ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NEW AND OLD EXECUTIVE ORDERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01022R000100050022-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Content Type: REPORT

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TAB
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COMPARISON Analysis of Differences Between
the New and Old Executive Orders
Principles, Authorities, Procedures,
Markings, Record Holdings, General.
Statistics
DECLASSIFICATION CIA Regulations, History of 'Prc,ceda cs,
Copy of Mr. Colby's Comments to Mr.
Ehrlichrnan, Memo for DCI on "Foreign
Relations" Series
Personnel Security: Authorities,
Statistics, Background Investigation
Polygraph Program
Processing
Reinvestigation Program.
Investigation Cost Factors
Security Review Procedures
DCI Memo to Mr. Ehrlichman
on Reduction of Clearances
DCI on DISCLOSURES Memoranda
NEW E. U.
A copy of the New Executive Order
11652
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ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THE NEW AND OLD EXECUTIVE ORDERS
INTRODUCTION
The new Executive Order mentions conduct of foreign
relations in addition to national defense. (Throughout the new
Order national defense and conduct of foreign relations are
termed national security). The old Order mentioned national
defense only.
1. Security Classification Categories
In the new Order classified information is defined in terms
of whether the information, if disclosed to unauthorized persons,
could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national
security. Executive Order 10501 is defined in terms of whether
the information, if disclosed to unauthorized persons could result
in damage or could be prejudicial. The words could result in the
old Order permitted classification of a document to cover extremely
remote possibilities of damage or prejudice while the new Order
requires reasonableness before a classification category can be
utilized. The term "national security" as used in the new Executive
Order includes both national defense and foreign relations matters.
The use of the term "national security" rather than "national dc'.ionse"
rccogni.zc that the category of information requiring protection is
broader than military information alone, and is also more consis-
tent with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act which
exempts from possible disclosure matters that are "specifically
required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy. "
The three categories of classified information--Top Secret,
Secret and Confidential--prescribed in Executive Order 10501 are
written in the new Order. The distinctions between the three
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categories still turn on the degrees of damage to the national
security that could result .from failure to protect the information
from dl.isclosu're. The old Order cited compromise of "in.telligen.cee
c:,perati.ons" as an example of damage. The new Order aiYiended
this to "sensitive intelligence operations. "
2. Authority to Classify
Under Executive Order 10501, 38 Departments and. Agencies
had the authority to classify at the Top Secret level which is
inclusive of authority to classify at the Secret and Confidential
level. Under the new Executive Order, only 12 Departments and
Agencies plus such offices in the Executive Office of the President
as the President may designate in writing are so authorize(.'[. An.
additional. 13 Agencies are delegated the authority under the new
Executive Order to classify information at the Secret level.
The new Executive Order provide s authority to delegate
within.a Department or Agency only to a Iiinited number of officials.
Top Secret original classification. authority may not be delegated
below the level. of the principle deputies or assistants of major
elements of the Department or Agency. In the 13 Agencies authorized
to originally classify information Secret, classification authority
may not be delegated below senior principle deputies or assistants.
Under Executive Order 10501 original classification authority at
the Top Secret level can. be delegated to any person employed by
the Department or Agency.
3. Aaa.thorit to Downgrade and Declassify
Executive Order 10501 requires the heads of the Departments
or Agencies originating classified information or material to
de igua-te persons to be responsible for continuing review of such
classified information or material on a document-by-document
category, project, program or other systematic basis for the
purpose of declassifying or downgrading. Usually only individuals
who had original classification authority were permitted to declassify.
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The new Order, by specifically authorizing the Heads of the
Departments or Agencies to delegate to individuals who do not
have original classification authority the authority to declassify
or downgrade, has increased the potential of the Departments or
Agencies for increasing their capability to downgrade or declassify.
The Executive Order just issued establishes a new guiding
principle--each person possessing original classification authority
shall be held accountable for the propriety of his classification
actions and can be reprimanded for overrlassification and unneces-.
fiary classsi.fication.
To enable enforcement of this principle, the new Executive
Order provides that information and material classified under the
Order shall indicate on its face the identity of the highest authority
authorizing the classification, unless the Agency involved shall
have provided some other method of identifying him. If the signer
or authenticator of a document also authorized its original classi-
fication, no further annotation as to his identity is required.
5. Declassification and Downgrading
Under Executive Order 10501, all information classified at
the Top Secret, Secret or Confidential level is also required. to
be grouped into one of four categories for purposes of downgrading
and declassification.
