and they tried to execute that order.
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A few excerpts from the testimony follow :
Richard Helms, CIA Director-
* * * my heart sank over this meeting, because * * * the possibility of bringing
off something like this seemed to me at that time to be Just as remote as anything
could be. In practical terms, the Army was constitutionalist. * * * And when
you look here at the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking you to
accomplish something, it seemed really almost inconceivable. * * *
What I came away from the meeting with the distinct impression that we were
being asked to do almost the impossible and trying to indicate this was going
to be pretty tough. * * * (Helms, 7/15/75, pp. 6-7)
Chief, Chile Task Force?
* * * it [was] my feeling that the odds [were] unacceptable, it [was] some-
thing that [was] not going to work, and we [were] going to be burned if we [got]
into it * * * what [were] the chances of pulling off a coup successfully, or in any
way stopping Allende from assuming the presidency? * * * we never even got to
two chances out of 20. (Chief, Chile Task Force, 7/31/75, p. 16)
* * * I assure you that those people that I was in touch with at the Agency
just about universally said, my God, why are we given this assignment? (Chief,
Chile Task Force, 7/31/75, p. 53)
Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division-
There was just no question that we had to make this effort, no matter what the
odds were. And I think that most people felt that the odds were just pretty long.
(Deputy Chief/WH Division, 7/15/75, p. 20)
Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the project's
difficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the
September 15th meeting: "So realizing all of-these things, I'm rela-
tively certain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully
tough." (Helms, 7/15/75, p. 16) Karamesslnes recalled pointing out to
the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized and
unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to o something,
there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamesslnes, 8/6/75, p. 10)
3. CIA'S IMPLEMENTATION. OF TRACE II
(a) Evolution of CIA strategy
The President's instruction to the CIA on Sgel ember 15 to prevent
Allende's assumption of power was given in context of a broad
U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 in-'
struction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a
military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in
Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actu-
ally take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.
There was much talk among Chilean officers about the possibility of some kind
of coup ... but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you
know, serious organizational planning. (Karamesslnes, 8/6/75, p. 32)
(i) The "Constitutional Coup" Approach
Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory
continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its ac-
tivities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end. On
September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in.Santiago:
Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary
legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective. (Cable 236, Hq. to
Sta., 9/21/70)
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The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting
a cup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency
decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth,. of a
successful military takeover." (Memo; Helms to Kissinger, 11/1,8/70)
TJnder this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve
the Congress, and proclaim a new election. Thomas Karamessines, the
Deputy Director for Plans, testified :
So this was In a sense not Track II, but in a sense another aspect of a quiet and
hopefully non-violent military coup. * * * This was abandoned when the military
were reluctant to push Frei publicly * * * and, number two, Frei was reluctant
to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military. * * * There
was left as the only chance of success a straight military coup. (Karamessines
S/6/75, p. 6)
At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:
Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For that
reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now appears Bitterly
unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course
be made. This involves promoting Army split. (Cable 424, Sta. to Ilq., 9/:3/70)
(ii) Military Solution
President Frei's failure even to attempt to dissuade his own party
convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Ailende
ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende, presidency. (.Memo,
Helms to Kissinger, 11/18/70, p. 16) Thus, by the beginning of Octo-
ber, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have
to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and tliot the
top leadership of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene
Schneider, constituted a stumbling block. (Cable 424, Sta. to Hq.,
9/123/70; Cable 439, Sta. to Hq., 9/30/70) The Agency's task was to
ca.use a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the
formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong
constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm
among those officers who were interested in a coup.
A three-fold program was set into motion :
a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers ;
b. Create a coup climate by propaganda,' disinformation, and terroris activi-
ties intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup: (Cable 611, Hq. to
Sta., 10/7/70)
c. Inform those coup-minded officers that the U.S. Government would give them
full support in a coup short of direct U.S. military intervention. (Cable 71112, Hq.
to Sta., 10/14/70)
1A cable sent from 'CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused on +reating
an appropriate ju- tification for a coup. The cable stated :
1. It still ap1 rears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification that it can offer to
make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary ro create
one to bolster what will probably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from com-
munism * * * 'you may wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military
for their use. These could include but are not limited to : (A) Firm Intel. that Cubans
planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating
structure for police state. * * * (B) Economic situation collapsing. * * * (C) Po>y quick
recognition of Cuba and Communist countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material
assistance to Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then
empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of terror based
on alleged labor and economic sabotage. (Use some quotes from Allende on this,
2. Station har written some excellent prop guidances. Using themes at hand an l which
best known to you we are now asking you to prepare Intel report based on some well
known facts and some fiction to justify coup, split opposition, and gain adher""nts for
military group. With appropriate military contact can determine how to "discoroor" Intel
report which could even be planted during raids planned by Carabineros.
3. We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plotters as soon as you
can. Coup should have a justification to prosper. (Cable 882, Hq. to St.. 10/19/70)
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(b) The Chile task force
Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special
task force was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to
manage it. The task force was placed under the daily direction of the
Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a. group of the
Agency's most experienced and skilled operators were detailed to the
task force. One experienced CIA officer was summoned back to Wash
ington from an overseas assignment to head the operation. With the
exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy and the
head of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware
of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had
responsibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications
channel to Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic
about Track II. (Memo, Helms to Kissinger, 11/18/70, p. 30) Most of
the significant operational decisions were made by the Chief of the
Chile Task Force, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.
It should be noted that all those involved with the task force de-
scribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Kara-
messines has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was
under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn
was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished."
(Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hem=
isphere Division testified that pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it
in my time there, extreme." (Deputy Chief/WH Division, 7/18/75;
p. 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we
did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant, * * *
Just continual pressure. * * * It was coming from the White House."
(Broe, 8/4/75, p. 55)
(c) Use of the U.S. military attache and interagency relations
The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the
Chilean military to carry out its task. However, a U.S. military at-
tache in Santiago knew the Chilean military very well due to his
broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a pro-
posal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist the attache
in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to
use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of
U.S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for
the Committee :
We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior mili-
tary which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident
that our military representative in Chile had. * * * And we got the approval
of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of the attache in our effort to procure
intelligence. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 6)
To obtain the attache's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested
message for the Director of DIA to send to him in Santiago
through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director,
General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited
DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jamie M. Philpott to his office
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on September 28, 1970.1 During that meeting, General Cushman re-
quested the assistance of the attache, and General Philpott signed a
letter which authorized transmission of a message directing hurl:
* * * to work closely with the CIA chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in
contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive
role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.
Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attache of this
message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine
activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously,
I wish-and now authorize you-to act in a concerted fashion with the CIA
chief.
This message is for your eyes only, and should not be discussed with oily per-
son other than those CIA officers who will be knowledgeable. CIA will identify
them. (Cable 380, Iiq. to Sta., 9/28/75)
For this and all subsequent messages intended for the ata.ache,
the secret CIA communications channel was used.
Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified tlnit ini-
tially the attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" in-
te,lligence on Chilean military officers.2 (Philpott, 8/5/75, l). 11;
Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the
attache, however, did in fact trigger his deep involvement in t1w, coup
attempt. According to the attache's testimony, he received day-lo-day
instructions from the Chief of Station, and on occasion, thsr COS
would show him messages, ostensibly from Generals Bennett ind/or
Philpott, directing him to take certain actions. The COS also trans-
mitted messages from the attache to these Generals.
General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II
and that he never received any communication relating therolo, nor
did he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the c L.tache.
