C.I.A.: MAKER OF POLICY , OR TOOL?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R000500130003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 25, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

APRIL 25, 1966
Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP83-00036R000500130003-9
CPYRGHT
C.I.A.: Maker of Policy, or Tool?
FOIAb3d
CPYRGHT
The Central Intelligence Agency, which 'does not often
appear in the news, made headlines on two counts in recent
days. The agency was found to have interceded in the
slander trial of one of its agents in an effort to o6tain his
exoneration without explanation except that he had done its
bidding in the interests of national security. And it was
reported to have planted at least five agents among Michi-
gan State University scholars engaged in a foreign aid
project some years ago in Vietnam. Although the specific
work of these agents and the circumstances of their em-
ployment are in dispute, reports of their activities have
raised many questions about the purposes and methods of
the C.I.A., and about its relationship to other parts of the
Government and nongovernmental institutions. Even larger
questions about control of the C.I.A. within the framework
of a free government and about its role In foreign affairs
are periodically brought up in Congress and among other
governments. To provide background for these questions,
and to determine what issues of public policy are posed by
the agency's work, The New York Times has spent several
months looking into its affairs. This series is the result.
Feared Agency Is sition.
Ultimately, the incident led
Tightly Controlled the United States Government
to tell a lie in public and then
to admit the lie even more pub-
Following is the first of five licly.
articles on the Central Intelli- The lie was no sooner dis-
gence Agency. The articles are closed than ?a world predisposed
by a team of New York Times to suspicion of the C.I.A. and
correspondents consisting of unaware of what really had
Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, happened in Singapore five
years earlier began to repeat
Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy questions that have dogged the
and, other members of the Times intelligence agency and the l
WASHINGTON, April 24
One day in 1960 an agent of th
Central Intelligence Agenc
caught a plane in Tokyo, flew
to Singapore and checked into
a hotel room in time to receive
a visitor. The agent plugged
lie detector into an overloaded
electrical circuit and blew out
the lights in the building.
In the investigation that fol-
lowed, the agent and a C.I.A.
colleague were arrested an
jailed as American spies.
The result was an interna-
tional incident that infuriated
London,. not once but twice. It
embarrassed an American Am-
bassador. It led an American
Secretary of State to write a
rare letter of apology to a for-
eign Chief of State.
Five years later that foreign
leader was handed an opportu-
nity to denounce the perfidy of
all Americans and of the C.I.A.
in particular, thus increasing
years: - + +
cWas this secret body, which
vas known to have overthrown
governments and install.;d
others, raised armies, staged anj
invasion of Cuba, spied and
counterspied, established air-,
lines, radio stations and schools
20 foreign correspondents an
present and farmer Govern
ment officials, members of Con
This study, carried out ove
several months, disclosed.. fo
all its fearsome reputation? is
under far more stringent pollti-
cal and budgetary. control than
Pigs disaster in Cuba in 1961
these controls have been tightly
The consensus of those inter-
viewed was that the critics'
and businesses, running out of a Congressional committee to
the control of its supposed poll-' oversee the C.LA.-would prob-
tical master? ppably provide little more real
(control than now exists and
galas it in fact damaging, mi
ht both restrict the agency's
g
bile it sought to advance, the, effectiveness and actually shield
land subversion without check] A Matter of Will
r regard for the consequences?'? Other important conclusions
.."y ..?wo a.,. 1Y1O- 6VV?Lir'fective and sufficient, it is real
ent" more powerful than even, the will of the political offici
he President? who must exert control that
is
alsost
These are questions constant-j mportant and that has most
y asked around the world. Some
f, them were raised again. re-
ently when it was. disclosed)
et6b"49 /NI,27ityl A P~3.3'~0'a36
ht
41 Even when control is tight
ant
and effective, a more import
CPYRGHT
was the cover for some C.I.A.
agents in South Vietnam during
assistance program the univer-
sity conducted for the regime of
the late President Ngo Dimh
Diem.
Last week, it also became
nown that an Estonian refugee
ho was being sued for slander
s a C.I.A. agent.
In a public memorandum ad-
e role- and propriety of one of
ashington's most discussed
o American President, Harry
Truman and John R. Ken-
A Wide Examination
To seek reliable answers to
ese questions; to sift, where
ssible, fact from fancy and
eory from condition; to deter-
ine what real questions of
blic policy and international
lations are posed by the exist-
ce and operations of the
I.A., The New York Times
5M30QO' 9 Lion and
 CPYRGHT
policy jud "a ly
decisions In o eign airs.
Q Whether or not political con-
trol is being exercised,'the more
serious question is whether the
very existence of an efficient
C.I.A. causes the United States
Government to rely too much on
r.landestine and .illicit activities,
back-alley tactics, subversion
and what is known in official
jargon as "dirty tricks."
lFinally, regardless of the
facts, the C.I.A.'s reputation in
the world is so horrendous and
t era crated
s
g
{~ qq~~tQQ~~ ya_~ d~}ies, t_he
~iidr`77C~iw'r l s siTirecor-
of Singapore and promised toNkrumah of hang and many now fear that the cumulative'
discipline the culprits; other leaders have repeatedly criticism and suspicion, at home
11insisted that behind the regular and abroad, have Impaired the
That appeared to have ended, American government there isi p
the matter until last fall, when, >, C.I:A.'s effectiveness and there-
Premi r Lee broke away fromian invisible government," the! fore the nation's safety.
e C.I.A., threatening them all
the :Malaysian Federation and with infiltration, subversion and' They are anxious to see the
sought to establish himself for even war. Communist CU na and, criticisms answered and the sus-
political reasons as more nearly, the Soviet Union sound this picions allayed, even if-1n some
a friend of Britain. than of thel the endlessly. cases-the agency should thus
United States,,although his anti- "The Invisible Government" become more exposed to domes-
Americanisnnwas short of pro- was the phrase applied to tic politics and to compromises
Communism. American intelligence agencies, of security.
li
h
t
f a
"
t
men
o
s
If the es
ab
To help achieve this purpose, and particularly the C.I.A., in
Mr. Lee disclosed the 1960 "of-I a book of that title by David Congressional committee with
nsibilit for intelligence
res
d
-
o
"
.
o g
Us role in even s
e
,
without giving any
that it is becoming a burden onlfront
American foreign policy, ratherstails, except to say that he had
that the secret weapon it was
Intended to be.
The Singapore Incident, with
its bizarre repercussions five
years later, is an excellent lesson
in how that has happened, al-
though none of the fears of,the
critics are justified by the facts
of the particular case.
Problem In Singapore
The ill-fated agent who blew
out the lights flew from Tokyo
to Singapore.only after a pro-
longed argument inside the
C.I.A. Singapore, a strategic
Asian port with a large Chinese
population, was soon to get its
independence from Britain and
enter the Malaysian Federation.
Should C.I.A. recruit some well-
placed spies, or should it, as be-
fore, rely on MI-6, the British
secret service, and on Britain's
bribe when he had demanded
?33rmillion.
TheState Department; which
had been routinely fed a denial
of wrongdoing by C.I.A. officials
who did not know of the Rusk
apology, described the charge as
false; Mr. Lee then published
Mr. Rusk's letter of 1961 and
threatened also to play some
interesting tape recordings for
the press.
`tlastily, Washington confessed
-not to the bribe offer, which
is hotly denied by all officials
connected with the incident, or
to the incident itself, - but to
having done something that had
merited an apology.
London, infuriated in the first
Instance by what it considered
the C.I.A.'s mistrust' of MI-6,
ability tb maintain good rela-l clumsy tactics In Washington.
tions and good sources in Singa-1 Acting on Orders
pore?
Allen W. Dulles, then thei Errors of bureaucracy and
C.I,A.'s director, decided to in mishaps of .chance can-easily be
filtrate the city with its own; found in the Singapore incident,
agents, to make sure that the ' but' critics of the C.I.A. cannot
British were sharing everything easily find In it proof of the
they knew. Although the deci-,charges so often raised about
sion was disputed, it is not un- the agency-"control," "making
common in any intelligence serv-, Policy" and "undermining pol-
ice to bypass or double-check on,
rc The agent in Singapore was
an ally. acting on direct orders from
f On Vice President Humph :,Washington. His superiors in
ley s visit late last year to the the C.I.A. were acting within
capitals of Japan, South Korea,; the directives of the President
SerrTaiwan, and the Philippines'! the the National SecurityCoun-
et Service agents found ati cii. The mission was not con-
]east three "bugs," or listening, rary to American foreign pol-
devices, hidden in his private !icy, Was -not undertaken to
'quarters by one of his hosts.) change or subvert that policy,
The agent who flew from and was not . dangerously fool-
Tokyo to. Singapore was on a hardy. It was not much more
recruiting mission; and the lie than routine-and would not
detector, an instrument used by have been unusual in any in-
the C.I.A. on its own employes, telligence service in the world,
was intehded to test the relia- Nevertheless, the Sinagpore
bility of.a local candidate for a incident -the details -of which
spy's job. have been shrouded in the
When the machine shorted C.I.A.'s enforced secrecy-add-
out the lights in the hotel, the ed greatly to the rising tide of
viricing agent, the would-be spy dark suspicion that many people
and antther C
Tman were
I
A
.
.
.
ore
a p
- -?av--- about tree agency and us a,ctivi- C.I.A. has been functioning that'
repo ed to he been tortured' ties.
-either for real, or to extract Carl Rowan, the former di-1 h castings a shadow over ours
a ransom, rector of the United States In? historic positions, and I feel
that we need to correct it '
The Price Was High 1 ,formation Agency and former
Secret discussions--apparent-
ly through C.I.A. channels -
were held about the possibility
of buying the agents' freedom
with increased American for-
eign aid, but Washington even-I C.I.A. has become a sort of
tually decided Singapore's price'
Achilles heel of American for-
was too high. The men were: eign policy."
subsequently released.. President Sukarno of Indo-
Secretar of State Dean Rusk, P i Norodo Siha??
y
.
Y
.Minas B. Bass. It p
Wise and
was a best-seller in the United would quiet public fears and re-
States and among many gov- store public confidence in the
ernment officials abroad. C.I.A.," Mr. Dulles said in an
interview, "then I now think it
Subject of Humor would be worth doing despite
So prevalent is the C.I.A. rep- some of the problems it would
utation of menace in so much cause the agency."
d
h
are
of the world that even jiumorists Because this view is s
have taken note of it. The. New in varying degree by numerous
Yorker magazine last December friends of the C.I.A. and because
printed a cartoon showing two its critics are virtually unant-
natives of an unspecified coun- moos In calling for more "con-
try wattihimg a vooano erupt. trol," most students of the prob-
One native saying to the lem have looked to Congress for
other: Millie C.I.A. did. It. pass a Iemtdy 19 years that the
the e C.I.A. has been in existence, 150
In Southeast Asia, even lir resolutions for ti hter Con res-
most roationalleadeve any sand said sional control have been intro-
about to be rea the dy to C.I.A. believeanything duced-and put aside. The stat-
"Like Dorothy Parker and the istic in itself is evidence of
things she said," one observer widespread uneasiness about the
notes, "the C.I.A. gets credit or C.I.A. and of how little is known
blame both for what It does and about the agency.
for many things it has not even For the truth is that despite
thought .of doing." the C.I.A.'s international repu-
Many earnest Americans, too,tation, few persons in or out of
are bitter critics of the C.I.A. the American Government know
Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, much about its work, its organ-
Democrat of Minnesota, has ization, its supervision or its re-
charged that the agency "is lationship to the other arms of
making foreign policy and in so the executive branch.
doing is assuming the roles of A former chairman of the
President and Congress" He has Joint Chiefs of Staff, for in-
introduced a proposal to create stance, had no idea how big the
a special Foreign Relations sub- C.I.A. budget was. A Senator,
committee to make a "full and experienced in foreign affairs,
complete" study ofthe effects of proved, in an interview, to know
C.I.A. operations on United very little about, but 'to fear
States foreign relations. very, much, its operations.
