NATO S 16TH NATION: SPAIN S PROSPECTIVE ROLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
NATO's 16th Nation:
Spain's Prospective Role
State Dept. review completed
DIA review
completed.
USAF review
completed.
Secret
EUR 82-10084
September 1982
Copy 3 4 7
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Directorate of
Intelligence
NATO's 16th Nation:
Spain's Prospective Role
The author of this paper isl European
Issues Division, Office of European Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, European Issues Division, on
Intelligence Council
This paper has been coordinated with the National
Secret
EUR 82-10084
September 1982
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Secret
Overview
Information available
as of 20 August 1982
was used in this report.
NATO's 16th Nation:
Spain's Prospective Role
Spain formally joined NATO on 30 May 1982. The first new member
since West Germany joined in 1955, Spain brings to the Alliance
strategically valuable territory and facilities, a large and improving
military force, and a substantial industrial base. Its entry provides NATO
an important political and psychological boost at a time when other
problems threaten the unity of the Alliance and leave an impression of
decline. 25X1
Spanish entry is the culmination of a process under way since Spain began
the transition to democracy following Franco's death. It also begins a new
process in which the country's role in the Alliance-its share of the costs
and benefits of membership-will be determined. There will be hard
bargaining to resolve a number of sticky questions, such as:
? The forces Spain will contribute to Allied defense missions.
? The "ground rules" governing Spanish-Allied cooperation, particularly
Allied use of Spanish facilities and the stationing of nuclear weapons on
Spanish territory.
? Spain's role in the Alliance command structure and organization.
? The amount and type of Spain's financial contribution to joint budgets
LOA I
The revision of the command structure is likely to be the most delicate
problem. Portuguese fears of Spanish dominance are centered on this area,
and Lisbon's strategy is to resist any compromise that might diminish its
own role. Although neither Greece nor Turkey would be directly affected
by changes made to accommodate Spain, Greece fears that such changes
may bring into question the basic documents on which Athens rests its
claim to Alliance commands covering most of the Aegean Sea. Turkey, on
the other hand, hopes to use these changes to advance its position. Finding
a way to restructure the Alliance commands while sidestepping this issue
could prove the most difficult problem. Finally, Spanish claims to Gibral-
tar are likely to color the debate on new command arrangements. =
25X1
Spanish expectations about the benefits of NATO membership are high;
officials have stressed to the Allies their need to be able to show concrete
results. Madrid's main objective-in addition to securing a role within the
organization that accords with Spain's image of its importance to the
Alliance and some progress on the issue of Gibraltar-is to obtain from the
Allies financial assistance for ambitious modernization programs for the
Secret
EUR 82-10084
September 1982
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Spanish armed forces. If these objectives are not met, Spain may become
an additional source of tension within the Alliance, and the US-Spanish
relationship could suffer. The problem could become particularly serious if
the coming election brings to power a Socialist-led government, which
would almost certainly be more demanding and less cooperative than the
current one and which might even be committed to disruption of the
integration process. 25X1
Spain's key contribution to NATO will be its territory and facilities, with
their potential for use as reinforcement or staging areas both in a European
war and in a time,of tension or conflict outside the NATO area. Because of
its distance from Central Europe, the Iberian Peninsula would provide a se-
cure rear area for logistic support in wartime and a good reception point for
reinforcements from North America. Access to Spanish bases would
assume special importance in the event that the United States planned to
apply its military force in regions outside the area covered by the North
Atlantic Treaty-particularly the Persian Gulf. The value of these bases,
however, would be limited by the extent to which Spain is willing to allow
their use. Madrid has insisted upon case-by-case approval for flights to the
Middle East and has generally been reluctant to grant such permission. It
is possible-but in our opinion unlikely-that Spain would be more
forthcoming if NATO were to provide an Alliance rationale for such
operations. 25X1
The Spanish armed forces, too, can make a modest but useful contribution
to the conventional capability of the Alliance. The 58,000-man Navy is
relatively modern in equipment and outlook. It has exercised often with
other Alliance navies and operates regularly in the areas it is most likely to
cover for NATO. The 37,000-man Air Force is a small but capable service,
ready for integration into NATO plans. Spain's air defense surveillance
system, Combat Grande, is one of the most modern in Europe. It is
compatible with the French Strida II system and with NATO's NADGE '
network. Although the Army is large-nearly 300,000 men-it is plagued
by problems which will limit its effectiveness in a NATO context. These
problems include major equipment deficiencies, inadequate training and
logistic support, and an archaic command structure. All three services have
ambitious modernization programs, which, if carried through, should
improve their capabilities markedly during the next decade.
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Secret
Among the most significant contributions Spanish forces could make
during the first few years are:
? "Presence" missions. A 900-man Army parachute battalion and a
squadron of Air Force air defense or attack aircraft could be made
available for use with the ACE Mobile Force-a multinational organiza-
tion intended to deploy rapidly to the Northern or Southern Flanks to
demonstrate NATO's resolve in periods of tension.
? Amphibious landing missions. Two battalion-sized naval infantry land-
ing teams are among Spain's best units, although they would require
Allied assistance with amphibious lift and air support.
? Reinforcement. Only the naval infantry units and an Army parachute
brigade are currently ready for deployment within 30 days. Over the next
few years, the Army also could improve an existing brigade or division or
put together a new unit, specialized for NATO reinforcement purposes.
