NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 17 MAY 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000300010041-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: May 17, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of ~~~
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
17 May 1980
T.. C,. ~4
Copy r, ~ ,,
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Situation Reports
USSR-Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
Briefs and Comments
EC: Foreign Ministers' Meeting. . . . . . . . . . . .
4
Japan: No-Confidence Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
south xorea: Opposition Protest . . .
Jordan-Iraq: Improved Relations . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
El Salvador: Dilemma for Christian Democrats. . . . . .
9
China-Afghanistan: Revised PoZiczU . . . . . . . . . .
10
Turkey: Presidential Election . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Netherlands: Defense Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
Nepal: Referendwn Results . . . . . . . . . . .
12
Special Analysis
Cuba: Anti-US Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
17 May 1980
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e--.
KilomeUrs
"Peshawar ~~~ ISLAMABAD
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rea of Soviet( ~~\
air intrusion l1
Paldilstan
:Boundary representation is
not necessarilLauthoritative
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The US Consul in Peshawar estimates that there have
been about 100 Afghan or Soviet violations of Pakistani
airspace. Last week, four helicopters dropped bombs
in a border area where easily identifiable ground fea-
tures make navigational error unlikely.
Meanwhile, the Pakistanis seem to be relaxing re-
strictions on insurgent activity. This week, they per-
mitted an assembly of representatives from every section
of Afghanistan to meet in Peshawar. The assembly elected
a revolutionary council that could evolve into a govP?YT]-
ment and pledged full-scale war against the Soviets.
25X1
25X1
17 May 1980
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u s. s. R.
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The government has made ZittZe progress in repaininq control
of Kurdish-populated areas of the north est.
Clashes between dissident Kurds and government forces
continue despite President Bani-Sadr's announced accept-
ance earlier this week of an amended version of the latest
Kurdish autonomy proposal.
Ayatollah Khomeini yesterday urged the military to
purge the Kurdish region of "infidels" and made no men-
tion of any conciliatory gestures to the Kurds. (U)
17 May 1980
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Political Developments
A date for the opening of the National Assembly has
still not been set, but press reports indicate the legis-
lators may meet in Qom on 28 May. The inquiry commission
to investigate charges of fraud in the first round of
elections confirmed the winners in all but three con-
tests--another victory for the hardline Islamic Republic
Party over Bani-Sadr.
New Soviet Transshipment Area
a major new rail
transs ipment yar is under construction at Astara in the
USSR just north of the Iranian border. The new yard
probably will be operational late this year. It will in-
crease capacity at this key transshipment point by about
30 percent and allow the Soviets to expedite the movement
of goods into Iran. Expansion of the transshipment fa-
cilities at Dzhulfa, the other major border crossing
point, is continuing and will enlarge capacity there by
about 25 percent. Iran's economic and political difficul-
ties are likely to restrict its acceptance of cargoes,
however, and ~ ,m, t the advant-ac~PG of these expanded fa-
17 May 1980
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EC; Foreign Ministers' Meeting
In what promises to be an arduous meeting, EC Foreign Ministers
in Naples this weekend will attempt to reach consensus on Iranian
sanctions, the UK net contribution dispute, a Middle East initia-
tive, and the EC's Afghan neutrality praposaZ.
The Ministers almost certainly will produce a sanc-
tions package weaker than the draft UN resolution of
10 January. EC legal experts on Tuesday recommended a
ban on trade, new loans, and some new service contracts,
but not on existing contracts whose cancellation would
harm member states more than Iran.
While the experts' report specifically defines ex-
emption criteria, the Ministers may be less precise in
defining which contracts can be exempted. Italy, France,
and to a lesser extent the UK and West Germany, oppose
complete cancellation of existing contracts.
The Foreign Ministers probably will not agree on
the amount and duration of a refund of the gap between
the UK's EC payments and receipts, $2.5 billion this
year. Although EC members pledged to reach agreement by
the end of the month, no new proposals have been ad-
vanced since British Prime Minister Thatcher refused all
offers at the recent Luxembourg summit.