Cleneral Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of ail?ything
connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cush-
man on September 28. (Philpott, 8/5/75. p. 16)
U.S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October
1970 was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Col-
lection, DIA, testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett
and Philpott on "a priority requirement to identify Chilean personali-
ties who might be helpful in preventing the election of Allende as
President of Chile." (Roth, 8/14/75, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no
mention of Track IT as such, the goal of this mission was identical to
that described in the message of September 28 bearing Pli ilpott s
signature.
Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities
connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a i,leeting
on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic mato,rial on
Chilean generals which focused on their willingness to participate in
8 military coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representa-
tive attended. The chronology also shows that on October 21. Roth
delivered a. message to Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA chanltels.3 A
1 General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970.
reneral Philpola was Acting Director in Bennett'- absence.
51n this connection it should be noted that when questioned about this letter, General
Philpott testified that he recalled signing an authorization such as that contained in the
first paragraph of Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and
instructions in paragraphs two and three.
3 Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this message and also
eed him on several er-ens tons to seek a response from Broe to an earlier , n,ssage to
the attache.
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message was sent to the attache that same day, ostensibly from
General Bennett, which authorized :
FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded.
This action does not repeat not imply change in our estimate of situation. On the
contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut
off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request
up date on situation. (Cable 446, Sta. to Hq., 10/21/70; Ref.: Cable 762, Hq. to
Sta., (Cable 934, Hq. to Sta., 10/21/70)
Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he
followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on
Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that
"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the respon-
sibility of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support
functions." (Roth, 8/14/75, p. 8) 1
Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described by
Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified :
I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is that I was informed
that there was concern at the highest U.S. Governmental level over the possible
election of Allende, that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with
the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be helpful, and so forth.
I have nothing specific as to'the nature of the instructions or the channels through
which they came.
Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a project that if
it had not been initiated by, at least had the attention of or concern of, the
highest level?
Colonel RoTH. That was my impression at the time.
Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest
level of government usually indicated the President of the United States?
Colonel Rovu. I would assume that.
The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Gen-
erals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among
these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Phil-
pott's purported signature. (Undated message, 10/14/70) General
Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted
that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Phil-
pott, 8/5/75, p. 22) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Cable
762, Hq. to Sta., 10/14/70) and October 21 (Cable,934, Hq. to Sta.,
10/21/70) conveying instructions from General Bennett to the attache.
General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages :
It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area.
It goes beyond the responsibility which I had in terms that I would have to get
the authority or the approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert
action of this magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me.
(Bennett, 8/5/75, p. 21)
According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to
issue the directives contained in those messages. (Karamessines, 8/6/75,
p. 84)
The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents
bearing on the issue of the attache's Track II instructions or responses.
A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel O. Graham,
Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for
the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, 8/5/75, p. 6) However,
1 Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe be queried on two
or three occasions regarding a report from the attache and that Philpott Instructed that
only he (Philpott) would communicate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth. 8/14/75,
p. 11) Roth nlso testified that Philpott advised him that communications with the attache
would be by CIA channels. (Roth, 8/14/75, p. 41)
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Roth testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he pre-
pared on his #activities are missing from the files. (Roth, 10/7/75. p. 58)
CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting
messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sewling a
message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines wa. - par-
ticularly forceful in this regard:
"' * * I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central Intelligence
Agency in which a message was received for an individual, an officer of the
government anywhere, in whatever department, which was not faithfuP{y, di-
rectly, promptly and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to ijis duly
authorized reprr.-entative. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 79)
We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the water's edge, and
we didn't play tricks among ourselves or among our colleagues within the Agency
or in other ageneoes. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 79)
We could not remain in business for a day * * * if this had been the practice
of the Agency. It would have been no time at all before we would hay, been
found out, a single instance of the kind of thing you are suggesting miglhi, have
taken place would have put us out of business. (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 50)
I)r. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the attache's role or
that he authorized any messages to be sent to the attache. (Kissinger,
8/12/75, p. 22)
The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the
statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. '['here
are four possibilities that could explain. the conflict. First, Generals
Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated
their general instructions to the attache. This possibility would bt~. con-
trary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not ;aware
of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general in-
structions to the attache. This possibility is supported by I oth's
testimony but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his
duty to keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted On its
own, and, after receiving initial authority from General Philpot t, co-
qted and ordered the attache without further informing any member
the Department of Defense or the White House. This possibility
would be contrary to the sworn testimony of the Chief of the Chile
Task Force, W 'illiam Broe, Thomas Karamessines, and William Colby.
Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized the CIA to con-
vey orders to the attache on the basis of high or highest government
authority. Further, that the White House staff directed that the
attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be informed. This possibility
would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. Kissinger and General
Alexander Ha ig.
(d) Agents who posed as third country nationals
In order to minimize the risks of making contact with dissident
Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to send four
agents to Chile posing as third country nationals to supplement the
attache's contacts with Chilean military officers. Headquarters fell' this
was necessary because "We don't want to miss a chance." (Cable 363,
Hq. to Sta., 9/27/70) The agents were compartmented fron, each
other and reported separately on their contacts to an operative in
Santiago, who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testi-
mony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from
Washington and not from the Station.
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.. (e) Chief of Station
Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did 'not know of
Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable
and the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean
officers. The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic :
I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues and superiors that I did
not consider any kind of intervention in those constitutional processes desirable.
* * * And one of the reasons certainly for my last recall [to Washington] was
to be read the riot act-which was done in a very pleasant, but very intelligible
manner. Specifically, I was told at that time that the Agency was not too
m de could continuously executed, butd1 or would th certain be proposals which had
(Chief of
been interested
Station (Felix), 8/1/75, p. 10)
The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.
The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report
should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on
action taken." (Cable 612, Hq. to Sta., 10/7/70) Very simply, Head-
quarters wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency
itself.
Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his
claim to have dissented :
Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceedingly narrow and available
options are quite limited and relatively simple. (Cable 424, Sta. to Hq., 9/23/70)
Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism. It is essential that we
not become victims of our own propaganda. (Cable 441, Sta. to Eq., 10/1/70).
Urge you do not convey impression that Station has sure-fire method of
halting, let alone triggering coup attempts. (Cable 477, Sta. to Hq., 10/7/70, p. 2)
4. CIA EFFORTS' TO PROMOTE ' A" COUP
(a) The Chilean Conspirators
Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key
individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the
General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. Fol-
lowing the "Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux
retained the support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as
well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian
groups. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President
on Chile," 7/15/75) Another individual around which plotting cen-
tered was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago
Garrison, who was in league with several other Chilean officers. (CIA
Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 11/18/70) These officers,
with one possible exception, were in contact with Viaux as well.2
There was considerable communication among the various plotting
elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:
* * * I might add here that it seemed that a good dozen or more Chilean senior.
officers were privy to what was going on * * * they were all talking to one another
3 This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the
military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup.
9 The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incom-
plete. The record does show, however, that several met with Viaux during the Track II
period. One. high ranking officer may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of
conspirators. Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups,
as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the principal dis-e latter
offic e
d
l
was
two ion
gro ups were in ontactawith each other. The red ecord alsio tcy t eeye kwored
together in at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts.
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exchanging views and trying to see how best to mount the kind of coup that they
wanted to see take place, (Karamessines, 8/6/75, p. 10.)