Senator Stephen 'M. Young, Many critics do not know that
Democrat of Ohio, has-proposed virtually all C.I.A. expenditures
that a joint Senate-House com- must be authorized in advance
mittee oversee the C.I.A. be- -first by an Administration
cause, "wrapped in a cloak of committee that includes some of
secrecy, the C.I: A, has, in effect, the highest-ranking political of-
been making foreign policy." ficials and White House staff
Mayor Lindsay of New York, assistants, then by officials in
while a Republican member of the Bureau of the Budget, who
Congress, indicted the C.I.A. on have the power to rule out or
the House floor for a long series reduce an expenditure.
of fiascos, including the most They do not know that, in-
famous blunder in recent Amer- stead of a blank check, the
ican history-the Bay of Pigs C.I.A. has an annual budget of
invasion of Cuba. a little more than $500-million-
Former President Harry S. only, one-sixth the $3-billion the
Truman, whose Administration Government spends on its over-
VA. iii, fl.UMIliaua4l q.Lavii' .~wanted "to'splinter the C.I.A. In
.a thousand pieces and scatter.
epd-e~fad face in~JariuiaW4 ~~fQ~a1?s3.?S'f
had sue~
President Jomo Kenya to of
Ambassador to Finland, wrote Kennedy s Bitterness
last year in his syndicated col- And President Kennedy, as
u the enormity of the Bay of Pigs
ofomn ]vast that "during Africa a and Southeast recen to'
Asia, it was made clear to me disaster came home tohim,said
tional Security Agency, a cryp-
tographic and code-breaking
operation run by the Defense
Department, and almostt,never
questioned by outsiders, spends
twice as much as the C.I.A.
The critics shrug aside the
fact that President Kennedy,
after the most rigorous inquiry
into the-agency's affairs, meth-
ods and problems after the Bay
of Pigs, did not "splinter" it
after all and did not recommend
Congressional supervision.
Thera .- i
_ that
u
since then supervision of intelli-
gence activities has been tight-
MtdAn lrtWWWtfi9nt Eisen-
1tHe6H~M bb~~EEL~~ tt{{e11~~t0 all Am-
 CpA$W ed For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP83-00036R000500130003-9
Drawing by Alan Dunn; ? 1965 The NewYorker Magazine, Inc.
THE C. I. A.-GOOD, BAD OR OTHERWISE? Much discussed and criticized, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency has not escaped humorous treatment either, its detractors
loudly condemn. it, nearly everyone talks about it, but very few really understand it.
bassaddrs placing them in cii,e Depart-
ment and is now a special as-
sistant to President Johnson.
Prof. Max Millikan, an as-
sistant director of the in telli-
gence agency in 1951-52, has
been director of the center
sine 1952.
T e authorities at M.I.T. have
tried in recent days to make
clear that they have not con-
ducted any overseas operations
and that the center's work in
India and other nations to help
promote economic development
has itot been supported by the
intell~igence aeencv.
Cont. Page 15
500130003-9
 CPYRGHYkPproved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP83-00036ROO0500130003-9
.its worldwide nerve system
weaving together, into the "in3
telligence" the government 1
needs, every electronic blip,,
-squeak, and image and the mil-I,
lions of other items that reach,
its headquarters from more con-
ventional, often public, sources:
random diplomatic contacts,,
press clippings, radio monitor,
reports, books and research Proj-
ects and eyewitness evidence.
(Even some of these "open" I
sources, such as a regional news
paper from Communist China,'
must be smuggled or bought at
a stiff price.)
Every hour of every day,
about 100 to 150 fresh items of
news, gossip and research reach)
the C.I.A: s busy headquarters
in Virginia and are poured into'!
the gigantic human-and-techno-:
logical computer that its analy-
sis section resembles.
Four of every five of these
items, it is said, now come
either from "open" sources or
inanimate devices. But in many
important instances it is still
-the human agent, alerted to
'make a particular arrangement
or to chase a specific piece of in-
formation, who provides the link
that makes all else meaningful
and significant; sometimes, now
as in the 18th century, it is
men alone who do the job in
When it was discovered, for
CRISIS: This Soviet freighter was photographed after
instance, that Premier Khru-
shchev had shaken the Com- DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE
munist world with a secret leaving Cuba on Nov. 6, 1962, carrying on deck one of the missiles the Soviet Union
speech denouncing Stalin in withdrew under intense pressure from the U.S. It was C.I.A. efforts that originally
w e uncovered the presence of Soviet missiles on the island that led to diplomatic showdown.
who was a C.I.A. agent
who finally came up with the c ears the C.I.A.
and
nce estimates. These en-11. i ed to have
somewhere in Poland
xt
eries
t
lli
i
,
,
e
ge
s a s
inte
The end product
other analysts who determined of papers, handsomely printed) compass all information avail- been extremely good in furnish-
that it was genuine. and often illustrated with fancy able on -a given subject and re- in information about Soviet
A Rebellion Hastened maps to gain a bureaucratic fthe final judgment of the military capabilities and orders
' flect
program Chinese
This feat of numan spying advantage over rival pieces of Board of National Estimates, a of weapons about the
n.ese
in an electronic age yieldedipaper from other agencies. Igrcup of 14 analysts in the nuclear battle,
produces intelli-and, the
vital information and, leaked toy epee reports almost C estimate intelli- Wafter hite constant se?adabout from the
the , hastened in Europe and aliI reports almos> hourlyl National gence is intended to reach a progress of India, the United
where, n anti t any sweeping summaries every Arab Republic, Israel and other
rebellions s in in many ny Communist It provides a special newsl'definite conclusion to guide the
countriesand probably contrib-;report for President Johnson's o President. But as other depart-nations toward a capacity to
express and the build nuclear weapons.
experts consulted
In-
Hungary their Reports from inside In-
rated upheavals in Poland an tines containng such juicy tid-',various are
donesia, Algeria
the heaviest are still amongi greements
ca eats ndtheir dissents are noted during recent fast moving situ-
the heaviest liabilities of Com-bits tivitiesheof most
there ndefaUg bleMews
a sub-agent ations are also said to have
mut takes thistory.
it in Tibet, President Sukarno of Indonesia.~tahne final document. These.
erald been On the other extremely hand good, the C.I.A.
personally an recruited by a C.LA. A C.I.A. Press Conference of dispute are likely to hsigns
m
man eherr or and 'paid either de- More elaborate reports and important uncertainties, and has been critikjlzed for not hav-
retaine sh of the piece, to army prgjections are prepared on !some officials believe the foot- ing known more in advance
liver a sheaf of secret army notes to be the best-read lines about the co
documents circulating among such matters as the rate of So
viet economic growth. of all the millions committedlBerlin Wall in 1961, about the
regimental commanders of nstruction of the
Com- The State Department has Ito paper in the Government divorce of the United Arab Re-
ation China's People's Libor-
tion Arm ~ sometimes published these, every month. public and Syria in 1961, about
Y? ,.rp,it to their origin. The C.I.A. also produces rapid the political leanings of various
inns of the aesign (1L uia= _?_- ---
terior of Peking's embassy (,al-.,conference in 1964 to put out
though such designs can oftenthe latest readings on Soviet
The idea of the
it
)
y.
be obtained with no more effort ' Prosper
spooks," as C.I.A. men are, of different courses of action
ki for them at the 1 .d summoning reporters contemplated at a particular
ra
l
quest - say, about the liken-;public and about such relatively .
hood of the Soviet Union's going) )public matters as party politics
to war over the Cuban missile'~in Italy.
g ca
e
than as
offices of the American who caused so much amusement in'imoment by the United States in
constructed the building). Washington-and perhaps dos- Vietnam.
And beyond this large re- pleasure in other agencies-that How Good Are the Reports?
maining value of the human the C.I.A. has never held an-
being in the humming world of other news conference. How effective these reports
espionage, it is also the human still more important subjects, have been, and how well they
brain in the C.I.A. that givesisuch as Soviet nuclear capabili- are heeded by the policy-mak-
information its real importancelties or Communist Chinese in-ers, are questions of lively de-
by supplying interpretations for;,tentions in Southeast Asia, are !bate in the intelligence com-
the and his a It with formal national munity.
Eisenhower -- nave eriL'U.-
the agency for not having rec-
ognized in time Fidel Castro's
Communist leanings or the pos-
sibility that the Soviet Union
would ship missiles to Cuba.
Almost everyone, however,
generally concedes the neces-
sity for gathering intelligence
to guide the Government in its
worldwide involvements. Criti-
cism goes beyond the value or
 CPYRGHT
Aoroved For Release 1999/09/27 : IA-RDP83-00036ROO05 0 0130003-9
accuracy of I.A. repoAs. Fori .When it presented the U-2 !
information-gathering often program in 1956, fear of detec Jobs for Refugees Aswan Ua.m.
spills over at the scene oftion and diplomatic repercus Besides entertaining and in- Soe of these Egyptian ties
action into something else -Isions led the. Eisenhower Ad-!,forming millions of listeners in lingered even through the re
subversion, counteractivit 'ministration to run some " roc-'Communist nations, these cent years of strained relations.
sabotage, political and economic tire" missions aver Eastern nominally "private" outlets pro- Through reputed informants
interve rtion and other klndsIEurope. The first mission to!vide employment for many like Mustafa Amin, a prominent
;
s
t
F ;ft h CIA 'd
d
t
t
tei' igence gatherer, by design
or ? orce of circumstance, be-
comes an activist in the affairs
e .. . is
a
e
or,
and knowledgeable refu-Cairo ed
the Soviet Union, in mid-1956,,g
?ees from Russia, Poland, Hun- in the United Arab Republic
over Moscow and Leningrad, :b
was detected but not molested., gory and other countries. to have obtained the details of
It did, however, draw the first? They also solicit the services la Soviet-Egyptian arms deal
of a number of secret diplomaticf of informers inside the Corn- in. 1964 and other similar in-
protests. munist world. monitor Com- formation. Thus, Amin's arrest
c
n
Action
U.I.A. analysts reading the .ministration halted+they flights, anti-Communist lectures and important channels and it gave
punchcards of their computers but the C,LA pressed for their;writings by Western intellectu- the United Arab. Republic the
alsand distribute their research oppotitunity to demand greater
in Virginia can determine that resumption. Doubts were fmallyi
a new youth group in Bogota overcome, materials to scholars and our-' American aid in return for play-
and 20 to 25 more, m j ing dgwn its "evidence" of C.I.A.
appears to have fallen tinder the the flights were conducted, with So-'nalists in all continents.
control f
t
o suspected C1vit fitI activi y in Cairo
om-egher planes in vain pur- But there is said to be rela-,.
munists, but it takes an agent suit of at least some of them.1tively little direct C.I.A. spying' Th C.I.A.'$ talent for secret
on the spot to trade informa-! The Powers plane is thought upon the United States' allies, waif re is known to have been
tion with the local police
teste twice in,Latin America.
col to have been i
en i
l
h
d
d
E
,
pp
v
e
n suc
un
emocratic
by the
lest photographs or and telephone nearby explosion of an ant'i'c-'countries as Spain and It su cessfully directed a battle
d of liberation " against the left-
taps of those involved, organize craft missile develo
Portu
al
h
ith
i
d
d
h
pe
g
w
ere more
w
n
epen
e,
t
,-and finance a countermovement U-2's in mind. tent C.I.A. activity might be ist government of Col. Jr:cobo
of, say, young Christians or Risky and Often Profitable pected, the operation is re- Arbenllz Guzman in Guatemala
x
democratic labor youth, and liably described as modest, in 1964. Seven years later, a
help them erect billboards and The simplest and most modest e ;C.I.A.-sponsored army jumped
turn mimeograph machines atiof these risky, often profitable, The American agency has aloff from secret bases in Guate-
the next election sometimes disastrous human ef-special interest, for instance, in:mala band Nicaragua for the
forts are reported to be carried keeping track in Spain of such'
o disastious engagement at
Dozens - at times hundreds
ut in the friendly nations of refugees from Latin America !Cuba's of C.I.A. men have been y Cuba's, Bay of Pigs.
Western Europe. as Juan Perrin of Argentina.
employed on Taiwan to train; In Britain, for instance, C.I.A. Nevertheless, it relies so heavily romoter of Fronts
men who will be smuggled intoiiagents are said to be little more on the information of the Span-~ Not so melodramatically, the
Communist China and to inter- than contact men with British ish police thatrlnter icon news- agency runs dozens of other
view defectors and refugees "intelligence, with British papermen are often a better operations throughout the
Who come out
t
t
i
;
o
ra
n Chinese K f Ami Eb
remlinologists and other-sourceorercanmassy hemisphere.