Another failure to solve the budget dispute could
sour the atmosphere for subsequent agenda items. Bonn
has indicated that the Foreign Ministers will attempt
to lay the groundwork for an EC initiative on the Middle
East that would incorporate the concept of Palestinian
self-determination. The details would be approved by
the heads of ctovernment at the EC summit in Venice in
June.
Regarding Afghanistan, the Foreign Ministers also
will discuss ways to revitalize the EC's flagging neutral-
ity initiative. Member states in the past few weeks have
voiced concern that the issue of the US hostages in Iran
has obscured the more important Afghanistan situation.
17 May 1980
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The unexpected passage of the no-confidence resolution in the
Japanese Diet z~esterdaz~ was the product of a continuing intra-
partz~ struggle among the ruling Liberal Democrats; substantive
poZicz~ issues such as defense spending and relations with the US
were not a factor.
The opposition Japan Socialist Party, which sponsored
the resolution in an attempt to embarrass the ruling party
before the upper house elections late next month, did
not expect the measure to pass. Liberal Democrat factions
led by former Prime Ministers Miki and Fukuda, however,
saw an opportunity to challenge Prime Minister Ohira
again. When the measure came to a vote, some 70 members
of the two factions decided on a boycott, resulting in
overwhelming approval of the no-confidence measure.
Ohira plans to call for dissolution of the lower
house in the next few days and for a general election late
next month. In the interim, Ohira and his cabinet will
function as a provisional government. The Prime Minister
evidently is determined to remain in power, but he faces a
severe challenge, given the magnitude of the division in
the ruling party.
In the coming weeks Ohira will be preoccupied with
restoring enough cooperation in the party to wage cam-
paigns for two critical and probably simultaneous elec-
tions in the lower and upper houses, where it has only
bare majorities. While the current intraparty struggle,
which is rooted in strong personal antagonisms among the
party elders, may eventually provoke a split, political
and financial pressures could hold the Liberal Democrats
together during the campaign.
As a caretaker Prime Minister in a tenuous position,
Ohira will avoid any risky policy initiatives, but he
also can be expected to maintain the broad outlines of
Tokyo's current foreign policy.
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SOUTH KOREA: Opposition Protest
Most street demonstrations were suspended early yesterday
as students awaited the government's response to their demands.
The death of one policeman and the lack of public
support for the demonstrations apparently have cooled
the enthusiasm of the moderate students who form the bulk
of the protestors.
T e mo erates may a so re-
sume off-campus demonstrations if they think the govern-
ment response to their demands is unsatisfactory. Presi-
dent Choi Kyu Hah, who returned to Seoul last night, is
rumored to be planning an announcement on the government's
intentions within the next few days.
The military claims to have proof that supporters
of dissident leader Kim Dae Jung, presumably acting
with his tacit approval, have been prompting the students.
The two rival opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam
and Kim Dae Jung, in a surprise move have joined to
issue a statement demanding the lifting of martial law
and the resignations of Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwack
and KCIA Director Chon Doo Hwan. Kim Young Sam's
agreement to cooperate with his more militant rival
stems from a desire to gain at least some political
benefit from the relatively restrained student demon-
strations that both hope will force at least some con-
cessions from the government.
17 May 1980
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JORDAN-IRAQ: Improved Relations
King Hussein's visit to Iraq today highlights the increasingly
close relations and growing economic and military cooperation
betz~een Hussein's moderate regime and Iraq's ruling Baathists.
The King's visit is intended to further solidify
these ties and to demonstrate his support for Iraq in
its conflict with Iran. Hussein is concerned that the
Iranian-Iraqi feud will aggravate existing divisions among
the Arabs, hindering development of a consensus on the
next steps in the peace negotiating process with Israel--
a key Jordanian goal.
The Iraqis, who are pushing hard for Arab leader-
ship, have welcomed the opportunity to improve relations
with moderate Arab states. Their interest in a rap-
prochement with Jordan in particular took on added impetus
after Iraq's falling out with Syria last year.
Iraq also sees practical advantages in aiding Jordan.
