THE ZANZIBAR REVOLT OF 12 JANUARY 1964 IN RETROSPECT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00764R000700120001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 26, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE ZANZIBAR REVOLT
OF 12 JANUARY 1964
IN RETROSPECT
26 October 1964
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THE ZANZIBAR REVOLT OF 12 JANUARY 1964 IN RETROSPECT
26 October 1964
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THE ZANZIBAR REVOLT OF 12 JANUARY 1964 IN RETROSPECT
PAGE
1. Summary- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
a. The Arab Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
b. The African Majority and Racial Tension . . . . . 4
3. Political Parties and Elections . .
4. Non-Communist Intervention in Zanzibari
Internal Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Communist Intervention in Zanzibari Internal Affairs , 12
6. Toward Revolt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. The Order of Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Armed Action and Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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"To succeed, revolutions need more than resolute revolutionaries....
They require quite exceptional incompetence, if not complete moral and
financial bankruptcy, on the part of the system of government they are
intended to overthrow. Only governments that do not possess the will to
resist, or that are prevented by quite special factors from exercising this
will, are overthrown by revolutions."
L.C.B. Seaman, From Vienna to
Versailles (Harper Colophon Books,
Harper and Row, Inc. , 1963), p. 49.
"What are, generally speaking, the characteristics of a revolu-
tionary situation? We can hardly be mistaken when we indicate the
following three outstanding signs: (1) it is impossible for the ruling
classes to maintain their power unchanged; there is a crisis `higher up',
taking one form or another.... If a revolution is to take place, it is
usually insufficient that 'one does not wish way below,' but it is neces-
sary that 'one is incapable up above' to continue in the old way; (2) the
wants and sufferings of the oppressed classes become more acute than
usual; (3) in consequence of the above causes, where is a considerable
increase in the activity of the masses who in`' peace time' allow themselves
to be robbed without protest, but in stormy times are drawn both by the
circumstances of the crises and by tY e 'higher-ups' themselves into
independent historic action."
V.I. Lenin, The Imperialist War
(New York, International Publishers,
1930), Volume XVIII, Collected Works
of V. I. Lenin, p. 279.
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1. Summary.
On 12 January 1964, the Sultanate of Zanzibar was overthrown by a
brief armed revolt, after having become independent within the British
Commonwealth only a month before, on 10 December 1963. This sudden
and, dramatic fall had been preceded by a long decline, which only gath-
ered speed in the Laial period.
Historically, the Arab domination of the islands of Zanzibar and
Pemba was a minority rule, founded on conquest and supported by use
of the islands as a depot for slave-raiding activities conducted on the
East African mainland. Slaving operations ended with the establishment
of the British Protectorate in 1890, but the Arabs retained their political
and economic hold. The prestige of the Sultanate declined during the
critical period as one incompetent ruler succeeded another.
In recent years, the African majority began to resent its exclusion
from political power. There was also rising dissatisfaction with the
land tenure system, which left most of the best land in the hands of Arab
absentee landlords. A declining market for cloves, Zanzibar?s main
export crop, contributed to economic stagnation and added to the reser-
voir of idle and improverished workers. Electoral victories only added
to African frustration, as the Arabs successfully maneuvered to retain
political control, and used the police and British troops to contain the
popular unrest.
The prospect of independence under these circumstances made it
clear that an inherently unstable political situation would arise In Zanzibar.
The result was that states as disparate as the United Arab Republic and
Israel began to dabble in Zanzibari politics. The new nations of the
African mainland, especially Tanganyika and Ghana, were not lar behind..
By offering definite examples of African sovereignty, the successive
emergence of independent states on the mainland contributed to instability
in Zanzibar.
Needless to say, the Communist movement was prominently repre-
sented in this overt and covert intervention in Zanzibar?s internal affairs.
The first elements to cultivate Zanzibari assets were the Communist Party
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of Great Britain (CPGB) and the Soviet Bloc; then Communist China,
and finally Cuba. These assets were the "resolute revolutionaries";
they spread across the spectrum of Zanzibari life, supported by
propaganda and supplied with funds as needed.
The Communist effort in Zanzibar was first stepped up in 1957,
and was then aimed mainly at the Arab Zanzibar Nationalist Party.(ZNP).