Nationalists to fly the U-2; to'scholars and experts. officials than the C.I.A. office. It provides "technical assist-
identify and befriend those who! With MI-6, its London, In much of Africa, too, despite ance" to most Latin nations by
will move into power after the' counterpart, the C.I.A. com-j the formidable reputation it has helping them establish anti-
departure of the Nationalist
'
s
;td dii
pares noes anvdes respon-
President, Chiang Kai-shek; to!sibilities on targets of mutual
beam propaganda broadcasts at!interest. The agency, having
the mainland; to organize har-!come a painful cropper In
rassing operations on the i
=
s
Si f
ngapore aew years ago,
lands just off the shore of the now leaves spying in Malaysia,
mainland, and to provide logic-Ifni instance to the old C
o
among governments, the C.I.A. Communist police forces. It
takes a.back seat to the Intel- promotes anti-Communist front
ligence agencies of the former; organizations for students,
colonial nations, Britain and workers, professional and busi-
France, and concentrates on,ness men, fanners and political
gathering information about;partiesi It arranges for contact
Soviet, Chinese and other Corn-'between these groups and
l
th
s ff
mon
eu
s while prop- ` " '
- Amuerk an labor organizations,
`?"" s
operations in Laos, Thailand, !
ably offering in return the go has been the major exeep- institutes and foundations.
Vietnam, the Philippines and! tion. The agency compiles lists It h s poured money into
Indonesia. C.LA.'s copious material front of travelers to Moscow, Prague Latin-American election cam-
In these and dozens of other in- Indonesia. or Pekin
tt
m
t
t
infilt
'
t
p
g a
e
s
ra
e
o
, stances, an agent who is merely Generally cooperative ar-!their embassies and checks on
ostensibly gathering Intel- rangements also prevail in arms and aid shipments through
ligence is in reality an activist countries such as Canada and African airfields.
attem
tin
t
t
p
g
o crea
e or resolve !
Italy and, to a somewhat lesser
a situation: degree, in France. In West Ger-
Because a great many such many, a major cold-war battle-
activists are also in the field ground, the C.I.A. Is much more
for a variet
of
ur
th
y
p
poses o
erti
acve,
than open or clandestine infor-.
ment of fallible, human beings
in the most dangerous and
paigns In support of moderate
candidates and against leftist
leaders such as Cheddi Jagan of
British Guiana.
It spies upon Soviet, Chinese
and otter Communist infiltr
a-
The agency Is
gency thought Mors and diplomats and attempts
to have attempted to infiltrate to subvert their programs. When
the security services of some the C.I.A. learned last year that
African countries but only a Brazilian youth had been kil-
with mixed success. It gathers l
d i
e
n in
Another in Berlin conducts spe-ties of various nationalist and scholawnmma sr.uaymg on a
cial activities such as theIliberation movements and be- scholardhip at the Lumumb
t
t
Irons I famous wiretap tunnel under') friends opposition leaders in mount s
y in Moscow, causes most of the p ounte a massive
bli
it
pu
c
y
agency's failures and difficul-ast Berlin, a brilliant tech such countries as Algeria and campaign to discourage other
,' Enical hooku that eave
in
d
bli
th
it
d A
b R
U
t
s
ro
ra
e u
c
n
e
e
ies and gives it its feas] p pped P Sth A
,romeoumerican families from
re utation. on Soviet Army headquarters. the hope that it can predict
p ;It was exposed in 1956 when u heavals or at least bel sending their youngsters to the
Men, by and large, can con-
t
r
1 E as
German workmen dii filiith ne rulers if thei
,ggngamar ww In Sot theist Asia over the
and not always themselves, It on another project, struck a bids for power are successful.' past decade, the C.I.A. has been
was not, after all, the shooting weak spot in the tunnel and The C.LA.. long in advance ,Iso active that the agency in
down of a U-2 Inside the Soviet` caused it to collapse. had information on the plan some countries has been the
Union in 1960 that caused' A C.I.A. office In Frankfurt; by which Algerian Army of princlpa4 arm of American poI-
worldwide political repercus-'supervises some of the United ficers overthrew Ahmed Ben!! icy.
ions and a Soviet-American; States' own espionage opera- Bella last June - but it did not It is said, for instance, to have
risis; each side could have ab-tions against the Soviet Union, know the month in which theof-been so 'successful at infiltrat-
orbed that in some sort of 1 interviews defectors and re- ficers would make their move, ing dthe I top of the Indonesian
'cover." It was rather the So- cruits agents for service in and It had nothing to do with
the
was army that to
Communist countries, plotting or carrying out the UStates and
of a living Ameri-~ g United nitet
iet capture to
an pilot, Francis Gary Powers;'' In Munich, the C.I.A. sup- coup~ disrupt C.I.A. covering opera-
hat could not be explained~~ ports a variety of research Thanks to contacts with tions by withdrawing aid and
way and that Russians did ntrt11 groups find such major prop- Carnal Abdel Nasser before he information programs in 1964
rant eat lained away. aganda outlets as Radio Free seized power in Egypt, theiand 1965. What was
p C.I.A. had almost intimate! presented
Buit the C.I.A. invariably de-(Europe, which broadcasts to officially in Washington as
Eastern Europe, and Radio dealings with the Nasser go o
v-tleration of President Su}car-
elops an .interest in its prof- ernment before the United States
c'ts and can be a formidable Liberty, aimed at the Soviet no's insults and provocations
dvocate in the Government. Union, drew his ire by reneging on was in much larger measure a
is mmuli bul t
e
_
On-the-S
43
 ;,, 1,-inacG a>R a9iEom9d1F
~~~~ z~~~a4,lf F~ Cekt o ri t2~Ad~~
00 000 from
3
t
t th
eu
e V ni
l.hroughou
have been involved in any of to drum up some legitimate
the maneuvering that has curbed of income.
President Sukarno 's power in sources Unknown co most of the di-
well months, the agency was
well poised to follow events and rectors ford instance, C I.A.
to predict the emergence of airline, 1 d' offi-
in
th
It can don the cloak of secrecy
and label all its works as neces-
jsary to further some "national
'interest." And it can quietly
lobby for support inside the
Government and among influen-
tial members of Congress and
with the President.
But a "national interest" that
is not a persuasive defense to
men who have their own ideas
of the "national interest"
along with secrecy itself - has
i
the inevitable effect of convinc-
ing critics that the agency ncy has
plenty to hide besides its code-
books. The an con-
,sc sc encesi of such inationscritics are cer-
e ea
may approach
ganti-Communist forces. cia.ls of the company, explain The agency's support for
Links to Power its problem and, acme awayM.LT. projects gradually dwin- After helping to elect Raman with some profitable air cargo died, but the fear of compro- Magsaysay as president of the contracts. wising publicity led the uni- In other domestic offshoots versity to decide' a year ago to Philippines in 1953, buttressing of the C.LA.'s foreign dealings, accept no new C.I.A. contracts. the family government of Ngo American ikewspaper and maga- Similar embarrassment was Dinh iDem and Ngo Dinh Nhu nine publishers, authors and uni- felt at Michigan State Univer-in South Vietnam in 1954 and as- versities are often the benefits- .sity after the recent disclosure sisting in implanting the regime arses of direct or indirect C.I.A.
d
that C.I.A. agents had servedof the strong-man Phoumi subsidies. on its payroll in a foreign-ai from Nosavan in Laos in 1960, the A secret transfer of C.I.A. 1955 etoin1So th Ve tuniver
C.I.-A. agents responsible obvi- funds to the State Department contended that no secret Intel-Itainly not set at rest when they
ously became for long periods or United States Information
much more intimate advisers Agency, for example, may help ligence work was done by the learn, for instance, that in 1962
and effective links to Washing- finance a scholarly inquiry and agents, but it, feared that a' an outraged -President Kennedy
ton than the formally desig-; publication. Or the agency may dozen other overseas projects- obviously differing with the
nated American Ambassadors channel research and propa- now under wa3 would be ham-l agency about the "national in-
pored by the suspicions of other'aerest" - forced the C.I.A. to
'
d
a-
in those countries. ganda money through foun
,governments. undo
Kennedy a tions-legitimate ones or dum-;
ministration ca And when came e Into nntto o office my fronts. The C.I.A. was among the piece
in 1961, the President concluded The C.I.A. is said to be be-'first Government agencies to #iave
that the C.I.A. had so mort- hind the efforts of several foun-ccpk the valuable services of name
gaged American interests to dations that sponsor the travel! American scholars - an idea
Phoumi Nosavan that there was of social scientists in the Com- now widely emulated. Many
at first no alternative to deal- munist world. The vast major- scholars continue to serve the
ing with him. sty of independent foundations agency as consultants, while
Moreover, the C.I.A: s skill at have warned that this practice others work on research proj-
able quickly and in reason- casts suspicion on all traveling
able secrecy drew for it many scholars, and in the last yearIects frankly -presented to their
assignments in Southeast Asia the C.I.A. is said to have cur-'superiors as C.I.A. assignments.
that would normally be given tailed these activities somewhat.' At a meeting of the American
to the Defense Department. It $400,000 for Research Political Science Foundation
was able, for instance, to fly Congressional investigation of !here last fall, however, at least
supplies to the Meo tribesmentax-exempt foundations in 1964 , two speakers said too many
in Laos to help them fight showed that . the J. M. Kaplan scholars were still taking on
against the pro-Communist Fund, Inc., among others, had full-time intelligence services.
Pathet Lao at a time when disbursed at least $400,000 for They also warned that the part-
treaty obligations forbade the the C.I.A. in a single year to a time activities of others could
assignment of American mils- research institute This insti- influence their judgments or
tary advisers to the task. tute, in turn, financed research reputations.
In South Vietnam, the C.I.A.'s centers in Latin America. that Radio Free Europe and Radio
possession of energetic young drew other support from the Liberty provide cover for C.I.A.-
men with political and linguistic Agency for International De- financed organizations that
talents proved much more suc-yvelo ment (the United States draw upon the research talents
cessful in wresting mountainuforeign aid agency), the Ford of American scholars and also
and jungle villages from Com Foundation and such universi- service scholars with invaluable
munist control than the Penta- ties as Harvard and Brandeis. 11 raw material. The Free Europe
gon's special forces. Among the Kaplan Fund's Committee even advertises for
there had been eight funds orj
foundations unknown to experts
on tax-exempt charitable or-,
committed to the Ngo brothers I'
and was tricked by them into
supporting their private police
forces. These were eventually
employed against the Buddhist
political opposition, thus pro-
voking the coup d"etat by mili-
tary leaders in 1963 that
brought down the Ngos.
In Thailand, the C.I.A. has
now begun a program of rural
defense against Communist sub-
version. Working through for-
eign aid offices and certain air-
lines, agents are working with
hill tribes along the Burmese
and Laos borders and helping
to build a provincial police net-
work along the borders of Laos
and Cambodia.
tions -the extent tc, which the
dispatch of a planeload of rice
by a subsidized carrier, Air
America, in Laos causes the
agency to set furtive opera-
tions in motion within the
United States.
When Air America or anypp
has fa ~i'1iY,1'icN f"lJt 1L
has run PIiY,tici7rr
ganizations. Five of them were
not even listed on the Internal
'Revenue Service's list of foun-
dations entitled to tax exemp-
tion,
Through similar channels,
the C.I.A. has supported groups
of exiles from Cuba and refu-
gees from communism in
Europe, or anti-Communist but
liberal organizations of intellec-
tuals such as the Congress for
Cultural Freedom, and some of
their newspapers and maga-
,
with a grant of $
the C.I.A. in 1951 and continued
to take agency funds until the
link was exposed, causing great
embarrassment to M.I.T.'s
scholars working in India and
vealing its ties to the United
ticularly active during the Bay
of Pigs invasion, maintains un-
publicized contacts with private
American broadcasters.
The C.T.A. at times has ad-
dressed the American people
directly through public re-
lations men and. nominally in-
dependent citizens committees.