The Air Force might be able to send a wing of aircraft-three or four
squadrons-to support Allied air defense efforts, and the Navy could put
to sea a light carrier task force, although its current V/STOL carrier is
antiquated.
? Sea control missions. In wartime the Spanish Navy could make a modest
but useful contribution from the outset by providing several ships to
conduct ASW and minesweeping operations in the waters near Spain and
to assist in protecting Allied convoys en route to European ports. Three
helicopter squadrons and six fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft also
could contribute to NATO's air surveillance and. ASW effort. In
peacetime, one or two Spanish ships might be assigned on a rotational ba-
sis to NATO task forces, and routine Spanish patrols and exercises in the
Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea could be integrated with
those of other NATO navies. 25X1
assign to NATO are ours.
Assessments of the
military responsibilities Spain might assume and the number and type if units it might 25X1
needed background.
the US Embassy in Madrid,) ~nd the US Mission at
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, as well as open source material. NATO documents supplied
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Secret
The Spanish Dowry: A Strategic Location and Useful Facilities 1
Operational Benefits of Spanish Membership 5
Problems Associated With Spanish Entry 6
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Figure 1
Peninsular Spain and Spanish Possessions
PARIS`
France
Bay of Biscay
Atlantic
Ocean
Western
:Gibraltar (U.K.)
Ceuta
(Spain) Melilla
(Spain),
Madeira Islands
(Portugal)
Canary Islands
(Spain)
".El Aaiun
RABAT*'
0 KILOMETERS 400
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Spain
~Mmm'e,raneenJSect
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
9S
Green SlaniIi ;
CO,SfOa
(Fran e)
rJ"`
r e
Sardinia ,
(tray)
G J aa5a
Mediterranean
Ba~eayva Sea
Kingdom t~,
^. Neth:~~
~`_ / Italy
Spain ~. ~,
Algeria
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
NATO's 16th Nation:
Spain's Prospective Role
Introduction
Spanish entry into NATO in late May marked the
beginning of what probably will be a lengthy transi-
tion period during which the country and its armed
forces will be integrated into the Alliance. The process
almost certainly will take more than the year required
for the integration of West Germany in 1955. The
Spanish have moved quickly, however, to place their
political/ military team in Brussels and to put for-
ward a sweeping proposal to alter NATO's command
structure. NATO Secretary General Luns has set in
motion a process he hopes will lead to identification
and early resolution of the significant problems asso-
ciated with Spanish entry.
This paper examines Spain's armed forces and their
likely contributions to the Alliance. It investigates
what Spain wants in return and discusses problems
that are likely to prove troublesome to the United
States and the other Allies during the integration
process. I
The Spanish Dowry: A Strategic Location and Useful
Facilities
Spain's territory and the use of its military facilities
will be its most significant contributions to NATO.
These assets have considerable potential importance
for the Alliance both in peace and war, and during
periods of tension or conflict outside the NATO area.
(See figure 1.)
In wartime, the Iberian Peninsula would provide a
secure rear area nearly 2,500 kilometers from likely
Central European battlefields. A variety of well-
developed Spanish ports and airfields significantly
augment Allied reception facilities for reinforcements
from the United States and Canada, and their easy
accessibility from the Atlantic and their distance from
Central Europe make them even more attractive.
Allied forces could stage from Spanish air and sea
bases and use them as primary bases if the Alliance
suffered serious reverses. Repair, resupply, storage,
and transportation facilities in Spain provide badly
needed rear-echelon support. 25X1
Air and naval forces based in Spain and the Balearic
Islands would be in a strong position to counter the
Soviet Navy in the western Mediterranean and the
approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar. Spaniards like
to point out that the Strait of Gibraltar would be far
better guarded and defended by a number of bases in
its hinterland than from the constricted British facili-
ty on "the Rock." Spanish holdings in the Canary
Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla would extend NATO's
assets near the European theater, and-in the case of
the Canaries-allow NATO to control sea traffic
along the west coast of Africa.2 25X1
How important these facilities will be in peacetime
will depend upon the extent to which the Spanish
allow Allied use. Spanish agreement to allow Allied
air forces to use the firing range at Bardenas Reales,
near Zaragoza, for example, could ease one of
NATO's most serious training problems-a shortage
of weapons training areas in densely populated Ce"-
tral Europe. Combat aircraft of the US Air Force,
Europe (USAFE) use the Bardenas Reales range for
about 70 percent of their weapons training. Spain's
climate makes it an ideal year-round site for such
exercises 25X1
Spanish military officials have recently discussed
limiting US access to the range in order to allow other
countries to use it. In exchange, Spain would hope for
additional economic assistance from these countries.
For many years, local and regional leaders have taken
a generally negative view of Bardenas Reales, com-
plaining at rallies and to the press about the danger
I The Spanish Government has pledged not to allow foreign forces
or facilities in the Canaries. Ceuta and Melilla would be excluded
by their location from coverage by the Atlantic Treaty, but Spain's
accession presumably would allow the Alliance to use all of these
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
On 5 June 1982 Spanish Defense Minister Alberto Oliart and
Foreign Minister Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, flanking NA TO Secre-
tary General Joseph Luns, move into position for the ceremony
presented by the weapons there and the adverse
impact of foreign personnel in the area. As a result,
the government probably would hesitate to press for
any additional use of Bardenas Reales. F_
Iin a fi ere ave
been unofficial discussions with Spanish military offi-
cers about the possibility of constructing-with
NATO assistance-new training facilities in unpopu-
lated areas.
