THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA FIFTH SESSION, NEW YORK, NEW YORK AUGUST 2 - SEPTEMBER 17, 1976

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• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2001
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• Publication Date: September 20, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Fifth Session, New' York, New York
August 2 September 17, 1976
REPORTS OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
ON THE WORK OF THE SESSION
(PART IV WILL BE REPRODUCED AS SOON AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE)
State Dept. review completed
Reproduced by
Office of the Law of the
Sea Negotiations
Department of State
Washington, D.C.
September 20, 1976
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UNITED NATIONS
THIRD CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Distr.
LIMITED
A/CONF.62/L.16
16 September 1976
ORIGINAL ENGLISH
REPORT BY P-IR. PAUL BAMELA ENGO, CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON
THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE AT THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE
I wish to apologize for the length, not the content, of this report. The
motivation is to speak frankly and to express views that I believe could help the
Conference in general and the First Committee in particular in future negotiations.
The two preceding sessions of the Conferehce, held in Geneva and New York
respectively, called for the preparation of unique documents which were to form the
basis for negotiations. The Single Negotiating Text 1/ that I submitted at the end
of the Geneva session in 1975 contained ideas drawn from my personal impressions of
what could provide a consensus, bearing in mind the nature and historic
significance of the mandate of the Conference in general and the First Committee in
particular. I was compelled in some instances to look outside and beyond the
unproductive debates that had dominated that session, especially considering the
climate of distrust and acrimony between opposing sides. As I explained in the
introduction to that text, I worked in the light of the provisions cont, .ined in the
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction, 2/ adopted without discussion by the United Nations
General Assembly on 17 December 1970. Also of considerable importance for me was
another international document commanding wide universal support: the
"Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" adopted
by the General Assembly on 1 May 1974 at its sixth special session. I could do this
because I had a free hand.
During the last session of the Conference held in New York, a new mandate was
given by the Conference by which I was to revise the Single Negotiating Text in the
r 1/ Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, vol IV United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.V.10 . Document
A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part I.
2/ General Assembly resolution 2749 (Xxv).
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light of the ideas and debates which occurred during the negotiations. I was thus
bound by a new duty to produce another negotiating text reflective of the discourse
in the Committee. The Revised Single Negotiating Text 3/ was the result.
From that account, it is clear that,, in spite of the intensive consultations
carried out before their production, the two negotiating texts were, in.the final
analysis, the product and responsibility of one man, the Chairman of the Committee.
As a first reaction, they were branded as everything from unbalanced to the worst
basis for negotiations. Yet, after serious debates between opposing sides, I am
reassured to find that each text has served the crucial purpose intended. They
indeed did expose issues in concrete terms.
If the exchange of views this session can appropriately be characterized, it
can hardly be disputed that they were conditioned by the clear knowledge of the
nature and content of the issues which stand between us and the adoption of a
universally acceptable Convention. It is not the Revised Negotiating Text that is
an issue. The argument whether or not it or its predecessor is a good basis for
negotiation responds only to subjectivity. A provision not in tune with one's
cherished position risks condemnation as a bad.basis. What must concern us at this
juncture are issues which still divide us. I shall turn to this aspect later. I
wish merely to state at this stage that the various observations and appeals which
I made in the First Committee, the General Committee and the Plenary remain valid.
Organization of work
With regard to the organization of our work, the details have appeared in
various Committee documents. I shall therefore scan through it merely. to place this
report in a chronological sequence.
The First Committee held 13 formal meetings during this session. Most of the
Committee's time was spent in informal meetings, either in the Workshop set up by
the Committee, or in the ad hoc group created by the Workshop to conduct
negotiations on the system of exploitation of the international sea-bed area. Both
were under the co-chairmanship of Dr. Jagota of India and Mr. Sondaal of the
Netherlands. The Workshop held 13 meetings, the ad hoc negotiating group 12. One
informal meeting was also held in an effort to consult the committee members on an
advice sought of me by the President of the Conference relating to the procedures
for dealing with the dispute settlement system at the level of the Plenary.
