THE SPANISH POPULAR ALLIANCE: A NEW CONTENDER FOR POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00857R000100170003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Spanish Popular Alliance:
A New Contender for Power
Secret
EUR 82-10104
October 1982
261
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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Spanish Popular Alliance:
A New Contender for Power
This assessment was prepared by
Iberia/Aegean Branch, West European Division, Office
of European Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Iberia/Aegean Branch, EURA
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate for
Secret
EUR 82-10104
October 1982
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The Spanish Popular Alliance:
A New Contender for Power
Key Judgments Since the last national election in 1979, the Popular Alliance (AP), a
Information available democratic right-of-center party, has grown from a marginal to a signifi-
as of 20 September 1982 cant factor in Spanish politics. The AP's increasingly firm embrace of the
was used in this paper.
new constitutional order has made it a viable option for conservative and
centrist voters disillusioned with the governing Union of the Democratic
Center (UCD) party's policies and personality conflicts. Extensive financial
support from the business community has also helped the AP.
25X1
The AP's strong performance in the recent Andalusian regional election,
where both the AP and the Socialists outpolled the Center Democrats, has
established the Popular Alliance as a contender for at least a share of
national power. We believe that the Socialists are now in the front-runner
position to take power after the next national election, which is scheduled
for 28 October. In that event, the AP probably would be the mainstay of
the opposition and the principal parliamentary spokesman for military,
business, and clerical interests. The party would probably reinforce the
Socialists' recently hardening positions against terrorism and greater
regional autonomy. It would also keep close tabs on deficit spending and
oppose Socialist proposals to liberalize the abortion laws and limit the role
of parochial education. In foreign affairs the Popular Alliance would
oppose any Socialist attempt to weaken links with NATO or the United
States, but it would generally back a Socialist government's efforts to enter
the European Community (EC), secure repatriation of Gibraltar, and press
for more French help in combating Basque terrorists. 25 1
Should the Socialists falter badly between now and the 28th, however, the
AP would be a key element in any conservative coalition that emerged as
an alternative. A conservative coalition led by the Popular Alliance would
probably be more sympathetic to the United States than previous post-
Franco governments, particularly on Middle East questions and the issue
of military overflights. Moreover, the AP would support continued
strengthening of Spain's ties with Europe. At the same time, its links to the
military could harden the government's position on Spain's dispute with
Secret
EUR 82-10104
October 1982
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Great Britain over Gibraltar, and its ties to the business community could
lead to a tougher negotiating stance on entry into the European Communi-
ty. Domestically, the AP would follow robusiness policies and be receptive
to foreign investment
A conservative coalition would tend to polarize Spanish politics and would
probably heighten political instability. The AP would be particularly likely
to clash with its probable Catalan and Basque coalition partners over
regional autonomy--the issue on which a ri ht-of-center alliance would be
most likely to founder
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The Spanish Popular Alliance:
A New Contender for Power
Two possible outcomes of the election on 28 October
dominate public speculation in Madrid: a Socialist-led
government, or a broad conservative coalition that
would keep the Socialists out. The latter possibility
has thrust the rightist Popular Alliance (AP) into the
spotlight. The party is led by, and almost entirely
identified with, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, in our view
perhaps Spain's brightest, most charismatic, and most
controversial politician. Since the AP was founded in
1976 following Franco's death, it has been on the
margin of national politics. But we believe that it
would be a key element in the coalition that would be
necessary to exclude the Socialists from office. If the
Socialists form the next government, as we believe
likely, we would expect the AP to em gg~,g ocal
point of the parliamentary opposition
Starting on the Wrong Foot
The Popular Alliance began as the wrong idea at the
wrong time-too closely identified with the old order
in the aftermath of General Franco. Admittedly,
Fraga had developed a reputation as a liberal reform-
er while serving as a cabinet minister to Franco, and,
after the dictator's death, he apparently saw a need to
respond to European and domestic pressure for de-
mocracy. Nevertheless, we doubt he either sensed or
shared the extent of his countrymen's desire for
change. Along with other Franco-era notables who
formed the AP, Fraga talked of a radual evolution
away from the old order.
