SUMMARY I BACKGROUND 1946-1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01034R000200010004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 23, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SUMMARY
I Background 1946-195o
This study traces the organizational development of the
Central Intelligence Agency, using as a chronological guide the
period covered by the administration of General Walter Bedell Smith
(October 7, 1950 - February 26, 1953.) It is concerned only
incidentally with the Agency's clandestine activities.
When General Smith became Director, Central Intelligence (as
Group and Agency) was almost five years old. The principal
developments during that time had been as follows:
(1) The central Intelligence Group (CI G) was established as
coordinating agent for the Secretaries of State, dar, and Navy plus
a personal representative of the President designated as the National
Intelligence Authority (NIA), by a presidential letter of January 22,
1916. CI G was to consist of a Director a. pointed by the President,
a:sisted by persons and financed by funds to be supplied by the NIA.
The Director was to (a) advise the NIA concerning needed modifications
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in the existing intelligence structure of their departments; (b)
"correlate and Evaluate intelligence'}, and (c) establish "services
of common concern" wherever there were "related to the national security".
Under this directive, the first director, Sidney ,d. Souers
(January 22, 1946 - June 10, 1946) formed two staffs: one for
coordination, and the other for correlation and evaluation of
intelligence. On February 8, 1946, the NIA, at the request of the
.President, added to CIO's duties by requiring a daily summary of
current intelligence. Since CI G was dependent on the NIA for funds
and personnel, there was no real staff for personnel and administration
under Souers.
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (June 10, 1946 - May 1, 1947)
proceeded on the assumption that, as the President's appointee, he
must take full responsibility for his acts as Director; he therefore
sought commensurate authority and was empowered by the NIA to (a) hire
i
and pay his own personnel; (b) receive and disburse independent funds,
and (c) act as the "executive agent" of NIA members in dealings
with their departmental subordinates. He was also empowered to
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collect foreign intelligence apart from the regular departmental
collection services, and to do independent research in intelligence
under certain limitations. To assist him in coordination of
intelligence activities, Vandenberg established the Interdepartmental
Coordinating and Planning btaff (ICAP5) consisting of representatives
from all DNI1, intelligence organizations plus a chairman appointed
by the Department of L)tate. To discharge his .functions with respect
to correlation and evaluation of intelligence related to the national
security, Vandenberg built up a full scale research organization
called the Office of ireports and Estimates (OHE), which took charge
of national current intelligence, intelligence estimates, basic
intelligence, and interagency coordination of all three, plus a
variety of other services including production of scientific, technical,
and economic intelligence. In view of the independent authority now
vested in the Director, staffs for personnel, administration, and
security were formed under the Director's "Executive'".
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Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter (May 1, 1947 - October 7, 1950)
retained all authority acquired by General Vandenberg with the
exception of his position as "executive agent" which Hillenkoetter
renounced on June 26, 19147.
On July 26, 1947, the Hatil-inal Security Act made the Group
an Agency (CIA) and substituted the National Security Council (NSC)
for the National Intelligence Authority. Between the passage of the
Act and January 13, 194b, National Security Council Intelligence
Directives (NSCID's) issued in pursuance of the new law, defined
relationships and allocated responsibilities among CIA and other
intelligence organizations but not in such a way as to necessitate
important changes in the existing CIA organization.
This organization, as of January 1, 1949, consisted of (1) The
Director advised by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (established
under NSCID-1); (2) certain advisory groups; and (3) six offices:
Collection and Dissemination FPD), Scientific Intelligence (OSI);
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reports and Estimates (ORE), Operations (00), Special Operations (OSO),
and Policy Coordination (UPC).
Daring ilillenkoetter's administration, difficulties arose with
respect to all of the principal CIA functions: Surveys undertaken
during 197-1950 resulted in numerous recommendations, many of which
were still pending when ?.General Smith took office on October 7, 1950.
II Organizational Hevisions 1950-1953
In spite of many internal. and external changes (an increase
of major organizational components in Washington; new leadership
in key positions; jurisdictional realignments among CIA's operating
units; reallocations of budgetary assets and personnel; changes in
operating programs, priorities and the like; and a variety of
modifications affecting CIA's relationships with other intelligence
organizations)y, he administration of General Smith was characterized
by important elements of stability in that basic legislation underlying
the Central Intelligence system did not change; and the system remained
decentralized among seven intelligence and numerous non-intelligence
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agencies of the government. The Smith administration was, nevertheless,
motivated toward change when it took office, partly because of
recommended changes already approved by the NSC and partly as a
result of the Korean Gdar.