Interestingly enough we struck our first consensus. Whenever there was time
available, regional and interest groups made good use of the opportunity to pursue
their work on First Committee matters.
The Workshop was created at the 2nd meeting of the session following
consultations held by the three Vice-Chairmen of the Committee. It determined its
own method of work and established the order in which it would consider two chosen
3/ Official Records of the Third United Nations conference on the Law of the
Sea, vol. V (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.V.8). Document
A/CONF.62/WP.B/Part I/Rev.l.
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sets of issues. Unfortunately, some delegations were prepared for detailed
negotiations on one of the two issues chosen and not on the other. Time had
consequently to be allocated to the regional and interest groups to get themselves
prepared for both. Work finally commenced in earnest with the system of
exploitation on 18 August 1976.
Five meetings of the Workshop were spent on discussing the various aspects of
the system of exploitation, particularly those arising from the three Workshop
papers submitted. On 26 August, the Workshop decided to create a more informal
ad hoc group for negotiations. That group was. open to all delegations but had a
central membership of 26, that composition being unique to the group.
A reporting mechanism was established between the Workshop and the Committee
and the ad hoc group and the Workshop. The results of the Workshop were set forth
in weekly reports by the Co-Chairmen (A/CONF.62/C.1/WR.l to 5); the activities of
the ad hoc group were reported orally to the Workshop by the Co-Chairmen after
approximately each four meetings. The final Workshop report of the Co-Chairmen
contains the main elements of discussions in the ad hoc group also. This was done
in order to give a more comprehensive account of the work done on the system of
exploitation, particularly article 22 of part 1 and related paragraphs 7 and 8 of
annex 1.
The various terms of reference, including the central membership of the ad hoc
group are to be found in the Workshop reports and in the report of the Rapporteur
(A/CONF.62/C.1/L.18).
The last four meetings of the Committee which followed the presentation of the
final report of the Co-Chairmen were devoted to an appraisal of the work of the
session by delegations, including the procedures adopted. It also included
consideration of the approach which should be taken at the next session.
The exchange of views was very useful and it is my hope that the respective
comments will be studied by all concerned. It became clear also that the Bureau
will have to play its traditional role of ensuring early and speedy negotiations by
all delegations at the next session. Delegations will for their part spend all
the time available negotiating and not dissipate energies on time-consuming
procedural questions.
Negotiation of issues
The final report of the Co-Chairmen 4/ presented on their behalf by
Mr. Sondaal of the Netherlands is comprehensive and contains a valuable assessment
of the current situation. I consider the latter to be of extremely great
importance.
It would clearly be less than candid to describe this as one of our more
productive sessions. It is true, of course, that the Group of 77 reformulated its
4/ See A/CONF.62/C.l/WR.5 and Corr.1 and Add.l.
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position on the system of exploitation, specifically article 22 and certain
important provisions of annex I, in an attempt to meet some of the expressed
concerns of the industrialized countries. Other drafts were produced by the
Soviet Union and by the United States which were helpful in the negotiation process
adopted by the Committee. But regrettably, it seems to me that the discussion at
all levels of the Committee's activities tended, in spite of all efforts by most
delegations, to cover old ground and failed to produce any new approaches that might
help resolve the problems at the centre of our work.
I am not above owing that I am deeply gratified at the spirit of co-operation
and understanding that continued to prevail in the Committee despite periods of
disappointment, frustration, even of despair that frequently threatened our work.
That the members of the First Committee were able to transcend these passing phases
and maintain the quality of their work calls for warm tribute to their patience and
dedication.
If it was regrettable that the First Committee failed at this session to make
spectacular gains, it was nevertheless entirely understandable and, if I may say
so, both foreseeable and foreseen. From my vantage point in the Committee, it has
been relatively clear for a long time what our several methods of work were
attempting to accomplish: viz. to place on one side the possible differences in
philosophical approach, and address ourselves in a pragmatic way to how a system of
exploitation might actually function to the satisfaction of all States concerned.