Many other C.I.A.-run fronts
and offices, however, exist pri-
marily to gather mail from and
to provide credentials for its
overseas agents.
Thus, the ramifications of
C.I.A. activities, at home and
abroad, seem almost endless.
Though satellites, electronics
and gadgets have taken over
much of the sheer drudgery of
Furtive Operations niai mouLuly WLW& --- ??-
Spanish and German as welly as
espionage, there remains a deep
involvement of human beings,
who project the agency into
awkward diplomatic situations,
raising many issues of policy
and ethics.
That is why many persons
are convinced that in the C.I.A.
the -indirect beneficiaries of
C.I.A. funds. Through arrange-
ments that have never been
publicly explained, several
American book publishers have
also received C.I.A. subsidies.
An even greater amount of
C.I.A. money apparently was
Lspent on direct, though often
a particularly clumsy
of sabotage that might
blackened the nation's
all around the world.
,,.0*?3'6Yi00500130003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP83-00036R000500130003-9
Cont. from Page 11
CPYRGHT
the spokesman explained, by
the disclosure that at least five
C.I.A. agents worked among
Michigan State University
scholars on a foreign aid proj-
ect in South Vietnam from 1955
to 1959.
Some embarrassment is also
said to have been caused to
M.I.T. scholars earlier in their
dealings with foreign govern-
ments when it was disclosed
that the agency had helped to
create their center. Faculty
opinion about the link was de-
scribed as divided until Mr. Mil-
likan passed word of the deci-
sion to accept no more research
contracts with the agency.
The center's spokesman said
the university had always pro-
tected itself adequately against
direct involvement with or con-
trol of its work by the intel-
ligence agency. It considered
the research for the agency to
be not only consistent with the
'traditions of academic freedom,
,he said, but also a fulfillment
of the university's duty to con-
itribute to the Government's
intelligence "with a sma 'I'".
There has been a "rigid rule"
that no field work be under-
taken with C.I.A. funds, he said.
When it was decided in Marc
1965, to sever all connections,
he added, there was thought
to be no reason to withdraw
abruptly. Thus, the last con-
tracts, running through June,
1966, were honored, he said.
Individual scholars will con-
tinue to have the right to act
as consultants to the agency or
to accept any other kind of
Government assignment. This
right has been enjoyed by most
American scholars, even those
at institutions, such as Harvard,
that have refused to accept
direct contracts from the iptel-
ligence agency.
15
Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP83-00036R000500130003-9
 APRIL 28PAVIPMyIR6pr ?fig p,fo- X99/09/27CPWA P83-00036R000500130003-9
C.I.A. OPERATIONS:
A PLOT SCUTTLED
Following is the fourth of fives
articles on the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. The articles are
by a team of New York Times
correspondents consisting of
Tom Wicker, John W. Finney,
Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy
and other Times staff members.
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 27-On
Aug.
am Hill, a British freighter un-
der Soviet lease, crept into the
harbor of San Juan, Puerto
Rico, for repairs. Bound for a
Soviet port with 80,000 bags Of
Cuban sugar, she had damaged
her propeller on a reef.
The ship was put in drydock,
and 14,135 sacks were off-loade
the United States embargo 0
Cuban imports, the sugar wa
put under -bond in a custom
warehouse.
Sometime during the lay-u
agents of the Central Intelli
gence Agency entered the cus
but unpalatable substance.
Later, a White House officia
running through some intelli
gence reports, came upon
!paper indicating the sabotag
cions confirmed and informe
President Kennedy, much to th
annoyance of the C.I.A. co
mand.
The President was not mere
annoyed; he was furious, b
place on American territory, b
provide the Soviet Union w
a propaganda field day, and b
cause it could set a terrib
precedent for chemical sa
tage in the undeclared "bac
alley" struggle that rages co
stantly bbtween the West a
the Communist countries.
Mr. Kennedy directed that t
doctored sugar not leave Puer
dered than done, - and it fina
required the combined
forts of the C.I.A., the Jus
Department, the Federal Bur
of Investigation, the State
-partment, customs agents
harbor autkocities to dis-intri
The Soviet Union never c ILS
loded. and no crew members ( undertaken "without appropri-
4,135 sacks Of sugar; whether -era tans ed The ship, whlchate approval at a hig h-political
ia~ !N, carrying coffee and level in our Government" out- .
was compensated for them asa c t,
tton, s~-as beached. side the C.T.A.
as not been,.disclosed: o
Richard M. Bissell, -a formers The problem is that the facts
It would be unfair to conclude
I.A. deputy director for plans,'presented to the Government by
as admitted that the -bombing the C.I.A. are sometimes drama-
hat this was a typical C.I.A. per.ation. On the other hand, it vas a
"sub-incident" that "went tic and inevitably tend to in-
established limits of spire dramatic proposals for
annot be dismissed as merely evond the
clandestine operations that the
he unwise invention of some
An outstanding example of an agency's men are eager to carry
gent who let his anti-Commu-
pera,t.ion with political tense- out, and that they believe can-!
tist fervor get out of control.
peaces was the dispatch of .or might-succeed.
There is good reason to be- ra.ncis Gary Powers on the U-2 Long Odds Can Hell)
Pakistan to Norway
ieve that a high-level political flight. from
the Soviet Union on May Even long odds sometimes!,
lecision had been taken to cross
1960, just before the Paris. work to the agencyy's advantage.'
,abotage, where feasible, the
surumit meeting and the ached- President Eisenhower, for in-;
auban economy. The sugar proj-
uled visit of President Eisen- stance, has written that he i n
hewer to Moscow. Idertoo
,ct, harum-scarum as it was, k to aid pro-Western, from a general policy)
Unresolved Question rebels in Guatemala in 1954 be-,
;
ietermination in the Plans Divi- cause Mr. Dulles told him the'
aion of the C.I.A., and the gen- The U-2 photoreconnaissance operation had only a 20 per cent'
had been going on for
chance to succeed. If the C.I.A.
director had estimated a better
>ral policy, If not the specific nearly five years, with f abulouS- lot, presumably had the ap-
tablished practice for the Press-'hewer wrote in his memoirs, hey
p al of the interagency, subs
dent to approve in advance aiwould have been unrealistic,, up-
Ca inet group responsible for
set of flights within a given convincing and overruled.
re ewing all operations that
time span, and there was also, Command of- the facts - at
Co Id have political conse-
established . machinery for the!least the best facts available-I
q aces. approval of each flight by the:
about
I
is was not, then, a well-laid plus zeal to do something plE that went sour in the oper- Secretary of Defense. Yet, to them;
many critics fear, cant
councils of the Government is -able advocate, not for a vested
n; - it was a badly laid plan top the C.I.A. an this day, no one then in the t was bound to cause sroube. able to say with certainty budgetary or policy interest, but
t is instructive because it l it whether the -Powers flight, the for its own sincere notions of
lu! crates many of the contro last in a series of six, was spe
blems in C.I.A. operation rificall approved by Thomas S. how to proceed. And its advan-,
an I makes plain why, from th
Gat s Jr.,t hen the Secretary of
et so many questions hay Defense f to ge t of d pc vdin must be made,
the facts on ;o persistently raised b ! these critics feel, can enable it.
n oOne Senator has said that the) to prevail over the advice or:
many critics about the ade IT
, flight was a perfectly legiti-tears of political officers.
cy of these controls. mate operation of great value,' Thus. in 1958, Anlba ssador
A Major Concern and that the embarrassment tot John Allison strongly opposed'
the President was not Inherent! of Allen Dulles to aid;
First, there is the pre-eminen in the project but was the re the plan
tern whether the C.I.A., de of a lack of coordination 'the rebel movement in Sumatra;
sy.te its disclaimers to the con cult and controls. against President Sukarno of
does on occasion mak Indonesia. But Mr. Dulles had
1tT ry, willfully, pechap "The operation," he said, "just won the powerful support of his
)icy-not because 1 went along regardless of they brother, Secretary of State Johns
t simply because of scat o Political circumstances." Foster Dulles.
;pE, to mount an ape A second serious control ques-I Foster ull the tan went for
t = d pursue it wherever it ma, Lion derives from the special w Ulti a with ly, the result that 4'l d without day-by-daY quid position of the C.I.A. as that American slot was shot down:
ce or restriction om th Government's fountain of neces-:and captured p
dcal departments of th causing y the Sukarno
sary information. This appears forces, csia conspicuousicuous)
iti
svernment? to be at once the major advan-+ deterioration of relations be
Operations like that of sab tags and a principal hazard oP tween Indonesia and the United
,ging the Cuban economy c the C.I.A. operation today. States. The plan was not unap-
ad to such dangerous episod "Policy," Allen W. Dulles, the) proved; it was just unwise.
s the sugar doctoring; they c I former C.I.A. chief, once said, A third problem of control
squire ,a momentum and life f "must be based on the best esti-II arises from the necessary secre-'
reir own, the consequences f crates of the facts which can', cy that surrounds the agency.'"
hich cannot be anticipated 1 be put together. That estimate, To protect its sources of infor-!
olitical officers who may ha' a grind in rind turn and should be which itgivenself by is some not o per mation, to permit it to proceed
ven them original approval. a enc which has no axes to f
Thus, it should be noted th g y with r any ations, to form of guard the e clandestine,
nation's'
1 the' sugar tampering, tie wedded 'too r. ny particular political relations with most'.
.I.A. and its agents unquestio _ policy." other countries, it is necessary)
bly believed they were Opera - This point is often made by ,
roved Instru for the C.I.A. to be shielded
rg within' app the C.I.A. and its defenders. and Congress has so shielded it, l
ons, and consequently resent d,
chat they regarded as "int They cite, for instance, the iby I8w-from the ordinary scru-
erence" by the White Hou a agency's accurate estimate on tiny, investigation and publicI
who reported it tote Soviet missile strength, as a disclosure of activities that]
fficer resident. contrast to the inflated estimates other Government agencies must
Another example of ape - that cache from the Pentagon in undergo.
the tIL V Fifties i latter they vv atala the a c+a.,
until
e'2
Li
16
ne of the tnree
,
one assuming a life of th it -ay, were surely influenced byl gay of disaster of 1961
dui g ;
he
heoccurred in
senrice rivalries and budgetary) even the
he st C.I.A.-engineered ered revolutim, battles-such as the Air Force's `I!I
was not a
r sinde the Communist-orient d desire for more missiles of its,
the "dirty
?reresddent of Guatemala, , Jac" o; Own. The C.I.A. has no such
and carri
~ rbenz P Guzman.
.
A vested interest and little to gain Division.
fighter, piloted by n h b distortin or coloring its re-
-Steve
America can, bombed a Brit ii ores and estimates. g
Many o
hip; the Sf-shore and, as e p Mr. Dulles -like Secretary of
meat offic
was flying off-shore and was a State Dean Rusk--insists that
to be c aircraft io I O
CPYRGHT
Intelligence Division
llowed to know about
tricks" being planned.
ed out by the Plans
nson in the Dark
f the highest Govern-'
ials are told nothing
 CPYRGHT
INVOLVED IN 1962 C.I.A. OPERATION: The S.S. I taminated by C.I.A. agents when the ship put up for
Streatham Hill, a British freighter under Soviet lease, repairs en route from Cuba to the Soviet Union. The
lying at anchor alongside two U.S. destroyers in San Juan, incident, designed by the intel1hience agency to injure
Puerto Rico, late in 1962. Her cargo of sugar was con- Cuban trade, instead incurred Prlesident Kennedy's wrath.
ties because, in the course of, does over the Atomic Energy lisped by the National Securityp Dulles had the power to give ii
their. own duties. they do not, Commission. Council - which advises theppthe',facts on which it had t.,
It is now well established, for; pletely satisfied with the scru- eign policy matters-what came ( group during the' Eisenhowe
instance, that until the disaster tiny provided by four carefully to be known as "the special Administration is believed b`
unfolded, Adlai E. Stevenson, selected subcommittees of the group," or the "54-12 group," knov~,vledgeable sources to hav
the United States representative Senate and House Armed Sett'- after the date (December, 1954) exercised little real control.
to the United Nations, knew ices and Appropriations Corn- of the secret directive ordering; The Classic Disaster
nothing of the Bay of Pigs plan. mittees, went to work. He sus its formation.