(b) Contacts prior to October15
The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential wthin the
Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly t bat anti-
Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carl,bineros
(police), but, were immobilized by "the tradition of military, respect
for the Constitution and "the public and private stance of ':xeneral
Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who advocated strict
adherence to the Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Tas'c Force
Activities, i 1/18/70), p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to oi, ercome
"the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean mili-
tary." (Ibid., p. 2)
Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General
Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prats, were ha.stile to
the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were stade to
the second level of general officers. They were to be informed 1 hat the
U.S. Government would support a coup both before and after it took
place.,, (Cable 611, Hq. to Sta., 10/7/70) This effort began in earnest
on October 5 when the attache informed both an Army Ceneral
("Station's priority contact") and an Air Force General of the pro-
coup U.S. policy.. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October
6.) 2 Three days later the Chief of Station told a high rankint Cara-
binero official that "the U.S. Government favors a military c elution
and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright Idlitary
intervention." (Task Force Log, 10/9/70) The official inforhtied the
COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high
command. ('T'ask Force Log, 10/10/70)
On October 7, the attache approached members of the War At, tdemy
in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. Ti,is was
the attache's first contact with the Army officer to whom he would
ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22.3 At this meet-
ing, the Army officer told the attache that he and his colleagues were :
` * * Trying to exert forces on Frei to eliminate Caen. Schneider to eft her re-
place him, send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap
hint. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take o er the
government to irrevent an Allende presidency. (Cable 483, Sta. to Hq., 10/4/70)
The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in re-
takinge ffice, "Tb,,Chileanprmilitaryf will not he ostht traci eda but Allende aer be coaline from
to
count on us for MAP support and maintenance of our close relationship." (Cable '075517,
11% to'Sta., 10/7/70)
According t the d'IA Station o and tCIheA's wrap-tip attaches for the most part the latter -made 21 contacts c aIto key
military and Carabinero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 11 /8/70)
In his testimony, the attache indicated that the Army officer was affiliated with an Army
bggenoral. (U.S. military attache, 8/91/75, p. 52) Ina cable sent to Headquarters or: octo-rea
uest
was indicatedn thwhic at th 1af tacche b licer's eved the officer, and h smcomnanion,sa Na maofficere ti ere in
leaPue with a Navs admiral. (Cable 562, Sta. to Hq., 10/18/70) At another point in 'n,is tes-
timony, the attach,, stated. "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy officer and the Army
officer and the Air Force General over here." (The attache, 8/4/75, p. 107) The Con nitee
has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army officer. However, as pre lously
stated, both the Army general and the Navy admiral were affiliated with General Valen-
zuela and the Na',,', admiral was in contact with General Viaux,
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spouse to the attache-Army officer meeting. Headquarters took note of
Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated :
* * * This would make it more important than ever to remove him and to
bring this new state of events ... anything we or Station can do to effect
removal of Schneider? We know this rhetorical question, but wish inspire
thought on both ends on this matter. (Cable 628, Hq. to Sta., 10/8/70)
During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success looked
bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented :
* * * the highest levels of the armed forces unable to pull themselves together
to block Allende. The Chilean military's tradition of non-intervention, Frei's re-
luctance to tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's firm constitutional
stand, and most importantly, the lack of leadership within the government and
military are working against a military takeover. (Task Force Log, 10/8/70)
The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid (ly)
waning chances for success." (Cable 487, Sta. to Hq., 10/9/70) This
pessimism was not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Sta-
tion has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Cable
504, Sta. to Hq., 10/10/70) Three days later the Task Force agreed:
"We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now ap-
pears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task
Force Log, 10/13/70)
If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were
bleak indeed. His own colleagues, including General Valenzuela, de-
scribed him as "a General without an army." (Cable 495, Sta. to Hq.,
10/9/70) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded
as the best hope for carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.
Although the U.S. military attache was instructed not to involve
himself with Viaux because of the high risk involved (Cable 461, Sta.
to Hq., 10/5/70), he served initially as a contact to Viaux through a
military attache of another country. This attache reported on October 5
that Viaux wanted several hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch
a. coup on October 9. (Cable 476, Sta. to Hq., 10/6/70) Headquarters
turned down the request, concluding that a "mini-coup at this juncture
would be counterproductive" and Viaux should postpone his plans,
"while encouraging him in a suitable manner to maintain his posture
so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." (Cable
585, Hq. to Sta., 10/6/70)
The primary purpose of the CIA agents who posed as third country
nationals was to contact Viaux, and they very rapidly relieved the at-
tache of his indirect role in that task. Viaux reiterated his demand for
an air drop of weapons to one of these CIA agents, and again the re-
sponse was the same: reject the demand for arms, but encourage him to
keep planning. In essence the Agency was buying time with Viaux :
"We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning.
Gain some influence over his actions." (Cable 689, Hq. to Sta., 10/10/
70) To achieve this latter purpose, Headquarters authorized passing
$20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000 in life insurance to Viaux
and his associates, as a demonstration of U.S. support. (Cable 729, Hq.
to Sta., 10/13/70)
On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over
Schneider by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making state-
ment in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might
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otherwise join Viaux?" (Cable 729, Hq. to Sta., 10/13/70.) The ?,ta-
tion's response later that same day was "Vials intends to kid tap
Generals Schneider and Prats within the next 48 hours in ordi';? to
precipitate a coup." (Cable 527, Sta. to Hq., 10/13/70) This Vi;tux
kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Station "as part ,f a
coup that included Valenzuela." (Cable 529. Sta. to Hq., 10/18;'70)
_,1.t. about t'li, time the Station began to receive encouragement from
its other contacts. On October 14, ten (lays before the Chilean Con;., less
wa.; to vote, the Task Force Log concluded :
Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing coup activity from other mili-
tary quarters, al'ecifically, an Army General [deleted] and Admiral [del,,tedl,
and the forces in Concepcion and Valdivis * * * (Task Force Log, 10/14;70)
(c) October 15 decision,
To summarize, by October 15 General Viaux had advertised trl his
contact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal
with the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once
with General Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plan ,.l
On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met v ith Henry Kissinger and
Alexander Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in ,hile.
According to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessinte : pro-
vided a rundown on Viaux, a meeting between two other Chileai mili-
tary coup colispirators, and, in some detail, "the general situation in
Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." (Memorandum of C>>nver-
sitt.ion/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 10/15/TO) A decisica was
nude at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least
temporarily :"
It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux
warning him against any precipitate action. In essence the message should state :
"We have reviawed your plans and based on your information and ours, ,ve come
to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. ~+'ailing,
they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will
stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other frien l can do
something. You will continue to have our support." (Memorandum of (",nversa-
t ion, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig, 10/15/70)
The meet i ng concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.
Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure
on every Allende weak spot in sight-now, after the 24th of October,
after 5 Noy, ember, and into the future untit such time as new march-
ing orders ore given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would
comply." 2
1 The reaso,, for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable from
Santiago to Headquarters :
We dis,,ount Vlanx's statement that he had called off his coup attes t because
of the Cla agent's Impending visit. Other reporting indicated Viaux probatey not able
or intending move this weekend. (Cable 4a9. Sta. to Hq., 10/10/70)
There Is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental in ;,ersuading
Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log :
Statioai reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met with Gai,sral Vlaux
and attr npted to persuade him not to attempt a coup. (Chile Task '.+'orce Log,
10/14/701
Secretary 1Zissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting Is not in ,+ 'cord with
that of air. Karamessines or the cable (Headquart(,rs S02) that was sent th! following
day to the Station in Santiago. This matter will be discussed In Part V of this report.
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The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White
House meeting to the Station in Santiago:
2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup.... We
are to continue to generate maximum pressure -toward this end utilizing every
appropriate resource.
3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup
attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail.
Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided
that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action, (Cable
802, Hq. to Sta. 10/16/70)
The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage
.him (Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces
with other coup planners." (Cable 802, Hq. to Sta., 10/16/70) The
message concluded : "There is great and continuing interest in the ac-
tivities of Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune."