By examining the practical details of a system of exploitation, it was thought we
might be able to achieve substantial areas of agreement, and succeed in isolating
and eventually narrowing areas of disagreement. This was what inspired the work of
the Committee and its various levels at Caracas, and since then in Geneva and in
New York.
I am convinced that we have progressed as far as we possibly can down that
particular road. Marking the end of this phase of the work, and acting in
accordance with the mandate given to me by the Committee and by the Conference as a
whole, I put out at the end of the last session a revised version of the Single
Negotiating Text which, on the basis of my-extensive consultations, I believed -
and continue to believe - might offer to all a satisfactory basis for discussion in
their search for a compromise acceptable to all. As I have often emphasized, its
objective was to suggest a possible direction toward a compromise, or at the very
least to expose problems in concrete form to induce fruitful negotiation. I am
gratified to note that such drafting as has been done at this session has taken
into account, and, to a not-insignificant extent has incorporated ideas from that
revised text.
Now despite these efforts at new drafts and the leadership shown under
difficult and sometimes impossible circumstances, by the Co-Chairmen of the
Workshop, we are faced with a problem of the first magnitude, a problem, in fact,
that liesaat the-.heart of our negotiation. It was a long, highly instructive and
even necessary road we travelled these years since Caracas and indeed unknowingly
continued to travel at this session. We all have to realize now that that journey
is over and that we have arrived at the core of our problem. Like conscientious
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and methodical workmen we have slowly but surely cleared away subsidiary issues and
questions, cleared away, I say, in the sense of having considered and discussed. them
to an advanced stage of rsturity, and greatly improved our own awareness of their
f~ill implications. This lone gestation period, as it were, has had a great
equalizing effect in that many of the delegates from the smaller technologically
less-advanced countries have now acquired a certain level of familiarity with our
complex subject, the better to represent their views in dealing with those who,
might approach things differently.
Having completed this initial phase, dealing vigorously and courageously with
a wide variety of legal, technical and economic problems we have now come to
confront the central and most difficult problem of all and it is this: should the
new system of exploitation provide for a guaranteed permanent role in sea-bed
mineral exploitation for States Parties and private firms? Or should such a role
for States Parties and private firms be considered only at the option of and subject
to conditions negotiated by the Authority? Or again, should their role be conceived
of as essentially temporary, to be phased out over a defined period agreed to
beforehand?
This then, to my mind, is the single most important decision that faces us in
the First Committee, and I dare say, in the Conference as a whole. We have
deliberately travelled the road that has led to this point. We have now reached
our valley of decision. We can proceed no further without a positive
manifestation of political will that will enable us to adopt with confidence one or
other of the three basic approaches that have been suggested during the Conference.
With regard to these, there appears to be no indication that the proponents of any
will accept the others. We thus find ourselves in an impasse. There is little
hope, I fear, that human ingenuity can find a way around. It can only be resolved
through a change in the positions and attitudes that go to create this situation.
This is the plain truth, as I see it. As Chairman, I would be failing in my duty
if I did not urge my friends and colleagues, who have worked so hard, to treat this
moment with proper solemnity, to reflect upon it, and to act then with purpose.
But if we cannot find a solution to this our central problem it may well be that no
progress will be possible in the First Committee or even in the Conference as a
whole.
