PRESS CONFERENCE OF HON. JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, AND JOHN DEAN, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01022R000100040013-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 12, 1971
• Content Type: PREL

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FOR IM IEDIATE RELEASE
AUGUST 12, 1971
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HON I. JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS,
AND JOHN DEAN, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
THE BRIEFING ROOM
12:03 P.M. EDT
MR. ZIEGLER: Jerry has covered the basic informa-
tion we have for you today.
As you know, a short time ago we sent a request to
the Hill for dollars to assist in the process of declassifying
World War II documents. Going back to January of this year,
as we have told you before, the President directed that a
study be made of the classification procedure within the
Government.
John Ehrlichman has been in charge of the overall
White House efforts on this, together with John Dean, who
has been working with Mr. Ehrlichman. John Ehrlichman and
John Dean and others have had a number of meetings with the
President on this subject.
We were meeting this morning with the President and
talking about this matter. The President asked that John
thrlichman come out and give you gentlemen a progress report
as to how we are proceeding on the matter of declassifying
documents. With that, John, you may give your progress report.
Q Before John gets into this, specifically, how
much money did the President ask for?
MR. ZIEGLER: W;We have asked for $630,000 as a
first request.
Q The overall cost is $6 million?
MR. ZIEGLER: Rictht.
Q
'documents?
Was that just for the beginning of World War
D. ZT GLER: Yes.
qq~j T ~ryv ~ti r.
T '
.Ai'1R? ~1 1~e.C*dZ.~J ...l..~M.AN: As 1: on. said, Aw3h6:at I am .~ go _ng to
r _ve you now is just a progress report, and is by no means
Description of the finished product.
'here have been some questions, apparently, about
he proc Tess of this ..7y As know, he.s been in prr,-,rou ++~~/r++i~ + a
/_y w..a F5 Yi.c a l.fan4,....?1vr
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His committee's work continues, and they have not
yet given final reco imendatio:: s to the President. Their
recommendations , as I a zdcL rsta,nd i t from him, when they
are rendered, will cover bo-Ch the subject of declassification
?:cocedures and the subject of systems of classification,
winch should be either inaugurated. or changed, looking to
the future.
We ago working here in the pz'ortulgatior Of this
new approach with the basic principle that we are going to
ba classifying fewer docum.ei is in the ,future, but ciassi:%y'i.- g
t i :n better. I that direction, we will be focusing or. the
question o: distribution.
As it is now in the Govc nmeat, as you k"ow, a
di umber of peep '3 hav secs Ley c `:.arzanccs, and as i b a.~.
ap' oppo:3 ticni, within a given wk_ cui:ity clearance there ...s i-%
,,.nnicai right. to see a document bearing a claassizic atio
nor which the individual is cleared. So you gut into t:.h
h'-,E;
+".quos?.:ion o-," distribution, who can c ee a docuii:erit, it he
a clearance, can he see all documents for which he is clea:"< d,
or only those for which he has a reed to know?
So they will be working with the principle that
there should be limits on distribution within a given security
clearance classification on a strict need-to-know basis.
e vcrLdly, the direction in which the study is
going indicates that there will be new limits on the right
to duplicate documents and the right to disseiiinate or d = -
tribute documents.
The problem of de-briefing or sharing with others,
zither in si:l? or outside the Government, the contents of
documents obviously is receiving attention.
And then. the question of what to do with the enor-
mous number of pages of c1a: sified documents that now reside
in various archives or storage places of the Federal Govern-
ment is a subject which will be covered.
The President has decided that he will expand his
request for appropriations to speed the process of declassi-
fication. He has asked for a study to be done of how signi-
icar.t historical events might be treated in this declassi-
fication process; that is to say, he has identified not only
the World. "+ a . _:i; doca? ylAez t , but also the documents relating
to the Koreaan War, the Lebanon action during the Eisenhower
A iraistr ation , and 1--he (uhc n inc .df'nt in the Kennedy years,
as events of such historical interest that, rather than wait
for the :oral chro io .agical clearance process, he has asked
the Archivists and those involved in this study to propose
to him a method by which they can accelerate and give priority
to the deciassiiicatio n of t:.ho-se historical events first.
