A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BY ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01034R000400110009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 191
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
and
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
William H. Jackson
Mathias F. Correa
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1 January 1949
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RET
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEAN-
ING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31
AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION
OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS
IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED
PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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LETTER OF 1RANSMITTAL
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.
January 15, 1949
Attention: Mr. Sidney W. Souers
Executive Secretary
Gentlemen:
In accordance with the terms of the memorandum to the under-
signed from Mr. Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council, dated February 13, 1948, as supplemented by his
memorandum of March 17, 1948,* we submit herewith our report on 'The
Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence."
On January 13, 1948, the National Security Council recommended to
the President that a group comprising individuals not in Government
service should make a "comprehensive, impartial, and objective survey of
the organization, activities, and personnel of the Central Intelligence
Agency." The group was asked to report to the Council its findings and
recommendations on the following matters;
"(a) The adequacy and effectiveness of the present organi-
zational structure of CIA.
"(b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.
."(c) The relationship of these activities to those of other
Departments and Agencies.
- "(d) The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel."
As a result of this action, the present Survey Group was created and
the undersigned appointedbythe National Security Council with the approval
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* See Annexes No. 1 and 2 for the texts of these two memoranda which
constitute the terms of reference for this survey.
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of the President. The terms of the resolution approved by the National
Security .Council were communicated to the Group on February 13, 1948.
Following discussions with the undersigned regarding the scope of
the survey, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council,
with the approval of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and
Air Force, sent to the Survey Group on March 17, 1948, a second memo-
randum which constituted an extension of the scope of the survey as
originally set forth by the National Security Council. In particular,
this memorandum included the following provisions:
"The survey will comprise primArily a thorough and compre-
hensive examination of the structure, administration, activities
and inter-agency relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency
as outlined in the resolution of the National Security Council.
It will also include an examination of such intelligence activi-
ties of other Government Departments and Agencies as relate to
the national security, in order to make recommendations for their
effective operation and over-all coordination, subject to the
understanding that the Group will not engage in an actual physical
examination of departmental intelligence operations (a) outside
of Washington or (b) in the collection of communications intelli-
gence. On behalf of the Natiohal Security Council, I will under-
take to seek the cooperation in this survey of those Government
Departments and Agencies not represented on the Council which have
an interest in intelligence an relates to national security.
"It should be underetood that the Survey of the Central
Intelligence Agency and its relationship to other Departments and
Agencies will be done for and with the authority of the Rational
Security Council.- The survey of the intelligence activities of
the Departments of State, Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,
however, will be for and with the authority of the respective
heads of those Departments."
It was also provided that the Survey Group should submit from time
to time recommendations on individuals problems, and that problem con-
cerning the Central Intelligence Agency should be given priority over
those involving other agencies.
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The Survey Group has submitted two special reports to the National
Security Council, each one in connection with particular problems being
50X1 considered by the Council and its members.
50X1
50X1
) The. second interim report, dated May 13, 1948, dealt
with the "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."
The present report is based on an examination and appraisal of our
national intelligence structure and operations as created by the National
Security Act of 1947 and developed in the Central Intelligence Agency and
the individual departments and agencies concerned with national security.
In accordance with the directive from the National Security Council,
emphasis has been placed upon the Central Intelligence Agency, but there
has also been an examination of the principal departmental intelligence
agencies in order to determine their scope in the field of intelligence,
and their relations to each other and to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Our examination has been confined almost entirely to the over-all intelli-
gence organization and activities in the Washington headquarters of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State, Army, Navy and
Air Force.
We have met with members of the directorate and personnel of the
Central Intelligence Agency and with representatives of other agencies.
With the assistance of our staff, we have consulted approximately 300
persons who by virtue of their present position or past experience are
familiar with intelligence problems. In addition, a series of confer-
ences were held at which officials?of all of the intelligence agencies
were invited to submit their recommendations and suggestions and discuss
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them with the Group. These conferences were atten&ed by representatives
from the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Staff,
Research and Development toard and Atomic Energy Commission.
In conclusion, we desire to record our appreciation for the effective
work of the staff members of the Survey Group, Robert Blum, Joseph Larocque,
Jr., Wallace A. Sprague and Edward L. Saxe, in assembling data with regard
to our national intelligence organization and in assisting the members of
the Survey Group in carrying out the examination of our intelligence
structure on which this report is based.
vi
Faithfully yours,
Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
Mathias F. Correa
William H. Jackson
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Pace
Letter of Transmittal
Summary 1
Chapter I Introduction: The Intelligence Problem in the
United States 15
Chapter II National Intelligence and the National Security
Act of 1947 21
The Duties of the Central Intelligence
Agency under the National Security Act . ? ? ^ 21
Control over the Central Intelligence Agency ? 24
The General Mission of the Central Intelligence
Agency 26
Conclusions and Recommendations. .
27
Chapter III The Organization and Administration of the
Central Intelligence Agency 29
Organization 29
Administration 32
Budget 33
Security 34
Personnel 36
Conclusions and Recommendations, 38
Chapter IV The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for the Coordination of Intelligence
Activities 41
The Statutory Provisions 41
The Organization and Operation of the Machinery
for Coordination 43
Intelligence Advisory Committee 43
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Page
Interdepartmental Coordinating and 'Planning
Staff 46
Office of Collection and Dissemination 48
National Security Council Intelligence
Directives 50
The Degree of Coordination Achieved 53
Scientific Intelligence 55
Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
Affecting the National Security 56
Communications Intelligence 58
Proposals for Improved Coordination 60
Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter V The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for National Intelligence Estimates
?