Spanish facilities could be valuable when the United
States wants to project military force into regions
outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Trea-
ty-particularly the Persian Gulf. Madrid has persis-
tently taken a restrictive view of US use of its bases
for such purposes. It has usually refused to allow the
use of its airfields for operations that might be
offensive to Arab countries, especially those relating
tion changes significantly.
to the Arab-Israeli confrontation.' Spain insisted dur-
ing the negotiations for a new US-Spanish security
agreement on continued case-by-case clearance for
US aircraft transiting to points outside Europe. Al-
though there is some possibility that Spain would be
more forthcoming if NATO supplied an "umbrella"
by agreeing that certain kinds of out-of-area opera-
tions serve Alliance purposes, in our view, this likeli-
hood is slight unless the Middle East political equa-
Political and Economic Benefits
Spanish entry also would provide a political and
psychological shot in the arm to an Alliance that
seems torn by doubts and unable to meet defense
'The only major exception to this policy was permission for transit
last fall by 100 US aircraft during the Bright Star exercise in Egypt
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Secret
spending commitments and force goals. Moreover,
Spanish accession should strengthen the Alliance's
Southern Flank, which has been militarily weak and
politically volatile throughout NATO's existence. The
addition of Spanish territory could reinforce the use-
fulness of Portugal by tying its landmass directly to
the rest of NATO.
Spanish membership brings to the Alliance a country
with the second-largest land area and fifth-largest
population in Western Europe. Spain's GDP ranks
toward the middle of West European countries, and it
has a well-developed, reasonably modern industrial
base and the capability to produce high-quality, less
sophisticated armaments and to coproduce sophisti-
cated weapons systems. Spain's entry also provides a
"one-time bonus" of about 4 percent in real growth in
the overall defense expenditures of the European
NATO members. (See appendix B for a discussion of
Spanish defense spending.)
The Soviets have viewed the prospect of Spanish
membership in NATO-and the addition of Spain's
territory, manpower, and national resources-with
some anxiety. They have tried in a variety of ways to
derail the process, inveighing against it in the media
and appealing directly and through intermediaries-
Soviet
statements have emphasized the increased danger
Spain would face in the event of war, the threat to its
nuclear-free status and national independence, and
the heightening of East-West tension utL~
result
~ Their statements also have encour-
aged the impression that Spanish membership might
bring pressure on the Yugoslavs to join the Warsaw
Pact. the
Soviets tried in May to use the Falklands crisis to
press Spain from going through with its application.
Soviet approaches to Spanish leaders have included
offers regarded by the Spaniards as veiled threats.7
blocs-NATO and the Warsaw Pact-should refrain
from expanding their memberships. In a demarche to
Madrid last fall, sharply rejected by the Spaniards,
the Soviets cited a United Nations resolution' along
these lines. 25X1
Military Missions
As the Spanish Government began to focus during
1981 on the political process of NATO membership,
Spanish military officers and journalists began to
discuss the ways in which
their military forces might contribute to the Alliance.
The Spanish National War College-CESEDEN-
was commissioned to do a study of the problems and
issues involved in joining NATO, among them the
role Spain might play. While they clearly recognize
that their country's strategic location is its most
significant drawing card, these advocates of member-
ship want the Spanish military to have meaningful
and clearly defined missions. 25X1
In many ways, the Spanish forces compare favorably
with those of several of the NATO nations. With
almost 400,000 men (see table 1) the armed forces are
larger than most European NATO militaries. Only
West Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
France have more men under arms.) -125X1
The Spaniards use much equipment that is similar or
identical to that used by other NATO countries-for
example, the AMX-30 tank and F-4, F-5, and Mirage
aircraft. Moreover, modernization programs under
way and planned should improve Spanish forces sub-
stantially over the next several years. Increased con-
tact with NATO militaries, especially during joint 25X1
training exercises, is likely to give Spain an increas-
ingly active role in Alliance military operations.
Nevertheless, we think the Spanish military has a
number of weaknesses that will affect its ability to
contribute immediately to NATO defenses. The
Army, in particular, is an unwieldly and deeply
'The preamble to UN Resolution 35/152G of 12 December 1980
contains language calling for the dissolution of existing military
alliances and, as a first step, for refraining from actions conducive
The Soviets also have tried both in public statements
and diplomatic contacts to push the concept that both
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Table 1
Personnel Strength of the
Spanish Armed Forces
Total a
391,000
Army
296,000
Navy
58,000
Air Force
37,000
a This figure does not include paramilitary forces: the Civil Guard,
which has 63,000 men and would come under Army control during
wartime, and the National Police, which has 45,000 men and is
responsible to the Ministry of the Interior.
conservative organization. The Navy and Air Force,
with newer and better equipment and a more modern
organization and outlook, are more ready for integra-
tion into NATO operations. (See appendix A for
discussion of Spain's armed forces.)
Sea Control. The area in which Spain should be able
immediately to make a modest but useful contribution
is that of sea control. Budgetary pressures are steadily
reducing the number of ships NATO navies have
available for this mission. NATO naval officials have
worried in articles in military journals and at NATO
meetings that the quality gained by adding more
modern and capable ships will not make up for the
larger number of ships leaving service. Therefore, the
addition of some 31 Spanish surface combatants and
seven submarines-several of them recently con-
structed-is welcome.
