SPAIN AND A WEAKENED UCD: DOWNHILL TOWARD AN ELECTION

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Spain and a Weakened UCD:
Downhill Toward an Election
State Dept. review completed
Secret
EUR 82-10069
CR 82-13764
July 1982
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Spain and a W eakened UCD:
Downhill Toward an Election
The paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
EUR 82-10069
CR 82-13764
July 1982
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Secret
Spain and a Weakened UCD:
Downhill Toward an Election
Key Judgments The Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), the center-right party that
has governed Spain throughout the transition to democracy, is showing
increasing strain and is not likely to hold together. The UCD is weak partly
because it is young and has never really achieved unity; partly because its
left and right wings disagree on the social issues the government is only
now beginning to address; and partly because its leaders have neglected
development of the party base, preferring instead to rely on such tradition-
al power centers as the Church, the military, and other vested interests.
The party's poor showing in the Andalusian election in May will aggravate
its problems. 25X1
Former Prime Minister Suarez, who was a key figure in the formation of
the UCD, is poised to play a decisive role in the future of the party. Since
he lost control of its hierarchy late last year, Suarez has been considering
formation of a new centrist party that could join a postelection coalition
with either the left or the right.
The party, plagued by continuing weaknesses, may be forced to call an
election before its mandate expires next March. It would have to compete
against a Socialist Party that now leads in the polls. Despite party chief
Felipe Gonzalez's persistent efforts to give the Socialists a moderate image,
the conservative military, which has a long history of intervention in
politics, remains extremely suspicious of the Socialists. Indications that the
UCD was about to break up or stronger signs that the Socialists would win
a general election would increase the chances of military intervention.
To banish that specter, increased pressure is being put on Prime Minister
Calvo Sotelo to move toward a coalition with rightist parties, especially the
Popular Alliance of Manuel Fraga Iribarne. A defection by Suarez would
practically force Calvo Sotelo to move in that direction, because the
Spanish electoral system tends to favor large parties. A UCD/AP coalition
probably would be well bankrolled and could win a respectable vote total.
Information available as of 13 July 1982 has been used in
the preparation of this report.
iii Secret
EUR 82-10069
CR 82-13764
July 1982
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If Suarez succeeds in retaking control of the UCD, he will probably reject
a rightist coalition in favor of an eventual alliance with the Socialists. This,
too, could split the party if its right wing finds an alignment with the
moderate left unacceptable.
If the UCD becomes more conservative, some domestic policies would
change, but foreign policies probably would not. The party would continue
to espouse a European, Western outlook and stand behind NATO and
European Community membership, as well as the bilateral treaty with the
United States. Should Suarez increase his influence and the UCD ally
itself with the Socialists, on the other hand, Spanish foreign policy would
place more emphasis on good relations with Third World countries but
would continue to pursue ties with Europe. Spain could become a less
cooperative NATO member and would be more independent of
Washington.
Whatever party or coalition of parties wins the next election, the outlook
for Spain is for continued instability. Whether the government is Socialist
or conservative, the political atmosphere will continue to be strained.
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Spain and a Weakened UCD:
Downhill Toward an Election
The Transition:
From Franco to Democracy
Spain has avoided most of the purges and upheavals
that often accompany the transition from dictatorship
to democracy. This is largely a reflection of the
continuity provided by the leaders of the transition,
particularly King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister
Adolfo Suarez. Although most of the transition lead-
ers had been closely associated with the Franco
regime, they quickly demonstrated they had no inten-
tion of defending the status quo.
As Spain's first post-Franco Prime Minister, Suarez
had the monumental task of dismantling the old
system and building the new. He did this with skill
and style, even managing to convince the Franco-era
Cortes to dissolve itself in favor of a new, democrati-
cally elected institution. Suarez led both his party-
the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD)-and the
government from 1976 to 1981, relying mainly on his
forceful personality and the rewards of power and
office that flowed from the party's electoral victories
(see appendix A).
The King's role was, and still is, just as important as
the prime minister's. As Franco's designated succes-
sor, Juan Carlos claims the loyalty of members of the
old regime; as a staunch supporter of democratic
institutions, he has won the loyalty of those-like the
once-outlawed Socialists (PSOE) and Communists-
who benefit from the new order; and as a commander
in chief who works hard at maintaining close personal
ties with the armed forces, he has been extremely
important in promoting acceptance of democratic
reforms within the ranks of the conservative military.
A constitutional monarch, the King has had to bal-
ance the need to be more than a figurehead against
the need to avoid overtly active participation in
government. He shuns any appearance of politicking
and plays a key behind-the-scenes role, working for
the overall stability of Spain.
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The transition to democracy has been eased by the
moderate and supportive role played by Spain's politi-
cal parties, including the opposition Socialists and
Communists.' Both of these parties took pains to
' For a further discussion of the opposition role during the transi-
tion, see John F. Coverdale, The Political Transformation of Spain
After Franco, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1979, pp. 65 and 126.