Organizational planning and advice were available to the new
Director internally from: (1) the "Management Staff"; (2) the
Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff (late MAPS); (3) the
Inspections and Security Staff; (4) the Budget Staff; (5) the Personnel
Staff; (6) the Legal Staff; (7) the "Project Review Committee"; and
externally from: (1) the "gberstadt" Committee's Report to the Hoover
Commission (in 1948); (2) the "Dulles Committeets" report to the
National Security Council (1929); (3) the results of studies made
by the State and Defense Departments in 1949 and 1950, and (4) studies
promoted by the Bureau of the Budget.
Of all these, the most important and compelling was the "Dulles
?eport", in that it was at the same time the most detailed, comprehensive,
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and objective, and a plan to whose implementation Ocneral Smith
was committed.
The principal changes indicated hp the Lulies Report were as
follows:
(1) Creation of an "Estimates Division" to be small and
carefully seleeted and to have charge of constructing "nationals'
intelligence estimates
in close cooperation with the other intelligence
agencies.
(2) Creation of a "Research and Reports Division" to (a)
produce whatever ""depaxtmental'u intelligence CIA might need, (b) take
charge of "basic" intelligence, (c) take charge of research in economic,
scientific, and technological (including map) intelligence as well as
any other type,that might in the future be authorized as a "service of.
common concern", and (d) take over certain support cervices, chiefly
the library, indexing, reference, and collation activities.
~3) ! merger of collection services and clandestine activities
(DSO, 00, OPC) under a single i?i.vision, and with "covert" administv.ation
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compartmented from "overt" administration9
(L) Creation of a "Coordination Di.visi.on", as a staff to
the Director, concerned with interagency coordination, and to supervise
the duties currently undertaken by the "Liaison Division" of OCD.
Other important features of the Lulles Report were:
(1) Suggestions that CIA should relinquish activities in
conflict with those of other agencies;
(2) '-pecia1 criticism directed at ORE for having become a
competitive producer of intelligence not properly classed as "national";
(3) Special criticism with respect to scientific intelligence;
communications intelligence; and "domestic intelligence including
counterintelligence and the points at which domestic and foreign
intelligence overlapd. ""
Some but not all of the recommendations in the Tulles Report
were adopted by the Smith Administration in complete or modified form.
Another irn,,)ortant influence on General Smith's Planning for
the Agency seems to have been a "Staff Study" issued jointly by the
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State and Defense Departments on May 1, 1950. The plan here suggested
ational Intelligence Group" within CIA to
produce both estimative and current intelligence (unlike the Dulles
Report Plan in which current intelligence might well have been dropped
from CIA activities).
General Smith reorganized the Director's staff to include two
members of the "Dulles Committee", Mr. William H. Jackson as Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. Allen Dulles Yf as
Deputy Director for Operations. The former took the lead in
reorganizing the Agency and inter-agency apparatus for production of
intelligence; while the latter took general charge of collection and
clandestine operations. Smith also appointed a Deputy Director for
Administration (M`1r. `Iurray W1cConnel soon replaced by Mr. '.alter It.
Wolf) to supervise the administrative activities of the Agency minus
the new office of Training which was given independent status. It was
not until January 2, 1952, that the third deputy (for Intelligence)
was added to superintend the work of the "overt" offices which eventually
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included rational Estimates, Current Intelligence, Research and Reports,
Scientific Intelligence, Intelligence Coordination, Collection and
Dissemination, and Operations. In the interim, Mr. Jackson took general
charge of the overt components.
While the Agency executive structure was being thus altered,
Jackson and Smith gave immediate attention to the problem of
re-asserting CIA's leadership in governmental intelligence. They
proceeded conservatively, however, seeking to withdraw the Agency
from fields where its "dominant interest" was not clear, rather than
attempt to take on new functions. Jackson spent much of his time
during his first weeks as Director in negotiating an agreement with
the Department of State under which State -conce#ded a dominant interest
in economic intelligence to CIA while CIA withdrew from the field of
research in political intelligence . (Later, CIA also withdrew from
certain fields of scientific and technological intelligence.) After
the first interagency agreements were negotiated, Jackson made use of
the Office of Intelligence Coordination (OIC) for study of interagency problems.
