GERMAN PAMPHLET: EXPERIENCES OF THE SOVIET THEATER OF WAR (1941-1945)

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R008500080005-4
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• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 18, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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c-9996
USSR
GERMAN PAMPHLET: EXPERIENCESiPF THE
SOVIET THEATER OF WAR (1941 - f945)
(INFO 1941 - 1945)
IP I ENCL (PAMPHLET: 48P)
SECRET/CON/US ONLY
12/8/52-1.,4 (1)
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25X1A
. r
FORM NO.
51 . 61
MAY 1949
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
PLACE
ACQUIRED
25X1A
DATE 12- 110 0 .
Aigg1861
9996 25X1A
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
USSR
Genian Pamp,let: Experiences of the Soviet
TLeater cf War (1)41 -1)45)
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50
U. S. C.. 31 AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO.
HIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED
SOURCE
ko?
DATE DISTR,
NO. OF PAGES
NO, OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
16 July 1952
1
SUPPLEMENT TO 25X1X
REPORT NO.
INtelfralWALUATED INFORMATION
The attached pamphlet, which describes the experiences of the German
Army in the USSR
is being sent to you for retention as (A' possible interest in the
analysis of Soviet armored tactics.
25X1A
It
IHIS DOCUMEHT HAS AH ENCL5aRE AITICHED
0 HU -1)EACil
25X1X
25X1X
a.
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Ex0riano es cc _the 85:mist Theater 2f War
1941 k9415
The German preventive war against the SU was Elmo Os last
empt to decisively weaken the biologically and poli ioally
reasing avalanche of the last, in order to eliminate any threat
n the future. restern urope, degenerated by culture and civili-
sation, weakened by the wars of the past and by the decreasing
birthrate did not solve this task and had to give up its togemony.
The soirees of the Soviet success were the inexhaustible resources,
the primitive standard of living and the unbelievable tenactty of
the Communist ideology.
MO nation of the world has ever lived in such endless a
cry and oppression as the present people of the SU. Thanks
e proverbial procreative instinct of the mothers and the
ievable vitality of the steppe peoples who are used to
%iv, conditions, the people survived extermination, slavery
opotism. The once rich and melanaholio soul of the people
sappeared. It seems 48 if the incessant melting processes
the USSR extinguished all softness and only hard metals
ed. The facie of the Soviet citizen shows an unpenetrable
Tmetead of individual characteristics only expressionless
Ormity is found. The merciless cruelty roots in the animal
like instinct of the struggle for existence and inoreases as
prOgresses Sistward. The politioal system is complete. The
Of surveillance dominates all phases of livelihood in the
kers' paradise". The Communist ideology must be accepted
by all the people. Communist principles are propounded with an
intoneity unbelievable to us. In this connection the schoolbooks
and literature of the youth and the troop manual "The Political
ldueation of the Soviet Army" are especially interesting. The
Soviet believes in a fraternization of the world,. on a Communist
basis and is convinced that Fascism and Capitalism are the only
obstacles.
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'The goal is the destruction of all hostile neighbors. and
systems. (Hostile is everything that is not under Soviet in-
fluence,) The armament industry is everything, even if the liv-
ing standard decreases continuously, even if no consumer goods
at all are produced. Nihilism, Stoicism and the complete igno-
rance of conditions in the outer world make "comrade soldier of
the Red Army" a tool of USSR foreign policy.
The polio*, the ideas of conquest and militarism condemned
by the Allies in Germany were poor imitations of what exists in
the Soviet Union. The SU did not only carry out the principle
of "total war" but also proved to be a successful teacher n the
methods of total war.
He who goes to the Zest, not only has to abolish Europe n
ideas of courtesy, but, above all, has to forget chivalrous
human rules of conduct as outlined by the Geneva Conventions.
The total war of Soviet conception knows only the surviver
and the defeated.
The enormous width and depth of the territory, compara-
tively little exposed, was the best ally of the Red Army in
the first phase of the war. For example, all villages and crops
were burnt in the course of the retreat, according to the method
suocessfully used against Napoleon. One understands this type
of action, considering what houses and villages mean for an in-
vader surprised by winter. The attempt to make the Germans res-
ponsible for all these devastations, originates from an 'untrue
propaganda campaign.
The village, in winter, was synonymous with warmth, toe.,
life. Many a desperate attack was undertaken without true miii-
tary significance, for the one purpose of driving the enemy from
a village.
Thanks to clear-sighted methods the Soviets succeeded in
a surprisingly Short time and with good execution in transferring
the endangered armament industry.
While the Donets Basin and the important industrial area
XRIVOI ROG fell in our hand destroyed and uhusable, the plants
wars shipped to the Ural Mt a., including every nail and laborer.
IA a few days work was resumed, but of course with much improvi-
sation. By this movement the problem of the colonization of
this uninhabited area was solved.
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Due to the laok of a strong air force, on both aides the
d isionwas, from the very 'beginning, in the hands of the
tank forces. In the first year of the war, the numerically
strong, but technically weak Soviet tank force was no opponent
for the victorious German tank divisions.
The firSt effective defense-measure was the "Rollkast line"
(wooden-box mine), which were used in atronomio numbers-.
After this attempt the antitank gum appeared also in unbe-
Table =saes. These two weapons and last but not least "General
ter" brought the German Armies to a standstill.
New the Soviets could think about bringing the principle
office to bear. Prerequisite for this was the third step, the
*Mitten Of a superior tank as an offensive weapon.' The standard
medal !VA the 14 34" tank. nen this mass program was successfully
eonoluded, the last measure was the development of an effeotive self-
propelled-gnu to support the infantry. From planning to brutal
realization, from immense production rate to detailed norming and
typification, this entire performanoe must be respected.
Rand in hand with this industrial mobilization went the
utilization of the inexhaustible human reservoir: age and sex
were not given consideration in this respect. The percentage of
women and children performing the Work of men surpasses ruropean
comprehension.
It IA a proven fact that womenwere also fighting. I re-
member two oases where-women were amens the attacking, mounted
on tanks. One woman (with make up and polished nails) with the
*ant Of a first lieutenant was lead before me for interview. She
declared that dile vas guilty of mistreating subordinates. As
punishment she WWI given a probation period at the frOnt. She
adAp take part in three tank attaoks. When hearing my decision
her"frould work in a hospital, the young lady became rebellious
and shouted: "I am a-soldier, as well as you are. / won't go
in a hospital. Old women can enpty chamber-pots."
Give the Russian citizen a weapon - it make no difference
if Man Or woman - and he is a soldier. The natural, instinctive
impulse of the hunter ntill exists. The conception of an un-
tivated civilian, familiar to us, therefore, hardly appeared.
Order women of a village to construct a tank ditch or a machine-
un emplacement and the work will not only be done in surprising-
ly short time and with thoroughness, but the tactical lay-out
will be correct.
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Terrain judgment and terrain utilization, things which had to
be learned by our towns-people on the troop training grounds, is
an instinct with these people. It is, therefore, not surprising
that the Russian leadership could fill up the gaps in front units to
a great part from the population who were not subject to military
service.
All inhabitants of liberated areas and towns were immediate-
ly utilized as soldiers and with or without arms joined the attacks
some hours later.
Three days after the delivery of KHARKOV, the pursuer
gummed more than 100,000 soldiers out of this town. For our
Oneeption and needs these people were physically Useless. An
insoluble problem of retreating German troops was the evacuation
of the population in the abandoned areas. The pursuing enemy
seemed to ridlonle all lossea; absorbing new recruits in every
town and village retaken, all resistance to this program being
destroyed.
At the end at the German soldier sat in his emplacement like
the rabbit before the snake. Re only knew, but did not oeuvre-
hand that this approaching beast lived spiritually on a completely
different basis and also fought differently. After the obvious
failure of all predictions and suppositions he despaired of his
ability of judgment, there being no standard which he understood
which could be applied to the resistance and fortitude of the enemy.
This factor paused panic and decisively undermined the morale of
the German Army. Interesting in thisconnection is that the para-
lysing pressure on the mind caused by Russian methods, vanished like
a bad dream from our 'Miners' mind when they returned to their
native cultural sphere. They perceived the western Front as re-
ereation in spite of higher losses and once removed from the Russian
front they felt superior to the Russian soldier.
The harressing of our rear areas by partisans was extraordinary
and inoreased with the victories at the front. German supply ship-
ments were directed to ambushes by Russians disguised as Ws and
destroyed. The supply and support units were separated from the
front by an ever-increasing distance due to acts of sabotage
behind the front.
Hunger rather than national feeling is the motivating
reason for partisan activities. For this roam= the Red Army had
also to fight partisans in their rear areas. If one succeeds in,
convincing the population that collaboration with the occupation
power is more favorable than seoret (mostly forced) support of the
rebels, there would be no more reason for continuous partisan ac-
tivities. .(Compare the Getman Wer-wolf-llovement).
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The Russian losses were - by our conceptions . immense. But
the oonaluelon Would be wrong, that this was due to senseless
mass seoPifi004. On the contrary, a brutal but ioecold calcu-
lation of the potential can be discerned.
Au individual is valued according to his usefulness to
state, Therefore, the task was to commit only as much first
e material as required to, execute the mission'. First rate
troops were always spared and old mon and women were used instead,
these people being of no further use to the state.; If a German
bridgehead was to be eliminated, the first attack was made by Gds
divisions. rthen the objective of the attacitvas reached-and the
new line ready to be defended, these troops were witherawn imme-
diately and'replaced by poorly arwed cripples and old men.
Because there vas no retreat in the stab,in-the-neok system
the replacements had to fight for their lines ant. in the long
rUn, accomplished their mission. But the German intelligence
SerViee triumphantly reported to the Headquarters: mrhe Soviets
are Mashed and have exhausted their potential, We are only
fighting old mon and cripples without oombat value." In the mean--
time, the enemy trained his young men carefully on a long-term
basis.
At the end. of the war I fought against airborne-divisions
(30.40 jumps at an average), which had been in no combatlor 3
years,
traffic difficulties, imposed on every soldier going
a special problem arose. This was the birth-rate de-
ted after the war. Many sources (prisoners also)
independently of each other, that the government ordered
insemmination" for the lussian women-,. This action could
ed as typical for this incalculable and incomprehen-
y.
There is no doubt that the countries enslaved and influenced
by the SU have to perform "human reparations". Intelligentsia and
*killed workers are scarce in the SU and, therefore, rank first
Within list.
Apart from the compensation of the losses during the war
means a program of human reparation and improves the blood
e country. The effect should not be underestimated. Tbere-
tbe USSR, penetrated by the idea of world revolution, not
only disposes over one sixth of the inhabitable earth surface,
but also has the possibilities of doubling by such means.
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Today, Russia is a sealed book. May the curtain never
Ilft for a second act. If this happens, the Occident mild
then bury its present oultare and start Triting a new history,
nr4Wrif 14.11104,
A. Iytfanprr
The Soviet infantryman Is tou p.r.istant ay and
unalklievablYzcodast. Because braver and intell genee are
in propertion to each other, his stu bornneas end defianoe
it be explained by the fataliatib mentality of
Instead of culture one often finds one-eided trained
In spite of all primitivity one cannot ooneider
Thia extraordinary seal for learning and apelike
the Soviet soldier not only a master of infantry
entrenching, camouflaging, etc., but he himself
rsonifled improvization of a perfect infantry soldier.
These abilities plus the instinct mentioned above make him,
under geed leadership, a dangerous enemy.
MUM, there is enough material concerning organization
and VO in the folloringI will present only the essential
baste ideas.
