SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R007600050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 7, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/24: CIA-RDP83-00415R007600050001-1
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CLASSIFICATION CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY Gernany/JSrR
SUBJECT Soviet policy. to>??ra-rr1 Gor any
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
W ICI In
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REPOT
CD NO.
DATE DISTR. 7 March 1951
NO, OF PAGES 2
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
20 the Russians Estill consider themselves the "allies"
of the *I-Testern pomers, and intend to rerain`allies if the neat honors the
Potsdam agreement, particularly with reference to the prevention of Gorman
rearr: rent in any fora. If the Soviet Union receives assurance that there
is no longer any discussion of 'Test German rearrirsent and that all such
plans are therefore dropped, it will agree to a four-power conference On
the other hand, if the 'Test undertakes to ream Trost Germany, the Soviet
Army will isriediately occupy TTeot G;rriany, by force if necessary.
2. The :trerlin is convinced that econonic reasons will compel the United States
to start a war in the near future. Therefore it is considered advisable to
bring about the greatest possible exhaustion of the UThited States forces in
Asia. The Russians view Gorrany as the only rower capable of containing flus-
sian expansion, and they would not tolerate any attempt to isolate the Soviet
Union by ar-ing Gerreny. They would strike iinediately, prior to the formation
of a military force or of police units which could be used as a riilitary force.
This, said ferenov, is no idle three'''., since there onou ;h Soviet troops 'not of the Elbe to reach the Atlantic in eight to ton days without the use of the
reserves in the oast-3rn ?Fart of the fus^ian zone,
3. when neetinr with the 1Test, the "ov?.et roprezentatives would be r,uided by the
followint beliefs which are hell in the Kremlin:
a. The United States should conf'ing its erhere of influence to So>>th America
and Asia (sic).
b. The United Kinatior is interested prir^arily in the S ire, and has no under-
standinl* or syrmathy for Eurorean rrobler s.
c, France is unable to play a responsible role beca?nse it is already "one third
Con-un1.st and two thirds decadent".
STATE
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/24: CIA-RDP83-00415R007600050001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/24: CIA-RDP83-00415R007600050001-1
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d. Altho')'h the Vatican is still a r. oti, rfu? force which rust be taken into
consideration, the Kremlin could use the Orthodox churches as an ever
increasing counterweight.
Germany in the only remaining; nation capable of becoming a great power. The
Russians wish to assist in the realization of this goal. Their are willing
to support the rrincirle of corrl?te German autonomy, provided all the occu-
pation troops are withdrawn. Russian support would be liven in return for
assurances of German neutrzlity in an Last-1Test conflict, or for the signing
of a `-oviet-German treity of alliance. The Russians have no intention of
rra'kinn Germany into a "satellite"; indeed, they are willin7 to injure German
economic independence by boundary revisions at the expense of Poland.
Following the withdrawal of the occupation forces, the US IM would relinquish
further derands for reparations, but It particularly desires the maintenance
of very close econorzic relations with Germany?
6.
Prof. Ulrich Tdoack, Dr. Gustav Heinemann, and Pastor Martin Tfie-mbIler should
be invited to the Soviet, Embassy to discuss German reunion, with the following
recornendations
on all German questions should be held in Berlin; and that Dr. Gflnther Gereke,
prior to a four-rower conference fornal conversations 50X1-HUM
b. Forr1.ation of a rrovisional all-German government width its seat in Bsrlin,
the members to be nominated by the four occuryin' powers.
c. Free German elections under the supervision of the Urited tNtions or of
neutral observers.
d. Imr-odiate irith,lrawal of the occupation troops and cessation of reparations.
e. Opposition to German rearmament under foroi n command and on behalf of
foreign pow,rars. However, the Russians would not oppose the fora action
of a national German army under German command.
;'2XrET/C" } 1 'f:JL `)TILY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/24: CIA-RDP83-00415R007600050001-1