THE FORRESTAL DIARIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 3, 1947
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
THE
Forrestal
DIARIES
Edited by Walter' Millis
WITH THE COLLABORATION OF
E. S. DUFFIELD
NEW YORK ? THE VIKING PRESS ? MCMLI
_Declassified and Approved For Release _? _50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
D.
eclassified and Approved_ For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
?THE Forrestal DIARIES
2:48
tO do and he would ultimately be in the hands of the Chiefs of
? Staff, which, I said, was my impression of what the Army
wanted. . . .
?Taft's son was in the Navy and he ?showed considerable
knowledge of what I meant when I talked about the easy as.
sumptions Of the Army regarding control of the sea.
Regarding Air?I told him that the development, of the Air
arm was probably the most uncertain of all in modern war; that
the phrase "guided missiles" was a misnomer because the
missiles were not guided and it looked like a long time before
they would be. When they were fully developed it would be a
question then whether the airplane became a guided missile
or the guided missile an airplane. Senator Taft said he would
be here continuously - from now on and we agreed that we
would talk again before the first of the year.
[ The diary records no further details of the unification discus-
sions until January 3. Forrestal came away from the Cabinet
meeting that day with Secretary Patterson.
3 January 1947 Cabinet Meeting
. . Judge Patterson rode back with me from Cabinet to
the Navy Department, He said he was much disturbed in the
growing evidence of bitterness between the Services and men-
tioned the fate of the Japanese Army and Navy, referring par-
ticularly to a book by Kato. He said that if the Army and
Navy officers went down to testify in a mood of bitterness and
hatred, they would do serious damage to the Services and the
national defense. I replied that he was simply stating what I
had stated right along, that unless the two Services were hon-
estly and thoroughly back of a plan for integration and co-
ordination, it would not be successful. In fact, it would pro-
duce the opposite of the result we were after.
I told him th4t I had discovered a depth of feeling in Naval
Aviation which had been very surprising to me?that it was not
merely a question of the battleship admirals and the older men
but of the younger ranks of officers?which had impressed me
as quite dangerous. I told him that it came from various seg.
sETTING NEW COURSES 229
inents of Naval Aviation who remembered that they had had
to fight hard within the Navy to get recognition and outside of it
to retain their independence against the assaults of the Army
Ai Forces.trson
said he was not rigidly or stubbornly committed
Patterson
a
te
to any one plan, that he was quite willing to be flexible on the
question of roles and missions, and that everything that was
done heavyhandedly or without the freely given support of
the officers of all Services would not be successful. His con-
cluding remark was "they must have the attitude that they're
all truly brothers in arms."
I told him that was precisely the attitude of Admiral Nimitz
and Admiral Ramsey and both had been at great pains to pre-
vent the growth of bitterness within the Navy, and that I
knew the President and he and I could rely on their efforts to
create precisely the atmosphere which he indicated. But I
said it was difficult to create such an atmosphere when we
had such speeches as were made by General Armstrong at
Norfolk, some excerpts from which I quoted to him.
He spoke highly of Admirals Nimitz, Ramsey and Sherman.
The whole conversation was in an entirely different key and
tenor than any talk I've ever had before with Patterson. He
said he had not paid much attention to the conversations that
Symington had had with Norstad and Sherman.
[ This "new key" was' evidently productive of results. Forres-
tal's appointment calendar over the next couple of weeks shows
numerous meetings which must, from the persons present, have
been devoted to unification, and on January 11 the whole day
was given over to the subject. But there was no further diary
note until January 16.
16 January 1947 Unification
Admiral Sherman, Symington and Norstad agreed today on
the final draft of the letter [to be signed by the two Secre-
taries] reconciling the Army and Navy views on the hategya-
tion of the Armed Services. Talked to Clark Clifford at the
Wilite House, who wanted to make an immediate release,
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
230 THE Forrestal DIARIES
but I insisted that that not be done until I had an opportunity
to inform the. principal Navy friends in the House and Sen.
ate?Senators Robertson, Byrd, Tydings, Brooks, Russell and
Austin, ex-Chairman Vinson of the Naval Affairs Committee,
Cole, eic., in the House. I said this was desirable ,not merely
from the standpoint of the Navy's obligation to these men, but
also by way of enlisting their sympathetic cooperation in
the future.
The documents were released to the newspapers at 6:oo p. m.
These documents recorded a climactic milestone in a long,
arduous and earnest effort. One, the joint letter from the two
Secretaries to the President, was in the form of a sequel to their
joint letter of May 31, 1946,8 in which they had reported dis-
agreement on four important points. They were now completely.
agreed on all aspects of the proposed legislation. Their recorn-
mendations?calling for a single Secretary of Defense with co-
ordinating powers, for a National Security Council, a smaller
War Council, a National Security Resources Board, a Central In-
telligence Agency, and a command structure headed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?in general accorded with the principles for
which Forrestal had begun to search in the middle period of the
war and which he had since so firmly argued for and upheld. It
was agreed that the allocation of specific roles and missions
among the three proposed Services should be dealt with not 1)
law but by executive order, and a, second document presented an
agreed draft for such an order. Here the wording was less exact
although again the draft order represented an acceptance, in the
main, of Forrestars and the Navy's position. The Navy was given
primary responsibility for its own land-based reconnaissance and
patrol aircraft and the Marines were accorded primary responsi?
bility for the techniques of amphibious warfare.
For Forrestal it was a very considerable success; but it was not,
as he well knew, a final victory. The newspaper reaction en
January 17 was highly favorable; but it remained actually to draft
a bill and get it through Congress. "It is," Forrestal noted in hii
See pp. 164-65.
sgTTING NEW COURSES 231
[ diary on the 17th, "most important that this drafting work be
watched very carefully. I think we still have to face continued ef-
forts on the part of the Army to enforce their conception of a
single Department and a single Chief of Staff, each of which, in
my opinion, would be disastrous." As it turned out, the bill was
finally passed in midsummer in substantially the recommended
form. The sound and satisfactory division of roles and missions
was, however, to prove a more obstinate question; the draft ex-
ecutive order, clothed in the vagueness common to most products
of compromise, was insufficient to settle the intricate problems
involved, and, as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal was to find him-
self still struggling with them nearly two years later.
III
A few days before Christmas Forrestal entered a note in his
diary that sheds an interesting light not only on the President but
on Forrestal himself, and on the relations between the two
men.
20 December 1946 The President
Last night the President came to dinner with Secretary of
State Byrnes, Averell Harriman and a few others. Before din-
ner I showed him a copy of the New Republic, which I said I
was going to give Jimmy Byrnes for Christmas. In it was a
caricature of Senator Taft with a picture of his father in the
background. Senator Taft and his father were represented in a
caricature fashion. The President laughed at the caricature of
Senator Taft but expressed himself that it was not in good
taste and an impropriety to caricature an ex-President who is
dead.
(I make note of this because it served to strengthen the im-
pression I have had of the President's traditionalism and his
sense of the importance of sustaining the dignity of govern-
ment. His remarks to the Commission on Universal Training
this morning reflected much of the same feeling, plus a deep
and obviously very sincere devotion to the government and
the people of the country.)
stow
ior.nArrri.ompArwLirremprtonwryw' Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4 ?
,
312 THE Forrestal DIARlys
inevitably that Britain's collapse meant d.2.e collapse of the rest
of Europe. . . .
. They were wrestling, as the summer waned, with many issue;
doubts, possibilities, uncertain future considerations. At this mo.
ment, hoWever, real and immediate crisis 'suddenly loomed, a
crisis that was to propel Forrestal himself into his new office.
_IS September /947 Italian Peace Treaty
? The Italian Peace Treaty became effective today. A line be.
tween Yugoslavia and Italy was originally determined by a
crayon drawing on a map. When surveying parties undertook
to establish this line in precise fashion it was found that it would
go through the middle of cities and villages. A resurvey was or?
dered, the result of which, territory-wise, was disadvantageous
to the Italians. American Ambassador Dunn [James C. Dunn,
Ambassador to Italy] telephoned the State Department that ad.
herence to this line was against the national interests of Italy,
that it could be used to great advantage by Togliatti, the Cora
munist leader, and probably would mean the fall of the De
Gasperi government. Army people replied that any attempt to
alter the line at this late date would almost inevitably result in
fighting, with the strong possibility that American troops
would be projected into the middle of it with obviously un-
foreseeable consequences. State then said it would adhere
to the original line but made it clear that it was a War Depart-
ment decision. The War Department people refused to accept
this responsibility, saying that they were merely acting as trans-
mitters of the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
State Department, to the effect that the consequences of war had
to be considered a possibility if the line was altered. The State
Department finally agreed to accept the JCS paper in this
- spirit.
[ Here was a' vivid example of just that kind of disconnection
in policy which the new defense structure had been devised to
overcome. That real dangers were involved was apparent before
the day was out.
FIRST SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 313
is ,September 1947 Admiral Wooldridge
Wooldridge [Rear Admiral Edmund T. Wooldridge, Assist-
Ant Chief of Naval Operations] came in to see me this evening
to say that the State Department had just had a message from
Ambassador Dunn to the effect that Yugoslavia informed Gen-
eral Lee [Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, commanding
Mediterranean Theater of Operations] that they proposed to
occupy Trieste. Lee, after consultation with Ambassador Dunn,
who in turn communicated with the State Department, replied
that if they did he would resist with all the force at his dis-
posal.
I asked Wooldridge to check with Admral Nimitz on the
wisdom of concentrating our naval forces?with particular ref-
erence to the aircraft carrier Leyte which is now at Smyrna.
I talked to Under Secretary Lovett of the State Department,
who confirmed the information I had received from Wool-
dridge. He said the State Department was lodging a note of
protest to the Yugoslav government in Belgrade. I asked him
whether the British were taking parallel action. He said he as-
sumed that they would because half of the troops in Trieste, al-
though under Lee's command, were British. . . .
President Truman at the moment was returning on board the
U.S. S. Missouri from a visit to Brazil. As the crisis developed it
seemed essential that the Secretary of Defense should assume
his office.
16 September /947 Clark Clifford
Clark Clifford informed me that he had yesterday afternoon
radioed the President the central facts of the situation in Trieste
and the Yugoslavia-Italian line. The President responded dur-
ing the night with instructions that I should be sworn in imme-
diately and take action to see that all available reinforcements
true provided for General Lee. In the light of the failure of
any Ivorsening developments today, Clifford said he has decided
to take the responsibility of not proceeding on this schedule
and has cabled the President that conclusion with supporting
reasons.
