THE VLASOV MOVEMENT, 1940-1945

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R006200040004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 21, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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 NO. OF ENCLS. 1
(LISTED BELOW)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
COUNTRY USSR/Germany DATE DISTR. 21 June 1951
SUBJECT The Vlasov i? ovement, 1940 - 1945 NO. OF PAGES 1
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50
U. 5 C.. 31 AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO.
HIBI TED BY LAW REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 50X1-HUM
STATE
ARMY
NAVY
TAIR
CLASSIFICATION JO"NFIUINTIAL/CONT toI,-U.S. I%FPICIALS ONLY
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The VLAQV Movement 192,.0 50X1-HUM
Its Origins
The formation of a Russian national anti-Communist movement with the
nucleus of an administration, with armed. forces and with elaborate apparatus
for propaganda and ideological discussion, as vie know it in the later
stages of the last war, was not the result of a planned action of a single
mind and will. It emerged as the result of circumstances which none of the
protagonists had clearly foreseen or expected a few weeks before and it is
this feature of it which makes it particularly interesting. It should not
be regarded as a planned action of the German High Command, nor as one
forced upon thorn by some Russian groups Which at a later date played an
important part in the movement.
Two days before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war Rosenberg made
a speech to "those most closely connected with the Eastern problem!' in which
he laid cloven the princi-plus of German policy towards Russia as well as the
general lines on which he intended to carry out the mandate given him by
the I/t.hrer for the administration of the Eastern area. "There is no doubt,"
he e,ays, "that we are faced by two strongly opposed cnnceptions of the East:
the common one and the one which I believe we should follow". The common
one amounted to a will to fight the vrar against the Red Army to a victorious
end and then restore the Russian realm under German leadership and with
German assistance so that its natural resources would be subordinated to the
German policy of world hegemony. This idea Rosenberg rejected completely.
"Thu call of the East", the fascination which Rosenberg himself admitted to
have oq erienced, appeared to him a danger for the future relations between
Russia and a victorious Goniv,ny. Those Germans who would go as organisers,
advisers, controllers and administrators to Russia, would necessarily succumb
to the danger of the Magic of the East; they would be fascinated by the
magnitude of the opportunities which the activity in the East opened to them,
they would(probably themselves and in any case their children) become attached
to the East and in fifty years Germany would be faced with the same problem
with which it was then at grips, the solo difference being that under German
leadership Russia would have become an oven more formidable and efficient
adversary. This is why Rosenberg decided to abandon the traditional German
attitude towards Russia and place it by a policy of "dismemberment of the
Russian realm" based on the fulfilment of the aspirations of Greater Finland,
of a Baltic ruled by the Gez-nians, championing the cause of Ukrainian separatists
and of the separatists of the Caucasian nations and tribes. What would remain
of Russia proper would then suffer an enormous lowering in its stand.-rd of lid's
lirobably combined with a vary considerable decrease in population. This "hare
decision had however to be taken and appeared to Rosenberg to be ideologically
justified in view of the racial inferiority of the Russian, who in spite of hds
charm, intelligence and artistic inclination, lack din his character the very
substance which would make him the equal of the civilized western man.
It would be interesting to know to whom actually the speech of the 20th
Juno, i9G3 was addressed and whp the "engste boteiligto an, Ostproblem" werrp.
The principles and motives of which Rosenberg's speech gave a nicer idea
remained, however, concealed from persons in very high positiona,uspecially in
the army, to whom the occupation of Russia was entrusted in the first place.
Strik-Strikfoldt montionoc that neither Fioldmarshal Bock, with whom he was
working in close collaboration, nor even von Brauchitch, had any idea of what
was planned for Russia. The Ftthrer's spouch at the outbreak of hostilities
stated vaguely that the struggle was not against the Russian people, but
against the- Communist regime; but it did not five any intimation of What was
to source CONFIDENTIAL
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As 18,5.50
in store for the pop '} $~fu o
1Qc~n ccupied territories. Von Bock asked Strik-
Strikf'oldt a f ow woo 'o or the invasion of Russia to go to Berlin and find
out in the Ostministeriupr what was going to happen, but Strik-Strikfeldt
was not able to got complete cla. ity about the inter .ons of the Ostministoriura,
in spite of tiis connections, and was told that this would emerge naturally when
the armirfatration of the Reichzkorx-rissftro would be finally act up.
Thu reasons for keeping Rosenberg's master plan secret are obvious: he
did not want to jeopardize the military effort of the German army by stiffening
the resistance of the enemy and playing into the hands of the newly inaugurated
patriotic propaganda from Moscow. He also possibly did not want to undermine
the morale of German officers who wore not in sympathy with the Naai Welt-
axisehauung and might have scruples about serving as instruments of a policy
which was contrary to their conscience and to their aspirations based on the
"call of the East", the power of which was so well known to Rosenberg. The
effect of this secrecy concerning the ultimate war aims in the East was that
the German officers were left to improvise a policy of their own, largely based
on the antiquated conception denounced by Rosenberg. In this spirit they
began setting,.amilitary adminstration and making declarations to the
bewildered population of the occupied territories, who approached them with
the question: "What is going to become of us?"
