YUGOSLAV PUBLICATION, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R006500230004-0
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• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 10, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

FORM NO.
MAY 1949 51. lilA
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CLASSIFICATION 1 5 RICT.^I)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. ^
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY
Yugoslavia
DATE DISTR. 10 November 1950
SUBJECT
Yugoslav Publication, Review of International
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Affairs
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CPYRGHT -.ii PFIAG STATINTL
Review of
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
FROM THE UNO:
Two Proposals by the Yugoslav Delegation to the UN
General Assembly
The Position of International Democratic Organizations Today
(Miodrag Avramovic)
For or Against Secret Diplomacy and Spheres of Interest (Rade Vlkov)
The Roots of the Present Policy of Denationalization in Pirin
Macedonia (Sf. Stojiljkovic)
EDITORIAL COMMENT:
After the Resolution on Korea
A Survey of the UN General Debate
Zapotocki and the Question of Economic Blockade
Notes on a Trip to England
THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA
M. Marceau's Tale About A Land He Never Saw
EDITORS: DUSHAN TIMOTIYEV I CH AND ZDRAVKO PECHAR
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Contributors to this Issue:
Re V/0- W of
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
THIS MAGAZINE IS A FREE FORUM
AND PUBLISHES THE OPINIONS OF
LOCAL AND FOREIGN WRITERS ON
VARIOUS PROBLEMS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS
Issued Fortnightly
Published by :
THE FEDERATION OF YUGOSLAV
JOURNALISTS
Yearly subscription : $3, or 16 English Sh.
Telephones: 28-451, 26-715, Post Box 125
Checking account: Yugoslav National Bank
PR Serb'a Branch JV? 103-906033
Offices : International Affairs, Teraziye 31,
Belgrade.
CONTENTS:
Editorial Comments:
AFTER THE RESOLUTION ON
KOREA - - - - - - --
A SURVEY OF THE GENERAL
DEBATE - - - - - - -
AN EXAMPLE OF SOVIET CON-
TROL OF FOREIGN TRADE RE-
LATIONS OF THE EASTERN PIT-
ROPEAN COUNTRIES - - -
ZAPOTOCKI AND THE QUES-
TION OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE
HERR GROTEWOHL AND THE.
"TWO-CHILD" SYSTEM - -
Rade Vlkov, Director of the Institute for Histori-
cal Questions of the Yugoslav Government's Office
for the Coordination of Scientific Activities
Stojiljko Stojiljkovic, Board Member of the Yu-
goslav Journalists' Association and Assistant-Editor-
in-Chief of the daily newspaper "Politika"
Miodrag Avramovic, President of the Journalists'
Association of Serbia and Editor of the newspaper
"Glas", the organ of the People's Front of Serbia.
Other contributors: The Editorial Board and
TWO PROPOSALS BY THE YIT-
GOSLAV DELEGATION TO THE
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY -- - _. _-, -- N. D.jokid 7
FOR OR AGAINST SECRET
DIPLOMACY AND SPHERES OF
INTEREST Rade Vlkov 9
THE POSITION OF INTER-
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC OR-
GANIZATIONS TODAY -? - - Miodra:g Avramovid 11
THE ROOTS OF THE PRESENT
DENATIONALIZATION POLICY
IN PIRIN MACEDONIA - - - --St. Stojil.jkov:d 12
'.I'HE TORQUAY CONFERENCE
GO ON, HAND AN EMBER TO TOVARISHTCH VISHIN-
SKY TO SIGN HIS RESOLUTIONS. ("Jet"- Beograd)
Through the Fog of Propaganda:
MR. MARCEAU'S TALE ABOUT
A LAND HE NEVER SAW --- -
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KCV7eW0
INTERNATIomAL
AFFAIRS:
AFTER THE RESOLUTION ON KOREA
S OUTH Korean troops, and the
troops from other countries
fighting in Korea, have passed the
38th parallel. The General As-
sembly Resolution, proposed by
Great Britain together with seven
other delegations, has been adopted.
The question which has been asked
so often in the recent past has final-
ly been answered in Korea and in
Lake Success.
The main question has remained
unanswered, however: the question
of Korea's future. It was brought
up in 1945, after the defeat of Ja-
pan. It was not solved at that tame
but a provisional boundary line was
drawn between the Russian and
American zones along the 38th pa-
rallel.. This halfway, provisional so-
lution through the intervening
years led to an armed conflict
which put Korea's future before the
United Nations under conditions
that have so far caused terrible
suffering for the Korean people.
All these circumstances and the
sacrifices and sufferings involved
placed a great responsibility on the
United Nations. It should be kept
in mind, however, that the correct
solution of the fundamental problem
in Korea - the development of an
independent, united and democrat-
ic Korea - is very important for
the success of the UNO in carrying
out its main task - the consolida-
tion of peace and international co-
operation In the world.
On June 25th this year, the Uni-
ted Nations were faced with the task
of preventing the spread of the arm-
ed conflict, provoked with the aim
of extending the power of the North
Korean Government, aided by the
Russians, to all of Korea. Today,
however, there is a danger that the
General Assembly Resolution will
lead to an imposition of the South
Korean Government on all of Ko-
rea.
Such tendencies, which are the
legacy of the previous division of
Korea into two zones, are apparent
in all discussions on the Korean
problem. However, the first pre-
condition for the successful realiza-
tion of the aspirations for which the
Korean pepole have been fighting for
decades under Japanese colonial
rule is precisely the elim nation of
such points of view.
Proving the formal and legal
justification of continuing the mili-
tary operations against the North
until final victory is of secondary
importance. In Korea, the United
Nations is not faced with a legal
question but with a political pro-
blem, on the solution of which the
future of a long- suppressed people
depends.
It is useless to call the southern
government "the legal government"
which was attacked, just as it is
useless to propose today that Korea
should decide her own affairs
without any interference from
outside. One cannot go far with this
as a point of departure. One can
,only worsen the situation in Korea
which would put the Korean people
in a position of even greater de-
pendence and injustice.
It is impossible to ask the Ko-
reans simply to consider the North
Korean Government as the aggres-
sor and the South Korean Govern-
ment as the legal one. It would be
equally impossible to disregard the
happenings of the last three months
and ask the UN to pursue a policy
of non-intervention. The unpopular
government of Syngman Rhee,
which remained a minority in the
elections held before the conflict
broke out, has become no better by
dint of the fact that the North Ko-
rean troops invaded South Korea.
In the eyes of the Korean people,
the conflict in Korea cannot be se-
parated from the struggle of op-
posing views on the internal system
of Korea. The United Nations must
not lose this from view. Ignoring
this internal political problem could
place the United Nations face to face
with even more difficult problems
than the ones they must cope with
today.
The General Assembly Resolution
on Korea will require great politic-
al wisdom from those who will
have the task of putting it into
force. Its contents are directed
toward intervention in the internal
political problems of Korea to such
an extent that it would be difficult
to imagine its application without
violation of the right of the Korean
people to self-determination. Let us
take, for instance, the strained in-
terpretation of this Resolution which
authorizes MacArthur to pass the
38th paralel, According to the
newspapers, even the General
himself did not look at the text this
way, although it is not very pro-
bable that he would be inclined to
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want to stop at that line. However,
passing over the 38th parallel is, in
any case, one of the most important
p o l i t i c a l problems in the solu-
tion of the Korean question. Such
a method of interpretation of the
whole Resolution can lead to a
whole series of acts in the near fu-
ture which would not be in accord
with the principles of the UN Char-
ter.
The premature abandonment of
the attempt to approach a funda-
mental discussion of the entire
problem in a sub-committee of the
General Assembly's Political Com-
mittee was, to say the least, a se-
rious omission. One need not, na-
turally, overestimate the possibli-
ties of reaching a unanimous agree-
ment, but the very result of the
voting on the proposal to set up a
sub-commission and the withdrawal
of India from the new UN Commis-
ion for Korea are sufficient indicat-
ion that the dec's'_on was made too
hastily.
The reasons why such a decision
was reached by the majority of de-
legations in the General Assembly
must undoubtedly be sought in cir-
cumstances which are not directly
connected with Korea. The conflict
in Korea, in the last analysis, did not
break out because of Korea itself,
and this explains its exceptional
importance. The events in Korea
reverberated far more loudly
throughout the world than any other
post-war event - including the
war in Palestine.
Keeping in mind the broader
framework of world events within
which the Government of North
Korea served as the bearer of an
expansionist policy, and the con-
flict in Korea as test of the relation-
ship of forces, one must register
the sad fact that very little effort
was invested in seeking a peaceful
solution of the conflict.