In Rcaippv.pisfinoe Unit
MID our reoonnaiesanee unite generally did not
fight, but only observed, the loviet reconnaissance unite
usual; both observed end fought. The personnel strenrth
SS Oast one battalion. On a broad front ineeesent (moat-
1,7 niebt) "reeennalseance attacks" "ere made to detect the
weakest point of the enemy lines. If a soft spot is found,
the unit settles entrenches. and calla reinforcements. If,
in this way, several assanita with these reinforcements
. Mailed, and the defender cannot destroy them immediately
in a eounterattaek, an unbroken line of defoliiii-dfirMit be
kept. Over the dead of the secrifieed "reconneltanse
the Ruesian waves go over to an imnrovised attelk in the
Woken line. As protection against the reconmaileanee, a
roving unit was used to fill breaks in the line
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reefing reoonnaissance and artillery were, as
signs of an impending attaok. The transfer and
ation of troops and material and preparations for
aek were exoellently oamouflaged by the enemy. On the
other handl if there was euffloient time, land reoonnaissanoe
and Continuous air-reconnaissance supplied the heavy wea-
pons and infantry with a Gorreot picture of the German
strong pOints? down to maohine gun amplaoememts, I
found Sketches of targets and fire-plans of precision and
perfection that altar aeademy might be, proud of.
Some hours before the attaok, innumerable antitank
San8 were emplaced in measured and well built emplace.
meUtO. After heavy artillery fire, the attack xtarted
40Serally at dawn. The antitank guns sterted a murderous
eeeyerging fire on all our known infantry weapons and,
at the sato time, frustrated a possible German tank
eounterattack.
The infantry, brought to the point of assault under
protection of darkness, ruShed to the first assault points
under this fire protection. If the main fighting line
wild be penetrated, the infantry turned to the right and
left, advancing up the trenches in hand.to-hand fighting.
If the terrain was rlthout mines, tanks with mounted in-
fantry follotlea immediately; athermise several strips were
first cleared of mines. If the defender succeeded in
ating the infantry from the tanks, he oould pro
-
? I defeat the enemy. If no commissar with a pulled
I was behind him, the Soviet soldier showed ranar-
little resolution, ability or initiative. Instead
eking advantage of the suocesst'and breaking through
emaining resistanoes' he often rested his time in single
ns, and looting. we won time for counterattaoks and
ng suodesses were aohievedwith ridiculous small
so sbmetimes only 4 to 5 men or 1 to 2 tanks. I
away* saw oounterattacked Soviets weak and emotional and
always disorganized. If the attack comes to a standstill
they entreneh. Antitank guns are advanced, and the infantry
itisppeared with mole-like speed in the soil. If the attack
is suocessful, the infantry is trucked right behind the
first tanks and pursues the enemywith far-set-goals.
H So
ere the viets completely adopted German prinoiples,
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as they also adopted the prinoipal attack formation. The
amazing mobility of the antitank guns, also committed as
artillery, must always be noted as especially oharaoteristie
end dangerous. "o vehicle - tank, tractor, truck or per-
sonnel oar -advances without pulling one of these guns
or at least one heavy mortar. In rapid'oommitment these
weapons seoure the territory won and" help prevent retreat
LegAsite units, in our sense of the word, are unknown to
the Soviets. Ammunition and fuel, only, are supplied.
Baggage is unknown and food rations must be taken from the
0ountry. Although in the first years all infantry was
hose drawn, they showed an amazing mobility. The muoh ri-
diculed "panle-columns" not only knew how to get rid of the
mot4rized German persecutors, but were even superior to
them in winter and during the mud and rain period. The
*stet pack of the infantryman contains everything to mak
him iniependent from every supply for at least one week:
hard bread, some tobacco and cleanins stuff for his weapons.
This self-sufficiency is surpassed only by his horses.
At the end of the war automatic weapon equipment surpassed
ours considerably.
Night Attack
*The nit is the friend of the strong" says our
regulation. For the Soviets must be applied: "The night
is the time of the wild animals". His natural instincts
make him especially dangerous at niaht. As the purposes
of a night attaok is a sudden surprise, it is generally
carried out without artillery or air support - at least
in the first phase.
If the attack is directed against aline, one advances
in broad front, without forming a point of concentration.
This is formed later from the first successes, and, by
means of VT message, the reserves; whioh were in readiness
behind the front line, are called. It is well known that the
Soviet is an expert in sneaking. up. Directed by occasional,
ineonapicuous signal shots by machine guns, installed by
the Russian outposts, the shock troops advance to noiselessly
eapture the sentries. If this silent method fails, he
tries to spread panic with ear-splitting noise. At the
same time blanket fire on the enemy position is ordered,
to frustrate relief. Flame throwers, hand grenades, spades
tad daggers play the main part in this fight. Strong German
resistance is avoided and the typioal 'safety tactic" started.
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Like drops leaking through a net, snail groups move
the enemy. A central plan does not exist. Re-
Os of threats fram the flanks and ganger of being
Oft from the main force, they meahanically grebe their
through and march continuously. Commanding offieer's
obaetvatIon posts and heavy weaPons and artillery emplacements
were Sometimes completely surprised. If it is possible to -
get reinforcements by means of r/T message a real assault
is the result. This develops immediately into a principal
attack. Otherwise they remain calm, entrench or disappear
among the population. After a few hours the defender is
already completely confused. From all sides panic and
ontait2opty reports arrive. The telephone net is destroyed
end control is completely lost.
The snaky is now between the still intact main fighting
line and the commanding ?Moises poste. There is no leader-
ship and the groups in the trenches are entirely dependent
upon themselves. They draw in their flanks and form a
defense ring. By this, the gap broadens and the front
breaks down cepletely. In other words, under utilization
of the-darkness and the morale effects, individual. moles
Sneak in through the-broad front and secretly caused the
destruction of the dam. Only isles of resistance remained
of a ;solid front. The former front must be abandoned and
anew line formed in the rear. 7ote: The front between
the Caucasus and the Arctic Sea was very thinly occupied.
The "through-tine" sometimes was only fortified villages.
Generally, a division had to defend a section of 20 km. ?
The attacker not only could chose where he wcmld 'attack, but
also knew that he could succeed anywhere.
If a night attack was directed against a village. rv.
Log as strong point, infantry and tanks generally cooperated.
The tanks advanced peat the objective of the attack and
turned in from the rear. The infantry simultaneously
attacked under the fire protection of tanks and antitank
guns. Only he who knows the noise'of a tanks and 10
-awakened by it in pitch.dark night, can judge the immense
morale effect of this fighting metnod. The German troops
in STALITPRAInadditionally suffered a continuously in.
creasing irritability in the flanks and rnar aewell as a
pronounced siege psychosis. The burning village blind.
folded the defender and caused panic. He has to give up
the village, exit, and hurdles together making an easy
target for the energetically attacking enemy. If there is
a street fight, the Soviets always try to "smoke out all
resistance. 70use by house is set on fire by incendiaries
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estroyed from short distances by tanks. If the
point is won in this way, the infantrymen imme-
y start a perimeter defense where the Will in
ng captured weapons is especially remarkable,
as the stroug commitsent of, tanks and mines
the prineiple, also of absolute superiority snd.
ar-reaohing attack.
en
The Soviet soldier outdoes every soldier known to me
in defense. The reaeonstcn this are found in his men.
tality and the above mentioned oharacteristios. In ad-
dition there is the commissarand politruk-system, inte
tering with everything, which makes a retreat impossible.
The position, in which the infantryman turns over to
-
the defense, corresponds in its composition to the genera1.
ly used pattern. Front slopes and elevated positions are
espeoially favored. striking characteristics are: Good
selection of the terrain and adaptation, unbelievable earth
works well camouflagedi that is not to be surpassed, at
well as an unusual depth of the main fighting line. The
? trenches are construoted in '..shape or in shape of a horse-
shoe opened to the enemy to increase flanking possiblitiee.
amorous mines serve as close.range protection.- If
tank-proef section is not in front of the posit Ion, there
Are usually tank ditches (sometimes 3 consecutively). These
ditches have been constructed by the population long before.
Machine ma aresent in a great number to the front. tven-
greeter is the number of bazookas (about 30 pieces for 100'
^ trench). ' In addition, every infantryman Is equipped with
nand GrabAdest bazookas, (sia improved type) and incendiary
projectiles (cunIn as TMMolotov.Oooktails"). The sharp-
shatters are numerous and are especially feared. The
training as conducted in special sdhools, "here they 'ere
trained as specialists for shooting in the head or in
the belly. An automatic rifle with a small but very
good sighting telescope is effective fora range of BOO
? Riplosive ammunitionla used exclusively (better ob.
striation). Officers-, tank commanders, camera O. 1, etc.lr
Are especially endangered. Should a turgeen have the
neriete wear a red-crest armband he 71ou1d be shot at
firet. In this connection the Soviet thinks very ma-
terialistically. The training of a surgean 'ante very
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ng Be is not as easily to replace as another officer.
Bis death may cause the death of a great number of injured,
Waiting in vain for help. The damage done to the enemy is,
therefOre, very greatand that is the meaning of the total
desperate fight, not "humane sensations".
The depth of the main fighting field is interlaoed
like a chess-board by antitank gun emplacements. These
are protected by, infantry and represent the real back-
bone. The horse-she. formation is very oommon, because
an attacking tank enemy can be put under fire from three
sides. There are no dead angles in the sector of out-
posts. The selection of the emplacements is very favor-
able and in accordance with the fire-plan of the artillety.
Every student of a ruropean military academy could only
learn from these facts. Antitank guns are committed as:
1 a) Antitank strong points
b) Antitank fronts
o) Antitanl: cut-offs
Am V Oa)
Several antitank guns are emplaoed in a close place
in snoh a ray that they can, apart from their special
missions, protect each other. Principle: Defense ring
("Igeistellune"). Angle of rheelingL 360?.
An to (b)
.On broad front line numerous antitank guns are emp-
laced on the same level. Their missions are of an artil-
lery and blocking nature. !very gun has a sketch of target
with. exact data on the effective range.
As to (0)
Commitment and use see (b), only on 'a smaller scale.
Particularly blocking of crossings and straits.
.14IPtra
, The mortar is very popular and -much used in the ..ed
Arm$7 ? rtile the light mortars are committed in the
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trenches, the commitment of heavy mortars is done from
strong points in depth. In perfect positions the fire
from batteries and battalions is concentrated. Because
Of the speed and the accuracy of firing the effect is
extraordinary.
Communication -VitOM
.The communication system shows an unusual onmmit ent
of operators. Almost every trench and strong point ts
Conneeted to a wide-spread net. Wireless telephone sets
wore seldom found, 4mming was, therefore) frequent and
had a didadvantageoue effect on the leaderehip cif-the de-
fender, The attacking infantry is unheeding of threats
from the flanks and the rear, and almost abandoned their
feat of tanks, Stubborn and fatalistic he satin his
holes even in complete hopelens situation's, and had to be
skilled individually, On the other hand, when there are no
political officers left, whole units' surrender. If there
is 'a good example the others follow like a herd. Sub.
leaders .have no initiative a counterattack. The fire.
dieCipline of the Soviets is low. They hare a childish
fun when there is shooting, and do not knol;., ammunition
tactics. The antitank guns shoot individual infantrymen
in the bazookas are handled like ordinary rifles. But
it must be mentioned that the effect on the attacking in
famtry is imMense. Apart from the excellent aocuraeY,
the demoralizing noise of firing is decisive. If the
enemy breaks through the main fighting linsethe Soviets
try to become smaller and.to hide themselvee. At nightfall
they shut off the lite again, to cut off the attaeket from
supply. Systematic individual fighters hide in straw
piles, burnt damn tanks or even in excavated corpse of
horses and endanger the supply traffic with mod single
shots even after several days. Thirinrr the battle on the
mein fighting line, the artillery ruthlessly take their
own lines under fire. Attempts at flight are prevented
by emplioed machine guns and Commissars' pistols in the
rear. As long As the Soviets are entrenched, they endure -
artillery fire with stubbornness. In the onen field they
are much more mensitive than our troops. German "Stukas"
and smoke sorrens often caused a panio-like retreat. The
Soviet infantryman is also a master in the defense of towns
and villages. L77INORAD and SEVASTOPOL are striking
example?. Preparations for this in principle are made
early and far-sightedly, even when there is no danger.
