DAILY REVIEW OF THE ARABIC PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R000800040018-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 6, 1946
• Content Type: REPORT

DAILY REVIEW OF THE ARABIC PRESS
For Distribution to U.S. Embassy Personnel only.
EMBASSY OF THE U.S.A.. CAIRO.EGYPT.
.110RUING P/IPERS.,
STURDY March 6t11, 1948
Marshall plan for Egypt and
the Middle East.
Undor the abovo headline, ilkhbF El Yom, the pro?
govornmont wookly, publishes a story Wtitton-by its Washing?
ton corespondent, ,Goorgo Williams, in which ho
says: "I learned from a wall?informed source that the Middle
East would benefit in the near future from a plan similar
to the Marshall plan for Europa. Although it was rumoured
in the past that tho Middle East might bo helped by Amorica,
this is the first timo the rumour has boon confirmed official?
ly,; It is understood in Washington that it may be weeks or
months before the U.S. govornmont takos a definite stop in
this matter, but there is every indication that Washington
will soon put the plan into offoct.
"Tho official i",merican circles are well aware that
the Communist influonce is incroasing rapidly in some countries
of he Middle East and that it will continue to increase
unless something is done to chock it. They also know that
ignorance, poverty, and disease in the Middle East make this
region a suitable place for communism to sow its scads.
They believe that no action which may be taken to combat
communism is effective unless some dcfinito stops are taken
to combat poverty, ignorance, and disease first.
"1J-though the U.S. government asked the Congress to
a7Trovo the expenditure of 16 billion dollars for the Marshall
plan, it is believed that the sum of money needed to help
the Middle East will only be between 2 and 3 billion dollars".
LE 100,000,000 for EL;ypt.
Under the above headline, i4.khbar El Yam comments on
the above story by saying: "Marshall plan would mean, as far
as Egypt IA concerned, that Egypt would got from L.morica about
LY2, 100,000)000 in the first year. This =nay will not be
a loan but a gift. Egypt would receive the major part of
this money in the shape of food, and agricultural-and indus.
trial machincry, small part will be in cash.
"We oontaptod NoIrrashi Pasha at a late hour last
night to ask if he roceivpd official news from IlMorica about
State Dept. review completed
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SATURDAY March 6th, 1948.
the subject. He replied that he knew nothing about it,
and refused to make any comment.
Akhbar El _Yom's editorial comment.
Under the headline "Vic and the Marshall plan", Akhbar
El Yon writes: "If the U.S. State Department succeeds in
=IT: up and putting into effect a Marshall plan for Egypt
and the Middle East, as our Washington Correspondent says,
America would be doing herself, the world, and the Middle
East a service.
"No doubt, Egypt and the-Arab countries welcome such
a plan if it is based on a desire to help them and not to
exploit them. Povertyl_ignorancc? and disease, are the natural
allies of communism and combatting these three evils is tar,ta-
mount to combatting-communism, We know that such a plan would
be difficult to pass in the Congress, because there aro some
men among America's loaders who although very short-sighted
are apparently so influential that they succeeded in making
their government support the partition of Palestine, and
reject Egypt's complaint at the Security Council. The Zionists
of Lmorica will oppose any plan by Marshall for helping the
Arab countries; right from the start while it is still in the
?radio. They will bring pressure to boar on the American
State'Dcpartment to make it don y that it intends to put such
a plan into effect in the Middle East.
"Tho Arab countries arc the firs't lino of defence.
between Communism and democracy. Unless this line is strong,
it will collapse and democracy will collapse with it. Tho
Middle East is in effect a victim of damecracy. The policy
of Imperialism and exploitation led to its poverty and werLk-
noss. Democracy is tasty but cannot be digested by weak and
Ompty stomachs.
"We do not wish to be too optimistic. Politics taught
us not to believe in promises and to suspect everybody and
everything. We therefore wait and sec."
Yemen.
Interesting stories by Akhbar El Yon,
Al Lisril oma Nussamarat Al Guoib.
Under the headline: The Yemenite government threatens
the League, Akhbar El You publishes a message received from
its correspondent in Jiddah in which he says that the scouts
which wore sent by the .4,rab League to Yemen to investigate the
situation there before tho League sent its delegation which
included Azzam Pasha and other senior Arabs, have submitted
their roport to Azara pasha at Jiddah. The Correspondent
then goes on to give the following r?m?f the report in
question:- The Sanafa government did not enable the League
mission to visit the various parts of Yemen on the pretext
that there was danger of attack against the members of-the
mission., Soif 1 Haq Ibrahim was not appointed P.M. in the
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SZ,TURDLY March 6th 1948.
now rogimo, but Pr'eSidont of the Consultative Council.
Tho Primo Minister of tho now govornmont is ,415. Ibn 1,bdul1ah
211 1:;azoor, cousin of the now imam, and ho already loft Sanata
at tho head of an army to fight Prince thmod.
"Imam W9zoor swore .on his honour to the mission that
ho had nothina, to do. with the murder of tho into Imam, but
it is generally believed in Yemen that tho murderer was none other
than .tho chief of tho police Jamal l Jamool who was persua-
ded to commit the crime by tho British officials in 41don.
The report alleges that it is quite possible that the British
had a hand in the murder because they sent a warship to 411
Hodayida after tho murder on a courtosy visit to 'Yemen.
"Tho Yemenito government expressed their hot displea-
sure at tho attitude of tho 4,11ab League and told tho mission
to leave Sonata to got weapons for tho now government or it
(the government) would .apply to the British govornmcnt for
help. Tho report also said that the tribes wore attacking
Sonata and looting was prevalent everywhere. Tho mission
oxpocted Sonata to fall in Ahmed's hands at any nomont.
"i?1 Wirtilany, the Maghreb merchant in Yemen who
is said to have had a hand in the murder of .Imom Yohia,told
the miasion that the murder was necessary for tho happiness
of the Yomonitos.? Imam Z4.hmod, says the ? report, told the
tribes that they could help thensolvos to the possessions
and fortune in Sonata of his murdorod fathcr. Hence the
?or'ithusiasm displayed by the tribes in attacking Sanata.
"The mission explains in its report that it was
watched by the now government and that on One occasion tho
mombcrs of the mission wore locked inside a room which smolt
of paint and Oil in the Imam's palace so that they
might not see ? some unknown visitors who wore in the -calcco
at tho time.
The report also says that the inhabitants of Sonata
arc talking these days about Sultanof (of the Russian Foreign
Ministry who served for a period at tho Russian Legation in
Cairo and who figured in the recent trade talks botwoon Russia
and EL,ypt). It is said said that he was in Yemen for ton
years as a representative of a Yomonito merchant of Russian
origin by the nano of Hokocnof. The report also says that
the Ycmonitos bolicv0 that RucJia, 4njland,,and U.S.L.. have
designs on Yemen which is said to be rich in uranium arl.F1, oil.
Misrits version.
jl Misri publishes an interesting story on Yemen under
an equally interesting hcadlino. Tho headline ?reads: ? "Tho
Sanata government threatens to sod: the aid of Foreign countries
if tho League docs not help it. Self 4",1 Islam hmod requests
the League to remain in. Hodjaz until his forces occupy Sonata."
The daily then publishes two stories, one from its correspondent
in ildon, and the other from its eorrospondont in Jiddah. The
don Correspondent says: "The now Yomonito government may
decide to refuse holding a plebiscite, and may withdraw from
tho Lrab League if the latter docs not support it. It is
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generally believed that the monarchs of the fAxab countries
Will make the League support Prince dil
Tho Jiddah correspondent, Zeheir 4seran, reports
that Hussein Al-Kobsy, tho now Foreign Minister in Yemen has
cabled to .i4zzam Pasha in Saoudi 1?riabia throatoning that the
now Yemenite govornmont would soak tho aid of foreign countries
if the Arab League- did not support it. Tho Arab League dole- .
catiOn held a mooting following the receipt of tho cable and
the members of the delegation expressed their abhorrence of.
the cable. His Majesty King Ibn Saoud was extremely annoyed,
seeing that he, as well as the Arab League had already'
declared that he would not allow foreign interference in. Yemen.
The same correspondent says that according to
reports received in Jidda from Yemen, tho Yomenito tribes wore
giving their full support to Ahmed after they discovered
that the lato Imam was murdered. Ho also says that the creator
part of tho army is with Ahmed, and that King Ibn Saoud has
refused to give airplanes and armoured cars to Ibn Wazocr.
The correspondent then coos on to say that the Arab League
delegation received cables from Ahmed and Ibn Al Wazocr infor-
ming it that it was advised to remain in Hodjaz until a safe
place in Yemen was found where the delegation could meet and
confer with the present government, or with L.hmed. ,Zihmod also
suggested in a cable to 2izzam Pasha that tho delegation should
wait in Hedjaz'until he succeeded in invading and capturing
Sana!a. King Ibn Saoud and the Arab Loaguo delegation cabled
back saying that it was necessary that the delegation entered
Yemen immediately. This is how matters stand at present,
explains tho correspondent who also reports that 2 British
and 3 1:imerican warships have arrived in Jiddah.
Azzam Pasha says he was given
assurances by Mr Tuck and Sir Ronald Campbell.
111 ?ailed on ,i,zzam Pasha", says Al Misrils corres-
pondent in Jiddah, "and asked him about this strange coinci-
dence (the arrival of the warships in Jiddah) and about the
rumours that the British had something to do with the recent
developments in Yemen. Ho ropliod: "When tho Arab League-
Council took a resolution at the close of its session concerning
foreign interference in Yemen, the British and ,:i.morican
Irabassadors communicated with 1-10 singly and denied that their
countries had any connection with the recent incident or that
they had any intention to interfere in Yemenis internal affairs.
Each country interpreted our resolution as moaning it.
Whorl I arrived in Jeddah, the British and 4,merican ro.presen-
tativcs repeated to me what their colleagues in Cairo
had told no, that is,thoir countries had no intention of ex-
ploiting the recent developments in Yemen.
Mussamarat Al Guoib!s story.
Maitpe bdcl Kader Hamzal one of tho editors of
4".1 Misri, writes an amusir- article this morning in Mussamarat
Al Guoib in which he states that Yemen is extremely uncivilized
and -orimitivc. Hamza was sent recently with Zohoir Asoran
to Yemen to investigate tho situation on tho spot. He says
that :there aro no shops or grocers in Somata, the Yemenite
that when ho was leaving Samara to Cairo ho
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Si,TURDi,Y March 6t111,. 1948.
wanted to buy a few sandwitchos to cat during tho 9 hour
journey by piano but could find no food for salo. Ho
finally called on tho Minister of Interior who issued a
ministorial ordor authorising him to get a loaf of broad
and a 1' ow boiled os from the govornmentfs food stock,
? ????m?ml
Tho local political situation.
Nahas Pasha made a speech yesterday before a largo
crowd which came from Sharkiya province to groct him, s'ays
the 11;afdist papers, and Sawt L,1 Umma. Tho speech
is very violent in character and too long to translate, but
it is intorosting to note that the Pasha directs his attack,
againt the present Egyptian govcrnmont instead of tho British.
Nohrashi Pasha and his tcam are accused -of being charlatans,
incompotent, and tyrants. The Egyptians arc hungry and the
present administrationtis corrupt, claims Nahas Pasha.
coalition Cabinet .
Iekhbar El Yon writos: "Some amateur politicians
tried to get a coalition cabinet formed which was to compriso
Shorif Sabri Pasha, J?li Maher Pasha, Ismail Sidky Pasha,
Hussain Sirry Pasha, iJodol Fattah Yohia Pasha, Sorag Eldine
Pasha, 41i Zaki l Orabi Pasha, Osman Moharram Pasha, Hoikal
Pasha, bdcl Galil ,Jou Sar. Pasha etc.... It was said that
the British would, have been very glad to soc such a Cabinet
formed, but when they saw that there was no hope of having
it formed, they declared that they were not interested in
EiyptTs internal affairs.
"It seems that the attempts to form a ooalition Cabinet
wore made behind Nahas Pasha's back. He did not know, for
instance, that some of his supporters had promised to --)orsuade
him to agree to tho formation of a coalition Cabinet. Hence
his clonal that ho was in favour of an all-party Cabinot."---
Ll Kutlafs attack on the
government and the British.
Kutla attacks tho "Egyptian government in a short
editorial unefor tho hoadlino:"Cabinots resign for less important
reasons". Tho daily points out that the Cabinet failed in its
presentation of tho Egyptian complaint before the Security
Council, and in combatting the cholera epidemic, poverty,
ignorance, disease, and the high cost of living,
Tho sane daily publislics an editorial under' tho rather
amusing hoadlino: "Our partnersbJn with tho British will
make us lose our sloop at night and bring hu4liation during the
day", It explains that the 'joint defence board and tho Sudan
Condominium would give the Egyptians a headache.
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STURDia March 6th, 1948.:
KUtla says E6ypt lost by.
tho trade acroomont botwoon Russia and Egypt.
Undor the hoadlino: "Tho ordob of wheat costs
LE 10 accOrdinL to tho Russian?trade acroomont"? 411 Kutla
writos: "Tho bartor of Ecyptian cotton for Russian whcat
is based on .civinE pussia ono Nentar of our cotton for
2 ordebs of Russian wheat. Socinc-that the kcntar of cotton
costs LE 20, it moans that tho crdob of wheat is costing
us TX 10. It is quite clear that such a sacrifice on
EL;yptis part was unnecessary. Our cotton has a good repu-
tation and the. covernmnt should have driven a harder bargain.
any rate, to covornmont is to blame for thb shortaco
of whoat in Ecypt, socinL; it did not import sufficient
fortilizors".
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17.2.1946 'No.22 (49)
ARAB WORLD AFFAIRS :
Weekly Survey
QZNEREZ
League's Sessim-Drawate its Close.e
In the course of a week ef discussions, the Arab Leoigue Council and its
various committeee aired:a number of political,ecenemio and legal problem. Some
of which were originally'listedon theofficial Agenda e(see issues No. 19 and 21)
namely: Palestine, libya,?Anglet-ArabLailiance, SyrpiLebanase currency dispute and
unification of currencies. Some of. the now items dealt with, included a petition
from the Viet-Namese,Gevernment, relations with the UN Burean for the Middle East
to be set up in Cairo,. a suggestion fpr calling an Aeiatic Conference, the condition
of the Moslem D.P.'s'in Urope and probably the question of modifying the League Charter.
A novel feature has emerged from the discussions on?Palestine with the decision
of the Council to establish a "miniature" Palestine Adthinistration, headed by a
triumvirate: the Mufti, 'Azzam PashaHand'the 'Iraqi Taht al-Hashemi, Inspector- .
,General of theekrab "Liberation" force.. .'It is stated?that others may possibly be
,added at a lateredate (Ahram,16.2.). This body is described as designed to form the
"backbone"of the League's Military Committee and as such it will conduct Arab affairs
in Palestine. Its seat will be located in Palestine, whilst its various sub-committees
will be set up in the neighbouring countries, in accordance with the specific functions
to be assignedete each. The question of chairmanship,htb?been left open, but it
was decided that the new body should come under the control of the League (ibid.).
it seems,
. The decision constitutes/another major defeat for the Mufti and a point.
scored by the Transjordan delegation. ? It will be recalled that the latter, 'and
particularly Suleiman Sukkari, the T.J. Minister of Finance, was reported to
have boon stubbornly opposed to the idea of setting up a Pea. Arab Government
composed. almost exclusively of the A.H.E. and its followers. Other Considerations,
also, may have prevailed, such as the Mufti's reputation outside the Middle East
and-as .Sukkeri pointed out-the desire to avoid possible accusations of undemocratic
procedure on the part of the League and the danger of exacerbating the Palestina
Opposition parties.,eIt was therefore agreed that the A.H.E. should tryto come to an
Understanding wit.41 the 'Opposition for the 'purpose of forming a coalition ,gpvernment
.The Mufti,in additien?te his failure to secure the military and
financial contrplofethe Palestine Affairs, is thus faced with a distinct defeat
in the politicalifield. Pessibly-to sweeten the pillIthe A.H.E. representatives ware
. granted-for the first. time full participation itithe Council's proceedings (as from
the 12th February meeting), but without the right of vote. Whereas until now only
two representativeseof the A.H.E. attended the meetings, the League Secretariat now
announced thet?threereprosentatives would attend, namely 'Tama Husseini, Rafiq
Tnnimi and Emile Ghouri, Moreover it was ?tPsted
by lAzzim Pasha to "Ahram" (13.2.) that the Council decided that the Mufti should
head the Palestine delegationi as a "proof that the Arab States insist on Palestine
becoming an independent Arab State".
Aa to the military aspect on the 9th February tho Political Committee heard
Gen. Isma'il Safwat's explanations of the Military Committee's report. He is said
to have come fromi3.aghdad especially for this.purpeae(AP.,8.2.). 'RoportedlY he
is the one who raised the question of opening a "seCend front" in the Negev And
stressed theelrgency of organising.. the supply of'foodstuffs and arms to the Arabs
of Palestine and of providing for ea proper network of communication between #2' Arab
,World and. the Palestine front (Assase10:2.). A Committee was then appointed, Composed
of Riyadh Scull., Jamil Mardam and 'Azzam, to examine Safwat's report. This 'cOmmitteo
met the next day to discuss the report of the Military Committee andlas "Assas" .
says (12.2.),it can be said to have.approved of the Military Committee's report.
Beth bodies .are understood to be Agreed that no invasion can take place before the
e British withdrew (Pal. Post,10..2.). Then the muchr-publicizod concerted general
attack fixed by the military loaders foxethe 1)th February (AP,6.2.) had to be
postponed. A plan calling for the occupation of Palestinian towns and villages as
span as the British leave, and for an Arab campaignto be operated dUring the remaining
Et4C1.051.1kL
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months of the Mandate is said to have been considered. On the 12th February,
As 'ad Doghar announced that the League Council had decided to hold off its
contemplated invasion, pending the docision of tho Security Council. The Arab
peoples, he stated, have announced theig determination to fight any international
force, but the League cannot adopt decisions based on possibilities. Safwat,
however, who attended the same press conforonco, said without hosiiition that the
Arab States should dispatch their rogular forces to gElostino immediately, if an
international force is sent to that country (AP,12.2tItese0qpfficial attitudo of
of expectation and rostraint regarding military action is possitqy
'actuated by the apprehension, lest such a step precipitate intervontion'bY the
Security Council. On the pthor hand; political activity at Lake Success has boon
incroasod. On tho 12th February Riyadh Solh, in his capacity of Chairman of the
L3aguo's sossion,instructod tho Arab representatives at UNerto warn tho UNO,member
States not to support the enforcement of Tartition, lest it compel the League to
send regular forces to Palestine (AhmWA43.2). Follov,ing that, telephone conversations
took place between Cairo and Lake Success (Fares Khouri, Camille Sham'oun, Mahmoud
Fawzi), -when it was learned that the US Government (?) uld raiso the implementation
issue at the Socurity Council on the 17th of February. The exact nature of the
League's instructions to tho abovo mentioned Ar'ab loaders (Ahram,16.2.) has not
been disclosod, but judging by Fares Khouri's legalistic arguments boforo the
Council, (e.g. the unconstitutional formation of tho Implementation Commission), it
may be expected that the Arab will not roj ?et any dolaying doo tPe( pap think
of.