(Ibid)
(d) Coup planning and attempts after October 15
The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to a Viaux as-
sociate on October 17. The associate responded that it did not matter
because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Cable
533, Sta. to Hq., 10/17/70) At the final meeting of the CIA agent and
the Viaux associate on October 18, the Agency was informed that the
coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduction of General
Schneider is the first link in chain of events to come." (Cable 568, Sta.
to Hq., 10/19/70) An "emergency channel" of communication with
Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activi-
ties, 11/18/70, p 21)
As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked
brighter for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military
contacts.' A CIA overview statement on Track II stated :
Coup possibilities afforded by the active duty military group led by General
Valenzuela and Admiral [deleted] had always seemed more promising than the
capabilities of the Viaux group. These military officers had the ability and re-
sources to act providing they decided to move and organized themselves accord-
ingly. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile,"
7/15/75, p. 5)
By mid-October the Chilean military officers appeared to be moving
in this direction.
On the evening of October 17, the U.S. military attache met with the
Chilean Army officer and the Navy officer. They requested 8 to 10 tear
gas grenades, three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammu-
nition. The Navy officer said lie had three machine guns himself "but
can be identified by serial numbers as having been issued to him. There-
fore unable to use them." (Cable 562, Sta. to H., 10/18/70) The attache
and the Chief of Station have testified that the officers wanted the
machine guns for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether
_L Two coup plotters, both Chilean generals, made one last attempt to persuade General
Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. The Station reported that the
meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to their eloquent
presentation of Communist action in Chile * * * and (remained] adamant in maintaining
his non-involvement stance." (Cable 548, Sta. to Iiq., 10/16/70)
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the arms were intended for use, or were used, in the kidnap ppii of
General Schneider. The fact that the weapons were provided the
Army officer and the Navy officer and that Viaux associates were con-
victed of the Schneider killing suggests that the guns were not
involved.
The machine gins and ammunition were sent from Washiinr4on
by diplomatic pouch on the morning of October 19, although F ead-
quarters was puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue maro ef-
fort provide them but find our credulity stretched by Navy o facer
leading his troops with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these
guns? We will try send them whether you can provide explan,iition
or not." (Cable 854, Hq. to Sta., 10/18/70) The first installmeri . was
delivered to the Army officer and the Navy officer late in the evc Wing
of October 18 and consisted of the six tear gas grenades intended
originally for Viaux.'
That same day, General Valenzuela informed the attache th:i.t he
and three other high ranking military officers were prepared to
sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
11/18/70) Tholr plan was to begin with the kidnapping of Getieral
Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military d uner
being given for Schneider,2 after which Schneider would be ;down
to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, one of Valenznnela's
colleagues would head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. WATith
respect to the kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reported :
General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly 1nc,dved.
He has been sent to Vifla to stay with prominent physician. Will be ~t ,on in
public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate :fact that above 'pera-
tion not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week. Military
will not admit involvement in Schneider's abduction which is to be blaxt+od on
leftists. (Cable 566, Sta. to Hq., 10/19/70)
The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because Gen-
eral Schneider left in. a private vehicle, rather than in his officihta car,
and his police guard failed to be withdrawn. The Army officer as+.;ured
the attache thin another attempt would be made on October 20. (fable
582, Sta. to Ilq., 10/20/70) The attache was authorized to pa,. Va-
lenzuela $50,1)00 "which was the price agreed upon between the pi )tters
and the unidentified team of abductors," but the attache insisted that
the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task horce
As previously ;atated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile f ecussed
on the active dut military officers-Valenzuela, et al.-rather than Viaux. An eiaople of
this shift in foeto was the decision to provide the Army officer and the Navy oil' e.er the
tear gas grenade, originally intended for Viauz. A cable from Santiago explained the
purpose of this ac? Son :
Station plane give -six tear gas grenades to the attache for delivery to Armed Poi 'es offi-
cers (deletion) in ,tead of having CIA agents posing as third country nationals dells 'r them
to Viaux group. +1ur reasoning is that the attache dealing with active duty office !-s. Also
MA. agent leaving evening 18 October, and will not be replaced but the attache Ill stay
here. Hence important that the attache credibility with Armed :Forces officers be tirength-
ened. (Cable 56'2. Sta. to Hq., 10/18/70.)
The CIA agent who was in contact with Viaux at the time the Valenzuela plan n is given
to the attache apparently understood that Viaux was involved in the October 19 att':opt. He
stated :
0, Were you told any of the details of how the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?
Mr. SAnNO. They indicated it was going to be at some sort of a banquet which the General
(Schneider) would be attending. ('Sarno, 7/29/75, p. 37)
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Log, 10/20/70) At the same time General Valenzuela assured the
attache that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force
Log, 10/20/70) The second abduction attempt, on the 20th also failed
and the Task Force concluded
Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty execut-
ing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or
even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log,
10/22/70)
(e) The Shooting of General Schneider
In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 a.m.), the attache
delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army
officer in an isolated section of Santiago.'
At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General
Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the
findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the
Schneider killing, neither the Army officer nor the Navy officer were
there. Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted on
his way to work by the abductors and he was mortally ;wounded when
he drew his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined
that hand guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it
also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the
killing.2
The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said
"Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned
on way to work" (Cable 587, Sta. to IIq., 10/22/70) and "Assailants
used grease guns. (Cable 589, Sta. to Hq., 10/22/70) The subma-
chine guns had previously been described by the Station as "grease
guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had
been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours
earlier to the Army officer. Santiago then informed Headquarters
"Station has instructed the attache to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valen-
zuela requests" (Cable 592, Sta. to Hq., 10/22/70), thus indicating
that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by
Valenzuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled
Headquarters :
Station unaware if assassination was premeditated or whether it constituted
bungled abduction attempt. In any case, it important to bear in mind that move
' Although the attache's testimony and the cable traffic do not clearly establish the iden-
tity of the group to which the Army officer was affiliated (see page 240 of this report) two
CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons and therefore the Army officer, to the Valen-
zuela group :
* * * The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to set the plan [of October 19] into
motion through Schneider's abduction was several submachine guns, ammunition, a few
tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses
(which was to be passed upon demand), (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
11/18/70, p. 22)
* * * Three sub-machine guns. together with six gas cannisters and masks, were
passed to the Valenzuela group at 2 a.m. on 22 October. The reason why they still wanted
the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the
Presidential election and the Valenzuela group maintained some hope they could still
carry out their plans. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from President on Chile,"
7/15/75. P. 7)
s The Military Court determined that those who participated in the shooting of General
Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led conspiracy. The Court also found that
this same group had participated in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.
In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot culminating in the
death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being "author of
the crime of kidnapping which resulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year
exile for conspiring to cause a military coup. General Valenzuela was also convicted on
the latter charge. He received a sentence of three years in exile.