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
'Ogir-Efeclasiiii-ecin?ciApprOVeci-VOr ReFee.. 014/63/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R-0003d0060002-4 7-77-77-
314 THE Forrestal ntAkiEt
f Forrestal was sworn in at noon the following day, Septern.
ber 17, as first Secretary of Defense; Sullivan and Symington
were sworn in on the 18th as the new Secretaries of the Navy
and of Air. The Trieste crisis passed, and there is no further ref.
erence to it in the diary. But the President's prompt order to
'provide all available reinforcements" for General Lee left behind
it an obvious and embarrassing question: What reinforcements,
in fact, did the United States possess against menaces which were
now apparent in nearly every quarter of the globe?
II
Since his confirmation, Forrestal had of course been occupied
with the problems of setting up the new Military Establishment.
A memorandum of August. 18 to Royall (now Secretary of the
Army) noted "a few subjects that I would like to talk over with
you sometime at your convenience"; they included the correla-
tion of the Army and Navy Reserve Officers Training Corps pro-
grams, the use of the Office of Naval Research by the Army and
Air Force rather than the creation of new research offices by
the other two, and "a detailed and carefully thought-through plan'
for universal military training. "I have the impression," he added
to the last, "that this has not yet been done. I think it will need to
be clone if it is to be effectively and successfully presented to
the public."
At the end of August he was discussing plans for the organiza-
tion of the Joint Staff (which the unification act had provided
to serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff) with Major General A. M
Gruenther. Gruenther, who was to prove a valuable and able
military administrator, was leaving his post as a deputy corn-
mandant of the War College to head the new body.
29 August 1947 Lunch?General Gruentizo
. . . [Gruenther] made the observation that there was 2
fundamental difference in thinking between the Army and thr
Navy on the question of a Staff versus Committee system of ar.
riving at decisions. I concurred, but I said the difference wen1
deeper than that, that one had to realize and take into account
a number of considerations: for example, the vast difference In
FIRST SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 315
the conduct of war on land masses and the kind of war that
was fought in the Pacific; the inherent organizational differ-
ences between Army and Navy derived from the fact that the
smallest unit the Army could employ was a division, whereas
the Navy was accustomed to operating either a single PT or a
task force of a thousand ships, and for that reason always had to
be flexible. Gruenther admitted that there was this basic dif-
ference, both as regards the character of war and the character
ot organization.
I pointed out that the concept of the chain of command and
the single commander simply could not operate in the South
and Southwest Pacific where commanders were a thousand or
two thousand miles apart, where communications were sporadic
and unreliable, and where the fighting was of the most dis-
persed and varied character. I said I had the feeling that Eisen-
hower had no conception of the Pacific war and that our think-
ing in terms of planning for another war might have to be quite
different from the planning and thinking for any aspect of the
recent war. . . .
On the day that Clifford told him that he should immediately
take the oath, Forrestal was confronting further problems of ad-
justment raised by the act.
hi Septendier 1947
Lunch?General Norstad
and Admiral Ranzsey
General discussion about thelunctions of the National Secu-
:ity Council?its relation to the President, the Cabinet, and to
:Ile Bureau of the Budget.
Norstad confirmed my impression that State under Acheson's
xadership had been very dubious about the creation of the
round' and would undoubtedly try to castrate its effectiveness.
It Was his view, however, that it was an essential link because
v) many decisions that now had to be made were a composite
of military and political questions. He did, however, express
considerable misgivings about the extent of military participa-
lon in diplomatic decisions. This flowed, in his opinion, from
the paucity of trained people in the State Department and the
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-"(r 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
N?-
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
THE Forrestal DIARItt
316
consequent necessity of drafting people from the military to
fill in the gap. Continuance of this practice he regarded as not
in the interests of the Military Establishment, which in due
course would come to be attacked as exercising too powerful
an influence upon our foreign policies. The actual facts of tilt
matter, he said, were contrary to public impression?it was
usually the military people who had to hold back the sporadic
and truculent impulses of political people and diplomats who do
not realize the consequences of aggressive action. He cited for
an example the incident of last September when Yugoslays silo:
down American fliers. Acheson was all for an immediate and
aggressive use of American Air fighter power over Yugoslavia.
Norstad at that time had to point out to him that such a dem
onstration would inevitably mean war and we would be expos-
. ing relatively green and untrained pilots to a superior and corn.
petent enemy. I said this was an example of what I believed
the Security Council should be for: To make a careful exams
nation of situations and incidents and to avoid "stumbling into
war." The opposite, I said, was the Panay incident in 1987,
when Japanese airplanes sank the U. S. S. Panay, a river gun-
boat, in the Yangtze], where we should have seen to it that IQ
went to war?if we had it would probably have avoided Work
War II.
[ Again, at a buffet luncheon the next day for the heads of
new organization, Forrestal realized that the National Secunt
Council might bring friction.
17 September 1947
It is apparent that there is going to be a difference betwet
the Budget, some of the White House staff and ourselves (
the National Security Council?its functions, its relationship!
the President and myself. I regard it as an integral part of if
national defense setup and believe it was so intended by t
Congress. Ag I have said earlier I regard it also not as a pla
to make policies but certainly as a place to identify for I
President those things upon which policy needs to be made
Meeting at 1:00 P.
'MST SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 317
At this buffet luncheon Forrestal had called together all of the
key figures in the new National Military Establishment. TV-
gether they formed a kind of dramatis personae of Forrestal's
administration, and as such it is worth listing them. Those who
attended were: the three Service Secretaries?Royall of the
Army, Sullivan of the Navy, Symington of the Air Force; the
three military chiefs?Eisenhower, Nimitz and Spaatz and the
head of their joint staff, Gruenther; the heads of four of the new
national Military Establishment boards?Arthur M. Hill of the
National Security Resources Board, Thomas J. Hargrave of the
Munitions Board, Vannevar Bush of the Joint Research and De-
velopment Board, and Admiral Sidney W. Souers, executive sec-
retary of the National Security Council; the President's special
counsel, Clifford; the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency,
Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter; and Forrestal's own three
assistants, Wilfred J. McNeil, Marx Leva and John H. Ohly.
A number of them were present at a meeting a few days later
devoted to further discussion of the role of the National Security
Council.
" September 1947 Meeting with War and Security Councils
1 Meeting in my office today, following present: Royall, Sym-
ington and Sullivan, Eisenhower, Nimitz, Spaatz, Souers, Gruen-
'cher and Leva. -
I said the purpose of the meeting was a preliminary dish's-
ion of procedures in the War Council [composed of the four
efense Secretaries and the three Chiefs of Staff] and in the
curity Council, what category of subjects the War Council
ihould discuss and what form they should be transmitted to
Ihe Security Council. The question arose as to whether the Se-
iurity Council should make positive recommendations as to
)iatters of policy and to whom they should make them. Secre-
ry Royall stated that the council should make such recom-
endations. I expressed the view that we would have to be
ost careful to avoid (a) the appearance of either duplicating
I replacing the functions of the Cabinet, and (b) giving the
' blic the impression that our foreign policy was completely
mutated by a military point of view.
.':"IglivngtiontivmmerwerrnmsvrirmiTtrwri
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-R6P83-01034R000300060002-4
'b?e-Cia-ssified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
318 , THE Forrestal DIARIts
I reported a conversation I had this morning with [Undel
Secretary Lovett of the State Department on the question 01
Italy?whether if upon evacuation by American troops then,
should be , subsequent formation of a Communist republic in
the north, we should encourage an invitition from De Gas
pen's government to send a military mission to Italy to recoil
stitute their army and otherwise put them in a position to re.
sist Communist domination. I said that Lovett had made thy
statement that neither he nor the State Department was in a
position to evaluate our capabilities in this direction. I had re?-
sponded, I said, that by the same token the military Service)
were in no position to determine national policy on such a
matter; that it was our job only to state the capabilities and
then await instructions. Lovett said because of this mixture of
interest between our two sides of government, it was obvious
to him that such a subject afforded an example of what kind of
business should come before the Security Council. I agreed
and set'Some time during Friday for such a meeting.
Other subjects discussed briefly were Korea, the United Na-
dons Police Force, and the work of the Committee on the Re.
duction of Conventional Armaments.
[ Forrestal took time out in these days for one of his reminiscent
lnnches with former Secretary Byrnes.
/8 September 1947 fames F. Byrnez
Lunched today with Jimmy Byrnes. We talked about Russi2
and American policy from 1943 on. He said one of the difficul
ties, he thought, after Roosevelt's death, was that Stalin did no:
like Truman and had told him (Byrnes) so. I made the of)
servation that Mr. Truman was the first one who had ever said
"no" to anything Stalin asked?that he had good reason for his.
ing FDR because he got out of him the Yalta Agreement, an
thing he asked for during the war, and finally an opportunil
to push Communist propaganda in the United States afl!
throughout the world.
figsT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 519
The Atomic Energy Commission had been rigorously separated
by law from the Military Establishment; but inevitably its opera-
tions came within the purview of the Secretary of Defense. The
deepening atmosphere of suspicion and disagreement surround-
ing its activities was evident from a visit on September 23 of
Lewis Strauss, a member of the commission. Strauss was worried
over a recent action of the AEC (against which he alone had
voted) in releasing information on isotopes to other nations. For-
restal had no scientific knoydedge as to the possible importance
of the information but he was disturbed by "the fact that the
AEC had acted without first checking with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. . . . I told him that the impression I had from members
of the Military Liaison Committee with the AEC was a very un-
happy one; they felt that, contrary to the public statements of
Dr. Lilienthal as to cooperation, we were actually getting none."
Another organizational problem was involved in the appoint-
ment of Bush as head of the Resources and Development Board.
When Forrestal took him to see the President the latter made
some pungent observations on the trials of his office. Bush was
under the impression that he did not have the full backing of the
President in scientific matters because of a difference between
them the year before over the National Science Foundation bill.
September 1947 Meeting with President
? ? . The President objected to this bill mainly because it
removed from him the right of naming the head of the founda-
tion, which he felt was transgression of the prerogatives of the
presidential office. Dr. Bush mentioned this at his meeting with
the President today and pointed out that in the handing out of
federal funds the President would need the advice of some pro-
tfesevslnnal body to protect him against the importunities of states
land regions of the country on a political basis. I supported this
The President interpolated the remark that the
Executive of the United States had to spend most of his
'brrie soothing the sensitivities of the people he wanted to get
0 work for him. He mentioned the fact that he had spent fif-
Cm minutes this morning listening to a man he had asli.ed to
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300o6onn9_4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
320 THE Forrestal o 'Anus
head up the Food Conservation program as to where he would
rank as to pi-otocol, this matter seeming to the individual con.
cerned to be paramount to the job that he was asked to do. in
short, the President said, the President of the United States has
to spend a good part of his time saluting the backsides of a
large number of people. . . .
?
On September 26 the National Security Council held its first
meeting, thus laying the cornerstone, as it were, of the new de-
fense structure.
26 September 1947 National Security Council
First meeting of the National Security Council. Present.