Libya
Consideration of the Libyan problem has become particularly urgent in
view Of thq fact that the Big Four Enquiry Committee for the former Italian
Colonies is duo to arrive in Egypt shortly 'and.' thence to procood to Libya, to
ascertain the wishes of the population regarding the Arturo status of their country.
Although the Commission's arrival in Egypt was previously schedulod for tho 9th
February, the Americun Embassy received word that it would arrive in Luxor on
the 17th, spond a fortnight there in order to draw up its report on Eritrea and
Italian Somalilandand then go to Tripoli as the first stop in Libya (Falastin,
10.2.) on the 7th March (Ahram,13.2.). Another factor nocossitating an early
discussion is thitnow situation resulting from the USA's having concluded a poace
treaty with Italy.is beinfr feared that Amoricapin addition to Russia and France,
maY support Italy!s,domand for an Italian trusteeship of Libya (Akhbar, al-Yom,
7.2.). Therefore, 'Azzam pointedly raised this issp at the very openingdDf the
League's session, since it as always boon a subjectbwhich ho'has'devotod much
care and attention. Ho reminded the Council of the resolutions on ,Libya taken
as early as 194), ,to the effect that Libya should bo independent and united,
or else come under the League's or Egypt's trusteeship (FalaStin,10.2.). It should
be noted, that prior to the League's conference, all member Statossaccording to
"Akhbar al-Yom" (ibid.), sent idontical notes to the Big Four Foreign Ministers,
demanding for independence and unity of Libya, stoppage of Italian immigration to
Libya and rejecting F;ay status of trusteeship or protectorate. On the 1,th
"Ahram" reported thatntibya Liberation Committee in Cairo had decided to go to
Libya this week and visit Barca, Tripoli and Fezzan, prior to meeting tho Enquiry
Committee. On the 14th the Libyan question came up before tho Longue Council,
which d.e?id?d to instruct Bashir Sallayi, a Tripoli loader, to go there on behalf
of tho League.
"Anglo-Arab alliance issue deferred.
The question of concluding an Anglo-Arab collective agreement is reported'
to have been considered by the League Council. However, it waa 'decided to, defe'r
it to the Marchneeting, at the request of1Tograshi Pasha and the ultimate assent
of Riyadh Solh and,Hamdi Fachachi, the.promotersOf'the collective allianceidea.
'Noqrashi's reasons are said to, have beenJa) his desiretoconault his AmbaSsador
.to Washington and Minister to,Mosdaw; (b) "hisbelief that Bevin is still under
the influence of his.pilitary advisors and net very keen on withdrawal from Egypt
and 'Iraq; (c) an important meeting was to take place at the British Effibassy on
the 17th February, at which the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbellswould discuss
with high-rankipg_officials of the Embassy and prominent members of the British
Community the question of Anglo-Egyptian relations 'd survey the possibilities
of coping to tarms.with a Coalition Government (Victor 'Azzam in Pal. Fost,15.2.).
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? 3 ?
Tho question of an Anglo-Arab alliance is closely connocted to that of
modifying the League's Charter. Both Riyadh Splh,and Janil Mardam are favourably
inclined to it. The former reminded "Misri" (9.2.) that, the obligation to
consult -the League members Prior to concluding a treaty With a foreign.yowor was
mentioned in the Alexandria Ptotocol, but was not embodied in the League Charter,
in spite of hia Insistence on it. J. Mardam_justified tho preposcd modifiption on
the grounds that incisivo changes had oCcurred in the Arab World since tho signing
Of the Protocol tnd the Chartori:Stria had achieved her independence, Egypt and
'Iraq had -adopted a now stand towards Britain and the conflict between East and
West had intensified. Therefore, he stated, no Arab State should conclude ,fn
alliance with a foreign State, but should endeavour to strengthen the economic
and politicaItios wit tr the rest of;Arab countries. A collective agreement, he
.mnt on; was not feasible either, sirfoo the Artb.League had not as yet acqUired
the authority to be a contracting party. Despite this, in his opinion, it was
desirable to endow her with that authority and to recognize her as a regional
organisation. As to the danger of Communism,,Mrdam pooh.Lpoebed;its influence in
Arab lands and ascribed oven that possibility tolli.ab resentment of Western
faithlessness (KUtla,10.2.). Bosidex, he,deniod that Britain had approached
the Levmt.8tates with a proposal to conclude an alliance with her (Difa',10.2.).
A brief interlude in the dealings of the, Loague'O'clitical Committee
accounted for the -appearance (on the 12th February) of Sir John BoydLOrr,
Chairman of the UN Food and Agriculture OrgYaiation.(FAC), in the company of
Hefnawi, Egyptin representative on that body, and:Mi..''AbdUl
Egyptian FinanCial'Under-Soarettry. The later was invited to address the
committee; bec6/se it was ho who proposed at the last session of the UN Assembly
to establish an Economic Committee for the Middle East, along the lines of tho
one sat up far the Far East. This proposal was subsequently endorsed by thG
States. It .was :Chiefly for the 'purpose of discussing this matter that the
Egyptian economic delegation recently visitod Syria. Sir John exp lniaod to the
Politieal_Cetmittoa the nature of the UN Bureau for the Middle Rast, which the
FAO Conference in Cairo had depidod to set up in that city and declared that it
aimed at &?peration between the UNO and tho League' member States in matters of
supply refoommedities which tended to raise the standard of living, and improve
agribulture and industry (Abram,l3,.2.,soe below).
Ourrencynroblems.
Currency questions have been considered, both with reference to the Syro-
Lebanese dispute over remaining in the franc area and regarding the plan for the
unification of currencies in the Arab States. The former question was referred
toakiediation Committee composed of Hassan Jabbara, former Syrian.Minister of
Finance,and the Egyptian Dr. Rifa'i (Ahram016.2.). No representative of the
Lebanon seems to have been included, but we arc told (Balagh,11.2.) that the
matter was? discussed by Solh and MardEm at the Syrian Legation. It should also
be mentioned that on the 7th February, a Syrian-Lebanese economic conference took
place, as a result of which a joint announcement was issued, advising both
governments to sever all connections with the franc as soon as possible (ANA,
8.2.). On the 9th, Wahbi Hariri, Syrian FinanceMiftistor,-warted that the
separatien of the Syrian and Lebanese currencies would inevitably deStroy_the
unity of interests between these countries (ANA, 9a.). Ho also welcomed the
linking of the Syrian currency to that of Egypt (ANA,8.2.).
The unification of currencies and the introduction of a:standard "Arab
Pound" (Balagh,9.2.). were proposed by the 'Iraqi delegation (Ahram,13.2.).
Jamil Mardam had previously declared himself strongly in favour of the idea.
It was essential, ,he said, that the Arab should render thoMsalves independent
of foreign currencies, particubrly as long as the Eastern countries "enjoyed a
far superior -degree of prosperity and vell-being than did the peoples of the
West" (sic!).(Difa',10.2.). It was finally decided. to refer the problem to a
committoo of Arab exports, assisted by financial authaes of world renown
(Ahram,13.2.). It is intended to select'a Swode and-a Belgian; the-name of Van
Zealand, the habitual financial advisor to the Arab govornmonts, is being
mentioned in this connection (Ahram,I6.2.).
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Viet-nom.,
A peculiar problem, reminiscent of Indonesia, prosented itself to the League
Council, when a petition was read from the Viot-namese Government (French Indo-
China) requesting the League to support its demand for liberation from the French
x.rid furthermore to raise the issue at the UN (Ahram,11.2.). The League Secretariat
informod the Council thet it had received a complaint from Viet-nara that the French
were using North African Ait.1 soldiers a$ainst her (ibid.?3,3.2.). The Council,
therefore, decided to moxpress its syrlapathy with Viet-nam and its disapproval of
any Arab fighting against her; it would furthortaoro concern itself 1,7ith.the issue,
when it is raised tlt the Security Council by oho of the States" (Assas,13'.2.).
According ?,9 ".11.r=11 (13.2.), the is81.10 resembles that of Indonesia and it is
therefore ,the duty of, every Arab State to stippor-b and defend it when it comes Up
for discussion at the Security Councilo.Lpreaentoci 1!). an. Arab State that will be
chosen s4ortly. This dobision,incidontWymakos strange reading in view of the
fact that the Viet-nam Cabinet is overwhelmingly - Communist.
Asiatic Gonforonce.
Another subject considered by the Political,Conpittee was a suggestion by
'Isar; Nakhloh, the A.H.E. representative at Iic_Lke Su'cceias, to summon an Asiatic
Cpnforence for discussing their particular prnbloms. "Ahramn (12.2.) learned that
"national institutions" in China, India and :Pakistan had expressed readiness to
participate in this oonforonce. The League Council, however, refrained from going
into the matter and referred. it to the Secretariat for furthor study, (Assa'S,13.2.)
Food and Agricultural Organisatien's Reg,ionel Conference in gairo.
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organissiton s Regional Conference
opened in Cairo on tho 2nd February with speech by John Boyd-Orr, the
?Organisation's Director-General, who pointed out that the scarcity of foocistuffn in
Europe was a result of World War II. He warned. that famine would befall the
world if agricultural production was not increased, fmd asked the ME countries
to assigns new areas to bo brought under cultivatiorx Special
mention was made by the speaker of the possibility of developing Ecypt for this
purpose. Besides a possible increase of prnduction thanks to the Nile Waters,
Towfik al-Hofnawi, a former Minister of Agriciature in Egypt and presently temporary
regional advisor to the FAO, had stated in a report to the Geneva Conference on the
Near East, that largo areas could be put under cultivation by the use of water
from deep wells and that production of winter crops could be IVreatly increased
Amongst the problems on' the r,.goncia of the Conference wore the possibilities
of increasing atsTicultural production on present cultivatead areas by the Use of
bettor farming and agricultural te.ch.n.?.lques;improvod 300dS, fertilizers and
pesticides; improved animal husbandry; the modernisation of hand tools; farm
implements and machinery; and tho oxpansiOn of education and extension of services.
Forestry problems included reafforostation, planting of trees to preteCt cultivated
areas from soil erosion, and the setting up of nurseries for growing young trees
(E?G.,29.1.)?
The Conference specially dealt with questions Clo.soly 1.o1atoci to agricultural and
social .problems in the ME. The sub-committee appointed to examine. the social. aspects
of. the food. situation in the ?ME reportod..that lithe social condition of ?the? fellaheen
ought to be improved" (-Saint' ) . The food sub-comittee., reached. similar
conclusions. It. stated that between 69 to go per cent of the ME' population are
underfed (ibid.). For E,'pt the proportion was from 70. to 80 per 'cent (Zaman,29.1.).
The Conference's final report emphasised that -2,865,000 feddans wore, under
cultivation in 'Iraq Whilel . were not, as yet cultivated.. The. cost of
? cultivating each.foddan by now irrigation schemes was estimated st V8?dellars
(Zaman,10.2.). ? The Conference has accordingly considered ?a five-year programme
for irrigation arid drainvge, clevelcipmorit in that country, (AP,14..2.)'.
In the..Lebanori, several now schemes ,,WQra suggested. Tewfik.all-Iofnavri, the
regional adviser, had informed the Li .Government, of the expected arrival in the
Lebanon of 'a mission of American engineers to investigate Lebanon's needs for loans
and other means of increasing its agrj!cUitural production (.ANA,26?.1.).
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. ? ?
In Syria, the cost of agricultural development wae estimated at a total
of 350 million Syrian pounds (Zaman,1042.). 250.000 acres wnuld.be brought under
irrigation provided agreement could be reached with 'Iraq ovor the supply of Wator
needed tO.impIemOnt thisschome. Syria, it was stated, would nood an immediate loan
fortho necessary equipmopt (Ap,14.2.).
,? As for Egypt,.tho,.roport recommended that it was of primary importance
to begin devoloping:as.aoon as possible now areas which would bo productive in
1950. The suggoatiOn was for 50,000 feddans in Lower Egypt, 65,000 in Upper Egypt
and,600.00 in the Nubia region, on.the southern borders. Total cost of the plan
was estimated at 5,430,000 pounds (Zaman,10.2.). ,The main recommendation of the
Conference was for a plan to be submitted to the meeting of tho FAO Council in
Washington on April 5th calling for 25,000 acres to be converted annually at 6
cost of. ,E300,00%fora system of basin irrigation which would be supplemented by
pumping wale in Upper' Egypt. Egyptian production, it was pointed out, as a result
of improved irrigation facilities could be increased by. more than 50% (AP014.2.).
Apart from the above mentioned teChnical recommendations, the Regional Conforonce
emphasised that FAO. assistance should be given to ME countries in the purchaso of
priorities and in the shipmeW,of laboratory equipment and dairy machinery from
the countries which would supply them. It also decided to ask the FAO to
establish a regional office in Cairo for the whole of tho Mg for tho purpose of
strenghtening LE collaboration(AP,14.2(.022. above).
?, The Regional Cpftforenco closed its session on the 14th. The mbeting were
attended by Egypt, Ethiopia, 'Iraq, Lebanon, Syria (as participant-membors) and by
? Iran, Sa'udia, Turkey, YoMen (as observers) (Assas,29.1.). Palestine was not
'represented. The Arab League was allowed to have two delegates as obsorvers
American and British representatives ?also..-attended (Ahram$2.2.)i
as well as U.N. experts (Assas,4.2.). .Ahmad 'Abdul Ghaffar, the Egyptian Ministor
of AgricuitUre was seleated..as.chairman
SiX FAO exports in ceoPeration with the various Governments concernerl_proviar,4.
the conference with information on the typo of agricultural assistance needed..
The experts wore sant to the M.E. a month ago and will remain' there for soveral
months to start work on the programme adopted by the Conference (AP,27.1.).
EGYPT
AnKlo-Egyptim relation's.
Anglo-Egyptian relations have appeared in the front pages of the Egyptian
press again, as a result of the Arab Leaguo's meetings in Crairo4 which was said to
include( discussions on a general Anglo-Arab pact (poe& of the mooting betvti
the British Ambassador' and the Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister. It was also
reported to havo examined tho Aagio-Egyptian question (Misri,10.2.)? and Bovin's
speech at the Anglo-Egyptian Society in London, on the occasion of Farawes birth-
day (ANA,11.2a).
These outstanding facts have givenribe to"vatious rumours, namely that of
American mediation for a change in the Egyptian Cabinet so as to include all parties
(Akher Sa'a,11.2. & MUssamsrat Talks for a resumption of Anglo-Egyptian
negotiations were also reported to have taken ,place between Casey and "an important
Egyptian personality" Nussamarat
None of the above mentioned factors however seem to lead to a decisive
improvement in Anglo-Egyptian relations. The League, it was pointed out, did not
include the Egyptian question in its agenda (Akhor Sa'a,11.2.) and the rumour
that Bevin would fly to Cairo (Misri,11.2.) was denied by the Foreign Office.
The formation of a national Cabinet,' will also be exceedingly difficult to sot
up'., Tho .British Government was alleged to have insisted that the Wafd be included
in an 41-Parties Cabinet which woad be fully backed by Parliament, and which would
negotiate with Britain .(Mussamarat Aaerica is also reported to have
intervened in pressing for the inclusion of the Wafd in :such a Cabinotosinco she
considers a representative of the Wafd necessary as a chock against foreign
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Communist infiltration (Akher 4a'a,11.2,.). This report seems to-be inline with
tho,British-aieen'that'an Anglo,-Egyptian or oven an ,Anglc-Arab pact ould prevent
from L a stand in the t4i:ddle East. It also appears -that in Order
:1z,,o?coriviace,publicliapinion of such a noces4ty prominence has to be giVern In 1
tho -Press'tro-Minor 'eventswhich appoar t6,b-,related to local Communist activities.
Such an instance is the undeserved importance given by newspapers to the arrest
of six alleged Communist students in Cairo who were stated to have boonin possession
of "soCrot codes";"reports on recent strikes in Egypt'Yetc.- or to 'have "burned
A:mportant,ceavidting evidence" before their Arrest-(Kutla01),;-2.);
Mild'sPeech of the 11.2. did ,not produce the reaction akPocted, by
thoBritiah'Fereigd'Minister. It was coldly received in Ciro and the press
unanimously criticised it. The W4fdist "S,awtja-Umma" iomarkoci that Bevin
"has not modified as imperialistic views" since he cotplately-ignore# EgYpt's_
politiCal'evelution% '-"Abram" stated, that"Bovin has tot frodd himaolf2'
,from obselate'lltperialist concep4ons alsoHshared-by British diploMstid'qUartors .
,
"I1.41"4122.YdescribedthPe60h,as Pirrelevflat ,ferggypt'sjhonoUr". These.::
sharP:briticiaMsWoreobViOUSiY the result,of,pn;unfartinate'sontenceIck_might
have slipped-joUt,iO4iIp's:spopph,When jle refarreeinding elithew-tc5C'Onaliate
thEgytt'it,nati6n'alism."Without endanger4.ng theHlefonce-of Your territOrf,and'of
our communication" 'as being theimain
It is doubtful whothei' the presoat Egyptian Government will desire or be
in a position to engago itself in new talks with Britain, before the British mako
clear their intentf.ons on the question of av7pu-tion. It appears that this questa
has not been sdlved yet byBritain whose military exports appose ovacuation at this
time? and insist On maintaining British troops in the Suez Canal-area
)Y
Wbateson Army in Ekvbtian Parliament.
A debate on th6-Govornment?S policy towards the Army was provoked in'tha
Chamber of Deputies on FebrUari9th, *a a-result of questions raised by Maurice
Fakhri'Abdul Nur (Kotlist) and Fikri Abaza,(Nat.), A,request from Government ,
bunches- to discuss the 'question in closed session was ,,overruled by the President
of the Chamber (Kut1a,10.2.). ??
