RECORDING OF MEETING IN GENERAL SMITH'S OFFICE CONCERNING REORGANIZATION OF DD/P. APPROXIMATE DATE 15 JULY 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R000200110002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 15, 1952
• Content Type: TRANS

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SUBJECT: Recording of Meeting in General Smith's Office concerning
Reorganization of DD/P. Approximate date 15 July 1952.
This transcript was prepared in June 1965 by persons familiar
with the voices of the participants and represents as close a verbatim
record as possible. The participants are believed to have been:
General Walter B. Smith
Mr. William H. Jackson
Mr. Frank G. Wisner
Mr. Lyle T. Shannon
Mr. Eric Timm
Smith What I want to know first is, is it going all right?
Wisner : In my opinion it is.
Smith I don't want to see a lot of charts, it's your shop. Well,
how do the rest of you feel about it?
Shannon: I think it's going very well, sir. And I think it's going
to go a lot better.
Timm Yes sir, we've got a lot of headaches, but we are getting
them worked out. That's the truth of the matter, and they
can be worked out.
Smith : You exaggerate these simple problems ......... How do you feel
about it Timm?
Timm It's working out better than I had expected, and I think
very well.
Smith Is that (damning it with faint praise)?
Timm No, it's not. I always had a lot of reservations as to how
we could make the thing work in as large a complex we have,
but it seems to be working.
Smith What are now your major headaches, major remaining headaches?
D:^ ^'.
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Now, are you going to take your personnel
requisi ions rom the people down the line and just swallow
them whole?
Shannon: No, sir.
Smith Look, before we did this, you had at every echelon all the
way down separate administrative groups, every place along
the line. Now, damn it, you ought to save there.
Smith Why, if this reorganization, this pulling together, is more
expensive personnelwise, as far as this Headquarters is
concerned--I'm not talking about the field, then we'd better
go back to where we started.
Shannon: I hadn't quite finished, sir. We took a more drastic look
at this thing between Mr. Wisner, Mr. Helms and myself, and
reduced those requests down to just overF -1
Smith What is your present strength?
Shannon: T
resent strength, with those people in process, is just
he
nder that figure.
Smith Thee could be a more effective consolidation.
25X1
25X1
Shannon: Something like administrative jobs, however, disappreared 25X1
in this proces
Smith All right just keep it at LJ under that figure and it'll 25X1
be all right....... very happy. I just wanted to say we held
our i ...we didn't lose ground. You get a medal for that
Ted.'
Jackson: You ought to give me a medal for the same kind of work. I
managed to get rid of ORR and never lost a man.
Shannon: I'm sure that we can save a lot more (on that job? ), both
administratively and operationally.
Shannon: In the first place, we cannot get the good people.
Smith We're going to save a hellava lot.
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Shannon I think the next major administrative problem we have is to
get our budgeting in much better shape. We're heading in that
direction, but we still have an awful lot of work to do, so
that the budget means something. At the moment, it really
doesn't mean anything.
Smith I really felt sorry for the boys the other day, because they
meant so well and they knew so little about assess'.1 And,
it didn't take ver many figures. You were in there when I
was talking with>A ders. I just made some quick mental compu-
tations and said, "Our bud et for this year has aot to be
between 25X1
dollars." They said, "You must have been talking to the budget
people? I said, "Why?" And, they said, "Because when they
came over the other day and said to us, 'How much is your
budget,' and I told them, they said, 'That's a little high,'
and I said, 'Well, what do you think it ought to be,' the
Budget man said, 'It ou ht to be about 25X1
G. D. it, all t a- is is a simple 25X1
bstracting, how much reserve did we
have, how much did we use, how much did we turn back, and
you come to the realization, Spend as much as we could, about
Is what it cost to run the show last year. 25X1
w , 4 k
Shannon : I think the end result we've got to come up one of these days
is a budget under which we can operate without coming back
and changing it all around once a week all year long. That's
what we're beaming at. If I can come back to this personnel
thing for just a minute, sir, our crying need right now
because we are in great confusion organization and personnelwise,
is to get some Tables of Organization that we can work with
under this present organization. If we can put those through
and get them approved on a fairly broad and thick basis, and
then have six to nine months to reexamine and cut down still
further and further, it will go a long way toward letting us
get ahead with this exercise.