.Royall, Sullivan, Symington, Hillenkoetter, Hill, Souers, Lo\
? ett and myself [in addition to the President].
Souers outlined the general scheme for organization of the
Security Council. The President indicated that he regarded
it as his council and that he expected everyone to work har-
moniously without any manifestations of prima-donna quali-
ties. I said that it was my conception of the Council that it
would serve as an advisory body to the President, that he would
take its advice in due consideration, but that determination of
and decisions in the field of foreign policy would, of course, be
his and the Secretary of State's. . . .
Admiral Hillenkoetter then presented a thumbnail review
of the world situation in the order of priority of importance.
I then told the President that we had agreed yesterday that
Mr. Lovett should present a review of one situation which he
regarded as a typical example of the kind of subject upon
which the Security Council's advice and thought would be use.
ful to the State Department, namely, Italy.
Italy is in the middle of a struggle between the Communis:
Party on the extreme Left, the conservatives on the extreme
Right, with the government of De Gasperi now in power rep.
resenting the middle of the road. Togliatti leads the Coln
munists and i mainly active in the north, where twenty-sk
million out of forty-five million Italians live. He has a work.
ing arrangement with Nenni, the leader of the Socialist Partv.
FIRST SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 321
Nenni he described as being under the delusion that he could
"control" the Communists. Lovett sketched various situations
which, if they developed, would call for quick decisions by the
United States (decisions which he hoped could be pondered
over in advance so that they would not be made under the
frenzy and fury of last-minute crisis): If the Communists in
the north should seize power and set up a so-called People's
government, invite Tito to "help them maintain order," and
then threaten the De Gasperi government in the south, what
does the United States do?
He pointed out that our ftilure to act would mean the nega-
tion of any effort we had made in Turkey and Greece for the
obvious reason that Italy lies athwart the line of communica-
tions to those regions. Furthermore, he said the whole position
in the Middle East would be threatened to the extent that,
with the line of communications through the Mediterranean
dominated by a Russian satellite, both Iran and Iraq and Saudi
Arabia would have to reassess their position vis-?is Russia.
The National Security Council's own first meeting thus clearly
defined its function. Echoes of the initial misgivings could be
heard as late as the presidential campaign of 1948, however,
when the Republican candidate, Governor Dewey, attacked the
preponderance of military figures in foreign-policy making. Ul-
timately the law was changed, dropping the Secretaries of Army,
Navy and Air Force from the council.
III
[ Lovett's citation of Italy as a case in which quick decisions,
which should be carefully pondered in advance, might have to
be made was given only as an example; there were many oth-
ers he might have chosen. A pregnant one came up at the Cab-
inet luncheon on the 29th.
29 September 1947 Cabinet Lunch
? . . Secretary Marshall said that he was giving close study to
the question of getting out of Korea, that to many of his people
in the State Department it seemed that the Russian offer. to
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
570
Declassified and Approved For Release a 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
THE Forrestal DIARIES
proper role of the Marine Corps, the danger that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff might become "fly-speckers," the desirability of corn.
missioning a few outstanding officers in the Armed Forces rather
than in any one of the three Services; but his major theme was
the weakness of the United States Army. It :sV,as already a hun-
dred thousand men short even of its authorized strength and
was still 'dwindling; the -modest Emergency Force of DA
divisions" maintained in the continental United States wAs below
strength. "One of two things will now happen," Eisenhower ob-
served; either there would have to be action to hold the Army at
the existing level or it would continue to waste away until the
occupation of Germany and the Far East would be no longer
possible "and the areas involved would have to be abandoned to
chaos and Communism."
It was this inability to maintain Army strength through re-
cruitment that formed a main argument for UMT. But man-
power deficiencies were only a part of it. "The problem of ma-
teriel," Eisenhower wrote, "is hardly less serious. . . . With
certain negligible exceptions, we have purchased no new equip-
ment since the war. Consequently we cannot arm even the few
regular combat troops with new weapons developed late in the
war but which had not 'achieved large-scale production. Obvi-
ously we have not been ,able to equip them with weapons devel-
oped since the war."
The true consequences of this situation were not to come fully
home to the American people until the outbreak of the Korean
War, nearly two and a half years later. It is a coincidence that
on the day Eisenhower left office, February 7, Communist ele-
ments in South Korea precipitated a wave of sabotage, strikes
and riots that may be regarded as one of the earliest engage-
ments of the subsequent struggle. But in early 1948 Korea
still seemed only one menace, and a relatively remote one,
among many. On February 12 there was a significant meeting
of the National Security Council.
12 February 1948 Meeting?National Security Coyne':
At today's meeting of the Security Council (Present: Mar-
shall, Sullivan, Whitney [Cornelius V. Whitney, Assistant Sc
"PLAYING WITH FIRE" 371,
rotary of Air], Hill, Draper [William H. Draper, Jr., Under
secretary of the Army]) discussion dealt with our position and
policy in Greece, Turkey, Italy, Palestine and China.
With respect to Italy, decision was reached to expedite the
shipment of all available and surplus arms under the general
plenary of the President.
With respect to the sending of military assistance to the
Greek government in the form of U. S. troop units, reference
was made to the letter from the,Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . to
the effect that dispatch of any American forces to Greece in
sufficient numbers to be of consequence would involve a partial
mobilization by this country. . . . The question . . . was re-
ferred back to the JCS for further study.
With regard to Greece, there was discussion of various al-
ternatives, including (a) withdrawal; (b) sending of Ameri-
can forces; and (c) standing pat on present policy. The Secretary
of State asked what was the opinion of the meeting as to the
size of forces that could be sent by this country without involv-
ing major political considerations. I said that any dispatch of
forces would raise serious questions, but for purposes of discus-
sion the largest unit that could be sent without too much
commotion would be something on the order of a Regimental
Combat Team of Marines.
The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force at this point ob-
served that the Air Force was most desirous of conducting flight
training operations in as many strategic areas as possible and
suggested that as a comprotnise there might be some flights of
13-ags to Greek airfields which might accomplish at least a
part of the purpose in mind in considering the dispatch of
round forces. The Secretary of State indicated interest in this
htter suggestion and it was decided to proceed along those
lines.
With reference to Palestine, the Secretary of State said that
a paper had come to him this morning from his Department
outlining three alternative courses as a guide to American pol-
icy. They are (a) direct abandonment of American support for
he recommendation of the General Assembly; (b) vigorous
upport for the forcible implementation by the Security Coun-
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
b'eclassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
372 THE Forrestal DIARIP.1
cil of that recommendation, which would involve the use of sub
stantial American forces, either unilaterally or jointly with
Russia; (c) an effort to refer the question back to the General
Assembly and attempt to reshape the policy, not surrendering
the plinciple of partition but adopting some temporary expe.
dients such as a trusteeship, or a joint Anglo-,French-Arnerican
mandate with a revision of the partition decision along the
lines of the original British cantonal plan.
The Secretary of State observed that these were simply the
statement of alternatives and that none of them carries as yet
the approval of the Secretary of State.
With reference to China, Marshall read two documents
[which he intended to submit to the Senate and House For-
eign Relations Committees]. . . . The gist of both is that we
regard the China problem under present conditions of dis-
order, of corruption, inefficiency and impotence of the Central
government as being practically unsolvable; that we cannot af-
ford to withdraw entirely from our support of the Chiang
Kai-khek government and that neither can we afford to be
drawn in on an unending drain upon our resources. He will rec-
ommend to the Congress a sum of about $550 million for aid
to China, to be administered by the director of the European
Recovery Prograrn.
At this juncture I made the observation that it seemed to me
the Secretary of State would have increasing difficulty in deal-
ing with the problems and complexities of our foreign affairs in
this highly political year, unless he would have the support on
an informed basis of both parties and of the candidates of both
parties. Concretely, I suggested that he try to get Vandenberg
to invite Taft, Stassen, Dewey and Martin to meet with him
at Blair House and make an exposition of the entire field of our
foreign policy, with particular reference to Palestine and the
Middle East and to the fact that any serious attempt to itO
plement the General Assembly's recommendation on Palestine
would set ,in train events that must finally result in at least 3
partial mobilization of U. S. forces, including recourse to Selec?
tive Service.
At this juncture Secretary Marshall made some remarks nil
I
"FLAYING WITH FIRE" 373
the question of universal military training. He said that the
trouble was that we are playing with fire while we have nothing
i+?ith which to put it out. He questioned whether -we should
bring this Greek situation to an issue of the use of troops. On
the other hand, he felt that if we appear to be weakening we
will lose the game and prejudice our whole national position,
particularly since we are now involved in the European Re-
covery Program.
In a brilliant phrase Marshall had here stated the whole di-
lemma. We were playing with fire while we had nothing with
which to put it out. On nearly every. front we were facing es-
sentially the same grim alternatives: to withdraw, to attempt to
stand pat on positions obviously untenable, simply to confess (as
Marshall suggested in the case of China) that the problem was
"unsolvable," or to take vigorous action?for which the means and
trained men did not exist.
What was to be done? Primarily, no doubt, this was a question
for the newly unified structure of politico-military administra-
tion. Unfortunately the loosely "coordinated" system of unifica-
tion on which Forrestal had insisted was in practice failing to
unify." The Air Force had already manifested its dissatisfaction
with the division of the restricted budget." "The process of
unification," Forrestal observed in his letter to Admiral Sherman
of February 14, "proceeds, but not always at an even pace?
three steps forward and about one backward, I would say." There
was no really unified military policy or even strategic plan to
which the diplomats could appeal under a situation Such as Mar-
shall had set forth. And a more or less fortuitous factor had en-
tered to complicate the problem of developing one.
In the previous year the President had appointed his Air Pol-
icy Committee, under the chairmanship of Thomas K. Finletter,
to make a civilian review of the whole question of aviation pol-
icy; a parallel Joint Congressional Aviation Policy Board under
o grant this is by no means to say that the monolithic system advocated by
ekresdwaotualdlthave worked even as well. The matter might be argued at length;
to the editor it seems most unlikely that the unitary system yould have
P. 352.
,,,7,1"."Fprmiplp?RiP Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
374 THE Forrestal Ds/taut
[ Senator Owen Brewster had been set up to study the same sub.
ject. Since the closing days of World War.II the Air Force had
been arguing vociferously for a permanent Air Establishment of
seventy regular air groups (with numerous National Guard and
Reserve groups in addition)?a goal much.higher than the fifty.
five groups allowed under the Truman peacetiine military bud.
ets. The Finletter report had been made public on Jamiary 13. It
accepted the Air Force estimate of seventy groups as a measure
of the need; in effect, the congressional board was to do the same
when its report appeared a few weeks later.