As a result, he and his Govern- ceeded in cutting away 14 of.. This directive also provided; At the Bay of Pigs, just after
meet suffered grievous humilia Mr. Mansfield's cosponsors, and the basic charter for the agen- Pre ident Kennedy tools of#ic
tion after he publicly misstated; the bill was defeated, 59 to 27. Icy's countersubversive and coup- in 1961, the worst finally hap
the facts. ter-Communist activity. Until pened; all the fears expresse
In years past, C.I.A. secrecy Board Headed by Killian !that time, these activities had, through the years came true,
reached some absurd proportions A year later the second been undertaken under author 'i'e Bay of Pigs must take it..
-with high-level employes iden-I Hoover Commission also recom- ity of a secret memorandum'{ place in history as a classic ex
tifying themselves solemnly at: mended a. Congressional joint froin President Truman issued ample of the disaster that cal
cocktail parties as "librarians committee, as well as a Presi-,in 1947 and inspired principally occur when a major interne
and "clerks." In its early days, dentially appointed board of by the Italian, Czechoslovak and'tiont,l operation is undertake
for, instance, C.I.A. employes consultants on intelligence ac- Berlin situations, then acute in deepest secrecy, is politically
who in their private lives need- tivities. . cold-war issues. app~oved on the basis of "facts"
ed to apply for credit were in-, To forestall the first, Mr. The 54-12 group was-and still provided by those who mos
structed by the agency to say, Dulles acquiesced in the second, is composed of the President's fervently advocated it, is car
when asked for an employer's and in January, 1956, President special assistants for national tied out by the same advocates
reference: "Call Miss Bertha Eisenhower named a board of security affairs, the director of and ultimately acquires a mo
Potts" at a certain number, consultants on foreign intelli- the C.I.A., the Deputy Secretary me tum of its own. beyond any.
It was not long, of course, be- gence activities, with James R. of Defense and the Under Secre- thin contemplated either by th
fore the lenders who were told Killian Jr., president of the tary (or Deputy Under Secre- advocates or those who suppos
to call Miss Potts would sky Massachusetts Institute of Tech- tart') of State for Political Af-~ediy!, "controlled" them.
gleefully: "Oh, you work for the nology as chairman, fairs, plus other officers con-J R sponsible officials of th
suited occasional) on articular'Eiselrhower Administration re
y p
C.I.A. Those familiar with the proposals. s
For many years prior to 1961, board's work in the Eisenhower port; for instance, that the in
a good many critics had been years say it performed a useful The group seems to have been} vasion plan was not even i
aware of the control dangers function on the technical side, created, partly at least, in re- existence, as such, when the
inherent in the C.I.A.'s peculiar where Dr. Killian, for instance, sponse to public concern over went out of office on Jan. 19
position. In 1954, Senator Mike was a powerful advocate in the the problem of control, and it 1961; there was nothing but
Mansfield, Democrat of Mon- development of the U-2. How- was given responsibility for Cuban refugee force, availabl
tana, obtained 34 cosponsors for ever, it is generally agreed that passing on intelligence opera- for whatever the incoming Ad
a bill to create a 12-menrberlthe board did not give very tions beforehand. However, be- ministration might ultimate)
joint committee on intelligence critical attention to "black" op- cause of the fraternal relation-,decide to do with it.
ship of Allen Dulles and John; Yet the testimony of Kennedy
to keep watch over the C.LA., erations, and then only after Foster Dulles, because of their Adn inistration officials-Theo
much as the Congressional Joint.the fact.
in
Arthur M,
Commitifta Prdved eWase to D8Jo2astab eRM '00 ofor instance--i-
 CPYRGK proved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP83-00036ROO0500130003-9
that the matter was presented
to Mr. Kennedy by the C.I.A.
advocates as if he were already
committed to it and would have
to cancel it rather than approve
it. Mr. Sorensen even wrote in
The President followed this,lthat the Bay of Pigs f?as alWalt W. Rostow, who have re-
letter, which was made public. iwatershed in the life of thel
with a secret communication,' C.I.A. and its influence on pol-
saying he meant it and specifi-(icy-making. Before that, no
cally including C.I.A. men( matter how much administrative
among those responsible to thelcontrol and political approval
Ambassador. there may have been, Mr. Dulles
Kennedy had been subtl
Y y pushed ran the agency largely as he
to be no less "hard" in his anti-' A Blow to Bundy saw fit.
Castroism than President Ei-1 Perhaps the most important) He was able to do so because
senhower supposedly had been. change in control procedures, he could almost always get "ap-
The ultimate disaster and its however, involved the 54-121 proval"-and thus adhere to the
various causes need no retelling. group within the political ranks forms of control - from his
Their effect was graphically de-I of the Administration, and it brother in the State Depart-
scribed by an official who -saw) came without any Presidential rnent or from President Eisen-
the shaken Mr. Kennedy imme-III initiative. hower, with both of whom he
diately afterward. The Presi-i The Bay of Pigs had dealt a had the closest relations of trust
dent, he said, "wanted to splinter! severe psychological blow to and liking.
the C.I.A. in a thousand pieces' McGeorge Bundy, who as the The effect of the Kennedy
and scatter it to the winds." President's assistant for nation- shake-up was immediately ap-
placed McGeorge Bundy in rep-
resenting the White House.
This group meets once a
week with a detailed agenda. It
concentrates almost exclusively
on operations. It approves all
proposed operations and it
passes in .great detail on ex-
penditures as small as $10,000
that have political implications
or could prove embarrassing if
discovered. Any differences are
referred first to the Cabinet
level and then, if necessary, to
the President.
While the group approves
every "black" operation, it does
not necessarily clear all the
routine intelligence -gathering
activities - of the agency. Nor,
Clifford, a Washington lawyer. ber of the group, and perhaps instance. W. Averell Harrim,au, once approval has been given
and close friend, who had writ-, also to his self-esteem. There- then the Assistant Secretary of i for a "black" operation, does it
ten the legislation setting up the' after he set about tightening up State for. Far Eastern Affairs, I maintain a running supervision
C.I.A. during the Truman Ad-'the surveillance of C.I.A. opera- -,oar given a. free hand ingetting ~ over every detail of its execu-
ministration, Mr. Kennedy said tions, subjecting them to search-1rid of the American puppc+:,~ tion.
But because he could not) advice of the Taylor and Killian the head of a neutralist govern-as specific and important as a
simply abolish the agency, much I investigations on two important mci1t. bridge-blowing. But the over-all
less its function, the President questions. , By general -agreement of vir-program would go on by itself
decided he would "get it under! First, he decided not to limititually every official interviewed, under the direction of agents in
control." , the C.I.A. to intelligence gather- the C.T.A. does not now directly the field.
First, he ordered a thorough, ing and not to shift clandestine, make policy, and its operations Bureau of the Budget
investigation by a group headed; operations to the Pentagon, on are under much more rigorous
by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and to .a, special agency created for surveillance and control than Another form of control is
composed also of Allen Dulles, the purpose. before. Nevertheless, there con- that of the pursestring.
Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief, These ideas had found favor tinue to be---and probably al- The C.I.A: s annual request
of Naval Operations, and At- among some sections of the State ways will be--instances where for funds, which is-hidden largely
torney General Robert F. [Department, among many public', the controls simply do not work. in the Defense Department
Kennedy. ! critics and even among some budget, is the responsibility of
Second, on Mr. Clifford's ad members and the staff of the Uncertain Boundaries the head of the Budget Bureau's
vice, the President recreated thei advisory committee. But it was Richard Bissell, who as deputy International Division. The re-
old board of consultants under stoutly opposed by Allen Dulles,' director. for plans was largely quest has usually fared well, but
the title of the Foreign Intelli-;who argued that this would re-responsible for the U-2 recon- in the fiscal year 1965, for the
gence Committee and .asked Dr, sult in duplication and rivalry,'! naissance triumph and for the first time in several years, it
Killian to resume the chairman- '~ and that .the two functions were I Bay of Pigs disaster, has ex-i was cut back sharply by the
ship. (Mr. Clifford became a interdependent, though he ad- j plained why this must be. bureau.
member and later succeeded Dr.iniitted that they had not been "You can't take on operations Another form of budgetary
Killian as chairman.) The Pres-wtiorking in harness on the Bay of this scope," he has said, control centers on the agency's
ident directed the committee to'1, of Pigs operation. "draw narrow boundaries ofd "slush fund," which used to be
investigate the whole intelli-i - The two committees of inquiry policy around them and be ab about $100-million a year and
gence community from "stem to
stern," recommend changes and
Gee that they were carried out.
the President replaced Allen,thusiastically agreed ,u that thelparting Cambodian rebels wlioi But another official put asome-
Duiles with John A. McCone, a C.I.A. should leave sizable mili-,oppose Prince Norodom Siha-what different light on how the
former chairman of the Atomic tary operations to the Pentagonjnouk, the head of state. Even "slush fund" is handled.
Energy Commission. He told the. and henceforth limit itself to some senior United States For Suppose, he said, that Country
be simply the director of the United States involvement would were not sure that the agency's
C.I.A. but should regard his be "plausibly deniable." This, firm denials meant no agent in
primary task as "the coordina- however, has proved to be a the field, no obscure planner in
tion and effective guidance of rule of thumb in which it isu the huge C.I.A. building in Vir-
the total United States intelli often difficult to hide the thumb. ginia, had strayed from the
gence effort." Mr. Dulles's key: strict boundaries of policy.
assistants were also removed. Something Like Secrecy A high degree of control of
Fourth, the President sent a' For instance, the later crea-I C.I.A. activities -exists, however,
letter to every Ambassador tell- tion of an air force of anti-[ and inquiry produced this pic-
ing him he was "in charge of Castro Cubans to fly for the' Lure of the controlling agencies
the entire diplomatic mission" Congolese Government was car- and how well the control works:
at his post, including not only ried out and managed by the:
foreign service personnel but C I A not b the Pentagon de-:
X is having an election and the
candidates backed by the Unit-
ed States Government seem
headed for defeat. The Ambas-
sador and the C.I.A. station
chief-the agency's chief in that
country-may forward a re-
quest for some fast money to
spread around.
The request, when reviewed
and cleared by the middle levels
of the State Department and the
C.I.A., goes to the 54-12 group
for review.
"also the representatives of all spite the recommendation. I The 12 This group will first decide
other United States agencies." group i t
The obvious reason was than of the control system. , Its ts heart mein- whether the money should be
These representatives of other the agency could do the job m, members now are Admiral Wil- spent, how the C.I.A. should
agencies were to keep the Am.something like secrecy, while Liam F. Raborn, the C.I.A. di- 'spend it and how much should
bassador "fully informed of their'
"Defense Department involve-(rector; U. Alexis Johnson, Dep- be made available. Then Vthe r~e-
11
abide by the Ambassador's de-sarily more open, advertising
cisions "unless in some particu-,the backing of the United States
lar instance you and they are for the "instant air force."
notified to the contrary." It is beyond dispute. however,
finally, did the President. ries will never be overstepped." I One- official has said that "the
for Political Affairs; Cyrus R.
Vance, Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, and two Presidential as-
sistants. Bill D. Movers and
to be justified in budget terms
against other needs.
18
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A Call Brings the Money i more frequently. Individual
For example, this official said, members also take field inspec-
one such project was recently: tion trips. Mr. Clifford went re-
trimmed by the Budget Bureau: cently to South Vietnam; Mr,
from $3-million to $1.7-million.' Gray has been on extensive trips
But In the last week of the elec-
tion, the C.I.A. ran out of funds
to the Middle East and South-
east Asia.
Department and Ambassadors.! of agents in each diplomatic
Secretary of State Rusk has ,mission.
confided to his associates that In secret testimony before the
he is now quite certain the, Senate Foreign Relations Com-
C.I.A. is doing nothing affecting mittee in the summer of 1965,
official policy he does not know( Under Secret%ry of State Thom-
about
But he
dd
d th
.
a
e
at he as C. Mann made plain that the
just as it needed some more bill- There is divergent opinion on was also sure he was the only: creation of the Imbert military
boards plastered, and It wash the control value of this board. llone in the State Department untia in the Dominican Reput-
able to get the money simply Some of its members are'informed about some of the lit n May was a State Depart.
by a phone call to the Budget highly pleased with . their own-things being done. 11
meat, and not a C.I.A., idea.