?Dr.:4outy-'Abdu1 NUr started the debates by a short expose in which ho compared
the Army's strength under Mohammad 'Ali (276,000 men) to its present (50,000)
strength (Ahram,10.2.). He then accused tho British of preventing the ggyptian
Army from carrying out moot of its plans for improvement. He Cited, as awinitance
that arms furnished by Britain were obsolete and said that members of Egypt's
military mission in Britain were,Prevonted from attending the most important
courses (Sawt al-Umma,10.2.).
Makingh referenCe, to:the, l93e Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which designated -Britain
_
as the Solo .,supplier Of -4tds to Egypt, 'Abdul Nur:stated:that Britain had Sold a
toMmy-gun far 401Peunds while she got it from the U.S. at half qf.., that-price. Ho
also disclosed that Britain had once dpiDbsed a project of Fordsrbuild motorcar
factories in Egypt,(Ahram,l0.2.) and indicated th3t motor 9t,i6 now used in the:.
Egypt -
Egyptian Army were of 48 different typos,:- making their_maintendacc --6xoo44dingly
difficult and verycoatly:($117tq_Umma:,.10.2).
D0Airl With the cost of maintaining a 'Seldier,-Aho speaker Charged the GO-Vern-
ment with extravagance when he pointed out that the sum allocated for depreciation
of material amounted to 7g_ pounds per soldier for the 'first year of service while
in other -Ceunt#P6 an Oerage,of,only 20 pounds w"s alloocted H suggested the
Setting up of- n inquirYAOmmission to investigate that? Matter (khrut11,10.2'.)
-Deputy'Abdul.Nur then remarked that the Army has a shortage.., of engineers.
Phgine.ers, he said, numbr, 270, while they numbered 2900 during. Mohammad
The Engineer Corps, ho added, lack adopate
Material nedearY't9Y.0d..prn army (AbraM,10.2.), while the army itseltauffera
-from 6 shortageOf:seVeral kinds Of .a.rmapeAts ._(Sawt,a17-.Umma,10.2.)'s. AS :far as ArmY
manoeUvros'WereConcorned, the: apeakor said. they were veryrarely-and irrgularly
held H Went'onite:CritiCise the newly enforced militc_ry-a6rvicolaW'whiCh, he'
said, conscripted only 30,000- out of 1.80,000 eligibles for service; most were
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the
1,3ft for the r,serve of territorial _rmy (ibid.). Deputy 'Abdul Nur then spoke
of the .:,rmy budLet (datils of 7hich were not published). According to "Sawt
_1_--rjrnma" (10.2.) the s-7,0::,her met 7ith stron opposition from various sources when
he r,:!sed the ?,7Auestion of the soldier's wages, and. was compelled to omit this
question from his statement.
Pikri Ilbazfl spoke next and recalled promises mf-,de by Nocir'f,shi, on his return
from the UN, to strengthen the Army's power. He suggested an increag in the
Alglayis budget and said it was most important to free the country from the 1936
treaty provisions which compelled Egypt to. buy arms only from Britain. Britain,
he chrged, was supplying the Egyptian army with old-fashioned weapons (iihrami10.2.).
Ho also asked for arms factories to be etup in Egypt Lndfor another ,military
mission to be sent abroad. The Army, he stressed, ,;as in groat need of technicians
and engineers (ibid.).
The Defensu Minister closed the deb,tos by assuring the assembled that the
Gr,vernment was seriously considering the ArmTtS neoth, Llid that the various plans for
improvements would be implemented. In the course of the debates ho la:4 disclosed
that a military mission Was on its way to C,,-J3choslovaki,, for thL, rurnose of
purchasing arms for the 11-; tin army (Ahr,m,10.2.).
This disclosure is hardly to be reconciled rith the military cluses of the
1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty whioh compol Egypt to buy arms only from Britain. It.
is also difficult to ascertain hether the military mission mohtioned by the Deftic
Minister 7as or was not intrusted to nurchF,se arms on beheaf of the Arab League, or ?
if this yc-cs the deal referred to by 'Azaam, (Le::,gue's Secretary) when he disclosed
th:t the whole affair of purchase of arms from CechoslovakiL for the Arab Lei,gue
had failed oTing to indiscretions by newspapermen who disclosed the fcts too
early (Rae Ll-YUssuf 10.2.).
In any event, there must be some truth in the report of the "Misri"
London correspondent (12.2.) that Britain had asked for explanations onEgypt's
intention to purchase arms from .Czachoslov(?ia. The correspondent .emphasised that
"it is generally felt in London that purchase of arms by Egypt from a country
other than Britain is a matter coming under the provisions of the 1936 Treaty"
(Lisri,12.2.).
1?
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2.3.1948
ARAB WORLD AFFAIRS
Weekly Survey
NO.24 (.71)
GENMAL
8cono 8hift6 to Drraascus-
Tho. leadlino of British rule in Palpstino, tho 1)th May, and the rapidly
dotoriorctinE international situation haVe'prosontod tho Arab Loague with two
cloaelyintorrelatol problems of primary urgency: Action:inPalestine:to provont
implomontation of Partition and conclusion of a collective security allianco with
Britain. The.firat has had. a:lien's...share in the proceedings of the Loaguo's
SQventh Session,. which? closed on the 22nd Fobruary,and the latter, it is boing
predicted, will dominate tho ?Cone (1)r more likoly, the behind-the-Scot-ins) of tho
deliberationa. scheduled to open on March 20th. In order to. bo abloto do? thia,
and at tho same time to givo Palestine its constant and undivided'attontion, the
League's Political Committeepas already montionod in our previous, issUesjostablishod
suproma advisory body-to conduct political and military action in Palostine.
'According to."Assas" it will also suporvise the activitios:ofilecal 'boycott
committoes..? The. committee is composed of_lAzzam Pasha as chairman and fopiesentativos
of the League member states cd the A.H.E. (the Mufti)..' Jamil Mardam is to assume
chairmanship duringthe absonco of !Az2:sm in. Yebon (Misri,29'.2.). By appointing
this body. the Council effected a.sopar.,Jtion of the political from thepurolY.military
joadershiP thus facilitating the military.dommand. to work smbothly (ibid.).
It was also docidod that both this and. tho Military Committee, would fit their
pormaont headquarters in Damascus which ia'to form the mootingplaco of an important
military conference for Palestine, duo to convene in the next few days (Ahram,29.2.).
Tho members of tho Military Combittdo including Ismatil Safwat, ?as v/..:;l1 as the
Syrian :deputies whparo ''participating?in.thofighting, have already arrived in
Damascus,. .1410 Conference Will draw up plans fot-the formation of the Arab Liberation
Army, which will be made up of?rogulai force's' of League members. under Safwat's
command... King Abdullah has-allogodly informed' the Loague,thathis frontier aro
opon to .any force wishing to,croSs'from Syrian into Palestina ,(V, Azam in Pal.
Post, .24.2.). This attitude On tho part of 'Abdullah has bon confirmed by facts
and may be explained as evidence of his willingness to cooperate with tho League
as a result of the latter having accoptod his Viewpoint regarding the-undesirability
of setting.up,a Palestine-Arab'GovorhMent or Administration:dcminatodbrhe?AHE.
Further proof of 'Abdullah 's change of mind. is tho appointment of the Transjoidon
representative on the Military Committee, tAhdiz14.o.der al-Jundi and his visit to
Damascus (see our last issue). Tho decisivo. moVoments, we are told, will start
beforo the beginning of spring and the first signs, of them will bo,soon imthodiatoly
after thoD:spascus Conforonco,-since Taha Hashomi and Favzi. Qawuqji have completed their
preparationsfp.r their departUre to Palestine (Misri,29.2.).
The oxpoctod visit of the Mufti and. other members of the AHE to Dathascus, as 'veil
as the presence of Musa 'Alami and 'Brig. Clayton in this city lends support tO- the
belief that, along-with military.Planning, now offorts will.bomade to find a
formula enabling some m-it of co7poratiOn botypen thechief.participants and
antagonists in -tc) Falostinian'drama: The Hussoinis en one hand and tho Hashomites
and Musa 'Alami.on,the other, with the League and tho British as mediating agents.
Oil Rovrisnls.
As eproilary to tho military measures, the Leaguiadocided - as was announced
by 'Azzam 'got to t7rant'ilny facilities or now oil concessions to those States
whic! supported Partition; until the situation in Palestine has boom ;carifiad"
(J. d'Egypto, 23.2.). This is why Jamil Mardam abandoned his projected trip to Ibn
Wud, as it had bectme purposeless (ibid. On tho other hand, Mi. Marshall, whorl
asked by pressmen for comments on the League's roported resolution, replied that the
State Department had no information concerning it (AFP,26.2.). It should be
mentioned that the abovo statement, although it dotes not specify, whether thereforonce
to the oil-concessions includOatho construction of pipolinos-for akploitint'
concessions already granted, has boon (;enoraly accepted as applying to the latter
as well, and is consideredna.a move directed primarily against the TAPlino company
(a.g_f_Zaman, 1.3.). :To this may-be added the interview of the Sn'udi :Ear Faisal
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to the sqIisri" correspondent in Jodda. The attitude of his country, declared Taiga",
was absolutely clear and gaveno'justification to the despicable attacks on his
father, If the Arab States decide te cancel tho oil-concessions of pro-partitionist
powers, StJudi Arabia, although having no othersources of income, will be the first
to carry out the decision and drive out aaY American from her soil (Misri,29.2.).
Another anti-Amoricm stop is reported to have been taken, incidentally, by Sa'udi
Arabia. According to this report (KUtla;25.2.), the Sa'udi authorities have
informed the USA that they are determinad not to renew the leabe of the Dhahran
airfield on its expiration date, March 1, l949,..sinco-they-do not see the necessity
for US .Air force personnel to remain it that country.
.L.E.Lat-ArabLLUEa21.
? . By'rafarring all matters. Connected with Palestine to the,Military and. PolitiOtl
Palestine Committees, the Arab LonAzo COuncil haScaetred the way to.. a discussion
of the inter-Arab alliance 'problem; aaapreliminary stap it is Widely rumoured,
towards the conclusion of a collective Anglo-(rap.?AngloSaen)ArabliiIitary
Allianco; This idoa was brought up by.Jamil.M.Srdam at, the la St sessio4 As was
'explained by him at-s0m6.length to H,./Ihram" (29.20) he.submitted to the Political
?Committee -a 5-point-proPosal suggesting (a) prohibiting the conclusion' of any
?treaty by a League member with a non-member:that would be apt to prejudice its
Sovereignty or independence Cr granting a foreign Fewer a military or.economic status
? harmful to other Arab States, prior te:Submittipig the clauses of the projected treaty
?-tO the LeagUe Council; ?? (b)the-conclOion'Of .an inter-Arab Military
'Alliance by all league mgmbers;.in accordance With tho provisions of the' Alexandria
Protocol and the.Lengue(thatter;.. such an alliance -will bind each?signatcry to
Hadopt a. unified '.folicy regy,rding foreign.ralations. and collective.defonce? (Misri,
23.2.). ? (6) tho revision o? 'the League Charter, in order to ad agt it to presont
conditiOns..nd to enable it to 'm? 'the requiremonts.specified. in t4).
This proposal waS' felt to be a liMitation on the frcedoM of action of the
individual Arab States. Moreover; siace,it was not based on the League Char-Or and was
not included it the'agenda, mostdelegations, decided not to? discuss. it before
contacting?thir respective governments.' This postponement, we are assured,
was not due to-internal differences, but to'..the feeling that under? prevailing
conditions? any discussion of?the subject would be detrimaltal to the, position of the
League. (Ahram,1.3.).
_
As to the prosPectS of an Anglo-Arab alliance, the influential "Le-Monde".
-(12.2.) opined 'that whereas separate military treaties would be_intolorable to
the Arab nationalists, they'could readily accept. a.collective alliance sanctioned
?:..41:07 the League_, ae-it'would-eliminateinterL-Arribrepro:bation?and.rivalrys, Merebvor,?
Britain, by virtuo of .her being 'the decisive power in Palestine', possesses the most
.ithpertant element. of bargniningin the. negotiations With the Arabs.It is difficult
to see, the' :paper 'arguee,? how1 LegUesould reject proposalsgrantitg tho Artbs,
so many advantages and -fulfil3?1-i'cir unity. On the other hand, ar official statement
issued by the Arab Office in London, clops not think that?Britain s good intentions
towards 'the 'Arabs arc 'sufficient to inducb the Arabs 'to enter into. regional alliance
with her. :Before she ,can. hope 'to achieve this, ,Britain must tiling about a change
in America's 'attitude?tevards the- Arabe, because Britain, in the. event of war, would
be Americal.s-vanguard in the Mile 'East and therefore any alliance with Britain
means in reality an indirect alliandb
There is more talk of efforts beitiT made to integrate Turkey and Iran in t1-16
framework of British Middle East security arrangements. "gisrip (29.2.) Says thero.::.:-
. ?
are signs of a strengthening of the. ties between the.LoagUe inember States and the
'countries ?referred?to. According to this"tFapor 'numerous meetings took place: -N
rocontly indlaghda; Cairo, Ankara.and Beirut between the Arab Premiers and Turkish.
and Iranian diplomats. ' The modorate.Tohoran paper "Ghiyam-i-Iran"dwells on'
developments in relations with Britain since HrEden's visit to Persia in January...
The political qUarters in London', the 'paper asserts', are prepared to revise the
South Iranian' Oil agreemont and turecbgnize to a certain extent Irantsclnims'i'n..'
this respect. ',The 'British Government had further. decided to include Irn an the ME
defenXn area rhich is to cimprise all Arab Statesiwith the exception of, Yemen.
This is 61sc dffirmad'by tho Tudeh .organ.."Marduin H. It is said that,Yr. Eden had
informed the directors .of ?ths Anglo:-IrmianOil Co. of the resulte_af has talks on
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this subject and that he suggested that one of thorn go to Teheran and start
negotiations with the Persian Government regarding Southern Iranian oil (AFP021.2.).
Addenda to League ?,,,solutions and Activities
.AXE.1) Offices:, The League Secretariat is preparing a new system for the Arab .
offices in Nev York; Washington, London and Paris ,following Iraq's having.surrenderod
ita control over thorn ? and agreed' to League supervision. The Political Committee
has allocated large sums for their maintenance and a staff of young Arabs from all
Arab countries is now being selocted (Misri,29.2.). Musa 'Alami, it is reported,
will continue heading the Offices.
?Fund-raising: The PoliticalCommittee'cal146pon the Arab Governments to-Secc-
to'it that the-funds for Palestine raised from public drives.ba directed thro101,
the proper, channels (J. d'Egypte,23.2.).?
League's Budget: The League's- bud0t for 1948 has boon fixed at EE .210,249;
?Syria's contribution to it amounts to 16% (Alif Ba,11.2.).
UNESCO to meet in Beirut;. Thanks to the efforts made by Dr. Charles Malek,
Lebanese Minister in Washington and delegate to the UNI. the UN Economic, .Social
and Cultural Organization decided to hold its October SEision in Beirut.
also suggested that Arabic be made the third official ?Language of the Conference
(after English and French), but this is still under consideration (Ahram,19.2.). _
Philippe Tagla requested. the League to sot up. a committee for laying' down a unified
Arab.plan in preparation for the conference (Ahram,1.3.). 'Besides, Dr. Malek is,
according to "Kutla" k27.2.), the originator of the idea of establishing a UN
Economic Committee for the Middle East on the ?pattern of those set .up for Europe
and the' Far East and it was he who submitted a proposal to this effect to the UN
'General Assembly last September.
On Extradition. of'Oriminals: The Legal Committee will submit to the Leaguib .
Council at the next session a proposal which distinguishes betmoen purely political
offences and "mixed" ones, thus considering as criminal offences acts involving
premeditated murder,poisoning and assaults 'on?Heads of States- and their next-
of kin, such as heir presumptives otc. (Ahram,29.2.).
? Resolutions of the League's Cultural Committee: These provide for a unified
curriculum on the subjects of national education, history, geography and Arabic,
to be applied to all League member State for primary and secondary schools,for
the purpose of fastening inter-Ai.ab solidarityand the consciousness of a common
heritage and destiny?(MisriO3.2.).
Relief to Libya andTunis: Tho Political Committee decided that the Arabs' ...
Governments contribute LE 20)0,000 to aid the hunger-stricken areas of Libya and the
MaEhrib, particularly Tunisia.. This amount represents the minimum that the Arab.
States are called upon to allocate. -Further particulars on the aid and its
distribution in the public interest are boing kept secret.- A memo by the 2if
leader, 'Abdul Krim, on the food situation in Tunisia and ?Algeria has bean
submitted to Habib Bourguiba, the Tunisian loader, to 'Azzam, urging the League to
apply 'to the international relief organizationsfor assistance. for thosecountries
(Assas,22.2.)..
. The Maghrib problem: As to Libya, in addition to sending a mission composed
of members of the Libyan Liberation Committee ,the Political Committee contented
itself with reiterating previous resolutions insisting on Libya's unity and.
independence and promising every assistance necessary to securing these ends.
Regarding Morocco, preliminary discussions ,according to "Ahram" (19.2.),led to the
cristallizing of two views on' the question: the one. favoured submission of the issue
to the Security Council, the other - to the UN?Goneral Assembly. The lattor c?ourso
is thought likely to be followed (ibidp). There is, however, no trace of either
of them In the official resolution, which merely states that Morocco had made no
progress towards gaining independence and it furthermore expressed regret that the
Powers ruling Morocco had ?done nothing to r000gnize-hor 6lairias to. self-determination.
It also regretted the bloody clashes' which recently occurred there (in Tetuan)
(J. d'Egypto,23.2.). The restrained and even likewarm tone of these resolutions
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standa,, it shOUld be noted; itastrange contrast to the violent press-campaign
waged against alleged French-Spanish collaberation in supprong Moroccan
nationalists and French maladministration in Tunis and Algeria. This cautious
attitude on the part the League hes been further underlined .by a Statement attributed
to, 'Azzam Pasha or the League, to the effect that the Arab States dc not approve
of the Moroccan nationalists' stand vis--vis Spain. This statement was, of co14-130,,
vigorously denied by the LeagUe Secretariat (Misri.?24.2.),
League Tackles Yemen Crisis.