In order to understand the bewilderment of the population in the
susnur of 1941 one should bear in mind that the war came to them as a complete
surprise. The Soviet press and radio propaganda since the autumn of 039 had
been explaining to the people that the Soviet Union had nothing whatever to do
with the "second imperialist war". Criticism of countries under a Nazi or
Fascist regime was extremely restrained and the picture given of those
countries was not a shade darker than that of the remaining "capitalist world"
in which the freedom-loving, toiling masses were oppressed. It was generally
lcaolrn and vddely broadcast that, if a war was going to be fought, it would be
fought victoriously "on the enemy's territory". It was believed that the
Germans had their hands full in the West. This belief was confirmed by the
success of Soviet diplomatic action which led to a considerable aggrandizement-
of the Union in 1939 and 1940 -vdthout bloodshed or sacrifices, if one discounts
the Soviet-Finnish war. The broadcast of Molotov's speech, which announced
the outbreak of hostilities, did little to allay the shock effect of the invasion
and there was no authoritative statement until the 3rd July (the first speech
by Stalin) by which time large portions of the Soviet Union were occupied by
the Germans. The prevailing mood of the population in the Western strip of the
Union which had been occupied by the Red Army in 1939-40, was that at last the
uhortl:Lved reign of terror had ended. Further east,thc people met the Germans
with an open mind, believing that now that the Communist stage in the history
of Russia hall come to an end, terms must be found for a modus vivendi with
the new military masters. There is ample evidence that inside the Union the
prevailing mood was that whatever might hap-eon, "this is going to be the and
of the present regime, at least in the form we know it". People in the
occupied territories accepted the change as an unforeseen cataclysm after
which life had to be organised in a new way. In what way,they had in the great
majority no inkling, because they never expected the change to come so suddenly
and had no opportunity to discuss what the order of things,which they would
prefer to life in the Soviet Union,should be. It took there quite a time to
realize that the; invader had made no statement of future policy which might
become the object of discussion, acceptance or rejection. They were ready
to believe any statement made by the local Guinan officer in command and to
cooperate with him, provided he showed a human and understanding attitude.
They immediately came out with a number of offers relating to the
administration of their district, putting forward their requests and demands
and offering their services to secure order, transport and public services.
'hose offers naturally reflected the aspirations of various types of Soviet
peogle and everyone was eager to be the first to put his view forward to the
Germans and get their sup.>ort for thu line of policy which he advocated.
Some of this rivalry was bitter and might seem surprising to anybody who
believes that the population of the Soviet Union has been ground down by 30
I n-11 r-. /years of the
CO :11A ~r? I
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18.5.50
years of the Soviet regime to a homogeneous mass. This is by no moans true,
as is shovm by the wide divergence of political views which cxiorgud as soon as
a free discussion of political matters was started. The only cornaon denomi-
nator was a general anti-Comrzunist attitude which manifested itself in this
great "all-national discussion which took place in every peasant hut which
had. boon liberated from the Soviets in every village, town, Ostarboitor camp,
volunteer or partisan detachment, everywhere that the Soviet citizens of
ywstorday found themselves -together". (Draft of the programme of SBONR. Borba,
6.7.4+9.) In this situation the German army and the administration which
followod it found no difficulty in recruiting the necessary numbers of police,
municipal workers, burgomeisters and so on, whom they tried to control through
the intermediary of Russian emigres, enrolled as interpreters and liaison agents.
1t took the population only a few weeks, however, to realise that the new
situation loft no scope for any political activity of theirs, nor for the ful-
filment of oven the most modest of their aspirations. Mho tactlessness and
stupidity of the Roichskoi-anissars' administration, the wanton and advertised
cruelty with which the hardest decisions made in Berlin concerning the requisi-
tion of food supplies, labour, deportation of labour to the Reich, extermina-
tion of Jevws, and so on, wore carried out, was fully exposed and deplored by
the Germans themselves. There is no necessity to dwell on this point here.
Cooperation with the Germans was very soon transformed into a kind of system-
atic double-crossing. The Russians who approached the G-en-aans trying to
influence their policy locally, soon learned that the only argument which
would be considered was that of political expediency on a small scale. In
order to satisfy any immediate need of the population, or to prevent the
carrying out of measureswhich meant great hardship and actual extermination to
the people, one had to argue that this would be the easier, simpler and
cheaper way to satisfy the German demands. Professor Grimm, who became a
close collaborator of Archbishop Sergius in Riga immediately after the entry
of the Gerri~uis, has given a vivid picture of this technique. His special
interest was in securing religious services in the orthodox communities in
the area of the three Baltic States as well as in the Pskov district. The
ro unption of public worship in places where it had been abandoned for years
was originally one of the most cherished manifestations of liberty from Soviet
control. People who had little knowledge of the elements of the Christian faith,
did not know any prayers and had never read the Gospel, insisted on having
churches and getting the sacraments performed as a kind of restitution of
their status as persons with a free conscience. This, of course, was not the
way things could be put to the Germans. But a few weeks of practical exper-
ience persuaded them that the presence of a priest and the interest in the
restoration of church life would favourably affect the morale of the popu-
lation and that much could be won in this way. The same applied to the way
in which, in spite of original opposition, the Ostministerilmi was finally
persuaded to dissolve the collective farms and introduce private ownership
of the land by the peasavnts.
Under these circumstances the population soon understood that no improve-
ment of their situation would be possible during the war and without the
interference of a strong political force which would counter-balance and
oppose the arbitrary rule of the Reichskoru:iissars' administration and the
S.D. This drove the politically-conscious elements in the population towards
the German array. As soldiers of the German army or even of the Vlaffon S.S.
they wore to a certain extent protected from being treated as 'Untormonsch'.
As commanders of detachments of Russian volunteers performing police duties,
rounding up detachments of the Red Army vfnich were cut off by the swift advance
of the Germans and roamed the forests, and rendering other services, officers
wore in a position to protect villages from senseless punitive expeditions
and the arbitrariness of the local German Cor_unissars. The Koch administration
complained bitterly of being impeded in its policy of ruthless exploitation by
such volunteer detachments. The army which h