Smith : Well if it is reasonable - -
II
Smith All right, you can get that approved, on the basis of expectation
that once you get settled down a little bit, it's going to be
considerably less than that. If it isn't, why then, you're
not very efficient.
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Shannon : In, say, six months, we should be able to commence to scale
down.
Smith I've asked the Budget to keep our ceiling at I've 25X1
told our own people that I impose an arbitrary cei in of
Now, that gives me a flexibility between and 25X1
in case I have to give you a more 25X1
people.
Shannon That ceiling if we can come up with fewer than at this 25X1
time, and can have a ceiling of or close i , it will 25X1
be very helpful.
Smith You can have a celing of
Your present strength being
25X1
25X1
Shannon : All right.
Smith You can have a ceiling of
reach it.
but I don't expect you to 25X1
Shannon : We'll get under it, sir, as we go along.
Helms Sir, did you have a chance to review a paper which we presented
about our own internal administration of projects in the
shop? I believe it came up under Col. Shannon's signature.
It was one of the proposals that we were putting forth on the
handling of projects and it listed in some detail how we
wanted to administertkurselves, internally, not only as far
as reference to you was concerned, but how we were going to
check up. -----
Smith Yes, I read it, and in time, that's the way to do it, but
until you're able to appraise and budget intelligently, I can't
let you do it. That's the answer. I had a perfect example
of it the other day when I was going over Europe, and estimating
our budget. It was not budgeted intelligently, nor was it
planned adequately. Now, when you're able to budget intelli-
gently and plan adequately, then you can do it that way, and
I'll hand you the money and tell you to shoot the works,
subject to a certain amount of supervision. But, particularly
in the psychological field; (I don't say that on the our?sb);
that goes along about the same all the time. I could pretty
nearly put you down for a fixed figure every year, and forget
about it, but in the intangible field of politic/, psychological
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Wisner And paramilitary ---
Smith Yes, that's there, of course its pretty hard for me to assess
there what we are going to do, but that isn't an intangible.
That's a tangible field, so many men, so many guns, so much
materiil, etc., what you want us to do, well there I'm on
familiar ground, but where you get to some of these other
things, I'm not; and yet I know enough about it to realize
that it is not being done practically or intelligently. When
I know that it is being done practically and intelligently,
and that's why we've got this organization, then you can
have your money, God bless you, but you've got to demonstrate
that first.
Helms Well, we'd like to put the system into effect so that we
can start it working, and gradually convince you and sell you
on the fact that it really is working.
Shannon But we have done that but we haven't signed off on the internal
mechanics yet.
Smith Meantime I'm going to have my representative down there, whom
you know, and who is responsible only to me, and who is going
to sit and listen and talk and ask questions, and then if he
comes back and says to me, "This just doesn't smell good
to me," then I'll go into it myself. I can't do it any other
way.
Helms Fair enough.
Smith Now, you're going to have this right here in another year. In
another year, I can forget it. If you all stay here and keep
your health, and don't let me worry you to death. By the
time this has been working for a year, you'll have it just
like a,..you'll be playing just like a trained staff, and I
can just forget about the whole. G.D. thing. But you're
not quite there yet. You will be before long. You've got
brains enough and experience enough. It's simply a matter
of being shaken down, like any organization. Don't worry
about it, but for a little while, you're going to have to
submit to a certain amount of semi-irritating supervision and
justification, that's all, but I'm not a bit unhappy about
it. The boys said here the other day, they took it in very
good part. I was rough with them, well, all right, but
we've got a good show here, one I have confidence in. Certainly
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go ahead that way, but you're going to be supervised for
awhile. I'm going to ask you an awful lot of questions, and
you're going to have to do a lot of justifying, and then you'll
get yourself into the mental pattern, and you'll know just
what I want, and how far I want you to go, and the things
that you have to bring up to me and the things that you can
do on your own. We haven't been together too damn long.
Helms Certainly not.
Smith What else?
Wisner Does that finish your point? (speaking to Shannon)
Shannon I've of to point one more thing out in connection with the
personnel ceiling you put on, sir. In connection with 25X1
that, I mean for the Agency ---
Smith Now, wait a minute. That's the budget. That's what we're
budgeting for, and I told you that you've got to stay within
land quite frankly, that's a completely unintelligent
figure and I take it on the basis that there will be some
changes and that the wheel that squeaks gets the most grease.