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General Smith was quick to call upon the Intelligence Advisory
Committee to aid him directly in problems of coordination of both
activities and estimates. During the next two years, the IAC was
convened almost one hundred times, occupying itself chiefly with
detailed discussion of intelligence estimates prepared. by all agencies
under the leadership of CIA for presentation to the National Security
Council. The IAC also reached agreement on a wide variety of inter-
agency problems.
Other coordinating boards which figured importantly during
the Smith administration were:
(1) the US Communications Intelligence Board of which the
DCI became chairman in the fall of 1952;
(2) the Operations Coordinating Board (formerly the
Psychological Strategy Board) directly under the NSC, on which CIA was
represented, the DUI acting for a time as chairman;
(3) various primarily military intelligence coordinating
committees in which CIA gained influence: the Joint Intelligence
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Indications Committee (which became the Watch Committee of the IAC);
and the joint military organizations for exploitation of prisoners
of war; enemy materials, and enemy documents.
In the particular matter of inter-agency coordination overseas,
General Smith gradually gained agreements in which the influence of
the
continued to maintain their own arrangements for coordination abroad.
Perhaps the most striking changes introduced into the intelligence
system by the Smith administration were those related to the production
of "national" intelligence as defined in NSCID-3. The following
division of responsibilities was gradually evolved for production
of intelligence in this cate;ory:
(1) Estimates by the newly formed Office of National
Intelligence which relied primarily upon the IAC organization for
the material underlying these.
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(2) Basic Intelligence (the National Intelligence Survey)
by a division under the Office of Research and Reports, acting
as coordinating agent for research carried on by the 1AC.
(3) Current intelligence publications by the Office of
Current intelligence (but national "indications" intelligence by
an inter-agency group).
This new division of responsibilities, which involved the
abrupt abandonment of the Office of Reports and Estimates, was made
necessary by the pressing international situation and the demands
created by the National Security Council's endorsement of the Dulles
Report.
III The Inter-agency Coordination Problem
It appeared essential to all CIA directors through General Smith
to organize a personal staff for interdepartmental coordination of
intelligence activities, to aid him in formation of decisions ultimately
to be considered by the Intelligence Advisory Board (January 22, 19116-
July 26, 19147) and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (after December 12, 1947).
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Admiral Souers organized such a staff (Central Planning Staff)
which, during the four months of its existence (February - June 1946)
conducted numerous studies of the points at which the existing intelligence
organization of the government might be strengthened with reference
to the national security. This staff was not primarily representative
of the agencies from which the members came, but rather consisted of
advisers responsible to the DCI.
General Vandenberg dissolved Souers' staff and organized an
"interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff" (ICAPS) in its
place. This consisted of representatives of all IAB members with a
representative from the State Department as chairman. It was in part
responsible to the DCI and in part to the !.AC chiefs. .According to
the functional description issued for ICAPS, it was to "ensure"
cooperative activity by each agency as well as CIG.
Admiral Hillenkoetter retained ICAPS after CI G had become CIA
with much the same theoretical responsibilities as it had had before,
adding to it a second staff celled the "Standing Committee". This
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committee differed from IC, 'a primarily in terms of seniority. The
ICj?S-Standing Committee system did not work well, primarily because
the staffs lacked the confidence of the IAC. Admiral Hillenkoetter
was not inclined to make re ?filar use of the I.AC itself in the
process of coordination.
In 1948 the Dd lles Committee found the system for and results
of coordination unsatisfactory on several counts. The Committee,
however, emphasized what it considered to be failures in coordination
of national intelligence estimates, for which the main responsibility
in CIA lay in the Office of Reports and Estimates. According to the
Dulles Group, rather than bring about the harmony of operation called
for by the requirements of coordination, ORE had tended to create
friction with respect to the type of material presented in intelligence
reports and estimates; the manner of coordinating their substance; and
in the field of intelligence research where ORE's activities impinged.
on the dominant interests of other departments. As to Hillenkoetter's
immediate staff system for coordination of activities, the committee
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found it inadequate as constituted at the time of reporting. In place
of ORE, the 1ieport proposed a small staff for estimating and a larger
one for research and reports. In place of ICAPS, the Committee
recommended a "Coordination Division" with somewhat broader responsibilities
than those accorded to ICAi>S.