Group 1 information and material.is excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification. It consists of information or
material originating with foreign governments or international
organizations, information and materials protected by statute,
such as that falling within the purview of the Atomic Energy Act,
and information or materials requiring special handling, such as
intelligence or cryptology.
Group 2 information or material is also exempt from automatic
downgrading and declassification. It consists of extremely sensitive
i.nfori,ri?ation. or material which the Plead of the Agency or his designee
designates.
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Group 3 information or material is exempt from automatic
declassification, but is subject to automatic downgrading at 12-
year intervals until it reaches the lowest classification. It
consists of that information or material which warrants some degree
of classification for an indefinite period.
Group 4 includes all classified information or material not
falling in Groups 1, 2 or 3 and is subject to downgrading at 3-.year
intervals and automatic declassification 12 years after the date of
original issuance.
Under the new Executive Order, separate groupings for
purposes of downgrading and declassification are dispensed with..
In lieu of the grouping system, a General Declassification Schedule
is prescribed, to which limited exceptions are specified and sub-
jected to special rules for downgrading and declassification.
The general downgrading and declassification schedule is as
follows: Top Secret information is automatically downgraded to
Secret at the end of 2 years from the date of original classification;
further downgraded to Confidential at the end of 4 years from (late
of original classification; and is declassified at the end of 10 years
from the !date it was originated.
Secret information is automatically downgraded to Confidential
at the end of 2 years and automatically declassified at the end of
8 years from the date it was originated.
Confidential information is automatically declassified at the
end of 6 years from the date it was originated.
This provides for an automatic downgrading and declassification
schedule at intervals of 2 years, 4 years and 10 years as compared
to the most rapid downgrading and declassification under the old
system--that applicable to Group 4--at intervals of 3 years, 6 years
and 12 years from original date of classification.
Four limited and specific categories of information are
authorized to be exempted from the General Declassification
Schedule specified in the new Executive Order. The specific
exemption category must be specified in writing on the document
or material. The four exemptions cover information or material
which fall into one of the four following categories:
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A. Classified information or material furnished by
foreign governments or international organizations and held
by the United States on the understanding that it be kept in
confidence.
B. Classified information or material specifically
covered by statute, or pertaining to cryptography, or
disclosing intelligence sources or methods.
C. Classified information or material disclosing a
project, plan, installation or system or a specific foreign
relations matter the continuing protection of which is
essential to the national security.
D. Classified information or material the disclosure
of which would place a person in immediate jeopardy.
Information or material falling into one of the categories
eligible for exemption may thus escape automatic downgrading
and declassification. However, such material is made subject
to a mandatory classification review any time after the expiration
of 10 years from date of origin upon request by a Department or
a member of the public.
In addition to the mandatory review upon request at the end
of 10 years, the new Executive Order provides for automatic
declassification at the end of 30 years from origination of all
classified information unless the Head of the originating Depart-
ment personally determines in writing at the end of 30 years that
continuing protection is essential to the national security or that
its disclosure would place a person in immediate jeopardy. Under
the provisions of Executive Order 10501, classified information
falling in Groups 1, 2 and 3 was subject to no automatic declassifi-
cation.
The Executive Order provides that information classified
before the effective date of the new Order, regardless of the Group
to which it was assigned, shall be subject to mandatory review at
Ilill c+ncl o.I 1.0 yearn .1rorn ov:iI;1.nn,Ili.()n in, acc(JrcIaaco w:i1.11 Ilw ru11('fi
w.ii,cli 'i1.)lil.y I:u I;11o 111all.flatu',-.'y ruviow 1'car 1.11forinalJoll nor >>in.I.11r1ni.
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exempted from the General Declassification Schedule under the
new Order. Sirnila.rly, all. information and material classified
before the effective date of the new Order which. is 30 years or
,more old shall be systematically reviewed for declassification
by the Archivist of the United States.
6. Access Marlcins'Is Safekee an s L,-2unta,l7x.lit '.Cran.sirli:i ' ioT.7.
Disposition and Destruction of Classified Information and. Ma.tcr;i-a.l.
The old Order gave specific instructions concerning Markings
Of C lassifi.ed Material. (Section 5); Custody and Safekeeping.; (,`Section 6);
Accountability and Dissemination. (Section 7); Transmission (Sect:i-on. 8)
and..l)i.s'}aosal. and Destruction (Section. 9).