During this session of the Conference some dramatic proposals were made public
outside the forum of this Committee, for a substantial input into our endeavours,
provided the system of exploitation eventually agreed upon was acceptable to the
Government concerned. The United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger,
declared that his Government would be prepared to agree to a means of financing
the Enterprise in such a manner that it could begin its mining operations either
concurrently with the mining of State or private enterprises or within an agreed
time span that was practically concurrent, and further that the United States would
be prepared to include in the treaty agreed provisions for the transfer of
technology so that the existing advantage of certain industrial States would be
equalized over a period of time. I do not think that anyone could fail to agree
that these indications on the part of the United States, an active member of one of
the major interest groups involved in the negotiation (the industrialized Powers)
have been extremely helpful, although it could be more helpful still when greater
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details are known. It deserves the most serious consideration. It was noted
however that the proposal comes with a clear condition that it would have relevance
only in the event that the type of system which certain of the industrialized
countries are prepared to accept, i.e. a system where it would be guaranteed that
the Enterprise would operate side by side and in parallel with States and private
firms on a permanent basis, were to gain general acceptance. Nevertheless it could
be an important element in the choices that we shall have soon to make.
Nigeria's distinguished Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice,
Mr. Justice Dan Ibekwe, similarly proposed what he considered to be "the area of
least resistance". He suggested in effect a joint venture system applying to all
activities of exploration and exploitation in the Area; this, he argued, would avoid
the problem of the types of relationships proposed between the Authority on the one
hand and States and private parties on the other.
Mr. Kissinger also spoke of establishing a periodic review conference at
intervals of, say, 25 years. This thought is also helpful in its attempt to find a
way of allaying the fears of a permanent imposition on the international community
of a system of exploitation that might prove to be unsuitable in the earlier years
of its existence. This is a politico-technical question which politicians must
decide on with guidance from technologists or miners. There could be consequences
deriving from the lifetime and availability of the valuable mine sites. One
implication of this idea is that, should there be no agreement on a new system of
exploitation at the end of the review period, the same "parallel" system would
continue. However, it is important that a major force among the industrialized
countries is prepared, in certain circumstances, to think in terms of an initial
period, after which another system of exploitation might, if agreed, be brought into
operation. In my opinion, very interesting possibilities for resolving our
difficulties could be in that direction provided that no serious consequences are
involved. The developing countries, which have shown a willingness to examine new
ideas will undoubtedly wish to ponder on this one, as well as its implications. At
the same time, consideration should be given to measures which would also allow the
Enterprise to play a significant role in the exploration and exploitation of the
area in those earlier years.
Intimately connected with any system of exploitation we choose is the matter
of making the Enterprise a reality, of making it operational and competitive; for
many, it is also a question of shaping it in such a way that it will be able to
assume the function of sole explorer and exploiter of sea-bed resources.
Mr. Kissinger's indications on this matter contemplate the Enterprise in a
particular setting - a setting in which it would operate in parallel with State and
private enterprises on a permanent basis. It is possible of course that our
deliberations could end differently and that the Enterprise would emerge in a
different and potentially dominant role. I think we should direct our thinking to
methods of structuring, funding and generally equipping the Enterprise to build
technological capabilities and managerial skills, independent of the particular
system contemplated. The Enterprise, mankind's business arm, must be viable. It
cannot, and must not, depend purely on the benevolence of willing States alone.
Financing should be on a proportionate and co-operative basis to the extent
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possible, and should aim at making it self-financing in the shortest possible time.
The Secretariat has, at the request of the Committee at this session, provided us
with a valuable paper on this subject which will facilitate the decisions we shall
have to take.
It is not my intention to survey at this time the entire range of issues before
the First Committee,. but rather to place before you squarely those which are of
current and critical importance. I wish to emphasize that the one central,
critical issue which must be solved without delay is that of the system of
exploitation. I will not repeat it, or seek to characterize or evaluate the
systems we have discussed. And indeed there may be others that the delegations
might wish to devise. But unless they decide, actually decide, upon the basic
approach to exploitation, upon the role of States and private firms in relation to
the Authority's functions, we cannot move forward.
In this connexion I propose that the time between now and the next session of
our Conference be used to ascertain the precise limits to which Governments will go
on this one single question. No other needs engage us. Just this one question
must preoccupy all our attentions before we meet again. I propose that there be an
informal agreement now that we take a decision oft this matter one way or another by
the end of the first week or two of the First Committee's work at the next session.