The Finletter report had made a wide public impact, but it
was not particularly helpful in the specific situation Marshall laid
before the National Security Council on February 12. By its
terms of reference, the -Finletter Commission had concentrated
upon air policy, not military policy as a whole; while its atten-
tion was plainly focused on a possible future "all-out" war with
Russia rather than on the immediate military requirements of
the moment. However necessary in the long view, atomic bomb-
ers were obviously no substitute for ground troops in the po-
licing of Palestine or, say, the protection of Korea; and while a
demonstration by B-29s might be helpful in Greece, it was not
a very effective answer to the particular military menaces there
cOnfronting us.
The acutely felt want was for currently useful ground forces.
'What was "lamentably clear" to Forrestal, as he put it some days
later, were "the limitations of our military power to deal with
the various potentially explosive areas over the world" there
and then. The want was so acute that on February 18 there was
a formal review of the situation before the President at the
White House. In the presence of Marshall, Forrestal, Royall ant!
the full membership of the Joint Chiefs, General Gruenther
gave the President a summary presentation showing how ap.
palling the "limitations" actually were.
78 February 1948 ' Meeting?White Hour
. . . General Gruenther made a presentation concerning out
available military strength balanced against present and possible
commitments:
"'LAYING WITH FIRE"
STRENGTHS?_I FEBRUARY 1948
Budget
Actual Authorization
Army
Navy
(includes USMC
Air Force
'375 ,
Congressional
Authorization
552,000
560,000
669,000
476,000
526,000
664,000
79,000
87,000
o8,000)
346,000
362,000
382,000
Deployments of Major Army Elements
Far East: 140,000 against requirement of 180,00o. (In-
cludes 20,000 in Korea as of I March 1948 against require-
ment of 40,000. Department of Army has cut Korea allot-
ment to 30,000.)
Eucom: 98,000 against requirement of 116,000. (In addition,
so,000 in Austria and 5,000 in Trieste.)
Zone of Interior [U. S.] operating 155,000 against requirement
of 166,000. This figure does not include the General
Reserve.
The total Army shortage will be 165,000 by the end of 1948.
The Navy has an acute personnel shortage now which requires
the immobilization of 107 ships, but this condition is expected
to improve by July 1. The personnel situation in the Air Force
is satisfactory.
In Korea JCS face major problem how to secure io,000 ad-
ditional troops needed urgently by Hodge [commanding in
Korea] for critical period ahead. Choices are: (i) Japan, where
already under strength; (2) send Marines; (3) take from Gen-
eral Reserve.
Status of Army Reserves and Marines is:
Peace Authorization
Actual
82nd Airborne Division 12,200
13,300
and Inf. Division 11,400
7,300
(T/0 strength [i.e. full war strength]
of Inf. Div. is 15,900)
Combat Comniand A 2,380
2,000
Task Force and Corps Support
24,00Q
46,600
Declassified and Approved For Release ? 50-Yr 2914/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
THE MARCH CRISIS 383
[ Czechoslovakia failed to figure in the discussions. Neither is it
surprising that the first diary note subsequent to the crisis should
haVe dealt with the altogether different subject of China, for it
was clearly a moment inviting a stock-taking of our position all
around the world.
On February 24, 1948, an armed and violent Communist coup
d'etat abruptly seized -power in Czechoslovakia. Communist
"action committees" roamed the country, suppressing all possible
opposition; the Communist Premier, Klement Gottwald, formed
his new Cabinet the next day, and the Czechoslovak Republic,
which from its foundation at the end of the First World War had
been a model of successful democratic governance in Central
Europe, was subverted at a stroke into a satellite Communist
dictatorship, or "people's democracy," on the already familiar pat-
tern. Throughout the Wet the shock was profound. The meth-
ods used did not differ greatly from those which had ahead:,
been applied in the Balkans and elsewhere; this was, however,
the first forcible Communist conquest of a strongly based free
government, and in the eyes of most Western publics it put an
altogether new light upon the power, ferocity and scope of Com-
munist aggression.
Forrestal made no diary entries during the next few days, and
there is no specific diary reference to Czechoslovakia. His ap.
pointment calendar, however, is unusually full of engagement%
with high military and diplomatic officials; he lunched with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 25 and with the State and
Army leaders on the 26th; he saw Gruenther, Bush of the Ee?
search and Development Board, Hillenkoetter of CIA, Whitney
of the Department of Air, Souers of NSC and officials of tho
Budget Bureau in these days, and it is scarcely possible dig
382
I March 1948 General Wedemeyer
Meeting this morning with General Wedemeyer [who had
returned from the Far East to become Director of Plans and
Operations, Army General Staff]. I asked him his view about
China and our present policy. It is obvious that he feels it is
unrealistic and that Marshall is not facing up to the problem
because he has a feeling of frustration and failure. Wedemeyer
said that when he first met General Marshall after the lat-
tcr's appointment as ambassador he, that is Marshall, had
shown him the directive written for him by the State Depart-
ment (John Carter Vincent and Company), the objective of
which was a government based upon a coalition of the Kuomin-
tang Party and the Communists. Wedemeyer said he had in-
formed Marshall immediately that such an objective was im-
possible of attainment because of the completely differing na-
ture of the two organizations and the fundamental fallacy of
assuming that there could be political association with any
Communist group without ultimate absorption by it. He said
the present Army representative in China, Major General
David G. Barr, is polite and loyal, a good officer, but al-
most entirely lacking in force.
Italy was another possible "explosive point," as Forrestal heard
on the following evening when he met with Representative John
Lodge and Alberto Tarchiani, the Italian Ambassador. The Am-
bassador was concerned about the election to be held on
April 18. "He said the Communists were spending from twenty-
five to thirty millions of dollars in addition to lire brought in
from Yugoslavia. He said De Gasperi [the Premier] would not
give in as Bene g [President of Czechoslovakia] had done, that
the Italian people, he was confident, did not want Communism,
but that there was an undercurrent of fear which made the
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
384 THE Forrestal DIAllis
outcome unpredictable?the same kind of fear which had made
many Who did not believe in Mussolini join his party. j
asked the Ambassador about the loyalty of the Army and he said
.there was no question as to the loyalty of its top command, but
that there might be some Communist infiltration at the Iowa
levels."
The administration's first concrete response to the Czech over-
turn seems to have been an effort to push through UMT.
March 2 Forrestal lunched with the Secretary of State.
2 March 1948 Lunch
Lunch today with Marshall, Lovett, McCloy fat this time
president of the International Bank] and Souers. The Secretary
.of State reported a meeting he had this morning with mem.
bers of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, Senators
Gurney, Saltonstall, Bridges, Byrd, Hill and Kilgore.
Saltonstall told him that it would be impossible for the
Senate committee to make any progress unless he, Marshall,
made it lear to the country through either a speech or statc.
ment, which would have wide circulation and 'receive broad
attention, of the relation of universal military training to his
conduct of foreign policy. Subsequently Senator Gurney called
me to say that the visit had been most interesting and had ins?
pressed people like 'Senator Byrd and Senator Bridges. The
Secretary of State said he believed the Armed Forces would
have to modify their ideas of what they needed to implement
universal military training. He recalled the fact that when he
got Selective Service through [in 1940], the Army had practi
cally nothing to implement it whereas now we at least have
the camps, buildings and so forth. The important thing from
his point of view is to get the adoption of UMT in order to
make inescapably clear both to our friends and non-friends
that there is continuity, firmness and Vill behind our foreigr,
policy.
He said that Bridges at the end of the conversation told
him he should be sure that the Armed Services, and in
'Diary, 2 March 1948.
Tni MARCH CRISIS 385
ticular' the wives of leading officers, be brought into line, The
Senator mentioned a dinner which he attended last evening at
which he said the wife of an officer had expressed the strongest
views against UMT. I gave it as my opinion that the command
in both the Air Force and the Navy were now solidly behind
UMT?that the Navy had been lukewarm about it originally
but were now convinced that even they had to have it, and that
the Air Force, possibly a more recent convert, was also ready
to give more than lip service in support. I mentioned the fact
that I had talked about it this morning with Mr. Symington,
who was anxious to make any contribution he could to a renewed
campaign on behalf of such a bill. . . .
Both Secretary Marshall and. Under Secretary Lovett are
now ready for him, Marshall, to take the lead in renewing the
drive for UMT either through the occasion of a speech in
California on ig March or before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, or possibly the entire Senate. (After the manner
of his, Marshall's, appearances before the entire Congress dur-
ing the war.)
On my part, I agreed to get hold of the appropriate people
in the Army to endeavor to bring our figures within more rea-
sonable limits and also to try to have them reconciled with
Navy and Air Force figures.
There was some consideration given to a joint effort by
Marshall and myself to get a concurrent resolution through
the House and Senate giving approval immediately to the prin-
ciple of UMT, linking, the implementation to a subsequent
bill, the thought being to capitalize on the present concern of
the country over the events of the last week in Europe.
Senator Gurney called me up after lunch to say that his meet-
ing with the Secretary of State had been excellent and to ad-
vise me that he was calling me and the three Service Secre-
taries and the Chiefs of Staff before his committee on Monday
morning to tell us that we had to get a more realistic approach
from a budget point of view. . .
[ On the day after this meeting there was a development of an
alarming kind, recorded only in a terse note:
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R0003nnrAnnn9_A
Declassified and Approved For Release d 50-Yr 2014/03/26 . CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
386 THE Forrestal DiEmirs
3 March 1948 , Submarine Sighting?Eniwetok Atoll
Word today from Eniwetok that there was affirmative identi.
fication of a non-U. S. submarine with schnorkel on the surface
in the neighborhood of Eniwetok.
It was at Eniwetok atoll that the second series of atomic tests
(of which there had been no public announcement) was to be
held in the following month.
It can only have increased an already rising tension. In a
telephone conversation with Representative Walter G. Andrews
that day, Forrestal had agreed that the President would have to
give serious thought not simply to UMT but to a revival of
Selective Service. On March 4 Forrestal called on Senator Wal-
ter F. George of Georgia, ranking minority member of the Fi-
nance Committee, member of the Foreign Relations Committee
and one of the most powerful of the conservative Democratic
senators. Forrestal wanted George and some of his colleagues to
hear a "presentation of the world situation by a member of the
Army Staff" (presumably this was Gruenther's summary as
given at the White House two weeks before). It is an example of
Forrestal's constant care for congressional relations, and at
least suggests that already the administration was realizing that
More would be required in the way of rearmament than UMT.
4 March /948 Meeting?Senator George
. . . I mentioned particularly Palestine, and said that many
people were saying we should implement the recommenda-
tion of the General Assembly with vigor and promptness, who
did not realize the fact that the deployable Army troops left
in this country total less than 30,000, to which might be added
23,000 Marines, whereas the British had to employ 90,000
troops merely to police the Palestine area, without trying to
impose any political partition or to create a new state. . ? ?