Another excellent source is Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi,
Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, London, George Allen and
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cooperate with Suarez's center-right government,
helping it to promulgate a new constitution, adopt
labor and economic reforms, and work out the meth-
ods for transforming Spain's highly centralized oliti-
cal system into one that permits a large degree of
regional autonomy. This era of "consensus politics"
contrasts sharply with the pre-Franco polarization
that led to the civil war of 1936-39. In fact, the new
penchant for compromise is based partly on the dark
held by the spring of 1983 and is likely to take place
this fall. A wide range of Embassy
memories of that disastrous time.
Even so, the avoidance of extremism in post-Franco
Spain has not brought political tranquility. Expedi-
ence, political infighting, and sharp clashes on govern-
ment policy are at least as common as in other West
European parliamentary democracies, at times pro-
voking the disdain of those Spaniards-particularly in
the military-who cherish stability and order. Politi-
cal tensions are heightened by economic recession and
the persistence of terrorism, especially in the Basque
region.
As documented in the press
some of the fiercest and most freewheeling
political battles occur inside the political parties. The
Communists are fighting over the relative merits of
internal democracy and democratic centralism, and to
some extent over Eurocommunism as opposed to pro-
Sovietism. The regional parties are divided internally
over how hard they should push for greater autonomy.
Even the Socialist Party is in danger of alienating its
left wing as a result of efforts to move to the right and
soothe the fears of conservative sectors in Spain. But
because the UDC has been governing Spain since
1977, the squabbling among its members clearly has
the greatest impact on the country. (See appendix B
for biographical information on political figures.)
Intense factionalism inside the UCD,Z for example,
has already led to 20 defections from the govern-
ment's parliamentary ranks, thus reducing its plurali-
ty and its effectiveness. Further splits in the party
would make it extremely difficult for the center-right
to compete successfully against a unified Socialist
Party in the next national election, which must be
2 The UCD has fought over specific legislation (such as divorce), as
well as party direction (centrist or rightist) and more petty concerns
reports indicate that many members of the political
establishment believe a peaceful change of govern-
ment will be the litmus test for Spanish democracy
but that they worry that the military, with its history
of political intervention, would not countenance So-
cialist rule.
we believe the breakup of the UCD
would sharply increase the chances of military inter-
vention
The UCD Under Calvo Sotelo
Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo, inaugurated after
Suarez resigned in January 1981, has had the unenvi-
able job of trying to hold the UCD together while
coping with the other problems of Spain. He had little
or no base of support in the UCD and made no effort
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Calvo Sotelo has had
to cope with worsening problems that threaten to
break the UCD apart. The tenuous cohesion of the
transition period has not withstood the challenges of
social and economic problems that have accentuated 25X1
the differences between the UCD's Christian Demo-
crats on the right and its social democratic faction on
the left. Personality conflicts and ambitions have
added to the dissension. In fact, a key problem for
Calvo Sotelo has been the continuing loyalty of the
party organization-especially in the provinces-to
Suarez. And Suarez has done his best to retain control 25X1
that could provide a base for a comeback.
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Before the Cortes had even installed new Prime
Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo y Bustelo-Suarezs
own nominee-an event occurred which has shad-
owed Spain ever since. On 23 February 1981, while
the Cortes was meeting to vote on Calvo Sotelo's
candidacy, a band of paramilitary Civil Guards
headed by Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero Molina burst into
the parliament building and briefly took it over. The
bloodless coup attempt failed, largely because King
Juan Carlos stood against it and persuaded wavering
military leaders to back him. It ensured, however,
that future governments will be especially mindful of
any military unhappiness over the direction of Span-
ish democracy.
Disgruntlement with several aspects of democratic
Spain pornography, street crime, terrorism, eco-
nomic decline, and the trend toward regionalism in
particular-spawned the coup attempt. As widely
respected writers on military affairs such as Julio
Busquets have noted, the military establishment's
focus on such issues reflects its traditional view of
itself as a major arbiter of Spain's internal policies.
When in its oath of allegiance it promises to defend
the state, it sees this more readily as a defense
against internal disruption than as a mission against
outside aggressors.
4 Ithough the straightforward desire for power
was undoubtedly a factor in the plotting, most of the
ringleaders insisted at their trial that they acted out
of patriotism and solely for the good of Spain. Tejero
became a folk hero of the right almost immediately,
entertaining visitors, giving interviews, and enjoying
kid-glove treatment in his prison quarters. Even when
he was moved to a prison in far northwestern Spain,
he continued to receive a steady stream of visitors
lauding his effort to "save" the country.
During the year and a half since the coup attempt, the
UCD leadership has taken steps to attend to some of
the strongest military concerns and to reach agree-
ments with the other political parties particularly
the Socialists-on other issues. The government has
expanded the role of the military in the fight against
terrorism; worked out a new economic agreement
with employers and unions; and agreed with the
Socialists on provisions of a new bill to "ha -e
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the regional autonomy process.