Under NATO, the Spanish Navy would work in
concert with Allied forces to patrol the western
Mediterranean, the Bay of Biscay, and the Atlantic
approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar-areas in which
it already operates.' If Spain follows the lead of
several of its NATO Allies, including Italy and West
' Assessments of the military responsibilities Spain might assume
and the number and type of units it might assign to NATO
missions are ours. We have taken information about forces normal-
ly available and adjusted it on the assumption that some units will
Germany, it would commit the bulk of its naval
combatant forces to NATO missions, although it may
retain many of the corvettes for national missions
related to the defense of Ceuta and Melilla, the
Canaries, and even antiterriorist patrols
During wartime the Navy could put to sea a light
carrier task force composed of a V/STOL carrier,
about six destroyers, one or two frigates or corvettes,
and perhaps three submarines. Associated aircraft
could include six AV-8A Harriers and eight ASW
helicopters. The Navy could play an important part in
guarding Allied ships transporting troops and supplies
from North America as they neared their European
terminus. The major Soviet naval threat to this area
in the initial stages of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war
probably would consist of a small number of subma-
rines deployed near Gibraltar to attack high-value
NATO targets such as aircraft carriers. Spanish
ASW forces, integrated with those of other Western
navies, could make a small but significant contribu-
tion to the effort to search out and destroy Soviet
submarines.
In peacetime, Spanish ASW units would assist in
monitoring Soviet submarine traffic in and near the
Strait, and three naval ASW helicopter squadrons
and one squadron of fixed-wing maritime patrol air-
craft belonging to the Air Force could contribute to
NATO's air surveillance mission there. One or two
ASW and surface attack units-destroyers and frig-
ates-might be assigned to NATO's Standing Naval
Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and the Naval
On-Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED).
One or two minesweepers might even be assigned
to the Standing Naval Force Channel
(STANAVFORCHAN), a small multilateral mine
warfare force that operates in the English Channel.6
6 STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORCHAN are made up of
ships from the NATO navies that normally operate in each area.
Each nation assigns one or two ships for tours of duty normally
lasting six or 12 months. Ships are earmarked for
NAVOCFORMED, which is periodically activated for exercises. It
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Secret
Amphibious Landing Missions. Two well-trained bat-
talion-sized naval infantry landing teams, totaling
about 2,000 men, are available for use on the South-
ern Flank. Some Allied amphibious lift assistance
almost certainly would be required to deliver and
support them. Moreover, because they lack dedicated
air support, these units are ready to assault only a
lightly defended enemy beach
"Presence"Missions. Battalion-sized or squadron-
sized ground and air units are available to be assigned
to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (ACE
Mobile Force or AMF). This organization, which
consists of military units from several NATO mem-
bers, is intended to deploy rapidly to the Northern or
Southern Flanks to demonstrate NATO's resolve
during periods of tension. Madrid could earmark a
squadron of Air Force air defense or attack aircraft
for AMF operations. The only Spanish Army unit
that could currently be made available for quick
response missions is a 900-man parachute battalion.
(Units earmmarked for the AMF must be available in
fewer than three days.) Spanish Air Force medium-
range transport aircraft probably are able to support
deployment of an Air Force combat squadron or the
parachute battalion.
Reinforcement Capabilities. Spanish political and
military leaders have said that no Spanish forces will
be stationed outside the country in peacetime and that
the principal mission of these forces will continue to
be the defense of Spanish territory. Nevertheless,
their recent public statements about NATO member-
ship make it clear that they expect to earmark some of
these forces for reinforcement missions elsewhere in
Europe
Spain currently has only a modest capability for rapid
reinforcement of NATO forces. The only ground
forces that now could be employed within 30 days are
one parachute brigade and (with US logistic assist-
ance) the two naval infantry landing teams. None of
the Army's divisions could be transported promptly,
nor do they have the modern equipment, training, and
mobility to perform well against the Warsaw Pact.
to deploy at least one additional brigade within 30
days after mobilization. If improvement of an existing
Army unit is made a high-priority objective in alloca-
tion of modernization resources, a division could
probably be readied. Spanish defense officials cur-
rently seem to be thinking in terms of developing-as
the Portuguese have done-a special air-transport-
able, mechanized unit that would be earmarked for
rapid reinforcement. Defense Minister Oliart has
referred to the unit as a "so-called Immediate Inter-
vention Force," and it probably would receive a high
priority for modern equipment and training. Its pra25X1
tical usefulness would depend, however, upon the
availability of dedicated air transport resources.)
senior Spanish military officers are determined that
any reinforcement unit would be designated for duty
in Central rather than Southern Europe.' These mili-
tary officers evidently see Central Europe as the most
important and prestigious NATO area, and they want
their role to reflect what they see as the importance of
their contribution. 25X1
We believe the Air Force probably could deploy a
composite wing of three or four squadrons of F-4C
and Mirage F-1 C aircraft for Allied air defense
missions within 30 days. Alternatively, one or two
Spanish F-5 squadrons might be deployed for ground
support and tactical reconnaissance, but Spanish at-
tack squadrons would require additional training to be
effective in a high-threat environment. Spain's inabil-
ity to provide adequate logistic support outside the
country almost certainly would require colocating any
of these aircraft with similar models belonging to the
host NATO countries. Air and naval transport re- 25X1
sources, if not heavily involved in transporting men
and materiel, could be used to support Alliance supply
and replenishment efforts in the Mediterranean.