One of the consequences is
already obvious - extensive all-
round increases in armaments.
Thus we have the paradox whereby
an action by the UN to prevent war
has been accompanied by increased
armaments in general. This, how-
ever, cannot be justified merely by
the attitude of the USSR, which by
its boycott of the UN took upon,
itself the greatest part of the respon-
sib_lity for the development of the
conflict in Korea.
It is necessary for both s:des in
the UNO to see the necessity to take
serous steps in the interests of
peace.
The only way the United Nations
can contribute to world peace in
the Korean question is to help the
Koreans, and not to offer them
tutelage or to punish those who
have already been victimized.
A Survey of the UN
General Debate
ONE of the characteristic features
of the UNO's General As-
sembly debate this year lies in the
fact that the delegates of various
countries dwelled less on the
specific questions on the Assem-
bly's Agenda, also less on ques-
tions of special interest to their
countries, and far more on general
questions of peace, international
cooperation and on the role which
the United Nations should play in
this respect. Nevertheless, one can
hardly say that this year's General
Debate, was sharper than in previous
years, which could easily have been
expected in view of the present in-
ternational tension. One can even
say that the speeches delivered by
the representatives of the big
powers were somewhat more mo-
derate. This app=ies in particular to
Mr. Vyshinsky when compering h's
present speeches 'with those deli-
vered in the past.
There is no doubt but that the
Korean issue dominated the General
Debate. We do not here refer so
much to the actual events in Korea
as to the fact that these events un-
derlay many of the questions which
the delegates- dealt with in their
speeches.
In the first place the General
Debate showed that aggress-'on as
such under the present interna-
tional conditions cannot remain
isolated, that every aggressor, no
matter how skillfully he might con-
ceal his actions, will have to reckon
with having the greater part of the
states in the world against him.
The General Debate further em-
phasized the international signifi-
cance of the United Nations and the
role which it can play in mobilizing
the world public opinion and in ral-
lying the countries throughout the
world against any action which
would constitute a menace to peace,
a violation of peace or would be an
act of aggression. This is best borne
out by the case of Korea where 53
states backed the Security Council's
Resolution, regardless of the objec-
tions raised against it, and promised
to take part in the action against
aggression.
The international significance of
the UNO was recognized even by
those who thought they cou'd walk
out of all its bodies and carry
through their action by circumven-
ting the United Nations. The USSR
returned to the Security Council
and came to the General Assembly.
Moreover, its representatives deem-
ed it fit to wave an olive branch t)
the other UNO members in the
course of their speeches.
The General Debate also showed
that the USA in the UNO's General
Assembly took maximum advantage
of the errors of the Soviet policy
towards Korea. This was evidenced
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EDITORIAL COMMENT
in the first place by the fact that
the contradictions among the coun-
tries of the Western world were
manifested in a far lesser measure
in the debate this year than earlier,
and that Mr. Acheson at the Gene-
ral Assembly was able to come out
with proposals which he would
have hesitated to present so openly
in earlier years.
However, although a general
anxiety over the present interna-
tional tension was manifested, the
General. Debate is distinguished by
the fact that almost all the delega-
tions expressed the view that it was
possible to do something towards
maintaining peace and advancing
cooperation among peoples with a
view to finding a way out of the
present situation. Hence, this year
we heard a larger number of pro-
posals concerning questions of peace
and international cooperation than
any time earlier.
Nevertheless, judging by the
substance of the proposals, in the
first place of those submitted by
the big powers, it can hardly be
said that they showed a desire to
put an end to their eirlier practice
of submitting proposals solely with
the object of realizing some of their
special interests in the UNO or of
achieving specific propaganda ef-
fects. Thus, Acheson's proposal on
the creation of an international
military force ignores the objections
which might be raised from the
viewpoint of the Charter, while
Vyshinsky's proposal to ban the use
of atomic weapons, reduce arma-
ments and form a pact of the five
big powers is nothing but the usual,
many times repeated, Soviet propa-
ganda manoeuvre.
On the other hand, the proposals
submitted by the Yugoslav delega-
tion on. the establishment of a Good
Offices Commission and on the
duties of state in case of war, as well
as the proposal made by India's
delegate at the beginning of the
General Debate, for the admission
of the People's Republic of China to
the United Nations Organization,
constitute real contributions to
peace and international coopera-
tion.
An Example of Soviet
Control of Foreign Trade
Relations of the Eastern
European Countries
T HE British House of Commons
towards the end of this month
discussed export control measures
with the purpose of preventing
shipments of strategical material to
the USSR and its satellites. The
outcome of this discussion was that
Great Britain prohibited the export
of a number of drill-presses to the
USSR and Poland which had
already been ordered and were to
have been delivered shortly.
The representative of the Polish
Embassy in London reacted to this
British measure, declaring that the
Polish Government, in. case Britain
cancelled her obligations, would
take corresponding measures to re-
establish a balance of exchange. As
Great Britain is still short of suf-
ficient supplies of timber, the first
rumours had it that Poland would pelled to do it again. The case of Po-
ban the export of timber to Greajland is the best proof of this.
Britain. However, when this ru-
mour began spreading, the Polish
Government hastened to deny it. It,
moreover, declared that it intended
to adhere strictly to the British-
Polish trade agreement. The Polish
agents of the USSR took this step
on Soviet instructions. The aim of
the Soviet Union is to prevent a
possible reduction of trade between
Great Britain and Poland so that
it might squeeze out as much as
possible for itself out of the latter
The Polish denial is undoubtedly
not an adequate reply to the Brit-
ish ban on exports. Because they
lack independence, Poland and the
other Eastern European Com:inform
countries are unable to fight against
certain economic measures applied
against them by the Western coun-
tries and the USA, just as they
were unable to resist the USSR's
pressure to wage an economic
blockade against ? the People's Re-
public of Yugoslavia. And just as
they had to renounce their vital in-
terests then, so now they are com-
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EDITORIAL COMMENT
Zapotocki and the Question
of Economic Blockade
N a speech held at Prague on
I September 28th, the Czechoslovak
Prime Mim'ster, Antonjin Zapotoc-
ki, has tried to enlighten the Cze-
choslovak proletariat on the ques-
tion of economic tasks, or rather on
the difficulties and discrepancies
occurring in the country's economy
due to the ever growing subordina-
tion of Czechoslovakia to the USSR.
On the same occasion he also refer-
red to the question of the economic
blockade as applied in a certain
fashion by USA and the Western
countries against USSR and the
countries subordinated to the lat-
ter.
Zapotocki found that "the econo-
mic blockade represents an ancient
trick of imperialist capitalists wield-
ed against those who refuse blind
obedience to their will". He failed
to mention that economic blackade.
as an instrument of aggression, is
being applied against Yugoslavia
both by USSR and the countries
subordinated to it, among them also
Czechoslovakia.
However, we bear witness to the
Fact that the economic blockade as
an instrument of pressure is not
inherent in the capitalist system
alone, but in the USSR as well.
What is more, the blockade conduct-
ed against Yugoslavia by USSR
boasts certain specific features
unlike any that had been previously
recorded in international economic
relations. One such feature Is that
all the Cominform countries have
been forced by USSR to join in the
blockade regardless of the extent
of damage wrought to their own vi-
tal interests through the action.
Another is that the blockade involves
the application of methods un-
precedented in the history of the
development of civilised society.
The practice of the USSR leaders
in this respect - in strict observa-
tion of adherence to the principle
of profound, utmost discrepancy
between words and deeds - has
produced an extra set of conditions
for the imposing and execution of
determinate aims and intentions,
and is marked by extreme vehe-
mence and brutality. It has produced
a special type of international
relations, founded in economics on
the crudest kind of exploitation, and
on subordination ad nauseam in the
field of politics. Being what they are
these relations offer no possibility
for combatting the economic block-
ade.
Zapotocki further sates that the
weapon of blockade had been ap-
plied against USSR during the ini-
tial stage of her socialist develop-
inent, and that. the weapon proved
helpless. That is true, but the block-
=ade was then fought successfully
by the entire Russ'an revolutionary
proletariat. Had Zapotocki cared to
introduce a more topical and con-
crete note, he could have reached
for another and far more recent
example - the case of Yugoslavia.