The people I have in mind [to hear the proposed presenta-
tion] are Senator 'George, Senators Millikin, Baldwin, Robert-
son (Wyoming), Knowland, Hickenlooper, Ives (?), Byrd, Van-
denberg and Gurney if they choose to come, Saltonstall and
Cabot Lodge (?).
ToE MARCH CRISIS, 387
I said I didn't want to have it so large as to take on the char-
acfer of a sales talk or a persuasive presentation?I had merely
been so impressed with this particular global recital that I felt
it would be both interesting and instructive to people like
himself?that in fact I felt it my duty to make such facts
available.ensi
T
on was rising. The Czechoslovak coup had spread a sense
of nervousness and excitement through the free world. Wash-
ington, already alarmed by the perils it faced and its powerless-
ness to meet them, had clearly begun to move in the direction of
a more effective military policy. And then on March 5 there ar-
rived a top-secret telegram from General Clay in Berlin, which
fell with the force of a blockbuster bomb. Forrestal copied the
text in his diary:
5 March 1948 War?Likelihood in near Future
?Message from Clay
FROM CLAY EYES ONLY TO CHAMBERLIN [LIEUTENANT GENERAL
STEPHEN J. CHAMBERLIN, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ARMY
GENERAL STAFF]
FOR MANY MONTHS, BASED ON LOGICAL ANALYSIS, I HAVE FELT
AND HELD THAT WAR WAS UNLIKELY FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS.
WITHIN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, I HAVE FELT A SUBTLE CHANGE
IN SOVIET ATTITUDE WHICH I CANNOT DEFINE BUT WHICH NOW
GIVES ME A FEELING THAT IT MAY COME WITH DRAMATIC SUDDEN-
NESS. I CANNOT SUPPORT THIS CHANGE IN MY OWN THINKING
WITH ANY DATA OR OUTWARD EVIDENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS OTHER
THAN TO DESCRIBE IT AS A FEELING OF A NEW TENSENESS IN EVERY
SOVIET INDIVIDUAL WITH WHOM WE HAVE OFFICIAL RELATIONS. I
MI UNABLE TO SUBMIT ANY OFFICIAL REPORT IN THE ABSENCE OF
SUPPORTING DATA BUT MY FEELING IS REAL. YOU MAY ADVISE THE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THIS FOR WHATEVER IT MAY BE WORTH IF YOU
FEEL IT ADVISABLE.
[ Again the diary makes no comment on this alarming telegram.
But that it did cause intense alarm among those in Washington
who were aware of it is now well known, while its influence
seems clearly traceable in the events of the next few days.
Declassified and Approved For Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
388
? THE Forrestal DIARIES
l? The Clay telegram came on a Friday. Gurney had called his
meeting of the Armed Services Committee and the military
heads on the subject of UMT for the following Monday; its pur.
pose, he had said to Forrestal, was "to tell us that we had to get
a niore realistic approach from a budget point of. view." 2 When
the meeting took place there were, to be sure, .plenty of objec-
, tions voiced to UMT on budgetary and other grounds. But the
result was a unanimous committee decision to proceed forth.
with on hearings on the measure.
8 March 1948 Armed Services Committee
. . . The objections, chiefly voiced by Senator Byrd, al-
though shared to some degree by Senator Saltonstall, were as
follows:
i'. The ultimate amount of the money involved in UMT
is around $4 billion. To add this to the already large sum ap-
propriated for military purposes would mean a $50 billion na-
tional budget, which would wreck the country.
2. So far ,as the effect on Russia and the rest of Europe
is concerned on the passage of UMT, the passage by the Senate
and rejection by the House would not merely rob the discus-
sions of any value in the implementation of our foreign policy,
but would actually weaken that policy because it Would show a
split in the country which would be interpreted as a vote
against war or against our determination to resist the over-
running of Europe.
The effect of the Finletter report and of the Brewster-
Hinshaw Board [this was the parallel Congressional Aviation
Policy Board which had reported on March i] has been to con-
vince the country that by a substantial increase in appropria-
tions for Air, there would be no necessity for UMT. . . .
Senator Morse said he felt there was a need for a review
and presentation to the country of the facts about the world
situation and our present military weakness. He said he had
spoken in many parts of the country over the past few months
and wherever he .went he encountered the impression that
aikpomma?????????gv
THE MARCH CRISIS 389
there was no real or serious danger of war, and that while the
Rtissians were truculent and difficult, the situation would be
ironed out without breaching the peace.
[ The diary does not say so, but according to news reports at
the time the committee was told, in answer to the objections,
that UMT had become "not only mandatory but necessary." The
committee unanimously voted to start hearings. Forrestal told re-
porters after the vote that "events are making progress for us," 3
and it is not difficult to guess what event he had in mind. "The
atmosphere I'd say is considerably improved," he said to Robert
Cutler two days later, "the improvement ,derived from other
events that one can't take much pleasure in. I think the political
aspect of it is much better." And he added, "It is always the dif-
ficulty of not being hysterical and at the same time giving
them the grim facts, and the facts are grim enough." 4
Events were making progress; yet at the meeting with the
committee there had already appeared the shadow of what was
to become an embittered controversy, seriously hampering the
course to rearmament. The Finletter and Brewster reports had i
fostered the notion that by increasing expenditures on Air, "there!
would be no necessity for UMT." Actually?and it was a weak-
ness in the administration position?UMT was scarcely a more:
relevant answer than Air expansion to the pressing immediate'
need, which was for some readily available forces, not to fight a
possible future third world war but to deal on the ground at that
time with the "various potentially explosive areas," as Forrestal
put it, out of which alone the danger of a future world war
could come.
The need for better Service integration and consistency of
basic strategic plan was urgent. Forrestal had already told the
President that if the Joint Chiefs did not produce decision an the
roles and missions of the Services, he would make some decisions
himself. On March 10 he informed his press conference that he
was summoning a prolonged meeting, outside of Washington, of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to thrash out the whole controversy over
'The New York Times, 9 March 1948.
tclephone conversation with Robert Cutler, io March 1948.
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
DeaasSified and Approved For Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
,s4
390 THE Forrestal DIAR1F
[ missions and to decide who will do what with what." If they
failed, he'said, "I shall have to make my own decision's"; and he
added?it seemed almost as an afterthought?that the Services
were now agreed that some form of compulsory military service
was a necessity. It was no longer a question .of whether or not
to adopt UMT; if there were no UMT there would have to be a
revival of the draft.5 The meeting of the JCS was actually con-
vened on the following day at Key West.
It was also on March 10 that Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister of
Czechoslovakia, son of the country's first President and liberator,
and a figure well known and well liked in all Western capitals,
fell to his death from a window of his official residence. Accord-
ing to the official announcement, he had committed suicide. The
event added enormously to the initial shock of Czechoslovakia's
subversion.
II
The conference?it lasted from the 11th to the 14th of March?
to which Forrestal summoned the Joint Chiefs (Leahy, Brad-
ley, Denfeld and Spaatz) and their aides, in the seclusion of the
Key West Naval Base, marked the beginning of the effort to re-
build the Armed Forces of the United States. It also marked the
first really serious attempt to grapple with the paralyzing divi-
sions between the Services and to re-form the Military Establish-
ment as a whole into a genuinely integrated team, designed to
meet the actual rather than the theoretic military problems con-
fronting the country. Both efforts were to progress, unevenly
and with many difficulties and discouragements, down to the out-
break of the Korean War in 1950.
Forrestal prepared some terse "Notes for Friday?Opening of
Meeting," which he later entered in his diary. They are sketchy,
but they clearly show the searching significance which he saw in
the seemingly technical question of "roles and missions." "We
must be guided," the notes began, "by the National Security Act,
but I don't want the impression that we are engaged in legalistic
discussions." The Navy, they continued, would keep its own air
'New York Herald Tribune, ii March 1948.
THE MARCH CRISIS 391
[ power but would have to realize that budget limitations might
compel it to "make-do" with help from others; that it would, for
example, have to give Air Force crews training in antisubma-
rine work and the close support of amphibious landings. The
notes go on:
11 March 1948 Notes for Friday
. . . 3. There should be certain studies inaugurated now
looking to reciprocal use of personnel in the event of emergency.
For example, I doubt if the Navy will require the number of
pilots that were in training at the end of the last war. Ques-
tion: Could any of these be made available to meet de-
ficiencies of the Air Force?
4. Question: What is being done about joint amphib-
ious training operations between Army and Marines and Navy,
so that techniques and tactics will be identical?
5. Question: Are there any plans for the use of Marine
commanders with Army units on tactical maneuvers?
6. Function of strategic bombing is the Air Force's.
7. The Navy is to have the Air necessary for its mis-
sion, but its mission does not include the creation of a strategic
air force.
8. Both Services, that is, Navy and Air Force, have to
give much more thought and help to the third Department, the
Ground Forces, who are the catch-all for the unwanted and un-
glamorous jobs.
9. The mission of the Navy which was inescapable
in the Pacific war was the knocking out of enemy-held land
bases which were unreachable by land-based Air. I should
like to see some study given to the possibility of passing surplus
Navy air power into the Air Force when such missions are no
longer necessary. For example, the closing phases of the Japa-
nese war. .
[ Without a clear definition of the responsibilities of the several
Services, without plain answers to these questions on the integra-
tion of function, no intelligent division of military manpower,
munitions or money could be made.
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Y
392 THE Forrestal DIARIES
f As the discussion got under way on Friday there arrived a dis.
patch frotn the Secretary of State, advising them of still another
area of tension and carrying, incidentally, an early suggestion of
the North Atlantic alliance which was later to take so important
a place in American military planning.
12 March 194o International Situation--Ifussia.n Expansion
Dispatch from Marshall today reflecting deep apprehension
on the part of Great Britain over the evident intention of the
Soviet Union to bring immediate pressure upon Norway to
negotiate a pact similar to that which they are now asking of
Finland. Bevin makes three proposals:
(i) Build around the five-nation (U. K., France, Bene-
lux, etc.) pact.
(2) A plan for Atlantic security.
(3) A Mediterranean system of security.
Bevin suggests a meeting in Washington between British and
American representatives early next week.
c.
[ Apparently, the Joint Chiefs had not reached a point where
' they could consider such larger possibilities as these. At Key
West they continued to thrash out the issues of inter-service rela-
tions. Even here they seem not to have answered all of For-
restal's penetrating questions, but by Sunday noon (March 14)
they had arrived at certain "broad, basic decisions." The diary
summarizes them as follows:
i. For planning purposes, Marine Corps to be limited to
four divisions with the inclusion of a sentence in the final
document that the Marines are not to create another land army.