We dealt with the first of our important political questions - the rules of
procedure - in co-operation with the Presidenttof the Conference in a similar
manner. I ask then for co-operations with me in the First Committee in resolving
what may well be the most important question before our Conference - and for an
agreement now that we shall spend no more than one week or so in doing so. I urge
that there be the fullest consideration of this problem in the intervening period
and that delegates return ready to meet a situation in which a decision.on the
matter can and will be taken.
My sense of duty and my strong personal convictions about the crucial
importance of a successful and universally accepted Convention for the sea-bed
area for the very survival of man on this planet impels me to venture sharing
further with all delegations some of my thoughts on this subject. I have myself
constantly discouraged the mere intellectual exposition of the issues and
encouraged the examination of possible avenues to their solution. The impasse
which haunts our deliberations makes imperative the need to review the respective
policies of the different groups.
Several significant developments must be recognized and their role examined.
I am of the opinion that at the present session, as stated earlier, the real issues
were no longer treated with evasiveness or contempt. Different interest groups
have now unveiled their underlying concerns and have crystallized their positions.
In reassessing these positions a new solution might be found.
Only two years ago, the exploitation systems envisaged by the two major
interest groups were diametrically opposed: the developing countries could accept
only the Authority as sole operator in sea-bed mining, whereas the technologically
advanced group insisted on operations by private commercial entrepreneurs. At
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this session, the latter has accepted the Enterprise on an equal legal footing with
other entities. The former, while still insisting on the pre-eminent role of the
Enterprise, has accepted that other entities (including private companies) may
also participate in sea-bed mining in a form of association with the Authority.
This interest group nevertheless maintains that the Authority should have a say in
the creation, form and terms of the association. Clearly, both groups now accept
roles by both the Enterprise and private companies. The disagreement would
therefore seem to lie in their respective roles and it is here that the impasse
focuses.
With a view to finding a solution, it is worth while to re-examine the basic
objectives and underlying concerns of the major interest groups; The principal
objective of the industrialized countries which insist on access to resources,
appears to be to increase the availability of inexpensive raw materials and in turn
reduce the current dependence on foreign sources. These countries apparently feel
that only guaranteed access of their private or State companies to the sea-bed
resources can provide the efficiency of development and security of supply
necessary in order to achieve these goals. In addition, these countries also
anticipate so-called spin-off benefits as a result of any operations by domestic
industry. These countries hope that such benefits would include substantial
financial profit and broader stimulation of the domestic economy and perhaps the
maintenance of an acquired power through the continued sway of their economic and
technological might in a delicate, ill-balanced bipolar international system.
However, since the multinational corporations would presumably seek the most
favourable taxation in host countries, some spin-off benefits, particularly
financial, may elude the industrialized countries.
At the beginning of the Conference, sea-bed exploitation was seen primarily
for the benefit of the developed nations. The developing countries, standing
uncertainly at the cross-roads of a cruel history, had the almost complacent
objective of gaining some financial benefit, while simultaneously protecting the
few land-based producers from adverse effects on their export earnings. A strong
international Authority appeared the only hope and guarantee. Due to this apparent
attitude, the developed countries perceived that the Authority would be used by the
others to obstruct sea-bed mining. In response to this perception, they formulated
the policy to strip the sea-bed Authority of any real power. They recommended a
mere licensing system, which gave the industrialized nations a free hand and cash
"hand outs" to the developing countries.
Contrary to their initial reaction, developing countries increasingly
recognized their interest in cheap and reliable supplies of metals, in order to
facilitate their own national economic development. Consistent with these
interests, developing countries have seen that other means can be devised to
protect adequately the legitimate concerns of the land-based producers. The
principal objective of increased availability of raw materials, originally held
only by the developed countries, is now shared by the developing countries as well.