King Juan Carlos had charted a more ambitious
course. He commissioned Prime Minister Adolfo
Suarez to bring the left into the political system, to
increase press freedom, and to preside over the first
democratic election since the Civil War. As head of
the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), Suarez
had the best of both worlds. As the agent of Franco's
annointed successor, he represented traditional legiti-
macy and, indeed, was able to build his party organi-
zation around the state bureaucracy. At the same
time, the UCD was committed to change, a change
made safe by the party's roots in the old order. The
left had difficulty competing with that appeal; the AP
found it impossible. Fraga's shrill rebuttals to harsh
press attacks that he was an unreformed Francoist
also hurt the party, as did his hedging during the
cam ai n on the need for a more democratic constitu-
tion 25X1
The results of the 1977 election traced out a bell-
shaped curve, commanded at the center and center
right by the UCD. The AP was relegated to the
periphery of the democratic right, winning only
8.2 percent of the vote and 16 seats in the lower house,
compared with the UCD's 34 percent and 165 seats.
Returns on the left of the spectrum showed the
moderate Socialist and Popular Socialist parties
soon to merge-garnering 32.8 percent of the vote
and 124 seats compared with the CommunisX1
9.2 percent and 20 seats. Moderate regionalist parties
won most of the remaini and approximate-
ly 16 percent of the vote 25X1
Difficulties Persist
Pundits quickly wrote Fraga's political obituary.
Fraga, nevertheless, took the popular verdict to heart,
purging the AP of authoritarian sympathizers and
joining it with some well-regarded conservatives in a
new group called the Democratic Coalition. His ef-
forts, however, were unavailing, for the party system
had gelled with the election. The next election in 1979
only reinforced the verdict of 1977. Indeed, while
UCD, Socialist, and Communist strength he2i5X4rly
constant, Fraga's proportion of the vote fell by ap-
proximately 28 percent and the Democratic Coali-
tion's number of seats dropped by nearly half. With
the growth of regional sentiment, support for central-
ism hurt the party, especially in the Basque provinces
and Catalonia. Many conservatives elsewhere no long-
er supported Fraga; in the parlance of the time, voting
for him was no longer "useful." Many of his support-
ers either defected to the UCD, voted fo
temic ultraright, or simply stayed home
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According to survey data, the Democratic Coalition
had been most successful with well-heeled, well.-
educated conservatives in Madrid, Barcelona, and
Valencia. It also attracted support in rural Galicia.
But even though it was the farthest to the right of the
four principal national parties, it generally failed to
attract one of the most conservative blocs of Spanish
voters-the small farmers in the North, who voted for
the UCD as the party that represented continuity.
Although Fraga received his strongest support from
middle and upper level businessmen, professionals,
and landowners, most members of these groups leaned
toward the UCD, the regional parties, or even the
Socialists. Even the Communists attracted more sup-
port from small businessmen and inde endent artisans
than did the Democratic Coalition
Moving Out From Behind the Eight-Ball
In the period since 1979, several factors have com-
bined to enhance the standing and prospects of the
Popular Alliance (the party reverted to its original
name in July 1981). Chief among them has been
growing public dissatisfaction with the UCD. After
five years in office, the Center Democrats are shop-
worn. They have not found an answer for stagflation.
Internecine warfare over policies and personalities has
left the UCD without a convincing message for the
electorate
Growing Pains
This more moderate image, along with money and the
UCD's decline, have contributed to the AP's growth.
In the year prior to the AP"s party congress in
February 1982 press reports indicate that formal
party membership expanded from 18,000 to 42,000.