Although the National Security Council endorsed these recommendations,
the only changes made in accordance with them up to October 7, 1950,
entailed little more than a token internal reorganization of ORE, and
a change in the name of ICAPS to the Coordinating, Operations and Policy
Staff (CORPS).
The disposition made of the ORE problem by the Smith administration
is outlined elsewhere in this study. COAPS remained in existence until
December 1, 1950, when it was abolished in favor of the Office of
Intelligence Coordination (0IC). (The "Standing Committee" was retained
until April 2, 1951 when it also was abolished.) No direct effort seems
to have been made to establish a "Coordination Division" in accordance
with the ftlles Report specifications.
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OIC was established as a small staff, with Office status, to
serve as an advisory, fact-finding, and management-consultant group
on various kinds of inter-agency problems of an organizational,
administrative, or procedural character. Though this staff was
responsible to the Director, it worked primarily with the Deputy
Director during its early development.
On January 19, 1951) OIC was instructed to furnish a Secretary
for IAC. In this capacity, the Assistant Directorfor Intelligence
Coordination prepared studies and agendas for the IAC and was enabled
to keep in touch with policies being formulated there.
On this same date, the Assistant Director described OIC as an
Office which (1) furnished aid where needed to other CIA offices, which,
however, themselves carried on inter-agency coordinationes it affected
their own special fields; (2) assisted in making the IAC effective;
(3) worked also with and through the regular meetings of the DCI:_:with
his Assistant Directors; (1i) developed an intimate knowledge of the
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functions and activities of the IAC agencies as well as CIA; and
(5) foresaw future problems in the course of planning in relation
to coordination.
The principal achievements of the Office of Intelligence
Coordination to 1953 were described as: (1) Regularization of certain
IAC practices and the IAC structure; (2) intelligence publications;
(3) advice on and the negotiation of NSCID's and DCID's; resolution
of jurisdictional problems among agencies regarding intelligence
activities and stimulating cooperative action to meet urgent
intelligence needs; (5) relation of services of common concern to
the rest of the community and provision of guidance to those services;
(6) support for DD/P and psychological warfare.
After January 1952, OIC was administratively responsible to
the Office of the DDI but was not absorbed into that office during
the Smith administration.
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IV The Conduct of Overt Collection
The Office of Operations (00), an amalgamation of four
organizations for collecting intelligences from foreign broadcasts,
foreign documents, domestic sources,
was originally formed as part of CI G on October 17, 19146. The oldest
of its constituent parts, the Foreign Broadcast Information Division
came into being in 19140 and was transferred, as an entity,
to Cl:~ on June 29, 19146. The next, the Foreign documents -ivision
(FDD) originated as a military agency in 1944, and it was transferred
to CIG on December 1, 19146. The third, the Contacts Division (00/C)
originated within CI G for the Office of Special
Operations (OSO) in July 19146. It was transferred from OSO to 00
when the latter was formed.
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By NSCID-6 of December 12, 1947, 00 monitoring activity was
designated a "service of common concern" to "conduct all Federal
monitoring of Foreign propaganda and press broadcasts required for
the collection of intelligence information to meet the needs of all
Departments and agencies in connection with the National Security".
The work of 00/C received similar authorization by NSCID-7
ee February l9h8. included were agreements with the FBI, which at
first feared CIA interference with its domestic security responsibilities.
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The Dilles Report commended the work of 00 in general but
objected to its organization as a separate office. Instead, the
Committee recommended that the Contact Division be made part of a
proposed "Operations .Division's in which OSO and the Office of Policy
Coordination should be the other two elements; that the Foreign Documents
Division should be made part of the Committee's proposed Research and
Reports Division; and that the Foreign Broadcast Information Division
!'should probably" be administered under the same. Admiral }Iillenkoetter
rejected these proposals on the advice of the Assistant Director for 00.
General Smith at first seemed to agree with Admiral Hillenkoetter's
position in that he told the NSC on uctober 12, 1950, that heopposed
the OSO-OPC-Co merger. In November 1950, however, smith changed his
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views to the extent of appointing Mr. Allen Dulles as Deputy Director
for Operations (DDO), to superintend the work of 00, OPC, and OSO.
and covert collection problems; and (3) Mr. Dulles, special qualifications
This reversal of General Smith's views seems to have been
motivated primarily by (1)
F(2) the need for coordination between overt
for collection work.