63
65
The Mandate under the National Security
Act and the Directives 65
The Concept of National Intelligence Estimates 68
The Organization and. Activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency for the Production of Na-
tional Intelligence 70
Proposals for Improving the Production of Na-
tional Estimates
Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter VI Services of Common Concern: Intelligence Research
and Reports
Proposed Research and Reports Division
Periodical Summaries
Miscellaneous Reports and Memoranda
The National Intelligence Survey
76
81
83
83
84
86
87
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? Economic, Scientific and Technological
Intelligence 88
Conclusions and Recommendations 91
Chapter VII Services of Common Concern: The Collection of
Overt Intelligence 93
Contact Branch 93
Foreign Broadcast Information Branch 101
Foreign Documents Branch 103
Conclusions and Recommendations 104
Chapter VIII Services of Common Concern: The Collection of
Secret Intelligence 107
The Charter of the Central Intelligence Agency
to Conduct Secret Intelligence Activities . . 108
Organization of the Office of Special
Operations 110
Field Activities of Covert Intelligence 117
Security of Secret Intelligence Activities . 122
Counter-Espionage 124
Communications Intelligence 126
The Need for Policy Direction of Secret
Intelligence 127
General Appraisal 128
Conclusions and Recommendations 129
Chapter IX Services of Common Concern: The Conduct of
Secret Operations 131
Relations between Secret Intelligence and
Secret Operations
The Office of Policy Coordination
Conclusions and Recommendations
131
132
134
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Chapter .X The Direction of the Central Intelligence Agency 135
General Appraisal 135
The Question of Civilian Direction 136
Conclusions and Recommendations 138
Chapter XI The Service Intelligence Agencies 139
Mission and Responsibilities 139
Coordination of Service Intelligence Agencies 141
The Status of Intelligence in the Services 146
Conclusions and Recommendations 149
Chapter XII The Intelligence Functions of the Department
of State
The Research and Intelligence Staff
Intelligence Relations between the State
Department and Outside Agencies 157
Conclusions and Recommendations 161
Chapter XIII Conclusion 163
151
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ANNEXES
1. Survey Group Terms of Reference (I): Memorandum dated
February 13, 1948, from Sidney W. Souers, Executive
Secretary, National Security Council
2. Survey Group Terms of Reference (II): Memorandum dated
March 17, 1948, from Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secre-
tary, National Security Council
3. Presidential letter dated January 22, 1946, creating the
Central Intelligence Group
4.
5.
Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947
Chart: Central Intelligence Agency Organization as of
January 1, 1949
6. Table: Personnel Strength of Central Intelligence Agency,
as of December 24, 1948
7. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1:
"Duties and Responsibilities"
8. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2:
"Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad"
9. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3:
"Coordination of Intelligence Production ...... . .
10. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4:
"National Intelligence Objectives"
11. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5:
"Espionage and Counter-Espionage Operations"
12. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6:
"Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring"
13. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7:
"Domestic Exploitation"
14. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 8:
"Biographical Data on Foreign Scientific and Technol-
ogical Personalities"
15. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9:
"Communications Intelligence
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SUMMARY
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The primary object of this survey has been the Central Intelligence Agency,
Its organization and activities, and the relationship of these activities to
the intelligence work of other Government agencies. Fxamination has been made
of these other intelligence agencies only to the extent that their activities
bear upon the carrying out by the Central Intelligence Agency of its assigned
functions.
Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947 creates the Central
Intelligence Agencyasan independent agency under the directionofthe National
Security Council. It gives to the Council broad powers in the assignment of
functions to the Central Intelligence Agency and creates a framework upon Which
a sound intelligence system can be built. The Central Intelligence Agency has
been properly placed under the National Security Council for the effeative
carrying out of its assigned function. It should, however, be empowered and
encouraged to establish, through its Director, closer liaison with the two
members of the National Security Council on Whom it chiefly depends and who
Should be the main recipients of its product--the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense.
The National Security Act, as implemented by directives of the National
Security Council, imposes upon the Central Intelligence Agency responsibility
for carrying out three essential functions:
(1) The coordination of intelligence activities;
(2) The correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the na-
tional security, Which has been interpreted by directive asmeaning the produc-
tion of national intelligence;
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(3) The performance centrally of certain intelligence services of common
concern. These include services of a static nature, such as research in fields
of common usefulness, and operational services such as the collection through
the central agency of secret intelligence.
These three functions constitute the basis of an integrated system of in-
telligence and they have been used as the frame of reference for the examina-
tion of the Central Intelligence Agency and the related activities of other in-
telligence agencies of the Government represented on the National Security
Council, particularly the Department of State and the Departments in the Na-
tional Military Establishment.
No amendment to the provision of the Act relating to intelligence is re-
quiredat this time. What is needed is action to give effect to its true intent.
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF JIM CENTRAL INEMIGENCE AGENCY FOR COORDINATING IRrEL-
LICENCE ACTIVITIES
Under the statute, the Central Intelligence Agency has broad responsibility
to coordinate intelligence activities relating to the national security. In
the discharge of this responsibility, the Central Intelligence Agency should
review the intelligence field and ascertain where there are gaps or overlaps.
The agency best equipped to do a particular job should fill any gaps. Where
two or more- agencies are doing similar work, the one best equipped ought to
carry on the job and the others drop out or their efforts be coordinated.
This latally Iiaportant responsibility for coordination is to be exercised
by recommending directives for approval by the National Security Council. The
Central Intelligence Agency has the duty of planning for coordination and, in
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consultation with the other intelligence agencies, of taking the initiative In
seeking directives to effect it. Today this coordinsting function of the
Central Intelligence Agency is not being adequately exercised.
To assist it in carrying out this task the Central Intelligence Agency
has available the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This group includes the
Director of Central Intelligence as chairman, the the heads of the intelligence
staffs of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.
A number of formal directives for the coordination of intelligence activi-
ties have been issued by the National Security Council upon the recommendation
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
These directives, except those specifically assigning to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency the carrying out of certain common services described below, have
not gone far enough in defining the scope and limits of departmental intelli-
gence activities. These activities continue to present many of the same juris-
dictional conflicts and duplication which the National Security Act was in-
tended to eliminate. Consequently, the absence of coordinated intelligence
planning, as between the Central Intelligence Agency, the Service agencies and
the State Department, remains serious. What is needed is continuing and effec-
tive coordinating action under existing directives and also directives estab-
lishing more precisely the responsibilityofthe various intelligence agencies.
The field of scientific and technological intelligence is an example of
lack of coordination. Responsibilities are scattered, collection efforts
are uncoordinated, atomic energy intelligence is divorced from scientific
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intelligence generally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving at
authoritative intelligence estimates in the scientific Tield, with the possible
exception of atomic energy matters.
Another important example of lack of coordination is in the field of do-
mestic intelligence and counter-intelligence relating tothe national security.