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against Schneider was conceived by and executed at behest of senior A+med
Forces officers. We know that General Valenzuela was involved. We also near
certain that Admiral [deleted], Army officer and Navy officer witting and
involved. We have reason for believing that General Viaux and nun sous
associates fully valued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution or atr ompt
against Schneider was entrusted to dements linked with Viaux. Important factor
to boar in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme righ ( ists,
set Schneider up for execution or abduction. * * * All we can say is that attempt
against Schneider is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity to prevent
Allcnde's election if they are willing to follow Valenzuela's scenario. (Cabls,' 598,
Sta. to Hq., 10/22/70)
(f) Post October 22 events
The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a tl+ecla-
rat ion of martial law, the. appointment of General Prats to succeed
Schneider as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General
Valenzuela as chief of Santiago province. These measures, and of hers
taken, caused the Chile Task Force to make the following initial
judgment:
With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional runoff, a coup climate
exists in Chile. * * * The attack on General Schneider has produced der-relop-
ments which closely follow Valenzuela's plan. * * * Consequently the plriters'
positions have been enhanced. (Chile Task Force Log, 10/22/70)
On October `, 3Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track [I:
11: was agreed * * * that a maximum effort has been achieved, and tha now
only the Chileans themselves can manage a successful coup. The Chileans have
been guided to a point where a military solution is at least open to them. ,Task
Force Log, 10/24/70)
Although it was not immediately clear to CIA observers, the Sta-
tion's prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider as a
result of an e.bduction attempt) would "rally the Army firm].' Y, be-
Mud the flag of constitutionalism" was correct. (Cable 495, Sta. to Hq.,
1.0/9/75) On October 24 Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean
Congress. General Schneider died the next day.
5. CIA; WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATION DURING TRACK II
The testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and
General Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials.
Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White
House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in
Chile. Both testified that after that date they were neither informed
of, nor authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap flans
of General Schneider and the passage. of weapons to the military
plotters.
By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and
afi er October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White fl ouse.
The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, i gut it
bears on the degree of communication between the White Home' and
the CIA in the earlier period as well.. For instance, Henry Kissinger
testified that he was informed of no coup plan which began wick the
abduction of General Schneider. Ile was aware of General Viaux's
plan-which he and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to
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forestall-but did not know that it was to begin with Schneider's
abduction.
CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was
close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the
White House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some
six to ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines,
8/6/75, p. 66) ; and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of
developments. (Ibid., p. 56) The Committee has records of two meet-
ings between Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone con-
versation between Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General
Alexander Haig. Karamessines' daily calendar indicates that three
other meetings with General Haig took place-but does not establish
with certainty that the topic was Track H. The calendar also suggests
that Karamessines and Kissinger met on three other occasions and
so might have had the opportunity to discuss Track II.
Henry Kissinger's testimony before the Committee differs from
Karamessines in two respects : he believed Track II was "turned off"
on October 15,1 and, after that date, he was informed neither of the
coup plans of the Chilean conspirators nor of the passage of weapons
to them. He said that Track II was:
In the nature of a probe and not in the nature of a plan, * * * no plan for n
coup was ever submitted to the White House. So my recollection of events, this
was a request by President Nixon for Track II which led to two or three meetings
which then on October 15th led to being turned off by the White House, after
which Track II was dead as far as my office was concerned, and we never
received another report on the subject. (Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 15)
In my mind Track II was finished on October 15th and I never received any
further CIA information after October 15th on the basis of any records that I
have been able to find. (Ibid., p. 59)
General Haig's testimony generally coincided with Kissinger's
recollection :
I left [the October 15th meeting] with the distinct impression that there was
nothing that could be done in this covert area that offered promise or hope for
success. I had the distinct impression that was Dr. Kissinger's conclusion, and
that in effect these things-and I wasn't even really familiar with what these
two groups were to do and how they were to do it, but they were to cease and
desist. (Haig, 8/15/75, pp. 26-27)
My recollection would be that we had no hope for a viable, covert plan of
action. That is the impression I got. (Ibid., p. 29)
The following pages present the Committee's record of communica-
tion between the White House and the CIA from September 18 through
December 21, 1970:
(a) September
September 18
Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House.
As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger
wanted a plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according
to CIA records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather
1 Secretary Kissinger, in a written response to a Committee question, stated that he
had not been able to find any "written instruction from the President to discontinue
efforts to organize a coup. The President did, however, convey this decision to me orally
in mid-October, 1970."
To date, the Committee has been unable to question former President Nixon on this
point.
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the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be cuxer-
cised in the Chilean situation." (Memorandum /Meeting withr )DP,
0/1.8/70) The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a s? bject
of concern during the last days of September. Apparently that iires-
sure was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the 'Frei
gay tiibit."
September 21
The 40 Committee met. The Committee has no confirmation that
Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karaiessines' cali,ridar
confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee
chitirman, also attended, although the Committee has not been e ile to
ret ew his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting-aiacl the
meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chai ; ed-
is i.hat the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an o ipor-
tuuity to meet, privately and discuss Track II if they desired., ii all
these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 2:~, the
Committee hies no evidence to confirm that such a, private Kissinger/
Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prep later years in an :M,ttempt to
deter prosecution of him for other unrelated matters. (See (ommlttee
Report, p. 85) 2
Whatever the totality of the motivation of all those invol t-ed in the
operational end of the plots, the uncontroverted evidence i that they
all truly believed the U.S. Government was behind the project.
II, The Testimony and Evidence Regarding Authority From Those
CIA Officials Knowledgeable of the Plots
The Committee's Report discusses the evidence relating to whether
the assassination plots were authorized by higher authority outside
the CIA. That is, of course, the ultimate issue of our inquiry. To prop-
erly address that issue, I feel it is important to note that each of the
supervisory officials of the Agency testified that they fully believed
that the plots were authorized by the "highest authority.'` 3 Durin
the Pre-Bay of Pigs phase Bissell and Edwards were the CIA officials
admittedly knowledgeable of the plots. Both felt that the Blots were
fully authorized. During the Post-Bay of Pigs phase Bisell turned
the project over to William Harvey and his lmmediat?, superior
Richard Helms. Both confirmed Bissell's earlier testimony that the
plots were authorized both within and without the CIA.
PRF.-BAY OF PIGS
Bissell testified that the plots were authorized by "highest. authority"
which he felt meant knowledge and approval by the Prt+:;ide;it. He
testified that it would not have been "consonant with the operations of
the CT A" to conduct such highly sensitive activities without the Pres-
ident's permission or knowledge. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 37-4,18) Bissell
elaborated :
1This was corroborated by the testimony of the Case officer, Maheu, and Harvey.
2 At least Harvey (and perhaps others) recognized that the use of flu. underworld
could lead to demands in later years. When he was first apprised of the details of the
Roselli proilect he observed that :
?* ? it was a very, or it appeared to be, and in my opinion was, at tbst time, a very
real possibility of this government being blackmailed either by Cubans for political
purposes or by figures in organized crime for their own self-protection sr aggrandize-
ment, which, as it turned out, did not happen, but at that time was a eery pregnant
possibility." (Harvey, 6/25/75. pp. 67-68)
3 Our investigation established that "highest authority" was a euphemism, used both
at the CIA and cabinet level, for the President of the United States.
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Q. * * * (I)n the ordinary course of the operations of the CIA as you know it
under their traditions, their rules and regulations, their policies as you knew
them, what is your opinion-(w)as the President, President-elect briefed or
was he not in the light of all these circumstances?
Bissell: I believe at some stage the President and the President-elect both
were advised that such an operation had been planned and was being attempted.
Q. By whom?
Bissell: I would guess through some channel by Allen Dulles.
* * * * *
Senator Morgan : Mr. Bissell, it's a serious matter to attribute knowledge of
this sort to the President of the United States, especially one who cannot speak
for himself. Is it fair to assume that out of an abundance of caution you are
simply telling us that you have no knowledge unless you are absolutely cer-
tain? * * * I gather that you think * * * it (assassination plot information)
came out but because of the seriousness of the accusation you are just being
extremely cautious * * * Is that a fair assumption to make?
Bissell: That is very close to a fair assumption, sir. It's just that I have no
direct knowledge, firsthand knowledge of his (the President) being advised
but my belief is that he knew of it (assassination plans). (Bissell, 6/9/75,
pp. 55-56)
Bissell emphasized that because of the Agency's structure, in which
he was only DDP and not DCI, Allen Dulles would be the "only per-
son" who could have informed the President of the assassination plots.