If it's intelligent squeaking.
Shannon But we did reduce our budget presentations by over
tions in connection with ...
posi- 25X1
Smith When I make my own I'm oin to stand absolutely pat this
year on a floor of because that represents one hell 25X1
of a cut, and it gives us a reserve, that's true. On the other
hand, when you look at the amount that we are turning back to
the Treasury, you realize that we are a little bit over-bud-
geting. Now, whether you'll be very happy with that figure, or
figure thereabouts, I hope you'll not make it Oexactly, but 25X1
willmake it -That gives us a reserve to play with, 25X1
and we'll be all right, but in that year while we've got it,
we get it. Well, you've got a chance to shake down thoroughly
and get our estimated budgetary figure, on a pretty G.D. tight,
unattackable basis. We are more healthily staffed and organized
now than we've ever been. You know Machiavelli over here is
back in the saddle.
(laughter)
Wisner While we're on this subject of production of projects and
so on, I thought it would be consistent to have 25X1
say his piece next. This gets us a little bit out of our
prearranged order. Frank, will you comment briefly on the
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work of the Marder Board, -- and how far you have gone. That's
our term for the internal group that's been combing and re-
combing a lot of these projects in the action side of the
program.
Smith I think that Jackson will probably sit with you as my repre-
sentative, to keep me informed.
We certainly more than welcome him. I'd like to say at the
outset, sir, that in undertaking this job, it is not only
because you directed the job to be done, but those of us who
did it thoroughly believe in just the things that you've been
saying. We think we've made a fair first start. We made a . . .
Smith I think so, too, and I'll tell you why I know, because I've
put baic some of the things you've murdered, in part, and when
you get to that point, then I'm happy and when I can say,
"They've been pretty rough with this one, and I'll put back
a little bit," or we'll hold out something, then I'm satisfied
you're doing your job. I am satisfied.
(So am I, sir). And, we all think that this is a first ,round
and that the same process should be a continuing one. There
are still a lot of activities that are peripheral and that
there is a considerable redirection of our effort to more
profitable and more effective lines. Our first step was
establishing what our criteria would be. Very briefly, these
are the major points that we took as yardsticks: the first,
the authority; is there an adequate anthority, or is this
off on the periphery; the second is, will this make an
appreciatiable difference, -- will this project in its
aggregate when it is carried out make an appreciable difference
in the overall East-West balance. We found a great number
of projects that were fine, but were pinpricking. You might
almost call them the smart tricks department, and unless we
can see ways of carrying those and building them up to the
point where there is a fair chance of making a difference,
then we're wasting our time and the lives of other people.
Smith Now, there's one more thing I want you to explore on this,
since you're operating. And, incidentally, your review has
got to be continuous.
I A
. Yes, sir.
Smith You've got to make the fellows justify their plan of operation
as being economical and intelligent, balanced, and coordinated
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laterally, so that if there is an intelligence by product
from a psychological project, we milk every G.D. bit of
intelligence value out of it, having always in mind the
fact that primarily, this is an intelligence organization.
I believe that the organization that we now have is already
g-, doing that to a much greater extent, -- providing
for that by-product. I think another thing that we feel
strongly has to be put into projects, and one of the places
where we're weakest is in evaluation, and we're going to try
to make every project at the outset carry a plan of how the
project and how the products could be measured. I think the
two separate types of evaluation, first of all, does the
organization exist and is it what it says it is; and secondly,
assuming that the organization exists, is the product worth
the price we're paying for it, -- and I think on both these
scores, we are far short of where we'd like to be. This is
going to take time because the techniques to do either of
those jobs just don't exist.
Smith Now, you're going to have another point, too. Did you see
that? You didn't see the draft, the paper that Frank did?
Wisner No, sir, I didn't.