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The King joined the political parties in the campaign
to assuage the concerns of the military. Although he
had suffered some damage in his relationship with
the military, particularly due to rumors that he25X1
first condoned and then betrayed the coup attempt,
the King has worked hard to rebuild his rapport. In
his s eeches on military occasions
he has encouraged the military to bring 125X1
frustrations to his attention at the same time he has
enjoined them to maintain discipline.
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Late last year, with I intraparty
tensions at an alltime high and defections from both
wings weakening the UCD in Parliament, Calvo
Sotelo pitted himself against Suarez for control of the
party hierarchy-and won. The Secretary General
and the President of the UCD-both Suarez cro-
nies-resigned and were replaced with a Christian
Democrat and by Calvo Sotelo himself, respectively.
Suarez immediately resigned from the Executive
Committee but announced that he would remain in
the party.
Party to share office with a party to its right should it
win a plurality-or even a majority-in the next
election.'
Where Does the
Electorate Stand?
There have been too few elections in post-Franco
Spain to permit a confident estimate of the strengths
and weaknesses of various parties and coalitions
ranged across the political spectrum. So many ele-
ments are either new or in flux that electoral out-
comes have yet to settle into any predictable pattern.
A study on party preferences done under a grant from
the National Science Foundation a few months after
the most recent general election in March 1979,
however, gives some clues about the electorate. The
profile of UCD voters that emerges is that they are
religious or at least sympathetic to the Church, come
from many classes of Spanish society, and usually
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not simply walking out. Still a young man (49), Suarez
wanted to prepare an avenue for his eventual return to
politics. Involved in a lucrative law practice, he
thought a walkout would jeopardize some of his firm's
cases. Most important, he was aware that his re;;igna-
tion the previous January was often blamed for
precipitating the coup attempt and he hesitated to
jeopardize the government's staying power.
party to form a centrist "hinge" party, capable of
forming an alliance with either the UCD or the
Socialists after the next general election.
The concept of a hinge party is gaining popularity,
and not just with Suarez's supporters. Liberals and
social democrats openly state in the press that they
too are tempted by this potential avenue to power.
According to press discussion, the idea's attraction
stems from several factors: belief that the bulk of the
Spanish electorate stands in the center of the political
spectrum; a perception that the UCD has been slowly
shifting rightward and may leave a "vacuum" in the
center; and the acknowledged desire of the Socialist
think of themselves as centrists. Of the seven econom- 25X1
is classes named in the study, the UCD drew its
greatest support from a category labeled "owners,
small businessmen, and independent artisans," who
made up 17.6 percent of the party. Over half of all
people in this category voted for the UCD. Of even
more interest, however, is the percentage of small
farmers-over 65 percent-that voted for the UCD.
The electoral system is skewed slightly in favor of
rural areas, so if the UCD can retain the allegiance of
these farmers it should have an advantage when seats
are distributed.
On a left-right continuum, the same study shows that
over 50 percent of the respondents place themselves in
the center and center left with another large group
just to the left of them (see the figure). This seems to
justify Suarez's early insistence on making the UCD
' This intention b leaders of the Socialist Party has been reported
repeatedly, and is designed to assuage conserva-
tive power centers and to provide the moderate leadership with an
excuse to its left wing for any failure to follow party platform
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Distribution of the Electorate
on the Left-Right Continuum
Percent
30
Source A study under a National Science Foundation grant authored by
Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shahad.
"centrist" and Felipe Gonzalez's strategy of dragging
the Socialist Party rightward. Leaders to the right of
center, however, such as Manuel Fraga of the Popular
Alliance (AP) would appear by their statements to the
press to believe there is a great untapped pool of more
conservative sentiment which would provide support
for a mass party of the right. Hence Fraga's call for
the UCD and the AP to coalesce into the so-called
gran derecha (grand coalition of the right).
It is dangerous to read too much into Spanish polls,
but recent surveys suggest continuation of the center/
center-left tilt among the electorate since the cited
study. The Socialist Party consistently outpolls the
UCD, and the largest group of respondents continues
to characterize itself as left of center. The polls may
underestimate the size of the conservative vote, how-
ever, because the rural areas-which are most likely
to be conservative-are those least likely to be
polled.
Scenarios, or
Can the Center Hold?
The UCD fabric, already fraying at the edges, has 25X1
come closer to ripping apart since the Andalusian
regional election in May. Although national leaders
stumped the hustings frenetically for their regional
colleagues, the UCD limped to a third-place finish
behind Fraga's Popular Alliance-which quadrupled
the vote it won in 1979-while the Socialists swept to
an unprecedented solid majority.
erupted into public recriminations, which were fol- 25X1
lowed by a defeatist attitude regarding the party's
future. With a national election less than a year away,
the UCD publicly dithered over how to recoup,
reorganize, and mold new alliances. One UCD leader
even gave an interview proclaiming that the party 25X1
would benefit from losing the general election and
taking on opposition status.
We see three trends emerging so far from the turmoil.