(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60). And, he summed up why he felt certain that
such authorization was obtained from the President by Dulles :
I had no direct evidence that (the President) was advised. I do agree with
you that given the practices of the Agency, its relation to the Presidency and to
the White House and given also everything I know of Mr. Dulles' character and
integrity, I would expect he had perhaps obliquely advised both of the Presi-
dents of this auxiliary operation, the assassination attempt. (Bissell, 6/9/75,
p. 47) 1
Bissell testified that it was not at all unusual that he, Bissell, did not
personally discuss authorization for the project with either the Presi-
dent or one of his aides in the White House.2 He stated that he be-
lieved that, since his position was that of DDP reporting directly to
the DCI, the DCI, and not Bissell, "in a matter of this sensitivity
would handle higher-level clearances." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 26)
On matters of this sort I left the question of advising senior officers of the
government and obtaining clearances in Allen Dulles' hands. (Bissell, 6/9/75,
p. 29)
Bissell concluded his testimony by describing the tight control which
was applied to such a project :
Assuming for the moment that I am correct (that the President approved the
plots), since the effort would have been to minimize the possibility of embarrass-
ment to the President, it is, I think, understandable that neither I nor anyone
else in the Agency would have discussed this operation on our own initiative
with, for instance, members of the White House staff. The effort would have
been to hold to the absolute minimum the number of people who knew that
the President had been consulted, had been notified and had given, perhaps only
tacitly, his authorization. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6)
1 How Bissell felt the President would have been advised, through the method of
plausible denial, is treated in Part III of these views. infra.
2 Bissell did discuss assassination canability with a senior White House official and
the record is patently clear that at a minimum he received no discouragement and at s
maximum was "ordered" to develop an assassination capability. As I discuss in Part IV
of these views, these conversations may have contributed to his strong subjective notion
that assassination was authorized.
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The only other supervisory official who testified about authorization
during this Pre-Bay of Pigs period was Col. Sheffield Edwards.
Col. Edwards was quite ill at the time of his appearanel before
the Committee (and has since died) and was unable to undergo a
lengthy inquiry. He was, however, certain in his belief that the
assassination plans were approved by the top echelon of the CIA.
He testifies: i before. the Committee as follows :
* * * (T)his possible project was approved by Allen W. Dulles, Director of
CIA, and by. General Cabell, the Deputy Director. They are both dead.
The Chairman : How do you know, Colonel, that the project had been
approved by these two gentlemen?
Edwards: I personally briefed Allen Dulles x * * and Cabell. (N7dwards,
5/30/75, pp.!',.--6)
Edwards was also interviewed by the Rockefeller Commission (Ed-
wards interview, 4/9/75, p. 5) :
Q. Now, who inside the Agency besides Bissell did you have an;rr, contact
with on the top echelon?
A. Very Important. The plan was approved by Allen W. Dulles and General
Cabell.
As Director of Security of the CIA, Edwards appeared to have little
direct contact with the White House and therefore was unable to en-
lighten the Committee on the issue of authorization to the plot, outside
the CIA.2 His testimony, however, corroborates the feeling:: of the
others involved in the plots that at no time did they view thei actions
as beyond the bounds of appropriate authority.
The assassination project or activities continued into a second or
post-Bay of Pigs phase. As the Committee's Report discusses, Wil-
liam Harvey was selected by Bissell to take over the project. Harvey
testified that he had no doubt, throughout his involvemeni. in the
assassination plots, that the project was authorized by the "highest
authority," ' which to him meant the President of the United States.
He testified that :
I can conceive of it [assassination] being perfectly within the province of an
intelligence service, * * * on proper orders from the highest * * * authority
(and)
the approval [for assassination] * * * must come from the Chief Executive,
the President. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 22, 24, 31-32)
Harvey emphasized at the outset of his testimony that he as a subor-
dinate officer of the CIA did not have direct knowledge concel Ring the
source of such authority. He described the. authorization process as nec-
essarily being conducted on a higher level :
[T]he fact that I say that authority for an assassination must * * * come
from the President does not mean that I as an officer in CIA am entitle!1 to know
or to inquire exactly as to the where, why, what, when and in what words this
authority may have been transmitted. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 32)
'See discnsolon regarding knowledge or lack thereof of 1. C. King, then Chief of the
CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. infra, Part VTT,
2 He did participate in the May 7, 1962. briefing of Attorney General Kennedy, which
I treat in Pare V, infra, and which is described in depth in the Committee's Report, pp. 131-
1'34.
' See ft. 3. pg. 308, supra.
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Harvey continually asserted and re-asserted throughout his testimony,
at several appearances before the Committee, that
I was completely convinced during this entire period, that this operation had
the full authority of every pertinent echelon of CIA and had full authority of
the White House, either from the President or from someone authorized and
known to be authorized to speak for the President. But I won't answer, so this
does not get out of context, that I have no personal knowledge whatever of the
individual's identities, times, exact words or channels through which such au-
thority may have been passed. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 31)
Harvey was then questioned about (1) whether he had any doubts
that the plots were authorized and (2) why he did not personally
confirm the authorization by specifically asking high government
officials about it. Harvey answered that, "[I]t was my conviction at
the time * * * that [the plots] were completely authorized at. every
appropriate level within and beyond the Agency." (Harvey, 6/25/
75, p. 69) He explained that he felt he was always operating under
appropriate orders from the top and that it simply was not his place
(or purpose, particularly within the framework of plausible denial)
in the bureaucracy to go "topside to question the orders of his su-
periors." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 73) In response to a question by Senator
Goldwater, he described his feelings this way :
I did not feel that it was up to me, after being requested, instructed, ordered,
whichever you want to put it, to assume (control of this operation), and after
being told, if you will, by a responsible officer at a senior level who was my
immediate superior, that this did have the necessary and requisite approval that
you referred to, Senator Goldwater, that it was up to me to go to the Director
and say, now what about this? (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 84)
At his final appearance before the Committee, Harvey explained :
* * * if I had not been firmly convinced that this had full authority right
straight down the chain of command, * * * I (would) have said to Bissell, all
right, if I'm going to undertake this, which at best is a damned dicey operation
or undertaking, I want to know who authorized it and under what circumstances.
But I had every right to believe organizationally, humanly, whatever way you
want to put it, that nothing that was being told to me by Bissell had not in fact
come to him from the Director of Central Intelligence, or with the knowledge
of the Director of Central Intelligence. (Harvey 7/11/75, pp. 73-74)
Harvey specifically rejected the idea that he would have entertained
the thought of embarking on an assassination project on his own:
I think what you are saying is had I not had reason to believe and been
firmly convinced that this was an authorized, direct and fully approved and
ordered, both operational and policy decision, would I, William Harvey, have
gone out on my own and planned anybody's assassination, and the answer to that
is a flat no. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 72)
Harvey best summarized his involvement in the plots as follows :
At no time during this entire period we are talking about did I ever personally
believe or have any feeling that I was either free-wheeling or end-running or
engaging in any activity that was not in response to a considered, decided U.S.
policy, properly approved, admittedly ; perhaps through channels and at levels I
personally had no involvement in, or firsthand acquaintance with, and did not
consider it at that point my province to, if you will, cross examine either the
Deputy Director or the Director concerning it. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 83)
The only other supervisory official of the 'CIA who admittedly was
knowledgeable of the plots during the Post-Bay of Pigs phase was
Richard Helms, presently U.S. Ambassador to Iran. Helms was at that
time DDP (taking over from Bissell in February, 1962) and John
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11cCono was DCI (taking over from Dulles in November. 1961.1
Helms had not been involved in the planning for the abortive Bay of
Pigs invasion and had no knowledge of the Pre-Bay of Pigs asuassina-
(.ion plots (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 17-18). Harvey testified that he had
"briefed" helms some time in early 1961 regarding Bissell's 4lirective
to Harvey to begin working on an assassination capability." (Harvey,
(/25/75, pl:). 42-44) 2 Thereafter, Helms said he was not "brought in-
to Cuban operations" until after McCone had become Director in "late
1961 or early 1962." (Helms, 6/13/75, p.18)
Our evidence established, however, that Helms was not brought into
the picture affirmatively until April, 1962, when Harvey discussed with
him the contacting of Roselli. Helms explained that :
Harvey * * * says he came to me and said he wanted to recruit this n1an * * ?