Jurisdiction over counter-intelligence and counter-espionage activities is as-
signed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation nthe United States and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency abroad. However,fifth column activities and espionage
do not begin or endatour geographical frontiers, and. our intelligence to coun-
ter them cannot be sharply divided on any such geographical basis. In order
to meet the specific problem presented by the need for coordination of activ-
ities in the field of domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence relating
to the national security, it is recommended that the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation be made a permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee so far has had little impact on the
solution of the problem of coordination, except in formally approving proposed
directives. It should be re-activated and called upon to play an important
role.
To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his duties
to plan for the coordination of intelligence, the staff in the Central Intel-
ligence Agency known as the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
should be reconstituted and strengthened. It should be composed of personnel
definitely assigned to, and responsible to, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and charged, on a full-time basis,
4
with carrying on continuous planning
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for the coordination of specific intelligence activities. This staff, 'which
might be called the "CoordlnAtion Division," should support the Director tm
fulfilling one of his most important and difficult duties under the National
Security Act.
In concluding the considerationof this most vital problem of coordinRtion
of intelligence activities, it should be emphasized that coordination can most
effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various agencies. With
the right measure of leadership on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency,
a major degree of coordination can be accomplished in that manner.
TEE RESPONSIBILITY OF fill, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
INTELLTGENCE RELATING TO TEE NATIONAL SECURITY
A long-felt need for the coordination, on the highest level, of intelli-
gence opinion relatingtobroad aspects of national policy and national security
was probably the principal moving factor in bringing about the creation of the
Central Intelligence Agency. The lack of any provision for the prompt produc-
tion of coordinated national intelligence of this kind was one of the most
significant causes of the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure.
This type of national intelligence, expressed in the form of coordinated
national estimates, transcends in scope and breadth the interest and compe-
tenceofany single intelligence agency. Hence, such estimates should be fully
participated in by all of the principal intelligence agencies. All jointly
should share in the responsibility for them.
With one or two significant exceptions, whose occurrence was largely for-
,.
tuitous, the Central Intelligence Agency has not as yet effectively carried
out this most important function.
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The Office of Reports and Estimates in the Central Intelligence Agency
was given responsibility for production of national--intelligence. It has,
however, been concerned with a wide variety of activities and with the produc-
tion of miscellaneous reports and summaries which by no stretch of the imagi-
nation could be considered national estimates.
Where the Office of Reports and Estimates produces estimates, it usually
does so on the basis of its own research and analysis and offers its product
as competitive with the similar product of other agencies, rather than as the
coordinated resultofthe best intelligence product which each of the interested
agencies is able to contribute.
The failure of this type of intelligence product to meet the requirements
of a coordinated national estimate is not substantially mitigatedbythe exist-
ing procedure Whereby the Office of Reports and Estimates circulates its esti-
mates to the intelligence agencies of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and ob-
tains a formal notation of dissent or concurrence. Under this procedure, none
of the agencies regards itself as a full participant contributing to a truly
national estimate and accepting a share in the responsibility for it.
It is believed that this situation can be remedied if the Central Intel-
ligence Agency recognizes the responsibility whichithas under the statute and
assumes the leadership in organizing its own work and in drawing upon that of the
other intelligence agencies or Government for the production of coordinated intel-
ligence. Thus within its own organization, the Central Intelligence Agency
:should have, In lieu of the present Office of Reports and Estimates, a email
group of gpecialists, which might appropriatelybe Galled "Estimates Division."
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It would be the task of this grouptoreview the intelligence products of other
intelligence agencies and of the Central Intelligence Agency, and to prepare
drafts of national intelligence estimAtes for consideration bythe Intelligence
Advisory Committee.
The final process of coordination should take place in the Intelligence
Advisory Committee which would review and discuss the proposed estimates. The
finished estimate should be clearly established as the product of all of the
contributing agencies in which all share and for which all take responsibility.
It should be recognized as the most authoritative estimate available to the
policy-makers.
Where particular scientific or technical intelligence matters are involved,
the Intelligence Advisory Committee should secure the views of the best quali-
fied technical experts available to them, Including experts from the Research
and Development Board and the Atomic Energy Commission.
There should also be provision for the prompt handling of major emergency
situations so that, as a matter of course, when quick estimates are required,
there is immediate consultation and collective appraisal by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee on the basis of all available information.
The inclusion of the Federal Bureaucf Investigation as a permanent member
should assure that intelligence estimates will be made tithe light of domestic
as well as foreign intelligence. Provision should be made for the representa-
tion on the Intelligence Advisory Committee of other agencies of the -Government
when matters within their competence are under discussion.
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PlabORMANCE CENTRALLY OF SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN
Under the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agencyshould
perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agenciee, such services
of common concern as may be assigned to it by the National Security Council.
These services, as now being performed by the Central Intelligence Agency,
canbebroken down into (1) static services, consistingof intelligence research
and production aa certain assigned subjects whichdonot fall exclusively within
the function of any one existing Intelligence agency, and (2) operating serv-
ices, consisting of certain types of intelligence collection and related secret
operations.
STATIC SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN
At the present time the static services of intelligence research and re-
porting are carried out in the Office of Reports and Estimates. If the duties
of this Office in relation to the production of national intelligence are as-
signed to a newly constituted: Estimates Division, the miscellaneous reporting
functions presently carried out by the Office of Reports and Estimates and a
part at least of the personnel engaged in them could be reconstituted as the
nucleus of a separute division of the Central Intelligence Agency to be known
as the "Research and Reports Division." This Division would also include the
Foreign Documents Branch of the Office of Operations and the various reference
and library functions now carried on in the Office of Collection and Dissemination.
The economic, scientific and technological fields are ones in which all of
our intelligence agencies have varying degrees of interest. At the present
time there is serious duplication in these fields of common concern. Cent a
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production and coordination by the proposed Research and Reports Division,
would result in great economy of effort and improvement of the product. For
example, the organization within this division of a scientific branch, staffed
by highly qualified personnel and empowered to draw upon the scientific per-
sonnel of such organizations of Government as the Research and Development
Board and the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of dealing with spe-
cialized scientific problems, is a project which should have the highest
priority.
This divisionof the Central Intelligence Agency should be staffed in part
by representatives of the departmental intelligence services so that the reports
produced would represent authoritative and coordinated opinion and be accepted
as such by the various consumer agencies.