However, Zapotocki absolutely
avoided to consider this question
from the angle of mobilisation of
the masses of the people for com-
batting the economic blockade. He
spoke instead about the pressing
need for a rapid and effective re-
orientation of Czechoslovak econo-
my so as to reduce its dependence
on the Western countries. Over-
looked was the fact that the process
worked both ways, i. e. that reduced
dependence on the one side would
inevitably lead to increased depen-
dence and subordination on the
other - in the direction of the
Soviet Union, which goes on im-
posing ever harder economic and
political terms.
Herr Grotewohl and the
"Two-Child" System
I N the midst of the present
dangerous international ten-
sion, with all the countries' agenda
featuring problems of vast eco-
nomic and political significance,
and the very future of peace
at stake, etc., the Prime Minister
of the East German Govern-
ment, Otto Grotewohl. took the
floor in the Parliament to de-
liver a speech reminiscent of many
pronouncements that emanated from
Berlin in the recent past. both du-
ring and after the Second World
War. Its central theme was an ap-
peal to Germans to abandon the
"two-child system" and to embark
on a more prolific one. Coming as
it did in the midst of the present
world situation, the speech sounds
grotesque. If, on the other hand,
Grotewohl thought he had to dwell
on the theme and precisely now,
regardless of all the other more
pressing problems of the hour, it
can but mean that the issue was
one of substantial concern to the
leaders of the Soviet Zone, that it
had assumed such critical urgency
that it could no longer be glossed
over.
In any event, it is easier to cope
with the subject in a declarative
iash'on (i. e. the one adopted by
Grotewhol) than to analyze the
reasons underlying the advent of
this "system". It certainly takes less
effort to launch slogans than to ad-
mit the decline in the birth rate
and admit that the "two-child sys-
tem" is the outcome of determined
economic conditions, whose elimi-
nation would primarily involve the
abolition of the exploitation of East-
ern Germany by the USSR.
it defies all imagination to guess
why such slogans need to be high-
lighted at this very moment, and
what useful ends they could be
made to serve.
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TWO PROPOSALS BY THE YUGOSLAV
DELEGATION TO THE UN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
E XPRESSING worry about the present si-
tuation in the world, the majority of dele-
gations which took part in the general debate
at Flushing Meadows posed two questions: is it
possible to preserve peace and can the United
Nations play an effective role in that respect.
The Yugoslav Delegation answered in the posi-
tive through Minister of Foreign Affairs
Edvard Kardelj in the general debate, and by
all its work so far. It maintained that it was
possible to preserve the peace and that the
United Nations could serve that end suc-
cessfully.
What is more, under the present conditions,
the threat of war can be diminished and over-
come primarily through the United Nations as
a universal international organization During
the five years of its existence, however, the
UNO has n t only not been strengthened as an
instrument of peace but it has, on the contrary,
grown constantly weaker. This is mainly due
to the fact that certain harmful tendencies have
grown to ever greater proportions in the UN
and paralyzed its work, thereby undermining
the trust of peoples in this international orga-
nization:
First of all, there is the tendency to turn the
UNO into a propaganda tribune instead of con-
solidating it as the supreme international organ
for the promotion of constructive work where
all nations can, with goodwill, sit down around
the round table and consider various questions.
Their aim would be to seek and find common
solutions through international cooperation,
respecting mutual interests and rights, primari-
ly those of the interested countries.
The second shortcoming in the work of the
UNO so far is the tendency of the contradictions
.between the great powers to become the de-
termining factors in its work. For this
reason., the base of international cooperation in
the UNO constantly tended to narrow down,
being reduced in the.final analysis to relations
between the two great powers around which
the majority of the other countries take up po-
sitions. The small and the medium-sized states
did not play that role in the UNO which they
should and could play.
The consequence of this was that the repre-
sentatives of the big powers, immediately start-
ed making propaganda speeches as soon as they
approached a question which had the effect of
making the problem at hand more acute instead
of solving it. Exploiting their prestige and keep-
ing their own interests foremost in mind, the
big powers were often a stumbling block to the
peaceful solution of various questions.
The fact that these tendencies became so
widespread may be blamed, to some extent, on
certain shortcomings in the organization and
working methods of the various UN organs.
Although the UN Charter offers ample oppor-
tunities for the development of the mechanism
of international cooperation, these possibilities
were not correctly or fully utilized.
These shortcomings were also pointed out at
earlier sessions. What is more, attempts were
even made to eliminate them and the General
Assembly voted in several resolutions on inter-
national cooperation, procedure, and so on.
However, the weak point of these attempts was
that they did not succeed in rallying all the
member-States and that they were subjected to
certain justified complaints. Such was the case
with the foundation of the so-called Little
Assembly.
Keeping in mind the imperative need to eli-
minate the existing obstacles to the consoli-
datiton of the UNO and the realistic conditions
and possibilities, the Yugoslav Delegation sub-
mitted two proposals which were placed on the
agenda of the General Assembly: a proposal on
the establishment of a permanent commission
for good services and a proposal on the duties
of states in case of -outbreak of hostilities.
The first proposal was that a permanent in-
ternational commission for good services should
be formed as a subsidiary organ of the General
Assembly. It would be made up of the six non-
permanent members of the Security Council and
six other members, elected by the General
Assembly, who are not permanent members of
the Council. The commission would consider
international disputes and problems, regardless
of whether or not they are on the agenda of any
of the UN -organs. This it would -do from the
angle of finding and exhausting all the possible
means for their peaceful solution. Its task, then,
is to. put itself between the disputing parties
and develop the greatest possible initiative and
experience in the peaceful solution of these
questions by way of agreement. In each parti-
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cular case, the commission would examine the
situation to see if the dispute could be solved
by way of direct negotiations and would advise
the interested parties to that end. If the perma-
nent commission found that the international
dispute, in the strict sense of the word, could
be solved by way of mediation either by the
Commission itself or by some other state or per-
son, it would consult with the parties to the
dispute and advise them to accept the mediation.
It would then offer them all possible services,
both in the negotiations surrounding acceptance
of the procedure to be followed, and in the me-
diation itself. On its part, the permanent Com-
mission could offer the parties its good services
in order to facilitate the negotiations on accept-
ance and implementation of some other manner
of peaceful solution of the dispute, viz. by way
of an investigation, conciliation, arbitration. As
far as the solution of questions of substance is
concerned, the Commission would limit itself
only to acknowledging and considering the
matter and informing the parties of all suggest-
ions made in that connection. But the Commis-
sion would not make any of its own conclusions
regarding these sugestions.
"In a word," said Minister Kard.elj in his
address during the general debate, "the com-
mission we are proposing would act as a kind
of catalyst. In spite of the present tension in
nternat.ional relations, it would make possible
the widespread application of the method -of
direct talks and negotiations on questions
which would otherwise be the topic of talking
battles for years to come".
In accordance with its aims, the Commission
would avoid any unnecessary publicity so that
the discussion would not take on the character
of propaganda. The Yugoslav proposal is a new
one in substance. It is also an innovation because
it takes into account the complaints which
might be made against it. It emphasizes, for
instance, that the Commission would not under-
take any of the affairs which belong to the ju-
risdiction of the Security Council or any other
organ of the UNO.
Apart from this, the Yugoslav Delegation,
declaring that the Yugoslav Government is
ready to conclude agreements on permanent
peace and non-aggression with every one of its
neighbors, submitted a proposal on the duties
of states in case of outbreak of hostilities. The
purpose of the proposal is to make aggresi!on
more difficult and especially to make it impos-
sible to disguise aggression. It is a well-
known fact that aggressors always try to
make it seem that they were the victims of
aggression, justifying their actions, for instance,
by the right of self-defense. In essence, the pro-
posal is that every state, under any conditions
whatsoever, finding itself in armed conflict
with another state, must declare its readiness,
at the latest within a period of 24 hours, to
cease hostilities and withdraw its armed forces
from alien territory. It would then have to im-
plement its declaration within 48 hours if the
opposing side makes the same declaration. By
way of this short and simple procedure, then,
states which do not act in the manner provided
for put themselves in the position of aggressors,
without any opportunity of making excuses, and
will have to bear the responsibility for upset-
ting the peace. Not only would such a state be
shown up before the public opinion of the world
as the aggressor, but this procedure would make
it easier for the Security Council to undertake
measures provided for in the Charter in case of
aggression.
The two proposals submitted by the Yugo-
slav Delegation make up a whole. Apart from
the proposal on the permanent commission for
goad services, whose aim is to advance inter-
national cooperation for the solution of disputed
questions, the proposal on the duties of states
in case of -outbreak of hostilities would repre-
sent an additional obstacle for an aggressor.