There is reason to suspect that this major thrust was dictated in part
by a Soviet hope that, through rapprochement between the ZNP and
the Cairo-based, UAR-supported Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement,
Communist influence might most rapidly be brought to bear in Zanzi-
bar to promote anti-Western attitudes and campaigns. The unantici-
pated speed with which black African nations moved toward independence
in the 19584-60 period probably forced modification of the general line
of the Communist subversive effort. By 1960 the granting of self-
government to Tanganyika promoted active African opposition to the
ZNP and contributed to the outbreak of racial violence in the island.
It was then obviously necessary that the Communist movement accel-
erate its efforts- -already under way--to gain influence in and around
the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and to avoid becoming involved in the racial
antagonisms. This in fact was done--at first by building up influence
among the ASP-oriented youth and trade union groups, and, as of 1961,
by exerting influence within the ASP leadership itself. By 1963, only
the Communists had succeeded in developing both a cadre and a follow-
ing in both the racial communities. In mid-1963 the break between the
Arab party and the Communists within it finally occurred. Thereafter,
the Communist effort was devoted to bringing together their youth and
trade union supporters from both racial groups and to cultivating a
national alliance between their break away Arab party--the UMMA--
and the ASP.
Independence left Zanzibar fatally vulnerable to any determined
subversive stroke, while simultaneously increasing the hopes and
demands of the African majority. The police force was rapidly weak-
ened by Arabization of the upper echelons, and by indications that the
mainland Africans who formed the hard core of the lower ranks might
soon be discharged. The Police Mobile Force (PMF) had been founded
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in 1961 to support the police in repressing disturbances, but it was
subject to the same weakening influences as the regular police force,
and it proved to be almost useless when the revolt occurred.
The final preparations for revolution proceeded on separate but
essentially parallel lines. At least two, and possibly three, groups
were formed, the leaders assembling men and laying plans with a
minimum of consultation among themselves. The common objectives
that all accepted were the various police barracks and the radio
station. Beyond these none of the groups seemed to have planned.
The apparent assumption, and the correct one as it turned out, was
that the police weapons in the hands of the African mob would destroy
the Arab regime in a single wave of terror. The initial assaults were
well-aimed, since the discharged policemen with the various bands
knew exactly where to go for the arms that they sought. Whatever
resistance was offered was overcome before daybreak on 12 January
1964, and the Arab regime of Zanzibar vanished in a single day as its
leaders fled, died, or were interned.
2. Background.
a. The Arab Regime.
The Arab presence in Zanzibar is centuries old, dating from the
development of sailing craft cipable of taking advantage of the regul-
arly reversing monsoon winds to travel down the East African coast
at one season, and to return at another after various raiding and trad-
ing activities. Influence became control when the Arabs of Oman drove
out the Portuguese at the end of the 17th century; the subsequent period
of Oman.i governors was followed by installation of the Sultan of Oman
on Zanzibar in 1832. During this period, the island served as a base
for large-scale and often bloody expeditions to the interi,,~)r of East
Africa to round up slaves, a practice that was ended when the British
made Zanzibar and Pemba their protectorate in 1890.
Under the British protectorate, the Arabs, who formed a minority
of about 15 per cent of the population of the islands, were able ;c retain
their economic and political control. The large Arab landowners continued
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in their traditional way of life, growing cloves and producing copra to
replace the past business of slave-trading. There were also smaller
Arab traders, often temporary inhabitants who came and went with
their dhows in the old manner. A separate "Asian" minority estab-
lished itself, Hindus, Sikhs, various sects of Moslems, and Christians
from Goa. They and the Arabs together were far outnumbered by the
Africans, composed of indigenous Shirazis, descendants of liberated
slaves, or more recent immigrants from the mainland.
To maintain their position as leaders of so heterogeneous a
collection of subjects, the last Sultans of Zanzibar would have had to
be exceptionally able men. Seyyid Khalifa apparently was--or perhaps
his record improved in retrospect and by comparison with those who
followed. His son, Seyyid Sir Abdullah bin Khalifa, had only been on
the throne a short time when a qualified observer commented, in 1961,
that Abdullah could well be the last Sultan of Zanzibar. Seyyid Khalifa
had been renowned and revered, by Arab and Asian and African;
Seyyid Abdullah was jeered on the few occasions when he appeared in
public. Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) supporters noted that Abdullah never
invited Africans to the periodic dinners he gave.