The Director's planning staff for coordinationofactivities, the proposed
Coordination Division, should review the question as to what subjects might
appropriately be assigned to the new Research and Reports Division for central
research and report and what services now centrally performed in the Central
Intelligence Agency might be eliminAted. The Intelligence Advisory Committee
would be the agency to determine the allocation of work, and in case of any
failure to agree the matter would be referred to the National Security Council.
OPERATING SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN
The operating services of common concern presently performed by the Central
Intelligence Agency consist of
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collection of secret intelligence abroad through the Office of Special Opera-
tions; and.:.the conduct of secret operations abroad through the Office of Policy
Coordination.
All of these services are appropriately allocated to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. These operating functions are so inter-related and inter-
dependent that they should have common direction at some point below the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence.
The genera1_aam1nlstrativa4rpblems of_these-operating offices_are uniqa-
becau-se of their secrecy and the consequent security requirements. They differ
importantly fran that part of the workofthe Central Intelligence Agenby which
is concerned with the coordinationofactivities and the pr duction of intelli-
gence. Accordingly, these three operating offices should have common admin-
istrative services separate from those of the balance of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
The three activities with the possible addition the Foreign Broadcast
y-
Information Branch dhoUld be responsible to one offrcial'eharged with their
direction. The new "Operations Division" would be self-suf lcient as to ad-
NN,
ministration end semi-autonomous. This would, to a large extent meet the
/7-
dri2cism frequently voiced, and with a good deal of. merit, that it is bssen-
N,,
tially_unsouna_to_oembine in a single ...intelligence agency both secret_opera-
tions and-over,all_coordinating and, estimating functions_7_)
-
In its secret intelligence work, the Officeof Special Operations requires
a closer liaison with the ether intelligence agencies, especially those of the
military services and of the State Department which
10
are its chief consumPrs
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s?-?
and which Should be able to guide its collection efforts more effectively than
they doat present. The counter-intelligence function of the Office of Special
Operations requires more emphasis and there is need for better coordination of
all its activities with the military, particularly in the occupied areas.
'ifito, ORGANIZATION AND DiEtCTION OF iliE CENTRAL INTETI7GENCE AGENCY
The principal defect of the Central Intelligence Agencyis that its direc-
tion, administrative organization and performance do not dhow sufficient ap-
preciation of the Agency's assigned functions, particularly in the fields of
intelligence coordination and the production of intelligence estimates. The
result has been that the Central Intelligence Agency has tended to became just
one more intelligence agency producing intelligence in competition with older
established agencies of the Government departments.
Since it is the task of the Director to see taint the Agency carries out
its assigned functions, the failure to do so is necessarily a reflection of
inadequacies of direction.
There is one over-all point to be made with respect to the administration
of the Central Intelligence Agency. The organization is over-administered in
the sense thnt aaministrative considerations have been allowed to guide and,
on occasion, even control intelligence policy to the detriment of the latter.
'Under the arrangements proposed in this report, the heads of the newly consti-
tuted Coordination, Estimates, Research and Reports, and Operations Divisions
would be included in the immediate staff of the Director. In this way the
Director, who at present relies chiefly on his administrative staff, would
be brought into intimate contact idth the day-to-day operations of his agency
and be able to give policy guidance to them.
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In commenting on administration, the question of security should also be
stressed. The Director is charged under the law with protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. One of the best methods of
achieving this is to correct the present situation where the Agency is viewed
and generally publicized as the collectOr of secret intelligence and ts) bury
its secret functions within a Central Intelligence Agency whose chief recog-
nized activities are the coordination of intelligence, and the production of
Intelligence estimates.
In reviewing the work of the directorate, consideration has been given to
the question whether or not the Director should be a civilian. The work of
the Agency, from its very nature, requires continuity in that office which is
not likely to be achieved if a military man holds the post on a "tour of duty"
basis. For this reason, as well as because freedom from Service ties is de-
sirable, the Director Should be a civilian. This recommendation does not ex-
clude the possibility that the post might be held by a military man Who has
severed his connection with the Service by retirement.
_LEE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND nit INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF !Eh STATE
DEPARTMENT
The Service intelligence agencies and the intelligence organization of
the State Department have been reviewed from the point of view of the over-all
coordination of intelligence and of the contribution which these agencies
should make to the assembly and production of national intelligence.
As regards the Service intelligence agencies, the active exercise by the
Central Intelligence Agency of its coordinating functions Should result in a
more efficient allocation of effort than is presently the case.
12
The Service
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agencies should concern themselves principally with military intelligence
questions, leaving the Central Intelligence Agency to perform agreed central
services of common interest. In addition, continuing responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency for coordination should be exercised with respect
to certain Service activities, for example, espionage and counter-espionage in
occupied areas. The Joint Intelligence Committee would continue to operate
with its membership unchanged and would concern itself exclusively with mili-
tary and strategic questions as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Services would participate In the formulation of national intelligence esti-
mates through their membership in the Intelligence Advisory Committee and would
share in the collective responsibility for these estimates.
In the case of the Research and Intelligence staff at' the State Department,
the conclusion has been reached that this staff, as at present constituted, is
not sufficiently close to operation and policy matters in the Department to
furnish the necessary liaison or the political intelligence estimates required
by the Central Intelligence Agency for the preparation of national estimates.
Accordingly, it is desirable that a high official of the State Department be
designated as its Intelligence Officer to coordinate these activities, to act
as the Department's representative on the Intelligence Advisory Committee and,
in general, to act as liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency with respect
to the intelligence and related activities of the two agencies and to develop
close working relations between them.
CONCLUSION
While organization charts can never replace individual initiative and
ability, the Central Intelligence Agency, reorganized along the functional
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lines indicated in this report,
should be able more effectively to carry out
the duties assigned it by law and thus bring our over-all intelligence system
closer to that point of efficiency which the national security demands.
* * *
The foregoing summary is only a brief outline of the main points of the
report and does not take the place of the detailed discussion in the report
and the various conclusions and recommendations at the close of the respective
chapters.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
Before considering the adequacy and effectiveness of the work of the
Central Intelligence Agency and its relations to our other intelligence agen-
cies, a brief word of background may be helpful.