These proposals put forward by the Yugoslav
Delegation are a powerful contribution to peace
and international cooperation under the present
conditions. N. DJOKIC
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FOR OR AGAINST SECRET DIPLOMACY
AND SPHERES OF INTEREST
S INCE the dawn of diplomacy - the diplomacy of
tyrants and satraps of ancient epochs, of absolute
feudal monarchs, of the times of papal intrigue and
during 20th century imperialism - this craft had been
cultivating and perfecting a special form of activity
designed to uphold the power of the ruling circles over
the people -- an active secret service and secret di-
plomacy.
Each word uttered or set down in secret docu-
ments, in a host of treaties and protocols, has spelled
ordeals and devastation to millions of human beings
through wars, pogroms, conquests and diverse other
sanguinary squarings of accounts.
The activities of secret diplomacy have been con-
demned by different thinkers, especially during the
period of the revolutionary battles of the young capi-
talist class. Voltaire, for example, said that history was
echoing with the sound of wooden shoes climbing and
of satin slippers descending its stairs. Discernible
through this traffic, though, are also the hushed foot-
steps of those who prefer the backstairs for their
comings and goings.
the first clear challenge was to come
However
,
from Marx himself. In his "Basic Manifesto of the In-,
ternational Workers' Alliance" he saw the perils to
which the peoples were exposed through the work-
ings of secret diplomacy, and at the same time raised
the battle cry against it. He called on the working
class to be vigilant of the activities of its governments
and to be particularly watchful of the secrets of in-
ternational politics.
And the first revolutionary act in the history of
mankind's struggle against secret diplomacy was the
"Decree on Peace", issued in November, 1917. It ap-
pealed to all peoples and states, to conclude an equi-
table peace, without annexation and indemnities. It
macy and declares to be determined to con-
duct all negotiations quite openly before the entire
people, and forthwith to proceed with the com-
plete publication of secret agreements confirmed
or concluded by a government of large property
holders and capitalists..."()
And, indeed, the Soviet government proceeded to
publish the secret documents. A seaman named Markin
was in charge of this work. Within less than two
months, during December, 1917, and January, 1918,
there were published seven volumes of the "Collection
of Secret Documents".
The documents which had been published, as laid
down in the "Official History of the Civil War in
USSR", "...exposed the robber policy of the czarist
government and the whole system of secret agree-
ments".(2)
And in the preface to the "Collection of Secret
Documents", seaman Markin wrote thus:
"The working men of the whole world should
be made aware as to how, behind their backs, the
diplomats, installed in their cabinets, traded away
/1) Lenin, Works, p. 14, Gosizdat, Moscow - LenSn-
grad, 1929.
.(2) "History of the Civil War in USSR", vol. II, p. 576.
their lives ... How they entered into shameful
agreements... Everybody must know the mode
in which the imperialists, with one stroke of their
pen, went on to appropriate entire provinces. How
they soaked battlefields with human blood. Each
document published represents a weapon against
the bourgeoisie ... "(3)
The "Decree on Peace" heralded a new era of
openly arrived at and equal relations between peo-
ples. Panic gripped the imperialist diplomatic circles
and their governments whilst the working men of all
lands welcomed with joy the unmasking of secret
plans. Even the "Arbeiterzeitung", the organ of the
Austrian Social-Democrats, who otherwise gave their
support to the war effort of the Austrian imperialists,
had to admit that the publication of the secret docu-
ments by the Soviet government represented an act
whereby the democratic mask of both the Entente im-
perialists and of their Austro-German counterparts had
been torn away. ("Arbeiterzeitung" of January 28, 1918).
Dealing with the significance of the "Decree on
Peace" and the publication of the czarist government's
secret documents, Lenin stated the following in his
report on peace to the Soviet congress on November
7, 1917, viz.
"Every government-is reluctant to disclose the
trend of its thoughts. But we are against secret
diplomacy and shall act openly before the entire
people". (4)
And again, at the 1st congress of the All-,Rus-
sia Navy: "We have been responsible for publishing
secret agreements and we shall go on doing so. No
amount of malice and calumnies whatsoever shall
be able to stop us along that road ... It is both
possible and -compulsory to carry on the closest
cooperation with the revolutionary class of work-
ing men of all countries. In publishing the secret
agreements the Soviet government had set its foot
on that path. That is not verbal propaganda, it is
the propaganda of deeds".(5)
Indeed, the "Decree on Peace" was no mere ver-
bal propaganda. As laid down in the official "History
of the Civil War in USSR", it had "... formulated
the basic principle of the entire
foreign policy of the Soviet state".(')
(The author's italics).
In other words, both Marx and Lenin were agreed
that the struggle against the evil of secret diplomacy
and the rejection of secret agreements and under -
takings represented no temporary tact cal expedient,
but that it constituted a component part, "the basic
principle of the foreign policy of the Soviet state".
Were these principles destined to survive for long
in the subsequent evolution of the Soviet Union?
They formed a subject of discussion-in 1925. At
this stage, Stalin still stood up in their defence. Ans-
wering questions at the Sverdlovsk University, Stalin
(3) "Collection of Secret Documents from the Archives
of the Former Foreign Ministry", No 2, p. 1, 2nd Edn., Petro-
grad, Published by the People's Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs,
1917
(4)
Lenin,
Works, XXII,
p.
16.
(5)
Lenin,
Works, XXII,
p.
101-102.
(2)
"History of the Civil
in
USSR", vol.' II, p. 30.
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spoke of the danger inherent in? the lack of faith in
the international revolution of the proletariat, about
the damaging effect of the sceptical attitude toward
the national liberation movement in the colonies and
dependent countries, that the Soviet land could not
have resisted world imperialism without the support
+ef the revolutionary movements of other countries,
about the dangerous nature of such concepts, and then
went on to say:
"That is the road to nationalism and degene-
ration, the road leading to the complete liquidation
of the international policy of the proletariat; since
those afflicted by this disease view our country
not as one particle of a whole, but as the regin-
ning and the end of this movement, deeming that
the interests of all the other countries should be
sacrificed to those of our own country". And
further: "Should the liberation movement of China
be upheld? And why? Would it not be dangerous?
Would that not engender strife with other coun-
tries? Would it not serve a better purpose if we
established "spheres of influence" in China togeth-
er with the other "progressive" states and if we
severed something off China to our own advan-
tage? That would be both useful and would involve
no danger... Whether to uphold the liberation
movement in Germany? Is it worth the risk?
Would it not be better to reach agreement with
the Entente powers regarding the Treaty of Ver-
sailles and earn something in compensation? ...
Whether to preserve the friendship with Persia,
Turkey, Afghanistan? Does it all pay? Would it
rut be better to revive the "spheres of influence"
with some of the big states? And so on along
similar lines.
"Such is the nationalistic 'conception' of the
new type which endeavours to liquidate the fo-
reign policy of the October revolution and which
stimulates the elements of degeneration".(7)
Subsequent events were to show Stalin himself,
with the present leaders of the Soviet Union, to have
unscrupulously turned round on these words of his and
liquidated "the foreign policy of the October revo-
lution".
It is not within the scope of this article to expound
in fuller detail the process of degeneration of the once
principled Soviet foreign policy and to list the mani-
festations of the growing revisionism in the realm of
the Soviet state's international relations.
We might, however, recall the following:
Instead of extending support to Germany's revolu-
tionarv movement, there materialized the German-
Soviet rapprochement in 1939-41, the secret agree-
ments on the division of the Baltic countries (Lithu-
ania, Latvia, Estonia), the fourth division of Poland;
in brief, various secret agreements and protocols cov-
ering the division of spheres of influence between the
Nazi German and the USSR governments.
In lieu of "upholding the liberation movement in
China", there were understandings with Clang Kai-
shek, and subsequently "with other 'progresive' states"
as well, the lot to the detriment of the Chinese peo-
lile's fight for liberation.
Instead of supporting the "national liberation
movement in the colonies and dependent countries"
("that elementary requirement of internationalism") -
there ensued new secret agreements - with fresh
partners this time - about the division of spheres of
interest, secret agreements leading to the liquidation
of the struggle for national liberation of the Greek
people, propagandistic and diplomatic aid to the emi-
grant government 'of King Peter, secret agreements
which tended to liquidate the achievements of the Yu-
goslav people's struggle for liberation, and that on the
cynical "fifty-fifty" business principle.