The chances of the dynasty were not improved by the nomination
of Seyyid Jamshid as Crown Prince and heir apparent. Jamshid's
extravagances were obviously beyond the means of a small and poor
nation; he also alienated the African politicians by actively participat-
ing in meetings of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), which was
primarily a party of the Arab element of the nation. Jamshid succeeded
to the throne in July 1963, when his father died of diabetic complications.
Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdullah was the last Arab Sultan of Zanzibar; his
reign came to a violent end after barely six months.
b. The African Majority and Racial Tension.
The African population of Zanzibar constituted an overwhelming
numerical majority of the population. This was the more true since the
Shirazis, a group traditionally of Persian origin, had been so long on
the islands that they identified themselves with the Africans. The Afro-
Shirazis formed the laboring classes, and thus were poor at best.
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Restrictions placed on Importation of cloves into India and Indonesia in
the 1950's were a direct blow at Zanzibar's main export crop, and an
even more serious blow to the income of the laboring class who did the
picking and preparation of the cloves. The African masses therefore
found themselves increasingly idle, or-driven by necessity to hard work
on small and inefficient farms for a bare subsistence, while the best
land was held. by relatively rich absentee landlords, usually Arabs. The
Africans further believed, and with considerable justification in the opin-
ion of expert and unbiassed observers, that control of the whole admin-
istration of the island was monopolized by the Arabs, from the civil
service and education to the police and the judiciary.
Under these circumstances, racial antagonism was inevitable.
Isolated cases of murder, arson, and intimidation became a regular
feature of Zanzibar life, to the point where race relations were a major
preoccupation of the authorities from at least 1960 on. This increasing
pressure built up into major violence in June 1961, when disturbances
occurred that were only suppressed by the deployment of armed security
forces, including British troops, throughout the island. This show of
force overawed the rioters for the moment, but even at the time it was
clear that these who had caused the trouble were only waiting for the
military to leave in order to resume their activities.
3. Political Parties and Elections.
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Political parties came into existence in Zanzibar after 1955, when
the British authorities granted a measure of self-government to the
Protectorate. In Zanzibar as elsewhere, party designations should not
be thought of as indicating unified and homogeneous groupings. Both
the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP)
included moderate and extremist wings, as did their respective labor
unions and other associated groups. These extremists, who were almost
invariably Communist-inclined and Communist-trained, did not begin to 25X6F
coalesce into a separate organization until the founding of the Umma Party
by Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu in June 1963. The sort-
ing-out of the extremists was no comp e e y the time of the revolt of
12 January 1964.
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The Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) was the rallying point for
the dominant Arab minority. As such, it received major contributions
from the well-off Arab landowners and business men, in addition to the
foreign aid discussed below. Consequently, the ZNP was in a better
position to propagandize, to organize and to buy votes in the various
elections that preceded in.d.ependence. Sheikh Ali Muhsin Barwani, the
moderate leader of the ZNP, is reported to have asked Abd.ulrahman
Mohamed Babu. to return to Zanzibar from the United Kingdom in 1957.
If he did, he had cause to regret the action later, since Babu rapidly
emerged as theleading Communist activist in Zanzibar. Organizations
such as Youths' Own Union (YOU) and the Federation of Progressive
Trade Unions (FPTU) were nominally affiliated with the ZNP and under
its direction.. In. fact, however, they were creations of Babu, and they
served the classic Communist function of "transmission belts", to carry
Babu's Communist doctrines to the ZNP members and to the Zanzibar
population in general. The FPTU was weakly supported by the workers
whom it purported to represent; in effect, it was a political agitation
group, especially with its leadership in the hands of such Babu. supporters
as Ali Sultan. Issa and Ahmed Abubaker Qullatein In 25X6F
the same manner, the ZNP offices in London and Havana were under the
direction, respectively, of Salim Said Rashid El Manby and of Ali
Mahfudhea Mohamed Both men were strongly Communist- 25X6F
oriented and completely attached to Babu. For a time, the ZNP office in
Cairo was directed by Ali Sultan Issa, who has been alluded to above as
another pro-Communist activist and Babu henchman.
The Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) was the spokesman. for the majority
African population of Zanzibar, but weak organization and a lack of funds
partially negated this majority electoral base. With respect to extremism
in its ranks, the ASP's problem paralleled that of the ZNP to a striking
degree. From 1961 on, the ASP's moderate leaders, President Aheid.
Amani Karume and Secretary-General Othman Shariff Musa had to deal 25X6F
with an extremist element under the direction of Deputy Secretary General
Abdullah Kassim Hanga Hanga's influence was enhanced
by the Communist orientation o e younger elements, who were stronger
in the Afro-Shirazi Youth League (ASYL), and in the Zanzibar and Pemba
Federation of Labor (ZPFL), than in the parent party. The ZPFL had
some claim to being an authentic working-class group, but it was unable
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to accomplish much in the line of normal trade-union activity because of
the depressed state of the economy of Zanzibar and the inability to accum-
ulate strike funds from the union members. Moreover, the Secretary-
General of the ZPFL was Hassan Nasser Moyo I , whose
Communist connections were numerous and varied. With Moyo in undisputed
charge, and with such assistants as Adam Mwakanjuki and Abdul .Aziz Ali
Khamis Twala to back him up, the ZPFL was primarily
a means for spreading Communist doctrines and a potential asset for any
subversive tactic that its leaders might decide upon.
In the 1961 elections for the Zanzibar Legislative Council, the ASP
won.9nly 10 of the 23 seats at stake, although its candidates received a
majority of the popular vote. The major riots at this time, and the general
lawlessness that preceded and followed them, played into the hands of the
extremists of both parties, as the more responsible leaders were dis-
credited through their policies and counsels of moderations. Both the ASP
and the ZNP began to develop militant wings and strong-arm groups, which
were ready material for offensive use by the extremists.
An attempt to burn the United States Consulate in August 1961 showed
that relatively advanced techniques were already becoming known on the
island. Later efforts to burn the British Information Service office on
5 April, and the post office on 3 May 1962, eventually led to the year's
incarceration of Babu and other members of YOU who had been involved.
Significantly, with these arrests "anti-colonialist" terrorist efforts ended.;
when four homemade incendiary devices were found in a deserted house in
early 1963, they proved, to be so poorly made that it was impossible to
detonate them.
Party clashes continued in 1962, and in October the authorities were
obliged to use tear gas to disperse the combatants.
The elections of July 1963 followed the previous pattern: the ASP
won a striking majority of 63 per cent on the island of Zanzibar, and a
plurality of 44 per cent on the neighboring island of Pemba. However, this
time, the ASP emerged from the election with a plurality in the National
Assembly, winning 13 seats to 12 for the ZNP and 6 for the Zanzibar and
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Pemba Peoples' Party (ZPPP). Again, the aspirations of the ASP to
form a government were frustrated, however, by the ZNP/ZPPP
coalition from which the ASP was completely excluded. Internal self-
government had been granted to Zanzibar the month before, on
24 June 1963, but with only ZNP/ZPPP supporters present, since the
ASP did not attend.
But the extremists were apparently prepared to change their
tactics. In the final weeks before the 1963 elections, the ZNP lost
the dubious services of its Secretary-General, Babu. Emerging
from a year's imprisonment for sedition, Babu had found that his
loyal associate Ali Sultan Issa had been expelled from the ZNP for
insisting too strongly on militant ZNP action to liberate Babu and for
too-bitter criticism of the leaders who did not measure up to his own
standards. Issa was still in the ZNP's labor union, the FPTU, however,
and the two men presented the moderate ZNP leadership with a lit of
seven candidates for whom "safe" ZNP constituencies were required in
the coming elections. The claim was turned down, as was the concurrent,
and almost certainly coordinated, one for six safe seats presented to the
ASP at the same time by Hassan Nasser Moyo If
successful, this gambit would have placed Babu and his extremists in the
highly satisfactory position of controlling between the two main parties,
13 of the total 31 seats in the National Assembly that was to govern
Zanzibar after independence. Babu resigned as secretary general of the
ZNP on 16 June 1963. Two days later, having prudently left Zanzibar
for the safer climate of Dar -es--Salaam, Babu announced the formation
of the Umma Party.