A leading Christian Democrat told US Embassy 25X1
officers that a large section of the party's Christian
Democratic wing, seeing the surprising gains of the
right in Andalusia, is making plans to join Frag25X1
Popular Alliance, probably in the late summer or
early autumn. On the other hand
Ca25X1
Sotelo and many others in the UCD have apparently
concluded that the party lost ground because it moved
too far right and insist that they will move it back
toward the center. And Suarez supporters, calling25X1
a strong, popular leader, have come out in the press
for the return of the former Prime Minister to a
position of power. For the short term, everyone is
likely to make contingency plans but keep all options
open. 25X1
We believe that the departure of a large part of the
Christian Democratic faction is one of the stron25X1
possibilities. Even before Andalusia, the Embass,
reported that some Christian Democrats were think-
ing of a move to the right and a coalition with Fraga.
But whereas before 23 May these reports showed that
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most of them assumed that the UCD would be an
equal if not the senior partner, their more recent plans
concede Fraga a stronger hand.
In our view, the position of Calvo Sotelo looks increas-
ingly shaky. His influence within the party has waned
drastically in the aftermath of Andalusia, and he is
only rarely mentioned in the press as someone expect-
ed to exercise real power in the months ahead. He was
replaced by Landelino Lavilla as party president on
13 July and with only a small personal following and a
demonstrated lack of voter appeal, Calvo Sotelo may
be unable to maintain his position even in the govern-
ment beyond the end of this legislative session. Para-
doxically, however, his very weakness could keep him
in place as a compromise among the various corn-
peting factions.
Another possible configuration revolves around the
return of Suarez. This development would almost
guarantee the departure of the party's right wing,
which deplores his leftwing tendencies and authoritar-
ian style. Even should Suarez restrict himself to being
the power behind someone more acceptable to these
Christian Democrats-Lavilla, for instance-it seems
unlikely that they would be fooled by this ploy. What
the UCD would then become, in effect, is the centrist
"hinge" party that Suarez had already planned to
form. Party strength could decrease dramatically, but
this rump UCD would still be in a position to stay in
power by putting together a postelection coalition
no financial aid to the UCD if it aligned itself with
the Socialists. Financial circles would probably con-
clude that any return of Suarez to influence would
mean a UCD-Socialist pact.
How Strong the Right?
Among informed political observers, estimates vary as
to how well a coalition of moderate rightist parties
could do in a general election. Even Oscar Alzaga,
who plans to lead any Christian Democratic switch to
Fraga's camp, told Embassy officers that he believes
the Socialists will win easily next time. Fraga himself
is more optimistic;
he believes that without CEOE financial
support the UCD will lose so many votes to the AP
that he can come within range of the Socialists' seat
count in the Cortes. But he stops short of predicting a
rightist win.
Other parties of the moderate right are also sorting
out their prospects. Antonio Garrigues Walker, orga-
nizer of the Spanish liberal movement, has said openly
he intends to contest the next election with a party
drawn from the much-publicized "clubs" he has been
setting up around the country plus whatever liberals
he can attract from the UCD. The moderate regional
parties, such as the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)
and the Catalan Convergencia i Unio (CiU) are sure
to be assiduously courted by both the UCD and
Fraga. Maneuvering and negotiation will intensify as
an election approaches, but there is no indication that
a grand coalition of the right is in the making.
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with the Socialists or, less likely, the right.
A suarista party, however, would face serious prob-
lems trying to finance a successful election campaign.
The UCD has depended heavily on donations from
business circles in the past, but these sources have
come to distrust Suarez. The Spanish Confederation
of Businessmen (CEOE), besides ostentatiously bank-
rolling the AP in the runup to the Andalusian regional
election, has
That situation could change by autumn as pressures
build to combat the advancing Socialist tide. The 25X1
business community, the military, the Church, and
even King Juan Carlos will probably be adding their 25X1
combined influence toward the forging of a conserva- ;
A preelection coalition is especially
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tempting because of the Spanish electoral system. A
party with 30 percent of the vote wins more seats than
two parties with 15 percent each, reflecting a bias
built in to discourage the proliferation of small par-
ties.
It is impossible to predict the electoral appeal of such
a rightist coalition. One prominent American political
scientist told US officials that he saw no signs of
much depth in the rightist gains in Andalusia, since
most of the electorate still considers itself centrist. He
explained Fraga's success as a rejection of cynical
maneuverings within the UCD rather than as a swing
to the right. Nevertheless, there appears to be a
sizable portion of the center-leaning electorate that
will vote for the party of the moderate right that
looked most viable no matter how mild the brand of
socialism being espoused by Gonzalez and his col-
leagues.