The necessary emplaeements and tank ditches aro con-
structed with the help of the population. Compared to our
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well organized measures regarding the name, there is
little time needed. This is due to the fact that there
is no need to found democratic Organizations and Con.
truction staffs, but only an lecaeIonal gesture with a
etol. During'edthbat the centralized defense of a city
Ls iMpoesible, because the entire systeM conoerning trans-
nlesion Or Ordere. and reports breaks dawn. Therefore,
She 00mtInd in in the hands of energetic and independent
SOAPleaders, starting with the sector-comtander to the
onapander of a bloc of houses. The concerned population
LI Also under their command and are committed in the fight.
Starting in the center, concentric defense rings advance
throuth the fortifications to the periphery, ?very street
OrOsSing or street.fork is blooked by barriers. 'Paths
through this labyrinth are only known to initiates. Fur-
thermore, for the protection against tans the pavement
is town out and the electric overhead -4ires are laid on
thogrOund. lttared tank positions are behind every
barrier. or close-range protection the infantry occupies
the houses located around it. Sharp-shooters are posted
at the most impossible places and have numerous alternate
pesitions alr-ady prepared (thelsharn-shooter psychosis
. very easily affects the attacker). other infantryten
break through the walls of cellars in cooperation Tfith
the inhabitants of the houses in order to erect an under-
ground net. Furthermore, tanks and antitank guns are the
backbone of the defense. Antitank cpme are emplaoed es-
psoiaily in different stories and on roofs. The hardiness,
perseverance, and the ability to suffer, shown by the
Soviet soldier in house.to-house fihting, is horrible.
The totality with rrhich old men, !r/omen and children are
.committed, is unbelievable.
GOB4Q04p54
3etreat
#1111111.11~MWM!
? During the battles of the first year of the Tier
we were always surprised at the smooth Russian retreats.
The retreat as carried out on briad front and cross..
00untry. The roads, used by the advancing enemy, inst.e
not used, but completely mined. The mobility of the light
infantry was superior to our motorized unit's. No weapons,
steel helmets, or other equipment were throvm away. If
siible, even the dead were taken along, this to veil
0 rate of 'casualties.
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Before the retreat, towns and villages were destroyed
or prepared. This means that, apart from the execution and
preparation of numerous demolitions, quarters were 'trapped.
In this connection, the most frequently used strategies were
hand grenades fastened on the inner door-knob, minks in
stoves', hearths, in beds and under the door-sill. I also
found water polluted by carcasses. Skill in the handling
of mines by the Soviets is amazing. The infantrymen and
even the civilian population Show a striking Skill in the
laying and the removal of mine fields. Rear details are -
*emitted on the retreat according to out regulations. The
main task is to be carried out by engineers, tanks and
antitank guns. The cold-bloodedness of the antitank gunners
is espeoially noteworthy. As the last shehl is shot, a truck
comas and, without haste, the gun is moved away, even if
enemy tanks are at a distance of about 500 men. If the gun
cannot be saved, at least the aiming device is taken along
or dug in. Otherwise the gunner 170. 1 is shot. Principally,
mine fields are under fire proteotion. Dummy works are fre-
quently used, as well as uncharged mines not dug' in. If the
attaoker removed these and believes be has open way, he now
comes on dug-in charged mines. Sharp-shooters and demolition
details remain in the cities. If the mission is completed,
they disappear into the population and become trainers for
partisan fights. Espionage, sabotage and intelligence work
are highly developed; they are promoted by education and the
ebaraoter of the people.
ArtillerY
?
, The Soviet artillery played no decisive role. rven though
its nobility was always great, the German principles as for
instance fire concentration and creating of strong points were
clearly recognized only at the end of the war. Vass fire
(up to about 100 batteries) then were a rule. Drum fire,
lasting for several hturs, started a great battle. Mostly,
the effect was not very great. The mobility in adjusting
sights was not very good. 'faulty cooperation between infantry
and observers was due to the lack of suitable equipment. The
development and the commitment of rocket weapons (?9tali6-
orgelw) was furthered. Trucks equipped with slide rails were
committed in great numbers. In spite of the great mobility
the offset did not correspond to the noise of discharge.
The Soviet artillery in its quality was by no means comparable
with the American.
CONTROL SF., 40,FEICIAIS cl
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COSTROL "
S OFFICIALS 0
04,
Was
As the Soviet Air Force at present Isin its development
this chapter is done -with a few words. The strong-
was the produotion of GA planes of type I1-2. By
lug numerous mall, high-sensitive fra entation bombs
are very effective. The retreat was accompanied by
in scant low-flying attacks of units comprising up to 100
planes. The sensitivity of Russian pilots to German AA
artillery and infantry fire was striking.
ArmemiCo and
wooden-box mine and the antitank artillery prevented
defeat, and the armored command gained victory for the
Sovie
Because there it sufficient material about T/0 and eon-
tion of the Soviet tank brigades, I need not go into de-
4? These units were *quipped with tanks of the following
Ypeel Mr. X, X.W. II, T.44, and TS (Tosef Stalin). I
mention only the principle types. The Tr.54 is ?the standard
0, and its principles are also expressed in later types.
UAW-rolling gears and an elegant profile are the
haraeteristics. It is built according to the principle:
The less meohanization, the less sources of fault. This
makes a primitive and makeshift impression, especially on
our technically spoiled senses. But just because it is in-
complicated and corresponds to the spiritual level of its
occupants, it possesses an amazing undestructiblenese. The,
speed (about 90 km on the road and 60 km cross-country at a
maximum) is its best feature, besides favorable weight.
The 76.2-mm gun is completely adequate and the amount of
ammunition -carried is amazing. The main advantage of the
1?34 doubtlessly is the diesel motor. The low fuel con-
tion makes long marches possible (350 km with an adr,
nal fuel container). The great advantage is clear and was
isive factor-. The LW. II was an unproblematic block of
weighing 52 tons. But the x.r. I represented not only
enlarged .type of the-T-54 but always WOW a very dangeroue
and tough enemy. Strangely, this tank appeared very seldom at
the end Of thewar, and'was exthanged for the Josef-Stalin
tank, a-new development. This tank only reached a certain
fate. Built after the prinoiple of the n.sve, it showed
many deficiencies, and was not yet fully developed. Concluding
X state: The arbor and the armament of the Soviet tank was
only of secondary importance. Decisive was the speed and the
great cruising range.
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Attok
The tank is an operational attack weapon. 011.13,
t the end of the war did the Soviets acknowledge these
principles. The tank forte, organized in the state of
defense and newly developed, could, evpn later, not
free itself from the taotioal'and operItivs diaatven-
tages of this development. Instead of conscious con-
eentratiOn and forming of strong points, decentralize:-
tion and dispersion in favor of the hard fighting in-
fantry was preferred. Much later the infantry was
uipped with its own SP tank units. The consequence
this dispersion was unusual heavy losses, because
demands of the infantry did not always correspond'
tank-tactical points of view. On the ether hand' an
1 cooperation between infantry and tanks develops
he ?lours? of time. The infantry belonged to the
tanks like the louse to the Russian. The advantage
for both parts in obvious. The stereotype attack methods
are best compared with the above mentioned methods of ?
reconnaissance. The units, formed in broad front. in-
dependently advanoed in broad front. At the same time
they attacked at different places. The units ccmnrised
usually 8 to 15 tanks, which corresponds to about one
company, as well as mounted infantry,' antitanl guns, and
heavy mOrtars. Until the end of the war, this 'peak-
tootle was most frequent and successful. It is typical
for the soviets and represents the parallel for the se-
eurity-4totic of the infantry. Ee,-.e too, no decision.
is strived for but the enemy line is to be destroyed
La untie mined as well as the defense. The attack is in
the direction ofthe slightest resistance and enemy tanks
are avoided. If the enemy main fighting line is broken
through, an aim which was almost always reffaied due to
reasons already mentioned, one advances without consideration
of the flanks far into the rear areas of the enemy.. Ob-
jeoti,es of the attack are: Artillery emplacements,
oomManding officer's observation points, and impediments
as well as demolition of the supply routes. Because we,
alloat never, disposed of rosaries, the tanks could
operate almost unharmed, facilitated by their cruising
range. In the dark they moved into position in a
village. The population constructed emplacements and ?
was armed. The antitank guns now play a decisive role.
At night the German leadership had to face the following
Situation: "Five tank-tad:kg broke through In the ser
of the corps. They are about 30-50 km in the rear area
and control our only supply routes. The entire rear area
is in oonfusion and the traffic in bolfla direotions is
blocked (transport of inlured). No replacements are
ma
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available for countermeasures. The Soviets develop
vivid attacks on the entire front and try to advance.
Ergo: Improvised attack of the rear services. Shock
troops are to be formed by bakery and butcher companies
and these have to attack immediately. Reports on
success are to be at X hours at the corps headquarters.".
Did the destruction of the units, advanced in above
desoribed way, not succeed, the local withdrawal of the
front was, in most oases, the only solution. This ax-
le ohms again the cooperation between tanks and
entry. If a tank is stopped in attack and forced
defend itself, it loses, in most oases, its main
weapon, mobility, and is degraded to a looal antitank
**Pon. Are there, however, antitank guns available,
these can take over the local protection, and the tanks
are free again. Concentrated by their leaders they are
in a position to force the decision in a crisis
4tta pip '711ages
The Soviets depend on two prerequisites in this
mthod of fighting: "Panzersolareek" with the enemy and
faulty equipment with defense weapons. The assaults
most of the time resemble a violent cavalry attack. Tinder
the fire protection of the emplaced antitank guns the
tanks raced into the village from at least two tides.
The machine were used to full capacity and all- weapons
Imre fired, The probable percentage of hits was only
at secondary importance compared to the morale offset.
If this incarnation of Chingis-Khan's cavalry packs
raced with elementary force 1:Ions's direction, even
a brave man became .afraid. A weak defender was always
lost. If, however, the attacker had to face an ex-
perienced opponent, such an attack meant an attempt on
azinnsuitable object. The phantom disappeared after a
few minutes, leaving behind numerous burning tanks .and
trying the same thing at another place. Even if these
attacks were made without plan, the instinotive utiliza-
tion of the terrain was remarkable. In principle, terrain
is utilized which is unfavorable for a tank attaek, and,
therefore, surpsies the defender, because his defense is
oonoentrated on the point, favorable for a tank attack.
The eharacteristics of the T-34 are especially advanta-
us. Terrain, especially unfavorable for other tanks
even light ones), i.e., bridges, swamps and deep snow,
sr no obstacles for it.
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NiAht At aok
In this method of fighting, favored by the Soviets
tor their operations, the tank, of course, played a
griat role. The main force is the tankiipaok. Like a
miniaturecbunit it always oonsists of tanks, infantry
(with mines), antitank weapons and mortars. Tt is an
inseparably connected organio whole. Oblectives of the
attack are:
?
(a) Tillages (especially in the rar area).
(b) Weak points of the front. An enemy ready
for defenee'is not attacked and is avoided.
Aa to (a
The selected victim is surrounded and put under
firs from a slowly narrowing circle, until the houses
oath fire. rhile the tremendous oonsumption of ammuni-
tion has the word, the undefined noise of motors and the
explosions make the defender nervous. ire overrates the
nuMber of the attacker and underrates his fear. Tf the
village is burning, the tanks come as far as the light
boundary and ,give fire protection to the infantry, ad-
yawing in intervals. If the infantry sudoeeds in ad.
vanoing into the village, some of the tanks Immediately
fellow, 'Existing resistanoe is extinguished from short
distances and the area, in cooperation with the infantry,
is cleared and seoured. The main weapon in this kind of
attack is the morale weapon. Continuous change of po-
sition much ping back and forth as well as incessant
shouting and shooting help. The defender, who calmly
gwaited in his position, saying to himself: "The poor
dogs have to attack, what fear they must have. I shoUld
not like to be in their place" this defender always won.