The same reports show that the AP attracted high-
level defectors from the UCD-most notably Miguel
Herrero Rodriguez de Minon, the centrists' former 25X1
parliamentary spokesman, aril i ter' of
Culture Ricardo de la Cierva. j 25X1
The 1982 congress showed the AP still split between a
minority of rightist "true believers" at the grass roots
and the more moderate majority led by Fraga. The
moderates beat back an attempt to change the party's
self-definition from center right to right as well as to
delete liberal and to add Christian. They also refused
to reverse the party's interdiction against dealing with
anticonstitutional elements and turned back a pro-
posed prohibition on preelectoral pacts with the UCD
and regional parties. Fraga defended the moderate
platform drawn up by executive committee member
Felix Pastor Ridruejo as the best basis for entering
the next election. That was not an easy commitment
to maintain because Pastor had recently resigned
from the committee to protest an alleged "lack of
(party) democracy" and was musing publicly about
bolting to the UCD. It was Fraga's iron grip o ier the
proceedings, however, that guaranteed the AP's mod-
the business community,
for its part, was dissatisfied by what it saw as the
UCD's irresponsible fiscal policy and excessive gener-
osity to labor. We believe that the free-spending
Employers Confederation initially increased its sup-
port for the AP in order to put pressure on the Center
Democrats. As the UCD failed to change its ways and
its popularity declined further, the business commu-
nity, in our view, came to rel increasingly on the AP
as a vehicle for its views
That support would not have mattered much, how-
ever, had the AP not made a successful effort to
convince the public of its commitment to democratic
constitutionalism. Fraga even won praise on that score
from formerly suspicious critics such as the influen-
tial, left-leaning Madrid daily El Pais
eration and reaffirmation of support for Spanish
democracy
Overtaking the UCD
The regional election in Andalusia on 23 May reflect-
ed both the UCD's troubles and the Popular Alli-
ance's new strength. While the Socialists' 52 percent
of the vote outstripped the :Field in this leftist strong-
hold, the AP overcame an almost complete lack of
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organizational infrastructure to finish second with
17 percent-a fourfold improvement over its share
there in 1979. The UCD sank to third with 13
percent
The AP in Opposition
In the event that the Popular Alliance does not win
entry into the government, it probably will emerge as
the mainstay of the parliamentary opposition. 25X1
Conservative sectors of society would expect Fraga to
champion their interests, and his natural talent as a
critic-not always an advantage in government-
would stand him in good stead. Just as the Socialists
and the AP have profited in recent years from UCD
troubles, the AP might thrive on Socialist misfortunes
and be in a strong position for the following election.
We believe that the AP's role in opposition would
depend in large measure on the extent to which
conservative groups saw themselves threatened by
Socialist programs and the extent to which at le2,5X1
grudging acquiescence from those groups was needed
by the Socialists. Press reports indicate, for example,
that the Socialists want to avoid a confrontation with
big business, which has the power to undermine a
leftist government. At least initially, the SocialiX1
would probably tailor their economic policies ac2&X1
ingly in an effort to take the edge off of business
aversion to them. Fraga would continue to speak out
strongly on business issues, but the development of an
accommodation between the business community and
a leftist government would remove much of the force
from his arguments. 25X1
That setback raised the UCD's factional strife to a
critical level. From late May until mid-July, the party
was locked in a bitter and public leadership battle.
The principal loser, former Prime Minister Suarez,
then bolted to form the populist Social Democratic
Center Party. Christian democratic defectors from
the UCD formed the Popular Democratic Party
(PDP), which has agreed to run as junior partner on
AP election lists. Opinion polls indicate that the
AP-PDP coalition might win over 100 seats.
Electoral Prospects
Popular Alliance leaders now hope that a strong
campaign will bring them within reach of formin a
multiparty center-right coalition government
.
Polls show that many of those voters are currently
undecided, and the AP's success in stemming the
Socialist tide will depend in part on its ability to get
them to the polls; this will be particularly true in the
traditionally conservative north central provinces,
which have disproportionately strong representation.
We believe that the AP's prospects also will depend on
the degree to which regional parties cut into Socialist
vote totals in industrial Catalonia and the Basque
provinces and on the ability of former Prime Minister
Suarez's new party to do the same in Madrid, Spain's
largest electoral distric
The odds, however, continue to favor the Socialists.
They have solid backing on the left and will probably
attract support from at least some centrist voters
disillusioned with the UCD but nonetheless worried
that Fraga still stands too far to the right. The failure
of the AP to entice the UCD into a united electoral
front means that the Socialists are almost certain, in
our view, to receive the extra representation that
Spanish electoral law gives front-running slates of
candidates
The military would be quite sensitive about its prerog-
atives under a Socialist-led government. The AP's
rapport with the military means that Fraga's words
would carry weight even though he might not speak
loudly or often on sensitive matters of civil-military
relations.' Fraga, however, would come down hard
against regional autonomy and terrorism-mato1
particular importance to the military. We believe
tough stands by Fraga would reinforce the Socialists'
recently hardening line on these issues.