Operational Benefits of Spanish Membership
Spanish forces-particularly the Navy-currently co-
operate and exercise with those of a number of
NATO nations, including the United States, Portu-
gal, France, and Italy. Spain's air defense system
25X1
If planned equipment modernization programs are
successful, the Army may, within a few years, be able
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
already is connected with that of France and, through
it, to NATO's NADGE radar system. Nevertheless,
NATO membership will allow a much greater degree
of preplanning, intelligence sharing, and joint train-
ing. The thorough integration of the Spanish air
defense system and ASW efforts with Allied plans
and operations will strengthen both Spanish defenses
and Alliance capabilities. The development in peace-
time of plans for the integration of Spanish forces and
the use of Spanish facilities avoids losing time in
negotiating complicated arrangements during a time
of crisis and assures that political consent will be
forthcoming-at least for contingencies within the
NATO area.
Problems Associated With Spanish Entry
Integration of Spain into NATO will involve multilat-
eral bargaining over such questions as the nature of
the Spanish military contribution. It also will require
internal Spanish actions and adjustments on a range
of small but important subjects. For example, Spain
has no central governmental body authorized to grant
security clearances and maintain records of them. The
Spanish Government has been working since spring
on secrecy regulations that would accord with those in
use in NATO. Although it will take time to sort out
such matters, they should be resolved without great
difficulty. A number of questions do pose difficult
problems, however, and there is some potential for
disappointment and frustration on both sides as nego-
tiations proceed
The Nuclear Question. Because of its distance from
Eastern Europe and the USSR, Spain is probably an
unlikely site for basing NATO's new intermediate-
range nuclear missile systems-the Pershing II ballis-
tic missile with a 1,800-km range and the ground-
launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range of 2,500
km. Nevertheless an explicit Spanish refusal to partic-
ipate in Alliance nuclear programs could create prob-
lems for other countries-such as Italy, Germany,
and Belgium-which have accepted or are consider-
ing fielding such weapons and, in the process, "un-
hinge" NATO's program to upgrade its intermediate-
range nuclear forces. Moreover, if Spain ultimately
were to refuse to allow any nuclear weapons in its
territory-even in transit-the flexibility of Alliance
By the time Spain's Parliament began formal consid-
eration of the accession instrument last fall, NATO
Secretary General Luns and several of the Allies most
interested in the question had made the government
well aware that it could not present the Alliance with
preconditions making Spain a nuclear free zone, and
the government pressed Parliament not to establish
any preconditions. Nevertheless, the Parliament did
add to the resolution several "recommendations,"
including a reaffirmation of national policy opposing
the presence of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil. In
accepting the amendments, the government pledged
itself to consult Parliament before proposing any
change in the policy. 25X1
The current attitude of the Spanish Government
toward the nuclear question has not been clearly
defined. The Suarez government in 1976 took credit
for the US agreement not to store nuclear weapons in
Spain and the subsequent withdrawal of ballistic
missile submarines from Rota in 1979. However, the
issue at that time concerned foreign nuclear weapons
and was argued in the context of bilateral strains and
resentments. The present government, however, seems
at least interested in preserving its options for the
future, and Spain continues to refuse to sign the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the past,
the Spanish Navy gave some consideration to building
nuclear-powered submarines with French assistance,
and some in the Spanish Army even seem interested
in possible acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons.
The Spanish Socialists-who have an excellent
chance of coming to power-have continued to favor
nonnuclear policies across the board.
NATO Command Questions. The question of where
Spain will fit in the NATO command structure is the
most delicate problem posed by Spanish membership.
(See figures 2, foldout at end, and 3.) The current
command organization was laboriously worked out
and revised as circumstances demanded to balance
the competing claims of the members. Geographic
boundaries between subcommands were drawn to
follow strictly the territorial claims of the members
and to reflect their historic sensitivities. The com-
mands were parceled out by a complicated formula,
military operations would be limited.
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Secret
Figure 3
NATO Command Boundaries
United ri
States
~a.~
HINNP
AnliOua antl adraVda
l maica
t.
WESTLANT
North
Atlantic
Ocean
St. Vincent and 11~._.,,...._-
tbe Grenadines--. Barbados
Allied Command Europe (ACE)
Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN)
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)
Ver. Sea
which clearly reflected the capabilities and roles of
the larger members, but also respected the pride of
the smaller ones. Where disagreements exist-as be-
tween Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea-they
can present the Alliance with monumental problems.
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
France
Algeria a rs 57
Libya Egyp
:.~ sbadi
The Spanish Command Proposal. In early June,
during a press conference in Brussels, Defense Minis-
ter Oliart announced that Spain intended to propose
to NATO a fourth major command-comparable to
ACE, ACLANT, and ACCHAN. The proposed com-
mand would comprise all of the territory and waters
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
in which Spain is directly interested-peninsular
Spain, Gibraltar, the Balearic and Canary Islands,
and the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, Ceuta, and
Melilla.