Smith If that becomes effective, which I hope and trust then it
will be your function after you've done your murdering,
probably, to carry the thing up and shepherd it through the
project review, this high-level project review group, possibly,
with some support. I'm not sure, but it seems to me that
once you have carefully analyzed the thing and decided it's
all right, you don't murder it or emasculate it, cut it in
half, but let it go, then it may become your function, toget-
her with the staff head of the part of the house that's
doing the operation to present the project to the three great
men or their duly authorized representatives, and get State-
Defense approval on it, because from now on, unless those
birds sign on the dotted line, we're not going to do it.
I'm fair fed to the teeth with having, being told that this
isn't the way we understood it, and we're a little afraid
now and that this has got to stop. I don't know if that's
the way it will be, but I'm thinking on that. Maybe that
isn't the answer, maybe it will be Mr. Wisner's responsibility
and his two or three principal staff officers to come up
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I
and shepherd the thing after you've made your recommendations
to him, and I've approved. Well leave that go, but some-
body's going to have to do it.
Very briefly, continuing on the criteria, another measure
that we applied is, can this be done by anybody else, either
by private organizations, by overt Government organizations,
or by foreign organizations. Another measure is what we
tried to call a multiplication factor, with a relatively
small amount of effort on our part, can we stimulate and
produce the largest reaction. Manpower, was we found, and
as you have pointed out, by far the greatest limiting factor,
and in order to provide a real measure which we've never
had before, as a part of this exercise, we made a survey
of both requirements and availability of what we called
the skilled manpower, in intermediate and senior positions,
in the substantive jobs, and we found that manpower certainly
was the chief limiting factor. We then used that as a guide,
and we found it a helpful guide in demonstrating to the
advocates of individual projects that they simply hadn't
the manpower to do the job. As a result of this survey, we
brought requirements and availabilities in terms of manpower
roughly into line, but it's still,--there's still, I think,
too much of a spread. Another important factor is . . . .
Smith Let me interrupt there. For a while, you're going to have
to confront these operating boys, the fellows that cook up
the ideas, with an alternative. For instance, this is a . . .
you believe the project is good and valuable, but you
haven't got the manpower, which would you prefer to do, this,
or the various others that you recommend, you can take your
choice of any two, three. four or f; vP Ac T 1-n1 d +hom
They didn't seem to be too unhappy about it?
Wisner No, I had a report.
Timm They thought they were lucky, they thought they were in
pretty fair shape.
Another point that we went over. We found that in many
projects that there were large hunks of dough for arms.
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Except where those arms were to be put directly into the
ground or used during the year, we took all of that out, and
Smith Let me interrupt again. John, you apply the
rigid, stereotyped military mentality to some of these
projects which involve arms. The paper which you produced
and which we sent over to the Chiefs of Staff the other
day with regard to certain things of that sort,
and certain personnel items, but your first assumption that
the NATB forces could conduct a successful defense in
Europe as you realize, there are certain gradations within
that assumption, but before we undertake any big project
tell us e areas which they expect o be able to hold for
a reasonable time. Are they going to hold, can they hold
on the Rhine and for how long? If not, where are they going
to hold--can they hold the Cherbourg penisula? Can they
hold Antwerp for a beachhead? Do they intend to hold the
line of the Pyrenees? Do they intend to hold the Brest
rp_"~la. or what thp hP11 do thpy intpnd tn dn? And-
e military have to 25X1
25X1
use tftem, because we recognize only too clearly that there
is no underground movement goingto spring to life on -Day.
Incidentally, in some magazine tha I marked, there is an
awfully interesting interview with whom 25X1
you know. Now, he's living in Lon on, Yellow knows more
about underground movements, probably, than anybody else
living. He gives his views, which are identical with our
own, and I must dig that thing out.
I wish we had that fellow working for us, some way or
another because he knows underground.
. We came pretty close to it once. I don't know what happened.
Smith He's a difficult fellow in some ways, but he does know under-
ground. I don't think you can trust him. I don't know,
but he did operate for a considerable time with a successful
underground, (was the principal,, by the way). Go ahead.
I
Well, the next step, sir, was simply blocking out certain 25X1
large areas in a country of the world where certain types of
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Smith
That all right.
Frank, I think we may have to go up more.
That is up over the previous year, obligations
i
t fi
f
i
l
h
or th
gure
s past year, wh
ch were on
y so t
a
we
arrived
at is almost double last year's expenditures,
The
Soviet
Division, from a program of
no
projects
were terminated, but 5 of the 10 were reduced
in
scope.