Significance for the West
Spain has already traveled a long way from the
authoritarian era of Franco. Its outlook has become
European, Atlantic, and democratic, and we believe
most Spaniards want to continue on this path. But we
think, too, that Spain has not yet achieved the kind of
stability that ensures a peaceful change of govern-
ment in the event influential groups, particularly the
military, see some danger in the change.
most military men
still see the Socialists as the enemy of the civil war
marked by suspicion and countersuspicion, rumor and
counterrumor, that a Socialist government would find
it difficult to provide stability. A Socialist coalition
with a Suarez-led UCD to its right would be little
better, in the military's view. The much less likely
option of a wider coalition between the PSOE and
parties to the right of center might be somewhat more
palatable to the military. Such a coalition would have
great difficulty working out a cohesive program,
however, despite the recent history of consensus gov-
ernance in Spain.
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A government with Socialist participation would pose
difficulties in the NATO arena. Although the Social-
ists have backed off from their earlier public state-
ments about pulling Spain out of NATO, we believe
they probably would be less cooperative and more
demanding with the United States than a conservative
government. Attitudes toward the Third World and
the Arab world are sure to diverge from those of the
United States as well, although we believe Spain
would continue to move toward closer cooperation
with its European partners, particularly once it has
entered the European Community.
Should the UCD retain a governing role in coalition
with conservative parties, we believe foreign policy
differences with Washington would be less evident.
More important, a continuation of conservative gov-
ernment in Spain would allow time for the military to
evolve into a more outward-looking, modern force,
less inclined to interfere in the political process. The
UCD left wing would probably leave rather than ally
with Fraga, however, thereby weakening UCD clout
within the coalition. If no one party were able to
dominate, a rightist coalition would face inevitable
struggles for power and position among the various
factions-that is, a reprise of recent UCD Hstory.
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We believe the most likely prospect for Spain thus
becomes a choice of two types of instability-on the
one hand, a relatively cohesive, moderate, Socialist-
led government rendered fragile by the uncertainties
of military and other conservative reaction; on the 25X1
other, a government led by a coalition of moderate
rightist parties of questionable cohesion. Either sce- 25X1
nario would involve severe economic and social prob-
lems that would aggravate the difficulties of govern-
ing. Of the two choices to win the election, we now
believe a Socialist coalition the more likely. Even
though the Socialists have worked for consensus while
in opposition, there are disturbing signs in the press
and elsewhere that the conservative parties might not
reciprocate if they take on opposition status. Such a 25X1
polarization could only add to the tensions within
Spain and increase the levels of military restiveness in
the coming months.
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Appendix A:
The Union of the Democratic
Center Under Suarez
In 1977, Spain held the first free national election
since the beginning of the Franco dictatorship nearly
40 years earlier. Franco had forbidden even his own
supporters to form political parties, and as a result
only underground parties had developed any kind of
organization. The National Movement had been the
only recognized political organization in Franco
Spain, but it was not a political party in the usual
sense. The Movement had no formal ideology and
represented a cross section of those willing to work
within the regime. The year after Franco's death saw
the demise of the National Movement and the appear-
ance of numerous centrist and conservative parties-
many of them created by regime leaders jockeying for
position. None of these parties enjoyed any broad-
based support.
To avoid splintering the moderate vote, 15 center and
center-right parties patched together an electoral
alliance-the Union of the Democratic Center
(UCD)-during the runup to the June 1977 parlia-
mentary election. Adolfo Suarez, the dynamic and
charismatic Prime Minister who had been appointed
by King Juan Carlos in 1976, agreed to run as the
head of the party. The alliance succeeded in winning a
plurality of the seats (165 of 350) in the new Cortes.
Shortly thereafter, Suarez insisted that the individual
parties within the UCD formally shed their identities
and unify as a single party.
Two aspects of the UCD's formative period were keys
to what has gone wrong with the party. First, the
UCD was troubled from the beginning by internal
divisions drawn largely along the lines of the original
party orientations-either liberal, Christian Demo-
cratic, social democratic, or independent-with subdi-
visions grouped around prominent personalities, other-
wise known as the party "barons." Given the lack of
consensus, Suarez, the acknowledged leader of the
party, used his power to force party policies in the
direction he favored. This created further tension
because his inclination was to push the party toward
the center-left on some issues, even though the UCD
had emerged from the election with a popular image
as the representative of the moderate center-right.
The more conservative elements complained, but they
decided to go along, given the overriding need to move
Spain toward democracy and their personal desire to
remain in office.
The second key feature of the young UCD was the
absence of party machinery. Gradually a party appa-
ratus did come into being, but in reverse order from
the usual procedure. Thus, the UCD began by win-
ning power and then built downward to form local
committees, a membership base, and the other accou-
trements of a modern political party. Progress was
erratic, however, and depended to a great degree on 25X1
whether Suarez devoted time to the organizational
process-and Suarez was concerned mainly with the
effort to achieve consensus on a new constitution.