(Roselli) which I didn't like at the time * * * But I decided to go along with it,
since (Roselli) had been used in a previous operation, which hadn't worked. He
was, therefore, in that sense, around our neck as a possible embarrassr cnt. if he
(Roselli) did have some connections and we didn't have very many in'-those days
into Cuba someplace, maybe he would turn out to be a useful fellow. (Helms,
7/17/75, p. 8';
Helms testified that he was never convinced that this operation
would be successful but since it had already been approved, he felt that
"we haven't got very much, why don't we try". Helms, 1/17/75,
pp. 23-24)
Helms, as our Report demonstrates, was much less involvol in the
plots than either Bissell or Harvey and perhaps because of this testi-
fied that:
* * * [t]here is something about the whole chain of episode in connection with
this Roselli business that I am simply not able to bring back in a coherelnl: fashion.
And there was something about the ineffectuality of all this, or tit,:, lack of
conviction that anything ever happened, that I believe In the end made this
thing simply vollapse, disappear. And I don't recall what I was briefed on at the
time. You saw the IG Report [which] says that. I was kept currently ?nformed.
Maybe I was and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember it. * * * But I
do not recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was recah made on
Castro's life. (Helms, 7/12/75, p. 38)
Nevertheless, Helms did recall being advised of the plots by Harvey
and indicating his approval. He testified that he felt, the assassination
attempts, while he was skeptical as to how far they actually progrressed,
were authorized by the White House. Helms, however, like Harvey
and Bissell, did not have any personal knowledge as to how or through
whom such authorization passed.3
1 McCone denied any knowledge of or authorization for the assassination plots which
went on during his tenure as DCI. McCone testified that he learned of the plots for the
first time in August 1963 when Helms briefed him. This discussion and the failure of
McCone to issue any directive thereafter affirmatively banning such actions (which con-
tinued into 11164 and 1965) Is discussed in the Committee's Report. pp. 99-10.w.
2 Harvey testified he told Helms exactly what Bissell told him, i.e., that the white
House had twice urged Bissell to set up an 'Executive Action capability. (Ilarve;*, 6/25/75,
pp. 42-44)
'Helms, in effect, stepped into the middle of a project run originally by Mssell and
passed on in November, 1961, to Harvey. Dulles remained as DCI until Noveml cr, 1961-
well long enough to have briefed the incoming Kennedy Administration on whether to
continue the :assassination actions. Helms did not know whether Dulles obissined such
authorization or for that matter whether McCone did so. As developed hereinafter, every-
thing which was transpiring around him led him to believe such authorisation was
obtained. See lielms, 6/25/75, pp. 67-69, '34, 90, 101-103. Part VI infra, of these views
provides a look at just what kind of environment surrounded Helms and the CIA in
1962. Helms, however, never asked anyone in higher positions if the plots wore In fact
authorized even when he had the opportunity to do so--exhibiting, at a minimum, very
bad judgment.
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Helms testified that while no one in the Administration gave him a
direct order to assassinate Castro, neither did he expect one., It was,
however, made abundantly clear to him by the Kennedy Administra-
tion that the CIA's mission was to "get rid of Castro" ;
The desire (of the Administration) was "can't you fellows [CIA] find some
way to get rid of Castro and the Castro regime?" (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 17)
Helms testified that lie had no doubts but that the assassination
attempts were within the authorized U.S. policy toward Castro :
I believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro and if killing him
was one of the things that was to be done in this connection, that was within
what was expected. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 137)
Thus, Helms told the Committee that the plot activities were both pre-
sented to him in 1962 as an ongoing project previously authorized and
that such actions appeared to be clearly within the ambit of authority
which he felt existed at the time. The latter concept, stressed by Helms
in his testimony, was that assassination plots were consistent with the
environment of the time. Helms' view that assassination was within
the approved policy during the atmosphere of the time is corroborated
by the authors of the CIA's 1967 Inspector General's Report who took
pains to point out :
We cannot overemphasize the extent to which responsible Agency officers felt
themselves subject to the Kennedy Administration's severe pressure to do some-
thing about Castro and his regime. The fruitless and, in retrospect, often un-
realistic plotting should be viewed in that light. (IG Report, p. 4)
Helms testified that during this 1961-1962 period
The highest authorities of government were anxious that the Castro govern-
ment fall and that in some fashion Castro go away (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 62)
and if he (Castro) had disappeared from the scene they would not have been
unhappy. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 72-73)
Helms summed up his testimony, in effect, by stating in colloquy with
Senator Mathias that, though no direct order was given to him, "some
spark had been transmitted that (assassination) was within the per-
missible limits." (Helms, 6/25/75, p. 72) Helms' and Harvey's total
understanding of the authorization of assassination plotting together
with the ingrained system of deniability present in intelligence opera-
tions, I feel, explains, but does not excuse their actions in not directly
confronting a superior or a While House official and saying : "By the
way, are these assassination plots really authorized." I think it blinks
reality to suggest that such a thing would have occurred. True, the
system must be changed, but these assassination activities must be
viewed in light of the modus operandi which existed at the time.
III. The Testimony and Evidence Regarding How Authority Would
Have Been Obtained-the Troubling Doctrine of Plausible Denial
The Committee received considerable evidence on the manner or
modus operandi which would have been employed to advise the Presi-
dent of matters of great sensitivity, such as the assassination plots. The
i How Bissell, Harvey, and Helms felt the plots would have been authorized is treated
in part III of these views.
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Committee Report defines and discusses the mode or method of operat-
ing which has come to be known as plausible denial. (Committee
Report, pp. 11-12) Members of the Committee have given its,[ pplica-
i ion to the, assassination plots differing degrees of weight.. ill these
iews I assign it substantial weight because of the frequen y with
which it wove its way through the evidence concerning the critical
issue of authorization.
Simply stated, plausible denial is the system which dictates that any
acts that are perpetrated shall be done in such a way so as to ensure
that the U.S. Government cannot be blamed. In its most common
meaning in the intelligence community, plausible denial dictates the
rise of "cut?+oiits," or, various levels of knowledge with the low{cst level
not being told that the, work that is being (lone is on behalf of t lie U.S.
Government. The system is designed to insulate the President from the
responsibility for projects which may go awry.
We know that, efforts were made to employ this system in the Castro
blots through the use of Maheu to initiate the contact with Rosselli
.Ind Giancena, the CIA Case Officer assuming the false identity of an
employee of Maheii, and the use of the "cover story" of the U.S. busi-
ness interests in explaining the plots to the Cubans. The agent (in
this case the Cubans) may assume or guess that the person lie was
loing the u ork for was a. government representative, but, an admission
Of governnent involvement was avoided.