We do not have an estimate of the dollar amount
involved, and it may be that this rea.rrangerrent of priority
from' the purely chronological to those of hiorical interest,
may evolve /c,.nc additional cost. That is one thing that w
will have to take a look at.
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I am told that we are talking about 160 million
pages of World War II documents g and some 300 million pages
of documents spanning the years 1946 to 1956. Now, of that
number, sortie are not classified. They are simply stored.
But the problem here is in reviewing all of those pages which
are now, as I understand it, stored roughly in chronological
order to determine which can immediately be moved out as
non-classified and which are classified and must be reviewed
to see which will be declassified and released.
The criteria for declassification is basically
:o be that the release of the documents will not jeopardize
current intelligence sources; and secondly, that the release
would not either imperil our current relations with other
governments, or seriously and needlessly embarrass individuals
who are foreign citizens.
We have here, obviously, the situation where some-
one might be subjected 'Co needless embarrassment by the
veiease of a document which otherwise had no 'public purpose
in its release. I cannot expand on that particular criteria
;very much moreo because, frankly, we have not seen it
developed in specific language or specific criteria.
I just want to indicate to you generally in going
by that that is a consideration that may be embodied in the
final recommendations to be submitted to the President.
Now, I will take: your questions in just a minute.
I would like to run through this in a series.
The President believes that past practice has re-
sulted in the classification of a number of documents which
need not have been classified from any standpoint of national
security or national interest. The system has been one in
which too many people have had the legal capacity to impose
classification on documents, and there has not been any
workable system for a review of decisions by these individuals
that a document should be classified. The burden-of proof
has, up until now, always been on the one proposing declassi-
fication.
The recommendations of the committee will undoubtedly
be in the direction of a system which will impose a presump-
tion, after passage of a certain period of time, that a docu--
ment should be declassified, which presumption could be
rebutted by a showing that it would be contrary to .the national
interest to declassify it at that time.
The presumption now runs in the other direction;
that a document will remain classified unless someone can
come forward and sustain the burden that it should be declassi-
fied. This, the President feels, is contrary to his general
approach, which is that the Government has not only an obli-
gation or that the Government has .a duty to make disclosure
of what is going on in the Government except in those cases
where disclosure would be inimical to the national security
or the conduct of foreign policy.
That is a very broad generalization, and it is
subject to some specific exceptions in the area of Execu:.ive
privilege, and so on, but basically that is the philosophical
or policy thrust to this whole effo.ct.
P1OPE
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As the President many times, he seeks an
era of negotiation rather C,a.ix Essential to
successful negotiation is cona-id ra?:..zklity. Parties, , whether
a..s between govt rnmen'Gs or i. ~ pxiva_tc life, simply cannot
:.successfully conduct irapor" G:n't^ negotiations where concessions
are sought on either side c_:cept under circumstances where
-here is an attitude of mut,uu]. confidence in which each party
can rely on the discretion of the other not to disclose the
conduct of the nego":iat:t.onc.
That being so, and conf iC ent.ial 4,y being a corner-
tone of an ere: a of negotiation, the President strongly be-
1 ieves that the Government must adopt a system of classi.fi--
caation of those kinds of documents important to the conc1uct
of foreign policy which will insure their confidentiality to
the maximum extent possible. Therefore, the study is going
forward both by the Rehnquist cormrittee and others as to how
w can better insure the confidentiality of classified docu-
ments.
The President draws on a number of years of e1per_
=Hence in :meeting with heads of government, chiefs of state,
in a one--on---one meeting. He draws on a set of principles
which he has personally followed in the conduct of his nego-
iations, which he has imposed or set down for the National.
Security staff here in the White House.
Very simply, these are that the content of negotia-
tions of that kind are shared with principals, and only on
a need-to-know basis; that de-briefing to staff is on an
extremely limited basis; and that documents, aide mernoire
and other documents involved in such meetings, are circa--
lated on a highly restricted basis.