Although the Central Intelligence Agency is largely an outgrowth of oux
experience in World War II, it would be wrong to proceed from the premise that
prior to the war our Government had operated without intelligence as to the
capabilities and intentions of possible enemies or prospective allies. The
of State had long maintained a widespread information-gathering
service. The Army, the Navy and certain other departments of the Government
had maintained their own systems of collecting information and producing
intelligence.
Prior to World War II, however, we had no integrated secret intelligence
service. We had not adequately exploited the available sources of overt in-
telligence. We had no central agency to coordinate intelligence collection
and production, and to assemble the best available intelligence for expression
in national estimates to guide in the formulation of foreign policy and the
preparation of Our defense plans.
In World Wars I and II our European Allies, Great Britain in particular,
had placed the product of their intelligence services largely at our disposal.
While we can expect in the future assistance from the intelligence services of
we have rightly concluded that we should not depend on
friends
and allies,
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them for our intelligence to the extent we were forced to do in World War I
and during the early days of World War II.
It was World War II which showed both our deficiencies in intelligence
and also what we could accomplish under pressure. Through the expansion of
the facilities of the State Department and the military services, through the
Office of Strategic Services -- our first move towards a central intelligence
agency -- through enlisting the best personnel that could be found, in and out
of Government service, we were turning out a very creditable performance in
many phases of intelligence work well before the end of Uhe war.
We now recognize that if we are to have adequate intelligence in times of
crisis, we must prepare in time of peace, and we have seriously turned to the
task of building up a central intelligence organization. The country has now
accepted the verdict, even if somewhat reluctantly, that peace-time intelli-
gence is essential to security and, as manyof our military leaders have said,
our first line of defense. It took us a long time to reach this conclusion,
and we are only now gradoally getting over our suspicions of intelligence and
our tendency to confuse it with mere intrigue and the more lurid side of es-
pionage. We are beginning to accept it as serious and honorable workandessen-
tial to our defense.
-It is well to recognizsyhowever, that an efficient intelligence organiza-
tion cannot be built overnight.
It will require years of patient work to provide skilled personnel to do
the job. Blueprints and organization charts, even legislation and ample appro-
priations will not take the place of competent and highly trained
16
men and.
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women. Without them we shall have neither effective intelligence operations
nor sound intelligence estimates. Unfortunately,_ in the difficult organiza-
tional period since the war, the future of intelligence as a career has seemed
so uncertain that many war-trained and competent men have left the service,
and it has been particularly difficult to find recruits to take their place.
Finally, security for our intelligence activities is not always easy to
achieve here in the United States. It is not only the penetration of fifth
columnists which we have to guard against. We have the general problem rising
out of our tradition that all of the affairs of the Government shall be con-
ducted in the open. Sometimes we tend to carry this over even as regards the
publication of the intimAte details of intelligence operations. In peacetime,
particularly, it is not always easy to reconcile our vital interest in pro-
tecting the freedom Of the press with the need for silence on certain phases
of intelligence.
As againdt these debit items, we could cites long list of highly favorable
factors. America has the potential resources, human and material, for the
best intelligence service in the world.' Within our borders we have every race
and nationality, loyal sons speaking every language, travelling and resident
in every foreign country. We have a wide geographical base for the development
of intelligence work. We have the greatest reservoir of scientific and tech-
nical skills'. We have important allies abroad who are ready to join their
knowledge to ours and to give us the benefit of their years of experience in
Intelligence. And last, and possibly most important of all, in the field of
intelligence work,we can develop the individual initiative, skill and ingenuity
of a free people, and, in dealing with our main intelligence antagonists, even
though they operate with the iron discipline imposed by the Kremlin, we can
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show that free men can be vastly more efficient than those working for a
slave system.
These are some of our great assets; our problem is to mobilize them.
There are real elements of urgency in seeing that this task is accomplished.
(1) America today, as never before in time of peace, is vulnerable to
sudden and possibly devastating attack. To meet an initial attack, there are
no sure military weapons of defense and it may well be that our best protec-
tion lies in adequate advance knowledge of the character and timing of the
danger.
(2) A. vast area of the world stretching from the Elbe River in Germany
to the Yangtse in China is largely behind an iron curtain where the normal
sources of information are partially or wholly lacking. The techniques of an
intelligence service ought to be one of the important means of penetrating
this barrier.
(3) A whole new area.of knowledge in the field of science has became
vital for our defense. This field cuts across the functions of various Govern-
ment departments and presents new problems from the viewpoint of intelligence
collection and coordination.
(4) The far-flung activities of the fifth column, both here and abroad,
present a new type of threat to our security, and we require a concerted in-
telligence program to counter this danger.
These are only a few of the developments which give to intelligence an
importance in our defense system which it has never had in the past in time of
peace. Fortunately, these facts are now becoming well understood, and the
18
IMMO
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119261
,qS:14,7,02i,;;4
Administration, the Congress and the people share with deadly seriousness the
determination that the United States here and now shall build the best intelli-
gence service that our national genius and our great resources can provide.
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CHAPTER II
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Beginning as early as 1944 preparations were under way for the transition
from war-time intelligence to a permanent intelligence organization suited to
our post-war needs.
In a series of discussions among the interested Government agencies as to
how the country could most effectively organize its permanent, long-range,
peace-time intelligence there was general agreement on some form of a central
agency. There was, however, a sharp divergence of views as to the scope of the
activities of such an agency, the authority it should enjoy, the manner in
which it should be aaministered and controlled and where In the Government it
should be located. These issues were resolved at that tlne_through the crea-
tion by Presidential letter (A:0 Annex No. 3) of the Central Intelligence Group,
and then more definitely determined, through the establishment of the Central
Intelligence Agency by Congress in Section 102 of the National Security Act of
1947. (See Annex No. 4).
THE DUTIES OF lab, CENTRAL INTEIETUENCE AGENCY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
Section 102 (d) of this Act defines the duties of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency as follows: -
"(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national secu-
rity, it shAll be the duty Of the Agency, under the direction of the National
Security Council --
"(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning
such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies
as relate to national security;
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1111E01
"(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for
the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and
agencies of the Goverment as relate to the national security;
"(3) to correlate and. evaluate intelligence relating to the nationn1
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelli-
gence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and
facilities: Provided That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena,
law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further,
That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue
to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelli-
gence: And. provided further That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure;
"(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agen-
cies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security
Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrp11y;
"(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct."