Instead of the "international policy of the prole-
tariat" there developed "elements of degeneration" and
nationalism, relations of inequality between peoples,
mastery was gained by the principle that "the interests
of all the other countries should be sacrificed" (fl) to
the interests of one country alone.
Stalin had thus become the initiator and executor
of precisely such a nationalistic conception which he
himself, in his speech at Sverdlovsk University (on
June 9, 1925), had described as the most dangerous
attempt at the "liquidation of the foreign policy of
the October revolution... "
Were the revisionist Soviet leaders able to conceal
from the eyes of the world the facts surrounding the
liquidation of the foreign policy of the October revo-
lution, to maintain the secrecy of their obscure diplo-
matic relations, understandings and agreements?
No, they were not. Their partners in the scramble
for dominant positions and spheres of influence went
on to publish some secret documents of their own.
And just as Lenin's "Decree on Peace" in 1917
precipitated a panic among the imperialist governments
and the latter's diplomats, the Soviet leaders were to
find themselves in a similar predicament after the
Second World War. They tried to prevent the publi-
cation of documents concerning the German-Soviet
relations, or at least to prevent the unilateral elabo-
ration of such documents. The following passage oc-
curs in the preface to "The Documents and Material
Preceding the Second World War", published by the
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948, viz.
"In 1945 the Soviet Government proposed to
the British Government that the German docu-
ments be jointly elaborated, and insisted that
Soviet experts be granted permission to partici-
pate in such work. However, the proposal of the
Soviet Government was turned down".(s)
The said publication carries no trace of any
attmept to refute the documents published in "The
Nazi-Soviet Relations in 1939-41" but presents other
documents on British-German relations. The Soviet
Union, thus, voices its protest merely against the uni-
lateral elaboration and publication of such documents.
And what principled statement have the Soviet
theoreticians and historians of diplomacy been cur-
rently advancing on the subject of secret diplomacy?
The latest edition of "The History of Diplomacy"
comprises an entry entitled "Secret and Confidential
Agreements" - which goes as follows:
"Parallel with overt, public and published
agreements, secret and confidential agreements
are concluded between states".(10)
That is all. From the first to the last word. Nine-
teen words all told, with the title to the chapter
thrown in.
It follows that the present Soviet leaders have
forgotten the "Decree on Peace", the words of Marx,
Lenin and of seaman Markin, but they will never be
forgotten by the peoples of China, Spain, Poland,
Greece, Yugoslavia and the other countries behind
whose backs the Soviet grand-state secret diplomacy
had been trading in their lives, and still proceeds to
do so. Rade VLKOV
(s) Words and sentences quoted are excerpts from the
preceding quotations of Stalin's speech, Works, Vol. VII,
p. 167-168
,(9) "Documents and Materials Preceding the Second
World War", I, "30 Dana" Publishers Beograd, 1949.
(10) "The History of Diplomacy", III, p. 812, Moscow, 1945.
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THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS TODAY
W BITING about the significance and role of inter-
national democratic organizations today, when so
many of them are under the direct control of the Sovi-
et leaders, may seem a useless task. What can be
done, some of the discouraged democrats may say,
when the leaders of these organizations are not lead-
ing them at all but simply carrying out Soviet
orders. The matter is all the more serious, will add
some of the foreign communists who, think with their
own heads - and their number is increasing, be-
cause the leaders of these organizations, most of them
members of communist parties, are intoxicated with
the -supposedly wise leadership of the Soviet Union
and thus covering up their own inability and ignor-
ance with idol worship. Actually, the significance and
role of these organizations must be talked about.
Although the international progressive, and primarily
the working class movement now finds itself in a
serious crisis thanks to the Soviet-Russian digressrons
we think that the international democratic mass orga-
nizations, must be returned to progressive mankind
and that this is worth fighting for. This is an import-
ant fighting program for all true democrats, for all
revolutionaries. That is why we are bringing up the
topic.
The international democratic mass organizations
appeared during a period of increasing tension in the
general crisis of capitalism, especially after the vic-
tory of the first socialist revolution. Their importance
has undoubtedly been enhanced after the Second
World War which was fought for the idea of equality
between big and small nations, for the right, of small
nat?ons mostly, to national self-determination and for
the longest possible peace. This war, more than any
other preceding event, brought people with common
misfortune together and forced them to the conclusion
that only unified struggle could defend their common
rights and interests. This awareness and general prac-
tical experience made possible the rapid establishment
of many new international democratic mass organi-
zations. The forces of reaction were rocked and, one
might say, silenced for -a period of time.
The first task that was set was the consolidation
and strengthening of internationalism, international
solidarity among progressive people of various groups,
classes and professions in the struggle for comprehen-
sive improvements in economic and cultural life, in
every other sphere. There were formed the World Fe-
deration of Trade Unions, the World Federation of
Democratic Youth, the International Federation of
Democratic Women, the International Student Union,
the International Journalists' Organization, the
World Committee of Partisans of Peace and many
others.
The main conditions for successful work of these
international mass organizations are the principles of
equality of all national participants, mutual discus-
sions, permitting expression of other even incorrect
points of view and full freedom of debate and struggle
of ideas. Here, the question of national prestige must
not be a decisive one, because this is a matter of
general :interest. The entire thing is changed and be-
comes the opposite of what it should be if one of the
equal members comes along with the conception that
it is the only one that Is 'always right in all questions,
that there must be no discussion, that the wisest one
must be obeyed by right of the first born. This is what
lies behind the idea that one country has the most
authority because everything in it is the best possible
and that nothing anywhere else is worth anything, be-
ginning from the everyday way of life to the smallest
;achievements of culture and the arts. No one else,
according to such a conception, deserves credit for
the present development of science and technique
except that one country. In that case, the interna-
tional organizations become servile executors of orders
coming from headquearters in one country which is
looking after its own interests and subjecting every-
thing else to its own big-power aspirations. Then we
do not have an international organization, but a for-
eign branch of the dictatorial organization of one
country.
Such is the case today when the Soviet leaders
have become bosses in the international democratic
organizations. Perhaps it is possible to boss the obe-
dient, bureaucratic communist leaders of a good many
communist parties who are not at all close to the peo-
ple, and their representatives in the international
mass organizations, for whom such behavior is a con-
dition for keeping their posts. Things have gone so
far that the Soviet leaders determine who shall be
the leaders not only of the parties but of the national
mass organizations as well. But it is not so easy to
boss around the rest of the progressive people in the
international and national progressive mass organi-
zations, or the communists who think with their own
heads or other freedom-loving people who see the
truth and what is and what is not in the interests of
toiling humanity.
Under the present international conditions when
the progressive, and especially the communist, mo-
vement in the world has reached widespread propor-
tions, it is impossible, needless and even harmful to
direct them from one center. No one can set down
for all states and, all people the rules and regulations
by which they are to work and fight for a better life.
Of course, there are and there must be general prin-
ciples of struggle primarily in the struggle for peace.
But they cannot be subordinated to anyone's special
interests as the two big powers, the USA and USSR,
wish. On the contrary, the basic task of all interna-
tional democratic organizations - the struggle for
peace, can be carried out only against the wishes
and, demands of the two big powers to turn all other
peoples and states into a means of bribery in their
conflicts over new division of the world into spheres
of influence.
The dispute between the Communist Party of Yu-
goslavia, and Yugoslavia in general with the Comin-
form, headed by the USSR, brought to the surface
the hegemonistic stand of the Russian leaders and the
support of that stand by their satellites in the in-
ternational democratic organizations. When Yugosla-
via opposed the Russian dictation and intervention in
her internal party and state affairs, the entire Com-
inform -propaganda mach'nery was turned against her.
It attempted to brand the Yugoslav leaders as servants
of imperialism, as fascists. After it was decided to
thus relegate Yugoslavia to the fascist-Trotskyite
camp, it was permissible to use against her all sorts
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of economic, political and other kinds of pressure and
discrimination. Thus, without any discussion and in the
absence of Yugoslav representatives, it was possible
to expell Yugoslavia, at orders from Russia, from many
international organizations under the pretext that she
was, "as confirmed at the Budapest and Sofia trials",
(which, in effect, were farces) a fascist state and could
therefore not be a member of the international de-
mocratic organizations.
This Soviet policy put the democratic organiza-
tiods to a test and brought them a serious crisis. The
expulsion of Yugoslavia caused, first, a weakening of
the unity of democratic forces; second, it meant the
justification and legalisation of the undemocratic, un-
sncjaljs and warmongering acts of the USSR which
were carried out against the other countries under
Soviet control, too, which would be, if neccessary,
carried out against any other country as well.