The new Order in Section 6 states that "The President acting
through the National. Security Council, shall issue d.i.:rectivc.s whicl?i.
Shall be binding on all Departments or Agencies to protect classified
information from loss of compromise. " It also lists seven policy
statements and states that such directives shall conform to these
policie S.
7. Implementation and Review Responsibilities
The old Order charged the National Security Council to conduct
continuing review to ensure compliance thereto, to ensure t1-1-it
classified information is protected. The new Executive Order pro-
vides that each Department or Agency originating or handling
classified information shall form a Departmental or Agency corn.m.it-
tee to act on all. suggestions and complaints with respect to the
.Department's or Agency's administration of the Order, The com.-
mittee is to be chaired by a senior member of the staff of the Head
of the 1'. 9epa.:rtm.ent or .Agency.
Even more important, however, the Order establishes an
Interagency Classification Review Committee under the National.
Security Council.. This Committee is to be composed of represent-
atives of t:lae Departments of State, Defense and Justice, the Atomic
CC),I'Y'1.7-nissi.on, the Central Intelligence Agency, and f:he
h;kL(.,i.rin ll. `.)ecurity. Council st.:.a,ff. The Chairman is to ho dIoiiif;ll.:l.i:cd
'I:by the Pro ;ident.
The Interagency Classification Review Committee has the
following responsibilities:
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A. To monitor Department actions to ensure
compliance with the provisions of the Executive Order
and. sucl'a. irnplcrnenting directives as are promulgated.
by the National Security Council;
B. To receive, consider and take action on, s;ugger;_
tions and complaints from persoa,.s -within or outrrid.e the
Coverrirra.ent on the administration of the E.xecutivo Order,
and
C. In consultation with the affected Department or
Departments, to assure that appropriate action is taker
on s.wgt er3tionr+ rand cornplaints.
T:a.e Executive Order requires Departments and Agencies to
furni.sh. the Committee any particular information or material.
needed by the Committee to carry out its functions. In addition,
prior to 1 June 1972 each Agency or Department will suhrn.ii, to
the Committee for approval a copy of the regulations it proposes
to ad.opt pursuant to the new Order.
S. 'ate'rial Covered by the Atomic Energy Act
There is no difference between Executive Order 10501 and
the new Order.
9. S:)ecial Departmental Arrangements
The originating Department or other appropriate authority
may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this Order,
special regkArern.ents with respect to access, distribution and
protection of classified information and material, including those
which presently relate to con-.L unications intelligence, intelligence
sources and methods and cryptography. No such authority was
granted in Executive Order 10501.
10. Exceptional Cases
The )AM Orcl.rr cloert not ei.f,nn.i.fic,-a.zltly M-1101-id l;xecrat:i.vc C)rdlerr
10!301 in i;hic3 .field. A person or Dep..artmcnt: n'a.ol; having original.
c41assi,fication authority but originating information which is believed
to require classification, shall protect the information as if it were
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classified and shall request an appropriate Department or
Agency to make the classification decision.
11. Declassification of Presidential Papers
The Archivist of the United States shall have the authority
to review information and material classified by a President,
his White House Staff or special committee or commission
appointed by him and which the Archivist has in his custody at
any archival depository, including a presidential library. This
provision was not in Executive Order 10501.
12. Historical Research and Access by Former Government
Officials
There is no change-in the now Order from the Historical
Research provisions of Executive Order 10501; however, the new
Order will permit the Head of an Agency to grant access to a
person previously occupied in a policy making position to which
he had been appointed by the President if such access is clearly
consistent with the interest of national security and the I-Iead of
the Agency takes appropriate steps to assure that the classified
information or material is not published or otherwise compro-
mised. Access granted a person by reason of having previously
occupied a policy making position shall be limited to those papers
which the former official originated, reviewed, signed, or received
while in public office.
13. Administrative and Judicial Action
This section permits administrative reprimands to individuals
who repeatedly abuse the classification process; i. e. , unnecessary
classification or overclassification. In addition, the Head of a
Department or Agency is directed to take prompt and stringent
administrative action against any employee who is responsible
for unauthorized disclosure of classified material. Executive
Order 10501 did not contain a provision for reprimanding individuals
abusing the classification process.
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W
General Analysis of the New Executive Order as it Affects CIA
By specifically exempting classified information and
material pertaining to intelligence sources and methods from
the General Declassification Schedule the new Order assures
that such sources and methods can be protected for as long a
time as protection is needed. I do not anticipate any substantive
problems in carrying out intent of the new Executive Order.