In these provisions the authors of the National Security Act showed a
sound understanding d' our basic intelligence needs by assigning to the Central
Intelligence Agency three broad duties which had never before been adequately
covered in our national intelligence structure. These duties are: (1) to
advise the National Security Council regarding the intelligence activities of
the government and make recommendations for their coordination; (2) to pro-
vide for the central correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence
relating to the national security; and. (3) to assure the performance, cen-
trally, subject to National Security Council directionyof certain intelligence
and related functions of common concern to various departments of the
Government.
The powers given to the National Security Council and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency under Section 102 of the Act establish, in our opinion, the
framework for a sound intelligence service for this country. Accordingly, we
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do not suggest any amendments to the Act and believe it would b3 unwise to
tamper with this legislation until we have had further experience in oper-
ating under it. Throughout our report we stress the vital tnportance of
giving effect to the real legislative intent through the effective exercise
by the Central Intelligence Agency of those functions assigned to it by
the Act. We refer particularly to the responsibility of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency for the coordination of intelligence activities and the co-
ordination of intelligence opinion in the form of national intelligence
estimates.
In providing for a send-autonomous highly centralized agency with a broad
variety of intelligence responsibilities affecting various Government agencies,
we have departed from the general pattern followed by other countries. There
the tendency in most phases of intelligence has been to avoid such a degree of
centralization. Under the conditions existing in the United States we believe
that the degree of centralization proposed under the National Security Act can
be justified, provided that the distinctive functions of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency are handled according to their special requirements.
As one recommendation designed to offset_the_disadvantages
of over-
centralization in intelligence, we later propose in this report that the
branches of tlie-Gentral Intelligence Ageilcy which arn,directIy engaged in clan-
destine activities, such as-secret-intelIdgehee,----Counter-intelligence, secret
operations and the likebe given-a-I-teat neasure of autonomy
?
administrationrthe control of their operations and. ,he-..selection of personnel.
III:this connection we have considered the arguments which-have`been
fre-
quently advanced that the functions of coordination and of evaluation on the
4
as to internal
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'"----'---,----_-.3 ------\?r----)
on,?,Lhand) should be wholly divorced from collection and operations an the
.,
_ ------
L /
other. One argument is that the analyst will be overly impressed with the
\ )/
particular items of information which his own organization collects, as con-
//f
trasted with the information reaching him from other sources. There sifa fur-
N\
ther fear) partly substantiated by experience under the Central Intelligence
Agency, that if the several functions are combined, there will be a tendency
to neglect the coordinating responsibilities in favor/of the more exciting
field of operations:NFinally, the pointis X
21m that by joining together a
7/d/e
variety of operations whose security requirements are quite different, the
possibility of providing effective security to those activities that require
it most is thereby reduced.
We appreciate the weight of these arguments but do not feel that they are
/7
decisive. We believe that the recognition of the distinctive functions of the
Z
Central Intelligence Agency, and the handling of each one according to its
special requirements and in proper relation to the over-a l"rdeIon, would
\
largely meet these objections. In particular, the granting of auto $o the
clandestine work and adequate emphasis on the important coordinating resp4tsi-
L_______
(/
to
bilities of the Central Intelligence Agencyuld
yo overcome the disadvantages )
,------- - ------ ----------------------------
-x ----,
--
,-- --
f comiining theta-funstions-in-one-brganizatio
CONTROL OVER THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
We do not agree with the argument, often advanced, that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, or at least its operating services, should be placed under the
direct control of one of the executive departments of the Government, such as
the Department of State or the National Military Establishment. The activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency do not concern either of these departments
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exclusively. Moreover, the administrative arrangements of these departments
are not well suited to the conduct of extensive secret foreign intelligenee
operations. The fact that In time of war secret activities are primarily of
concern to the military is not, in our opinion, sufficient justification for
placing them under military control in time of peace. The National Security
Act is flexible enough and the authority of the National Security Council
sufficiently broad to permit any necessary adjustments within the Central In-
telligence Agency so that these operations will be responsive to the needs of
the policy-making and operating departments of the Government, without sub-
ordinating them directly to these departments.
We have also considered the question whether the Central Intelligence
Agency as a whole is properly placed in our governmental structure under the
National Security Council. When the National Security Act was being drafted.
doubts were expressed whether a connittee such asthe National Security Council
would be able to give effective direction to the Central Intelligence Agency.
It was argued that the National Security Council was too large a body, would
be preoccupied with high policy natters, and would neat too infrequently to be
able to give sufficient attention to the proper functioning of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
There is force to the criticism that a committee, no natter how august,
Is rarely an effective body for the direction of the current operations of
another agency. It is true that the National Security Council cannot effec-
tively assume the task of directing such current operations, and should not
attenpt,to do so, except to the extent of assuring itself of compliance with
its directives. However, the Council, whose chairman is the President and
whose membership comprises the highest authority in the interested departments
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of the Government, can render effective service indetermining the nature and
scope of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency within the frame-
work of the National Security Act.
We recommend, however, that provision should be made for closer liaison
between the Central Intelligence Agency and the two members of the National
Security Council on whom it chiefly depends: namely, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense. We suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence
be encouraged to seek current advice and continuing guidance from these two
members of the National Security Council on matters which may not properly be
the subject of its formal directives, or which have not reached the point of
requiring such directives. Such close association would help counteract what
we feel is a growing tendency for the Central Intelligence Agency to become a
separate and independent agency of Government working to some extent in com-
petition with, rather than for the benefit of) those departments of Government
which are the primary users of what the Central Intelligence Agency should
produce.
THE GENERAL MISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Unless the Central Intelligence Agency performs an essential service for
each of these departments and coordinates their intelligence activities it
will failin its mission. The Central Intelligence Agency should not be mere-
ly another intelligence agency duplicating and rivalling the existing agencies
of State, Army, Navy and Air Force. It should not be a competitor of these
agencies, lint a contributor to them and should help to coordinate their
intelligence activities. It must make maximum use of the resources of exist-
ing agencies; it must not duplicate their work but help to put an end to
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existing duplication by seeing to it that the best qualified agency in each
phase-of-the intelligence field should assump and carry out its particular
responsibility.