In spite of the flagrant pressure being brought to
bear on the international and national democratic
mass organizations by the Soviet leders they still
meet resistance. Last year, the French Committee for
Peace refused to adopt a resolution calling Yugoslavia
a fascist and warmongering country. The delegates
from Republican Spain rose against, the expulsion of
Yugoslavia from the International Lawyers' Associa-
tion. The distinguished American public worker and
political personality, John Rogge, sent a Resolution in
June of this year to the Plenary Session of the World
Committee of Partisans of Peace in which he de-
manded that an invitation be extended to adherents of
peace in Yugoslavia to attend the coming World Con-
gress of the Partisans of Peace.
The discriminatory attitude of the Secretariat of
the International Journalists' Organization also led 0
corresponding consequences. The International Jour-
nalists' Organization has virtually ceased to exist as a
genuinely international organisation. In addition to
Yugoslavia, the organisations of Great Britain, France,
Sweden, etc. have also left this body.
At: last year's Congress of the International Stu-
dents' Union in Prague, the British delegate oppos d
the discriminatory acts of the leaders of the World Fe-
deration of Democratic Youth against the Yugoslav
youth. The progressive British organization, the Na-
tional Peace Council, several American public figures
arid many other freedom-loving people and democratic
organizations decided, in response to the invitation of
the Yugoslav National Committee for the Defence of
Peace, to send their representatives to Yugoslavia to
see for, themselves whether aggressive preparations
against her neighbours are taking place here. They
have expressed the wish to visit also the neighbouring
Cominform countries with the some object. Last sum-
mer visits were paid to Yugoslavia with this aim by
American. Brits sh, and other public and cultural work-
ers. However, the authorities in the Cominform coun-
tries bordering on Yugoslavia refused to grant per-
mission for their entry into those countries. The rea-
sons underlying this refusal are understandable when
analysed in the light of the present aggressive Com-
inform policy.
There are, therefore, tendencies in the interna-
tional democratic organizations to break with this
practice of blind obedience. An increasing number
of members of these organizations is becoming consci-
ous as to where such practice is leading. They realise
that, for the sake of saving the unity of the interna-
tional democratic movement and restoring the repu-
tation of international democratic organisations, it is
necessary to emancipate these organisations as soon as
possible from dependence on any great power whatso-
ever and to proceed most energetically to return them
to the service of the interests of all progressive man-
kind.
Mfodrag AVRAMOVIC
The Roots of the Present
Policy of Denationalization in
Pirin Macedonia
THE Cominform agents in Bulgaria are preparing
the ground for resettlement of the people of Pirin
Macedonia to the southeast, into the border regions
from where they are now forcibly moving the Turkish
minority. The people living in the shadow of the Pirin
Mountains, are now being subjected to final denation-
alization by these new measures to separate them from
compact masses of the Macedonian people, a part of
whom have set up their own state within the
framework of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia.
The past of the Macedonian people has both its
bright and its dark side. From the moment of their
national awakening, at the beginning of the n'.ne-
teenth century, they have had to fight for economic
and national emancipation from the oppression of the
Turkish feudal system. They have also had to defend
themselves from the tendencies of the incipient bour-
geoisie of neighboring countries to make a colony of
them. In this strenuous struggle against the enemies
of their national independence, the people of Pirin Ma-
cedonia have made great sacrifices and they are still
doing so today.
In the common struggle of the Macedonian people
against denationalization, Pirin Macedonia has had its
own special bright spots in history. The Pirin Moun-
tains sheltered many national heroes, the famed Hai-
duks who fought in select groups against the Turkish
oppressors and all alien attempts to bring misfortune
to the Bulgarian people. Local insurrections were fre-
quent, like the ones in Kresna and Razing on October
9 and November 16th respectively, in 1878.
The creation of the VRMO (Vnatrasna Makedon-
ska Revolucionarna Organizacija - Internal Mace-
donian Revolutionary Organization) in 1893, headed by
Goce Delcev, represented the inception of organized
struggle by the Macedonian people. One of the prin-
ciples of the VMRO, as a real national, progressive or-
ganization and a higher form of expression of the
national consciousness of the Macedonian people, was
stated in the words of Goce Delcev: "The liberation
of Macedonia can only be carried out by Macedonians
themselves." Through the initiative of Goce Delcev
and associates, even the means for organization and
purchase of arms were collected only from their own
sources and all the activities of the organization were
adjusted in every respect to the employment of do-
mestic forces.
The influence of VMRO in Pirin Macedonia was
very widespread. This is especially true of the work
of Goce Delcev himself who came to Bansko in 1896
as a teacher, and of his closest associate Jane San-
danski, who was born in this same place. In propagat-
ing the aims of the VRMO, they linked national libe-
ration up with economic and social emancipation, and
the liquidation of the feudal landlord system. The ac-
tivities of Goce Delcev and his comrades from the
VRMO, their close connections with people who were
spreading socialist ideas, and the mass participation of
the Macedonian people in the organization, were very
disturbing especially to the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and
the court. In Sofia, a Supreme Committee was formed
of mercenary scoundrels. Through these people, known
under the name of Supremists, armed detachments
were set up and operated throughout Macedonia espe-
cially in the mountainous regions of Rile, Rodopa, Pi-
rina and Melesevci, where about 250,000 Macedonians
live. The detachments had the task of infiltrating into
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the VR.MO organization and, through their agents, of
paralyzing the influence of Gocd D'elcev, Jane Sandan-
ski and others. The Supremists did not restrict their
activities to the above, however. They also staged local
rebellions to incite the anger of the Turkish authori-
ties against the VMRO and its people. Even that was
not enough for them, so they organized the assassi-
nation of Goce Delcev, and later Jane Sandanski and
others.
Through their hangmen, the Supremists, the Bul-
garian bourgeoisie and court succeeded in 1910 in
usurping the Macedonian organization, and transform-
ing the national and progressive VMRO into a gang-
ster-like, and later into a monarcho-fascist organization.
The great organizers, popular spokesmen and revo-
lutionnaries Goice Delcev, Jane Sandanski, and many
others were substituted by Todor Aleksandrov,
Aleksandar Protogerov, Petar Culev and later Vanca
Mihajlov. The activity of VMRO, as an organization
of bandits, was concentrated mostly around Pirin Ma-
cedonia, because it was to have served as a jumping-
off place for the denat:onali+zation of all of Macedonia,
and its annexation to the "mother country", to a united
'Bulgaria.
Although the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and the court
were in the past the main culprits for the reactionary
and denationalizing policy pursued toward the Ma-
cedoni,an people, they were not the only ones. The
Bulgarian socialists, known as the "narrow socialists",
who later became communists, (and also the "broad"
ones who were already at that time well-known for
their revisionism) had an opportunistic attitude toward
the Macedonian question We know of the unofficial
statement made by Georgi Kikrov, Secretary of the
BRSDPP ("narrow" socialist) during the Balkan Wars:
"Words are one thing and deeds are another. Mace-
donia is Bulgarian and it is to remain so". Even the
greatest authority in the Party at that time, Dimitar
Blagojev, did not think otherwise, although he was
of Macedonian descent himself.
It is not at all odd, therefore, that the leaders of
the "narrow" socialists were hypocritical in their
behavior toward Dimitrije Tucovic, leader of the
Serbian social democrats. This was demonstrated when
the "narrow socialists" refused the invitation of Dimi-
trije Tucovic to attend the second Balkan Con-
rence. As a pretext, they claimed to have some
sort of principled stand on the question since
the "broad" socialists had also been invited to
the conference at the request of the Croatian
social- democrats. However, the leadership of the
"narow" socialists that had refused to take part in
the conference of Balkan social-democratic parties,
which was supposed to offer moral suport to the Ma-
cedonian people, did not mind at all departing from
its "principled" stand and signing a document, through
Georgi Kikrov, which justified the denationalizing
policy of the government of Ferdinand Coburg in
Macedonia. In their opportunism and dogmatic blind-
ness, the leadership of the "narrow" socialists had an
even more backward point of view than the agrarian
party of Stamboliski when it came to the roamings of
the VMRO organization of bandits in Macedonia and
the threat to the democratic liberties of the Bulgarian
people. Not only did they not support the armed
struggle of the rebelling Bulgarian troops in 1918 after
the defeat at, Dobro Polje and the creation of the Ra-
domir republic in Pirin Macedonia, but they did not
even perceive the danger from the activities of VMRO
which was preparing the June 9th coup. They em-
phasized that they had again taken some sort of prin-
cipled stand on this question, summed up in the words:
"Let the city and village masters give each other a
good beating". The fact that this coup was actually
directed against the working people of town and coun-
try, primarily against the most progressive class, the
working class and its vanguard, the workers' party,
seems to have been of very little significance for them
at all.