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CLASSIFICATION
STATINTL
1. Princii)les for Classification
a. Classification of information and material is considered
in terms of the potential effects its unauthorized disclosure
has on the defense intelligence efforts of the nation.
b. Classification of information and material is in accordance
with the definition of the security classification categories.
c. Classification is based upon degree of secrecy warranted
for control of the information and not upon. the desi.r~.-ability
of restricting access under the need-to-know principle.
d. Classification of information and material is based on
content and not necessarily on relationship to other
documents.
e. Reference to classified information or material when
the reference does not in itself reveal the substance of
classified defense or intelligence information shall not
be classified.
f. A document or material shall bear a classification at
least as high as that of its highest classified components.
It will bear only one overall classification notwithstanding
paragraphs and sections which bear different classifications
or no classification.
". All CIA. documents and material are excluded from automatic
downgrading.
3. Authority to Classify
The CIA Classification Control Officer, Assistant Classification
Control Officers and Authorized Classifiers are the only persons
authorized to apply an original classification to information or material.
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4. Classification Network
a. Network was established to control the classification of
information or material against unauthorized disclosure.
b. Network under jurisdiction of Assistant Director for
Central Reference consisting of:
(1) The CIA Classification Control Officer
(2) Assistant Classification Control Officers
(3) Authorized Classifiers
c. Deputy Directors and Operating Officials designate as
many Assistant Classification Control Officers within
their areas of jurisdiction as necessary for effective
administration and supervision of classification
procedures and activities.
d. Assistant Classification Control Officers may designate
as many Authorized Classifiers as required.
e. Notification is given in writing to the CIA Classification
Control Officer of all individuals so designated.
5. When security classification categories do not apply, the following
internal Agency control markings may be considered
a. Administrative-Internal Use Only. This control
marking may be used for unclassified, non-
sensitive administrative information which
should not be disseminated outside of CIA.
b. For Official Use Only. This control may be used
whenever intelligence or intelligence information
does not warrant a defense (national security)
classification, but does require some dissemina-
tion limitation. Intelligence or information bearing
this marking may be used for official purposes by
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foreign governments which have been authorized
to 'receive it by the originating agency. It may be
disclosed to non-Government persons and organi-
zations only with permission of the originating
agency. This control marking is used alone and
never in conjunction with a defense (security)
classification. Some reasons for requiring such
dissemination control are: protection under
copyright, libel, slander, and communication
laws; and protection for moral, ethical, or legal
reasons.
6. There are other control markings which are used with
security classification categories, such as:
a. WARNING NOTICE- -SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED
C
This marking shall be employed in the absence of any
other suitable marking to inform all recipients that the
information is sensitive and requires special controls and
a severely limited distribution. For the purpose of this
marking, such intelligence is identified as that classified
intelligence, the unauthorized disclosure of which could
lead to counteraction
(1) jeopardizing the continued productivity of
intelligence sources or methods that provide
intelligence vital to the national security, or
(Z) offsetting the value of intelligence vital to
the national security.
b. CONTROLLED DISSEM
This marking is used where source protection, including
proprietary interests of commercial sources would warrant
limiting the dissemination of the document. This marking
STATI IV?TL
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may also be applied for dissemination control purposes
to assist in identifying that intelligence material which
by category or classification is by USIB-approved policy
and other directives prohibited from dissemination to
contractors.
c. NO DISSEMINA. TION ABROAD
Eiriployed to preclude the dissemination of a document
outside the States of the United States except as determined
by the originator to satisfy special conditions.
d. BACKGROUND USE ONLY
Employed to preclude the inclusion of the information
in any other document or publication. Intended solely to
control the use of the information.
Employed when, the originator predetermines that
intelligence information must not be released in any form
to foreign governments.
f. CIA. INTERNAL USE ONLY
Used for classified information which if disclosed
would violate existing Agency policy regarding protection
of sources and methods. Classified intelligence or
classified information so marked may not be released
or shown to anyone outside the Agency without permission
of the originating office. Within the Agency, classified
intelligence or classified information so marked may be
released only to full time Agency employees and is not
disseminated to consultants, external projects, or reserve
personnel on short-term active duty unless permission of
the originating office is obtained.