Neither the Umma Party's membership nor its activities left. any-
doubt of its Communist orientation. Ali Sultan Issa, A'i Mahfudhea
Mohamed, Salim Said Rashid and others quickly fell in line behind Babu
and his new party. Umma was smaller than the longer-established
parties, but its leaders had sympathizers who remained in the ZNP, in
the ASP, and in their respective fronts. Umma attempted to hide behind
the ASP to some extent. When 4 joint comin:ittee, was fo =ed to oppose
a bill requiring the registration of societies and newspapers, Babu was
the committee's secretary general, but its president was Abeid Amani
Karume, the relatively-moderate ASP leader. Umma worked busily in
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the youth field, handing out much literature and announcing the formation
of a National Union of Students (NUS). An All-Zanzibar Journalists'
Organization was inaugurated on 7 August 1963; its officers were all
Communist sympathizers and Babu was considered to have inspired its
formation.
An organization calling itself the Zanzibar Communist Party (ZCP)
emerged during the pre -independence period, but its existence may be
disregarded in considering the development of subversion in Zanzibar.
In fact, it was so artificial that one outside source alleged that it was an
invention of the ZNP, and one of a series of minor parties created to
draw votes from the ASP. This view would suggest a degree of sophisti-
cation not seen elsewhere in Zanzibari political action; an especially
ingenious touch was the use of a Secretary General whose name could lead
to his being confused with Babu, the real turning point of Communist
activity in Zanzibar. The ZCP's leader was Abdulrahman Mohamed Hamdany,
called "Guy", whose record included travel to Communist China and the
Soviet Bloc, and also treatment in various hbspitals for mental ailments.
Whether independent or sponsored from outside, "Guy" collected only a
score or so of followers, and his ZCP was of no importance either in
furthering or decreasing the subversive threat to Zanzibar.
Caught in the current of decolonialization that was sweeping the world
in general and Africa in particular, Zanzibar drifted toward independence.
Under the conditions just described this obviously unstable political
situation was one to encourage foreign meddling. The Zanzibar "political
animal" was plainly staggering; the vultures circled lower in readiness
to pick its bones when it fell. A variety of foreign states intervened in
Zanzibari internal affairs, openly or discreetly, during the final years of
the British protectorate. Each nation seems to have selected its clients,
either individuals or parties, in accordance with its estimates, its inclin-
ations and its objectives either offensive or defensive. For their party,
the Zanzibaris, both individuals and groups, accepted aid whenever and
wherever offered, in a tacit, and possibly even unconscious, recognition
of the self-evident proposition that Zanzibar was incapable of surviving as
an independent and unsupported nation.
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The United Arab Republic (UAR) gave considerable backing and funds
to the ZNP as the party of the Zanzibar Arab element after establishing
close links in the early 1950's. As late as mid-1963, heavy Egyptian
support for the ZNP was continuing, although the more recent Egyptian
broadcasts had ceased to discriminate against the ASP. Earlier, in 1961,
Ali Muhsin Barwani had tried to counter the extremist influence of Ba.bu
on the ZNP by strengthening the ZNP's relations with the UAR. One of
his initiatives in this direction was to bring five Egyptian teachers into
the Zanzibari school system. The fact of Egyptian backing for the ZNP
was widely enough accepted for a rumor to gain credence, in the last days
before independence, that in case of trouble Egyptian troops would be brought
into Zanzibar. The accuracy of the rumor is less important than is the
climate it connotes.
Given the known UAR support for the ZNP, Israeli aid to the ASP
was to be expected. Rather than an Arab regime which would by definit-
ion be hostile, Israel naturally preferred to see an African government
installed in Zanzibar, particularly one that would have reason to be grate-
ful to Israel after its accession to power. The most prominent Israeli
in Zanzibar was Mischa Feinzilber (wa. Feitzwengler), whcse business
activities included a fish-freezing plant and several lime concessi