That is a general survey of the first cut at this
25X1
25X1
25X1
operation.
Smith We're only being so drastic because as I've said many times,
if the necessity first ofl is tightening up, and then taking
a good look at what we've learned to see if it is productive
or not, and then we can concentrate on the major ones.
Well, I think .....
Smith (One of the boys will talk to you about this.)
The principal difficulty, I think we have several excellent 25X1
projects, that we are just not putting the energy on those
that they deserve, and for that reason, we have to sheer
off some of these others.
Smith Which ones are we going to concentrate on -- the really
productive ones. The ones that are questionable or unpro-
ductive, we close them out or put them on a standby or
storage status until we (can see?) about it.
Wisner Yes, sir; I'm particularly anxious for Eric Timm to attempt
to make some comments with regard to the secret intelligence
mission.
Timm Well, as you pointed out, General, our problems are a little
bit different from the ones facing the other people.
Smith I don't want to bother you people.
Timm I would like to -- if you'd like, I can run through how
it has affected us, how the change in the organization
structure.
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Smith Well, has it hurt you?
Timm No, it hasn't hurt us; it has increased the responsibilities
of common concern that we perform for other people. Now,
when you put people doing two jobs where they did one before,
that's going to hurt a little bit. Some of our senior
people are performing service functions which we think are
proper and there will be a net gain on it, but as of today
when a man reviews for CE or Security ten projects where
he reviewed five before; it's going to take a little time
to catch up.
Smith You know, Eric, he not only has to review for CE and Security,
but he also has to review for intelligence library.
Timm Yes, sir.
In other word, if the boys are going take a venture in the
field of -- again I revert to the area specialists. -- While
this chap is sitting on his fanny comfortably at $9,000
a year and expenses, what are you going to get out of him.
You ought to know everything about that area. What can we
get out of it intelligencewise. That's the big problem.
Never any of you forget that, that's our major function.
Timm Our setup, as you well know, has long been signed to have
a continuing internal audit, because our failures aren't
very spectacular. We have a vacuum where we should have
something, and we have sort of been conditioned to looking
down our own throat, and trying to figure out where we're
hurting the most, we're hurting in a lot of areas, we are
perfectly frank to admit. Ido believe that getting all of
the mechanism joined in together is going to help us. As
you know, we have a terrific paper record billed against us,
both in CE and positive intelligence by a lot of people
who are watching us from outside the Agency. I think in
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:Yes, sir, I have a very small staff to start with; I'm
afraid it will build up rather slowly to start with, to get
experienced really people, rather than ......
Smith We've got certain gaps in our command setup down the line.
We'll have to meet -- I'll have to talk to you and Mr. Wisner
about those. A planned command organization is good; it's
just a matter of filling the slots with the right people;
and that isn't the easiest thing to do, but we'll get
around to that all. Have any of the rest of you got anything
you want to raise at this next time? Bill, how long
would you be able to be here? Are you going to stay here
all night?
Jackson : No, sir.
Smith When are you coming back?
Jackson : I'm taking f-ten back.
Smith Four ten back?
Jackson : Yes, I have to see Kirk before I go.
Smith You have never been over this side of the picutre, have you?
Jackson I have, in its derivation and the work that's been done
on it, but I haven't seen the finished product in detail.
As a matter of fact, I would appreciate about three minutes
of comment If I might dare make it on one thing that I
think is important.
Smith Will you have lunch with me?
Jackson If you want me to, yes, sir.
Smith
his arrival.
"'I
Well
I'll
tell
you wirt I thought you might do -- I thought
you
might
come
out to the house and have lunch with me, then
run
on out
and
see Kirk, and you won't want to spend more
than
10 or
15
minutes -- then come on back here, and have
the
chaps
who
worked this thing out give you a little personal
go-around,
and
then we can have a few minutes' talk before
Jackson : That will be fine. My point that I'd like to bring out
in your presence and in the presence of these people is
simply .....
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Smith Come in. Was that somebody knocking?
Jackson : Is this one point that I think since you've been down here,
the reorganization of intelligence parts of the Agency has
been a real contribution, and that the CIA, as such, can
command general respect, based primarily on,,,whereas prior
to this, there was some question.