' The 27,000 officers in the Army-the largest and most politically
assertive service-amount to far less than 1 percent of Spain's more
than 36 million total population. Career officers, however, have a
strong sense of mission as the ultimate guardians of the nation's
well-being. Their historic willingness to act on that belief gives
them far greater political influence than their votes alone com-
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Fraga has avoided identifying the AP as a clerical
party, but probably would take up the cudgels on
behalf of the Catholic Church in various controversies
likely to develop under a Spanish Socialist Workers
Party (PSOE)-led government. For example, he prob-
ably would champion continued state support for
private education-which is an important issue to
many affluent, secularly minded voters as well as
more devout, less wealthy Catholics. On the more
controversial abortion question, we believe he would
seek a lower, but still pro-Church profile
The AP's positions on the foreign policy of a Socialist
government would also parallel those of elite interests.
While the PSOE is more enthusiastic over joining the
European Community than continuing Spain's
NATO and US ties, the AP's emphasis would proba-
bly be the reverse. Similarly, we believe the AP would
oppose Socialist flirtations with Third World radical-
ism. But the AP's strong nationalism would probably
lead it to support a hard line on Gibraltar and defense
of the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.
The AP, no doubt, would second the Socialists in
protestin the French policy of refuge for Basque
terrorists
In general, the AP would be a counterweight, pulling
a Socialist government toward the center by holding it
vigorously to account and by voicing the concerns of
elite groups and institutions that have far more
significance in Spain than the limited votes they
command. Less constructively, Fraga's caustic ag-
gressiveness as principal opposition spokesman would
tend to transform many normal policy differences into
personal animosities. That would be particularly the
case if, as we believe likely, the similarly sharp-
tongued Alfonso Guerra became o of the cialists'
principal parliamentary spokesmen] I
Foreign and Domestic Policies of an
AP-Led Government
In the somewhat unlikely event that the Socialists do
not win enough seats to form a government, an AP-led
coalition would not have an easy time governing. The
Socialists will almost certainly be the largest single
party in Parliament, and we believe that exclusion
from the government would leave many of them
feeling cheated. With the moderate policies ofi Felipe
Gonzalez discredited by a third disappointment in six
years, the party would probably turn more radical.1 2 X1
The greatest problem facing a conservative coalition,
however, would not be its parliamentary opposition
but its own internal divisions. An AP-led coaliI ion
would cover at least as broad a section of the political
spectrum as did the UCD and would incorporate
many of the same conflicts that split that party,
including the particularly intractable issue of regional 25X1
autonomy. Fraga's domineering personality would
place its own strains on such a partnership. 25X1
Should Fraga nonetheless succeed in stitching togeth-
er a government, the AP would play a central role.
Fraga himself would probably become premier. The
party's close ties with the military and the business
community would be likely to lead it to take the
defense portfolio and key economic ministries as well.
The prestigious Foreign Ministry, on the other, hand,
might be a suitable plum for one of Fraga's more
important partners. We believe the AP also would be
likely to give direct responsibility for regional af-
fairs-an issue that we believe Fraga knows would 25X1
cause his party and government articular prob-
lems-to another party. 25X1
We believe that Fraga and the AP would strongly
influence foreign policy even if they formally conced-
ed the foreign affairs portfolio to a coalition partner.
Fraga has spoken out strongly in favor of Spanish
membership in NATO, and his party has championed
requested a high-level meeting with US officials in
Washington-in part in our view to convey the idea
Alone among Spanish parties, the AP advocates rec-
ognition of Israel, and in power it would work to
remove the traditional pro-Arab bias from Spanish
policy. In particular, we believe an AP-led govern-
ment might favor somewhat greater latitude for over-
flights by US military aircraft moving to and from the
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Middle East. On the other hand, the AP has been
consistently more nationalist than the UCD and we
think it would probably tend toward a harder line on
Gibraltar than the UCD has pursued
Fraga is on record as sharing the national consensus
in favor of accession to the European Community,
which would be prized as a European endorsement for
Spanish democracy. Doubts about the economic
trade-offs, however, have recently begun to surface in
the press among segments of the business community.