Madrid probably sent aloft this trial balloon primarily
for domestic reasons. In our view, it likely represents
an effort by a weak government to carve out a
defensible position on emotional issues such as Gibral-
tar and the status of the enclaves in advance of
elections likely to be held this fall. Several of the
Allies have indicated in discussions at NATO Head-
quarters that they would not accept such a major
revision of the Alliance's current organization, or such
a major role for Spain. Moreover, the Spanish propos-
al includes a number of elements, such as the inclu-
sion of Ceuta and Melilla, that will be difficult if not
impossible to resolve to Madrid's satisfaction. It does,
however, delineate the areas Spain will expect to
command in the name of the Alliance. It would,
moreover, sidestep the knottiest problem facing the
negotiators-the problem of Portugal. Thus, the Alli-
ance command structure that eventually emerges
from the negotiations may contain at least elements of
the Spanish proposal.
The Portuguese Problem. In integrating Spain into its
existing structure, the Alliance will need not only to
satisfy Spanish ambitions but also to assuage Portu-
guese anxieties. Comments by Portuguese officials
over several years reflect a fear that Spain, with its
larger and somewhat more modern armed forces, will
naturally come to dominate Portugal in Alliance
planning and operations. This fear has deep historical
roots, and it is reflected in Portuguese ambivalence
toward Spain's applications to NATO and the Euro-
pean Community and her general reintegration into
Western Europe. In the case of NATO, this anxiety is
chiefly expressed in terms of the command structure.
In September 1982 a Portuguese admiral for the first
time will become Commander of IBERLANT, which
is responsible for the ground and air defense of the
Iberian Peninsula as well as the waters around it.
Lisbon, determined to retain this position, has told the
Allies that it will never accept a Spanish commander
for IBERLANT and has pressed the notion that
Spain should focus its efforts in the Mediterranean
and Central Europe. Still, the Portuguese cannot
avoid recognizing that Spanish ground and air forces
logically fit under IBERLANT, and that some of
Spain's most vital interests lie in the waters covered
by the Iberian Command.
On 9 July a Portuguese Foreign Ministry official told
a US diplomat that his country would accept one of
two alternatives:
? Putting IBERLANT under overall Portuguese com-
mand with two subcommands-one Spanish, ex-
tending from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Canaries,
and one Portuguese, covering the rest of
IBERLANT.
? Putting the area from Gibraltar to the Canaries
under a separate Spanish command and extending
IBERLANT to include the Azores, which now
come under WESTLANT.
The Portuguese official indicated that his government
recognizes that the first alternative probably will not
be acceptable to the Spanish.
Statements by Spanish officials in NATO and to US
officials suggest that the Spanish Government under-
stands Portuguese sensitivity on the issue, and we
believe Spain probably will compromise to respect this
sensitivity. Nevertheless, Spain sees itself as potential-
ly a strong, valued NATO member, and wants its role
in the Alliance command structure to reflect its
status.
In the meantime, the Portuguese are trying to settle
several matters before Spanish accession. They have
proposed in NATO the shift of the Azores Island
Command from WESTLANT to IBERLANT-a
move they apparently believe would consolidate their
holdings and strengthen their claim to the Iberian
command. Portuguese officials in NATO also are
anxious to nail down Allied funding for programs to
modernize their armed forces so they can play a valid
part in NATO activities. They want prompt NATO
infrastructure funding for an independent Portuguese
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Secret
air defense warning and control system because they
hope to obtain an Iberian air defense command before
the far more modern and effective Spanish air defense
system can be integrated.
guese statements-both public and private-make it
clear that the leadership is concerned not only about
protecting its practical interests as the Spanish join,
but also about "staking out" Portugual's proper osi-
tion as one of the founding members of NATO.
Other Potential Problems. Although Spain's geo-
graphic location makes it the logical successor to the
naval subcommands in the western Mediterranean
(MEDOC) and Bay of Biscay (BISCLANT) aban-
doned by France when it left the military side of
NATO in 1966, the French are likely to be sensitive
to any arrangement that might seem to give Madrid
control over French coastal waters. French Foreign
Minister Hernu recently commented to Portuguese
officials that Spanish accession poses "not insignifi-
cant" difficulties for both France and Portugal. Fur-
ther subdivision of these command areas might solve
the problem.
Rome's interests do not appear to conflict directly
with those of Madrid, but statements by Italian
officials in Brussels suggest that the Italians will be
watching very closely to see that their control of the
major naval command in the Mediterranean is not
threatened.
The problem with the most serious potential to derail
the process of Spanish integration, however, involves
two countries not directly affected-Greece and Tur-
key. Greek officials in Brussels have stated both
publicly and privately their fears that the negotiations
could throw open the whole question of NATO ar-
rangements in the Mediterranean and jeopardize the
control Greece currently enjoys over most of the
Aegean by encouraging Turkish objections. Athens
argues that MC 38/4, the 1956 Military Committee
document setting out the organization of Alliance
commands in the Mediterranean, is applicable; Anka-
ra claims that it is not. The Turkish Permanent
Representative recently linked his approval of Spanish
command arrangements to disavowal or revision of
MC 38/4. The Allies eventually may have to pressure
Greece and Turkey to accept revisions in the western
Mediterranean without prejudice to command ques-
tions in the Aegean. 25X1
Gibraltar. Spanish discussions and debates about
NATO membership over the last six or seven years
have suggested that Madrid expected that the prob-
lem of Gibraltar would somehow be resolved if Spain
joined NATO. We believe that the government now
understands that this expectation is unrealistic, but-
as evidenced in the "fourth command" proposal-it
still seems to hope that a revision in NATO's struc-
ture might offer it some satisfaction. Madrid probably
would prefer to see a Spanish admiral installed as
NATO's commander at Gibraltar-a development
the government could sell to the Spanish public as a
major step forward-but it is a solution we believe the
British would be even less likely to accept in the wake
of the Falklands crisis than before. Another Spanish
proposal calls for the Gibraltar base to be labeled a
NATO base under joint UK-Spanish command.