Bureau. This official explained work. They point out that over Despite this information gap!I Asked whether the C.I.A.
that there had to be some way the last four and one-half years~as high as the Under Secretary; wound have set up the junta
of providing "quick-turn money" they have made some 200 recom-Y and Assistant Secretary levels, j without orders from State, Mr,
under tight controls and audit. nlendatkons of which the Presi--State Department officers with Mann replied:
It should also be noted that dent accepted 95 per cent. la need to know are far better' "I will say that In the past.
this form of control is purely They take credit for persuad- informed about operations than; this may have been; I do not
budgetary and not substantive. ing President Kennedy and Sec- before the Bay of Pigs. , know. But since I arrived in
The Bureau of the Budget does retary of Defense Robert S. Mc
Moreover, in the 54-12 group ,Jan Lary, 1964, I have had an
not interpose any policy judg- Namara to create the Defense and
ment but simply weighs a pro- Intelligence Agency, combining in meetings, State s, Department e taintelligence
of- of-i an Me d one rstanding and now first with Admiral
with Mr. posed operation against total the separate service e intelligence fivers are now more ready to~,Raborn, and I am sure the de-
money,available and the outlays divisions. This had been recom-
speak out and more likely to be'part}nent has, even more im.
for other projects. mended by Secretary of Defense; heeded on proposed intelligence;, portantly, that the policy is
Gates and by Lyman Kirkpat- operations that they believe:, mad - here [at state] and that
Foreign Intelligence rick, inspector general of the would compromise larger policy nothing is done without our con-
Advisory Board C.I.A., as a result of the widely interests. sent."
Another control ais the differing estimates of the so-. President Kennedy's secret' This "nothing" probably goes
Foreign ntontrol agency Advisory called "missile gap" in the late letter to the Ambassadors also; too far, since there remain areas,
Foreig This group has nine: nineteen-fifties made by the in-jhad some effect In changing a;.of ambassadorial ignorance. Ai
telligence arms of the services. ;dangerous situation. Ambassador is not always in-
members. Four have had ex- Another official in a position', In 1954, William J. Sebald re-, fornxed of "third-party" spying
tensive government experience, of auth ity, however, believessigned as Ambassador to Burma in his country --for example;
was The special counsel Clark President that the oard does little more because of continued C.I.A. sup- (spying in France on the Chinese
Truman from 1946 to 1950, than provide a "nice audit" of~port to Chinese Nationalists in Communists there. Nor is he
Among the other members, C.I.A. operations and that any;northern Burma despite all his given specific details on coun-
Among D. Murphy, former car, "control" it exercises is largely protests. In 1956, James B.terespionage and information
Robert rt D. urp former ex post facto. He asked what; Conant, Ambassador to West,gathering about which he may
Under Sbasadoh and could be expected from a board Germany, was not told about be generally informed.
Uniral csret rs, ofs had State for that met only a few days a; the tunnel under East Berlin. If the C.I.A. has "bought the
per- r r month. i In 1960, in Laos, Ambassador madain," as one official put it,
sonal experience in clandestine "By 5 in the afternoon," he Winthrop G. Brown was often of a house of ill fame
operations, for he prepared the said, `the guys can't remembers bypassed as the C.I.A. helped ized by influential citizensoor
way for the American landing what they were told in the morn-~I prop up the American-backed offici~.ls of a host country, the
in North Africa in 1942. He is ing." Premier Phoumi Nosavan,Amb,assador does not know it
now a director of Corning Glass. Even the members
i
d
t
conce
e aga
ns
his advice. The ram e and probably doesn't want to.
Gordon Gray, a director ofi that their work has been aimed year, the Ambassador in Mala He ould, however, have the
the R. J. Reynolds Company and primarily at improving the ef- sia knew nothing of the Singe- IIdubio Ls benefit of any informa-
a newspaper owner, was Secre- f'
t
f
ary o
the Army under Presi-
dent Truman and later was
resident Eisenhower's special
assistant for national security
(fairs. Frank Pace Jr., chair-
,an of the Special Advisory
card, Air Force Systems Com-
and, was director of the Bur-
r ULLu,IaLe,y' pion 9ne madam might disclose.
C.I.A., rather than at control was to embarrass the State De- T ere are the four institution
of individual operations. Thus,! partment in 1965. I,al fo ms of "control" of the
if the board does investigate; It is doubtful whether suchlIC.LA., that now exist-save for,
some "black" operations, its em-! things could happen today if!!Congt.essional oversight and the
phasis is placed on whether it; an Ambassador is forceful 1all-im~ ortant role of the agen-
was done well or could haver enough in establishing his au- cy's director. And The New
been more successful, rather; thority. Y
ork Timer's survey for these
than
th
on
e olitical
au of the Budget in 1949-5o of whether it should :have been! ba adore have beenakept much l!Inewl1 vigoroluslefunct ooing tof
nd Secretary of the Army from done at all. better informed, and their rela- these four groups has greatly
950 to 1953. One member reported, how-; tions with C.I.A. chiefs of sta- ]improved coordination, more
Two members are scientists ever, that the C.I.A. now brought:tion have been consequently nearly assured political ap-?
onnected with industry-Wit some of its poposals to the com-more cordial. Ambassadors ,,prova and substantially re-,
ram O. Baker, vice president in'mittee for prior discussion if 11 Clare Timberlake and Edwardllduced the hazards implicit in
harge of research for the Bell not specific approval. ullion were completely
This is posted'~C.LA:j operations.
elephone Laboratories, a mem-not an unmixed blessing, G on C.I.A. operations during the] Nevertheless, the agency still
er for many years of the Sci- While the .board might advise Congo crisis and worked closely ~,' remai s the fount of information
race Advisory Board of the Air against some risky scheme, it' with the 'a enc So, a
orce, and Edwin H. Land, also might not; in the latter' was Henry Cabot Lodger afte ~ rest, and theysour ey of cfacts
hairman and president of the case its weight added to that, he took over- the embassy in selected or otherwise, on which
olaroid Corporation, a former of the C.I.A., would present the Saigon in 1963.
dviser to the Navy on guided responsible political officials in While the Ambassador may to justify its own projects.
rashes and an expert on pho- the 54-12 group with an even Wt always be completely maNevertheless, the C.I.A. en-
ography. more Y .any an inherent he advantage ins
There are two military repre- ~ usual.~e~ul advocacy than te
does r in his own house, neither any conflict with the State on
entatives-General Taylor, for- An advantage of the board staff ;report! Po Sebe tru -as I
n foie Henra Defense Departments because of
er chairman of the Joint Chiefs is its direct link to the Pres y;its undeniable
expertise-espe.
f Staff and forme Ambassa- ' M. Jackson's subcommittee on cially in economics and science
;dent. Since this is augmented, national security staffing and -and because it is free from
olr or to South Vietnam, and Ad- I at present, by Mr. Clifford's operations said in 1962 - that
iralJohn H. Sides, commander close personal and political ties 'the primacy of the Ambassador,! trysuchg to b political ld up ena tanglements as
i chief of the Pacific Fleet[to President Johnson, any 'ref-1 supposedly established by the, trying to up case missile
om 1960 to 1963. Dr. William ommendations the committee, Kennedy letter, was largely i aL.Air Force) (as in the having to the
Langer, the ninth member, is makes carry great weight with; polite fiction." Air Force) or of having to jug,
rofessor of History at Harvard the bureaucrats of the C.I.A., For example, Robert F. Wood-; tify the recognition of a foreign
d a frequent government con- even before the appear (as in the case of State),
s il.tant? Presidential order. ppear in award Ambassador to Spain, And nevertheless, in its legit;-
The hoard meets an aver- i vetoed a man chosen to be the mate need for secrecy, the
e of on a of one and one-half State Department C.I.A.'s Spanish station chief. C.I.A. simply cannot be sub-
ys amonth. It is subdivided and Ambassadors And the State Department, whi14 jetted to as much public or even
it to two-ratan panels specializing Al exercisl still complaining about the size official scrutiny as all other
i z at roue i~rjyrV V d Re SeA e~~~ 00050MM03-9
1-9
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A Call for More Control
For all these reasons, and be-
cause of occasional blunders,
there has been no abatement ivi
the demand of critics for more
and stronger control. Inevitably;
their call is for some form of
increased supervision by the
people's representatives in Con-
gress, usually by a joint com-
mittee of the two houses.
The Times survey indicated
a widespread feeling that such
a, committee would do the agen-
ev's vital functions more harm
than good, and that it would
provide little if any solution to
the central problem of control.
The history of the Centr .t
Intelligence Agency since 1947
makes one thing painfully clear
--that the control question,
while real and of the utmost
importance, is one of "not
measures but men." The forms
of control mean nothing if there
is no will. to control, and if there
is a will to control, then the
form of it is more or less Ir-
relevant.
Such a will can only come
from the high political officials
of the Administration, and it
can best be inspired in them by
the direct example of the Presi-
dent.
But even the President prob-
ably could not impose his will
on the agency in every case
without the understanding, the
concurrence and the vigorous
and efficient cooperation of the
second most important man in
the matter of control-the di-
rector of the C.I.A.
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 APRIL 29, 1966 ~~1ea~s
99/09/27 :P1c "3-00036R0005Q0130003-9
Approved For F~/ &Hl gg
The C.I.A.: Qualities ofDirector
Viewed as Chief Rein on Agency
Following is the last of five
pence Agency. The articles are
by a team of New York Times
correspondents consisting of
Tom Wicker, John W. Finney
and other Times staff members,
military build-up in Cuba, in-
aircraft niis.siles, poured into
1962, the director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, John A.
half-way around the world from
Moscow had to be designed
Mr. McCone told Presidents
Kennedy about his hunch but;
guess entirely lacking in con
crete supporting evidence. He!
his hunch on the contradictory
evidence being provided by the
intelligence community over
which he presided. He contin-
estimates-based on all avail-!
able evidence-that the Soviet'
Union was not likely to do
what he believed in his heart
it was doing.
When the evidence that the
Russians had implanted offen-
sive missiles in Cuba did come
in, Mr. McCone was among
those around the President who
argued, for quick, decisive air
ction before the missiles could
become operative. But when the
President decided on his block-
ade-and-ultimatum policy, Mr.
McCone loyally supported it and
helped carry it out.
Test-Ban Hearings
In 1963, Mr. McCone was per-
onally in favor of the proposed
imited nuclear test-ban treaty.
e had backed such proposals
he Atomic Energy Commission
On the Eisenhower Administra-
ion.
rveyed by The New York
S.
A Gambling Man
As 101w, as his brother, John
Oster lles, was Secretary
f State, Allen Dulles had no
eed to chafe under political
control" The Secretary had
n almost equal fascination for
evious, back-alley adventure in
that he saw as a worldwide
Personal Judgments
The advocate overcame th
planner.
As President Kennedy an
others interposed reservation
and qualifications, Mr. Dulle
and his chief lieutenant
Richard M. Bissell, made what
evier changes were required
Pr instance, they switched th
lads site from the Trani
dad
a ea to the Bay of Pigs, t
achieve more secrecy, thereb
accepting an inferior beachhea
sitje and separating the refug
fo a of invaders from th
E cambray Mountains, whet
they were supposed to operate
as guerrillas, by 80 miles of
swamp.
Above all, lacking his old
ra port with President Eisen-
h wer and his brother, lacking
acoldly objective approach to
his plan, Mr. Dulles never
reslized that President Kennedy
suffered from more than
to Clarence Cannon of -Mrs- These misgivings-in reality
ONITOR-1J.vA. FURCHAK chance of success there might
I.A., with the result that he placed Allen Dulles at the
variably had on his side those C.I.A,.'s most critical hour.
embers. of the Congressional After the Bay of Pigs fiasco
tablishment who could carry. it sad barely escaped dismem-
e rest of Congress with them.jbeiment, or at least the divorce
able to act almost at will
shielded from any unpleas-
consequences.
ennedy Kept Him in Office
of,! if not hostile to, the agency.