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STATISTICS (Estim.ates)
1, 3, 500 - persons authorized to classify docurnents at
all levels
760 - persons authorized to classify documents
Top Secret under now order
2% - CIA documents classified Confidential
8870 - Classified Secret
10% - Classified Top Secret
4. 675, 000 - Number of CIA classified intelligence
documents and. cables produced annually
(does not include classified admin reports,
memoranda, and notices, for which no
estimate is available)
5. 1, 070, 000 - Documents received annually from other
Government agencies
6. 349, 400 - Cubic feet - Total volume of records on
hand in offices and storage (FY 1971)
7. 72, 940 - Cubic feet - Volume of records destroyed
(FY 1971)
8. Special files in cubic feet
1, 326 - Lebanon Conflict
4, 982 - Cuban Missile Crisis
5, 672 - Bay of Pigs
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RE, CORD HOLDINGS
1957 - 1971
Fiscal Year
Totals
(Cubic Feet)
1957
153,
700
1958
184,
800
1959
223,
600
1960
2:i.5,
200
1.961.
225,
600
1962
241,
800
1963
244,
000
1964
275,
800
1965
288,
300
1966
286,
200
1967
330,
400
1968
355,
900
1969
332,
400
1970
330,
80()
1971
349,
400
Top Secret 10%
Secret 88%
Confidential and Unclassified 2%
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DECLASSIFICATION
1. The Central Intell.ige.rnce Agency regulations provide for, an
orderly procedure for declassification and reclassification of docurn.ents.
The regulations set forth that:
"Classified information or material. shall
he reviewed on a continuing basis for the
purpose of determining the current
appropriateness of the classification
assigned with a view to declassification
or reclassification where appropriate. "
2. In the. years immediately following the issuance of Executive
Order 10501, the Agency had a formal program. of classification review
to upgrade or declassify all, RESTRICTED material. EO 1,0501 had
(-:eliminated that classification. We established a Classification. Control
Network which :regularly issued reclassification bulletins. Now our
Central Top Secret Control activity continues to issue semiannual.
notices of `17op Secret documents which have been downgraded. Because
of cost constraints, manpower reductions and the increased volume of
classified documents we have collected our efforts are limited to re-
sponding to ad hoc internal and external requests for downgrading of
specific CIA documents. Individual requests are handled on. an expedi-
tious basis. About 100 CIA TS documents were downgraded in 1.971.
A review project is underway within the Agency to declassify the
publication "Trends and Communist Propaganda" and earlier titles in
this series from. 1947 to 1966. We continue to review OSS material and
have declassified some of it in response to official and public requests.
3. We are in the process of amending our regulations to insure
that the provision of the new Executive Order are implemented within the
Agency. I believe the new Executive Order is a realistic approach to the
problem of classification, reclassification and downgrading and the CIA
will, of course, adhere to its provisions. Although specific areas of
concern may develop as we work with the document, I am confident that
these matters can be resolved within the mechanism of the Interagency
Cl assification Review Committee established under. Section 7 of the new
Oaxle:r.
STATSPEC
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7 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable John D. Ehrlichman
Assistant to the President
(Domestic Affairs)
SUBJECT : Declassification
:t. Bill Colby told one of his lunch with. you and
your discussion of declassification. We have produced the
attached outline su-mrnary of the problem and a possible
solution for your consideration. It obviously would require
further detail if it were to be adopted. The important
thing, however, is the degree to which it fits your general
6dn.king.
2. If there is anything else we can do to help on
this problem, please let me know.
Richard Helms
Director
Attachment as stated
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SUBJECT: Declassification
1. From the parochial perspective of an intelligence officer,
the major problem inherent in declassification relates to the risk of
compromising operational sources and methods. A report several
years old whose substantive content is no longer politically delicate,
for example, could nonetheless compromise a still producing source
who, indeed, might now be even better or more strategically placed
than he was when he provided the report in question. What an intelli-
gence service needs (and strives) to protect are the techniques it
employs in going about its business and the human assets, especially
foreign nationals, it uses or has used in the past. From an intelligence
officer's standpoint, therefore, a document's sensitivity is a direct
function of the extent to which that document could compromise sources
or methods if it were to fall into unauthorized hands or pass into the
public domain.
i
2. When we address the issue of declassifying the intelligence
contribution to major policy decisions or historical events, we are
talking about at least three separate types of documents.
(a) Finished Intelligence. This appears in the form of
National Intelligence Estimates or special memoranda, drawn
from all sources, recounting the facts and assessing a situation.
