REPORT OF(Sanitized)FORMER SOVIET ARMY SERGEANT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R001000010012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 11, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

:OUNTRY USSR
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CLASSIFICATION SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION REPORT 25X1A
25)AJECT Report of
Former
'LACE
kCQUIRED
71ATE OF WO
Sovlet Army Sergeant
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CIA Library
"LIBRARY COPY"
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
une 1914
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTEO BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
39698
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Soviet Army Units in the Soviet Far Last
33 TopograAic Detachment: In the fall of 1940 this unit, of approximately
battalion strength, was stationed in Volochasvak golochaevka, 134-42, 48-3.g.
The unit operated out of the city, making topographic surveys of the area a;T:
preparing relief maps in some detail. The purpose of the surveys often re,eatc0
for particular areas at periodic intervals, was to establish artillery landlark
2. 12 Automobile/anent; In March 1942 the personnel complement of this rep.,ix-elm
D.ocation unstatea/ was much larger than that of the normal Soviet Army reg4.ment.
There were ten battalions, rather than the usual three or four, in this reg:ment
3. .....1p_220IndeikaUsgOilmalt. In early May 1942 the headquartere of this wit,
which had been recently formed, was located about sixty kilometers south of
Khabarovsk. For a time, the unit was billeted under severe field condition:73
later, it was transferred to permanent barracks. The initial period of hares. ip
was a testing period, during which the most severe critics and persistent
complainers were removed from the unit as potentially disloyal elements. Tiv
brigade was well equipped with British and 1KV" tanks. It contained a high
percentage of Communist Party and Komsomol Dersonnel, which fact indicated thac.
the brigade vas intended eventually to become an NKVD unit.
4. ......4_310220113.dettanIsisde: At the same time as the 203 was being estab:f1%,)di
the 204 Independent Tank Brigade mug being formed at Bira J33-14, 48-1g,
Birobidzhan.
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5. Numbering of Soviet Units: Units of the Soviet Army were not numbered
but the numbers were assigned at random and frequently changed for security
reasons.
12A.....et.a.s122E_CsireSoviettAr East
6. The total population of all labor camps in the USSR in 1942 was approximately
14,000,000. At least seventy per cent of the population of the USSR at one t4i
or another had been incarcerated in the camps. This condition was consideree
normal; for example, one of the standard questions asked of job applicants
"Under which article did you serve your hard labor?" The majority
relatives and friends had served terms ranging from three months to three
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7. Economic, rather than political, considerations were primarily responsible fez
the labor camp system. When a new project was announced, mass arrests might taLe
place under artificially created charges. An example of a sentence to a leeca
camp on trumped-up charges for reasons of expediency was the case of an emeetafe
sergeant of engineers who had been working on the construction of a river tunlel
connecting the Ussuri and Amur Railways. The work was treacherous, and tee
were many casualties caused by the changes in air pressure, which was kepe aigh
in the tunnel. On completion of the project, the sergeant, whose personnel war!:
involeed the notification of next of kin, was sentenced to eight years in tele
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labor camps, apparently for no other reason than that he was an undebiratie
witness to the miserable working conditions of his unit.
8.
9 .
%Agosauclsty0 W40 emeosea unaer Article 58, Clause 10 L? of the military cr-iminal codi!?
which covered "enemies of the people," conspirators against the state and agentR
of foreign powers. In addition to receiving severe treatment in the iabol, ete6i-A,
and being automatically exempted from "privileged" technical jobs, prisonere
sentenced under this article had their passports stamped with the letters ?D.X,
which signified the permanent forfeiture of certain benefits.
The Soviet penal code considered persons from the age of twelve onward reL2z2tila-.1
for their actions; therefore, the age range in the labor camps was great.
Prisoners were divided into two groups: ordinary criminals ("bytoviki") eni
political prisoners, with the first group receiving more lenieht treatment.
A non-political murderer might draw a sentence of as little as five years.
Furthermore, ordinary criminals received preferential work assignments in till
casco and were eligible for amnesties, from which political prisoners were
exempted. Intellectuals received the hardest treatment and were bullied both
by the guards and by the criminal prisoners.
10. Work output of the prisoners was carefully graded according to established: "no'
standards, and only prisoners meeting those standards were granted the full oui
ration. Prisoners failing to meet the standard were dropped to a lower gran)
gith a smaller ratiog, and this change resulted in increased weakness anl
eventual death unless they were fortunate enough to be sent to special came
recuperation.
11. The Khabarovsk #5 Camp furnished manual labor for the power plant at Khaba:o1.81_
In 1942 it contained about five hundred prisoners and had a guard complet-ont
three platoons, consisting of one officer and thirty-two men per platoon.
12. The usual ratio of guardsto prisoners in inhabited areas or near the bordor wvt
one to five. The number of guards decreased rapidly in proportion to the diste
from populated zones and border areas.