FolloWing on appeal for Arab League arbitration issued by7both contesting
parties in the YeMon, an inquiry commission was sot up, headed by 'Azzam and composed
of delegates of all member Statesi as folloys: Hussein Hoshi, Secretary to the King
and an expert on Yemen (Egypt), Yussuf Yassin Satudia), 'Abdul Jain Raqi PIraq),
MaZhar Arslan (Syria), Taqi-eddin Sulh (Lebanon), Midhat Jumla (Transjordan),
Sheikh Hassan Ibrahim, the Yemeni representative on tho Arab League. Prince Soif-
ul-Islem .Abdullah, who is now in Paris, had cattled the LeagUe to allow him to join
the delegation, Since he was neutral to the conflict, but owing to the' urgency of the
matter, this idebNo be abandoned (Akher Sala,26.2.).
.The d, ,gation left Cairo on the 28th February (Ahram,29.2.) aboard the schooner
"Farue elUippad Trlth canons and armoured vehieles and accompanied by a military
plane.: The delegation thought at first to 63 to Sanala by air, following the example
of. tha advance party (see last issue) bUt later changed its- mind, in order to be
ableppossibly, to call representatives of both parties aboard the schooner, as
neutral ground for arbitration (Akhor Sa'a, ibid.). Prior to leaving,the delegation
cabled: an appeal to both parties to stop hostilities pending the Leaguers verdict.
'Azzam declared that the delegation had no fixed plan and would act according to
circumstances (7.aLn,1.3.)..i, It is noteworthy that on the 26th 'Azom received a despatch
from Ibn Sa'ud dissuading htF?Wis "arduous" journey to San' asa (Ahram,29.2..),.
YET
The British Scheme for "Sudaaiz'ation" of the uan. .
The text of a decree issued by thea8Udan Government bringing reforms to the
;Administration of the Sudan, wap published, in Cairo on the 22nd February. A copy of the
decree had been sent by the Acting Governor General to the EgYptian Government and
a: second, copy, to the British Ambasgador in Cairo. In an axpianatery note attached to the
decree the Governor General pi. stated that the decree will be submitted to the
Sudan Advisory Council. on March3rd (Kutla,2.2.).. An official letter dated January
15th by the Foreign Office to the Egyptian Ambassador in London was also published
in Cairo. The letter emphasized that the decree on Sudanization had been issued by
the Governor General in accordance with the civ11 and military powers conferred
to him by the Angloptian 1899 Convention. t asserts that a number of modifications
earlier notified to Britain in an Egyptian memorandum had been included in the decree,
aud stortes that thodecroe has the full approbation of the British Government.
The letter also suggests a corm:ission of non-official Feyptian and British experts
to examine the legal aspects of the decree :and ;namely, para.) of the Egyptian
memorandum which pointed out the necessity of Angle-Egyptian consent before a legislation
could be legally put into effect by the Governor General. It finally eictressos -
the hope that "the Egyptian Government has not the intentioil to 'imitate the executive
authority of the Governor General-in mtters dealing exclusively with Sudan's internal
affairs "(J. d'Egypte,23.2.).
In decree, comprising 65 articles, provides for the constitution of an Executive
and a Legislative organs. The Executive,:Under the responsible chairmanship of the
GoVornor General (art .17) is to comprise not loss than 12 and: not More -than 18 members.,
appointed by the Governor General EIrt.10). the Governor General iu alSo to enjoy full
authority on the desions reached by tho' Executive' (art.19).
The Legislative Council is to comprise appointed members (not exceeding 10)
as well as elected members making a total of 6) (art.26). Sudanese Nationals over )0
years of age, resident of the constituency Which elactsthem for over 2 years are
eligible or liable to nomination in the Council (art.30). The Toegislative Council-can-
_
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bu dissolved by the Governor Gdnoral (art.37). Elections? aro to be held -every throe
years (art.38).. The?nemination,of the Council's chairtan must be approVed the
Governor General (art.41). The Council is .not allowed to logiforate on%),the
Sudn conatitutioni b) the relations botwoen the Sudanese GovOrnment.on the one
hand and .the British and Egyptian Governments on :the ? other, c) the relations beton
the Sudanese.Government and other toreign countries (art.53). Discussions on
defame, finance, minorities ;(national or religious) cannot take place ?unless previous
authorisation-froM,the Executive (art.54).All. decisiets?.reached-by the Legislative
Council are to be notifed to the Executive in the form of "rocommondations" (art.46).
Art. 5 & 6 provide that the Governor Gonoral will "when he sees it fit" appoint
tinistaiS anduhdar-secretrios responsible to him (Sa*t al-thiana,22.2.). ? .
ho .dodroo.wez described in the Foreign Office lotter of.tho 15.1.48 to the
Egyptian Ambassador as "'the long-awaitod initiative towards self-government in
Sudan" (J.dlEgypte,25.2.).
,The publication in Cairo of tho decroe on the SudanizatiOn-ef'the Sudan,
was follo7d by an outburst of?virulont?attacks-diroctod against tho. Egyptian Govern-
tont and the British. Thefolloving headlines in-Egyptian newtpapors leollacted
at random by J. D5.24.2.1vare most chaxacteristic of the indignation eXprossed
by pressmen belonging to different parties: !Dictatorship in the Sudan". -"Plot
for Setting up a.dictatorial regime". "Criminal attompt to separate Sudan from; Egypt".
"A legislation putting the Sudan under the domination of. the Governor General".?
One of the roost striking headlin9s 7,as that of 'Abram' (27.2.) reading: 'EIS -Majesty,
Robert Howe the First". . ?
Indoedthe text of tho British daoroa needs very little comment, if at all,
to outline its dictatorial character. It is however noteworthy to emphasize the
fact that LlmoAt all newspapers in Egypt condemned tho scheme and doscribod it .o
"a now British manoouvre to secmro full British contrandautherity ovelltheSudan".
Moreovor, it was especially pointed out that, should Egypt aCcept to entor into
negotiations with Britain on the basis laid down by tho British sChomb; 'She treuld
by so doingruin her whole national,cause (Ikhwan al-Muslomin voted by--Zaman;24.2.,
and Misri,25.2.). "Miari" (24.2.) also wrote that the scheme as but an'association
of words to empower tho Governor General pith complete sovereignty over the Sudan.
.The Wafdist press, naaely "Sawt al-Umma" 25.2.), violently took tho Government to
task and charged Nograshi with the sOlo:responsibility for his policy of "fait'
accompli". The same newspaper also; emph4sized that the Governor Gonoral of the SUdan
is but an Egyptian official. A similar romarkAvas made by "Ahram" (25 and 25.2.).
Only .flitssas"., the.Saadist organ .(Noqrashi is the- President of tho Saadist Party)
mado a timid attempt to justify Noqrashi's-hositations Vis-tl-vis the British bchomo.
It tried to explain :that "since tho British are still ocCupying thO SUdan" it would
be bettor to:.nogotiato with thorn than to leave things as they are (Ass'as,27.'2i)&
Noqrashi has boon reported to have blamod.tho Sudanese fer their haat? tO get rid
of tho British and to have stated that the Sudanese shOuld not be impatient (KUtla,
27.2.). This report,however,was not confirmed by othor sources.
At all events, it was ,becoming obvious that the EgyptiWCabinot had boon ?
seriously affocted by thq.general opposition qgainst the British'Scheme ad that
it would be compelled to, reject it in view of the violent reaction of Egypt's
political quarters (Misri,2).2.)) Egypt, it was reported, would also'domand for a
strict application of her constitutional rights'(Akher Sa'a,25.2.). A.draft'answer
by Egyptian experts rejecting the British proposals?wat reportod?to?bo already:in
preparation for dispatch to London (Ahram,27,2.! and a now Egyptian scheme ?Preparod
instead (Zaman126.2.).
The British proposals were finally rejaCted by the Egyptian Cabinet (Router,
28.2.). Various political parties and associations, including tho Liberal (GoVernment
Party) had previously statod their opposition to the scheme. The Senate Foreign
Affairs Commission had also oxprossed the opinion that Egypt had erred by accepting
to enter into negotiations with, Britain on the Sudan question
' In view of the Scarcity of information from-the.Sudan it is difficultto .
ascertain what has been the. exact reaction of the Sudanese., particularly the
British "Lima" Party, to the British proposals. ? It appears, however, that t"
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been at with similar criticism as in Egypt. The Secretary General of the Sudancsa
rndependent Party (Separatist) is oven reported to haver stated that the propoSed
legislation includes neither provisions for Iself-governMent nor for independence
(R,2 5.A.). The Union of Sudanese-students'in Cairo iabued a memorandum stating that
they viii fight -"the imperialistic Scheme" and appealed to the Egyptian to fight it,
too (Kutla,25.2.)-. The President of tho Ittihad (Sudaneao Union) Party, donnounoed the
scheme as an attempt to divide between Egypt and tho .1.1dan -(Misti)25.2.)i A spokes--
mon of the "Ashilqa" Party (partisan a of the Unity with Egypt) is also reported to have
voiced his party S rejection of the propcaed legislation (Ahram,27.2.).
Despite this outburst of criticism and
Britain-weuId-cqrry"but-the implementation of
"Ahram" (2).2.) also recalled
legislation haVing.been anforced in the Sudan
protests, it vs hoWeVer feared that ,
theaChome, eVon ifEigYpt rejected it
that there had been precedents of
Without:Egyptla conbent.
OptimiSM Seems:to have prevailed for a while in LondonasHto a faVrouable
outcome of the Proposed legislation. Well informed circle went eVon as far as to
foresee a rosuMptien of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations (Ahrami24,2.)i It should be,
however, omphasied that. thee reports wore pUblishod before .to' gyptian roactions
to?the British scheme wore .knovAl in London. The Egyptian press'attitudo waa,lator
described by the Cairo -'Matichoster Guardian" correspondent as "unenceuraging"
(Ahram027.2.). Egyptian Circles in London also stressed that the British proposals on
the Sudan "wore of a nature to bring new difficulties to Angle-EhYPtian relations"
Still,the belief persisted that Britain woUld enforce the scheme
as she wiShes, to keep control over the 8Udan for strategic reasons eonnectod with
general plan,forthe defence of Aftica-(Ahram,27.24.
'IRAQ
'Dissolution of the Chamber.
On the 25th February a Royal decree was issued by the Regent Ordering the
dissolution of the .Chamber. It 'stated, inter alia,.that "because of the .prozent delicate
circumstances which necessitate taking due measures to fulfil the desires of the nation..
it,is imperative to ascertain the opinion of the nation..."?(Ahram,26.2.).
One reason for the dissolution of the Chamber-May be said to be the CDbinetts
desire to meet another of the six demands, jointly advanced by the country's throe
.parties. on-the day that?the Cabinet was :inaugurated (Ahram,26.2.). A second reason
May be the desire of the Government to appear to the nation as being progressive, in
that they removed all rem nants of the. jabr period. Moreover, in view of .0...probable and
seemingly much-desired settlement of, relations with Britain (see below), it doubtlessly
wanted to .render impossible a recurrence. ef.the,:recent "coup" .which waP instigated by
unsatisfied parties and inadequatelTTepresented.elementS.of the Chamber who agitated
tho,populaCe to ride against the authorities.
Elections are to, be hold, in two months and the new Chamber is oxpectoct to convene
two months later (Ahrat,26.2.). Prior to the elections a reshuffle of the Cabinet
is anticipated in ordeit to make it a-coalition Cabinet by admitting into it National
Democrats and, Liberals (the Istiqlal is already represented by its President, ,
Muhammad Mahdi Kubbeh, tho-Minister for Supply). Kamil Jadurji, President of the
left-ring National DeMocrates stated that hip party Would only participate in the
Government if its stipulated conditions wore accepted, the main one prosumabely being
the proportion of their participation. Tho Liberals have not as yet decided on the
question of thcirparticipation (Misri,26.2".). The purpeso of setting up a coalition
GovernmentiS to ensure that elections will be conducted by a Government representing
all parties.(Ahram,23.2.). The dissolved Oilamber ins elected in 1947 under the
administration of Premier Nuri Said (Ahram02662.) and none of these parties was
represented in it, the Liberals boycotting the elections, and the other two parties
failing to gain any seats.
In view of the impending elections the "Constitutional Bloc" which was the
Opposition of the dissolved Chamber, and cotprised some 70 Deputies (put of a total
of 140), is 'reorganizing itself into a now party to bo called "the Constitutional
Bloc Partyl'. This nascent party represented in tho present Ofilbinot by-uhammad
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Ridha al-Shabibi the present Minister of Education, who headed it in tho Chamber,
and by Nassrat al-Farisi, Minister of State (i'direm,25.2.).
In the forthcoming election-campaign, the parties are exnected to co-operate
with Fvacb other by jointly allotting to themselves districtssespecially those
populutod by tribes ,in order to prevent independent candidates from gaining office
(Ahram,26.2.).
Anglo- 'Iraqi Relations
On the 23rd February it was disclosed that the 'Iraqi Government had sent to
Britain a metherandum explaining the reasenz for the non-ratification Of the Portsmouth ?
Treaty. The memorandum asserted that the proposed Treaty was not in the interests of
'Iraq, since it did not cull for the complete withdrawal of the British from the two
airbasos in Habbaniah and Shaibah. ? Moreover, it gtanted Britain many financial and
economic. concessions. 'Iraq, furthermore, could not agree to the proposed joint
Defonso Board which was to be established as an executive and not merely a consultative
body. Had it boen.uccapted it would have meant in effect British control over 'Iraq's
policy and public utilities. Finally the memorandum expressed 'Iraq's readiness to
revise the 1910. Treaty in a manner guaranteeing 'Iraq's national aspiration (Mien,
Assaa(& A1),24.2.). The disposition to revise the Treaty is also be found in two'
unofficial statements as follow: On 23rd FobruaryNo.ssrat al-Farisi, Minister of.
State, commenting 'onthe British reply to the 'Iraqi rejection Note of the Portsmouth
Treuty,said that 'In,.;:xbyishing to strengthen her friendship 'es with Britairovery
much desired to enter into new negotiations with her . regarding the modification
of the 1930 Treaty (Misri,24.2.). Similarly, Hamdi el-Pachachi, tho Foreign Minister,
on his return to Baghdad from the Arab League Council's session in Cairo, stated
that ?since the 1930 Treaty does not suit 'Iraq at present she would not refuse to
negotiate with Britain its modification (Ahrem,26.2.). Both of these .statements
should be associated with a series of earlier ones (see our last issue) indicating
the same trend.
===+===
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24.2.1948 No.23(50)
s?ARAB WORLD AFF RS
= W F
Weekly SurVey
GENERAL
League aession Closed: Summary of RSsuIta.'?
Since the discussion-on Palestine, the dominating feature.of the session, waa
completed on the 17th, proceedings were expected to come to an end on the 19th.
However, they dragged on until the 22nd, thereby extending it Tore than a period
of a fortnight. This delay presumably duo te events in Yemen .and pessibly to
the desire to ascertain the, trends of ditoussiena at the Security Council and not
accordingly. Theeintervaniug days -were filled' by a .review of the Libyan question,
the situation in the Maghrib, with special reference to the Tetuan clashes- and the
alarming food shortage in?Tunis, Lahaj's request for admission' to the League, the
question of a unified oil pelicy as a weapon to fight Fartitien, the relations
with. the .1.7N Peed and Agriculture OrganiZation, :the question of joining the
International Refugees Organization (I.R.0.), Jess well as a nuMber of technical,
legal and natural problems. If we add to this the problems referred to in our ereves4
issues, such as the question of an Anglo-Areb alliance, the Syro-Lebanese monetary
dispute, the unification of 'currencies, the conVening of an Asiatic Conference and
Viet-ns appeal for help, we will have a fairly complete picture of What the
League anticipated dealing with.
It is obvious that the two week period allocated to copewith an agenda as
pretentious and crowded as this falls far short of the actual need and cannot
be expected to yield appreciable results. And indOode none of the problems, with
the exception of Palestine, was given. a thorough ?treatment , lot alone brought
nearer to solution. They wore either, a) referred to special committees (or
respectively assigned to Governments for further ? study), as in the case of 'Iraq's
proposal for the unification of currencies, the Asiatio Conference and Viet-nem's
request or b) postponed until the coming session in March, as. was the fate of the
suggested Anglo-Arab. alliance , theekindred problem. of strengthening inter-Arab
solidarity in the politital and economic spheres, and the modifiying of the League
Chester or else c) some short term compromise was found or minor preliminary stops
decided upon, as was the case with the Levant currency dispute, Libya and North
::ifrica in 'general.
On the other-hand, certain positive achievements Should not be overlooked.
As
regards Palestine, to begin with, unanimous agreement is said to have been
reached on all points discussed by the Political Committee (Misris18.2.), and
all of them, 'Azzam assured ?the press, wera'of .an?"executive" (i.e. practical)
nature (Miari,17.2.), including a number of "secret" resolutions bearing on military,
political and financial aspects .(ibid). It was decided to sentralize and
coordinate defense measures and to insure an increased supply of arms and foodstuffs.
To this end a three-man body was created (gae.our last issue), referred to by
Emile Ghouri as the "Supreme Advisory Council"; Whose task it is to oomplement
the varied (political and administrative) functions of the A.H.E. (Difa',19.2.).
By including the Mufti in this body, he was, accorded full political status as the
official representative of the Palestina Aiabs on the League Council. It was also
agreed to,invite Jerusalem'a Assistant Director of Supply to Cairo for consultations
(Ahram,13.2.). A plan for imMediste military action was presumably drawn up by .
s conference convened by General Swat in Cairo on the 21st and attended by Col.
Shswkat Shuqoir, the Lebanese representative on the Military Committee, 'Abdul
Qader al-Husseini and Hasean Sslemeh. ?The Military Committee who met on the some -
day (Ahram,22.2.), it should be noted, has been atrengysened by the arrival in
Demeeeue of its Transjordan member, 'Abdul Qader al-Juhdi, Deputy Commander of the
Arab Legion, who went at once to seesqawuqji (Palastin
Although it had :been previously stated that there :was no intenticn,to invade
Palestine before the British withdrawal, the approsahingdiscueeipn by the SocUrity ?
Council of the despetch?of an intornationta foroe to Paleetine prompted the League'
spokesman to threaten immediate invasion by regular .and other forces, should the
Security Council decide on such a step. There is civil war in Palestine, 'Azzam
ENCLOSURE
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declared, and therefore no foreign State or group of States is permitted td
intervene (Misri,17.2.). Truman's personel appeal for restraint and preservation of
peece,in the Middle East does not seem to have produced any tempering effect.