Addition;illy. we found the system used in the records of the Special
(,roue which avoid direct attribution to the President and refe-r to the
President ai,s "higher authority," or "his associate." This was true in
almost all the cases we examined.' Moreover, the testimony revealed
that the prevailing practice on all sensitive matters was to brief the
Iresident without obtaining his express approval. Maxwell Taylor
testified that; the President would simply listen to what the person
hriefing hint had to say without responding affirmatively o that
"the record (did not) say that the President personally appro -.r~d (the
project). (Taylor, 7/9/75, p. 25)
Thus, whenever we attempted to climb the authority ladder to deter-
r Trine the highest level of knowledge and approval of assay' ;nation
plots we e.n,:?ountered the use of plausible denial. Indeed, Biss,dl testi-
fie(I that he and Edwards used the system to "circunilocutiously" ad-
t'ise I)ulles of the assassination plans because "the Director (Dulles)
0refe.rred the use of * * * (that) sort, of (circumlocutions) lan-
guage (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 25) Bissell testified that ii would
ho through the use of plausible denial that, he felt approval for the
,assassination plots would have been obtained from the President by
Dulles.
Bissell testified that Tulles would have advised the Presidei:tt, of the
issassination plots by obliquely describing the operation but continu-
iriS~r "until the President got the word." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 12-14)
lie described how Dulles could have preserved deniability yet obtained
approval from the President:
I have expressed the opinion and am making it clear, it is not based on hard
E'cidence that probably the President knew something of this * * * I very ranch
' See "Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE" (Draft), March 5. 1962; Memoraandum for
he Record, Special Group Augmented, "Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE with the
President" of March 16. 1962 and accompanying footnote of March 22, 1962 ; Memorandum
Tor the Record, Special Group Meeting, August 25, 1960.
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31.5
doubt if he at any time was told any of the details. My guess is that indeed who-
ever informed him, that is Dulles directly or Dulles through a staff member,
would have had the same desire that you referred to to shield the President and
to shield him in the sense of intimating or making clear that something of the
sort was going forward, but giving the President as little information about it
as possible, and the purpose of it would have been to give the President an op-
portunity, if he so elected, to cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to
continue but without, in effect, extracting from him an explicit endorsement of
the detailed specific plan.
Senator MATHIAS. What you're saying is this is a highly subjective kind of
operation in which an intimation can be given in which the President can
clearly be told what is happening, but be told in, I think the words you used,
a circumlocutious way, that lie might not even blink unless he wanted to. Is that
right?
Mr. BISSELL. That is correct, sir. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-61)
Bissell made it clear that his perception of what happened at levels
of authority above him spanned more than one administration. Indeed,
he continually spoke of President Eisenhower and Kennedy together :
In the case of an operation of high sensitivity of the sort that we are discuss-
ing, there was a further objective that would have been pursued at various levels,
and that was specifically with respect to the President to protect the President.
And therefore the way in which I believe that Allen Dulles would have attempted
to do that was to have indicated to the two successive Presidents the general
objective of the operation that was contemplated, to make it sufficiently clear
so that the President-either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy-
could have ordered the termination of the operation, but to give the President
just as little information about it as possible beyond an understanding of its
general purpose. Such an approach to the President would have had as its
purpose to leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the operation if it
should surface.
My belief-a belief based, as I have said, only to my knowledge of command
relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operations
is that authorization was obtained by him in the mariner that I have indicated.
I used the word on Monday "circumlocutious," and it was to this approach that
I referred. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6)
William Harvey and Richard Helms also felt that they doubted that
there would ever be a direct written or even oral order communicated
to the DCI on a. matter such as the assassination plots. Helms elaborated
on why lie felt the plots were authorized even though he was unable
to point to a direct written or oral order to carry them out :
[Assassination plots would not be] authorized in any formal way * * * These
schemes * * * would have taken place in the context of doing what you could
to get rid of Castro, and the difficulty with this kind of thing, as you gentle-
men are all painfully aware, is that nobody wants to embarrass a President
of the United States discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his
presence. This is something that has got to be dealt with in some other fashion.
Even though you use euphemisms you've still got a problem * * *
Now, when President Eisenhower took responsibility for the U-2 flights that
was on his own * * * [h]e wasn't obliged to do that * * * he had his mechanism
to blame it on, if he wanted to. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 29)
Helms added that apprising the President of such a matter was
no easy or simple task :
Senator MATHIAS. When Mr. Bissell was here I think I asked him whether
the job of communicating with superior authority was one of protecting superior
authority, and specifically the President, protecting him from knowledge and at
the same time informing him, which is a difficult and delicate job, and he agreed
that that was really the difficulty.
And you this morning have said that in advising a President or very high
authority of any particular delicate subject, that you resorted to euphemism.
Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 65-66)
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Senator MA TITAS. Did Presidents indulge in euphemisms as well as ti: rectors?
Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I found in my experience that Presidents used the
entire range of the English language from euphemisms on the one ex:ireme to
Very explicit talk on the other.
Senator M?,THIAS. Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A.
iReckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said who will rid
me of this man. He didn't say to somebody go out and murder him. He said who
will rid me of this man, and let it go at that * * *
Mr. HELMS. That is a warming reference to the problem.
Senator M.'THIAS, You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?
Mr. HELMS. [ think it does, sir.
Senator M ATHIAS. And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be
said, which night be taken by the Director or by anybody else as Pre::fdential
authorization to go forward?
Mr. HEI.M5. That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that orn sort of
grows up in tradition of the time and I think that any of us would hn. a found
it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the United states. I
;just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out
of the Oval Office.
Senator M. 'rHIAS. And yet at the same time you felt that some si ark had
been transmitted, that that was within the permissible limits?
Mr. HELMS. Yes; and if he had disappeared from the scene they would not
have been unhappy. (Helms, 8/x13/75, pp. 71-73)
The Executive Assistant to Harvey, described what he (houaht
the approved process might be in the following exchange with ~ienator
Schweiker :
Senator Sc awsixER. We keep coming back to this confusing status where
we see the assassination plans and plots falling out very prolifically, and we see
ghat higher authority as in your case has authorized them, but somewhere along
there we lost track. And I guess my question is. would a logical explanation of
this very confusing situation be that some of the powers that be 311.?9 decided
not to discuss them in the formal sessions, and just verbally passed on instruc-
tions through the chain of command, but not in the formal committee special
group apparatus?
Might that lie a logical explanation of why we are continually confusr d by the
kind of testiniony that you have given, and let me say that others htr a given,
too?
ExECUTIVE 1SSISTANT : I wouldn't expect any President to sign a piece of paper
directing an assassination for any reason. I don't think that is done in any
government.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. So that kind of an explanation would make seise from
your experience in government?
ExECUTIVE kSSISTANT: Yes, Sir.
Senator SCUwETKER. And exnlain the discrepancy that we keep running into
in. terms of different situations analogous to yourself?
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT: Sure. I don't think you are going to find a piece of paper
for everythinv that this Agency or any other Agency has done. There ai a lots of
I hings that get done by word of mouth.
The CHATS nAN : But does this leave us in a situation where the direr: connec-
lion between the President or the Special Group Augmented, the hit.l1 policy
snaking authority. with respect to knowledge of and direction to assn: sination
of Mr. Crastro must be based upon assumption or speculation?
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT : I think it is based upon the integrity of the pe iple who
na.ssod on the orders. And it is all oral. (Executive Assistant to Harvey, 6/18/75,
it). 54-.hr)
Ilarvev, renortino directly to first Bissell and then Heli is, also
'chibited iii. his testimony an ingrained reluctance to even discuss
assassination in front of his superiors unless specifically ask( A about
it. He was