Helping the Jordanians to develop their port at Al Agabah
and to improve road links with Iraq, for example, could
relieve heavy con estion at Al Basrah, Traq's main com-
mercial port. Toti Secret
17 May 1980
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The decision by the G`hristian Democratic hierarchy to remain
in the government--despite. the release this meek of rightist
plotters the party had publicly demanded be punished--is not ZikeZy
to prevent defection by party members from the administration.
political realities have forced
the party to back off at least temporarily from its threat
to quit the government. The party believes that for now
its only chance to build popular support is to remain in
the government and support the reform programs. With no
political middle ground in El Salvador, the Christian
Democrats could suffer substantial losses to the insur-
ctent-led coalition if they leave the government.
Both the Christian Democrats and progressive junta
member Colonel Majano, who ordered last week's arrest of
the conspirators, seriously underestimated the power of
conservative elements in the armed forces. The party,
especially, has suffered a humiliating public defeat.
It is pursuing legal efforts to repeal the military in-
vesticrator's decision to free the plotters
The freeing of the conspirators, the failure to re-
move any leading rightwing security official, and the un-
abated violence will increase the impression that the
government is tilting to the right or at least is unable
to discipline rightwing security officials. The Christian
Democrats faced substantial pressures from party members
before this latest incident, and these will now increase.
Even naming Christian Democratic leader Duarte president
of the junta--still possible in the near future--will
not be enough to prevent defections unless he should
quickly achieve effective control over the military.
17 May 1980
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CHINA-AFGHANISTAN: Revised Policy
China has slightly softened its position on the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan by publicly stating that
it would be willing to see Moscow withdraw its troops
"step-by-step" over a period of six months to a year,
provided that this leads to a complete withdrawal of
Soviet troops. Beijing previously had insisted on a
prompt and total Soviet pullout. This adjustment in an
otherwise firm policy is more in harmony with various
formulas calling for a negotiated settlement of the
crisis being discussed in South Asia and the West.
After eight weeks and 75 parliamentary ballots,
Turkey appears no closer to naming a replacement for
President Koruturk, whose term expired on 6 April. The
withdrawal on Thursday of the opposition Republican
People's Party candidate leaves the ruling Justice Party's
Saadettin Bilgic as the sole official candidate, but he
remains too controversial to be elected. The political
dallying has prevented consideration of major domestic
legislation, and both the public and the military are
expressing frustration with the politicians. Unless a
compromise candidate is named by early June when five
new presidentially appointed senators must be named, the
issue could turn into a political crisis inviting the
military's involvement. General Staff Chief Evren's
statement on Tuesday that it is "high time" for a
resolution of the situation is a sign that the military's
patience is indeed wearing thin.
17 May 1980
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Sweden
`~~:
,t^.
Baltic Sea ,
Liepaja
44'
Caspian ~ ~~,
Turkey
`~~ Sea
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NETHERLANDS: Defense Spending
The Dutch Government's decision this week partially
tc restore proposed defense spending cuts in 1980 prob-
ably does not increase chances that defense spending in
1980 or 1981 will reach NATO's 3-percent goal. When the
budget for 1980 was passed last fall, defense spending
was to be increased by nearly 3 percent, in line with
the Van Agt government's NATO commitment. Economic prob-
lems caused the government to cut expenditures across
the board, however, and defense was slated to be reduced
by $125-150 million, thus setting a precedent for future
budgets and ultimately threatening the Dutch commitment
to NATO's long-term defense prograrn.
The government should have enough votes to win par-
liamentary approval soon for plans to restore more than
half of these cuts, but plans to restore the rest of the
cuts in August will face more serious opposition. More-
over, if the cabinet asks at that time for a full 3-
percent increase in next year's defense spending it would
reinvigorate the coalition that led the successful fight
against Dutch participation in NATO's theater nuclear
force modernization and feed growing sentiment for a
more neutral defense posture. The emergence of strong
opposition, coming on top of other problems expected with
the budget, could force the government to resign.