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13. There were said to be many labor camps in the Yakutsk Province fi Yakut A.S.S.L7e7
some sixty of which were devoted exclusively to gold mining. Camps in the
Indigirka giver, 142-06, 63-17 region contained large numbers of Chinese,
who were former residents of the Maritime and Amur Provinces, and there weeet
a few Chinese in the other camps. All had been incarcerated in 1937 and al-!.
were sentenced under the same article--"treason to the state." This sentenee
created a legal puzzle for the prisoners: which state had they betrayed?
14. At approximately the same time as the segregation of the Chinese in the
Maritime Province, Koreans living there were resettled in Kazakhstan.
Economic Conditions in the Soviet Far East
15. For the bulk of the population of the Soviet Far East, living conditions impr)-ed
gradually from an all-time low in the early 1920's. A peak in relative pro8p3fit?
was reached in 1936, at which tire all rationing and other restrictions were
removed and the stores were amply supplied with consumer commodities. Howevee
unrestricted trade was of brief duration, and rationing was soon reinstated.
The stores of goods accumulated during unrestricted buying were confiscete:1 be
the government, and the larger hoarders were charged with speculation.
16. The Peasants of the Soviet Far East had been fully collectivized, and prielte
holdings were permitted only within the framework of the collective fares
(kolkhozii). An individual collective farmer was permitted to have a email
private plot, a cow and a few hens, and the only part of this private propeeke
which actually assured a minimum living was the ground itself, since it, -tt"
carefully cultivated, would yield some produce for home consumption and fer SC .0
on the open market. However, the farmer was required to pay the State Tractor
Station for the use of tractors, and this payment usually was made in kine.
Furthermore, the farmer was taxed on the cow and chickens he possessed, at tbc
rate of three hundred liters of milk, thirty-six kilograms of meat, and oee hie
a year per cow, and thirty eggs per chicken with no exemption for young hr-J1c or
roosters. These assessments obviously necessitated recourse to the black larPet
in order to meet the taxes.
17. The annual rate of taxation on grain was determined each spring by a cempe,ttee
from the nearest city. The cnairman of the collective farm took the members ot
the committee to a specimen field of good, of medium, and of poor productivity.
The number of stalks of grain per given area in each category was counted, alad
the rate of taxation and compulsory, sale was simply based on this figure.
18. If the chairman of the collective farm was a farmer himself gnd not a Party
membeET he was careful never to exhibit the best examples, with the result 1?14t
the estimate was below, rather than above, the actual anticipated yield. F07
ever, when a Party member was made chairman of the farm the results were dAsds;?.
for the individual farmers. A faithful Party member, mindful of the rewarJe fn.
his ?en efficiency, saw to it that the estimate was rade as high as possible
leaving little if any grain for the individual farmer.
19. Other potential enemies of the
kolkhoz Party organization and
planners, agronomists, tractor
sent of the kolkhoz. The work
the fictitious "work-day," and
ordinary farmer.
collective farmers were the secretary of tt
the various non-member specialists (economle
drivers, etc.) brought in to assist in th.,D 4.1va;,-;
of these specialists was estimated on the b.:sis
the liberal estimate greatly exceeded that ei tie
20. The difficult living conditions of the city dweller were chiefly caused by
insufficient remuneration for work, heavy taxation, and lack of freedom wi,-5n
a job or of freedom to change jobs. The possibilities of being granted a
to change jobs were slight, and being repeatedly late to work, absent witheet
permission, or below the established minimum in production made the worker liaL
to imprisonment in a labor camp. '
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21. The one profession in the Soviet Far East which retained some elements of free
enterprise was gold mining. There were a few families of private gold miners,
whose experience was utilized by the government by allowing them to enter into
contracts with the government. Illegal mining was prevented by prohibiting the
surrender of raw gold in return for a gold certificate, redeemable in commodities,
an arrangement which might be used for turning in finished gold products.
However, the regulation was often evaded by melting raw gold into rude finished
forms.
Minority Groups in the USSR
22. The Russian people, in particular the Great Russians, were more victimized by
the Soviet system than were the other national minorities. In particular, the
proportion of Yakuts, BurYats, etc., in the labor camps was quite small, even
considering the respective ratios of their population.
23. There was great hatred among people of these minority groups toward the Soviet
system and a tendency to identify the system with the Russian peopae. There was
also considerable anti-Semitism both among minority groups and the Russian people
themselves, and many Jews were compelled to conceal their origin and to adopt
Russian names.
Public Opinion the
. Stalin was neither loved nor hated, but was considered merely a puppet of the
Communist Party. Lenin, an the other hand, was still much respected, and his
death was considered a great blow. Trotsky, despite his great early poptilarity,
was completely forgotten.
. Propaganda alone would not be effective in altering the belief of the people in
the Soviet system, because of their ignorance of the outside world, their general
feeling that conditions abroad were worse than in the USSR, and the constant
incitement to xenophobia. In discussing his own reaction to war propaganda,
source said, "We realized that under the Soviet system we had very little, but
this little we were prepared to defend to the last. We really believed that
there was a capitalist conspiracy against our country."
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