2- Air Force recognizes right of Navy to proceed with the
development of weapons the Navy considers essential to its
function but with the proviso that the Navy will not develop a
separate strategic air force, this function being reserved to the
Air Force. However, the Navy in the carrying out of its func-
tion is to have the right to attack inland targets?for example,
to reduce and neutralize airfields from which enemy aircraft
may be sortying to attack the Fleet.
r 201 4/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
THE MARCH CRISIS 393
3. Air Force recognizes the right and need for the Navy to
participate in an all-out air campaign.
[ With this decided, there was still a half-hour left .before
lunch. Gruenther brought up a Staff paper that would otherwise
have awaited their next meeting. This paper laid down five prop-
ositions: The joint war plan of the Joint Chiefs called for larger
? Armed Forces than Congress had authorized; existing forces had
shrunk to levels below even those which had ,been authorized;
therefore voluntary enlistment was a failure; UMT could not
furnish additional men fast enough; therefore the Joint Chiefs
should recommend immediate re-enactment of the draft law. The
conference accepted the conclusion, and, Forrestal's summary
ends:
It was concluded that it is now necessary to ask immediately
for a restoration of Selective Service.
It was concluded that an immediate examination of atomic
energy matters is required, including the decision on whether
or not now is the time for turning custody of the weapons over
to the Armed Services.6
Though the diary does not mention it, it was also decided, ac-
cording to a subsequent public statement of Forrestal's, to request
the President to ask a supplemental appropriation from Con-
gress "in order to bring our total strength up to the point where
it more nearly met the realities of the world situation." 7
Forrestal left Key West the same afternoon. He stopped over-
night at West Palm Beach and did not reach Washington until
Monday afternoon. It was not until 5:15 that day that he re-
ported to the President. His account of the Key West decisions
included one or two additional points: "Navy not to be denied use
of A-bomb"; "Navy to proceed with development of 80,000-ton
carrier and development of HA [high altitude] aircraft to carry
heavy missiles therefrom"; and he also reported that the Joint
Chiefs were of the opinion that custody of the completed atomic
'The Diary note bears the date ii March 1948, but covers the whole conference.
'Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, 22 April, New York
herald Tribune, 23 April 1948.
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060007_4
,P.M.P.????7{,
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
394 THE Forrestal DIARIES
f bombs should be turned over to the military. "I said the condi-
tion of readiness of these weapons was highly uncertain?that
what a civilian might think was ready would be a long way from
readiness for battle use."
More important at the moment than his own report, however,
was what Forrestal learned. The President, already advised of the
Joint Chiefs' Conclusion that revival of the draft was essential,
had a couple of hours before announced a dramatic decision.8
President Truman had an engagement of some weeks' standing
to speak at the St. Patrick's Day dinner in New York City on
March 17, and he had intended to use the occasion for a plug for
UMT. The Joint Chiefs' demand for Selective Service had put
the matter into a much more serious context. According to For-
restal's diary note:
15 March 1948 Meeting with the President
The President said he was going to deliver a message to
Congress on Wednesday going all out for Selective Service and
UMT. He said the original idea had been that he would make
reference to tliis in the St. Patrick's Day speech that evening,
but Marshall had felt that that was not a proper forum. We
have arranged to have the UMT initial testimony-taking de-
ferred until Thursday, when Marshall will be the first witness.
In changing his "forum" the President had changed to one that
would give his remarks the very maximum of solemnity, ur-
gency and effect. The news of Monday afternoon that he was
taking the unusual course of addressing a joint session of the
House and Senate two days later (in addition to making an im-
portant policy speech in New York the same evening) came with
a sensational impact. It is reflected in Forrestal's diary note of
the next day.
16 March 1948 International Situation
Papers this morning full of rumors and portents of war.
Wallace in New York interview yesterday charged that United
?The announcement was given out at the White House at 3:35 p.m. New Yor
Herald Tribune, 16 March 1948.
(
THE MARCH CRISIS 395
States was fomenting war and the Czech coup was an act of
desperation by the Communists to which they were driven by
threat of a Rightist coup. Nothing could be sillier, but such
statements, even from Wallace, will have their effect. The
fact is that this country and its government are desperately
anxious to avoid war. It is simply a question of how best to do
it. If all Europe lies flat while the Russian mob tramps over it,
we will then be faced with a war under difficult circumstances,
and with a very good chance of losing it.
It is inconceivable that even the gang who run Russia would
be willing to take on war, but one always has to remember
that there seemed to be no reason in 1939 for Hitler to start
war, and yet he did, and he started it with a world practically
unprepared. Our effort now is to try to make the Russians see
the folly of continuing an aggression which will lead to
war, or, if it is impossible to restore them to sanity, that we
at least have a start which will enable us to prevent our being
caught flat-footed as we were in 1941.
Since General Clay's telegram of ten days before, the intelli-
gence services had been working at high pressure. Not until this
Tuesday, March 16, was the CIA able to hand the President a
brief combined estimate by State, Army, Navy and Air Force,
saying that war was not probable within sixty days; and not for
another two weeks was CIA able to extend even this tenuous
forecast of peace.9 In the meantime, even before the President's
message had been delivered, there was already evidence that
the decisions of Key West would be insufficient to control the
quarrel over the allocation of the rearmament effort for which
everyone now assumed that the President was about to call.
16 March 1948 Press Release?Key West Conference
Secretary Symington called this morning to say that Norstad
nd Spaatz were not in agreement on the press release to the
ffect that there had been agreement in all major areas at Key
Vest. I said I believed this referred to the preamble or state-
ment of philosophy. I subsequently talked to General SNatz
Diary, 23 December 1948, which gives a summary report of the March crisis.
Li
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
[. The fact that there was another aspect to the problem of de-
fense has already appeared, fragmentarily, in this record. Intethe
midst of the Key West discussions Marshall's telegram had ar-
rived, reporting Foreign Minister Bevin's proposal for a "plan
for Atlantic security" to be built around the five-power Brus-
sels Pact. i One of Forrestars first queries, after the, presentation
on March 25 of the original rearmament program, was whether
the JCS had any plans to equip European 'defense forces.2 At
the height of the argument over the domestic military program
this important subject had recurred.
9 April 1948 Conversation?General Gruenther?
Western European Pact
General Gruenther informed me today of the progress of the
conversations between the British and the United States staffs
on European security.
i. The five nations concerned in the Western European
Pact are extremely anxious for the United States to associate
itself with that pact. The present American attitude is that the
President should make a fair statement giving his blessing to
the organization of the five-nation alliance but without for-
malizing it in the form of a treaty or even a protocol. This
See p. 392.
:see p. 403.
422
THE EFFORT TO REARM
423
would not be satisfactory to the Europeans. A curious fact is
that Canada is equally as strong as Britain for the formation of
the alliance. More understandably, Mr. Spaak, of Belgium
[Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister], also supports it most
strongly.
2. The British have always held to the view of what they
call the three pillars of strategy: Britain itself, the Mediter-
ranean and the sea lanes. To these they now add a line in
Europe which they consider to be the present line and the
time for announcing Allied policy concerning which, to be
now.
On April 22, the day after Forrestal's pre'sentation of the re-
vised military program, the subject was before the National Se-
curity Council. The extreme delicacy with which it was ap-
proached is indicated by the fact that this diary note ("ribbon
copy only") is one of the very few in which Forrestal designated
the participants only by initials.
22 April 1948 National Security Council
Meeting of the National Security Council at the White
House today. Subject: Western Union.
"L" outlined tentative proposals for as nearly concurrent
action as possible by the Senate and the President, not in terms
of a treaty, but a statement that we were willing to consider,
under Article 51 of the United Nations, steps looking to the
construction of a regional agreement, if it proves to be in the in-
terests of the security of the United States. The tactics would
be to have this action initiated by the Republicans and to have
the ball picked up immediately by the President, who would
tate his interest in the plan and make some further appropri-
ate comments.
"R" raised the question of whether this was not provocative,
Whether it did not raise the fear in another mind even if
one did not presently exist. "L" pointed out we were trying to
get this group to say what they would do to help themselves in
addition to taking help from us, and that this proposed
step was part of that action. It was designed to indicate to any-
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
. ,
424 THE Forrestal oingtEs
One that there would be a price to any decision to overrun?that
it would tiot be simply a walk-in.
[ At the Cabinet next day Lovett first reported that the atomic
_energy negotiations in the United Nations had "come to a point
of standstill," The discussion then turned to the fundamentals of
Soviet-American relations.
23 April 1948 Cabinet
. . . Mr. Lovett spoke of meetings which he and Bohlen
[Charles E., or "Chip", Bohlen, Counselor of the State De-
partment] have had recently with Panyushkin [Alexander S.
Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador] and members of the Em-
bassy staff. These conversations have taken the form of ap-
parent probing by the" Russians as to our real position vis-
?is the Russians. They asked, for example, at the first meet-
ing between him and Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson,
whether America really intended to stay in Europe. The Ameri-
cans at the meeting restated the question and said that the real
question is: Do the Russians mean to push beyond the line of
their troops' advance at the end of the war?
Mr. Lovett summed up the position of Russia in his opinion
as being of a dual nature at the moment: (1) Constant prob-
ing to find out the solidity of our intent; and (2) a reflection
of their own fear of a preventive or aggressive war on our part.
Two things he felt were contributing to their motivations?
the overexcitable statements, some by military people, on a
preventive war, and the activities of Henry Wallace and his
proposal that the President sit down with Stalin and make a
world agreement.
He read a cable, which is to be sent to Bedell Smith, out-
lining in general terms our position and our desire for ac-
commodation with Russia plus our apprehension that any meet-
ing between the heads of the states would prove as futile and as
nonproductive asin the past. Smith was asked his opinion as to
whether a communication addressed to Stalin along these lines
--namely, that America has no aggressive intent but neither
did she intend to let Russia dominate Europe?should be sent
THE ,EFFORT TO REARM 425
by the President or should be explored on a personal basis by
Smith himself. .
After Cabinet I talked to Mr. Lovett about the implications
of the Western Union conversation which we had at the Se-
curity Council yesterday, when he related the substance of con-
versations between France, Britain, Belgium, Holland, Den-
mark, et al., on the question of Western Union and the political
and military implications thereof. This morning I asked him
how far we were getting committed to such countries on a
military basis. He said the whole point of the conversations was
that we wanted to make it clear that we were not willing to be-
come bound to an unequivocal contract to come to their as-
sistance unless and until they manifested a.desire to help them-
selves. Such assistance by us, he said, would of course have to
take the form of some kind of lend-lease. I asked him what he
would guess the total of arms procurement might be, and he
replied, "Not less than $3 billion."
Such demands from Europe would, of course, only aggravate
the already acute dilemma between unpreparedness and inflation.
On April 24 Forrestal dictated two memoranda. The first con-
sidered the "economic factors"?employment already at 5M, mil-
lion with the prospect of reaching 62L million by July, "the
highest in history," and leaving "practically no employable with-
out a job"; and the demands for ERP, atomic energy and ex-
panded armament which would fall upon "this tight economy."