Like Mr. Dulles Mr McCone
de'#oted much energy to resist-
in a formal Congressional
watchdog committee, to court-
ingi the senior members of the
Ari!ned Services and Appropria-
tio$s Committees on Capitol
Hill and to converting the
members of a resuscitated
Presidential advisory board to
his view of intelligence policies.
But those who observed him
wok believe he also brought
a been intelligence and energy
to. a tough-minded administra-
tion of the agency itself and to
Sion between operations and
an lysis that had kept the
C.L: s analysts-incredible as
it seems-ignorant of the Oper-
atidns Division's specific plan to
invade Cuba. And he began to
subject the C.I.A.'s own action
programs to vigorous review
and criticism by the agency's
own experts.
sses as C.I.A. director -) The intellectual level of
ainst whatever objections,J,causs he _ put_.diiffcult and in.
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 CPYPAW6ved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP83-00036R000500130003-9
paring . formal analyses and
plans, forcing them to chal-
lenge and defend their own
judgments.
Above all, he set the hard.
example himself of putting
aside personal preference, in-
formed guesses and long gam-
bles in favor of realistic weigh-
ing of available evidence and
close adherence to administra.-
He brought specialists and.
experts into conferences and de.
:
cision-making at a much higher
,level of policy than be;ore.
Often he took such men with
;him to meetings at the Cabinet
level. This exposed then. to
-policy considerations as never''
before, and put policy-makers
more closely in touch with the
on whose "facts" they
States Intelligence Board - ?a'
group that brings together rep-!!
resentatives from the Defense',
Intelligence Agency, the State';
Department's intelligence unit
and others-Mr. McCone won
a reputation for objectivity iby,
frequently overruling the pro-
posals of his own agency, the'.
His regime was not without
its critics. Many officials be-
lieve he narrowed the C.I.A's
range of interests, which was
as wide as the horizons under
the imaginative Allen Dulles.
For instance, they say, he was
slow to mobilize the C.I.A. to
obtain information about nu-
clear programs in India, Israel
and other nations.
Mr. McCone also tried, but
failed, to end interagency rival-
ries. He spent much time in
bitter dispute with Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamar
about divisions of labor and
costs in technological program
and about chains of.comman
in Vietnam. He is reported
have feared the growth of the'
Defense Intelligence Agency a
an Invasion of C.I.A. territory:
With the State Department,
too, rivalry continued-and still
does. Much of this can be at-
tributed, on the diplomats' side
to the C.I.A's readier access
to the upper levels of govern-
ment
and to its financial ability . McCone or the C.I.A. In
to underwrite the kind of re his time overstepped the bounds
search and field operations that of policy deliberately.
State would like to do for itself. Thus, they are inclined to
c
On the agency's side, there is(
ite .1,1_ as
roof of the theory
p
go
n
sition
er
-
.
m
p
o
f
t
e .
h
auty re
lec
f
that in the pav.;e~a o
n
8t the -State Department's
cent) con- mgt men are more important interests of the swbeommittees~
Y Increased tment political than mechanics-and in support ?~ Those on the Senate side are
trol of C.I.A. operations. Fo of the widespread opinion I said to be "lackadaisical" and resent
atheti the day Presid nt ZJ f cials t at the p blfem ofrcon- a or tcw with to some
Domingo, the C.I.A. had re- with'men inside the agency it-)
ported the possibility of a re- self.
bellio and it knew of thre6
__
ener l belief
more g
The
functio Fg in the Dominica la "-'O _-~oice ' ?
a ~nueh rger v in thg con-
Republic, but the agency had trol of the agency. This ;belief
not suggested an imminent is reinforced by the fact that
threat of a Communist take, the congressional control that
over. , now exists is ill-informed, in
When the President and his the hands of a' chosen few,
advisers became persuaded that subject to what the agency
ever, L
JMM I9$f27:
CHIEFS OF THE C.I.A.: Allen W. Dulles, left, was replaced by John A. McCone, center,
in 1961. Present director, Adm. William F. Raborn, right, has held the post for a year.
confirming intelligence- some
of it open to challenge by an
alert reader. C.I.A. officials
seem a little red-faced about
this compliance, and the intima-
tion is that the C.I.A. may have
gone overboard in trying not
to undermine but to substanti-
ate a political policy decision.
Within the Bounds of Policy
Mr. McCone's pride and the
fierce loyalty to the agency that
he developed made him resent-
ful of Congressional and public
criticism, not always to his
own advantage. Nevertheless,
as a result of his single-minded
efforts to control himself and
his agency, other former mem-
Adminis-
Kenned
f th
y
e
bers o
tration - many of whom opposed
his appointment-now find it
hard to recall an time when
y
t
There are four subcom- me believe they should Protect
mittees of the Senate and House thensensitive C.I.A. budget, as it
Armed Services and Appropria- comes to them, from the Con-
tions Committees to which the gressional economy bloc and
director reports. the agency's more determined
Mr. McCone met about once' critics.
a month with the subcommit-~ As a result of this and other
tees. The present director, congressional representations.
Adm.. William F. Raborn, meets the C.I.A. "slush fund" for
with them somewhat more emergencies has been reduced
often. below $100-million. And-much
Conflicting Views ~to Mr. McCone's annoyance-
(President Johnson's economy
There are conflicting opin- drives resulted in an Adminis-
ions on the value of these ses- tration reduction In the agency's
lions. Some who participate say general budget.
that they are "comprehensive," Three things, However, are
that the director holds back clear about this Congressional
nothing in response to ques- oversight.
tions, that he goes into "great No Real Control
detail on budget and opera-
tions" and is "brutally frank." One is that. the subcommittee
Others say that "we are pretty members exercise no real con-
well filled in" but that the trol because they are not in-
subcommittees get no precise formed of all covert operations,
information on the-budget or either before or after they take
the number of employes and place.
that the director reveals only The second point regarding
as much as he wants to. Congressional oversight is that
non anu ,l. ena.bur rcu0aeu, wauu
their great prestige, do not so
much control the C.I.A. as
shield It from. its critics.
Finally, even these ebtablish-
ment watchdogs can be told
just as much as the C.I.A.
director thinks they should
know. In fact, one or two of
the subcom
mittee members are
known to
shy away from too
Representative
George
H.
much secr
et information, on
Mahon, Democrat
of Tex
as,
the ground
that they do not
chairman of
the House Ap-
want eith
er to know about
propriations
Committee, has
"black" op
erations or take the
warned the
Administration it
chance of
unwittingly disclos-
must itself
budget more
police the C.I.A.
stringently than
ing them.
l For all
these reasoxis, there
i
-R
8 OO .
~~s?
O13
is 5 a large
al
0 O3-9Cong substant
ongre e s
ss
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP83-00036R000500130003-9
-- that favors more specific either or both-for instance,
monitoring of intelligence ac- supporting some non-Commu-
nists leftist against a military
tivity, regime, or vice versa. TO re-
The critics insist that Con-I port this kind of activity to
gress has a duty periodically' Congress would be certain to
to investigate the activities of set off public debate and re-
the C.I.A. and other intelli- criminatlons and lay a whole
gene arms; to check on the new set of domestic political
C.I.A.'s relations with other pressures on the agency.
executive departments, study gPolicy. Knowledgeable men
its budget and exercise greater In Washington do not accept'the
and more intelligent oversight Joint Committee on Atomic
than the present diffused sub- Energy as a desirable model
comnittees, which operate with- for oversight of the C.I.A. They
out staff and with little or no point out that the Atomic En-
representation from members ergy Committee has developed
most concerned with foreign af- its own staff of experts in its
field, in some cases abler men
f
i
a
re
But the overwhelming con-
sensus of those most knowl-
edgeable about the C.I.A, now
and in the past, does not sup-
port the idea that Congress
should "control" the C.I.A. A
Commission, and these Con-I poses.
Nor could the Defense De
art-
p
gressional experts now have a
vested interest in their ownlment easily acquire the skill,
ideas of atomic policy and praj- the convenient "covers," the
ewes political talents and bur?eaucrat-
ic flexibility required for quick,
An Empire Foreseen improvised action in time of
This, these sources fear, crisis.
o
e
o v
a
services H all the
number of reasons are adduced. gSecurit Congress is the would be the outcome of a As evidence of that, there is
y ' joint committee on intelligence the case of the successful polit-1 activities of the C.LA apart
well-known fountain of more -a new intelligence empire on ical and military organizationI from those dealing with tech-
leaks than any other body in Capitol Hill that could in time of hill tribesmen do Vietnam nological espionage-satellites
Washington. The political aspi exert. a: direct nnlirv influence ! carried out by the C.I.A. some l and the like-had their budgets
members make them eager to
appear In print; they do not
have the executive responsibil-
ity weighing on them, and many
C.I.A. operations could provide
dramatic passages in. campaign
speeches.
gPolitics. Any standing corn- a Congressional intervention the opponents ask, how could
raittee ar-Hsan would This have to be bd-' have been advanced. The most: "the department survive the in-
tis would ive s
the kind of visibility that brings
the C.I.A. Into disrepute over-
seas and? at home.
One former officei said quite
seriously that he was not sure
how much the nation would
l
s
d
it
l
But the State Department is
traditionally starved for funds
by m embers of Congress who
scoff at the "cookie-pushers"
and the "striped-pants boys."
The same members are often
quite willing to appropriate big
sums, almost blindly, for the
secret, "tough" and occasionally
glamorous activities of the
spies, saboteurs and mysterious
experts of the C.I.A.
As another example of what
a specially organized, respon-
sible Congressional Investiga-
tion might discover, some of-
ficials expressed their doubts
about the National Security
Agency. This Defense Depart-
ment arm specializes in mak-
ing and breaking codes, spends
about ;1-billion a year-twice
as much as the C.LA,--and, in
Its
the opinion of many who know
Its work, hardly earns its keep.
But to most of those inter-
viewed, the question of control
ultimately came down to the
caliber and attitude of the men
who run the C.I.A., and par-
titularly its director.
The present director, Admiral
Raborn, is a man who earned
a high reputation as the de-
veloper of the Navy's Polaris
L. g drastic-and in some ways the suitable exposure af some bit of minority party members - as. well as dissidents in the ma- most interesting-would be to political skulduggery in some
orit un legislate the separation of the other country, when it is sup- rifles to le tithe secrets ertof C.I.A.'s intelligence and analy- posed to be the s9imon pure ves- psis function from. the deer w- sel of the United States' proper fo
the reigneCu
policy and tive, anchtoanmakeitions or "dirty tricks" function, diplomatic relations? President Kennedy, after the political capital of mistakes oil Bay of Pigs, rejected a proposal A Less Drastic Plan controversial policies. Repub-Ito create a new and autonomous Afar less drastic but per- )leans, for instance, armed with). Y. g hap s all the facts and testimony that intelligence and analysis a cn
investigation - has more feasible a roach could have dis cy. This plan would have covert would be to add knowledgeable closed, might well havelpolrt>cal operations under a Congressional experts In foreign wrecked the Kennedy Admin- small and largely anonymous affairs to the military and
1section of the State Depart- appropriatdans, subcommittees
gThe Constitution. The C.I.A. I ment. that
acts at the direction of the Along this line is the idea If accepted, this plan would backed by Senator McCarthy-- President and the National Se-'have had the great advantage ' curlty Council. If a Congres- that a subcommittee of the Sen-
sional committee had to be in. in terms of control, of divorcing ate Foreign Relations Commit-formed in advance of C.LA.i black" schemes operators and their tee should be added to the ex- activities, covert and overt,! from the source of in fisting watchdogs. there might well be a direct formation on which the deci- Such men as J. W. FulbrIght, chair-
Congressional breach of the con- sion to act must be made. Thus, Democrat of Arkansas, the covert operators would have man of the Senate Pbrei Re- stitutional freedom of the exec- ~
utive branch and of the Presi_ no more information than any- lotions Committee
, Mike Maros-dent's right to conduct foreign one else in government, no field of Montana, the Senate withhold Democratic leader, and George
policy. Power to shape, color, 9Controi: If a carefully or manufacture information, D. Aiken of Vermont, aRepub-
,to do by of the Foreign
committee conscien and could, in effect do only lican member gn Relations Committee, might
tiously tried to avoid all these what they were told dangers it could probably ex- political authorities. bring greater balance and sen-; 1
ercise little real . "contro " ofi sitivity to the present group of
the kind critics desire. At best, size It and would also power of reduce the the C.I.A. sheer watchdog subcommittees.