17 May 1980
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In a personal victory for King Birendra, Nepalese
voters have elected to retain the country's partyless
political system rather than adopt a multiparty system.
The partyless option, which gained 54 percent of the
vote in the referendum held earlier this month, will
give the King greater control of the liberalization
process he has started, but the strong multiparty show-
ing indicates that pressure to liberalize the government
faster than the King would like may continue. The multi-
party camp's leading politician, former Prime Minister
Koirala, seems ready to work constructively within the
new political system. Others, however, are claiming that
the vote was rigged.
17 May 1980
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Key West
4'
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i
r?~~ "~'' ~ HAVANA \~,.,
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J. Via..
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Cayman Islands
(U. K.)
,_ ~\
L__...
Guantanamo Bay
U.S. Naval Base
0 200
Kilometers
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CUBA: Anti-US Campaign
Fidel Castro's anti-US campaign probably will climax today in
demonstrations throughout Cuba involving as many as 5 million people,
half the country's population. The focal points for the marches
will be the US Interests Section in Havana and the US Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay. Some potential for violence exists, but the govern-
ment has made preparations similar to those taken before the orderly
march past the Peruvian Embassy on 19 April, indicating that the
authorities ~aiZZ again exercise tight control over the demonstrators.
We believe that after this Weekend the Castro regime z~iZZ begin to
return the island to normal economic activity. Anti-US rhetoric
will probably lessen temporarily. Castro still, however, will have
to face tougher domestic problems and noZiey choices than he has
confronted in recent years.
Pressures on the Regime
The current campaign against Washington and the
continuation of the refugee exodus at Mariel are responses
to economic, social, and political pressures that have
been building since 1977.
The Cuban economy has stagnated, and the already
austere standard of living has deteriorated
even further.
A rapidly expanding labor force has created a
labor surplus, and a large number of recently
graduated Cuban youths have been unable to
obtain jobs.
The visits by obviously prosperous exiles living
in the US, which brought badly needed hard
currency, have further damaged morale.
The incidence of crime, of poor job performance,
and of political discontent and minor acts of
dissidence were on the increase.
17 May 19 0
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Castro has also become worried by what he sees as a
growing US hostility toward Cuba and the USSR. He is
particularly concerned by stories in the US media suggest-
ing retaliation against Cuba as an appropriate response
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He interprets the
creation of a Caribbean Naval Command and the stationing
of US fighter aircraft at Key West as signs that the US
now may be more willing to use military force against him.
Castro has responded by applying tactics he has used
successfully in the past. He has decided to rid the island
of several hundred thousand undesirables to relieve eco-
nomic and social problems. He has mounted a massive prop-
aganda campaign against the US and against the departing
refugees to provide scapegoats for the government's
nomic failures and to revitalize popular support.
Castro has succeeded in alleviating the pressures on
his regime only temporarily. His actions have helped to
solidify his popular support and to revitalize flagging
revolutionary fervor, but the departure of several hun-
dred thousand persons will bring only limited economic
benefits. The nation's basic economic problems are not
being addressed and will continue to cause trouble for
Castro in the political sphere.
Castro may believe that he has achieved as much as
possible in terms of rechanneling discontent and apathy,
and that continuation of the turmoil would be counter-
productive. Continued disruption would further damage
economic production as well as Cuba's international image.
The ability of the government to implement its recent
.order to terminate violence against would-be refugees
and to control today's anti-US demonstrations will be an
important indicator of the regime's control over the
passions it has incited.
Cuba's mounting problems have caused Castro to turn
to hardliners in his regime for policy advice. The ap-
pointment of Ramiro Valdes as Minister of Interior last
December symbolized the ascendancy of a group that is far
more passionate and unreasoning than Castro in its antip-
athy toward the US.
1 May 1980
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Over the longer term, the hardliners' predominance
will probably lead to greater political repression to
counter any apathy or ideological deviation. This could
polarize the Cuban political system. Abroad, the hard-
liners are likely to be more willing to support revolu-
tionary movements and to resort to confrontation policies
when dealing with the US and other governments.
ay 1 0
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i op aecret
Top Secret
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