In the succeeding chapters of this report we will suggest concrete steps
for giving effect to these general principles. In doing so we will start from
the premise which we have stated above that the existing legislation affords a
good basis on which to build a central intelligence service. Furthermore, as
the most practical Method of approach, we will examine what has been accom-
plished through the Central Intelligence Agency under this legislation and
suggest as we go along the specific and, in some cases, fundamental changes
which we consider desirable. In this way we will build upon what we now have
rather thah attempt to start anew and build from the ground up.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 establishes a
framework for a sollild intelligence system and no amendments to this Section of
the Act are deemed necessary at this time.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency is properly placed in our govern-
mental structure under the National Security Council.
(3) The Central Intelligence Agency should be empowered and encouraged
to establish through its Director closer liaison with the two members of the
National Security Council on whom it chiefly depends, namely, the Secretaries
of State and Defense.
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CHAPTER III
THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ORGANIZATION
The National Security Act of 1947 does not make detailed provision for
the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. It provides that the
Agency shall be headed bya Director of Central Intelligence and that he "shall
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, from among the commissioned officers of the Armed Services or from among
individuals in civilian life".
With one exception, noted below, the Director is free to organize the
Central Intelligence Agency as he chooses and to appoint to positions within
the organization persons of his own selection, as well as to terminate their
employment without regard for normal Civil Service procedures.
In this chapter we discuss the administrative organization of the Central
Intelligence Agency, leaving for Chapter X, when we have completed our exami-
nation of the various activities of the Agency, an appraisal of the over-all
direction of the organization in relation to its assigned mission.
In carrying out his task of organizing the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Director has designated as his immediate subordinates a Deputy Director
and an Executive Director*. Assisting this directing group in a staff capacity
are the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS); the General
* General Order No. 11 of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated September 14,
1948, which is to become effective short1y;abolishes the post of Executive
Director.
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)1,3fgri

Counsel who handles all legal and legislative work,. the Advibory Council, a
small represents the Director in handling-communications intelli.11
ciFice matters; the Executive for Administration and Management, in charge of
financial and budgetary matters, administrative services, supply and general
housekeeping, personnel and management advice and surveys; and the Executive
for Inspection and Security, responsible for internal security policies' and
Investigations, physical security arrangenents, inspections and audits: (For
Organization Chart as of January 1, 1949, see Annex No. 5).
The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS), comprising
persons nominated by the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, has
the primary responsibility for assisting the Director and the Intelligence
Advisory Committee with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities.
(See Chapter IV).
The other functions of the Central Intelligence Agency are performed in
five Offices*, each headed by an Assistant Director. Mese are the Office of
Reports and Estimates (ORE), 'Office of Special Operations (050), Office of
Policy Coordination (C)PC), Office of Operations (00), and Office of
and Disseminatibn (0CD). A chart showing the personnel strength of the various
parts of the Agency as of December 24, 1948 is given in Annex No: 6.
The responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency to "correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" is assigned to the
Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). However, as we will point out later,
.(See Chapters V and. VI), a clear distinction has never been made within the
* We understand that since this report was written steps are being taken to
create a separate Office of Scientific Intelligence.
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Office of Reports and Estimates between the duty of correlating national in-
telligence and performing other miscellaneous reporting activities which are
more in the nature of "static" common service functions.
The "operating" services of common concern Which have been assigned to
the Central Intelligence Agency are carried out by three Offices. The Office
of Special Operations is responsible for foreign espionage and counter-espionage
(See Chapter VIII). The Office of Operations is charged with the exploitation
of domestic contacts for foreign intelligence, the monitoringof foreign broad-
casts and the exploitation of intelligence information found in foreign docu-
ments, press and other publications (See Chapter VII). The Office of Policy
Coordination is charged with conducting secret operations abroad under a spe-
cial mandate from the National Security Council which stipulated that the As-
sistant Director, Office of Policy Coordination, must be nominated by the
Secretary of State, and that his appointment by the Director is subject to
approval by the National Security Council. This is the only case, as mentioned
above, in which the National Security Council has prescribed internal arrange-
ments within the Central Intelligence Agency or limited the appointive author-
ity of the Director. (See Chapter IX).
The Office of Collection and Dissemination combines avariety of functions,
each somewhat differently related to the over-all mission of the Central In-
telligence Agency. It performs static services of common concern in that it
compiles and maintains certain biographical, library and other reference mate-
rials. It also performs: a coordinating function in handling intelligence col-
lection?requests of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other departments.
Finally, it performs administrative functions such as the reception and dis-
semination of documents and reports.- (See Chapter IV).
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40#7tET
_ADMINISTRATIOI)
eatiive requirements of an
STAT
-
organization such as the Centralt:
5
Intelligence Agency, which carries out overt and covert activities, ? of
which are highly specialized, cannot be expected to conform to normal admtniE1-
\
trative Practice. The entire organization is, to some extent, affected by
special security requirements, and these are particularly difficult to handle
with respect to secret intelligence and related operations.
N
It is for these reasons that we are opposed to p pOsals for increasing
the degree of administrative .,centralization in the Central Intelligence Agency*.
N',. /
In particular, the administrative problems \ assOciated with secret work abroad \
are of such an unconventiona character thithe need to be given special
treatment. (See below, page 1161..
Administrative arrangements whicfi\do not at first sight appear to be ef-
ficient or economical may be/necessary in the Central Intelligence Agency.
Personnel requirements for crtain types of work cannot conformtonormal Civil
Service standards, and the demands of security often impose special and unusual
procedures. This situation must be understood not only by those responsible
for the internal organization of the Central Intelligence Agency but also by
.
Congress and the Bureau of the Budget.
.The chargeis sometimes made that there are too many administrative person-
nel and that the Central Intelligence Agency organization is top heavy in Ude-
/ 7
relper. The Executive for Administration and Management and the Executive for
\ \
provides for the centralization under an Executiverr
nistration former Executive for Administration and Management) of all
opinion,1221. and contrary to_the_principles
This measure is, in our budget,_nervices,_Pernopnel and management ons, both overt and covert.\
advocated in this report.