Spain's most basic concern with respect to Gibraltar,
however, seems to be that no one mistake the arrange-
ments it accepts as acquiescence to continued British
rule. 25X1
In the meantime, a bilateral effort by the British and
the Spanish to lower tensions over Gibraltar has
encountered difficulties. Spain was to reopen its bor-
der with the colony on 20 April, and the two countries
were to begin negotiations on "all issues" concerning
Gibraltar. Because of the Falklands crisis and what
the Spanish see as British rigidity on the question,
Madrid deferred these actions and finally postponed
them indefinitely. 25X1
The positions of Britain and Spain remain far apart,
and a full resolution of the issues is likely to take
years-if it ever occurs. Spanish support for Argenti-
na during the Falklands conflict may make agreement
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
even more difficult. Ultimately, however, Spain's
membership in NATO could provide both sides with a
fig leaf for whatever concessions they might finally
agree on.
The Spanish Enclaves. Parliamentary debates last fall
focused as well on the failure of the North Atlantic
Treaty to provide protection for the Spanish enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla, which lie outside the NATO
region in North Africa. By the time Spain formally
joined the Alliance, the government seemed to have
accepted that it could extract no explicit arrange-
ments for Ceuta and Melilla-although the recent
Spanish command proposals raise the question again.
The government "fudged" the issue last fall in re-
sponding to parliamentary questions, knowing that
the enclaves raise strong emotions, especially in the
military, and lend themselves to demagoguery. The
government's position essentially was that "NATO
membership will protect Spanish territory; Ceuta and
Melilla are part of Spanish territory." The US Am-
bassador has observed that on this, as on some other
issues, the government may have allowed the Parlia-
ment and the public to believe that parliamentary
"recommendations" on the NATO legislation mean
more than they do, betting that the issues will fade
with time or that the perceived benefits of NATO
membership will outweigh disadvantages.
Many Spaniards continue to believe-as evidenced in
the parliamentary debates and writings by military
officers and journalists-that the most serious threat
to their security comes from the south-from poten-
tial instability and Soviet meddling in North Africa.
NATO membership does nothing, in their view, to
meet that threat. Some military officers, writing on
Spain's potential military contributions to the Alli-
ance, have pointed out that it will be necessary to
withhold from NATO control the forces necessary to
defend Ceuta and Melilla.
The Canary Islands have not presented a comparable
problem. They are included in the area covered by the
Treaty, whose southern ocean boundary is the Tropic
of Cancer.
Spanish Goals and Expectations. The Spanish Gov-
ernment found that the process of weighing potential
costs and benefits before deciding to join the Alliance
was time consuming; few interest groups were truly
enthusiastic about the notion and
large numbers of
officers, especially in the Army, did not approve of
joining NATO. A poll taken in October 1981 indicat-
ed that 52 percent of Spaniards opposed joining
NATO, while 18 percent favored entry. In the end,
however, the government decided that entry might
help to achieve several goals. Among these were:
? The acceleration of Spain's full integration into
Western Europe, including membership in the Eu-
ropean Community.
? The redirection of the armed forces toward a Euro-
pean-oriented military mission; with the virtual end
of Spanish colonial involvement in Africa, the mili-
tary had little to do and strong motivation to meddle
in domestic politics.
25X1
25X1
? The modernization of the armed forces to "NATO
standards," both through increased contact with
better organized, more capable Western militaries
and through greatly increased financial aid. l 25X1
We believe that most of these objectives will be met to
some extent, but that Madrid holds some unrealistic
expectations about the economic benefits of NATO
membership
the
Spanish believe that they would receive substantially
more military assistance as a member of NATO than
they would if they did not join-both from the United
States, in the context of the new Treaty of Coopera-
tion to cover US use of Spanish facilities, and from
other NATO countries. We believe that Spain is
counting on aid from its allies to help fund ambitious
modernization programs.
These expectations are likely to confront some harsh
realities during the next year. Clearly, Spain stands to
receive substantial military assistance from the Unit-
ed States under the new treaty, and Spain will become
eligible as an ally for speedier transfer of certain kinds
of defense technology. Spanish industry may also find
more opportunities to participate in European defense
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Secret
cooperation programs to develop new weapons sys-
tems. Nevertheless, we believe that US assistance is
unlikely to approach levels that would satisfy the
Spaniards, or to provide the kind of grant assistance
or concessionary terms they believe they deserve.
West Germany is already pressed to meet its own
force improvement goals, while aiding other Southern
Flank countries. Few other NATO members have the
resources for more than token assistance to poor
Allies-and Spain's economic development places it
well ahead of the poorest NATO nations, Turkey,
Portugal, and Greece.
It is also clear from remarks by Spanish officials that
Spain, like most of the lesser NATO countries, ex-
pects to receive much more in benefits from the
Alliance infrastructure program-funds allocated to
improve facilities for joint use-than it contributes.'