Pachachi, Mardua, 'Am= and the Arab Logations in Cairo wore eager to assure -..,
the public that they know nothing of it (Ahram017.2.), though - according to
another report (V. 'Azam in Pal. Post,18.2.) -the receipt of the message was
confirmed on the 16th by the 'Iraqi?AotingForeign Minister, who had telephoned
Pachachi for inetructions'concerning it. Pachachi wven went so far as to saddle
Truman rith the responsibility for the disturbances in Palestine and threatened
that they would not cease until Partition was abregated and the Arab?demands
satisfied (Ahram,16.2.).
? Aside from the military measures, the Politibal Committee ie said to have
decided to recommend ton economic reprisal measures against States participating
in the implementation of Partition, including, it is believed, the severonCe of
economic relations (bifa',, In this context. the oil question presumably
belongs. It was unanimously agreed that all 'member States should adopt a unifiod
oil policy, with particular ref onto the T41ine Company, and that this matter
should not be discussed or docided.upen,without. the consent of the rest of member
Stetes (Misrio2.2.). This decision would .not affeet, however, existing oil
coriessiori In this'oonnection, it ihoula be ot9A that Aromoo.has reportedly
ffered. to Syria, the ailthor of the aboVe Mevo,a 0? millionloan. This is said '
to have been rejected, as well.as a similar offer to Egypt (V. Azam in Pal. Post,
22.2.). Another step in a' different direction is the strengthening of the anti-
Zionist boycott. The League Secretariat has informed the Lebanon that the 'League's
Boycott Committee would shortly visit that country as part of an inspection tour
of the Arab Coitala (ANA,18.2.).
A tangible achievement represents the temporary agreement (until March 31)
mediated by 'Azzamand-Yussuf Yassin (on instrUctions from Ibn Salud)in the Syro-
Lebanese monetary dispute, whereby both countries agreed to maintain for the.
specified period the free convertibility of their. currencieS for import-export
purposes (See, Lebanon).
The Political ?Committee also passed the Egyptian proposal for the
establishment of a UN Bureau for the Middle East and issued the appropriate instruction!:
to the Arab representatives on the UN Economic and Social Council. It stipulated,
however, that the activities of the Bureau should be confined to the Middle East
(including Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) and exclude foreign Powers who
have interests in this part of the world. The Bureau aimS primarily at furthering
commercial intercourse between the countries concerned (Ahram017.2.).
Lahei? and the League. .
The request of thoSeltan of Lahej and Chief of the 'Abadilo tribes, Sheikh
Fadhl 'Abdul 'Karim, to grant his country representation on the:Arab League,
confronted the latter with a peculiar problem.- It was opposed from the start by
Yemen, which even objected to the compromise suggestion proposed to the League
Council, to admit LDh3j to a number of sub-committees, in accordance with the
precedent set in tha case of certain North African countries, which wore .granted
representation on-the Cultural Committee. The main reason for Yemen's refusal is
that Lahej was not, as provided in the League Charter, an independent country,
but one of the nine British dependenties_in 'Men Protectorate. ,The /emeni delegate
to the League, 'Ali al-Muayyad, took up the matter with the Egyptian Deputy'
ForeignMinister, Kernel 'Abdul Rahim and explained to him that Lahej was but an
integral part of the Yemen but had been forcibly separated from it and that the
Yemenites never recognized the legality, of the British occupation, just as
Egypt disoWned'Britain s claims to Sudan.. He also submitted a detailed report,
prepared by Najib Abu /Izzeddin, on the political, legal and social conditions
prevailing in the Protectorate, This report points out that the Sultan of LEI-1(3j
receives from the 'Aden. Government amonthly allowance of 1082 rupees plua an
annual gratuity of 2100 rupees; that the number of itS inhabitants does not exceed that
of ?a single Cairo; constituency; that the administration is controlled by a British
Governor, Chief Secretary, Resident Advisor and Chief Justice; that all this
is providadfbr?in local 'agreements termed "treaties" by the Colonial office, which
have boon arbitrarily renewed since 1803 for a icession of years.
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The Egyptian Government accepted the viewpoint of-Yemen and made endeavours to
persuade the League delegates te,prevent Lahoj's joining the League committees
(Misri,18.2.). The matter came up before the Political Committee on the 18th
and as a result, it was decided to defer the discussion to the March Session
(Ahram,19.2.)..
aeague's Latest Worry: Yemen. Special
The Yemenite coup d'Etat (for Which soe 'Istio) took the League Conforenco
unawares. Although rumours of ImatYahyals death and the establishment of a now
Government headed by Sif ul-Haqq Ibrahim, the Imeaa's 8th son, under the Imamate
of 'Abdullah b. al-Waair, haveloen set on foot since January 1, those events
bocame a certainty only as lato as, the middle, of February, when the new Imam
cabled all Arab Kings and Rulers the nom of his succession and Hubsein al-Kbbsi,
the now Foreign Minister, cabled 'Azzam to come to the Yemen and see the "new
structure erected by a democratic Govern:6mA" (Ahram,20.2.). King 'Abdullah, toe,
telephoned 'Azzam and urged him to respond Kobsi's cull (Misri,21.2.). Following
this the Political Committee vent into the question (on the ].9th) and decided to
despatch at once a fact-finding committee to Suna'a, as a preliminary step to
sending a six-tan committee, composed by representatives of all Loagdo member States
and led by 'Azzam, for the purpose of "assisting Yemen in overcoming present
difficulties". Sheikh Hassan Ibrahim, the Yemeni delegate to the Political Committee,
suggested the choice of Gen. Isma'iI Safwat for this job, since he was well acquainted
aa_th that country and ;- it was pointed out - a friend of the supporters of both
the late Imam aild hie successor. It should be mentioned that Safwat spent the war-
years 1939-42 in the Yemen, Gs la,ad of the 'Iraqi Military Mission for Creating
a Yemenite Army. However, Safwtkt expused himself because of his duties as C.
of the Palestine "Libegution Army". Therefore the following wore appointed as "faaa.
finders": 'AbdulMunIsma'il Hassani-InclMahd.Mustapha Yas sin, three
. .
Egyptian Foreign Ministry officials and Muhd. ,Saleh as-Sumati, a 'Yemenite notable
resident in Caito (Assaa,22.2.), accompanied .by Yuhya Ism&il al-Wadi% a Yemeni
cfficial of the Arab League. On the 21st the mission left for Saha:a by air.
EGYPT
Political attivity,..in Egypt this week has shifted from purely Egyptian
affairs to the Arab Laaguo'S meetings, which dealt mainly with Palestine and
incidentall5acith Libya (see General, Arab Affairs). Behind-the-scene activities,
however, centred around the Sudan,quostion. A British note, in reply to Egypt's
request for a modification in tho Sudanese regime, was reported to have been
examined by-tha Egyptian Cabinet (Misri,19.2.). The note which was published by the
Foreign Office in London on the 21st proposed an Anglo-Egyptian Conference to roviso
ordinances for ruling the Sudan (AP,21.2.). It stated that the revision should
ensure that the ordinance provisions are truly in the intoroats of the Sudanoap
people and that it affords thorn the maximum degree of self-government consistent
with their present stage of development (ibid.). Although the official reactions to
the British note are not yet available, some itnisters wore already reported to have
reserved their opinion "until the British answer is officially discussed" (Mien,
19.2.). On of the greatest opponents to the GoVornment's attitude in the Sudan
question seems toabe Hussein Hoykal, the:President of the Senate and Chairman of
the Liberal Party. Heykal, it was stated, is of the opinion that the' British policy
on the Sudan is a meta screen for the maintenance of the present Sudanese regime, End
that all British propositionS should have been completely ignored by the Egyptian
Govornment(Misti,16.20. Although the Liberals have taken no decision as yet
on the British note (ibid.),, their President, in a statement to "Rose'UlaYusaUf''
(11.2.),recallod the fact that at the UN Noqrashi had insiateerthe British aVaeuat
from Egypt as well as the Sudan. Heykal is also reported to have stated that "it
would be janconsistant with Noqrashi's statement, if Egypt enters into negotiations
on reforms of a regime which she has previously asked to,bannulled altogether (ibid.).
Available press reports seam to indicate that the differences botweon the
Liberals and the Saadists -the two Goveznmeat,partiOS), were increasing. Apparently
the leaders of both parties are pursuing effertsHto maintain a-united front against
the Wafd. Hoykal had appealed for more unity and warned that "new elections would
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result in the Government being held by one party" (meaning the Wafd) (Sawt.al-
Umma,18.2.). In another statement, he alb stressed the need for more political
unity (Ahram,19.2.). It is apparently in order net to provoke a split between the
Liberals and the Saadists that the Egyptian Premier later expressed criticism of the
projected British scheme (P.B.S.,2.3.2.).
Meanwhile, it was reported that the., Sudanese delegation was to be reshuffled
and all its members summoned tedsire in order to follow the development of the
talks concerning their country Isma'il al-Azhari, the leader of the
Delegation, and a known .supporter of the unitSr with Egypt, later stated at a meeting
hold by university graduates, that he was against the '"Sudanisation" schema (Ahram,
20020. ?
On the19th Of February' the Sudan Government published in Khartum the text
of a bill'providing for the nationaliaationof the Sudanese people (ANA,19.20.
The bill,. which is to be sabthitted to the Sudan Advisory Council on the rd of
March, provides that people.born. in. Sudan or, permanently residing there, are entitled
to become nationals of Sudan.. The bill has been violently criticised by opposition
parties in Egypt, and it was pointed out that, when enforced, Egyptians will have
the status- of "foreigners" vi---vis, the Sudanese (Kutla,20.2.). "Sawt'al,Umma",
19.2. described the bill as an important step towards the disunity of the Nilo
Valley, while the Wafd s General secretary charged the Government with full
responsibility for losing the Sudan (ibid.).
The Sudan question is expected to be fully exploited by the opposition in
the coming days, and the Government will be obliged to follow the stream or olse be
confronted with a serious crisis. New developments should be awaited in ,any case
before aoncluaively stating What the official reaction of the Egyptian Government
win be towards the British.propoaal.
Gevernment.considers measures to combat Communism.
A bill aimed at checking the spread of. communism haa been prepared by the
Egyptian Ministry of Interior, and a special Police Bureau to centralise information
on Communist activities has been sot up?(J. d'E.,17.2.). The Government has been
contemplating anti-Communist measures for. a long time. In January, the Cabinet
held a special meeting to discuss the question of Communist activities "which were
apparent recently at the Fund University and the l4phalla Textile Factories" (A,27.1.
As a Matter of fact, the groWing Communist influence has resulted in more
frequent strikes and greater dissatisfaction openly expressed by workers and other
social groups in Egypt. Hence, when coMmeating upon the proposed anti-Communist
measures, the Wafdist press pointed out that it mould have been better to deal with
Cemmunism either by putting an ond to bribery amongst officials, checking high cost
of living or by enforcing social reforms (Sawt al-Umma,Misri,18.2.).
Attempts to minimize the Communist, danger were previously made by "Ahram"
which affirmed that Egypt was protected. against Communiam by her Islamic principles.
The paper also concluded that Britain was only using the spectre of Communism to win
support for her new policy in the Middle Eaat (EaG.,29.1.). The "Ahram" allegations
however are not entirely corroborated by facts. A recent poll in the Fund University
showed that 20% of the students favour Communism, 27/0 Socialism, while Only 18%
are for "lemic Socialism" (Rose Tho same magazine also stated
that -"ComMunism has suncooded in convincing quite .R largo number of "Al-Azhar"
students". It went on to say that *Communiat elements, which are numerous at "Al-
Azhar", are trying to sabotage religion in this country" (E.G.,19.1.). In a latar
issue it reported on a clash between Communists and members of the Moslem Brotherhood,
in the Cairo religious institute (Rose al-Yussuf,18.2.), Similarly "Asaas"
the mouthpiece of the Sadist party, in an editorial pointed out ' the existence
of "a destructive .force", which Egypt is determined to combat. The same qualification
was also put by "Akhbar al-Yom" (24.1.) which stressed that "it was useless to deny
the existence of destructive extremist movements.
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It should be pOinted out, however, that,tho?Egyptian Government obviously
differentiates?between tha local Communists and the U.S.S.R.,or countries under
U.S.S.R. influence. "hkhbar?al-Yom" (14.2.) put it quito clearly-when it wrote
that ?t is the Government's task to combat'CoMmunism in the. Country', but. that this
has nothing to do with 4s.'ypt'.s ielations.with.the Eastorn..Bloc". Thus the GOvernment
is engaged in commercial talks with a Soviet mission,, and has sent official
representatives to Vienna. Bucareat, BUdapest and Sofia (Misri,22.2.).
Pending the enforcement of the 'now anti-Communist law the Govornmemt appears
to have stiffened its attitude towards alleged Communists, Those in custody, pending
trial, are reported to suffer ill-treatment at thotands of the police and their
dafonse council has lodged a 'protest to this offectjSawt al-Umma,17.2.).
It is worthwhile mentioning that the pre-Govornment press have attempted to discriminate
against local Communists by claiMing that :they wore closely cooperating with the
Wafd Lhkhor Sa'a,30.1. & 11.2.). Other discriminating.attempts also?csme from' .
"Rose al-Yusauf". (18.2.) Who alleged that Several Egyptian Jots in the ranks of the
Communist party, are in. fact mere "Zionist agents".
Moslem Brothers store arms.
On the 2Cith '7)f February, between, 10.30 and 11 P.M.,. the IslamicRoltibns
Office, Cairo, which belongs to the Moslem?Brotherhood, was bely damaged by an
explosion which shook buildings in an area of 10 kilometres (J. d'E.,21.2.). The
Office was being.used for a farewell party to Ubslem Brother volunteer from
Suez, Alexandria ? and Faqus before. their departure foryalestine (Akhbar'al-Yom,21-2-R-
.Ahram22.2.).. Several persons. were injured, amongst whom was the rife .of the?Mir-e_
of Poland who lives in the same building (Misri,22.2.). .limong those who attond&I
the banquet was Mahmud Labib, leader of the Brotherhood volunteer( squ.9A.P.(khbsr
al-Yom,21.2.), who escaped injuries._ Hassan al-Banna expected to ...tend,
apologised?for not doing so and did not. attend .(J. d'E.,21.2.).
According to a police report following the investigations, ,a grenthe ,wont off
accidentally exploding ammunitions tstorod in the building (ANA & Hasgn
al-Banna,When interrogated by the investigators said that two Palestine Arabs n
had requested his authoris,ation to keep explosive and blankets in the premises,
and that he had agreed (Ahn:..m022.2.). Further' roports frqmithe,oxports' as. to the
cause of-the explosion, considered the poSsibility of the explosiVos having boon
discharged . as a result of the heat Of tho covering blankets (ibid.). These
various semi-official reports.?did not prevent some newspapers from charging
Zionists or Communists with the responsibility for the axp1o6ion. . Thus. "Akhbar ra-
YomY C212) wrbte that police, investigator's believe that,Zionists who succeeded in
infiltrating into EgYpt.coUld be the plotters of the out/-age. Similarly the same
paper explained that Communists might also be the culprits as "difference of
opinion had recently come out betwebn Communists and Moslem Brothers on a planned
demonstration on the occasion of the 21st of February".
Tho allegtions of course wero.Moant to divert public opinion. Irian
the accidental blowing, up of the Moslem Brotherhood and Islamlc Relations. Office,
is further testimony to: the fact that the Moslem Brothers are ,storing arms and
explosives in their various premises.
LEBANON ANDSRIA
Frpvisional Agreement.
Utilizing their meeting in Cairo, and under the prosSure of 'AZzam Pasha,
Jamil Eardam and Ri Yadh as-Sulh-on the 18th 'Fobruhry signed a provisional agreement,
according to which free trade between the two Countries will continua until the 31st
'March, and allowing that during the same period the currency of ouch country will be
acceptable at the customs of the other., FloweVor, transfer of money between one.
country and the other will be subject to Obtaining special permission from the
respective Finance Ministers. The to parties fUrther undertOok to inangurr:_te
negotiations concerning their Common Interests not later than the ljth March
(Misri019.2.).
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Although this agreement gavei rise to optimistic declarations by as-Sulh
and 1.1ardam in respect of future relations between Lebanon and Syria; it Only
represents a very temporary settletent of their relations designed to avoid chaos, whit)
might prove harmful to both countries. In fact, even before the monetary issuo the.
Common Interests Convention was ektonded to the.31st karch. The present agreement
corroboratos.the extension With some :important limitations resultant from the
separation of currencies: The agreement does not refer at all to the monetary
problom,,buit recommends a final settleMent of the economic issues botwoon the two
countries in the light of tho separation Of currencies.
Tho article providing for free trado betweon SYria and Lebanon, even for a
Period of one month as stated in tho agreemont, appears to be a serious handicap
to Syria. It moans that Syria's plan for premixing hard currency by bloCkipg the
Lebanese border and by retaining for overseas export all surplus products will be
seriously affected. However, tho Syrian Government may. still circumvent this
provision by hinting to Syrian exporterito withold their transports to Lebanon.
Reletions with Britain.
Despite the statement ma e by a Foreign Office spokesman that Britain
would not reply to the 'Iraqin. lecting the Portsmeuth Treaty (R.,9.2.), it was
disclosed by "Ahram" (17.2.) that Sir Henry Mack, British Ambashador to Baghdad,
had submitted to the 'Irrtql QoVernment Britain's reply. kceording to "Ahram",it
allegedly stated that .6ritain considered the 1930 Treaty still valid and made it ?
clear that as long 'as 'Iraq did not insist, Britain would not revise the Treaty.
As regards the Portsmouth. Treaty, the reply descrbied it as being in the interests ?
of 'Iraq, adding that the opposition against it and the riots ensuing from it resulted
from a misunderstanding: This version of the reply is consistent with a further
report. concerning tho Jabr-Bevin Treaty,- to- the-effect that it was understood. that
for the moment there was no desire apparent in Whitehall to secure it ratification
by.the.well-worn moans used on previous occasions, the idea being to let the now
Government staw.in its own jlid:Ce for a while (P.P.,20.2.).
"Kisri" (22.2.), hewever,.rePortod that the Baghdad paper "Al-Sata", which .
it. described as being the mouthploce,Ofthe present Government, wrote that the
British reply, stressing Britain s.dosirete maintain peace in the M.E. and to
continue her good relations with 'Iraq; statod that Britain was ready to (=inter now
negotiations for the modification of:the 1930 Treaty. Anyhow "Ddisri" (.21.2.)
reported that the Cabinet had prepared a.rosponse to the British reply.