If those misgivings become widespread, Fraga would
probably adopt a tougher negotiating posture with the
Ten, a move that could be fatal to Madrid's entry in
light of the increasingly evident reservations within
the Euro can Community concerning Spanish mem-
bership
iI
The AP, with Abel Matutes likely to hold one of the
principal economic portfolios, would promote probusi-
ness policies. The AP has publicly argued that Spain's
economic sluggishness has resulted from efforts to
redistribute rather than increase income and wealth.
In power, we believe that the party would seek to
encourage private investment by reducing corporate
taxes, particularly employers' contributions to the
financially strapped social welfare system, and by
using the state's considerable role in labor-manage-
ment negotiations to hold down wage increases. The
AP would be sympathetic to foreign investment, but
sensitivity to domestic producers would probably pre-
clude significant new concessions, especially in bank-
ing and finance. A rightist coalition, we believe,
probably would abandon much of the UCD's already
faltering commitment to create new jobs through
public-sector spending.
On other social issues, the AP's past record leads us to
conclude that it would continue its strong law-and-
order stand, including a call for restoration of the
death penalty and vigorous pursuit and punishment of
terrorists. The party's close links with the military
suggest to us that it would also continue its rhetorical
support of the armed services, but fiscal constraints
probably would prevent expenditures on the armed
forces from increasing much beyond current projec-
tions. Nor do we believe that the AP, despite mutter-
ings about the need for greater journalistic responsi-
bility, would brave the political storm that would
ensue from any effort to rein in the free-wheeling
press. The party's platform indicates, however, that it
would take up the Church's cause on abortion and
controversial education questions. 5X1
The AP might press for a new electoral law that
would end proportional representation. With consider-
able logic, but somewhat incongruously for the head
of a small party, Fraga has argued repeatedly against
the system of proportional representation based on
separate provincial lists of candidates. Fraga recog-
nizes that the present scheme is biased toward larger
parties, but he nonetheless contends that-like all
proportional systems-it still encourages the prolifer-
ation of minor fringe parties and works against forma-
tion of the broad parties conducive to strong, stable
government. Fraga would probably push sirrrg)em-
ber districts and plurality voting in earnest if, as
expected the AP became the largest party on the
right. 25X1
Regional autonomy would, we believe, be the hardest
issue of all for a center-right alliance. Home rule is
not merely important, it is the raison d'etre of the
Catalan and Basque parties. A center-right coalition
requiring the support of even one moderate regional
party would have difficulty following up on the re-
cently enacted law that makes possible a partial
rollback of the regional autonomy achieved under
Suarez. But among Spain's principal parties, the AP
is the most committed to a traditionally centralized
state; Fraga's followers have more of an emotional
stake in this issue than any other. Moreover, regional
autonomy is an issue on which the military would
insist a conservative government make a stand. The
probable way for a center-right coalition to j2 1 over
its differences would be for the regional parties to
accept the new legislation in principle in exchange for
a pledge from the AP and its partners not to reduce
local autonomy significantly in practice. Even if a
coalition could be brought together on that basis, the
revue would be a constant threat to its unity.
u 25X1
In sum, not only does Fraga face formidable obstacles
in his efforts to bring a center-right coalition to power
but, in our view, he would have even greater difficulty
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keeping it in office. As long as it was part of the
government, the AP would have an opportunity to
strengthen its credibility as a governing party and to
make itself attractive as the core of a broad, new,
unified party of the right. To accomplish this, howev-
er, we think Fraga would have to achieve three things:
? He would have to produce greater unity on the post-
Franco right than it has ever achieved.
? He would have to overcome the polarization that
almost certainly would accompany a conservative
victory and contain the regional tensions that would
undermine a rightist government.
? He would have to check his own volatile tempera-
ment.
In the final analysis, we do not think Fraga can
achieve these goals. Failure to do so, we believe,
would quickly set the stage for the accession to power
of a Spanish left less moderate than the present
Socialist party and would sharply increase the likeli-
hood of a prolonged period of political instability
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