I think that, demonstrably, those principles which
have been applied in the President's ? s experience and in the
conduct of the business of the National Security staff have
esulted in very few incidents, if any, of any breach of
confidence.. The President has, likewise, followed the prac-
tice of ir:".i.rer te1tr ._
lir:-ii_ed sharing of information, even in a
domestic contexct, where he has piety for instance, with the
steel negotiators, or meetings of that kind where it is
important. that the parties be. able to speak in confidence
and in candor without the probability of reading their
remarks or having then displayed the next day.
So :r 4m trying to describe here for you a setting
in which classification and secrecy is important, and the
reason for its importance, as distinguished from situations
where classification has rather arbitrarily and unnecessarily
been imposed on documents.
In the case of The Times and Washington Post dis-
c losu:ces , the action of the Administro ation, through the Depart-
ment of Justice, in seeking injunctions in that case has a
relation to this pot icy that i have been describing to you.
don't thin- the is any question in the minds
of those in the rtx i nis"t.r i jon who are knowledgeable on the
subject that some of the documents involved there, probably
the large maj;o:c ty or th-. i , were n C~ mac.;~s1~1 classified at
this time; that is " .o say, hyIc time of publication; that
the class i fir do could have very w4:.i 1. been removed consistent
with the principles that. I have r:,~~ra;.i. /;;ed.
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At the same time, a massive compromise of a
classification system such as occurred in this instance
demonstrably has raised questions in the minds of those with
whom this Government will be negotiating or with whom we have
negotiated in the past as to whether or not the classification
system which we employ in this country is, in fact, effective
to maintain their confidence.
The national security study memorandum of last
January which led to the formation of the Rehnquist committee
and a review of our whole classification procedure was under-
taken, as you know, a number of months before The New York
'irnes--14ashington Post incident, on a foresight basis, recog-
nizing that the Government had an obligation in two directions:
One, in I.Le direction of disseminating infor;m2ation; and, on
.. et second hand, in the direction of maintaining a system tai
c. ` ication' which would r, assure those with whom we, hope
:_n uegot~iai c that their con idences not only would, but could
he Kept, in an encou.rac;ement of -free and open negotiation.
Now, t ;ere arc a number of contrasts in the role
of the Government and the role of tine press. You people do,
an should, dig for every bit of info mats on you can get, and
there is no sense of cribcis ' involved in anything that I
say here wit:.hi regard to that role of the press.
At the same time, that is to be contrasted with the
obligation of the Government and its people to establish a
l:i?6:C't't1, and ma:.ntain1 it in such a way that it can successfully
conduct foreign policy and maintain the national security of
the country. Those are not adversary relationships in a
real sense.
The press have a real problem when they come up
w _th a classified document. it doesn't happen very often,
but when somebody in journalism conies up with a classified
document, it is very difficult for him to know, in fact, the
'-'o'val conte.t of what is really going on at the time, to
know whether or not it is inimical to the national 'interest
to publish that:. document.
don't mean by saying that, or by recognizing
that fact, to shift the burden to the press. `that I mean
to say is that we have to recognize the dilemma and to.
recognize the likelihood that, in good faith and with the
best of intentions, the journalist may go forward with the
; ublication of that document suite innocently and it may very
,wc:l.l directly affect negotiations in progress or it may
create a climate of coubt among present or future negotiators
as to whether or not the Government has the capacity to
respect the confidence of the negotiation.
So it is the duty of the Government to go forward
in the adoption of a system than, will minimize the risk,
either to present or potential negotia'iions. That is what
this process is all about.
Now, I have not been terribly specific about the
system to be adopted. A,s I explained, the reason I have not
is that the system is not yet in place, but l have tried to
indicate to you tike d _; e ct ioi~ in which the study is going on
some of the principles on rhic:~ we are working. At some not
too distant date, a specific se3tr of recommendations will be
prepared, presumably will be approved, and then will be put
into place.