It seems that regardless of the .likelihood of a joint regional defence
pact between the Arab states and Britainl'the 'Iraqi Government and varioUs political
personalities have no wish to preclude the'possibility of resuming bilateral
negotiations with Britain. aimed at modifying the old 1930 Treaty. To this and a
good many statements have been made: Hamdi Pachachi, the Foreign Minister; disclosed
that the 'Iraqi Note, of rejection of the Portsmouth draft Treaty mentioned in
addition that the 'Iraqi Government wanted soon to resume talks with Britain regarding
the conclusion of a now Treaty (Ahram,13.2.). "e also told' the "Daily Telegraph"
correspondent in Cairo that 'Iraq Would begin a series of now talks with the
recently-appointed British Ambassador to Baghdad (Ahr=,10.2.). Similarly, Premier
Muhammad al-Sadr told AP that the rejoction of the Portsmouth Treaty would not
affect friendly relations between 'Iraq. and Britain as fnr as 'Iraq was 'concerned
(Misri,11.2.). Rida al-Shabibi, the present Minister of Education, when asked what
was preferable from the 'Iraqi Standpoint - the continuance of the 1930 ? Treaty or
new negotiations - gave an, evasive onswer,.. while Daoud al-Haidari, Minister of State,
when asked the same question, answered that he thought that the conclusion of a new
treaty was of greater valUe to 'Iraq (Misr;t;15.2.). Sheikh Mahdi KUbboh, present
Minister. of Supply .and President of the istiglal party,also asserted that the 1930'
Treaty should be..modified. In. a like manner, Muhammad Hudaid, Vice-Prosident of the
National Democrat party stated that.the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty did not
mean the accaptanee of the 1930 Treaty (Ahram,16.2.).
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further indication that .'fraq is rolaxinganer fOrmer attitude is preVided by
"Ahrum's" report (16:2.).that althoUgh there is no Sign of agreement to the ilea Of
joint defonso.board.as projectedin the.Persmouth Treaty (on, thisiiDoint .471ci British
mostly insiated) sOtle-Cir6les would not object to it formation as-a mere 'Consultative
body.
Nevorthelessyrsaub:'Iraqi circles are inclined to leaVe:.thO 1950 Treaty unchanged
until it expires in 1952, since Britain duos not seemlikelaato'Make.aaY.further concession
(Ahra.m,18.2.).
. .a
In any caSo, from the aasortion made by 'Abd al-'Aziz allassab, the Speaker
of the Chamber,ta the off0Ct that the 'Iraqi nation by its very nature supports '
"'Democracy" in its StrUgglo with the Eastern Bloc (Ahram,16.2.) it may be understood
that 'Iraq still prefers British friendship with its limitations to absolute lack of
commitment.
Before coMmencing new talks, the 'Iraqi Government will be obliged:to wait
until the disturbances in the country are quelled. Furthermore, all'Parties agree
that now nogotiationsahould be precedod by the dissolution of the Chamber, the
election of a new one and the setting. up cf, a strong. coalition Government which
would initiate new negotiations. In the event that Britain objected stubbornly -
to the modification of the Tteaty 'Iraq might bring her Complaint to the
Security Council (Ahrua,18.2.).?
Unmindful of Government deliberations, it. appears that the 'Iraqi press have
used a harsh tone against Britain, a fact thichled the British Ambassador to lodge
a protest 'with the Government, declaring that such a tone was inconsistent ?with the
mutual friendship, existing between the two states (Ahram,16.2.). As a result of
this protest (which was net affirmed in?London official circles - "Nisri",17a.),
the press was askePl.efrain from its attacks (1Ahram,16.2.). knothar outburst of anti-
-British fuolina7s-wan the ttempt to sabotage water-pipes and electrical. tirasaloading.
to the British airhase in Shaiba. Here too the 'Iraqi authorities intervened, the
District Commissioner of Basrah dCelaring that those assets were the property of the
Government and threatening the saboteurs with punishment (Assas,20.2.). Furthermore,
in demonstrations in Baghdad, Sulaimaniah, al-Hallah and Ramada touched off by the
Cabinet decision to dissolve the Chamber .(see below), the demonstrators shouted
anti-British slogans and attacked British reading-rooms (Kutla,21.2.).
Internal State of Affairs.
On the 17th FObruary "Misri" reported that the Cabinet had adopted a resolution
to dissolve the Chamber "because it does not represent the nation and was not properly
elected" (Ahram,2042.). This decision was discussed by Premier Muhammad al-Sadr
in his two-day visit to the Regent who is spending a vacation in Sursong, in northern
'Iraq (Kut1a,23.2.). The decision seems-to be rather abrupt since the Chamber was
adjourned for two months on 3rd February, after the new Government was constituted.
In explanation of this measure it may be maintained that the Cabinet Was provoked to
thia decision by growing pressure from those of its members who-were neither members
of the Sancta nor of the Chamber, and by those who had alleged fraud in the last
elections (such as the Istiglal party). Sanator Mahdi Kubbeh? was reported ?the day
before (Ahrem,16.2.) to have said that since his Istiglal party had not acknowledged
the legality of the Chamber it still insisted on its being dissolved as demanded in
the joint manifesto of the parties.
Another explanation suggests that the dissolution aims at divoating the former
ministers of their parliamentary immunity so that they may be tried on charges of '
responsibility for the bloodshed in the recent disturbances (Ahram,19.2.).
That this is still an important problem may be concluded from the fact that in
a;-eating called by Premier Muhammadal-Sadr to discuss the situation, the principal
,J.Incnd of the leaders of the country's three parties, the National Democrats, the
Liberals and the Istiellal, was for the due punishment of those responsible for the
bloodshed (Misri,18.2.). In this connection. it was reported that Jamal Bahan,-
Deputy of the former Premier )-and Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab, the former MinisterMinister for
Social Affairs, repudiated any such responsibility saying that they had resigned
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from the Cabinet before tho riots (Misri,17.2.) ' As for the ex-Premier Saloh Jabr,
it was decided to bring him back from abrord to fL,ce-the investigation cotmittoo
(Ahram,19.2.). It was later ropOrted that the invostigation/actUally interrogated
some former ministor and high-ranking .officials (Miori)22.2.). /committee
It should bo nOtad that should a miniSter be found, responsible ho will have
to be tried by a high tribunal which according to the 'Iraqi legialationsis to
bo presided over by the President of thu Sonata Nuri Satid, who wf,,pa member of
the former Cabinet and played an impoittht tolo in tilt) conclusion orlbrtsmouth
Tror.ty (ibid.). Aocidontallyj NUri Satid Was raportod to be intending to leave
'Ireq for the purposo of settling it TUrkta (ASs1E426g2.). With rolation to this
issue it was rumoured that Jcmil preSent Uinistur of the Interior,
had tendorod his resignation) peraiatAith his otAftion that all dotails about th0
recant disturbances should be kopt secret (Misrii1812)i
Unreliable as it may be, this rumour should bo coupled with reports. in
Baghdad press about the infirm:stand of the Government crid the possible, resignation
of some of its members (Ahram,18.24.
At last, in view Of the imminent alection-camp:Agn, it may worth while
mentioning that the Government :allowed the existing political parties to set up
branches throughout the country, something rhich?ws proviously forbidden (Ahram,
16.2.).
1948
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?ARAB.WORLD AFFidRS
No.20(46)
-Weekly SurveY.
GEVERAL
Inter-4rab_polidarltx Vs Britain?. .
.It would appear that 'one of the keys to an understanding of the current crisis
in AngloArob relations lies with Ikypti This is not an altogether new conception.
The Efryptian press, particularly that of the, Opposition, has continually emphasized
that there could be no question. of BritEin Settling her problems with the rest .of the
Arb World as: long-as -she persists. in -ignoring Egypt's fundamental. demands. and- that
any ngreement reached with them was bound to founder on the Egyptian deadlock (sea our
issue No.18). But whereas this sort of talk could be dismissed, up to a very recant
date, as more propaganda .t.l.nd a bargaining device, since no tangible proof ofreal Arab
backing: for Egypt 11*0 evidenced, the 'Iraqi de,Acia and the ,reported Syro-Lebanese
neativo attitude towards the British bilateral treaty offers to them and Saudi
Arabia seem to indicate that Egyptian diplomatic pressire has been at work in the
Arab Capitals. The causal nexus -between it and the 'Iraqi ebullition must wait for
further elucidation, but it is obvious that Egypt could not have looked on, idly whilst
an Arab Les;eue member- State was negotiating a treaty which Egyptian public opinion
rezdod as a "stab. in the back".' It is significant, as "Sawt al-Umma" (28.1A) wao
eager to detect, that the Daghdad deonstrators, did not only c2amour for British
evacuation-of 'Iraq but also of all Are_b:States and that reports from there, if we
to beliava the. same paper, show that Egypt and Palestine were among the factors Which
provoked the outbreak. . alSo be remetbered that the Lebanese proposal to S'udi
Ar:_bia and the tour to. Riyadh and C6iro of Muhsin Bart:# ustated to be the personal
envoy of pre,sident-uwatli,was preceded. (though not immediately) by the deliver:./ of a.
secret dispatch from F.77rouq to the Presidents of the Levant Statos and Transjordan.
The content of the: messagejit is generally stated ,bears on Palestine or the fight
agin-st Communism, but persistent rumours have it that it is connected with the British
defence plans for the Middle East (Musamarat,1.2.).
Besidos, the Lebanese. demarche,it is said, was not Confined to Saludi Arabia alone.
it is reported that the Lebanon had proposed to the Arab League that the membor St: t:
should conclude an irl#41..rArab military alliance which would prohibit the signing oiA
separate sgreements with non-members Statos before consulting, and, obtaining the coni.:ent
of ,the other members and' included a clause calling for the League Charter, to bo
modified accordingly. This report was,however, denied by 'Azam and Riadh.Solh (du ,294.
But this political move is said to have. been followed by an economic one. Accordilv to
"Assas". (29.1.) the Lebanese Govt. suggested to the Le4ue that a collective commercial
NE7reoment between the -member States be conducted which would provide for (a). no
commercial treaties liable to-prejudice the interests of the League would bo made between
them and non--member ,States; (bl determining the. economic relations between the, LeL.uo
States and the principles of mutual supply and exchange of goods; (0) defini,n;: ?
the attitude .of-the Arab States-towards the anti-Zionist boycott and the economic
policy decided upon by the recent im.1.1) Premiers Conference in Cairo. This move r:L'y _,70
.t.IctuAed by the widespread Lebanese dissatisfaction with .existisai3economic
with the Arab League States, -as a? result of (a) the boomerang ofTect of the-----
Zionist boycott boycott on the Lebanese economy which the "sister" countries have consi:tant]
i7lored and (b) the constant economicfTiction-between tho-Lebanon and her Krian
?noi.6J1bour culminating in the present quarrel over the. question of temainim,' the
4n-nc area. These considerations, Coupled With the political factors (e.g. the.
British, bias of the Maronites, see issue No .19) may also have ultimately prompted
her to give practical evidence of her 'solidarity with Egypt.
..An interesting featuro. which la-nE.J. further support to the hypothesis of 1j)rtial
irXyptin authorshio.of the Arab reactions mentionei dove, are the conclusionsarrived
at by a committee recently sat up by the Egyptian.Poreign Ministry for.. the "co-ordination
of Egyptian foreign poliCy".- This committee has mat several timpS during the, pest three
weeks and is understood to have fermi:dated the following prindiples in its report to
the 'Ministry: a) The restriction of Egyptian policy to ita narrow local framework
cannot realise Egypt's aspirations b) Since Egypt has made the Arab Log:Ne the oxis of
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her.policy in the international arena, she must .direct public opinion in Egypt and
the neighbouring countries towards the unificatiOn of the Arab political plans
and their external problems for the purpose of setting up an Arab solidarity bloc vis-
6.-vis, the foreign Powers in zonera and-Britain in particular. It. follows from
the "collective" policy that urgent steps should be taken to thwart Britain's attempts
to conclude separate agreements with the Arab states and to imbue them- with the
conviction that any 4.reement of. this nature is but an axe.forundermining. the .
League Char-tar and the Arb bloc policy. .The pcIiticI-uxiendi-b-E-CompergYpt to
declare-that she will 'reject ;:-ny?proposL1 which is not ba- joint, joint.settlement
of the relations between Britain .and the-Arab States. as a whole, aaclartion. must
be freely endorsed- by the League members. Conversely, no members ? will,sign any
agreement -?ich is .not pE'Lrt of a gnerL1' settlement with ECypt sn.. the. Arab East.
Britain's ?contention thEt.she must-be-responsible for the security of the laddie
c:,.'ahnot sorve 'as a basis for -an.'reement, since the security of thi6,area?is the
sole responsibility, of its peopled', provided they 'are given the necessary ma%eriE.1
means? and furthermore it depends,on the extent of their confidence in',Britclin
-hich in turn is dependent on Britaids willingness to recognize their claims and
to remove the restriction's 04. arms. and thera.cing of this soeica standro producd.'
Britain 'a political domin*On
,? These .orincipliss ar not likely to come as surprise to the rest of Sttes)
r1(1 indeed may have been influenced by Previous consultAions ,Ath them. According
to "ALher (29.1.) the Arab. leaders 'haddiscussegt the Premiers' Conference)
the problem. of "piecemeal settlements end had decided ..,gainst them; more s,w'cifically,
cgEinst.ny militry treaty mc-de before Brit in Ii Li come to.Rn unde,rst&m.dith Lgrpt.
:This new orientation of itLypt implies, .it would xec;,.m; thLt she has ?finally?
di=?spc.ired'of reaching single-handedasatisf&ctory solution of her problems with
Britain. And this conviction, we are told.by Jen Kimche -.Eost4.2..), is-shared
by the British. It there has ever been a glimmer of hopejor a compromise, the
repudiation of the AngloT'Iracii Treaty -and the f6te.of,iia 'Iraqi siEnatioryhas
-extinguished itpas they will doubtless act on Woqrashi as a. most effective deterrent.
It is not a question of the terms .propo?sed by Britain, says the "Manchester Guardian",
(quoted by Kut:L?,31.1.) because any terms and Lt-ly concessions to. Brit,in will be
rejected by the Arab People '-ad_there are vary few Arab leaders whose position
is 6.o strong that they can d&re to brave theirpooples' wrath. As a result, Kimche reports
an alternate -eIen_is_being cr,d:ually developed.. It envisages formation of a defence
-bIac? which' Would include 'Iraq, Transjordan, Arabia and Syria, with Pakistan
th supplant Egypt and to assume the leadership of the bloc;. as a consequence, it is
presumed, E6wpt would be politic6.11y isolated and its influence in the Arab League
weakened-. Significantly onough,the Lebanon has been left out of the scheme (see abovo.
is, to be won for thi, new plan, by Britain's abandoning tho Greater Syria
scheme and Tr.ansjordan compensated for the latter by changes in hor treaty with Britain
and a more generous subsidy from the.. British Treasury. Mr. Marshall is said to have
given assurances of the fullest Amerion support for_the.scheme. . ?
That such a plan could have been maintained in 'spite of the 'Iraqi setback
presupposes:a considerable degree of .optimism. regarding .future relations with 'Iraq.
As farc,a treaty relations -ith the four Arab S-Lates. specified above are concerned there
is much to warrant 'such an outlook. As:to Syria, the separLtion of her currency?frem
the franc' see Syria),' is likely to op_m up 0. 'ide field of economic code ration
-w--4-.,.heainna:,,dollr..s!.rehis,inddition to her hitherto fri6ndly ,ttitude
towards. Britain and the litters' concessions regarding Greater -Syria -?
induce her ultimately (in- spite of her reported refusal, see above) to join the 3ritis
camp. As "4:_ powerful StiMulus in-this direction may servo Ibn Sa'ud's
A:n-dh,Jre things look rAher. hopeful for Britain. The talks Which had originally
taken place at 'Riyadh between Ibd S..lud-and-tho British AMbassador there, are stated
by Hafoz Wahba, the Saludi Ambassador tO London, to' 1.1::; progressing and are. expected to
continue in London shortly (Mien 3.1.). Regarding.-Trmsjord4n Yr. Bevin is expected
tc meet the wish of the former' ? lovernment for a general rovision of the ,.r1glis-
Trnsjordan Treaty, as well as of its.military annex (R.,3.2.). Thus a situation may
be.crpAd sobn whereby 'Iraq would' be surreunded by a ring Of British Lilies
eo7erfulIy?bached by the
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EGYPT
External Situation
The Egyptian press agrees almost unanimously that the lIractifiAscorhaJ for
? the time-beingruined'the ,c1]:eknces for resuming_ Anglo-Egyptian nogetiations.
?The press continues to extol the "revolutionary movement" of the 'Iraqi people.,
'who aye filed the ImporialistiC designs of Britain' (Ahram,26j.; Zaman,29.1;
Mussamarat ,1.2.etc.). "Rose al-Youssof" (28.1.0 simply asberts that political
circles in Egypt rejoiced at the British failure, because thoy had feared they would
have to follow 'Ircq's example. 1AisriM (28.1.) .carried a report that recently .
established "committee for Co-ordinating Egyptian foreign policy",lhedod by
Abdur-Rahim,:Undor-Socretary for Foreign Affairs hal:deCided among other things to
recommend C: more closer co-ordination of the policy of the Arab Legue
? designed to "frustrate the British plans of contracting:separato troatios with the
Arab States". Although lathe following day the Foreign Ministry published an express
deni4 of this report (Misri,29.1.), it seems that the Egyptian Government views with
disfavour any immediate resumption of the negotiations, as long 5.b such negotiations
could be construed as an acaeptanceof the British demands for a common :defence
scheme. There There wore reports that the U.S. was supporting Britain and opposing
unconditional withdrawal (Akhbar al-Yem,24.1.), that were denied by a British
Foreign Office spokesman (Misri,31.1.).
, In this connoction, it .a,lao1/1'd be noted; that some Prominent porsohalitias
like Hafez Ramadan, 'Aziz 'Ali%lluba have openly declared that Egypt
.sheuld at presont jointneithor Of.the two world blocs and in the event Of war should
remain neutral, liasri added that she could ultimately join th. stroter bloc,
? while Saloh Harb advocated a pro-Western orientation dependent on complete
evacuation, "otherwise we might even join the (awn", (khor Sa'a,29.1; Mussawcr,
? 30.1.) 4 Objection to a special treaty with Britain on tho ground that it would
naturally_beconstruod by Russia as directed ,against her, were voiced
? "Musawwar" (23.1.). Mahmud Ghannam, Deputy-Secretary of the WafdjaVon stated that
Egypt should orientate its policy in the light of the stand taken by. the Powers
in considering the case before the Security Council, e.g. a tentative suggestion
of a pro-RuSSias attitude, whereas "Sawt tl-Umma" (31.1.) attacked the Government
for participating in the Hawana ,Economic Conference which is regarded as "an
additional stop towardsjoining,the western bloc.'