These were "very great pressures," as he wrote at this time to
Mrs. Ogden Reid, thanking her for an editorial in the Nctv York
Herald Tribune supporting his stand; "we have to keep America
militarily strong, but we have to be sure she does not become
economically or socially impotent in the process." 3 The second
memorandum considered the probable impact of these eco-
nomic factors on the fate of the defense program in Congress.
24 April 1948
Alternate Courses
1. The President wishes to adhere to UMT program.
2. There is some chance, in my opinion, of getting the
To Mrs. Ogden Reid, 28 April 1948.
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26_: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Ap ? roved For Release
50-Y. 2014/03/26: CIA- RDP83-01034R000300060002-4 -
.?
448 THE Forrestal DIARIES
patience, and everyone in the Armed Services is most grateful
?not merely for the result itself but for the size of the favora-
ble vote. . . .
[ ? Thus the curtain was rung down' upon the dramatic passage
which had begun with the March crisis some three and a half
months before. It represented the first effort to rebuild the
Military Establishment, the first serious attempt to grapple with
the underlying issues of unification and the first important test of
the new machinery for national security as established by the act
of 1947. In each respect the results were mixed; they were also
complex and difficult properly to evaluate. Forrestal had not
gained in popular esteem. Yet his answer to an appreciative note
from a friend was essentially correct.
To Roger W. Cutler, 12 June 1948
. . . It is always helpful to have the old troops rally around.
In spite of all the commotion there is substantial progress being
made on the foundation of this structure; but there is work
which has to be done before the ornaments become visible.
Furthermore I want to be sure we do not destroy existing or-
ganizations until we are sure of what is going to replace them.
Nothing could 'be more fatal at this juncture of world affairs.
[ Some of the "ornaments," few though they still were, did un-
questionably become visible in the tragic summer of 1950. And
perhaps the most penetrating comment on the episode was For-
restal's own, in a letter to Hanson Baldwin.
To Hanson W. Baldwin, 16 June 1948
. . . I haven't the faintest idea what I am going to do when
I get out of here?I never have planned my life except at the
beginning when it was necessary to get enough money to eat
and pay. debts.
With regard to unification, the most substantial accomplish-
ments are of an unspectacular character. There are things that
r
THE EFFORT TO REARM 449
had to be done before superficial problems are tackled: the
creation of an efficient and clear-headed approach to the bud-
get. The 1948-49 budget was already in last September, so the
plans, in my judgment, had to be for the 1949-56 budget. On
that I believe the foundations are laid for a rational and logical
method by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff will participate in,
and share, responsibility. This is the greatest central problem
of unification, and everything else, more or less, stems from it.
In other areas the ancillary bodies created by the Security Act
of 1947 had to be brought into being and staffed. . . . There
is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency, on which, I am
sure you will agree, if one is to secure improvement, one must
undertake to secure it without fanfare, and that I believe we
shall be able to do. . . .
There is, of course, a great additional spate of things that
have to be done, most of which are all obvious to you. The
coordination of publicity will have to be brought together into
one central spot and there will have to be a more vigorous ap-
proach to stockpiling. Much more detailed planning has to be
done, through the National Security Resources Board and the
Munitions Board, regarding the relationship of our raw mate-
rials, manpower and industrial capacity to our war capabilities.
Two fields I almost forgot are of the highest importance:
civilian defense and special weapons, including atomic energy
and B. W. [ Biological Warfare]. . . . There will be some pub-
lic announcements in the near future.
[ In all these basic matters?of more critical significance in the
long run than current budget levels?progress was being made.
But the core of the whole problem, as Forrestal clearly saw after
the almost grotesque experiences of the spring, lay in the budget,
in the manner of its construction, in the responsibility for its al-
location and for its adjustment both to logical strategic plan and
to the nonmilitary limitations which could not be disregarded.
By June 23 he had prepared the rough draft of a memorandum
for the three Secretaries which clearly defined the issue and in-
dicated what he intended to do about it.
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
452
Berlin (ipmetime in 1944), provided that the United States
had free access to that area. It is believed there followed an ex-
change of messages between Stalin and? Roosevelt in which
Stalin agreed, in principle, to the stipulation that the United
States should have complete right of entry of persons and goods
into the Berlin area; that Stalin replied to this message with
one of his own, stating that he agreed in principle but that the
terms would be worked out by the Russian, American and
British commanders in the field. Apparently this was never
done, although it is General Parks' recollection [presumably
Major General Floyd L. Parks, chief of the Public Information
Division of the Army Special Staff, who in 1945 had been the
first commander of the American military sector in Berlin] that
in conversations between Eisenhower and the Russians there
was a clear verbal agreement in the sense of the above. . .
Lovett observed that the casualness of this procedure
stemmed from the attitude prevailing at that time in the minds
of Roosevelt, Stimson, Hopkins, Eisenhower, etc., that we
would have no trouble in dealing with the Russians.
[ But the present was more urgent than the past; the legalities
less important than t,he problem of what to do. On Sunday, the
? 27th, there was a conference in Royall's office of Forrestal, Lov-
ett, Royall, Sullivan, Bradley, Norstad and a number of other
State, Defense and military officers. Once more they found them-
selves facing the now wearisomely familiar dilemma: to fight, to
get out or to try to stand on some uneasy middle ground.
27 June 1948 Berlin Situation
. . . Discussion proceeded on the assumption that with ex-
isting food stocks, plus supplies which might be brought in by
air, serious food shortages would not occur for approximately
thirty days, and the German population could perhaps be fed
for sixty or more days if dried foods were introduced. The
three possible courses of action discussed were the following:
1. Decide- now to withdraw from our position in Berlin, in
concert with the other Western powers, at an appropriate time
in the future, presumably when a constituent assembly for a
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
THE Forrestal DIARIES
THE BERLIN BLOCKADE AND THE ATOMIC BOMB
453
Western German government is called on September 1, and
? plan accordingly.
2. Decide at this time to retain our position in Berlin by
all possible means, including supplying Berlin by convoy or
using force in some other manner, such action to be only as a
last resort after utilizing all diplomatic and other means to stay
in Berlin without force to avoid war, but accepting the pos-
sibility of war as a consequence if necessary.
3. To maintain our unprovocative but firm stand in Berlin,
utilizing first every local means, and subsequently every dip-
lomatic means, to obtain recognition and assertion of our rights
while postponing ultimate decision to stay in Berlin or with-
draw.
Secretary Royall felt that a decision should be reached now
concerning our ultimate position, since our actions in the im-
mediate future should be patterned in the light of this deci-
sion. There was considerable discussion concerning (a) the ef-
,fect of withdrawing from Berlin on our position in Europe,
on the spread of Communism and on the success of the Eu-
ropean program as contrasted with (b) remaining in Berlin
under the stress of consistently recurring crises and frequent
humiliation, or (c) running the risk of war through efforts to
supply Berlin by force. There was also preliminary discussion
of the various steps which might be taken, on the one hand
either to minimize or cover our withdrawal from Berlin, and
on the other hand to augment our position vis-a-vis the Rus-
sians. Consideration was given to whether two B-29 squadrons
now in Goose Bay should proceed to Germany, and as to
whether it would be advisable to base two B-29 groups in Eng-
land.
Definite conclusions reached at the meeting were the follow-
ing:
i. That State and Civil Affairs Division should prepare a
currency paper for transmittal to Clay which might be used by
him as a basis for resuming discussions with Sokolovsky.
2. That Secretary Royal!, Mr. Lovett and I should meet
with the President the next morning and present the major
issues involved for his decision, and that in the meantime De-
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034RnnmnnnAnnfl'iii
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
510 THE Forrestal DIARIES
realize, of course, that these are questions which involve many
imponderables, and that a letter in precise language is not an
easy one to draft. I do feel, however, that I must seek every
avenue of judgment in order to supplement my own. . . .
In addition to submitting a budget within the President's
tentative ceiling of 14.4 billion, I feel an .obligation to inform
him of the weakening of our strength which this budget en-
tails, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, I am also
considering sending the President, as my own recommendation,
a proposal that he lift the ceiling to approximately 17.5 bil-
lion?which, in my opinion, while involving some risks, would
provide us with forces capable of taking effective action in the
event of trouble.
I am writing this letter to obtain from you as much guidance
as possible in determining the degree of vigor with which I
should support the recommendation which I propose to sub-
mit, as outlined above.
[ An acsompanying memorandum explained the effects of the
budgetary limitation on troop strengths. The April program as
finally adopted would "if fully implemented" provide on 30 June
1949 a total strength of 1,964,000 men [including 161,000 one-
year trainees) and a sixty-six-group Air Force. The $14.4 billion
ceiling would permit the maintenance in fiscal 1950 of an aggre-
gate strength (including one-year trainees) of only 1,625,000
and a fifty-one-group Air Force. It was estimated that "to con-
struct forces with a capability of effective reaction immediately
at the outset of a war" would require an aggregate strength of
1,975,000 and seventy groups. The cost for fiscal 1950 would be
about $21 billion. "Specifically, these estimates are based upon
a war plan which?in the event of hostilities?would contemplate
securing of the Mediterranean line of communications." The im-
mediate program on which the Defense Department was work-
ing would come to about $17.5 billion and would provide
strengths appwximating those originally contemplated for the
end of fiscal 1949.
At the time this letter was written, Marshall had already re-
turned to Europe. Lovett promptly telephoned.
THE ,BATTLE OF THE BUDGET 511
1 November 1948 Letter to Secretary of State
Lovett called me this morning to inquire as to the speed with
which I desire an answer to this letter. I told him that the im-
portant part of it obviously dealt with the larger amount,
namely, 17.5 billion, and that I would like to have Mr.
Marshall's view by 15 November in order to help me in
determining the degree of importunity that I put into my rec-
ommendation to the President. . . . [After promising swift
delivery of the letter] he said that in an effort to be helpful he
would make his own responses to the questions, observing
that to the first question, which was whether or not the in-
ternational situation has improved sufficiently since last spring
to warrant a decline in our military strength, the answer is: no/
He remarked that he felt that the answer to the first question
pretty much provided the answers to the other two. In brief, he
would say that he would respond, no, to the first and third, and
make no comment on the second.
[ But when Marshall's own answer came back from Paris a week
later, it evaded the real issue by answering the third question?
"Is the situation about the same?"?in the affirmative, and then
returning to his familiar theme. The important task, Marshall in-
sisted, was to rearm Western Europe. In the specific dilemma in
which he was trapped, Forrestal was apparently to get little more
help from the Secretary of State than he had been getting from
the Joint Chiefs. But by the time the answer was returned there
had been a dramatic reversal in the whole position.