In most cases, declassification of such documents would not
jeopardize sources and methods, since the sources of the facts
and assessments are usually not stated or are obscured so that
they are not apt to be disclosed by declassification of the
document. The documents may occasionally refer to the original
source of material contained therein, but such references could,
be edited out or generalized so that the original source remains
protected. This would require of course careful review of any
such material prior to declassification with this thought in mind.
(b) Disseminated Intelligence. Some disseminated
intelligence, such as technical or communications intelligence,
reflects its origins in very specific terms so that de.cla Hiiii'i.-
cal:ion would almost inevitably result in the disclosure of the
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source. In other cases, such as clandestinely acquired
intelligence, generalized source descriptions are used in
the disseminations, so that the exact identity of the source
remains concealed. In all these categories, the passage of
time may to some extent alleviate the damage caused. by a
disclosure of the source, e. g. , the fact that we were reading
Japanese codes during World War II is hardly a sensitive
matter any more. On the other hand, with respect to some
of these sources, the passage of time may not relieve the
sensitivity of the matter, particularly on material provided
to us by a friendly foreign intelligence service which expects
us to keep their relationship with us a permanent secret. Thus
in the category of disseminated intelligence, a considerably
greater job of editing might be necessary to s epar. ate items
which could be declassified from those which should not be.
(c) Intelligence Operational Traffic. There is a great
deal of this material which in almost all cases should not and
can not be declassified without a highly inappropriate disclosure
of intelligence sources and methods. The material itself is
frequently written with special code names which may be
valuable in the future. Also the methodology revealed may
show things about our service which could be of advantage to
an unfriendly power. The true names of our agents and the
precise techniques of our operations should in no event be
disclosed even after many years.
3. Cutting across the specific problems of declassifying intelli-
gence material is the way our government does business in these
times. Thanks to the enormous improvements in communications
technology, the government utilizes a flood of separate papers and
documents in the course of doing its business. In order to make
these manageable at the key decision levels, these raw documents
must be collated, summarized and analyzed in the form of over-all
reports. This of course is what happens to raw intelligence material
through the National Intelligence Estimates and similar documents.
Decision-making on major national events is almost always based on
the refined product rather than the raw. As noted above, the refii n.ed.
Ill?ndncl; ra:i'llell cclnniderabiy fewer I ol>luillrl of dec?lal.nrlifi.calliull 111;u1.
l=ll.o raw. .I!?O7.' tho fow c1LliUd in wldcll raw ducu111e11t11 a c kwefi. in
decision-making, edited versions might be provided.
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4. Another factor to be considered is the inter-agency nature
of most such major events today. Thus no single department or
agency couuld give an over-all view of a major national event on the
basis only of material available to it. The Pentagon Papers display
this weakness.
5. A possible solution to the problem might lie in centralizing
the. production of official histories of selected major events. An
historian might be added to the White :Ho-use staff or the .A.rchivit.;t of
the United States -n-tight be assigned this responsibility. This officer
could serve as a point of coordination and tasking of the various
departments and agencies to contribute to a national account of a, major
c ve.r-.t. Department or agency contributions could, thus be consolidated
into a single over-all account. From the point of view of the intelligence
community, this would, permit sum:marizati.on of material, considered
significant to the event to protect intelligence sources and. method. s,
rather than declassifying raw material. It would also put the focus
of the account on the key documents actually used at the national level
rather tlaa.n seeking the impractical aim of declassifying all raw
material. T_,astly, it would provide an over-all context in which
individual raw documents would find a proper place, rather than
causing sensational misunderstanding, if and when they came to
public notice.
6. Such studies would not satisfy the history purists, of course,
but they could meet the legitimate needs of the general -public.
Criticism could be made that an administration was writing its own
histories. Th.e proof of this pudding would be in the eating, i. e. ,
whether the resulting studies were truly objective. The Pentagon.
Papers have not been subjected to this accusation nor are the Foreign
Relations series produced by the Department of State or the studies
produced by the Office of Military History.
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- HE WK TE HIOUS.
march 8, 1972
MssMMORA.NDUMl FOR
ern r?r rr7'r
TIM DxiLt?(.~OIL Ox CT;iv r a
Or e i gn
Sub;Je.C : Acceler'atiOn of Publication of ,F
Relations" Series
..{.. hl ~.'Ve today instructed the Secretary of utc
program to reduce the time I a 9 of the off:ic:ial car,cuici r,--
s r . n
t.ary series "Foreign Relations GL t,-
,c-published by the Department of State, from 26 to 2G yearn, .