The cautious remarks of Si i Ronald Campbell, who returned to Ezypt on the
30th January, further confirms the view that negotiations will not be resumed in
? the near future. He paid that his task was tp remove difficulties preventing
a final agreotent and that Mr. Bevin stillhopod that such an agreement was
possiblp., 110 had now come to convey to Egypt the opinion of London on this matter
after he had fulfilled the corresponding task in London. But members of his
entourage declared that it was highly improbable that negotiations would be resumed
i4the near future (Misri,31.1.).
Brj-tAin?RAplies to Eovntian Note on_Sudan
,.The constitutional future of the Sudan remains therefore the only problem
on:.7.Thich direct Anglo-Egyptian contactexistss. "Zamae reported on the 29th that
'a note containing the British reply to the recent Egyptian note on the coi-tstitIon,G2
reforms in the Sudan had been delivered to 'Amr in London and forwArd.5d by him
to the Egyptian Government The paPor asserts,thattho British had stated in this
note that "since tho Sudanese Gevertment could not .aga.in_ postpone- its aChomo
of "Sudanization" in conformity With the domelnds of the Sudanese people, thu scheme
would be submitted to the Sudanese Advisory Council in its fOrthcoming session in
March. The British however proposed the fo4m.ation of a committee composed of two
British and two EOptian members, neither,of whom Was to be an official, to study
this scheme and suggest modifications Which wouldN.e-submitted to the Advisory
Council. The Govarnor-Genaral would be requested to consult the British and the
Egyptian Governments before taking'Political,,Constitutional and international
? steps. This has ,been generally -Confirmed by "Misri" (1.2;2.2.) whose reports
do, not contain the last proViSion but add' ihat the GoVerner-Ge;neral himself should
formulate 'a. new scheme, to be sUbmitted to the combined commission, the non-
OfficiO. character of which was-Strosaod.
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If those reports are correct, and they correapond to earlY British reaction
describing the Egyptian proposals as "irreal and too far-reaching, Iiable to impede
the implementation of the whole scheme" :(Economist, Ahram,26.14, then the Egyptian
,proposal'set Dlo.rth in their last. noto,havo not been tot at all, but the door has bean
.left open for further negotiations, 'It ahouldcbe borne in mind,too, that there were
unconfirmed reports that Egypt hasalso, proposed the formatiancf, a mixed committee
that mould include Sudanese representatives to study the'Varioda suggpstod schemes.
The fact that a'British reply to the Egyptian net() on the constitutional
reforms in the Stdan, had tK3.6r1 deliverodwas- confirmed by Nograshi:hitaelf, who
stated that the edvisoty Socty of. the aabinet_wasstudYing it (Ahram4..2.). "Miori"
(1.2.) reports this matter will be the main topic of the forthcoming talks botreen
,Tograshi Fad CamPbo31. Londoncircles are Optimistic about the butcomo of thooe talks.
Negrashi has again stated hisconciliactarypolicy in this resPoct, when, in ansvoring
intorpellations in the Chnber on the Sudanese problem he 'accepted full responsibility
,for the Egyptian Gevernment'scomploto support of Sudanese self-government and
failed to indicate the Govornment!s attitIlde to the SudaneSe Govornor-Genoral's
recent anti-Egyptian steps (AhrciM,28.1.).
-Trade TA1ks with Russick
- A Russian trade mission, headed by M. Menchokoff, Deputy 0omissar for Foroign
Trade, is now conducting talks in Cairo. There was .a great doalof preliminary
contact in November-December 1947 .(Misri,27.1; AssaS030.1., see also Out issue
14 (41)), till the official Russian delegation finally arrived on the 24th January
(Misri,26.L). Diccirashi in reply to a question raised in the Senate hy a Wafdist
Senator, regarding the severance of trade relations between EgYPt and Russia,
stated that the Egyptian Government did not saro efforts to strengthen .economic
relations with other states, among them Soviet Russia. "Misri" had previously
(24.1.) published an article calling on the Government to festertmtde relations'
with Russia. '
The Russians are willing to buy about '100,000 tons offEgyPtian long stnle
cotton, whereas Egypt is mainly, interested in Russian wheat, owing to th,e serious
Wheat shortage (see 'our last.issueNo. 18 (45)). Egypt will receive about 150,000
tons and there were also reports that the S_9viets might supply barley, wood and
paper if demands for Russian_korosine Torarefused (Miri,26.1;27.1; Assas,30.1.).
The main difficulty,ncountered in those talks is the fixing of the prices of
goods_to-be deliVered by both sides. Since the cotton is valued at much map
than the wheat, Rtscsia will have to pay an additional sum to Egypt There
differences that must be reckoned with in the currency exchange (J,. d'E.1.2;
Misri,29.1.). There -are also reports that Egypt is about to sign a financial
agreement with Rumania. Since Egyptian debts in Rumania were frozen, during the war,
Egyptian importers from Rumania were required to deposit 30% of their paymontotc)
Rumania in Egypt. This state of affairs has considerably hampered- trade between
the two countries. The new agreement would settle those accounts and encourage
mutual trade (Misri,17.1.). It is reported that Egypt has sent an envoy to Bulcnria
to prepare for restoration of normal. relations between the two countries (Misri,14.1.).
"Ahram" ,(29.1.) reports that-YugosIavia will soil 20.000 tons or .malio to, Egypt.
This would considerably improve the grave food situation that exists in Egypt.
Trade talks with Norliay have broken down. The NorVegians asked for cotton in
rettrn for the sale of fish, 1 whereas the Ecyptians dotanded wood and paper
(AhraM51.2.)-. _
Egypt Panands EvaC11Qtion of Poles and Yugoslays
The Egyptian Government has.emongly demanded the evacuation within a three
months period of Polish and Yugoslav troops stationed in the, Canal Zone by the
British (Ahram,28.1.). Those troops had been there ever since., the war and have
refused to be repatriated. The Egyptian Government had protested strongl to
Mr. Chapman-Andrews against retaining them in Egypt (A.P.,28.10., Although London
did not confirm these reportNA (29.1.):disclosed that the 'first steps to evacuating
them were actually being taken. There Wet() 600 Yugbslavs there, six of whom are
wanted by the Yugoslav Government as war criminals. 'Both the Poles. and the Yugoslays
are of course opponents of the present rogita in those cduntries (Ahram,1.2.).
"Saw t al-Utta" (31.1.) demands an official statement on the matter.
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Communism Spreading in Egy2it
The: EgyptiantuthoritieS seem to be much concerned by the-spro&ding
what is describes. as ."Communist ideasflin,the country. ,The social ,unrost-whiy*
prevails noW in Egyptis apparently cloVerly oxploited by leftist groups.: :In
Parliament t deputy urged the -Government to Check tho rising cost, of living in
Order, to avoid 'thB ,spreading of. Communist principles. (4awt_al-Umma,20:.1..). a .
appears, however, that Communist -principlos-haya already spread to several olcs
Of the PoPulc;tion. Even in London, left ,wing ,a,otivitios. of Egyptian student
reported?, and the Egyptian Ambassador was requested by his Governmont,,Pte tab
aCtion", The;,EgyptianGovernment is, reported considering the
introduction of anamondmorit to the criminal legislation in order to pormit,
punishment .of communist elements. (Mussawar00,1.). Duo ,to the lack of proper
legislation, alleged Cotmunists arrested have so far been released after their
pz.,as were brought to the Court..
,Despite a pros campaign pointing out that Communism is in contradictir,
to' Islam (KUt1a,16..1.), there were several re-Torts thtt,it has spread to the.
religious Azhar faculty (Rose,e3,Yussaf,28.1.), while other reports disclose tht
students, in tho Egyptian University had shouted ,"CoMmEnisaabove Islam"
(Mussawar?30.1.).
,
' Th9 stronghold of CommUnism in Egypt seems however to be centered in
industrial workers of the Mehalla 014Cobra toxtilo manufactures. A fow days before
tha elections of the Mohalla trade unions committees wore due, the Under. Socretry
of Social Affairs and the Director of Public Security hold a,meetingsto,discues
the situation in.Mohalla el-Kora .(Ahram,16.1.). Following thtt pooting,p9lic_
and army ,contingents wore sent to. Mahalla al-Kobra and wide searchosfer ??
Communists" wore carried.elit. As_a result, 6p workers wora,roportodHtohavo been
arrested' and.a considerable:amount of Communist propagandamateriltlleged ?to
have boon seized (Sawt al,Umma,23.1.). The searches and arrests continued fol
days aftorwards,bringing the total number of Workers arrested to 72 (Sawt al-
Umma,25.1,d. They will all be brought to trial charged -with perpetrating "activities
aiming, at overthrowing. tho present constitutionalrogime" (Sawt al-Umma,25.1.).
,
? ,IJ,DAN
Nilo. Valley Remains OnitadH . ?
The split among the pro-Unity of the Nile Valley prties po#iTilles.(soo
our issue No.15(42)). Attempts, Were made by n Egyptian. deputy visiting the od:n
(Ahram,5.1.), a body.of independentyleaders. (Ahram,74.) and bY the 'Students
Union (Misri,17.1.) tobridge theHgu4 between the Ashiqqa 'arid the Groduates
Congress which is dominated by. the Ashiqqa. party and between the other throe,
Federalist parties: the Federalists, thojiberals and tho Unity of the Nile 7L11.,:y
party. But all those attomptsfailed bee,01,69the two sidas could not czi.po
composition of the now body which was to...direCt the activities of the unitod
front,;ner could they agroo on the-roconstructed Sudanese delegation in EgY.A,
which now is composed.only ofjreprosentiAiyosof the Ashiqqa? and onoindopondent
member --Ahmad Khair, who.opposes their policy (ThoAshiqqa.genorally support
Noqraship while evincing, pro-Wafdist leanings,(Ahram49.1.).
? Both sides alsediffered en thecompetopce of the new?body, the, Ashict.
:demanding that,the political fUnction,offthe.:GraduatesConyentiontho. cradle
,of tho.movemont", shouldrbo,mEint4nod,while.tho othor.three,parties demanded
that the:now,bedy should bc.7empowerod tp male,politicl decisiens,(444A,,1421J.1.).
Both sides-are-unwilling to, compromispj? tho.Ashiqqa Who .are tho.,largest,part:/'
'aro unwilling to forgp,their,domirnwt. pc)sition, while the other parties are ?
?
determined ".0 refuse any proposal which would give the Ashiqqa a majority in.
tho new bodies to he constituted. They accuse this party and its: leader' Ismai].
al-Azhari, of having monopolised all external political activities of the pr:,-
Unity of Nile Valley!mOvemont (Nisri,19.1;22.1.).,
. .
. Maanwtilo the .Ashiqqajlayegain.proved their bold on?the,Graduatest
. _
Convention .as indicatodby the results. of the-eloction.to itslooal branches
They emerged with ?c. complete victory (Kutla,20.100.1.).. In the pro-Unity of Nile
Valley movement this party has remained dominant.
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Preparations for Legislative Assembly
The Sudanese Government continues to make actual preparations for: the
elections of theLegiSailtive? AsbeMbly ProVided,for in the now constitutional scheme
for the Sudan; although no final agreement has 'a6 Yet been'reachod bQtween Egypt
and Hritain'on thiSjmatter(Seo Labblke).:The doUncil of the Northern Districts has
already taken actual top in- proption for the &actions and-tho'choico of
cndidates,(Miori4131.). The Public RolationsOffice of the Sudanese Govortment
has announced that the diStrict governors are consulting local leaden and officers
or the elebtiow .(Sawt These governors Were instructed to prepare
suggested methods of indirect election fel -rural districts, a6d for the district of
Darfur. Candidates had already been,nbminatedAMisii-,25.1.4.utla9.10 ovon
rePorted that Nocirashi Nai. agreed to these steps and that the IndePetdents had definitel:
decided to participate in the elections, Federalists possibly, aiSo.
The Independence Front has however pubIiShed a statement in which they demand
several modifications in the constitutiona1. scheme prepared by the Sudanese
adminiStration before they could agree toPPartiCipats in the LegislatiVe
.TheYdemand that the Ass'embly ShOUld reprogent both-the Nerthern and the Southern 2art
of the Sudan The oxeOutivehcouncil Which:Should include. Sudanese should be
responsiblo to the Assembly.' After three years the condominium should be perman,Dntly
terminated and the Sudanese be free to determine their destiny
Those demands are very similar to the modified demands submitted by Egypt.
! While the indePendents are thus still roSorving their comments and the
pro7Unity'of File Valley supp6rterS have declared thoy would' boycott the Assembly,
the tm religious.factionsi the followerSofthoMahdi family - the Ansar,!and tho
folloynrs of Mirghani the? Ihattmiya,- 'are*ported-to be ready toParticipate
in thisAlections. titt their 'participutien depends on tho neW "Assembly. -really
constituting a ParliamentarybodY0 -(at'aI-Umtaa,9'.l; -1-dIraffi,2C410. Since the two
factionsarei mere important:in theWhele of the-Sudan than the political parties,
which aro important Only in the, towns, their-Support may, be adaisive.
A delegation of the supporters of tho Mahdi family is now touring the western
Std,5n where Most of the inhabitants ere their followers. The tour was 'undertaken
as soon as the Government lifted the ban imposed on the family 30 years ago
prohibiting their visiting that area (Ahram,23.1.). Western Sudan is very important,
its inhabitants numbering 3 millions out af,6-7 million inhabitant of the Sudan.
This visit is only a preparatory stop to tho visit of Sir Abdut Rahman al-Mahdi
himself. Importance_is---placed on the fact that Sir:Robert Howe siMultateously
is-visiting thib are& (ibid.). Those Lctivitis may be conneCted:with preparations
for the Legislative Assombly,for the Federalists have: also demanded
permission to visit this: area (Ahrut,18:.1.). "Mussamarat al-Jaib" (1.2.) reported
that the pro-Unity bodios contemplate'a Series of visits to the variots parts of the
country for the purpose of condUcting a 'campaign to boycott the Assembly.
Reaction to mooted Ani=10-Egyptian Talks
Tho reactions t,O the Mooted- Anglo-Egyptian preliminary talks on the Sudan
are generally unfavourable. The pre-Egyptian parties are against Egypt concessions
to the Unity of the Nile Valley sCheme (Ahram,11.1; Samt al-UMma,30.1.), whereas
the Independents fear that the.cOnceSsions"will be at'theCest of the Sudan", thereby
prolonging the condeminim.indefinitelyij They have demanded an invitation to the talks
and proposed the formation of a united body to be representative of the country
(Ahram,16.1.). The ropresentativeofAhe indepenlont; Umma party Ye. club Uthman has
accordingly returned to Londonto-wat_ct.ttio_develoPmentSAAhrnm417i.).'The Inde-
pendence front has Uso-nOtified Mr. 3oxintd:Nocirashi that any agreement -which-would
ignore Sudanese Independence would not :berecegnizod (01,,25.1.). The Sudanese
Government has hovover re-affirmed that:the, Sudanese would be consulted prior to
the taking of a fital decision (Ahram,27.ii)i The failure of tho Iraqi treaty
has thud been wolcoMed by all parties concorned,as a serious impediment to Anglo-
Egyptian talks .:(KUtla,28.1.).
There aro conflicting reports :de the present attitude to Egypt of the
Independents. "Mussawar" (9.1.) alleged that they persisted in demanding complete
reparation from Egypt, whereas other reports maintain (Ahram,14.1; Assas,31.1.)
that the present Egyptian policy supporting the granting Of wide self-government
to the Sudanese, as ro-affirmed-by!Nograshi-on Many occasions (for the last one
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zoe Llbovo) has created amongst them many sympathies for Zgypt. This fact has been
stressed by,Noqrashi too who indicated his satisfaction with the sutcess of th now
E;77-yptian policy towards the Sudan (Ahrtm,28.1.). "Kutla" (31.1.) reported that tho
Independents have conStruedthis policy to be an abandonment of tho demand for the
immediate Unity of the Nile Volley and the recognition by Egypt of the Sudan's right
of self-determination. The mouthpiece of the 6/ma party has attacked the British
for their "falSe imporialiatio support of the Sudanese' Independence Front which is
motivated by ulterior selfish aims" (Saw al-Umma,27.1.). All in all, it seems that
tho 'Egyptian policy has sOmewhat succeeded in allaWing the feats of the Independents
that Egypt wanted to dominate tho Sudan, and this success has been stressed several
times by Noqrashi. On the Other hand, tho objection of tho Unity of Nilo Valley
parties to this policy will Only servo to strengthen Egypt's position, since it can
now be claimed that the demands loss for herself in the field of immediate Unity
with tho Sudan, than to the yelitical bodies in the Sudan. All thse matters will be
clarified When the new developments of the 6udanese question (see above) will become
more blear.
ailvay WOrkera2Stage Warning Strike
On tho 26th January the Sudanese railway workers staged a three day warning
strike, after their domands for increased wages had been refused by the Government.
All ComMunications,wero disrupted and Egypt was severed from the Sudan'. There was
no postal service either, (Ahram,27.128.1.). Although the workers occupied the
promises, there were no disturbances, and on tho 29th work was resumed (Ahram30.1.).
Trade-unions in the Sudan arp generally not recognized and this factor has caused
much unrest among the workers. In the last year the Government refused tho demand
of the railway workers - the bulk of Sudanese workers - to recognize thoi,r union.
The Workers struck and the Government was obliged to recognize thalr union. Their
demands for increased wages was hoWevor refused but they were promised that the
matter Would bo re-Considered at the end of February (Zaman,31.1.). The workers
have threatened to go On strike indefinitely if this ro-considoration should fail
to.moot:their demands.
AND LZBANON
Separation of Currency.
The offectsof Syria's withdrawal from the franc area will be more perceptible,
by far in Lebanese-Syrian than in Franco-Syrian relationa.__Whilo the-links between
Syri& and Franco have long since been limited to the technical attachment of the
Syrian pound to the French franc, the very basis of the Syrian-Lebanese "coMmon
interests" is stultifiedty the separation of Syria's currency from that of Lebanon.