'II
[ Not until October 26, exactly one week before the election,
does the diary record any intimation that the Republicans might
not, after all, be the certain winners; and even this intimation
was disputed by a distinguished political commentator.
26 October 1948 Conversation with Leslie Big
Leslie Biffle told me that he thought the President had
made very substantial gains in the last two weeks. He thought
he would carry Massachusetts, Rhode Island and possibly Con-
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300o6onn9-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
512 THE Forrestal DIARIES
necticut. The Senate, he thinks, will be Democratic by a ma-
jority of five, and thinks there is a possibility of the House also
being Democratic.
, On the contrary, I asked Arthur Krock [Washington cor-
respondent of the New York Times) his view this morning and
he saw no change. So far as the Senate and House are con-
cerned, he thinks that "the hair will go with the hide"; in other
words, Dewey's strength will counterbalance local tendencies.
Other prophets were also seeing dimly. When Forrestal two
days later had Admiral Hillenkoetter, the head of the Central
Intelligence Agency, in for breakfast, the admiral was apparently
"assuming Mr. Dewey's election." The intelligence chief also pre-
dicted "no war in the immediate future," in which he was
right, and that De Gaulle would be "in power in France next
March," in which he was as wrong as he was about Dewey."
Whatever the voters might do, Forrestal still seems to have con-
sidered his own public career as approaching its end, and there
was much unfinished business. On October 7 he had appeared
before the Eberstadt "task force" of the Hoover 'Commission, to
testify for the strengthening (which he had already outlined to
the President) of thp powers of the Secretary of Defense. One of
the "task force" members, the Chicago industrialist General Rob-
ert E. Wood, wrote to say that he had been "very much im-
pressed" both by Forrestal's appearance and by the inordinate
difficulty of the military problem in a capitalist democracr'For-
restal's answer put it well.
To Robert E. Wood, 18 October 1948
. . .There are no easy black and white solutions for the
problems which face this country. How to secure the formation
of capital necessary to our plant replenishment, how to secure
; a tax system which will provide the incentive and the op-
portunity for the individual acquisition of capital, how to
balance between a military organization sufficiently formidable
I to give any other country reason to stop, look and listen, with-
out at the same time its eating our national heads off?these
Li Diary, 23 October 59.13.
THE BATTLE or THE BUDGET
.0001.1.1?11?...11?04.1111.6461.1????????..??????????........
513
are segments of a very complex matter which must trouble any
citizen who understands it. . . .
There has seldom been a better statement of the searching
socio-political implications of the military problem in demo-
cratic societies, which have rarely paused even to consider that
the problem exists. Forrestal was not having much success in
getting either the 'military or the 'civil arms of government to
face these implications; but it is a measure of his stature that he
was throughout acutely aware of them himself.
The "task force" hearings had afforded a forum in which to re-
vive the old demands for the absorption of Naval Aviation in the
Air Force. Forrestal dictated a memoranduM which was a
shrewd and penetrating comment not only on air strategy but on
the whole strategic problem.
27 October 1948 General Notes on the Question Naval Air?
Air Force
1. We now have in existence strategic air forces of great
potential power in terms of weight-lifting capacity and range.
The unresolved question, however, is whether unescorted big
bombers can penetrate to targets that have a vigorous fighter
defense.'2
2. We also have in existence a nucleus of carrier aircraft and
in reserve an additional number of carriers which can provide
tremendous striking power.
3. Strategic air warfare is the assigned responsibility of the
Air Force with the proviso that they are to call upon Naval Air
for whatever help Naval Air can provide. It is my opinion that
if war came the Air Force itself would immediately, or shortly
after the outbreak, realize the diversionary possibilities neces-
sarily of the aircraft carrier task forces.
4. No one knows the form and character of any war of the
future. War planning?so-called strategic plans?are largely an
intellectual exercise in which the planners make the best esti-
mate of the form of a war against possible enemies. But the ac-
Forrestal considered it "unresolved" in spite of the Air Force's confidence of
a month before. See p. 493.
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
18 THE Forrestal DIARIES
5
layed and whether the distribution of supplies and equipment
in China could be controlled.
No decision was reached on the general China situation,
which will be studied further.
[ In the abruptness of the political reversal there were many de-
cisions which had to be "studied further." It obviously trans-
formed Forrestal's entire personal and official problem. He had
been expecting a probably automatic solution for the constantly
vexing dilemma about resignation, by which he would go out
gracefully with a defeated administration, under circumstances
that would leave him no option but would imply no reflection
? on him. Now the administration had not been defeated; but it
was doubtful whether he himself would survive, and he may
well have begun to wonder if the administration any longer re-
garded him as an asset.
In his differences with the President over military budget pol-
)cy, thelatter's band (and the hand of his Budget Bureau) had of
/ course been greatly strengthened. The congressional committee
chairmen, with whom Forrestal had been working so carefully
over the past two years, would now all be changed; he would
have to go over much of the old ground with pew faces or with
? old faces now suddenly restored to power. Forrestal had antag-
onized important groups-the always numerous and ardent
friends of the Air Force, dale professional Democratic politicians
who resented his refusal to participate in the party battle, influ-
ential sections of the Jewish community who resented his stand
on Palestine, labor and "liberal" groups who thought him too
closely identified with the industrialists. The newspaper column-
ists were already beginning t4 circle, vulture-like, for the kill;
and soon after the electio0h1More responsible Washington cor-
respondents began to disseminate the speculation that when the
President re-.formed his Cabinet, Forrestal would no longer be a
member. Among Forrestars personal papers there is a scrap-
book in which are entered samples of these newspaper predic-
tions of his early downfall. And against all this, there was little
or no real public understanding of what he had been trying to do
and of the very great services he had rendered to the nation in
THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET 519
[ the attempi/./As he had himself written the year before, the dif-
ficulty of government work was that it "not only has to be well
done, but the public has to be convinced that it is being well
done." 16
Forrestal wired the President his "congratulations on a gallant
fight and a splendid victory"; and went down with the others to
the Union Station on November 5 to greet the President's tri-
umphant return. At 12:30 the same day there was a brief Cab-
inet meeting.
5 November 1948 Cabinet
Cabinet meeting today. The President said that he wanted
his Cabinet members to go to. work on the preparation of
,material for his policy message on the state of the Union
which is due for delivery to the Congress on the first of January.
He asked to have these suggestions available to him at the time
of his return, in about two weeks.
The President was leaving on Sunday, the 7th, for a vacation
at Key West; and on Saturday he made it known that there
would be no decision on Cabinet changes until he got back.
Forrestal, called again to the White House the same day, had
to run a gantlet of reporters; he told them "jokingly" that his
resignation had been on file with the President ever since he had
assumed office, and he did not intend to "reiterate it." The
President duly departed for his Florida vacation. A couple of days
later Forrestal took off for a rapid, one-week flying trip
through Western Europe.
Iv
For this final trip to Europe, Forrestal kept unusually exten-
sive diary notes, partly, perhaps, because he had Gruenther (al-
ways exact and efficient, and who took some of the notes him-
self) along. The survey really began in Washington, in a conver-
sation with Lewis Douglas and Allen Dulles, who were at his
house for dinner on Saturday evening.
"Sec p. 800.
"New York Herald Tribune, 7 November 1948.
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034RnnngnnnAnrvv, A
- 520
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000300060002-4
THE Forrestal DIARIES
7 November 1948 Conversation with Ambassador Douglas_
Allen Dulles
Highlights of conversation with Ambassador Douglas last
evening.
! It is essential to get a settlement of the ',Berlin impasse. He
believes that the Russians are equally desircfus of it provided
some face-saving formula can be found. He thinks that a solu-
tion may lie something along the lines of my suggesiion that a
neutral group . . . suggest a formula dealing with economic
matters." . . . The British have not yet solved the problem of
costs, and it is doubtful if they will solve it in the next three or
four years since the government is unwilling to face the politi-
cal consequences of asking for more work and longer hours,
. He is very deeply concerned about the Middle East, and
believes the consequences of the creation of the Israeli state will
flow for a long time. . . .
With regard to France: I gave him my view that we should
not permit ourselves to become frozen into a state of aloofness
from De Gaulle. . . . He expressed complete agreement in
view of the fact that he believes De Gaulle will come to power
in France within a matter of months.
Allen Dulles said he thought the greatest mistake in Mr.
Dewey's campaign strategy was the failure to attack the Demo-
cratic record more vigorouslmThis stemmed from the failure
to realize that they were the Allenger and not the challenged.
Among other areas in which they restrained Mr. Dewey was
the sequence of diplomatic decisions at Tehran, Cairo and
Yalta. They did not do so [sic] because they felt that injecting
these issues into the campaign would have been destructive of
the effort toward bipartisan foreign policy.
[ On Tuesday afternoon, November 9, Forrestal, with Gruen-
ther and two or three other aides, took off from Washington. The
trip was doubtless due to a suggestion from Harriman, in the
preceding month, that he should come over and see for himself
the urgent necessity for getting ahead with Atlantic union and
military aid; and on Wednesday evening he dined with Harriman
'See P. 491.
THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET
5'
[ and Marshall in Paris. His diary entry was dictated the following
day.
11 November 1948 Aid-to France
Marshall returned to the theme which he had developed in
his last visit to Washington: the importance of making avail-
able, to France in particular, but also to other countries of
the Western Union, arms on a sufficient scale to give these
countries the feeling that we were back of them. . . . I made
the observation, which was supported by Harriman, that we
need to have a clear and focused policy, embracing political,
military and economic matters. . . .
in a conversation with Harriman this morning, he returned
to this subject and said there was a great need for coordination
of our policies in these three areas, and that otherwise our
strength would be frittered away without relation to the ac-
complishment of the result that fundamentally we are after:
the re-creation of stable conditions throughout Europe. He
said he believes that this idea could be sold on the basis of its
being a sound investment?that money spent on a carefully
thought-out and phased program would . . . have the result
of lifting a great continuing burden from the American tax-
payer. . . . Such a program could not, however, be imposed by
fiat on these countries, all of whom are made even more sensi-
tive by the fact of their poverty and present straits. . . .
11 November 1948 Aid to France
Conversation with M. Ramadier [Paul Ramadier, the Prime
Minister] this evening. Central points of his conversation were:
France must be defended at or east of the Rhine. There is
manpower sufficient for the creation of thirty divisions, but
the French must have equipment. I asked whether this equip-
ment could take the form of small arms, etc. He said that was
not their need, but rather for heavy equipment?tanks, antiair-
craft, vehicles. . . .
They are considering the building of carrier, to be finished
in 1952. I said I hoped they would not divert too much of their
effort to naval power, particularly in the field of aircraft car-
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/26: CIA-RDP83-01034R0003nnnAnnn9_4