Moreover, we think that Suarez and his close advisers,
whose outlook had been formed during the Franco
regime, probably did not fully appreciate the need for
a well-developed party infrastructure, preferring in-
stead to depend on the government ministries as
sources of power. While it neglected grass-roots af-
fairs, the UCD did keep its lines open to power centers
such as the Church, the Employer's Federation, and
the elite landholding classes.' 0 25X1
By the time of the first UCD congress in October 25X1
1978, Suarez, apparently recognizing the need for an
improved party structure, had expanded the Executive
' Some scholars go so far as to argue that all parties and party
systems in post-Franco Spain were created as a concession to
foreigners-that is, that the parties are merely synthetic creations
designed to satisfy the conditions for US aid and entry into NATO
and the European Community, while the real focus of power still
lies elsewhere. See Western European Party Systems edited by
Peter H. Merkl, New York, 1980, pp. 298-328, Howard J. Wiarda,
"Spain and Portugal" for a further analysis of this view. Wiarda
acknowledges that there is some truth to the argument but makes a
convincing case that Spain has a dual system of political power and
authority: new institutions such as the parties, Parliament, and an
electoral system maintain an uneasy balance with traditional
institutions including the army, the state structure, and a variety of
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Committee and given the secretary for organization
the additional title of "coordinator." The congress
provided some structure by approving statutes and
what Secretary General Rafael Arias Salgado called
"a catalogue of principles," but it failed even to try to
draw up a detailed program.
Instead, Suarez was at pains to emphasize that the
UCD intended to attract support from a broad politi-
cal spectrum between the Marxist left and the au-
thoritarian right. The party defined itself as an orga-
nization that aimed at harmonizing the disparate
claims of different socioeconomic classes and regional
groups. It gave particular emphasis to the security of
society through maintenance of public order and the
struggle against terrorism, and its spokesmen talked
vaguely about achieving "social efficiency" through a
mixed free market economy.
The party articulated its foreign and defense policies
more clearly, declaring Spain's basic foreign policy
option to be "European, Western, and democratic."
The UCD aspired to NATO entry, integration into
the European Community, and an active presence in
the Council of Europe. Its program gave high priority
to relations with Portugal, Latin America, and the
Mediterranean basin, and even allowed for the estab-
lishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel pro-
vided the government decided this was in the Spanish
national interest.
To demonstrate independence of the United States,
the UCD criticized the defense agreement with this
country as "marred" by the weakness of the previous
Spanish regime (Franco) on the one hand and by "a
mercantilist view of renting" on the other. At the
same time, the party called for increased emphasis on
trade, cultural, and scientific/technological relations
with the United States. UCD policy was closely
attuned to the Suarez government's program.
Another Election
By December 1978, the Prime Minister had negotiat-
ed a new democratic constitution with the other
political parties and had seen it approved by a referen-
dum. Suarez was up in the polls again, and he used
the excuse of the new constitution to call an early
election to "ratify" the UCD's continued leadership.
Suarez's gambit succeeded; the election in March
1979 gave the UCD almost the same plurality it had
enjoyed two years earlier-168 out of 350 seats-and
Suarez again became Prime Minister.
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But internal struggles over perquisites and policy
continued to weaken the UCD and divert it from
problems such as terrorism, the economy, the regional
autonomy question, and military unrest. By March
1980, for the first time since Suarez became Prime 25X1
Minister, a public opinion poll showed that more
people disapproved of his performance than approved.
Press and Embassy reporting indicated that UCD
leaders, King Juan Carlos, and the military all were
critical of the government's performance as 1980
drew on. Suarez now
felt besieged and unsure of his ability to control the
party. He met with the King on 29 January 1981 and
resigned as prime minister, saying that he had lost his
moral authority with the Spanish people.
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Appendix B
Fernando ABRIL Martorell
Deputy, Cortes
Fernando Abril Martorell, 45, was once widely regarded in Spain as the second
most powerful member of the government and of the' UCD. The key to his
influence was his longstanding personal friendship with Suarez. Martorell served
in a variety of posts in governments headed by Suarez and was assigned to handle
matters that were of personal interest to Suarez. As Suarez became more
unpopular with UCD "barons," we believe Abril was targeted for removal from
the Cabinet as a first step toward attacking Suarez. Abril left the government in
September 1980, but he still belongs to the party's Executive Committee. As
reported by the press, his behavior in the Executive Committee meeting following
the regional election in Andalusia indicates that he may no longer be the Suarez
Jose Luis ALVAREZ Alvarez
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food
toward an electoral coalition with the Popular Alliance.
Jose Luis Alvarez Alvarez, 52, is the only prominent Christian Democrat in the
Cabinet. He is a leading conservative spokesman who, according to US Embassy
officials, believes in free enterprise and a humanistic variety of Christian
Democracy. A former law professor and a highly respected notary, Alvarez helped
to organize the Popular Party (the nucleus of the UCD) in 1976 and is widely re-
garded as the architect of the UCD's electoral success in the 1977 election.
Alvarez has a reputation for being decent and hard working, and US officials in
Madrid have said he may be too good natured for the rough and tumble of politics.