In spite of this new dispensation for intelligence collection
(published in chart form January 19, 1951) 00 remained intact as an
office without important change in its functional assignments.
Nevertheless, those in charge of the Office of Operations were
not convinced of the wisdom of the merger. The 00 Assistant Director
,Wade representations to the OCI and others to this effect during 1951
and 1952.
The principal arguments against the merger were (1)
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This proposal was adopted in February 1952,
In spite of the above-described changes in uOts status, the
Office continued to operate productively during 1950-1953 with
respect to all its various functions
Statistics for the period 1950-1953 show that:
(2) The Foreign Broadcast Information Division continued to
represent a problem of both mass and quantity, as the Division increased
its daily output, derived from monitoring an estimated
foreign
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broadcasting stations.
(3) The Foreign Documents Division continued to furnish
a variety of translation, abstracting, and research services both
for CIA and the IAC agencies. It also served as a coordination center
to reduce duplication and confusion in the translation field. During
the period it increased both its volume of service and the number of
languages it could handle.
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VI Problems of Scientific and Technical intelligence
The exceptional importance of establishing an efficient post-war
apparatus to deal with scientific intelligence from the point of view
of national security was recognized from 19146 on, but a long series
of difficulties arose as attempts were made to devise an appropriate
system.
The first agreement of importance in this field established a
Scientific Intelligence "Branch" within the Office of Reports and
Estimates of CIG. This organization (which was severely criticized
by the D2lles Committee on the basis of its l9h8 survey) proved to
be a failure for numerous reasons and was supplanted as of January 1,
1949, by an Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) in CIF.
In September 19149, after the unexpected Soviet explosion of
an atomic bomb, this Office complained that its mission was impossible
of accomplishment under current circumstances. The principal reasons
given were, first, that the Office of Special Operations did not furnish
adequate scientific intelligence from the field; and second, that the
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intelligence system under the IAC did not cooperate for scientific
intelligence purposes. OSI proposed, in effect, that it be given a
greater control over 030 with respect to scientific intelligence and
that the Director should assert complete authority over the IAC.
Neither of these recommendations was carried out, but in the course
of an ensuing controversy involving the Assistant Directors for
Scientific Intelligence and Special Operations, the former resigned.
As a result, a new Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
took office seven months before the coming of the Smith administration
under circumstances of some delicacy with respect to the internal
organization of CIA. These special circumstances, along with general
difficulties attending the 01Ua-ONE-ORR reorganization in 1951, may have
had a part in the tendency shown by the Smith administration at this
time to concentrate on other problems than that of scientific
intelligence. No attempt seems to have been made in 1950-1951 to
transfer scientific and technical intelligence to OTW, as had been
proposed by the Dulles Committee, or until 1952 to modify the arrangements
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for inter-agency coordination that had been begun under the previous
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for inter-agency coordination that had been begun under the previous
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In origin it seems to have resulted from ar compromise adopted by the
IAC in preference to a method of coordinating; medical intelligence
proposed by becretary of Defense Forrestal in March 19249. Its
principal mission was to produce coordinated estimates, for which
purpose it relied on sub-committees specializing in various fields
considered to be of scientific and technical importance.
The Office of Scientific Intelligence itself, when General Smith
became Director, was almost two years old but still largely in a
Largely because it had been unable as yet to
recruit a large enough and competent enough staff, its achievements
to October 1950 had been limited. The Office had expressed
dissatisfaction on numerous occasions with the quantity and quality
of material collected by the field and made available to OSI. Under
regulations promulgated by the amith Administration early in 1951,
the emphasis with respect of OSI's functional responsibilities was
Formative stage of organization,
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shifted in.the direction of furnishing national scientific intelligence
for use in estimates to be produced by ONE.
At the end of fifteen months, the Scientific Intelligence
Committee began to show signs of fundamental disagreement. This came
to a head in April 1951 with a divided vote on a motion to abolish
certain sub-committees considered to be engaged in work belonging
exclusively to the military establishment. As a result of this and
other disagreements, the matter of department l jurisdiction in various
fields of scientific and technical intelligence came before the
Intelligence Advisory Committee on August 2, 1951.
