DEAR MR. BECKER:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00764R000600100049-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: April 2, 1952
• Content Type: LETTER

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25X1A5a1
Mr. Lertua BekeT
25X1A6a
De,r 3eoker:
April 2, 1952
A second readiAtrOf the interesting:essay confirms my judgment
that it is a purelY theoretical evaluation based on informationevallable
to any student of the subject. The characterization* conform strictly
to the typical current "outside" rationalizations. The analySis of
roles is nine parts typical "outside" theory and-one-pert guess. One
guess seems to me fantastic. One important assumptiOn ccntradicts, by
implication, the best "inside" information now available. The essay
seems to be at attempt to cover everythitg from now forward in the'k,ommu-
nist-Capitalist struggle - without really saying anything that yau .!an
pat your finger on as a clue to a single- predictable future move or.the
part of the person* discussed.
WFI : mt
?
25X1A5a1
Sincerely yours,
4fic;.,;/,r dec., ofe4rs46..4L.?
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MEMOR.ANDU11 F'ORR. BECZER
25X1A2g
ormation
SUBJECT: Comment on March 1952,
"Events Leading to a Split in the
Soviet Communist Leadership.?
20 March 1952
1. The subject document is unneually interesting. The
probability of the existence of tensions and cross-purposes within
the Politburo has long been recognized, but with the exception of
past purges and questionable caees, such as that of Ihdanov, which,
if they ever existed, have been resolved, our knowledge of their
actual existence, nature, points at issue and groupings of person-
alities is, as far as I know, a complete blank. If the content
of this document is reliable, ita intelligence value is very high
and could well have a major effect on our planning and action. I
do not believe that it merits auch
2. In Feneral, the viewpoint and reactions attributed to the
nopportuniets" are much closer to orthodox Bolshevik thought than
are those attributed to the nrealiste". I have no doubt but that it
is possible, given sufficient knowledge, to group the Politburo into
those mho are inclined to favor Lore aggressive policies and those
who would act less boldly. Such a grouping mihht also be a source
of strain, but both groups would view things in the lihht of long-
accepted central concepts, and the pattern of their divergences
would depart materially from that set forth in this document.
Neither group would hold the view that their own masses would not
permit the use of atomic weapons (par. 55), and often the view
attributed to the Realists as being in opposition to that of the
Opportunists could not fail to be held by any good Communist.
Sometimes, as in the supposed contrast between the bSA and
socialists, (par. 58) the views of both groups are actually
orthodox and can be held simultaneousay in the Russian mind with
no difficulty.
? 3. If a division as extreme as that which is portrayed
existed, the so-celled Opportunists would be very apt to brand
their opponents as "opportunists" and themselves as trealists,,,, far
some of the more important view- attributed to the ,ealists are so
inconsistent with a very consistent Bolshevik pattern of thought
that those who held them would be regarded as adventurers. Those
aspects of Realist thought seem to me to be unnatural to a hard-
core Communist (which must be a prerequisite for Politburo
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4. In the sense in which the Beleheviks define the term, it
would take some unaccustomed wishful thinking to consider the world
situation ripe for immediate revolutionary action, even without the
risk of war (6). No true Bolshevik, even if discouraged (and there
is little to discourage them), could consider that all political means
leading to final Communist victory had been exhausted (55)? or
seriously doubt that there would be time before 1954-1958 to take
measures to interfere with a war initiated by the Americans (56).
Nor would they consider that revolutionary intervention in favor of
world Commas% as distinct from military intervention, has become
so perilous as to constitute a major limitation (30 b), nor that
aid to bourgeois Islamic feUdal lords or any of the bourgeoisie,
for that matter, need be unconditional (52).
S. The date of 1950 as one by whichthe recovery of the Soviet
Union and the absorption of the satellites would have been achieved
is not in accordance with realities, and would not appear so to
ease an optimistic Soviet mind (15). Much different vie are con-
tinually given to the Russian people by their leaders, and one has
only to live in Russia to know that the time element is much longer.
I believe that major questions of policy are settled in the privacy
of the Politburo, and not in the breeder publicity of joint meetings
with the Cominform and Chinese statesmen (23). There are ample
means other than external adventures, for controlling the chronic
dangers arising from the inactivity of the Soviet Amy and the
failure of Soviet workers to obtain the promised benefits (14).
I do not believe that the Soviet leaders have fallen into self-
deception by coming to believe their own propaganda, but rather
that they believe in the ultimate validity of its orientation and
aims and are completely conscious of its (to them legitimate)
distortion of supporting fact (14).