According to press reports, Alvarez does not belong to the secessionist wing of the
UCD Christian Democrats and has expressed his support for Calvo Sotelo since
the Andalusian election debacle. Nevertheless, according to press reports he tends
Fernando ALVAREZ de Miranda
Deputy, Cortes
One of the most respected figures among the Christian Democrats in the UCD,
Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, 58, is an attractive personality who is well liked by
his UCD colleagues, according to Embassy reports. As president of the Popular
Christian Democrat Party in the early post-Franco years, he ultimately was the
force behind uniting the various factions of the Christian Democrats with the
UCD. In mid-1981 he joined with others in that faction to form a "moderate
platform," a "group within a group" that tried to influence Calvo Sotelo toward
more conservative policies. US Embassy officials regard him as generally conserv-
ative, but he has made statements that transcend the ideological spectrum. F
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OscarALZAGA Villamil
Deputy, Cortes
One of the Young Turks (at age 39) of the UCD, Oscar Alzaga Villamil, has be-
come increasingly critical of the party apparatus, which he feels is too much under
the control of the followers of Suarez. He has told US Embassy officials that he
sees a UCD/AP pact as the only chance for thwarting a Socialist victory in the
next general election and has already made plans to lead the Christian Democrats
into such a coalition if the UCD will not swing to the right. Alzaga has always
been extremely outspoken and candid in his criticisms of how the party is run, and
there is considerable press speculation about his intentions and the number of
deputies he could take with him if he were to leave the UCD. Alzaga accepted an
appointment as adviser to Calvo Sotelo in December 1981 but
tensely.
indicates that zaga is pessimistic by nature, is an acute observer of the political
scene, and has excellent contacts with the Church. He was one of the party leaders
who worked for Suarez's resignation last year, and the two dislike one another in-
thinks his government is "ineffective." Embassy reporting
Rafael ARIAS-SALGADO y Montalvo
Minister of Territorial Administration
democratic wing of the UCD and is counted as a Suarez loyalist.
Rafael Arias-Salgado y Montalvo, one of the bright young men (age 40) of the
UCD, served as party secretary general from 1978 to 1980. He flirted with
Christian Democratic politics in the mid-1970s before helping Francisco Jose
Fernandez-Ordonez: found the Social Democratic Party, which became part of the
UCD. Salgado gravitated to the team of Adolfo Suarez and became a protege of
former Economics Minister Fernando Abril Martorell. He is still in the social
Pio CABANILL4S Gallas
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
Lawyer, author, and professor, Pio Cabanillas Gallas, 58, was a firm supporter of
former Prime Minister Suarez during the early post-Franco years and probably
still pays him some allegiance. He has also been close to Calvo Sotelo. Cabanillas
is regarded as a UCD "baron," but his power base is Galicia and his influence di-
minished after the IJCD did poorly in the regional election last year in Galicia. Al-
though he has past ties to Manuel Fraga, Cabanillas
has recently expressed doubts about the wisdom of a UCD/AP alliance.
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Leopoldo CALVO SOTELO y Bustelo
President of the Government (Prime Minister)
within the party.
A former businessman, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, 57, advised Suarez during the
creation and formation of the UCD. Although slightly to the right of Suarez,
Calvo Sotelo is basically a nonideological moderate with no identifiable power base
election debacle in Andalusia this May.
Calvo Sotelo dislikes political infighting and has tried to remain above the fray
during the party bickering that has plagued the UCD since before he became
Prime Minister in February 1981. Suarez personally chose Calvo Sotelo as his
successor, probably in the expectation that he could manipulate the new Prime
Minister, but the two have become estranged as each jockeyed for power within
the party. Calvo Sotelo tends to stand pat and appear calm in the midst of turmoil,
a trait that has alternately been described in the Spanish press as "inward
tranquility" and "paralysis." Such aloof behavior successfully reduced the tensions
of the postcoup months last year and won the Prime Minister high praise. The
same behavior has been inadequate to deal with party dissension since the regional
Francisco Jose FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ
Leader, Democratic Action
with other leftwing dropouts from the UCD.
Francisco Jose Fernandez-Ordonez, 52, was regarded as the leader of the leftwing
social democratic faction of the UCD until he left in November 1981 to form a
new party, Democratic Action. He refers to himself as either a "social democrat"
or a "left liberal." His decision to leave the UCD came after a long history of
widely publicized struggle against Suarez's control of the party and criticism of
what Fernandez-Ordonez characterized as the increasingly rightward shift of the
party. he has garnered
the support of only a handful of senators and Cortes members for Democratic 25X6
Action. He has good contacts with the PSOE, and the program he favors-tax re-
form and modernizing the public sector while reducing government subsidies to
the private sector-would place him ideologically on the UCD left or the PSOE
right. For now he is sticking with his independent course, but his viable
alternatives seem to be to seek closer ties (or even integration) with PSOE or to ally
Manuel FRAGA Iribarne
President, Popular Alliance Party
Former diplomat, law professor, and author Manuel Fraga Iribarne, 59, leads the
basically conservative reformist Popular Alliance Party (AP). In 1979 the AP
received less than 5 percent of the vote and, together with its allies in the
Democratic Coalition (CD), had only nine seats in the Cortes. Recent UCD
defections have increased its parliamentary faction, and both the success the AP
has enjoyed in regional elections-in particular Galicia last fall and Andalusia this
May-and recent opinion polls indicate that it will become one of the major
parties of the right following the next general election.