The opportunistic stand of the leadership of the
Communist Party of Bulgaria on the national question
of Macedonia, has not changed much even in the era
of the Fatherland Front, which began after September
9, 1944. The only one faithful to internationalism, in
words as well as deeds, was Georgi Dimitrov. But the
correct - policy determined by him on the Macedonian
question, and its application in Pirin Macedonia, was
paralyzed even by his closest associates in the Polit-
buro and the Central Committee of the Bulgarian
Party.
At the end of 1946 and the first half of 1947, :same-
thing was done to give Pi,rin Macedonia cultural au-
tonomy. But the operation of a Macedonian bookstore
in Gornja, Sumaja, the inauguration of a Ma'cedon'a,n
theatre and schools with sections where the Mace-
donian language was taught, were still looked upon at
that time as somenthing suspicious. Finally, when it
was felt that the spreading of Macedonian culture was
taking on increasing magnitude, sinister forces from
the Central Committee started their work. Through
men of the type of General Damianov and similar
persons enjoying the patronage of the USSR, it was
discovered that there was an "urgent need" for some
of the most prominent Macedonians, men who had
taken part in the liberation struggle with the units
of our Army, to withdraw from work in the field and
become active in the Bulgarian Army. Even at the
end of 1947, they were sent to garrisons in Eastern
Bulgaria as military leaders.
After the Cominform Resolution, the hypocrisy of
the leading Bulgarian communists came to the surface
in short order, despite the announcement on which
Georgi Dimitrov had insisted - that the dispute be-
tween the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)
did not mean a cessation of cooperation between Bul-
garia and Yugoslavia. Overnight, the cultural auto-
nomy of Pirin Macedonia was liquidated, and all work
on the dissemination of Macedonian culture and the-
national independence of Pirin Macedonia was stopped.
Lenin's words to the effect that socialists of an op-
pressing nation, if they do not propagate secession of
the oppressed nations, are not socialists, or inter-
nationalists, but chauvinists, can be applied in their
entirety to the leaders of the Communist Party of Bul-
garia.
The most recent undertaking by the Cominform
agents in Bulgaria to resettle the people of Pirin Mace-
donia, thereby subjecting them to ultimate denational-
ization, are not far different from the methods which
the Supremists used to employ in the past as agents
of the Bulgarian court and bourgeoisie.(') What the
Supremists did not succeed in doing with knife and
bomb for the benefit of the creators of the San Stefano
Bulgaria, is now being done under the banner of false
internationalism and the protection of the "great teach-
ers and authorities" from the USSR. In this case,
the Bulgarian Cominformists are not only manifesting
extreme chauvinism, but are acting like the propaga-
tors of the policy of conquest of their patrons from
the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and the Soviet Government. They do not stop
at any means in menacing the independance and free-
dom of other people for the purpose of imposing hege-
mony upon them and realizing their own and their
masters' imperialistic aspirations. St. STOJILJKOVIC
i(l) A valuable contribution for the elucidation of the
policy of denationalization, past and present. toward Mace-
donia and especially Pirin Macedonia, is Disnitar Mitrev's
book "Plrinska Makedonija u Borbi za Nacionalno Oslobo
djenje" (("Pirin Makedonia in the Struggle for National Liibe-
ration"), published by the Principal Committee of the Peo-
ple's Front of Macedonia, Skoplje 1950.
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THE TORQUAY CONFERENCE
T r(" HE organisers of the recently held conference at
i Torquay, England, are showing a tendency to
attribute a remarkable significance to the event as a
means for increasing international trade. It must be
recalled. however, that similar conferences held in the
past, at Geneva and Annecy, which sought the same
objective, had failed to exercise any major influence
on the volume of international trade exchanges. Al-
though the number of the customs privileges mutually
granted by the participating countries ran into several
thousand, it is to be noted that they mainly covered
commodities of secondary importance, and that no ap-
preciable practical advantages did accrue from these
,tops.
The first and basic contradiction about to loom
large at Torquay is the contrast existing between the
low-tariff countries and those adhering to a high pro-
tective tariff policy. The countries of the first group.
particularly Belgium and some Scandinavian coun-
tries, will demand substantial reductions in the cus-
tonrs tariffs not only of U. S., but of France and Ger-
many as well. In doing so, however, they do not re-
gard themselves as bound to grant any concessions on
their own part, having long ago, with their liberal
import policy, sufficiently contributed to the expansion
of international trade. Many obstacles will have to
be overcome before the conference could meet the
desire of such countries, since the tariffs of some eco-
nomically stronger ones (Germany, France, Italy) had
been considerably raised recently with a view to secur-
ing corresponding economic concessions in return fo-
a subsequent reduction of same. This expedient was
resorted to in emulation of U. S. customs policy, after
the signatories of the "General Tariff and Trade Agre-
snent" (GATT) had adopted at previous conferences
the quid pro quo principle in their dealings, namely
the granting of concessions solely in compensation of
-oncessions obtained.
The conference is bound to witness an assault by
the politically and economically weaker countries on
another principle established at the preceding GATT
conferences - the principle of the "leading supplier".
According to the provisions of the "General
Agreement", customs concessions may be asked
from a partner only by that country which is
his largest supplier of the commodity involved (in
which case the benefits naturally extend to all the
other member states). The practical meaning of this
provision is that the interests of the "leading supplier"
countries will frequently restrain them from insisting
on a tariff reduction so as to uphold their positions -
the very fact that they hold first place in the import
of individual countries signifies that they had already
managed to render inofens've all the -other competitors
here.
According to certain information, the delegations
at Torquay will endeavour to secure some advantages
also in such spheres which bear no strict relation to
the customs tariffs themselves. The French, for exam-
ple, will demand the regulation of the international
market for certain key raw materials, both in respect
of distribution and prices. At the same time a whole
series of countries is due to support another French
proposal which is in line with the American policy -
the demand for the abolition or at least considerable
reduction of the British imperial preferential tariffs.
The type of British reaction to be expected on that
score is anything but difficult to guess: a most vehe-
ment re& stance to any attempt, no matter haw limited
in scope, levelled at the privileges Britain keeps hold-
ing at the cost of so much effort.
Western Germany is to appear for the first time at
these GATT negotiations. It will try some skilled
manoeuvreing with her new customs tariffs in order
to gain the highest possible concessions in connection
with the export of her pharmaceutical, chemical and
optical products to the other GAAT member states.
The U. S. government, on whose inititiave the
present session had been actually called (many coun-
tries had favoured its postponement both because of
the present world political situation, and bacause no-
thing special is expected to result from it), is likely to
support the majority of the demands for reduced cus-
toms tariffs. Tariff concessions in combination with the
liberalisation of imports, namely the gradual abolition
of quantitative restrictions between the Marshall Plan
countries and the functioning of the European Pay-
ments Union, are assigned a major role in the smooth-
ing out of the last obstacles in international trade.
The countries of Europe, whose renunciation of certain
foreign exchange and commercial-political instruments
was mainly due to tenacious U. S. insistence, however,
have come to regard tariffs as the only effective
weapon still left to them for the implementation of
their separate aims and the safeguarding of their
interests.
As regards other issues, the question of compe-
tition between capitalist states for the capture of suit-
able markets could scarcely arise amidst the current
boom brought about by the war preparations. The dif-
ficulties met in obtaining all sorts of supplies, from
raw materials and consumer goods to capital invest-
ment goods, would be a rather more opportune topic
for discussion just now. In such circumstances cus-
toms tariffs cease to represent barriers capable of
obstructing the marketing of eventual export surpluses.
It may, therefore, be assumed that the Torquay con-
ference will be able to achieve a measure of success
since the many countries will not consider it necessary
to oppose the demands for tariff reductions.
In contrast to the American efforts, the West Eu-
ropean delegations on their part will bid for a reduc-
tion in U. S. tariffs, which would help their countries
t:o increase their exports to U. S. A. and improve their
payments balances and dollar reserves. Although the
U. S. government has been making repeated promises
to do so, it has so far failed to effect any appreciable
reductions in its high customs tariffs. In so far as
the attitude of the American delegation should prove
more yielding in this respect, the other countries would
be more disposed to grant concessions on their own
part. The outcome of the Torquay conference will,
therefore, be largely determined by the tenacity with
which the U. S. A. will pursue its views and on its
readiness to grant the concessions demanded for its
import duty reductions.