No action was taken by the IAC at this or'later meetings during
1951. The Scientific Intelligence Committee continued to function
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as usual, though its actions were under study by OIC. In January 1952,
however, it was announced to the Committee that the Joint Intelligence
Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had established a technical
subcommittee whose work would obviously duplicate that of the SIC.
Closely following this new development came two new surveys of the
scientific intelligence situation.
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DCID 3/3 and the SIC were to be retained
1 ! _ aaa r :... :Z f _
,Jhile the Inspector General's survey was going on, General Smith
attacked the scientific intelligence problem from a new angle by
requesting "interested members" of the IAC to designate representatives
to an ad hoc committee on scientific and technical intelligence under
the chairmanship of CIA's Deputy L rector for Intelligence. This
Committee was to study "existing arrangements relating to the production
of scientific and technical Intelligence." It reported on Au::-,ust 1, 1952.
It concluded that no new NSCID on scientific intelligence was needed
because the allocations of responsibility in this field to be found
in NSCID-3 were adequate. It proposed, however, a substitute for
DCID3/3 which should interpret those allocations to the extent of
differentiating between "scientific" and "technical" intelligence along
the lines set forth in the Inspector General's report.
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VII Current Intelligence, warnings, and t+~stimates
CIA disseminated current intelligence from February 1916 through
1950 in accordance with a requirement originally issued by the NIA at
the request of the President. In 1949, the U,tlles Committee recommended
that this activity be discontinued by CIA, or if not, that a survey be
made to determine whether the current intelligence being issued by CIA
was justifiable in relation to similar material being disseminated by
other agencies.
The Hillenkoetter Administration, rejecting this recommendation,
continued to produce a daily summary based on dispatch traffic from all
sources available to CIA; a weekly Surmnary of the same; a 1-Tonthly Review
produced at the request of the National Security Council, and a variety
of other services designed to keep policy officers informed of the most
important world developments as seen in reports from the field. At the
request of the President in July 1950; CIA also issued a special daily
summary of developments in the Korean iVar.
Immediate responsibility for production of all these lay with the
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Office of reports and Estimates
wa_,.._als.o_shared with-national estimates, basic intelligence., ? r-eseareh....
and-.reporting in all--.intell.i. Once fie],ds... except_,.scientti ic, ~~nd a variety of. other--dui,i.es. leuer#,}~ ess~ ,he "excessive" time said to
be devoted b OIE to current intelligence was the subject of criticism
by the Dulles Committee and within 0,12 itself during 19 49 and 1950.
The `3-nith Administration considered two alternative proposals
regarding current intelligence when it took office in October 1950:
one that current intelligence should be produced under a "National
Intelligence Group"; the other that it be produced under the proposed
Office of National Estimates. No serious consideration seems to have
been given to dropping current intelligence activities.
Late in November 1950, most current intelligence activities
still remaining in ORE were transferred to the Office of National
Estimates. This was not, however, intended to be a permanent arrangement.
ON acquired from ORE sufficient staff to produce the old CIA Daily
Summary (the other publications being dropped with exception of the
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Korean Suinn-nary which continued for some months to be produced in OPtg).
The Summary was produced by the Office of National ?estimates until
February. 27, 1951. Personnel acquired from OBE in connection with
the Summary remained in ONE..
On January 15, 1951, General Smith created the Office of Current
Intelligence (OCT), by changing the name of the Office of Special Services.
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OCI, under a new assistant director, was to consolidate all CIA
current intelligence activities, including those maintained by ONE,
those that had been attached to the Office of Special Services, and
those that were still in oh.
OCI was distinguished from its predecessors mainly in being
concerned with current intelligence only, and through its ability
to combine communications and Hcollateralu intelligence in UUall-source"
publications. Between January and June 1951, OCI built up an
organization
and for substantive and editorial review
of publications. The first increment of OCI personnel was drawn
from former ORE employees
I I
The publications issued by the Office up to ]February 1953
were; two dailies, the Current Intelligence Bulletin and B:.ily Digest;
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Later additions were from outside recruitment.
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two weeklies, the Situation Summary and Current Intelligence
Bulletin; the Daily Korean Summary; and occasional Intelligence
Memoranda.