'.t'h e Department of State, in carrying out this will be seeking the assistance of your Caepartment or aIgcncy
in the collection and declassification of the material in
question. I ask that you cooperate fully wit:'.:. uhr Secretary
of State to meet the above objectives in the ?raost expeditious
manner and to the maximum extent consistent with, the j:e--
quirements of national security.
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 Approved For;Ejlease 2001/04/01: CIA-RDP83022R000100050022-5
k'4a~;1 I:~MMEDIA L. E ,.LEASE u, : C)'1i
Z tAae ..~
i..aiCe QZ '. a White r -' i? 7,:. a G A .i. . Y Kf~u ` `' aJGG:iC.,,tu"i1
~ aVi:9 C'Cil Ci, 1CJ 1G
aV,'ct.I ?. R>t'a'L DU iV 1.''i 4{
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
a~i:CL: .t~1C~GC 1Gi'cAL1G~x o. x~ub icaatio('A of ~'x' 0r(Ag A i{e1atioi-.i"
i hC UAL. 1CAcd Ciocur1]G'i.'aLtA.ry/ .)eI'xf:;:i t~ 'CaS'4;1t~T1 yc{(1:~L1Crl1#i CiL tA"Au C)"a"
c:'. IY
`'.:j:ty y published by 41L~:. Depa1.tZ A CAA4 OA" St atc, haarye .(Or kAai1.AA j V:.:
'I).l'oviclc,d the Arnorica public with i,L i 7.xi Clxu Fi C1:(lu:.;I,l1LC:; yJ C;. is F.i '7 C; ~; Li'fl%
uA~ our Nation's history. The CAiri.4erxCM1C9 now 'CJ E;l't1(> pUi:)l'Lf1LiS:C:i, AACiV/-
i1v )"y relate to the cvGl'1L6 of 1946, C.aad I ahxrk tha' i lt: e ATAL{.;w S; Iii;fi
C)l tL ~1o to ' ii'b. orx"" ed public the length oti 'LalfA.e I:1citv!cc i cvcri: ,iAC.x
~u licatlon should rye shho: tecied. ask ""a',
is Accordingly, ,~y, I ask i.~wi,C1.C.;Uu
4,d;lJ.y)-air in the Cillaii y and iv3 LAG4t re of 111( seric:0y You
A
ila"~1eC~1 c:~1 ci institute a pi; ogi; am to reduce this time la" to Z O '/ear.
Your objective should be to rnaicc thJiG CC3C]>:ction Within the xiQ 3
years i'.vLd to keep thS pub1icaiion point at 20 years i:a om till si on.
11i.l order to achieve this goal in the x- ost expeditiouS Ina mlek,
today Anst..l.uctizig the S'."C ."etaary of Defcnse, Lhe Dino for oA
.ii^itelliger'ice, al'ad tile" .Assistant to 'Clh I resident rro National 5c cv4; icy
iac4i y to CCaC?1?C3a 1te lull y/' with you k i coi1C`.ctai'lb and Ci4'C:le:3Si f1.i. a L't^s E:
ap'propriate3 rnatez1ais to the r a ximura wert consistent with Ln1S; Ve-
w_ 11iI'exiled1tLl of national security.
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 Approved For Rase 2001/04/01 : CIA-RDP83-04li22R000100050022-5
PERSONNEL SECURITY AUTHORITIES
The basic statutory authority on which the Personnel
Security Practices and Procedures of the Central Intelligence
Agency are based is the National Security Act of 1947 (as
amended, 1949). Under Section 102d~3) of this Act, the
Director is personally charged with protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The
Director has also declared all positions in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency occupied by staff employees to be sensitive
positions within the meaning of Section 3(b) of Executive Order
10450. Finally, there are numerous regulations of the Central
Intelligence Agency concerning compliance with security
regulations, the clearance of personnel for duty with the Agency,
the security processing of personnel for entrance on duty,
separation, leave and official absence, the control of personnel
security files, the marriage of employees, the travel of close
relatives to Communist controlled areas, limitations on outside
employee activities, and assignments involving risk of capture.