Jackson : Here is a point I want to make. Under your direction, I
went through almost every part of the Agency, with exception
of Central Administration and Security. I got to the OPC
last. That was where all the criticism was directed, that
was where all the morale ---- I went through that, and
concluded that the people in there were just as good as the
people in any other part of the Agency.
Smith Oh, there're good, yes.
Jackson : Administratively and otherwise. Now, you've got together
under Frank as good people as you could possibly get. This
is as encouraging a meeting as I have seen. The only thing
I wanted to bring out is above that chart there, the
Psychological Strategy Board, the NSC, the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of State, and finally the President--
in conducting a cold war, I don't believe there will ever
be, certainty in it no matter how good you've gotten it.
It is going to be this thing one day and that thing the next
day, so that you can be almost too self critical in what
you do in that field, because a hundred men get all set to
do something, and then they are cancelled. That isn't done
by us, that's done away up at the top, so that the switchers
of policy up there have a real switch at the bottom here
so that all these guys doing this thing with -- and Ted
will find that out, you can never do it as precisely and
efficiently as you could some other kind of operation, and
every guy working in there ought to know this project may
be canceled tomorrow. It'll be damned disappointing he
usually'll think the whole game is wrong, but that's just
an inevitable part of cold war.
I've never seen anybody who has improved his reputation in
cold war work, and that's going to go for you, too, Ted.
Not anybody that I've seen has increased his stature in
cold war, because, by God, there isn't any way to do it.
(Gen. Smith was interjecting noises of agreement here)
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Smith Frank and the rest of them came back from this
discussion the other day with their chins hanging down
below their navels and feeling terribly bad about it.
Well, of course, we feel bad about a thing being called off
like that. But there is nothing personal about it. You
may have an attack called off any time. When you are all
keyed up and everybody's worked up to the point of just
rushing over and raising hell.
Jackson It's particularly true with cold war. You've got no fair
objectives at all, and that makes everybody feel he's a
bad administrator, makes everybody feel that you have to
worry about the morale. I have had these kids indirectly
come to me and complain to beat hell about OPC. They'd
left someplace, come down here, been trained for God knows
how long, and then all of a sudden sit here for another
three months and do not a damn thing.
Smith And then, they finally, they produce a brainchild which
they think is perfectly wonderful, it gets up to a certain
point and somebody throws it back at them and says "Balls"
then they are broken hearted.
Jackson Yes, but, that's just inherent in it, even with this greatly
improved organization; you're still going to meet it. That
was my whole point.
Smith I remember that when we were operating in0 we planned 25X1
11 large airborne operations and each time the progress of
military events or the additional distribution of assets
canceled them out, one right after the other, right after
the other, right after the other.
Jackson : Somebody down below your level often thought you were crazy.
Smith Yesf, they though"Why the hell don't they make up their
mind?"
Shannon : I had to do that in Personnel.
Jackson : But, you're going to find that, Ted, that a thing won't
come off administratively the way you'd like to see it.
Shannon : I don't expect it to.
Smith Well, now, come on up and have a bite with me; and then I'll
send you out to Kirk, and, let's see . . . .
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Jackson : Kirk has his baths at one, so I'll have to get there when
he gets back from that; I'll work that out.
Smith What time does he.... Well, do you want to come down here
right after we have lunch and have a talk with these chaps
a little bit.
Jackson : Maybe I'd better do that.
Smith All right. And you can be down here by 1:30.
Jackson : I can be down here whenever you want me.
Smith Well, we'll come back right after lunch.
Wisner If you do have a bit of staff time, I'd like to suggest that
Bill take a walk into the room where Admiral Kirk and the
rest of us are going over this....
What time are you meeting?
This ( ) paper of yours.
Wisner That's about 2:30, sir.
Smith Well, I'll get him down here right after lunch.
Jackson : May I check in with you when I get back ( ), sir?
Smith We haven't got an extra copy of that, have we?
Wisner I have a copy right here.
Smith Is that an extra copy?
Wisner It's the only copy I have.
Jackson : Well, I can get at that when I get back.
Smith You better keep it here. He can see it later on.
All right, I thank you very much.
Chorus Yes, sir, thank you.
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