Two current intelligence problems apart from those solved
through the creation of OCI were of special concern to the Smith
administration: that of reporting vs. estimating, and that of
central responsibility for warnings and hostility indications.
The first involved an adjustment between the Office of
National Estimates and that of Current Intelligence within CIA and
with the IAC Watch Committee outside CIA. Although the Office of
Current Intelligence adopted an approach to current intelligence
reportin-; which allowed for intrpretations intended to represent
the immediate opinion of OCI only, ONE found them from time to time
in conflict with ON's function with respect to estimating. Methods
designed for closer intra-office coordination were adopted to resolve
the conflict. As to the watch Committee, there were complaints both
that its reports bordered too closely upon estimates of the situation,
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and that the reports were too little interpretive to be useful.
The Watch Committee itself was formed as an agency of the
IAC during, .General Smith's administration to take the place of
organizations within CIi and the Defense Department which were
attempting to put early-warning intelligence on a systematic basis.
Although General Smith spoke with some pride of developments
in current intelligence during his administration, he warned the
National Security Council that CIA could not guarantee "certain"
advance warning of sudden undeclared hostilities.
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1
Vlll The Office of itesea.rch and ;3eports
The Office of research and Heports that was sug;ested by
the Wiles Co mittee in January 1949 was to carry on research
nd be responsible for "such other metters
as are deemed of common concern".
is actually a rthorized under an Order of November 190,
however, Oidit's functions were more limited than this. By the Order,
0,111 acquired O 2 's functions and assets
Jhen it began, therefore,
O,iR consisted of certain residual functions and assets of o1 q,
No p rmanent organization for O'J was adopted until mid-January
when negotiations had been completed by the DDCI r:i.:. a result of
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which research in political intelligence was assumed to the
Department of State while CIA took the principal responsibility in
the economic field.
Other negotiations, begun under the previous administration
culminated in the spring of 1951, in NSCID-15 whereby CIA was given
primary responsibility for production of economic intelligence as
a service of common concern. Under the authority of this Directive
and with approval of the IAC, the J)CI formed the Lconomic Intelligence
Committee (~sIC)) trough which it became possible to coordinate not
only economic intelligence production as among the lAC and related
agencies, but to coordinate economic intelligence activities throughout
the government to an extent which had no precedent in CIA history.
The nature or the new system was such that GIR became the primary
research facility for material ;ublished b, the Economic intelligence
Committee.
.Iith a view to these decisions rege-.,rding. economic intelligence,
0:.tiVs Assistant Director (appointed January 15, 1951) accepted a plan
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of organization whereby the Office became a -three-part uni
iroblems of personnel and norele were pressing in O J during
most of 1951.
J1Zecruitment, therefore, became an urgent problem curing
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1951-1953. The low morale existing in the Office in 1950 unproved
rapidly as a positive research program was developed.
Because it was, in effect, necessary during ly5l to create
an entirely new office to specialize in economic research (along with
appropriate machinery for the 'IC), volume of roroduction was not
great during that year
where work went forward as it had normally done in the past. Numerous
economic reports were disseminated, nevertheless, including important
contributions to national intelli Bence estimates. 24uch of the work
produced was considered tentative, the Office not being in position during
its period of formation to publish
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The National Intelligence Surveys (compendia of "basic"
intelligence) were assigned to CIi by I""'ID-3 of January 191~h.
:?erlier CIA had ac wired the Joint r:ny-Navy Intelligence survey
pro gram which had originates in 1913, and had or;. er,ized a
"r?asic Intelligence 3roup"' in 0 tE to administer the hIS grogram.
All contributions to the Nr1S were compiled by the intelligence
organizations under the IAA and by other segments of the ,overnment,
this work bein; coordinated by an NIS committee with the chief of
the CIa basic intelligence unit as chairman. In accordance with
A'SCID-3, this Committee during 1948 produced a complete outline and
requirements .for Surveys onIreas of the world, excluding
Antarctica and the United States.
The shift of the INS unit from OIRE to OX II in 1950 did not
importantly affect its work which was, however, somewhat interrupted
as a result of the Korean War. Steps were taken during 1952 to
strengthen the program against future interruptions of this sort.
By 1953, the NIS program was in a stronger position than ever before,
having shown
in 1952 over 1951 and
25X1
25X1
I over 1952. 25X1
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