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50X1
CTIT'sjection and Security together represent a large numb-6r of per-El-al-1'neltotal-
r_ _r
This-figur!_!=t_tude per-
sonnel performing administrative fuTa-c:_tioin ot or znr_softheorgan_Lze7Cr-',
C2!: ever, regardless cethe criticism directed against numbers,criticism should
properly directed against p6r5iw---1-a. pro5eiCh4TEM
BUT
The Central Intelligence Agency appears to have no serious budgetary
problem and is favoredby adequate Congressional support. The budget proposals,
an approved by the Director, are submitted each year with the authorization of
the National Security Council to the Bureau of the Budget where they are
handled by one official who has full security clearance. Then the budget in
.supported before special sub-committees of the Appropriations Committee of the
50X1 two Houses of Congress.
50X1
Both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget have refrained from examining
in detail the internal workings of the Central Intelligence Agency in order to
determine the justification for the budget. It is important that such dis-
cretion and security be continued and that special treatment be accorded.
However, in order to justify this, it is necessary that the National Security
Council' continuously assure itself as, to the proper management and operations
of the Central Intelligence Agency, serving as the informed sponsor of the
Agency and as the protector of its security.
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50X1
In summary, we believe that the present arrangements for handling the
difficult question of the budget for the Central Intelligence Agency are sound
and that the Agency has not been hampered in carrying out its present respon-
sibilities by lack of funds.
SECURITY
Altlingh-thbra-is--nZ evidence of any laxness in the administrative ar-
/,
rangaments for security, there area number of circumstances andpolicies// whith
i/
detract,from the general security of the Central Intelligence Agenc_ . It is
.\\,..
very difficult to create adequate security, other than mere phyeical security,
N\ \
around an organization which was publicly created by statutej employe about
individual- and encompasses a wide var'ety of activities. The
\
fact that some of these activities are carried on isamatter of public record;
the existence of others and particularly operating details are highly secret.
Yet, by codbiaing in a single organization a wide variety of activities, the
V,'\\
security of the covert activities risks being compromised by the lower stand.-
/ .7--
arde of security-of the overt activities.
50X1 In the Washington area, the Agency occupiee-about buildings, all
of which can be rea7ly identified as buildings of tfieCentral Intelligence
Agency. In various cities throughout the United States, the regional offices
(
of the Office of Operations conduct their business under the name "Central
50X1
Intelligence Agency". Over individuals publicly4dentify them-
// \ \
selves with the Central Intelligence Agency which has unfortunately become
/
publicized as a secret intelligence organization.
This security problem is an aftermath of the wartime period, with its
rap Id.
1public dramatization of,espionage_and other secret_operationa.,44
r--
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RET
urnover of personnel. Intelligence_has become a_suliject of general discue7
sion:tb--WhiZh,the publicizing of inter-agency rivalries has contributed.-----xor
example, after the Bogotiri9,ts in April 1948 there as a public-fairing before
a Congressional Committee of the hPnaling_of sepret-intelligence concerning
developments in Colombia. Damaging-disclosures-were made regarding certain
operating details-of secret intelligence activitiezi'conducted by the Central
'-:'--- -N---.
Intelligence Agency. During the past year, there have been newspaper and
'-,
4(?::-----
-,----------_____-- ----
magazine articles concerning the Central Intelligence Agency and Its secret
,---------"_________,---------- .------ - -____________
abroad:'
--------___J
Lest further incidents of this character occur, every effort should be
made to prevent the public
operations of the Central
Act (Section 102 (d) (3)),
disclosure of secret information relating to the
Intelligence Agency. Under the National Security
the Director of Central Intelligence is made re-
sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. This mandate appears to give the Director authority to resist
pressure for disclosure of secret information.
If, however, in his relations with Congress or with other Government de-
partments, the disclosure of secret. information is sought from the Director,
and if he has any doubt as to whether he should comply,itshould be established
practice for him to refer the question to the National Security Council in
order that it may determine whether or not disclosure is in the public interest.
We believe that other steps can also be taken toward an improvement of
security. There should be greater flexibility in the Central Intelligence
Agency's organization by distinguishing between those functions which are
written into the statute and hence are public and those whose existence, and
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certainly whose operations, should remain secret. The two should be adminis-
tratively and functionally separated, and appropriate-concealment should be
given to the secret activities as discussed below. (See page 116).
At the same time, a serious endeavor should be made to reverse the pres-
ent unfortunate trend wherein the Central Intelligence Agency finds itself
advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organization. It should be
presented instead to the public as the centralized coordinator of intelligence.
This would help to cover rather than uncover its secret operations. Even with
these specific steps, in the long run only organizational discipline and per-
sonal discretion will insure security.
PERSONNEL
The Central_Intelligence Agency labors under a difficult personnel prob- --I
im?part because a comprehensive intelligence organization such as this
has extremely varied, personnel requirements. It is handicaTped,Inimeeting
x.
them because of the-sensitive security considerations which limit recruitment,
the anonymity which should'properly be demanded of a large part of its person-
nel, and the special relationships-which,neeetvo be maintained with the other
branches of the Government. It needa-personn vith highly specialized talents,
aswellaspersonswithbroadexperience. It also reguires personnel who are
familiar with the prOblems
of the agencies which
Agency serves/and with which it works.
jj/)The youth of the organization and the conditions of change and uncertainty
N,\
which have prevailed in our central intelligence organization during the pat
the Central Intelligence
few years have made the task of recruiting_and holding_personna.---i:N*Li2
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_
Persons lite7Milihrt-thetWise be 41W1ifled and interested in intelligence
as-a: e
career have' discouraged from entering this field or have left
On the whole, morale within the Central Intelligence Agency/is not good.
The chief reasons appear to be uncertainty as to the future of a career in in-
/
telligence '\1?widespread criticism of the performance of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and dissatisfaction with leaderehip Among the civilians there
\\\\
/
is a realization that military personnel who come and gooccupy many of the key
\ \ /
'positions;andamongsomeofthemilitaryper/eonnel there is often discontent
arising from a lack of interest in intelligence and a belief that a tour of
/
duty in the Central.Intelligence\Mency will not lead to Service advancement.
Delay in obtaining securityClerances has caused particular difficulty
in recruiting personnel,/ Although the security of its personnel needs to be
beyond question, procedures and restrictions should not be so rigid that secu-
rity is obtained/nly by sacrificing talent, Imagination and initiative.