6. Many of these points seem to me to be very representative
of viewpoints that are held by those who have not lived for long in
the Soviet Union and are not familiar with its realities. They are
part of the normal Western or non-Russian thinking. The explanation
of Thoree presence in Moscow as a make-weight for Eisenhower's
presence in Europe (33) and regarding Korea as Stalin's first major
politico-military errors together with its connotations (29a? 30, 50),
seem to me to be non-Russian interjection's. There is reason to
believe that hussia's appraisal of atomic weapons is not consistent
with the absolute weapon (2a). Especially noteworthy is the
attribution to any hard-shell Communist of a belief that
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international problems could have 'open settled by their arguments
at the Paris conference (9), and to Aolotov's disillusionment (10).
They 3uet don't think that way.
7. Major consideratioua, notably problems of weaknesses and
limitations of a peculiarly Russia-4 nature, are completely untouehed.
In Ay opinion, the Politburo is well uware of them and they weld
profoundly condition the thinking ot the Realists and be reflected
in the issues under discussion. , The problems that would arise in the
minds of any responsible Russian are simplified out of existence.
They know that there is more to overrunning Eurasia than a purely
military capability (9c). 'Even when Russia is not directly involved,
issues are over-simplified and a genuine echism would be more apt to
cleave along other lines than those etated. Thia applies sometimes
to the -viewpoints of both Realists and Opeortunists. Eennples are
the favoring of an attack on Tito (51), the reasons for calling off
sea an attack (33)2 the cleavage on further Chinese expansion (19),
future action in Indo-China, hone- Kong and Formosa (3), and the
policy towards the satellites (54). The realities involved, such as
the intervention of the Seventh rleet in Formosa and the fact that
the soviets are not being forced into either contrasting policy in
the satellites, are missing.
8. Khruschev is something nore than a cOlorlese careerist, for
he is an expert industrial and political trouble-shooter and admin-
istrator. aussian officers have told me that vasilievskii does not
repreeent the Aimee, but is as much of a politico as Felganin (60).
9. kroon: the minor incensietencies and misstatem s that
the satellites were exploited at the expense of devastated Soviet
territory (2b), expectaton of hele from international Zionism (3.4),
and US need to withdraw troops from roma for the rearmament drive
elsewhere (36).
10. Other explanations than those @yen sometimes seem to fit .
the facts and the situation better, sech as the reason for naols
viait to Moscow (20) and anti-Secitism (34). The Koniev plan for
overrunning Europe may- have existed (10), but it is a normal function
of the military to make plans within the limits or their capabilities.
;nether or not they are seriously considered for implementation is
another question. It is probable that Kuznetsov and the eld.grmy
chieft do not alwaye fully support Yolotov (61), but this does -not
necessarily mean a Politburo split.
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11. The document is lengthy, and very much of it is not
abject to these objections. Much of it can well be accurate. Even
the grouping of .personalities may be true, but if so it would be on
different issues' and different platforms. A doubtful point which
seems to be capable of authoritative independent intelligence check-
ing is that regarding Communist strength among the Indians of -
Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil and Chile -.(47). A genuine sehism might
arise on the subject of military security versus ideological security
in Germany (50), and there is undoubtedly more than one opinion on
how best to exploit Communist gains and succeeses (5). I believe
that it is very true that no firm deotsioes or blue prints have been
nade by the Politburo, and that tot hes a continuing .impact in -the
satellite, including China, and in the little Politburos of all the
Communist parties of the world (6) I do not believe, however, that
there is any fundamental struggle in the Politburo for acceptance of
a Plan with a capital but that instead the Russians will
continue to be opportunists and adjuat themselves with a high degree
of flexibility to whatever comes as they have -in the past, without
changing their basic Communist aims, intentione and orientation.
12. This document, in my opinion, is an able and probably
sincere effort of a central European to construct what gots on in
the Politbero? based on rumour, gossip, and inforlAion which is
probably classified. I do not think that any such individual has
access, classified or otherwise, to idiat really goes on in the
Politburo. Too much of the document is- not understanding, sincere
Communist, and too much of it ie in oonformity with Western patterns
of thought rather than Russian. It is recommended that the align-
ment of Individuals, but not their suoposed viewpoints or powers,
be kept in mind as a possibility.
13. Since prepartng the feree 1Nilve read the very able
analysis done by CIA's organization which takes into
account external rather than internaL evidence. The only comment
I have to make on that analysis is tat it mei ley too much stress
on the discrepancy between the announeed role of the Comintern and
the role implied in the document under discussion. It would not
only be contrary -to Communist training and doctrine for the
Cominform to adhere to its publicized functional but most of tboee
particular inconsistencies disappear when one accepts the high
probability that the influential meMbere of the Cominform can and
will continue to function in a broad area as Communists under a 25X1A2g
different hat. In any eventailliplistrongly reinforces the
conclusione which have dr
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