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We weu.i.d expw c' will tL: eomple tely :.n-
formed as to 7 _ f: thou " f .i. e1. w~ ,al t will at the time that
"C. occurs.
fro': :lG:i2C3:? ie "chw journalists may
n, " s y u' .t.~..l.s7,. something ',Cla,~. 'i .. '~nillE:n'G is ,
+.x }J,eo~.rAt c. the ;oVE:. G1S"'
s,..tY1~7C.E.t1'C..{.
t,urbeCd about : e nc, pub i sh ti. i am wondering if, in that
context, you have determined yet w ae her innocence has been
established the case of The Times and Post, and the other
newspapers, in th Pentagon papers
MR. HR ICHM, ;AN: : bviously, 1 would not com.ent on
,natters in litigation. I -think deep in the questioner's heart
must lie the answer to that question. (Laughter)
Q Si--, I would like know what is the basis
of law for classifying,, is this in the Constitution? Per-
haps Mr. Dean c?n help us.
Is this in the Constitution, and if so, whereabouts
and what are the laws that govern this? Does the Adrainistra-
tion plasm to put this in the realm of law, or put it in an
Executive Order?
MR. E =C si1dTiT s 1 think you have an excellent
suggestion. We will call on the lawyer.
MR. DEAN: l is twofold. There are a number of
statutes on the books right now.
Let's begin with the Constitution.
MR. DEAN : The Constitution permits the Congress
to enact those laws which they feel are necessary and proper.
They have set up some laws which say that certain documents
must be held in confidence.
Q Who has?
MR. DEAN-. The Congress. That is part of the
authority. There is also the President's inherent authority
'co issue an Executive Order to devise his own method to
maintain a security system.
Q Are you going to do it by the laws which you
say exist, and I don?t know which ones they are, or are you
going to do it by Executive order?
MR. DEAN? I imagine they will be a little of both.
As John said, the specifics of the system are still in
.
development
Q John, which nations with whom we will negotiate
or nave negotiated hav indica ed that they were upset by
revelations?
i'iR. AN . aal t , I think there have been some
.at I have read in the newspape . s .' Beyond that, I would not
be prepared to .;o.
Q Jdhri, yo said "tri"ne criteria for declassifit at-
i_on, one of t1lem, wa, that would not needlessly embarrass
foreign citizens. Would ~yy s ri Feria be applied to citizens
of '4 he United Stacey
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g~ p''y9t 1 /~ (+~i R.. ^~:&11R 1CHM AN in, (I (c-~~'i ya'~:ot prepared to say wheUi-her
i 'w+ Y ouid or not. I ~...A~ink policy thrust, -M and this
is very vagcca and let r,t L~.rcerlineS that it is Very Vauu,:'.
was Dust trying to give you a flavor of one of the co.-
sid'erations that has to be raised aid di._ used o here
either pro or con, is that the Archives o . the Government
may very wall h'av'e a derogatory of some ndivi ua q
as to which there is no valid public purpose in its publiCa~
- J on, and there is a judcgmcntai question that. is going to
L _L b e raiA as to t cat document
Do you put that out? :o you impugn an individual
Ai4ediessly without any public purpose being involved, or do
:u set up some kind of a review system that takes t1la`C
"u _ stion in-Co account? 1 u :i not ;O spar ,( 'Co say r g'ht now
~a1at the syi'::tem will, in 5:acv, 'C.ak that into account, but
is is one of the things that now is being looked c .
Q t . ' ems i o me that this is cent, zi.' to 4-he
sar.o.k..e controversy over cla.ssif .cation, because 4he chief
objection that 1 think most journalists have to class if'J.0-d
documents is that they are used quite frequently to save
embar:rassmerit of public officials. That is the reason I a=
asking.
MR.:; i,ICETI''I1N: I understand that. it is certainly
not a legitimate function of the classification simply to
save someone from embarrassment because he made a mistake.
But it is with foreign people?
'!R. :-HRL?