A, 9 (b);
This method in no way differs from the daylight
attack already mentioned. If the terrain is reported
to be free of mines, the advance is done at night. For
Omand and orientation reasons the tanks remain Closely
rogether. Only oommanding officer's observation posts and
artillery emplacements are attacked. If this is done
with or without success, the Soviets try to cause panic
and confusion in the rear areas. Other tanks post them-
selves with enginee off vlose to the supply routes and
destroy supply shipments. At daybreak they reach their
own lines in the same way or take defensive positions in
ApprevelligalliMPA AMP1006 te6bVen :lays in
the great cruising range an t e amoun o ammunition
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_ . ? .
t r ?
;Ara Attack
In the same proportion as the Soviets took over
the initiative, the tank as operative attack weapon
Oined ..ortanoe. As already mentioned, the methods
earrespon completely to German principles. The con-
eentration and ;reparation of positions took place
especially at night and were well camouflaged. The use
of dummies was frequent and played a great, often mis-
leading role. In the night before the above mentioned
reeonmaissanoe, attacks were carried out. The main
purpose was the clearing of mines. As soon as it became
light, the tanks assembled under fit's-protection on a
broad front. The speed corresponded to a rolling barrage.
Mostly several waves attacked, The mission of the speedi-
ly advancing first wave was the destruction of still
existing antitank and maehine-gun emplacements, and to
advanee as far as the artillery positions. The second
ware followed the first one in range of sight, witlithe
infantry. The mission was -in close cooperation with
the infantry - to bring the infantry through the enemy
Main flitting line and deep into it. The third wave,
with Mounted infantry, slosely follovled, to start -
in the right moment - in high speed, the break through and
the follow-up, while parts of the second wave had to
broaden the break-through on both aides. If the break-
'through succeeded, the third wave changed in lateral
=tension to pack-tactios in close cooperation with
Strong OA units.' tf the Soviets did not have to count
on mines, which was often the case in our extended fronts,
the tanks also attacked before the infantry. The elimina-
tion of the antitank defense through systematic artillery
fire was a prinoipel objective.
Defense
In the defense the tank forces were, as a rule,
pack-like distributed on the whole front. After close
terrain reconnaissance and cotmitment possibilities,
they stood in direct contact with, and at the disposal
of the infantry. lea counterattacks were very few. In
ease of alarm, the infantry was supported from previous-
ly reconnoitered fire positions. The tanks served as
defense frame*work (morale) and at the some time had to
regent a retreat of their own forces. lbt fully movable
were, well camouflaged and dug in up to the turret,
0 main fighting line. Because they held fire until
they sometimes were unpleasant surprises. Their
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t was very great and connected with high losses.
is defense of villages and towns the tanks played a
iv, role. Often dug in tanks and prepared po.
one are used. Nevertheless, the constant mobility and
eontinuous changing of positions is the main principle.
Only is ease of oomplete imoobility the tanks may
be dug in. Agaimakthe good cooperation velth the infantry
must be mentioned. This is especially noticeable in
house-to-house fighting. The tanks are posted behind
barriers just overlooking them with their guns and are,
therefore, a small target. At least three tanks at the
time protect each other, and the entrenched infantry
ell as sharp-shooters represent a completely safe
protection against close-range fighters. The supply of
strong point and out-off forces wee out at night with
tank convoys. Espeeially striking to the defender is the
useful camouflage and the triekness of the positions,
(In houses, between streetcars, under bridges, etc.).
treat
During delayed conduet of the battle and on re.
Seat, the tank-packs are the main points of the aetion.
inciples correspond completely to ours. Toughness,
ougne35 and sometimes self-secrifice (often ordered)
e characteristic. Sine? faulty tanks are demolished
Oks1047 retreats, the Soviets commit them usually to
rear missions.
Lfaite ahln and Training
The losses of the Soviet tank force were'immense and
the statements of the German army report were, aeeording
to my observations', eorrectt'not considerinr, however,
that total losses were not always correct because a great
percentage could be repaired. The reasons for this are
O be found in faulty leadership and wild driving. As
the armament industry produced mote tanks than were des-
troyed, replacement Of personnel was net always as good.
The tank* were sent directly to the front from the plant
and often the crew consisted of laborers. The Success,
however, was in no proportion to the loss of these skilled
warkers, As experienced officers and MOs were soon
killed., the leadership was ln the hands of young officers
an s. Imring the greatest part of the war only the
eommand tank was equipped with radio installations. This
alone caused the peek-tactic. Tanks had to beclose to
and follow the leader. If the tank rts destroyed,
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*emend is the baste and preirquisite for every tank-
tactic. Its lock waa the eat handicap of the Soviets
and caused great losses.
. The training of the crews often was insufficient? -a
whieh found'itivenression particularly in bad
eating. There;ore, the Soviets avoided, if possible,
ank battles with up. Peeause Of the lack of individual
fighters he almost exclusively depended on mass and
morale effects. The technically primitive and easy to
handle tank fatored short- driver training. "Usually,
they were sent to the factories,.7.11.ere they worked on
last assembly on their own tank, A. methods which has
to be designated as an ideal one and which should be
applied to the whole crew,
In generals the leadership was inferior to the
German, as well as that of the other branches of ser-
vice. Individualism and personality was replaced by herd
matinee and natural instinet. According to my Opinion,
initiative and responsibility were oppressed:by thefl
eemmissar-system. qotmissars and Pilotruka were not
only the soul and motor of the fights but they resisted
up to the end of the fieht. If they were killed, the
reeistanee immediately stopped.
G
.The Soviets tried to free the tank force from their
mmitment with the infantry, in ordr.r to assign it
operative mission after the regained freedom and develop-
ment of the tank tome. After the Clem= pattern S/P
guns were developed and on battalion and brigade level
assigned to the infantry. As the development of shock-
artillery VEL3 simultaneous and was very similar to the
S/P artiller7, clear characteristics soon vanished. The
developed types had the chassis of a T-34 or a T..". T
and the guns had a caliber of between 78.2 and 172 mm.
During the fights of 1945 many -T guns appeared
with the attaking infantry. But as n most cases,
they were committed like tanks and were destroyed.
The last development, which came to the front only short-
ly before the end of the war and surpassed all other 1/P
guns by faro was the S/P gun S17u.100. Strikingay low
structure, great cruising range, amazing ammunition supply
and favorable drive charaoteristios and a very dangerous
'
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100-mm gun. Accuraey of fire, effective range and force
of perc4ss5.on make it the best 1/P gun ever .known to me.
The German tank of type VI (?Tiger") was defeated from a
distance of 1,000 m with good success. 'As seen,from
Oaptured documents and production lists, the motorization
of the tied Army progresses considerebly-
TTnder'p culler Conditions
Winter ar
As the Soviets understand ho-'" to adapt themselves
with remarkable hardness., modesty and power -of resistance
to the climatic conditions of their cetntry, winter is
their ally, rhile our locomotives froze, nnd the supply
eolumns coUldn't 'move in the deep snev, the Soviets dis-
played an amazing mobility. The light vehicles were
placed on sledge runnAers and the infantry received
skis and snow-shoes. Aircraft and holitrtAtalYOttraS
well were mounted on sledge runners. lime the front
line in winter corresponded to the locatedn of villages,
and one 115 forced to hold on these for self...preservation,
villagee were, of course, the principal attack peints-
of the Soviets.: The prerequisite for all offensives was
the Superhuman work of the population villa, brutally
forced, had to keep the supply routes Cleared and had to
carry ammunition and. fuel to the front.
The soviets were used to these conditions and felt
superior to us. reverthelese the fast acclimatization
of the German troops as surprising and often the student
surpassed his teacher. That the Soviets excelled us was
because we ate. not demand, so much -of the population or
Of our troops, which was not in accordance with our cultural
conceptions. Two examples may show thib: During the
extremely hard tinter of 1941/42 there wese'many casualties
due to freezing on both sides. ecause it could not be
determined hether this happened voluntarily or involua-
tarily, this was a time of voluntary mutiliations. Then
the number of these eases incrensed with the troops oppo-
ite to me, the Soviets proscribed a sentence of death
or freezing of limbs. Consequently, not one of these
effected dared to go to the doctor but carried out his
duties. I saw t.101tiet soldiers with 'completely frozen
hods! They bandaged them with rags, and between the
fingers of the right hand there was a nail to make them
able to gull the trigger. - During the smme winter the
Seriets flew sabotage troops in our rear area. This
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oratt glided about 3 meters high over the snow, the 00-
eupants were simply pusbed out without parachutes. Two
thirdo broke their neoks or legs or froze to death but
the remaining third carried out the mission. And that
was the main point. Conoluding I state' Troops, vell
equipped, hard trained and educated for combat in bad
virather# need not fear the Soviets even in iinter.
(b) Mud andt Rain Period
The mud and rain priods in spring and fall are
feared with good reason and, as a rule, action decreases.
Beeause roards are generally vithout any firm subgrade,
they must be blocked for traffic, because even 6 stall
column can make them permanently unmaueble. The firm
- clay prevailing in the Ukraine is especially dangerous.
A rainshomer, lasting 5 minutes can suspend all traffic.
The soil becomes soap-like and the slightest slope is
insurmountable for vehicles. After heavy rains, main
roads are sometimes covered with meter-high mud, so that
even heavy trailers and tanks cannot move on these roads.
It is underatandable that the Supply traffic stopped cow-
pletely ? no supply, no offensive. The soviets not only
made possible the impessible, they even had their greatest
successes. In winter the troops were mobilized with
sleighs, and the population took care of the supply.
By an unbelievable improvization, ammunition and fuel
were shipped to the front mostly carried by men. I
remember one case: " "li:Ting conveyer", 30 km long,
stretched crols-conntry. rhile our leadership was help-
less and-our guns were silent, because of lack of am-
mmiition, enemy tanks broke through our line, pulling
infantry-sleighs and forced the defender to retreat,
It takes no imagination to see what has to he left
behind under these circumstances. The Germany Army
started these mud and rain periods without' art prepa-
ratory measures taken, beca,:se time was always short, one
was too optimistic and the ocod.vetther had to be taken
advantage of. The development Stowed that the speed of
attack and the construction of a road system in nuesia
has to go hand in hand.
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This study is made neither under the impression
of tbs liussensOhreekw nor the defeat. It is an
attempt o a factuAll resonable representatiOn front the
trout point of view. !von the soviets are not uaper-
human. / referred to the guards units by pointing
out their oharaoteristios. The mass were inferior and
vier. efootive only by reason of being there and having
nuMorioal superiority.
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German Tank Ta tics in? the Ea.
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As presume that the reader will be f miller with the
pertinent Lien= regulntions as well as the organization of the
German tank divisions, I shnll, therefore, deal with those issues
which were chPracteristic of the Russian ThePter of wnr.
The events in the followinc described took place in the wide
level tract of the Ukraine and Southern Russia as f r as the Don
River. This study refers to the culminating point of the combat
action. It does not mention the first two years of war during which
time the Russians were absolutely inferior to the Germans regarding
armament and experience.
Sinopsiu
The German tanks proVed excellent and, during the whole war
no tanks of equal qualities aPPe-?red at any front. "Panther", TiFern
sind'Ebenigstiger" were highly manoeuvernble: and had superior armor
and armament. Not the design but the difficulties in the procurement -
of material and substitwtes wns reason for many technical deficienctia,
As the present development apparently made antitank guns superior
to tanks, two separate problems and linea of development arise
regarding the armored command:
(a) A:heavy tank with strong armor and a long-range gun Which
Is systematic011y to fight down theinemy antitank defense.