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he is acknowledged to be one of the most brilliant politicians in Spain.
Fraga was part of the first post-Franco government but left in a huff because he
was not selected to be prime minister. It was then that he founded the AP and be-
gan his maneuvers to return to power.
Juan Antonio GARCIA DIEZ
Second Vice President for Economic Affairs
Juan Antonio Garcia Diez, 41, is a member of the left wing of the UCD and con-
sidered loyal to Calvo Sotelo. Garcia Diez was Minister of Commerce and
Tourism in the first UCD government. He is credited with lifting many of the pro-
tectionist restrictions on trade and opening Spain up to foreign trade and
investment. He is now the third-ranking member of the government-Minister of
Economy and Commerce-and, because of his falling out with Suarez crony
Fernando Abril Martorell, we believe that he might be in favor of a UCD alliance
with the Popular Alliance.
Antonio GARRIGUES (gahREEGez) Walker
Director, J. and A. Garrigues (since about 1972)
Antonio Garrigues Walker, a prominent international lawyer and financier, is well
connected to the Union of the Democratic Center but is a member neither of the
UCD nor of the Cortes. His political power base consists of a network of more than
50 regional liberal clubs, which he formed in 1981 and which are now a growing
political force in Spain. Garrigues's political ideas center on a belief in Christian
Democracy and a "moderate socialist" economy emphasizing free enterprise but
allowing for state control of certain basic industries. He sees his movement as
centrist and, according to the press, intends to convert it into an independent
political party capable of allying with either the UCD or the Alianza Popular.
Garrigues is adept at using the press to keep himself in the public eye, an ability
which has greatly helped the development of his liberal clubs.
Miguel HERRERO Rodriguez de Minon
Deputy, Cortes
Miguel Herrero Rodriguez de Minon, 41, was one of the drafters of the Spanish
Constitution. Once a parliamentary spokesman for the UCD, Herrero belonged to
the conservative Christian Democratic faction of the party. An outspoken public
critic of the UCD leadership, he became the moving spirit and one of the leaders of
the "moderate platform" within the UCD whose purpose was to try to influence
party attitudes toward the right. In January 1982 Herrero left the UCD to join the
Popular Alliance, and because of the high esteem that others have for him, he
could become a magnet for other dissatisfied UCD deputies.
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Landelino LA VILLA Alsina
President, Cortes
President, UCD
Landelino Lavilla Alsina, 47, a leader of the moderate Christian Democratic
faction of the UCD became president of the UCD in July 1982. Lavilla was once a
close ally of Suarez, but he was shouldered aside by former Economics Minister
Fernando Abril Martorell. He eventually became a leader of the "criticos" in the
party who fought to unseat Suarez and were one factor in his resignation.
According to the press, he is now close to Calvo Sotelo. An elegant, suave, friendly
man, Lavilla has been criticized within the Christian Democratic faction for being
too much under the influence of his wife. 25X6
Rodo1Jo MARTIN VILLA
First Vice President for Political Affairs
A "baron" of the UCD and a very influential man among the party independents,
Rodolfo Martin Villa, 48, earned his political stripes in the National Movement.
During the post-Franco transition, he founded the progressive Francoist Independ-
ent Social Front, which eventually joined the UCD. Once a major source of
Suarez's support within the party, Martin Villa switched camps and ensured Calvo
Sotelo's takeover of the party hierarchy from Suarez late last year. He may now be
edging toward support of a Suarez comeback. Martin Villa has evinced no interest
in becoming the leader of the party himself, but will probably continue to play an
influential role in determining the direction the party will take.
Aldolfo SUAREZ Gonzalez
Deputy, Cortes
individuals but has trouble being so convincing with groups.
eel
Suarez can be very persuasive when dealing with
has been negotiating to keep the right wing from
archy. Suarez stands to the left of most of the party but
Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, 49, was a virtual unknown when King Juan Carlos
selected him to serve as Prime Minister in July 1976 and to orchestrate Spain's
transition from dictatorship to democracy. In the next four and a half years he 25X1
formed a political party, won two elections, and promulgated a new constitution
while working to lead Spain out of the isolation it had suffered in the Franco era.
By 1980, however, his mishandling of the regional autonomy issue, the growth c25X1
terrorism, the sagging economy, and hisdecisionmaking style under-
mined his personal popularity and led to his eventual resignation in January 1981.
He maintained control of much of the UCD apparatus, however, especially at the
provincial level, and now intends to make a run to regain control of the party hier-
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be firmly to and political eolo or concrete set of ideas, but he
is a political infighter par excellence.
Suarez does not appear to
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