Following the devaluation of the franc a. 'speedy settlement of tho relations
between tha three countires' currencies was imperative in order to forestall gross
speculation. The French fixed the 1st February as the?Ultimate date for winding-
up negotiations and signing an agreement. The Syrian -Government asked 15 additional
days in an effort to mitigate the economical and cultural concossionsdeManded-by
France in return for the guarantee. of the Syrian-Lebanese marrecny, lat the French
insisted on the 1st February (Ahram,2.2.). After two meetings botwooeSyrian. 'and
Lebanese Presidents and Governments on the 27th and the 31st January - at which
time the Syrians vsinly tried to persuade the Lebanese to join them in rejecting
the French proposals, it was formally announced in the evealing of the 31st January that
Syria withdrew from the franc area as from the 1st February and .would institute a
"national currency' to. be issued bY5-"nationa1 bank".
-According to the provisional agreement of the 26th January - immediately after
the franc devaluation - the Lebanese. pound retained its 'former value in respect
to the pound sterling and dollar (i.o., 883 Lebanese piastres to El, and 219 to
Al), the franc equivalent thereby being increased by 80 per cont, i.e., from )4 to
97 francs to LL.1. ,Whether the French accordingq,yincreasod the franc cover of the
Lebanese currency was another question, which could be answered only when the
provisions, of tho new. Franco-Lebanese agreement (due to be signed next ma by tho
Lobanose Foreign Minister Who is now?inParis "Ahram"12.2.) are made public.
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8
The reasonsfor the differing reactions of,Syria and Lebanon are obviou8.'.4
Syria was actuated by the deep ',doted hatred to Franco rather than by purely economical
considerations.. But ap'art froth such an antagonism, Syria wad by far bettor able
than the Lebanon teronounco the -backing of the French Treasury. Whores the lob non
is mainly an'importcountry, Syria exporta a considerable number of items, particularly
agricultural products, and Can therefore, to a curtain:oxtent, equalize the lack
,of gold and hard currency neCexary to guarantee: a self-maintained currency:
In the Lebanon, on. the other hand, the loss of France's guarantee would itmediitely
?entail .a swooping inflation with incalculable results. During the SyrianLobonese
nogotiations,Aprior to thb announcement of Syria's withdrawal, the Syrians .Pro7.esed
that the economical resources bf both Countries should be merged :And the hard
currency equally distribute& .(Misri,S,1.2).S The Lebanese, however, were disincli:led
to enter upon this arrangotent in view of Syria's unenceuraging attitude towards
thejJebanon during former crises:'
? As it new :stands, tho Syrian Government ,intends to set up f?.:Untional Bank
(with the shares to be held either by both the Government and inhabitants, or
exclusively by the Government), Which will have the ,privilego o2 issuing 'currency.
Forty per cent. of the paper currency is to be gUaratteod-iii7gbid (Misri,1.2.), amid
.thoorost:Pby a healthy expert-import policy" (AP,1.20. It appear, however, .
that thoro is a good deal of confusion among Syrian statesmen with rogard to the
now status of Syrian currency, and as into as the 26th January, Primo Minister
Jamil Mardam declared that the Syrian'pdund could easily'dispense with Frando's
backing sinco it was guaranteed by tho'International Monetary (Hayat,'
(The paper money circulation in Syria having been about.LS.2000000,000 -
..equivalent to almosto100,000,000 dollars - ma 2yria's contribution to the Fund '
being 6,5ocyppo dollars, the Fund, consequently, could guarantee only some ?
IA..4,0000000 of her paper ono-fourth of the amount doposited by Syrias )
On the other hand, "Sharq"; reported on the 27th January that
Syriaswill ask America to borrew gold from her to be guaranteed by Syrian Govern-
, tentLands. Whatever the caser Syria is henceforth more than-over dependent on
the goodwill of America. She will further be confronted with the same problem
which Egypt facesfkoeping local gold from "fleeing" abroad.'
The economical relations botwoon Syria and the .Lebanon will have to
undergo a sweeping revision following the separation of tha. two ?countries'
currencies. Once ?the uniformity of currency, which formed the basis of the
.Comton Inter4sts Conventionis. abrogated, it is hardly imaginable that other.
previsions - such, asa-common-customs system and free transportsobetween tho.
two countries_- -Could be maintained, In fact, the validity..of the Common Interests
COnvention expired on the .1St January, 1948, but was extended for three months
more pending the settlament of the issue with France.
? The political implications of tho new situation cannot as yet be indicated.
The Syrian Minister in Faris expressed to "Ahram" (2.2.) his confidence that the
political relations between Syria and Lebanon would not be prejudiced by theirY
economical separttion. On the other hand, %Eisri" (1.2i) reports from Beirut .
that the signing of a FrOnco-Lobatiese Agreement is considered there as a victory
of the pro-French elements and a defeat of the pan-Arab (ipso facto, anti-Fronch)
i.circles,,now at the helm.
.TRANSJORDAU
Anglo-Transiordan Talks_. Bo
On the 26th January the Transjordn'delegatiOn and the Britimh Foroign
Socretary began talks for the revision of the Anglo7Transjordan Treaty. of 1946.
The Transjordan delogate8 are reported to have expressed their desire to revise
the military appendix to the Treat, and the British to have shown their willingness
to listen faVourably to the Transjordtn demands (Ahram,27.1.). Bovin, who was -
.apparently.upsot by his 'Iraqi SetbaCk, resumed hisintorrupted yacation after the
first interview, leaving Foreign Offico?efficisls -Le continuo tho talks. The
Transjordan delegation felt that it has arrived in London at a particularly critical
time owing to the complication that had occurred With reference to the 'Iraqi
question (Ahram,27.l). Ii appears obvibus that the dolegation wantod to discuss
more than military matters, as first reported, and that its main object would be to
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seCure.to?Transjordan,through an entirely new agreement with Britain, a status
similar to that enjoyed by other Arab Statea, Official British circles. were.
therefore not surprised when Tawfiq Abul-Huda suggested that it Was his intention to
revise the whole Anglo-Transjordan Treaty together with its annexes (ANA,27.1.).
The Transjordan delegation. was even reported to have had a draft treaty ready
(R.,28.1.), as a basis of discussion.
Preliminary-talks?to ?thieLeffedt, it'haa'boen disclosed, were heated, as
the Transjordan delegation 'eneountered difficultiaa in convincl_ng. the British
of the soundness-of their claims (ANA,3.1.).-Tawfiq Abul-Buda seems to have adopted a
very firm stand and to have been ready to return to 'Amman without rev.ching an
agreement rather than; Sacrifice the essential Tranpjordan demands (ANA,31.1.).
It can also be assumed that the Transjordan Premier wished above all to avoid sizning
c.Treaty destined to undergo the same fate) as the new Anglo-'Iraqi pact, especially
as strong opposition to the talks had, already been 'Voiced by TransjOrdan political
rofugoas and students in Damascus. The latter had .cabled toAC.ing 'AbdUllah that
tho Transjordan delegation did not represent tho Transjordan people, wile wanted
real independence, complete British oVacuation and this revision of tha-Conatitution
(ANA,25.1.). At any rate the argument put.forward by the TransjQrdan delegation
in London in favour of the complete revision Of the Treaty lrith Britain was that
seta clauses, especially those allowing Britain to stationtroops'anywhere in
Transjordan, "had inflUenced the Russians in vetoing Transjordan admission the
the U.N."(R.,28.1.).
It was strongly felt by the Transjordaft delegates that Bevin would hesitate to
reject the Transjordan demands at a moment when her plans .to launch a new-treaty
sy8tem linking'Britain with theArab World .(R.;28.1.) 'in view of tho itpertanr,D
of the t4lks.; it was reported that he mould takeover the entire question froth tee
Foreign Office officials (ANA,31.1.). It is worthwhile mentioning a'comment by
ANA pointing-out-that Bevin's pro-Arab policy would render htl telerant in discu;3sing
the Transjordan demands and that "ho would not %entertain a policy which may cuse
the woakening of the Arab League 'structure" (ANA27.1.).
According.to various press reperts the talks 'Proceeding Sine? the 26th
of January between the two delegations deal with the poeition of the Arab Legion,
the Middle East situation and Palestine (ANA,27.1.). Two major problems around
which the talks were supposed to centre were the future of the British-Controlled
/Arab Legion and financial relations between the two States- (ANA)1.1.). The
-TiEHTordan2
,rTamiUr-iaPo dlosed at a prose -66firOia-Ce-tEat One?OfI
- he-Subjects
of the discussionewas "BeVin's proposal for, a joint Middle East ,Defence Board
in which Transjordan was to participate" (R.,27.1.). This was one of the '
important modifications Britain wanted to include in the Treaty under revision
(ANA,30.1.).
The question of the Arab Legion Was apparently an internal affair between
Glubb Pasha aad the British Government. Tapia between Glubb and the WarOffico,
/
it was believed, mould result in the return of the Arab'Legien to Transjordan
territory (R. & PTA, 27.1.), although Tawfiq Abul-Huda affirmed that "it is premature
to say what the Legion will do after the British withdrawal". He made it clear,
however, that the command of the Legion after, the British withdrawal would be
trasforrod to the General Command in Transjordan ..(ANA,27.I.). Reports that the
chief' question discussed with regard to the Arab Legion was whether the force should
be placed under the control ef the Arab- League or- remain:' exclusively at King
'Abdullah's disposal (P.P.,29.1.), were not authoritatively confirmed. It is .
highly probable that the question of the Legion has been settled with Glubb Pasha,
who was reported to be making Preparations to roturn to 'Amman (Ahram,2.2.).
The Transjordan delegation, however, has preauthably:heard Britain's view on the
probable outcome of the current conflict in Palestine-and,:according to the "Palestine
Post" Correspondect in London, the impression gainod is that 'Amman will retain some
latitude regarding Partition but will be asked to *operate more closely with the
League on larger issues (P.P.,29.1.). This view is partly confirmed by a statement
by the Transjordan Premier that "part of the Arab Legion 11 be withdrawn whoa the
British evacuate" (AP,26.1.) and that "the Arab League has not yet docidod to use
its armies in Palestine. This also applies to the Arab Legion" (ANA,27.1.).
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The future Transjordan attitude with regard to Palestine is still obscuro
The -Transjordan Premier's statement that"the Transjordan Government will act in
conformity with the Ara League's resolutions to oppose Partition " (ANA127.1.),
is VCI.glie end obviously, meant for Arab consumption, as itis' inconsistent with King
'Abdullah's.declared policy for a Greater Transjordan if not with that for 'a
Greeter Syria.
TRiez,
Saloh Jabr 's Cabinet Resigns o
:The bleedy'demenstrations which followed the announcement of the Signing
in London of a new Anglo-'Iraqi treaty,, were. resuMed on a large scale when Ssleh
Jabr returned, to -Baghdad from London. These demonstrations, of tone of thousands
of .peoplee seem to have beepethe n14.ri factor in the 'Iraqi Crbinot's resignation.
Saleh Jabreattemptod to tho4ast minute to remain in Government. On, the day
ofhisoarrivalheHissued a ptatetent.,e4pleining that he has aimed at a revision bf
the treaty inEsuch a way as to fulfil the country's national aspirations ('ANA, 77.1.).
As the demonstration dengerously spretld, ho asked the.Rogont to sign a decree enforcing
martial law (Miari,31.1.)..e,Ho also attempted to justify the new Pact reached With
'Bri'tain.. Secret docUmentse it was alleged, wore shown by the Foreign Office to the
delegation. ,These4ocuments.proved that Russia intends to launch armed
attakcs during the current year on Greece and Turkey, Iran and the Middle East and
on Western Europe (Akhbar al-Yom,31.1..). It was only When they paw the secret
documents. that the 'Iraqi delegates approved to sign the proposed treaty providing
for 'joint defence between Britain,and 'Iraq (ibidfl. With the same purpOse
in mind the former 'Iraqi DefenCeMinister a1-so disclosed that Britain had, immediately
after the aigaing ef the treaty, supplied 'Iraq with the first consignment of military
material as qgroed in new-Pact .(ibid.). The argument of- the Jeint Defence
Board, invoked,by partisanp,pf.the Treaty, was in factthe mninreason for its "
rejection by Opposition.leaders. An explanttory statement tothis effect was issued
by the National Democratic Party (left-wing) and published by 'several Egyptian
newspapers.
As arater of fact thP popular,mevoment against?'ther new Treaty' has leen:,
extremely violent,. Despite being machine-gunned by. the pelice; the Baghdad' '
demenstrators armed with sticks' and stones, and some firearms set fire to several
-.;Government buildings and attempted: te reach Saloh Jabr's house. ? Two Cabinet Wnist4-;r11,
onoeidontified as?the 'Minister-of Social?Affairs, wore fired ?at .but csared
injuries(,e27.1.).
When it became apparent that,the demonstrations could not be checked, the
Regent called a conference of the Premier and ether .political.leaders, follOwlng?
which .Saleh Jabr tendered his resignatieh! PreviouslY the President of' the Chamber
of Deputies and 34 members of the Chamber resigned in protest tooth* Government's
attitude in dealing with the anti-British demonstrations. The Regent refused to ac.oep..
their resignation.
The Cabinet resignation was announced in t broadcast by the Rbgent himself.
Baghdad radio played records of 'Iraqi songs 'of independence and the crowd danced
all night in the streets (AP. & R.,27.1.).
Th New Qebinet
T4Enew. 'Iraqi Cabinetewas formed on the 29th January under' the Premiership of
Mohemmad.:00.-S;adr,ea feurmer ..residant_.c>f tbeeSOnate who Was, described as a "modercte".
Inefact, hp is a ShVitc, religious leaier, wielding'great inf1U6A.cie-OV6t-the fanatical
Shi'ite 'Ulema circles. He played a role ,in the 1920 anti-British riots, but was
never much outstanding in the building up Of the ''Iraqi state and its political life.
The Ctbinet, which has a pronounded right-wing tendenCy, includes three former
ProMiers, two members of the parliaMentary:opposition and one member of the Istiqlal
Party (UP.,,A2, & R.,29.1.'). The miniatere are: Foreign Affairs: Hamdi Pachachi,
former Prime Minister, considered as extremist. Interior: Jamil Madfati, partisan
of "Iraqi-British cooperqtion, but in opposition to the Nuri Satid faction. Defonco:
ArshadUmari,eformer Premier and prosideat:of the 'Iraqi delegation in San Francisco,
known for the cruel suppression of left-wing. and Democratic-Liberal groups during
his term,1946. Education.: Muhammad Ridha ash-Shabibi, leader of the opposition in
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.aa
.the Chamber of Deputios.. Finan.: Sad a% el-Bassam, Senate Vice-President. Social
'Affairs: Najib ar-Rawil President of the 'Iraqi Bar. Economics: Mustafa el7'Umari;
Justice: 'Umar Nazmi. Supply: Muhammad Mahdi Kubbell, leader of the extreme right-
wing Istiqlal party. Communications. and Work: Jalal Baban. Ministors without
portfolio: Daud el-Haidari, Nosrat el-Parisi and Mohammad -Habib Chief of the Rabi'a
Tribes (Ahram,30.1.). The Cibinet includes neither left-wing elements - National
Democrats - nor members of the .Liberal Party. Both Parties have made reserves as to
theirfuture attitude towards the now Government, as it took no stop towards tho
dissolution of the Chamber. The entire Cabinet was described as a transitional one
? (Kutla,30.1.) and this was confirmed by the now Premier in a statement to "al-Mien"
(pee below) Most of the now Ministers, it should be noted have been active an the
field of the aid to the Palestina Arabs. The Premier, Mohammad as-Sadr, acted ao
chairman in the Assembly 'which denounced the recommendations ef the Anglo-Amorican
Inquiry commission in May 1946. He .and Hamdi Pachachi, Jamil Madfali, Arshad al-
Sadiq Bass= Ridha aah-Shabibi, Mohammad Mahdi Kubbeh, are all active ,
members of the Committee for the Defence of Palestine, founded in Baghdad in 1946.
In order to .quieten public opinion and political parties Who had asked fQr the
dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies (Kutla,30.1.), it was reported that the
Chamber would be closed for two months (Ahram,1.2.). With the same purpose in mind
the Minister of Education stated that the children of victims of the demonstrations
wOuld be entitled to free education (Ahram01.2.). From statements made by the new
Foreign Affairs Minister (ANA,311.) it appears that the Anglo- 'IraqiTreaty signad by
Jabr was not to be endorsed by the now Cabinet. However in an interview with "al-
Misri", the new Prmier stated that his task will be to dissolve the present Chaater
of Deputies, to held new elections preparatory to the constitution of a majority
Government "whioh will enter into negotiations with Britain" (Misri,31.1.).
-11-
Warring to Palestine the Foreign Minister stated that the 'Iraqi Government
will do its utmost to prevent Partition to become offective (R.,31.1.).
In London, official circles stated that the relations between Britain and
'Iraq were still ruled by the 1930 Treaty concluded for a period of 27 years
(APP,28.1). It was also admitted that the non ratification by 'Iraq of the new pact
has resulted in a setback to Bevin' s pro-Arab policy, the more so that the Pact was
regarded as the first one of a series of Treaties to bo signed with other Arab
coun'ariea (AFP,28.1.). Another aspect of the surprise was the shaking of the Foreign
Minister's reliance on the information passed on him from the Middle East regarding
current opinion in Arab countries (Jon Kimche in P.P.,-29a1.). .Information from
the British EMbasay in Baghdad and other M.E. sources, J. Kimche added, laas..assured
the F.O. that Britain's stand on the Palestine issue had created a proper climate for
treaty discussions. According to the same source a considerable overhaul in the,
organisation of Britain's information and diplomatic representation in the M.E.
appears to be a possible by-product of the 'Iraq fiasco (F.P.,29.1.).
The U.S. State Department was reported to follow with much interest the develop-
ment of events in 'Iraq (AFP,31.1.). It was also disclosed that the terms of the
'Iraqi treaty were shown before its signing to the U.S. State Department which is ?
said to have urged 'Iraq to accept them (P.P.,29.1.). The Americans aro therefore
vary keen on Britain firm=1:y trying up its relations with the Arab States in such a
way as would minimize America's direct commitments, and in that connection A.P.P.
(31.1.) points out that Britain, according to the 1930 Treaty, has the right to
keep using the airbasos of Shu'aiban and Habbaniya. As repercussions on the
American stand on Palestine, it was believed that tho_U.S. would be compelled to
reconsider its policy "notwithstanding the big pressure brought by Jews on President
Truman" (Masri,31.1.).