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 25X9
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POLYGRAPH PROGRAM
At present, the polygraph is utilized as an aid to the
personnel security process in (a) the security investigation and
clearance of applicants for employment; and (b) as a part of the
security reinvestigation process of employees on duty to ensure
their continued security reliability. The polygraph program is
voluntary and all applicants and employees are requested to
participate on a voluntary basis. The Office of Security is solely
responsible for the conduct of the polygraph program of the
Agency, including the training of polygraph examiners and the
supervision and administration of the polygraph program.
No person will be polygraphed who has a history of
serious cardiac trouble, a serious physiological deformity or
who has a serious physical or personal problem at the tirpe.
Polygraph reports are maintained exclusively within the
Office of Security on a special controlled basis. Only those
officers having a direct responsibility for personnel security
evaluations may have access to reports of polygraph interviews
concerning staff employees or applicants.
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 STATINTL
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 Approved For Rel ge 2001/04/01 : CIA-RDP83-0109,.3R000100050022-5
COST FACTORS
Set forth below are the results of a September 1970 analysis
and comparison with Fiscal Year 1969 on costs of field investigations,
various Agency clearances, and polygraph examinations.
A.
Field Investigations
FY 1969
$279. 76
FY 1970
285.52
B.
Covert Approvals
FY 1969
$ 63. 24
FY 1970
60. 33
C.
Overt Clearances
FY 1969
$ 49.65
FY 1970
45.11
D.
Polygraph Examinations
FY 1969
$160. 23
FY 1970
154.92
E.
TOTAL COST OF A CASE
FY 1969
$496.43
(Includes Investigations,
Average Covert/ Overt
Clearances & Polygraph)
FY 1970
$493. 15
There has been no recent cost analysis but there have been pay
increases and costs have generally risen. It is estimated that the
total cost of a case at the present time is between $500. 00 and $550. 00.
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 Approved For lease + L' i ie
P83022R000100050022-5
SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES
With respect to CIA Staff Employees, the Director of
Personnel has the responsibility of convening Personnel Evaluation
Boards in order to review significant problem cases, and this is
done on a regular basis. There are also occasions when more
senior Executive Review Panels are convened at the Directorate
level. If a case should justify such action, the Director of Central
Intelligence has the authority to terminate a CIA Staff Employee
under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, Section
102 (c) quoted below
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 652
(now 7501) of Title 5, or the provisions of any
other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may,
in his discretion, terminate the employment of any
officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall
deem such termination necessary or advisable in the
interests of the United States, but such termination
shall not affect the right of such officer or employee
to seek or accept employment in any other department
or agency of the Government if declared eligible for
such employment by the United States Civil Service
Commission. "
In Industrial Security cases, preliminary arrangements are
made with the contractor to withdraw any clearance when it is deemed
to be in the interests of national security. In normal circumstances,
the Agency makes it a point not to utilize individuals unless they have
been appropriately screened from a security standpoint. The cancel-
lation or withdrawal of an industrial clearance is effected by:
A. The completion or cancellation of the contract.
B. The development of serious security information.
C. The determaYination that an individual no longer Lau a
"need to know."
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M. ti ohr }~. f.ril~'~iC rci a~aZ
A::Gi.til,. .aii4 to GiXi.4
YJ~~ r
:~~, ~:;i~1 L'OL.,T
61 siJ {~,1nd4I to your A 4i qucFY4 o(r [Jr
.,i C;p .i w:.:l.ch I.ho t., etiA4J4ai .l..Ai ei1d. :AACie ArA Vr c'/ 47 i1.J 4+a.L~en -o l: I.e i..:t.l. .. ..: pl:. ~.L~.Q%,~1.1
i ~C ia'cLilc' CS pui't3uaX'1t to the i}~C i1CA'GY1t Di;;cctivo Q'& 30
Z. The ACency(J L ecU:.rity Ciea+ax co 'Review has :'G:il.11tcc in the
o"llowin clea'i'anco 1w cd'c ctionri:
TYPE AND NL7MrJE014.1 O CLEARANCES CAltit,rra..E J)
Top Scca"et CG\AC1:Jna.'r
190
15 5
o1~ Conti;actort3 946 1,791
Grand Total / ~.~lJ'1
..~~ 1:)11J'arjo lot m o know -IC a1',f yll~~li 471 Claw i icati1J I7 OA, ki1v.T 1~ IA O iii
}} t r ~
DiA QctoA
D/S Rowxittci G/ 'XlXr~Ofc
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25X1A9a
OO/- (lcir~i?c~s cc