(b) 4 medium tank which is to be an offensive weapon with high
speed and large cruising radius and lesser armor and armament.
Panther" and "Tiger" tanks already had these qUnlitites. In
my ?Anion their weight is the absolute limit, for a further inerense
of wiight would no longer maintain the balance between advantages
and disadvantages. -
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Normally my regiment would consist of two battalions equipped
with tanks "4" and "Panther" tanks respectively. At the end of the
war I ?emended one mixed battalion (2 tank "4" companies and 2
"Panther" companies), and one "Koenigstieer" battalion. Regarding
the variety of combat missions and the different manoeuverability,of
he tank tYpee this composition was an extremely bad one. On the
, ,
beide of my experience' in talc warfare I expressly recommended the
renewing compositions of a tank regiment being an organic unit of
teak divisions;
Two medium "Panther" (tank"47) battalions.
One armored in entry battalion (mounted on armored personnel
carriers).
The "Tiger" battalion being a unit to be committed in the point
of main effort, should be assigned to the Corps. In all cembat
missions the tank regiment cannot de without infantry. Once tank
and infantry troops are components of one battalion, cooperation
and, first of all, the feeling of solidarity are essentially better.
On the other hand, it was experienced that an Infantry regiment
which again. aad an had to detach one and the zamm infantry battalion
to the tank regiment is losing interest in the battalion concerned.
The battalion suffers under these ciroumetences and its 00 falls
between two stools. A tank regiment which includes an infantry
battalion as an organic component is most suitable for all combet
missions.
My regiment destroyed about 1,500 enemy tanks and lost about
500 of its vehicles. Out of these 500 vehicles, 1,5 % were destroyed
by enemy tanks, 35 % by enemy tantitank Guns and antitank mines and
50 % were blown up by ourselves for various reeens. My regiment,
according to a rough estimate destroyed about 4 times as many enemy
antitank guns as enemy tanks. The number of easualtiee among our
tank crews was surprisingly low.
Both the transmission of orders by radio and the fact that we
were always in the offensive were the decisive prerequisite for
successful actions, ever when being in the defensive against an
enemy greatly superior in number. Success was achieved only because
all officers - the regimentel commander dcwn to the youngest
lieutenant- stayed and fought in the tanks.
We lways felt sueprior to the Ressiens, a fact held up our
morale and bearing until the End.
The best weaon should be manned by the best men.
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The armored oomeand, therefore, should be an elite force
of volunteers only. Only most careful picked and tested een will
come up to greatest achievements.
Since we could never compete with the numerical superiority
of the Russians, it was our problem to train highly wunlified
speoinlists. The training was done by continuous courses conducted
in the rear of the fie:nt. Experiences made at the front were
eTaluated immediately. Only the most qualified officers and non-
commissioned officersswere appointed instructors. Overrureg all
arguments / used to send to the rear s idlers who particularly
distinguished themselves. such men, remtning at the frent, r uld be
seized by an efficiency complex and, venturing too much, weuld soon
be killed,
, Sand table exercises, radio-map exercises and radio-command
post exercises were the most valuable means of instruction
during the'aforementions courses. If there was eime to spare before
important actions, I even trained my officers by building sand
models of the combat areas concerned and exercising the plenned
attack in all details.
A highly wunlified t-nk crew has to exel in:
(a)
Marks-manship
(b) 4uick reception and correct execution of all eiders
transmitted by radio
(0) Driving wall and corsiderebly.
km at the front the tank crews constantly underwent such
training.
0q,var. (t):
Improvised target ranges, range estimation and continuous
firing practics with the turret machine guns which was coaxially
mounted with the tank gun. In other words: the gun was layed and
the machine gun was discharged - a useful and inexpensive method.
On par, ():
Tactical instruetien WPO exclusively done by radio voice
transmission. The radiotelephones were dismantled and placed at
the sand tables, in the terrain, or mounted on vehicles.
911.12a.i9jj?..
Tank drivers were, if possible, sent as test drivers to the
tank p ts _aped Ao_repair shop companies in oder to complete their
techni r`Thltr."'MV1.(014.t2eM.*giteliaDEWO04115R1)8891/00seese-technical
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knowledge alone which is of decisive importance. The tank driver
also has to see, estimate and utilize the terrain. A this
qualified tank driver will often save a tank from deetruetion.
In combat the infantryman runs or lays down. The same applies
to .a much greater eXtent to the tank which essentially more attracts
the enemy fire. Therefore, a tank has the alternntive either to
go full speed or to cover from view. The driver has to keep looking
for possibilities to cover from view. He even has to develope a
sense for each lump in the ground and each hollow. "Aimping" from
one Cover to the other the tank is not easily to be destroyed. A
good driver should be an expert in utilizing the terrain. This is
Wren more important tLan to drive the tank for 0,000 km without
distuxbanees, My most efficient tank comanders have been drivers
before. The most succossful one, who also distinguished himself
most in the wh,:la army, destroyed about 150 heavy enemy tanks; a
surprising performance, which emphasizes the value of experienced
specialists.
The tank crew is living under a common fate. They must not
only have cenfidence in their weapon but they also must love it.
I.used to 1Lad a little ceremony of a crew was to be assigned to
a new tank.
Xaeh member of the crew signed a document, pledging himself
rather to die before allowing the enemy to capture "his" undamaged
tank. This measure surprisingly raised the mornle and the feeling
fpr eolidarity.
The tank crews did not only regard themselves as fElldiers but
also as trustees of4,roperty of the German people. Even in Russia,
damaged tanks very often had to be left in the enemy rear during
attacks. The crew always stayed with their tanks and had to
defend it until the end.
. 'Under such circumstances, a single "Tiger" tank which had been
damaged by an antitank mine and was unable to move, destroyed 27
attacking "T34" tanks by firing 30 rounds of ammunition within a few
minutes, the last one frm 4 distance of 4 m. In the long run, socces
depends on soldiers with firm character more than on soldiers with
a high degree of training.
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A. Attack',
ONTRO'4.
When attacking an enemy who is ready for,defenet, cpreful
planning is necessary. There was no attack by my division which -
when carefully prepared - did not lead to success. In the East
we asually:noved into assembly gsition and attacked at dawn.
In the attaok, the tank regiment formed the center of gravity and
therefore, eould chooae-the terrain.
Uaaally, one armored infantry battalion and one self-propelled
artillery battalion were placed under my command. With the break-
through accomplished, the two lottalions dipenvged from the main
body and formed the direct pres3ure element.
The attack was carried out according to the usual rules:
first tank wave was formed by heaviest tanks which were to
. destroy or neutralize the enemy antitank defense,
the second -wave followed about 500 in behind, 'protecting the
leading tanks against close-combA infantry. Simultaneously
advpalcing self-propelled antiaircraft guns effectively fought
latantry targets. The companies of the armored infantry battalion
advanoed with the second wave. All elements of the attack waves
closely cooperated in holding the enemy trench system under
permanent fire and this allowing the own infantry to follow up
and to clear trenches and foxholes.
In order to prevent separtion by any further resistance, the spec
of the tanks had.to Conform *ith the infantrY. The tank crew fought
with high-explosive 'shells and machine guns, the tnnk cam ander with
hand grenades and pubmach,,ne gun. The tank commander, in order to
direct his tank, had to look out of the turret hatch despite he
Was liable to be hit.
Owin to the nA.se of the tank engines voioe-cOmmunication with
the infantry was extremely difficult. Radio comiumication could net
be applied since the tank radio oper:-tors were fully ab3orbed in the
radio tra fic of their awn tank unit. The tanks could most rapidly
?. direct their fire against ground targets if the infantry indicted
the direction of the target by means of a signal pistol. In smoke
screens, the tnks needed a close-in protection of infantry mounted
on tanks,
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The Russians were very easily irritated by smoke screens.
The combination of tank and armored infantry units proved extremely
successful. Technique and morale were excellentif combats tef-Fme
remained together. Pursuit was done in accordance 7!2ith the usual
rules. It had to be continued by all meana, even at night.
TAAlc ageineT Tanki
. AS, on the German as, well as on the Russian side, tanks were the
decisive means of combat, the Germans used tinks in the points of
main effort,- whether tank duels or tank battles were concerned (e.g.,
in the summer offensive of ITTFLGOROD where both the Germans and the
Russians concentrated 1,500 tanks in a small area). The characteristic
difference in the manner of fighting was that we used brains and
the Russians accelerator pedals. 9isreg-rding any numerical
saperierity of the Russians, we always aimed at flank attacs, if
possible frm both sides, with only weak forces containing the
enemy in the front.
The battalion commander or, at least, the ccynpany commander
deterined the range, designated and slice ted the targets and
ordered the commencement of fire, usually a sale of surprise fire,
which always proved e greet,success. Several enemy tanks were
destroyed at the same time and the enemy withdrew panic-stricken.
The Subsequent pursuit caused hievy losses to the enemy.
In combat against moying targets, it was unwise if each tank
choose its van target. Experience proved that Sudden concentrated
fire of only few rounds of amraunition,was most suitable to achieve the
end in view. But fire centrol was necessary as exemplified in the
following: Order of 3 platoon le der: "11.00 hours - 900 ;- 3 enemy
tanks moving parallel to front - prepare surprise fire of three rounds
by each tank". Upon re7ort of the t-,nks, the platoon leader ordered
"fire" and each tank fired three rounds.
Advantages: (a) The target is destroyed at one with certanty.
(b) Ammunition is sved.
Cu) The enemyanorAe IS affected immensely.
Before firing for effect at an enemy at long distnce, the
commanding officer detern.ines the range by trial fire. The Russians,
being supericr in number, used to eharge like cavalry, firing el P.A1138.
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8iA08 such a charge greatly affects the morale of those belng
attacked, those in the defensive have to know that "who runs away
Is going to die", whether it is tanks or irCantry. The defenders
who did not lo :e their nerves and immediately me:yea into position
were superior to the headless onslaught. In such a case tank
drivers being efficient and skilful in the utilization of the terrain
'Isis Of greet ,imgrtance. A salient fetor in the defense against
sach chal:ges, even of an enemy greatly superior in number, was to
intercept with week forces the attack in .the front, and simultaneously
to close in OA the fanks. The Russian impetuosity usually resulted
in cloAo combat. They often even tried to ram. It also ha,pened
that tanks of both sides passed eadh other at closest distance,
reversed'thir turrets and fired over the rear. !'ometimes the
Rueelene 4804 smoke candles which, developing the typical black
.Diesel smoke, were tc simulate the bruning of t.nks. Then they
suabnly reopened fire.
Taerefcre, each cnemy tank had to be fought until ablaze, even
it It had already been put out of action. Owing to our superiority
regarding leadership and material 'we always had the initir:tiVe
In tank battles. The Russians were immensly afraid of the
"Tiger" tanks. Camcufalge painting was of special imliortanoe.- We
not only painted oura cording to the seasons but also to the
colors prevailing in the terrain concerned.
The Russian tanks arrived directly from the factories with no
amouflage painting at all. Being black and prominent tnrgets, the
Russian tarthewere easily sr,otted and eighted at.
II. Talk against Antitank :un.
I, already mentioned the decisive role the Russian antitank 7uns
played. The fight against antitank Euhs was a daily problem to us.
Although the layman may believe that it is more difficult to
destroy tanks than antitank ouns, a triak crew will now that the
right against an antitank cans is the hardest.
Characteristics of Russian antitank tactics:
(a) All guns were dug in up to the barrel.
(b) Excellent camouflac7e
(c) Comencement of fire at shortest distance on-?.y.
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d) Guns could be traversed by 3600.
(e) Alevted position preferred.