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NOTES ON A TRIP TO ENGLAND
IT is with satisfaction that I
noticed that you (the working
men of England - Z. P.) have none
of that awful curse of national pre-
judices and national arrogance
which in the long run are nothing
but general selfishness. I noticed
that you hold dear all who seriously
turn their forces to the progress of
mankind - be he an Englishman
or not -- and that you admire all
that is great and good regardless of
whether it is nurtured in your na-
tive land or not".
These words of Friedrich Engels,
which I read and noted while still
in Belgrade, have been fully con-
firmed during my visit to England
where I often came into touch with
these same men either in West Ham
or in Lanesmouth, in Pigswoode or
in Leeds, in Birmingham or in Lon-
don, with these men who have even
further developed these virtues of
which a great and cultural people
can truly be proud of. At the same
time we realized how important it
was to see conditions in another
country with one's own eyes and to
become acquainted with the life of
its people.
MANY MANY of the great, classical
works by Charles Dickens are
being translated in Yugoslavia today.
During our sojourn in England, a
prominent state official who knew
that Dickens was very popular in
Yugoslavia, thought it necessary to
point out that the England of today
differs from that of Dickens' time,
from Victorian England. And that
is indeed true. But I should like to
underline that the England of to-
day also differs greatly from the
pre-war England (before World War
Two) and that these differences are
palpably manifested in the life of
the broad sections of the population
and in the economy of the country.
Whereas mass unemployment before
the war was the usual thing - in
- 1939, for example, there were
1,349,600 unemployed - today the
Labour Government has ensured
full employment to workers. In 1949
there were only 243,000 unemployed
which means 1.6 per cent of the to-
tal number of workers (with man-
power shortage, for example, in the
mining areas). A visible result of
the nationalization and moderniza-
tion of mines is a higher living
standard of the miners as compared
with the pre-war period, so. that
today ?m'ners in England, especially
pit workers, are better off than
ever before. If we are to grasp to
the full extent the successes achiev-
ed by the Labour Gov; rnment in
eliminating unemployment we
should recall that after the war the
Government was faced with the dif -
ficul?t problem of closing dawn a
whole series of military establish-
m nts while simultaneously secur-
ing jobs for about four mi15'on men
who worked in those plants, and
finding work for the demobilized
troops who were at a - truly
rapid rate leaving their units.
The certainty of full employ-
ment a constant increase of pro-
duction and a better distribution of
the national income, can be felt at
every step in that country, and the
Labour party rightly considers this
its biggest success. All this elo-
quently bears out that the present-
day England differs greatly not
only from the England of Dickensian
times - ruin of weavers in the tex-
tile mills, debtors prisons, unbear-
able conditions of life in the facto-
ries, working days of 15 to 16
hours, etc. - but also from the pre-
war England.
A T the time of the struggles for
Parliamentary reforms, Free
Trader William Cobbctt, &ddressin.,
the men of England in 1816, wrote
in his paper the "Political Regis-
ter":
"I beg of you to employ peaceful
and lawful means, but at the same
time to work zealously and with
determination so as to attain the
goal".
These words of William Cobbett,
written almost one hundred and
fifty years ago, reflect the deep-
rooted conceptions of the English
people. and are also characteristic
of the post-war course of Great
Britain.
All those who refuse to realize
that many reforms have been car-
ried through in post-war England
in a specific way - not according
to patterns imported from abroad -
are in fact denying, sullying and
belittlling the significance of all that
has been achieved in that country
in the field of nationalization,
healt, food-supply, etc. How and
how much was done we shall not
discuss here, The fact remains that
Britain's economic posit'on today is
more favourable than it was earlier
(a balance of payments has been
achieved this year, coal output has
increased, mining and transport are
being modernized), that the Labour
Government has, through the na-
tionalization of steel, fulfilled one
of its important electoral promises
and added a very active branch to
the nationalized industries. Thus
one fifth of the country's wealth
has so far been nationalized in Bri-
tain. It is also a fact, which w
checked on he spot, that the free
health services in Britain are at a
truly enviable level. In order to
ensure real wages. to the working
people, the Government from its
budgetary means grants 410 mil-
lion pounds of subventions annually
for essential foodstuffs (guaranteed),
etc., etc. By means of progressive
income tax assessments, huge
inheritance taxes, which the Labour
Government has increased, the ca-
pitalists in Britain have been pre-
vented from gathering in a good
deal of all they accumulated before
the war. (The main share-holder of
a big sugar refining trust d_ed some
time ago. His heir had to pay huge
inheritance taxes, and the British
papers write today that if he were
to die shortly a great_r part of the
property of the trust would go to
the state in the form of inheritance
taxes). The capitalists endeavour to
evade these heavy payments by
means of various devices.
All that we were able to see dur-
ing our one-month's sojourn in
Britain eloquently bears out that
her people are building up their
future in their own specif'c way
and that the role played in this
respect by the Labour Government
is important and decisive, that
present-day England differs quali-
tatively from that of Dickens' times
and thatt it would be difficult to
find any internal force which
would be able to turn back all that
has been achieved by the people of
Britain. And that these achieve-
ments are no small ones is best con-
firmed by the anxiety of the big
capitalists who feel they are hard
hit by the latest steel nationaliza-
titon measures and who are doing
all they can to prevent the' imple-
mentation of the law on the na-
tionalization of this industry.
Zdravko PEeAR
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1'HRO.'G'H THE FOG OF PR OPAG ANNA
Mr. Marceau's Tale About a Land He Never Saw
W KITING ABOUT SOMEONE
OR SOMETHING IS REALLY
CONSIDERABLE EFFORT if the
writer wants to describe the whole
truth effectively for the reader. All
suitable means are used to this end,
various handbooks, newspaper and
radio communiques, etc., etc., But f
a person wants to write about some-
thing, especially the situation in
a certain country, whether he is a
writer or a newspaperman, the best
thing for him to do is to visit that
country and get the material for
%s s work on the spot. Its value will
then depend on his skill in writing
and his realistic portrayal of the si-
tuation and events there.
Judging things from this angle,
it, would seem that it is even more
difficult to write about a country
without having any information on
it, without knowledge of the facts,
and particularly without having
visited it. And ghat is the way it
really is if one wants to give an
objective portrayal or make a judg-
ment. However, if all one wants to
do is to reason arbitrarily and draw
certain conclusions without knowing
the facts, in the absence of any
ethics whatsoever, then no intellec-
tual effort is necessary.
The Athens correspondent of the
Paris evening newspaper, "Le
Monde". M. Marceau, avoided mak-
ing any effort whatsoever in writ-
ing from Athens something that.
resembles both an article and a re-
portage about Yugoslavia, which his
home office published on the third
of this month. In his story, he was
rather clumsy about linking up
several factors which have no mu-
tual connection whatsoever. First of
all. he writes about "Titoism", by
which he discloses what inspired his
article. Then he goes or tc complain
about certain British correspondents
in Belgrade whom he reproaches for
being prejudiced about Yugoslavia,
which they had visited or were vi-
siting. In the meantime, he forgot
from where he was "objectively"
writing about Yugoslavia, which he
himself had never visited.
In order to conceal from his edi-
inns and the public the real buyer
of his story, Mr. Marceau writes in
a hodge-podge manner. He mixes
two styles of writing: first, a stand-
dard anti-Yugoslav sentence- or
passage, and immediately following
it one of ' Mr. Marceau's own addi-
tions. Finally, this double-duty
newspaperman shows h's cards,
concluding his article with the as-
sertion that it is inevitable that
"Tito, since he wants to be ndepend-
ent, must pay the price".
Mr. Marceau's exposition of the
"Yugoslav situation" itself is not so
important, for it is the most ordinary
kind of mass production item in
which the public has no interest.
What is interesting though, is the
way a correspondent cast deceive
his home office, passing off on it a
story camouflaged with apparent
objectivity and pretty words which
it would probably never ask him
for since he is the correspondent
from Athens, not Belgrade. But
anyway, making up stories is not
a new thing with dishonest news-
men.
-F HE BEST WAY TO AVOID
1 DENIALS of false news is to
wait a while and print the new:;
after the publication of the denial
itself. The latter may then be con--
, idered out of date in view of the
?~arlier date of its publication. In
such a case, a false news item, pub-
lished after its denial, retains the