for of which is based on its oom-
do little more than investigate, the New York Times survey for missile but who had no previ-
isome questionable operations;, m
binatnf of ormation functions acac- - these articles also believed that ous a cote in intelligence
in secrecy and after they had g in f proposing the C.I.A. should have no in- work. Nor Is he particularly
tion and having the ability tol p
kilter place, and then report fluence on the selection of men- close to President Johnson or
carry it out.
privately to the President, who bens of the subcommittees. to other high Administration
aright or might not respond. Efficiency Drop Feared While the excuse for giving, officials.
gldeology. Congress is full ! On the other hand, as Mr.; the agency a voice Is to make
Inauspicious Start
of "professional anti-Commu- Kennedy concluded, such a di-! sure that only "secure" and
nisi-"' and has not a dew "pro- vorce might well lower the total "responsible" members of Con- The admiral took office on
fessional liberals." In its overt and covert efficiency of gress are chosen, the net effect a bad day-the one on which
worldwide activities, the C.I.A. the intelligence effort. Those1 is that the agency usually man-1 Mr. Johnson dispatched the ma-
regularly. takes covert actions' who favor the present combined' ages to have itself checked by: nines to Santo Domingo last
that would profoundly offend agency insist that intelligence) its best friends in Congress; April.
and challenging the President's control of the operation in a A number of others suggested
policy decisions. This would dif- I bureaucratic in-fight, the good that at was possible for a great
fuse rather than focus power beginning was lost in a classic; many of the C;I.A.'s dnforia-
over the agency and confuse bit of military mismanagement,' tion"-gathering functions and
rather than clarify the problem and the tribal project collapsed. jistudy projedts to be handled
of control. As for the State Department's'; openly by the _State Depart-'
and action officers must be' and by those who can best
close enough to advise one an-! shield it from more critical
other-with analysts checking I members like Senator McCarthy
operators, but also profitingi and Senator Mansfield.
from the operators' experiences Fund Slash Proposed
in the field.
Moreover, they point out that
so-called paramilitary opera-
tions are more easily trans-
ferred on paper than in fact
Finally, many observers con-
sider that It might be useful
for' some select, nonpermanent.
committee of independent-
to the Defense Department,? minded members of Congress to
They note that the department, make a thorough, responsible
for instance, can by law ship I study of the whole intelligence
community. only' to recognized goy- unity. Such a group
might set out to determine how
ernments that undertake cer- much of the community's ac-
tain obligations In return, and tivity is actually needed or use-
cannot legally arm or assist, I fu 1, and how much of the whole
say, rebel groups or mercen- apparatus might be reduced in
aries, even for laudable pur- size and expense-,and 'thus in
23
 CPYRGHT
ro ed _ R [as l%9% 9/ 71 ? representing t e h to ouse~plies the facts to justify them,
ecessor, Mr. McCone, lunched ber of the group that argued, interest in C.I.A. operations. and the danger of its getting out of
together in downtown Washing- out high policy and influenced. if Admiral Raborn's alleged control of the Administration
ton that afternoon, unaware of the President's decisions, not.J!lacic of experience in intelli exists and ought to be taken
the imminent intervention. As with facts but also with opin- genre and foreign affairs handi-seriously within and without
they parted, Admiral Raborn of- ions and recommendations. caps firm, effective control of the Government. The Bay of
fered Mr. McCune a ride to the Admiral Raborn is said to the agency could be weakened p Pigs stands as enduring testi-
Langley, Va., headquarters ofd to make little effort to exert without any change at all in the many to that fact.
the C.I.A. But Mr. McCone said such an influence on policy. official processes of control. gThe task of coping with this
he was going home to pack Partly, this is because Mr. John- Promotion Debate danger is essentially that ofthe
his clothes. son apparently does not want President, his highest officials
Those who know of this ex-,`the C.I.A. director in such a role i Some people concluded even
change have a hunch that if", and among those interviewed before the end of the admiral's and the director of the C.I.A.
Mr. McCone had accepted the kby The New York Times there first year that the difficulties, It can only be met peripherally
invitation and returned to the .,Pas a belief that one reason of finding a succession of suit-'by Congressional oversight, and
turmoil that quickly developed ,John McCone left the post way able C.I.A. directors made it ad-then with increased danger of
in his old office, the history F, that he. could not play as influ-, visable to promote impre ssive security leaks and domestic go-
of the Intervention might haver ential a role as he had in the p``"fessionals from within qThepressures
charges against the
been different. Manare in agency.
Many a" Administration. C.I.A. at home said abroad are
dined to blame Admiral Ra-j The most widely respected of,so widespread and in many
born, In any event, for they Among knowledgeable offici- these is the deputy director,;
mishmash of hasty evidence' als, moreover, Admiral Reborn Richard Helms, who was said to 'Nays so exaggerated that the
the C.I.A. contrived to justify, is credited with at least two have been Mr. McCone's choice' .rf .biveness and morale of the
the State rtment's claim' administrative developments to succeed him. ao;~iicy may be seriously Im.;
that there wasaa threkt of a;~ within the. agency-both stern- Others argue, however, that paired. In particular, there
Communist uprising. ring, again, from his Navy intelligence is too dangerous a could ultimately be a problem
One reason the admiral was background. thing to be left to professional in recruiting and keeping the
chosen, after President Johnson; He has installed an opera- spies and that a loyal associate;, high caliber of personnel u oil
had searched for six months' tions center, not unlike a mill- of the President's with the po"~~ fot e enuseful cy work must anrely
for a successor to Mr. -McOone,1 tary command Post or a Navy litical qualifications for a sen-, for keeping for doing nus work k and
was that as head of the Polaris 'l ship's "ccrabat information cen- for Cabinet position should hold u
project he had shown great ter." In it, round-the-clock duty the Post. I proper bounds.
ability to work with and mol- officers constantly monitor Whatever his identity, how-; Crucial questions
lify inquisitive Congressmen. communications of every :tort. ever, the prime conclusion of Thus, there must be In this
Another was that his mill- They can instantly communicate The Now York Times survey ?*f 1 and in any Administration a
tat background made him an with the White House, State the Central Intelligence Agency! tight, relentless, searching se-
utnlikely target for charges of Department, Pentagon and is that its director Is or shou'.d view and analysis of the C.I.A.
being too "soft" or too liberal' agents in the field, by means be the central figure in estab- and its activities, meeting
for his post. The same con of the agency's wizardry with lishing and maintaining the ac-;,squarely and answering honest-
sideration influenced President machines and electronics. tual substance of control, whale.-
Kennedy in choosing the con This represents primarily a ever its forms may take. For Is any proposed operation or
servative Republican John Mc- drawing together and stream- If the director Insists, and bends activity likely, on balance, to
Cone, and it is notable that lining of capabilities the agency all his efforts to make sure, that make a genuine and necessary
no leading figure of the Demo- already had, but it is rated as the agency serve the political contribution, in the long view
cratic party, much less one of! a positive advance in C.I.A. administration of the govern- as well as the short, to legiti-
its liberals, has ever been the efficiency. meat, oily blind chance or in- mate American interests and
agency's director, eptitude In the field is likely
Because of his lack of ex- Long Range Planning to take the C.I.A. out of p?lit- aspirations in the world, or Is
perience in Intelligence and In- The other Raborn Innovation foal control, and -merely convenient, , expedient
regard to
ternational affairs, it It widely is a Navy-like system of long- and e without itho
believed among present and range management planning. Conclusions of Study its wider implications or to the
former officials that Admiral He has assigned a group of of. A number of other conclu. real necessity for it?
Raborn was chosen pr yficials to "look ahead" for de- lions also emerge from the In sum, Is the government of
a proud and honorable people
as a "front man.to bwdcallyl cedes at the shape of the world study:
the Congress that he *as sup- to come. gWhatever may have been relying too much on "black"
posed to im ess - is actually, Out of this continuing study, the situation In the past, and operations, "dirty tricks," harsh
concerned 4n ewe disclosed' the admiral hopes to be able to whatever misgivings are felt and illicit acts in the "back - a1-
-because he has not seemed, make more precise plans for. the about Admiral Raborn, there is leys" of the world? Is there
to have the sure grasp of they agency's needs In manpoer,now little concern in the John- some point at which meeting
agency's needs. and activitiesmoney, equipment and organi-',s?n Administration or among fire with fire, force with force;
that would most inspire confi-. nation in, say, 1975, so that it former high officials, and there subversion with subversioni,
deuce in it. can be planned for right now. is even less evidence, that the crime with crime, becomes Act
Raborn Defended There persists among many C.I.A. is making or sabotaging prevalent and accepted that
interested in the C.I.A., how- foreign -policy or otherwise art- there no longer remains - any
Knowledgeable sources say ever,-a- reluctance to accept thein.g on its own. distinction of honor and pride
the C.T.A. itself, in its day-'to- idea that the- agency should be; 4When C.I.A. operations ac- between grin and implacable
quire a life of their own and;' adversaries?
day business, is a bureaucracy (headed by anyone other than an
like any other, functioning rou experienced, strong executive -outran approved policy, theyi These questions are a proper
tinely whatever the quality Of with a wide grasp of interna- often follow a pattern well-and necessary concern for the
its leadership. These sources tional affairs and intelligence known also in less secret armsi people of the United States,
argue that the experience and work, strong ties to the Admire- of government. Diplomats fre-1 They area proper and necessary
professionalism of its staff are istration and the knowledge and quently say more than they are concern for Congress. But. in the
so great that any' lack of these determination to keep the agen- told to say to other govern- t nature of the case, neither the
qualities in Admiral Reborn is cy's work within the limits of ments or otherwise exceed their is people nor Congress can easily
scarcely felt. policy and propriety. instructions. Foreign aid and.learn ti'-' answers, much less inr
But they do not agree that This concern has been height- propaganda operations, though sure that the answers are al-
"Red" Raborn is just a front ened by the departure from public," can commit the United ways the right ones.
man. He is different as would the White House of McGeorga 1States to practices and men in The President's Task
be expected-from any direr Bundy, now president of th ways not envisioned by Wash-
for who preceded him, but there Ford Foundation. As Mr. John- escalate Military operations can Thatcan only done within
is evidence available to suggest son's representative on the 54-12 escalate by their own logic, and the e executive branch, by the
that he may not be such an un- 7 when things go wrong the Pen- highest authorities of the Gov-
- group, he was probably second tagon has at times been more ernmerut. Controlling the C.I.A.
fortunate choice as has been only Io the director of the C.I.A.
suggested in a number of crit- in maintaining "`control" and reluctant Is a job that rests squarely upon
producing oducing than the C.I.A. in the facts, the President of the United
ical articles in the press. took an intense interest in this gNonetheless, while the States, the director of the agem
The admiral is said to have duty. C.I.A. acts as the Government's cy and the officials appointed
President Johnson's confidence, Thus, if the White House re- i fountain of information as well by the President to check its
although in -a different way placements, Bill D. Moyers and as its "black" operating arm, ork. And If these men are to
from the confidence President Wait W. Rost ow, prove either while it is the C.I.A. that both linsist that they do control the
Kennedy placed in Mr. McCone.f less interested or less forceful in P1?o uses t s a Motu,, e e ones
24
 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP83-00036R000500130003-9
CPYRGHT
who must be blamed if control
fails.
'Those who believe that the
united States Government on
occasion resorts to force when
it shouldn't," Richard Bissell,
the C.I.A.'s former deputy di-
rector, once said, "should in. sll
fairness and justice direct their
views to the question of national
policy and not hide behind the
criticism that whereas the Pres-
ident and Cabinet generally are
enlightened people, there is an
evil and ill-controlled agency
which imports this sinister ele.
ment."
The New York Times study
of the C.I.A. suggests that it is
,not an invisible government but
the real government of the
`United States upon which the
responsibility must lie whenever
the agency may be found "nut
of control." For if that respon-
sibility is accepted, there can
be no invisible government.
25
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