German countermensures:
(a) Careful examination of the terrain by field glasses.
(b) Advance only under the covering fire of part of the force.
(c) Expoitation of the greater range of cur guns.
(d) 0 ancentr,,ted fire of several tanks.
(e) Amployment of high-angle weapons (mLrtars and heavy
Infantry Guns). *
It ought to be the mission of artillery or air forces to fight
a eoncentr'ated antitank defense as well as individual antitank guns.
AA we seldom had such support tanks only were successful if their
crews were willing to sacrifice themselves. This method, however,
incurred very heavy losses so that the att_ck could not be continued.
My regiment destroyed the gretes number of antitank pAns. To -
fight antitnk Guns, we applied two tactics ':ihich I should like to
designate as follows:
1 The German or methodical tactics.
2. The Russian tactics in German version.
Cn.pa.
The tank unit, acLancing in line formation, from time to time
eto ped in order to observe. such stops were only made in favorable
terrain, mostly in reverse-slope positions. The foreground was
systematically scrutinized by all tank commanders. Any spotted
targets were destroyed by sudde_i concentration of fire by platoon
or compony. Reverse-slope positicro: were preferred as they increased
the effective range or our mins. The stereosc671c tolescDpes with
which we were equipped, were of special importance.
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leee;er. 2A: The talcs were formed to attacking groups and firing
igeoups. The eering eroup consisted of heavieet teles. These,
firieg all guns, raced tceards the targets and rolled over the
antitank guns positions. The firing of machine guns was of immense
importance in this action. All other teaks provided protective fire.
This teotica was very risky and called for very courageous tank crews.
It possibly could turn out badly especielly if the antitank guns ecre
rototed by a corden of antitank mines ea close-in protection.
This tactics, however, greetly affected the morale of the defenders.
A few figures eill explain the mass engagerent,of Russian antitank-
guns. Once we destroyed 52 heavy antitank euns, employed in an area
about 300 bz C,C) m, which were to pretect the highway north of
BUITeMIR, wurine an attack nerth of SHITO:IR WS destroyed 128 anti-
tank guns when brekine through the lines of ee Russian divisiens.
Taking the "Grate' bridgehead, - In spring 1945 - my regiment destrcyed
more than 400 heavy antitank guns one guns_ within four days. Only
9 out of the about 5.0 tanks of my regiment eerc not damaged.
I. Tqeks asuaiast AnfentrY.
The shortage in ammunitiCn prevented us from firing at eech
foxhole. As we did not very mach affect the Ressler' infantry which
was dug in and excellently camouflaged we restricted our fire to
the support of our own ineintry. The Russians in the fire-trenches
were kept down ,by eachlne etin fire, 46 that armored infantry could
advance; whoh in tern paved the way for the following ineentry.
A difficult and deegerous mipaion Oxeye as the fighting cf the
numerous antit Ink rifles. On the heavy Russien ground, it was risky
to roll over foxheles, trenches and aougouts. As the tanks were
liable tc sink in. A tank deprived of its manoeeverabillty easily
J'alls a prey to daring defenders. The Russian "Molotov ocktaile
end antitank hand grenades were hardly effective beecauee of oer
system of mutual surveillanoe. Neither at the Eastern nor at the
Western front, my regiment lost a tank on a count of close-combat
munitions. Once the enemy gaee up his position and :Ithdrew no one
escaped the pursuing tanks and especially the armored personnel
carriers.'
IV. Tqnke vainst
In the Zest - contrary to the West - there WAS no artillery fire
through which we were not able to Pass eitailLr. Uoncentreted German
artiA.ery fire always dispersed the Russian tanks or forced them to
withdrew. The enemy never WEIS able to do so. It WEIF our princiele tp
pass under artileary fire of the enemy with wide-open throttles. If
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Caught by artillery fire durinr an engagement, our tanks evded
their fire by maneuvering blic and forth. Prereeuisite: Exact
transmission of orders by radio/elastic change of formation.
a d
In ease our tanks broke through as far as to the firing ptitins
of the enemy artillery they fought against puns like against anti-
tank culla.
V. Antitank Mines and antitank ditches.
When attacking an enemy ready for defense, antitank mines and
antitank ditches had to ve expected at all times. Therefore,
infantry and enginen's had to -advance before or together with the
tanks. If we met with antitank mines and ditches while advancing
alone, we applied the following melhods:
(a) Small mine fields were marked and bypassed.
(b) If a large mines field or antitank ditches blocked the
advance, all tnnks were immediately informed by radio,
?
stepped and cautiously withdrew.
' It was fundementally wrong to stop in front of such mine obstacles
since they Were 7rotected usually by antitan runs, tanks or artillery.
In such instances the tnks withdrew and effort was made to re-
connoiter the terriAn for a bypasain way. The loss of time was
always Worthwhile. Only if there was no other possibility, lanes/
had to be cleared across the mine field. apecial tanks were ordered
to support the working armored engineers. If theaJvance was continued
light tanket led with all other tanks following their tracks. This
way only light tanks could strike a mine. Thus a lot of material
was Saved. In conclusion it may te stated that the Aussian mines had
little effect. They were, however, dangerous because they could not
by located by Mine detectors and because they were protected by
antitank puns.
Foxs4it.
The principles of pursuit coriesponded to the usual rules.
Direct pressure elements first 1:-?cluded tanks and secondly motorized
infantry. The armored group comprised all armored comonents of the
division, wit'; the exception of self-propelled ;'ins which had to
stay with and support the in entry. Furthermore a reconnaissance
bnttalion was attached to my regiment in the case cf large-scole
actins.
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The groeps were named according to the mission concerned: either
armored group, direct pressure group or comb:t group Compensation
of all breeches of service Was imnortent for successful opereti-Als.
No definite toreets eere ledicetea but resulted from the development
of the adtion. The commanders at higher headquarters Made their
deleions according to the situation reeorts by the ermored group.
Decisive results and destruction of the enenmy could be reached
only by continuous pursuit, disregrding time or weather. The
Russian commissars often Luanges to stop stampeding troops and to
reorganize theminto an imprcvised resistnnce, in sure-risingly little
time, owing to the fnct that Germnn troops always diseen-inued
pursuit at nightfall, the Russians, according to their own stntem-
ments, often escaped disaster. I my unit was assiehed to pursuit
missione it was always sucessful within the limit of gaseline and
ammunition. Usually our own ininetry.could not follow up so that
my unit wns repeatedly cut off. (e.g., comitment in the 'Eifel Mts.)
Therefore, the speed of the -pursuit group had to enform to that
of the infantry follo4ieg behind. If possible, I seearated some
tank-a, which were in redio contact with us and h,d the mission to
protect the supply vehicles, by applying the convoy aratem. If
we discontinued thc pursuit, e immediately took up defense,positions,
i.e. a1l-around defense. The tanks lied to be withdrawn for a
technical check. In spite of the arguments of the infantry it was
unwise' to leave them in the defense position dny end night. The
Russian method of cooperetion between tanks and antitank Funs was
essentially better.
Tanks conluer the terrain and antitank :-unb hold it, This
method riot only provided for the emplyMent of the right wea-on in
the right plce but also increased the physical fitness of the tank
erect and saved M terial.
. 41 ht attack.
Inght attacks of tanks were not even diseissed for a ion A time.
Derieg tee wInter?of l942-1.943 I conducted SCAMB successful attacks
at night and W88 at once marked an "expert". This reputntion
never let me get a rest. Tank attaoks at night are only to be
conducted in exceptinal ceesei and must not be made a rule. The
.followin?: issues are prerequisite for nieht att:-cks;
1. Suitable terrain.
2. At least three quarter moon in summer and three quarter
moon at the 'Moat In winter.
3. The enemy must not be reedy for defense,
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. The attacaing force must be an organic unit of tnnks and
armored infentry (battalion oe armored personnel carriers).
The morale effect caused by the noiae of the flat-trajectory
shells and peculiar roar of engines and chains at nilit, was decisive :
in all night attacks. In other words, the tank paralyaes the eaeMy
morally and the armored infantry meanwhile ruehes in for cls-comb t.
A salient factor for the preparations of a -ight attack -as that
all soldiers intensilely studied the maps. The flatness of the
country makes Orientation very difficujat, even when Using a garo-
compess. It Was necess-ry to cover up the exhaust opening in order ?
to prevent the dashing of burning aas, -edause thos little flames in
the tank's rer ere prominent aoints of aim to the enemy antitank euns
Usually we ha, the following missions:
1. Counterattacks in order to regain boat positicns.
2. Harrassing attacks into the enemy rear area
retro ted immediately.
Atteekin of so heavily ?collated localities
not be attacked in daytime.
after ahath
that they could
On par. la
I a looal attack ws directed eaeinst new nositians we ad-
vanced, extended inwidth, with the firat moon. Our infantry either
mounted the tanks er followed behind. If the enemy oaened the
fire we speedily advanced, firing all runs. Uaon arriving at the
trenches and pecketa of resistance, infantry cleared them out while
the tanks took up limited pursuit. In these enses the Rassiens
easily gave way, so that our casualties were surprsingly low.
Again, the most difficult aroblem Was to fight the enemy antitank
guns. As the Russian antitank gunners heard the noise of the
advancing tanks very soon they hnd time for preparation and,
knowing the terrain and ranges cc:ace-reed, they were superior to the
tanks. The tenk is not able to destroy the antitank aun by highe
explosive shells for the following reasons:
(a)
The tank gunner is blinded by the muzzle flash of the
antitank guns.
The tank commander Cannot aeterirdne the range.
It is to d-,ik to aim desoite the illuminated telescopic
sight.
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We sucOessfully aeplied he following methods;
1. 0oncentr7ted fire of machine guns by nenrby tanks 11A.e
distant tAlks stooped their ehgines and fired high-explosive shells.
Meanwhile armored infentry bepassed the enemy nntitenk gun positiens
and attacked from the flank.
2. The Russian antitank runners were blinded by pyrotechnics and
subjected to permanent machine gun fire by one tnnk, while the other
tanks, cemine from arother direction, overrun the antitank Funs.
3. Employment of improvised search lights compiled eith tan Funs.
Though being rether primitive, the searchlights elroved very suecess-
ful, all the more ns a seerchlieht is hard to hit. This method,
however, requires team-work of tanks. If we had the mission to teke
back a place just conque-ed by the enemy, we used the RueWen method.
We . had to deceive the enemy as we were not able to surprise.
(a) massed tnnks formed cleerly discanible tergets which
absorbed the enemy/s attention. Meanwhile own armored
infantrz (on armored personnel reirriers) attacked from
the ether side. ririnp all gime ter rushed through the loonlity
concerned leaving it at the other end. The houses were put ablaze
by flame throwers and soldering lamps. Tanks exploited the peril()
and, firing all guns and machine guns, penetrnted the place under the
support Of infnntry.
(b) Employment of loud speeker trucks which played records re-
producing the noise of tanks in order to ceceiere and harass the
shear.
(0) Qiverting of the enemy's.attention by a euiden concentrntion
Of artillery fire, ehich simultaneously drowned th nelee of f,fty
advanoing tanks. Was the miesion fulfilled, the tanks withdrew and
antitank, guns advanced.
On pat 2.:
aupply?bases, important roads and artillery emplacements were
attacked. Aleo in these cases the Russian method can be rether
effectively a plied. The Russinns excelently protected their rePr
area. Therefcte, ee had to bypass localities, reeaining out of rPnge
of the enemy antitank guns. We never moved along roads but elweys
went cross-country. We rlways fired some preventive shells if we
tpproached underpasses, bridges, etc,.
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We were very successful when, being unnoticed by the enemy, we
got into line with enemy columns. This way, the Russians never
eared about us end we could drop pretence at the right moment.