As a NATO member, Spain will almost certainly
benefit from the infrastructure program, but it will
find competition keen for these funds. Spanish firms
will be able to compete for infrastructure projects
throughout the Alliance, but their competitive advan-
tage will be strongest on Spanish projects. Ultimately,
the amount of infrastructure that is built in Spain will
depend directly on its participation in NATO defense
efforts and the extent to which it allows Allied forces
to use its facilities. Discussions about assistance levels
and infrastructure funds will be difficult and protract-
ed and the Spaniards are likely to feel some disap-
pointment
Spanish Government officials and those parliamentar-
ians and military officials who favor accession have
stressed to US and Allied officials their need to be
able to show real benefits from NATO membership.
Many of the advantages to be derived from participa-
tion as equals in NATO councils and committees and
regular contact with Allied militaries will be intangi-
ble and difficult to measure. Spanish perceptions
about such benefits will, however, be extremely im-
portant in coloring Madrid's attitudes concerning the
more difficult questions of assistance levels
the Spanish military currently views the
NATO connection with ambivalence. Some elements,
especially in the Army, remain anxious about the
changes membership seems certain to bring, worried
about the loss of sovereignty implied in joining the
Alliance, and aware that their equipment and capabil-
ities do not currently measure up to NATO standards.
Other military officers, generally those in the Air
Force and Navy, regard with considerable enthusiasm
the new opportunities for assignments at NATO
headquarters and commands and professional contact
with NATO officers, and hope that membership will
bring practical benefits like modern equipment and
more sophisticated training. 25X1
On balance, the armed forces seem to have accepted
NATO membership as a positive step. Their leader-
ship actively supported the government during the
accession process. They will play a major role in
hammering out the new arrangements for Spanish
participation in Brussels; the new Spanish Ambassa-
dor to NATO has indicated to US officials that his
government hopes to engage the military so deeply in
the process that it will become an advocate for NATO
should the Socialist Party come to power.
25X1
Potential Political Problems With the Allies. Be-
cause of its particular perspective and, in part, be-
cause of its isolation from the European mainstream
over the past four decades, Spain may view some
political issues differently from the other Allies. Al-
though expressing sympathy for both sides during the
Falklands crisis, for example, Spain eventually came
down on the side of Argentina. The Spanish Foreign
Minister used his maiden speech to the North Atlan-
tic Council to remind the Allies of Spain's Latin
vocation and to hope-evenhandedly-that the two
sides would negotiate a solution "which would respect
both the territorial integrity of Argentina and the
On a number of other questions, Spain has differences
with individual members. The Gibraltar question, the
rivalry with Portugal, problems over French harbor-
ing of Basque terrorists in southern France, economic
and trade issues with all the Allies-any of these
could tarnish the image of heightened cooperation
' For a discussion of the potential costs to Spain of membership, see
appendix B.
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
between Spain and its NATO partners and make the
technical issues of integration harder to solve. It is
true that bilateral issues frequently divide other mem-
bers of NATO, but Spain is the "new kid on the
block," and the Allies will be looking to Madrid for
signs that it can get along and add to rather than
detract from Allied harmony.
The problem could become very serious if the current
government collapses soon, leading to early elections,
and even more critical if the opposition Socialist Party
(PSOE) should win the elections. The PSOE has
publicly opposed Spanish membership, insisting that a
referendum should be held to decide the question, and
recently has adopted policies that combine opposition
to NATO with politically popular patriotic demands
on Gibraltar and the Spanish enclaves. An election
campaign also would put pressure on the parties of the
center right to adopt strident positions on such ques-
tions. The Spanish debate could, therefore, needlessly
exacerbate relations with the Allies, and the parties
may establish positions that will be difficult to back
off from after the elections.
tion. Moreover, if the Socialists win a majority of
parliamentary seats, their campaign rhetoric could
impose on the leadership the referendum on NATO
US Embassy officials believe, based on conversations
with PSOE leader Felipe Gonzalez and other Social-
ists, that Gonzalez is inclined to allow the integration
progress to continue even if he comes to power. This
change of heart reportedly is based on Gonzalez;'s fear
that the military will stage a coup if his party takes
power and a belief that a rash act such as a sudden
withdrawal from NATO might provide the pretext.
His thinking may also reflect a growing realization
that NATO membership would be good for the
Spanish military, deflecting them from their concen-
tration on internal strains and domestic politics. Nev-
ertheless, we believe that a new government dominat-
ed by the Socialists would take a more confrontational
line on the difficult issues involved in Spain's integra-
membership they have said they favor.
If the Socialists dominate the next government, their
political behavior in the Alliance will be shaped in
part by the pattern of cooperation they choose with
other Socialist-led governments. If they often make
common cause with Greece's nonconformist and na-
tionalistic Prime Minister Papandreou, Spain will be
a divisive force within the Alliance rather than a
strengthening one. On the other hand, if Gonzalez
forges special ties within the Alliance with the French
Socialists or a Schmidt-dominated West German
SPD, those ties will help smooth Spain's integration.
The PSOE already has ties to all three partie
visited Greece for consultations with Papandreou
shortly after he became Prime Minister. Nevertheless,
we exepect that a PSOE-led government would retain
an independent point of view on issues before the
Alliance; it would likely choose its allies because of
their positions on questions of mutual interest, and not
be led by any foreign ally.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Iq
Next 12 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8
Approved For Release 2008/08/28: CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8