(Once we had to leFlve behind one "Tiger" tank dur to radiator
defect. During the night, the tank joined a Ruasian infantry column
for about 40 km, and Ruesian soldiers even carried MOTO than 400
galloes of water to refill the tank. The following morning the
tank rejoined our unit. (No ode of the crew spoke Reasiann)
Cooperation with the Air Force proved very succespfull to
improve orientation in the terrain. I ,dividuel aircreft marked
roads and targets by parachute-fierce. Thereby the enemy was blinded
and decelaed by the noise of the nircreft, a fact which Was of !x.e ,t
importance.
Q.n pee. Z.:
Such attacke I cenducted only at the end of the war, at normal
times I Would have refused to do so. Fellure or success depend on
the most triflinc incidents. In any cense, night attacks are conduct-
ed only in emergencies, if an attack in dnytime appears hopeless
because of both the enemy's superiority In number and the dis-
advantageous situation of th_ own troops.
While moeping u- the "Grail" bridgehead in the spring of 1945,
I attacked three villages in three subsequent nights. The villages
had been the last strongholds of the Ruasien; they were very 'Ail
protected and fanetically defended. (Incidentally, the Ruesian
comandere were by radio continuously threetened with capital
punishments in case t ey surrendered these places.)
Purthermore, the foreground of the villages WEIS densely, occupied
by infantry with mines and numerous dug in flame throwers. Enemy
artillery, being employed on top of a hill, commanded the area to
Such an extent that we could not move during daytia.e. As our infantry
was totally exheusted and neededltank sueport, et le-at, to bolster up
their mercle. I decided to participate in this ectien, against all.
reason and tank tctics. These were the aost important preparations:
(n) Painstackinaly correct information on the terrain.
(b) Allocation ofsmell hills as firing positions for the tank
_ oompanies.
) Surveying of all distenees and drawing of target sketches
for cencentrnted fire by tanks at night.
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kajt.
(4) Thorough understanding with the infantry.
Together with the infantry about 40 tanks of my unit launched
at the attack at half-moon. The tanks quiekLy separated from the
infantry and moved to the firing positiens allocated the day before.
The tank opened up with ooncentea ed fire, using only as much
ammnnition as ordered before. 14eanwhile the infantrymen arrived
at the tanks, and together we penetrated the enemy positi.na. After
short cloze-cambat fighting, the enemy staeTeded to the village.
When pursuing the enemy, 50% of my tanks hit ueon mines. dith the
remoining tanks I advanced amongst the retreating Russians, thus
running under the eeemy barregc fire which was opened instently.
We were separated freee our infantry Tehioh 7ae forced to dig in.
(The terrain was flooded by 20 cm of water.) With five tans I
succeeded in penetrating the village together "eith the retreating
Russian infantry. The eemy took to flight. Four heurs later we
were relieved by our own in!eantry. :4 unit suffered no casualties
regarding personnel; eniy one tank was destle.yed and 28 teaks were
damaged by mines but could be repaired within two days. ? Cur two
infantry regiments suffered about CO casualties. The attacks
during the followine nights were similar and under similar circum-
stances.
Experiences: At ale:et, direct tank fire is wore effective than
during daytime. Even the 'ussiens are losing their nerves.
2. The attack of Zenfas and infantry has to be launched from two
different directions, as the defensive fire concentrates ueon the
tanks and calloes too heavy lo:sea aaong the infantry. The tanks,
for their own protectien, have to be accompanied by infentry on
araored personnel oerriers.
3. The main effect of the tanks: (a) The mere faot of their
presence. (b) Peception of the enemy concerning their strength
by constant evading movement:. (c) The roar of the tan: eneines.
(d) Concentrated fire in salvos accord!ng to plan (up to 10 extra
boxes with shells -eere mounted on the reer).
has to
4. Infentry/penetretepf the enemy positiens ahead of the tanks
otherwise it mould imply suicide. To summarize it can be-st-ted:
? Night attAks of tanks are the last and highest test. 3uecess de-
pends on both cooperation between armored infantry and teaks and on
painstaking preperations. ,iuccess can be surerisingly great with.
surprisingly swan losses. Taeks attacking at nicht muet olo/sely
cooperate with aircraft.
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B. Defenses
?
Due to immensely extended fronts and tee numerical superiority
of the enemy, the Germen linea could only be held by applying
offensive defense. If we kept absorbing the enemy's attention, the
enemy could not put into effect his plans for attacks. also in the
defense, the tank Was ono of the most important weapons and always
had to be kept in the reer, ready for action. It aleelys was the
desire of th infantry to equally distribute the tanks in the rear
of the defensive sector. This should never be done. Who wants to
protect everything, fts not protect anything. In order to erotect a
position, the following methods were used:
1. Antitank gun nests were dug in th- main defensive area
according to the Russian pattern.
2.. Self-propelled elms were cencentreted at and placed at the
didposal of the command posts of idhntry regiments.
3. The tanks were assembled in a village or woods in the imme-
diate'rear of areas which were saiteble for enemy tank
attacks. enc group of thee tanks was elternetely alerted
to come to the aid of the infantry at once. The tank
crews stayed in their tanks, the engines were kept warm,
and the tank commanders maintained constant telephone
_oentact with the infantry comeand posts concerned. The
principle mission of such employment was: (a) To repel
enemy tank attacks. (b) To attack immediately any
enemy troops who penetrated the lines of the own infantry.
Prerequisite for euch missiens were a close contact with the
infantry and current information on both the terrain and enemy
movements. All officers and tank coemanders had to welk through
the defensive scoter befere and had to be able to find their way
while sleeping. (iuring very dnrk nights, the way wes marked with
paper.) Furthermore, tank emplacements/built within the main
defensive area. were
We used to dig up holes in reverse slopes from which only
turret and can of tan's, which moved in, projected. The tank
ewe enders also had to Ire familiar with the positiens of adjacent
troops. If there was en ugh time (even if there were only two drys)
a sand eodel of the terrain concernedww7 111170:17d, h the
tank commanders received thorough irnatrncti n.
At /
:
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If the enemy attacked, all tanks had to be ready for action
within five minutes. The commanding officer of the elerted tank
group drove to the cosaand rost of the infantry commander, observed
the development of the situation and was in current radio contact
with this unit, When Feassir, tanks advanced, the alerted group
took up the prepared psitions and frontally stopped the attack.
The commandinE positic,ns on reverse slopes were always the reason
for inial. suecess. After the initial &fleck, the ertey was centeined
in the front and annihilated from the flanks. reuelly the Resdian
furiously drove headlon into our lines, and thus into destruction.
During the summer offensive of BYTTLVOD (1943) the enerly, advancing
in a width of about 800m, ove 'run our infentry which had dufein on
* hill.
had an under-strength tank battalion waiting on a reverse slope.
Our tanks ellowed the enemy tanks to approach closely and destroyed
them from a distance of 200 down to 10 m. Toeether with infantry
we destroyed all 169 Russian tanks of them in close combat). If
the enmy took to flight, he was pursued up to a limited de7th, the
mine fields in front of our own lines permitting.
To take countermeeeures against Russian infantry Denetreting
durIng daytime was no problem at all. In sach cases, it was on'Y
espeht191 to "be in time', a matter of thoroueh oreenizatien. The
mea04r0$ talcan,during n1.:7ht.attacks were cerresponding: if the
Ressians knew that we disposed of tank;. 'they would only attack with
infantry. The morale eTfect of a tank counterattack was: surPrisingly
high, on th., rart of the offensive as well as of the defensive
forces. cnce the infantry acruaily gains cenfidence in "their" '
tanks and Is neVer'disappointed, the infantrv e17.1 always hold their
positions until suoportine tanks eerrive. Ground signals blinded us
and reduced twiur fighting power. The infantry, therefore, had to
be instructed regerd.ing tank tactics.
The conterattack was always a question of time. An immediate
00Utterattaok alW-ya had its affect on the Russiens. In the
defense of a village, our tactics were similar to the Russian
tactics. Half of the success depended on a torough etady of all
posaibilities arising in mbat, this excluding moments Of surpr:.se.
:j1sua1ly nothing could go wrong, if all tank crews 7ere, familiar
, .
with the terrain and had walked through the area before. We had the
following principles:
(100911,
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(a) The atand-by positions of tanks depended on the terrain and
the riven conditions regerding cover. The tanks Stayed together in
eompanies at lest.
(b) Commanding officers of tank an infantry units were located
In one ocumand eost.
(0) Plans were worked our for alerts during both day and nieht.
(d) Protecting tanks were placed at endingered soints (if there
was eneugh time tans e_rc dug in). The positions occupied in 'r
time varied fro e t ose occueied at night. All tanks 'ere connected
by telephone.
(e) In mergencles at nient, taeks fou-ht outside ef vtlieses.
If pos-ible, the enemy was taken in tie falnk by concentreted countEr-
attecks. Tanks in a burning village were imeensely handicapped.
(rire-flashes, sracke, scintillation, silhouettes) A t nk being
used as otetienary anti ank eun, lost helf of its value by bring not .
able to move. Towns were defended according to the Russian rattern.
Effort was alweys made to keep the tones together. Tanks should net
be Separvted and att ched to infantry units. Sometimes it was harder
to convince the superior infantry comnander than tT richt the enemy.
E. OombAt Team.
Dering the laetewo ye-rs of the war, increasing imeortance was
attributed to the ceeb t teem, censistine of at least one trek battalirn
which - suPeorted by other wee one - was eble to fight independently.
Like expelitic-ing elements, combat teams were sent ahead or
left behind. They were of particular importance deeing offensive
eefenge and withdrawals. The tank divisions, on account of thier
equipment and orgahization, were first to develop such combet teams.
Some capable officere con became outstanl'ng combet teem commanders.
This development, however, improvised at first to increase flshting
power, eventually disrupted the integrity of the "army mach'ne".
The cembat team commanders like the way of indenendent fiehting and
the absence of interferring superios. Such officers net only eere
wholly independent but eve-tuaily took the co duct of operetiens into
their own hard e so that divison commanders often had te cenform to
such ambitious "young men. The areSored element of the tank division
.tn this oese also called combat team - included 111 armored vehicles
with the exception of self-propelled guns. The -r ered eeleoes eere
reinforced by arti lery units (75 mm and 105 mm reins on self-pro-
pelled mounts,) rurtherscre, the hieh-angle wen -ons of the ar ored
infantry battaliens have to mentioned (heavy 150 mm &elf-propelled
infantry guns, called "Grille" and mortars mounted on mored personnel
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Tb e eitmy vas very much afraid of the"Grille". In spite of the
fact that, the, time during which I commnnded a comb-t team in
numeroua enzagements wes the most independent and satisfactory oie
of my whole oareer as a scidier, and desnite the fact thnt we were
_surprisingly suceeesfulover agenst rudiolou 11 ].o-"s, I do
decline the cezie,t team as a standerdnit and recommend its 0-
'p1oyement in cases of mergency only. The combat team was a
typical feature of 7rarfre in the.East? where it was not the
technique and nateriaL 1-7.t mattered but the initiative of the indi-
vidual. Yet, there in no doubt about the fact that it were the com-
bat teams of the tank divisions which prevented an early bre,:kdown in
Russia.
. it-Ortega',
A prolonged and regular withdrawal. is the mast difficult way of
fighting since It obliges the troops to the gretes extent 'of
rilrale, and discipline and necessarily results in the
destruetion of the tanke force. The contineoes German Withdrawnl
TO/reeled an unprecedented lack in responsibility ana aecision.
The Germn'n High oomoiand, k.hich arbitrarily remc.:ved and replaced
toMmanding officers, felt surrounded by an atmosphere of distre-t
and uncertainty and had to make decisions on the basis of febriceted
and false reports, The conduct of war, originally based on science
and tradition, 'eeceme an improvisation wh0h, in thr nd, wns just
a cover name for "incapability". The purose of a Withdri.val is to
gain time,
Aa Rdssian tam,:s were the prineil)le wee on of pursuit, (Air
rear guards hnd to formed by tanks, too. This mennt'a dissipation
and finally the desiintragiation of our tank lOrce.
kteoq Liard
tietualy? our recr guards were formed by small ar=red groups
supported by egginoers equipeed ,Ath mines. In order to enble
the infantry to tr?ke up new positions., the reer Fuards almost
exclusively had to sacrifice themselves in such missions. Leng7
range firing and retreat in pahses char:_cterized luch
Damaged or unser-7160We tanks were salved 1-)y wrecker platoons.
If the retreat took leeger than throe days, the slv4ge of such tanks
was'ne Unger possible. Tb, ereW,Jof darilacd ...r-ks had to fight until
the l.st moment and then'to'blow up thiAr tanks, havine removed
optics an ars. Tanks salvLged by wrecker plateona often ilia rIct
arrive et the repair :7.hops, because the wholehieterind 'APS in
motion too. ffort was made to maintain constnnt. radio contact
with the rer ir shop com.,anies.
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During the retreat in Hungaria, my unit often towed up to
60 demeged tanks whoh, however, had to be blown up sooner or later.
The Russian always followed in the dixectioa of tte weakest ree
eletence. jeldom the Russionas fcueht our rear guerdse they rather
bypaseed, so that we were quickly cut off. In ering 1_945, Ierove
fee' three days in the midst of a 4ussien supply column, right behind
their direet presaure detachment, alweys trying to reach my division.
lvasice tomeeents es::entielly.haee to cenecrra to the tereein. If,
dee to the leek of respeneibility and for reesons of .prestiee, the
retreat is limited to only few meters daily, it is im7oesible to
contain the enemy from out new positions, aed the retreet soon tarns
a stseeeede. Cqunterattack is necessery in order to disengage from the
enemy without being neticed. Gely local success enabled our infantry
to ig in again.
The eounterettaek.
The prinsiple:"If once is to weak for rl,efense, ene has to
attack" proved true end saved us in numerous a sea (e.g. the
"Liffel" offensive which was conducted to ge!en time.) In pursuit,
the Russians were always extremely eereful, even -hen being greatly
seacessful. If Russian direct preeeure detachments were stopped,
they immediately due in. Innumerable antitenk eel= came to the
front lines erecting an insurmountable well behind which the tanks
returned. The Russian protection against back-storkes and their
method of not to overstrein their areored units during pursuit, was
absolutely outstanding. Therefore, ee had to resort to counter-
attacks which took the enemy by surprise. If ear. counterett-ek hit the
molting enemy from an unexpected direction, it could be of decisive
importance. .e cleseic example was the battle of KHeree0V in jell le43.
After we had reconeuered the town by throwing in all available troops,
the Russians,* coming frem the Ease, launched a counterattack of a
whole tank arty. As a defense seemed to beabsolutely hopeless,
the Gereein ?Owe:rend decided to launch a counterattack. 14y armored greue
succeeded to overrun the Russien (Ay nee elements, to erive through
seven Russian di;isiens and to take the town of 13TILGLROD which
'located 80-km to the rear (without loosine one man).
The enemy was completely taken by surprise, lost his heed and his
counterattack eunred ieto an irregulat witadeawel. At the end of,
the wet, the'Ruesiens never attaeked without being supported by _tanks.
If we succeeded in destroying these 'banes, our own troops had enough
time to take up new positions. In spring l945, I manrged to destroy
- at such an assignment - with only 24 tans 148 ":oaepheStalin"
tanks within one dey. This did not only delay the leree-seale
offensive for VIFT174, but also evented my army from being sur-
rounded, Sumnar ins, the following cae be stated: Our counter-
attacks were lead by armored advance elements. The aim was to
anninillostkoteAFTeliAttse 411442/KwiP14;RDINPAPVt?BaWSOCMP413ured If
the toying enemy coeiellbF4tekettmegtife V
A, eTte eeerny'infentry -
Or. IT nprviAl c run
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at such mlasiAls Javer managed to take up regular defense poeitins.
G. itatekzlezi.
Since, .in winter, the airsians did not .go civer to position
warfc:xe but doubled thA.r efforts to keep moving, we -,ere forced to
revise our tectts. If one wanted to remain master of the sitatien,
one had to be!: all trAitic.lal rules and Lad to fight the Rus&lans
by applying metl,ods of thOir own. The Russian inter o-fensives
constituted part of their psycholo:ioal warfare. In commemorF,tien
of the 11-1. ag-Anst Napoleon, the TILIsians exploited the con--J,itions
of the terrain, thr: nature of thier country and the weatiler, thus
giving their action, a nimbus of fright, horror and superhuman
Vslitites. There is no doubt, this mvtery deeply affected tIle
Gerwan soldiers. Intensified training ,lad conatt,ns appealsto
efficiency and the feeling of superiority had to make the CerwIn
soldier fit.
Jtbecae our practice to train -eldiers for comb,t in b_ad
weather. If the e-temy appeared under protection of d'rkness in a
light rain, re ape red dttring pitch-dark ni hts v,tien it w-s,
raining like hell. If tLe enemy attacked -hen it w.?s
'Pe attacked during sncv storms. In other words: If, 7nE i'v,ned to
maintain oneself and even be successful, the se'f-confidence rd
morale of the troops h-i to b increased Iv de 2_ lading exlre:le
achievements from them. Iss.es relatin,7, to technique and sup ly
were our men preble:T. Almoit all our sisignmmts were to take
or hold localities. Cur methods ofilghting ccrres;-nds to th se of
the Russinns. It was my princi.je to attack in extremely h:.'d weather,
thus taking the enemy by surprise. -je were very successful this
way and terrified the Russinns. The disadvantages by the continuous
Eastwind were balanced by the dvantaces luring our attacks:
(a) Disadvantages:
Nxtrezoly bd si;ht; injuries by freerzinc; Icing of
optics an, protectoscopos.
(b) ildvantages:
1 The enemy did not he-r the noise of the teaks so
that we -Jere a lc to appear b: sur)rise; no reduction
of visibility because of nuzzle-blest
The last losue is most important, since it grest44 incrs-sed the
rate of fire. In case of terk *Weis, the Aw?ians were hi-Ldered by
their own mu zle-blast smoke which oondensed in frcnt of thier tanks,
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Wigs' OW
In case of long-range wea-aons duel, it was essential to take
up positions where the snow was frozen or vlow'n awry by the -^nd so
that, 7then firing, no snow clouds were kicked up and unmasked the
position of the tnnk, pile to good visibility, night attacks during
winter time prored idenl. During all four winters in Russian the
eno eonditienslapart from snow drifts, were no obstncles for our
tanks, The Germnn planning did provide shelter for repair shop
installations. Repair shop personnel were often forced to work in
:the ooen for 24 hours a del. At least they should be provided with
tents. Summarizing, the following is stated: For our winter wnrf-re
we hA to todjien our troops ,Trld to accustom them to the rough Russian
climate. Onee our trops' got accustomed and realized that the
Rdssiand were only human beings Ylho suffered from cold as much as ,e
did, they were no longer afraid dur!Ag the winter. The same applied
fpr the mud and rain" seson.
The most dangerous enemy weanons.
1* Tanks: "T347 "1", "Josef Saline", SU-100 (runs,
heavy antitank runs of.76.2 mm caliber.
2. Antitank guns, medium antitnnk guns of 38 ram caliber .1th
conical barrels.
3. Wooden boa mines.
4. 4.ntitank rifles.
5. Heavy mortars Of 132 mm caliber. ?
6. Explosive ammunition for infantry rifles and machine guns.
PEficiencies of our taffies.'
Our tanks suffered from the following defeciencies, necenitating
:the follpe,ing improvements:
1* Greater 'cruising radius.
2. Better sighting mechanisms and range finders.
3. 8mokeless powder.
4.Searchlights coupled to guns.
5. 'Tank commander ns gunner.
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Protective clothing.
/
) , 7, Better voice-radio equipment.
. 1. This iseue mentioned before, Iagainrefer to
cetasful Ilussian solution,
2
Where es tank guns v;ere developed most rapidly, the
ng msehanism Ives kirdly ireeroved. Better enlargements end
!table field of view are required. Ou.Teessfal firing depends
on training and still of the man who operates the rangg-finder,
'It should beepossible to design a renge Linde which is coupled vith
the telescopic pieht as Ina eTica camera) in order to relieve
the gunner.
On Dar. 3 The burning residue escaping the ejected cartridges
dangerous y affedted the crew. The ventilators did not suffice so
that the crew was subject to !leaser, during prolonged cceb-t.
Sometimes, the SMC'R within the t.Inks prevented the crewe from
Participating in fuether combat. The muzzle-last smoke alweys un-
masked the own positien and hin6ered the own observetion of the fire.
.Unfaverable wind even made it necessary that another tank had to
take oyer observation an corrections. cin all feeents I observed
powder genatating to much smoke,
On. ar. 4 There 13 no doubt about a succeseeul emeloyment of
*earchl1gts in attacee, in the offeesive an defensive. (Leg.
on the invaaon front). This also applies to tank attecks
night. The Clereeene had not yet completed the development of eearch-
lights lehich waie coupled to the tank guns and had invisible lieht
sources (infrared rays). I also should like to mention the importance
of firing eith silencers. Ra.Te,Aae patrols and partis_ns used
Silencers designed by the Germans. The silencer is important not
- only to poacheee but also to the military.
? On Tar, 5, The t.-elk commender is the only member of the crew who is
able to jook out. He designates the te)rget, ?Uterines the Age
and orders the commenc(ment of fire. The time whiot he needs to
convey his orders to thk gunner is practicelly. 1:st an, ye-re ofteh,
is of decisive imeor dace,
In additbn, the tmnk comm,nder ,sees the tercet frem an angle
which differs from that of the gunner. An optic I transmiaion
Should enable the tank coeleander to fire in emergency cases. He
who fire e the firet stet is victor in th2 duel tank aeainst tank
or antitank guh.
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pir C, Experience showed that 80 A of the crews of destroyed
ankS Suffered frem serieus_buras. Leather clothing and the cenetent
wearing of leather gloves proved to be a very good proteetion.
Only the foe rem_ins unprotected. I tried to protect my mime men
e'by mainee them wear asbestos masks. But nobody wore them as they
e were. ver inconvenient. Nevertheless, something should be done
regarding this problem. A protective ointment should be sufficient.
Zany a taek soldier burnt to death because he could net free him-
salt in time from the wires of their throat-type mieroebenes.
Development and improvement is also required in this field.
Oneeir, 1. The leading of tanks entirely depends on the voice-
radio cominic:ti ystem. The transmission of orders mey Se made
lmeossitle if the en smy aucceede in jamming the same wave le4h
and it monitoring the alternete waves as Yell. An1-iLmerican
attespts in this field were very effective on the fren of invesion.
. The interphone commanicetion also was effectieely jemmed by the
enemy. The impact of enemy shells often destroyed the fu es. Ordera
could not 1on6ee be communicated and the tenk temporarily withdrew.
Protective measures end imeroveeents for ultras '_ort waves and Inter-
phone commueicetien are reuired.
Cdhcl ading not
The above study is based on experiecnes and repres-nt the
personel opinion of the writer and, therefore, do ant cleim.
general validity. Thc ar in the Last showed its true face in the
most horrible form. It s.Sowed that culture, civilizetion and inter-
natienal agrceliwnts are overruled by tho instinct of self-preservetion,
Even today it is only a anal step from iun to beeet. The former
German, soldier re.tLebere with mixed feelinge thosemf years of blood -
shed. lie remembers full of love end hate the vast and melancholic
country, and rombrs fell of horror and admiration its ialibitants.
But he cannot ccL4;:c(211ed both, neither with feelings nor with
brains, It le another world.
!1:4
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