Thus, today, there is common interest in encouraging rapid and efficient sea-bed
mining.
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What divides the developing countries from the technologically advanced ones,
it would appear, is not so much the scope of the revolutionary concept of common
heritage, but the emphasis placed by the latter upon exploitation by State or
private companies. The developing countries fear that so long as these companies
have guaranteed access and alone possess the necessary finance and technology they
would dominate sea-bed mining in a monopolistic manner. This would deprive the
rest of the international community of any significant role in sea-bed mining. The
developing countries envisage the Enterprise as a suitable means for offsetting
such a monopolistic situation and for achieving this meaningful role. Yet,
technological, managerial, institutional and financial problems confronting the
Enterprise can clearly be seen from the recent note prepared by the Secretary-
General on the alternative means of financing the Enterprise (A/CONF.62/C.1/L.17).
The developing countries appear to be fully aware of these difficulties. As a
result, they hesitate to accept the proposition that the Enterprise should be
placed on a merely equal legal footing with private companies from the beginning,
since this would in fact place the Enterprise in an inferior position. The
majority of the developing countries believe that the Authority must have a role to
play and that in turn the Enterprise must be a copcrete and commercially viable
entity from the outset.
If what in fact divides the industrialized from the developing countries is the
means to achieve the common overriding objective of increasing the availability
of less costly raw materials deriving from the sea-bed, then this may be the last
opportunity to pose and answer the question of whether alternative means can be
devised to accomplish this goal. If a mechanism can be found to ensure the
accomplishment of this overriding objective, then it may be possible to break
through the present impasse. A number of preliminary thoughts might be advanced
to stimulate other ideas. For example, it might be helpful to stipulate in clear
and unequivocal terms in the Convention that exploitation should be conducted for
the explicit purpose of increasing the availability of raw materials. Although a
similar provision exists in article 9 of the Revised Single Negotiating Text, this
idea should be stated more prominently as the overriding goal and this principle
needs to be complemented by other substantive provisions to ensure its
implementation. Adequate measures would need to be devised and embodied in the
Convention to guarantee that this basic objective would be met. Specifically, the
Convention might stipulate provisions for calculating a time schedule of sea-bed
production whereby a determined volume of sea-bed production would be achieved. It
might also seem advisable to ensure that the metals produced from sea-bed mining
would be made available on the world market.
Once this mechanism has been clearly and indisputably established, many
outstanding fears - seemingly inherent in the strict policies of "guaranteed access"
or "full and effective control by the Authority" - would be allayed. For example,
resolution of the title to and control over the resources of a quota system, and of
the relationship between the decision-making organs of the Authority might come
within relatively easy reach. Needless to say, these problems comprise crucial
issues, some not yet even treated in the Committee and all unresolvable in any case
under the present circumstances.
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But once this is done it is my view that the respective roles of the
Enterprise and private entrepreneurs become clear and the role of both may then
be perceived as a means to further the common objective. Serious consideration
should be given to how private companies, possessing the necessary technological
and managerial skills, could be employed to strengthen the role of the Authority,
and to facilitate its rapid and successful commencement of commercial production.
In this manner, the proprietary interests and investments of these companies could
reasonably be protected while simultaneously meeting the concerns of the developing
countries mentioned above, all within the framework of accomplishing the
fundamental objective of helping supply the international community with the raw
materials it demands.
There is a widespread view in the Committee that the international community
needs a strong international Authority for the very reason that it will be the
instrument of all mankind. It is only with such an Authority that the revolutionary
ideas we are discussing can best or at all be effected. A viable operational arm
of the Authority, which is the Enterprise, is imperative if the strength of the
Authority is not to depend only on the uncertain benevolence of a single State or a
group of today's wealthier States. No one now ,seriously imagines that a consensus
can emerge without this foundation.
I am convinced that we shall spend decades in fruitless dialogue if we continue
to accept that the interests at this Conference may naively be classified into two:
those of the developed versus those of the developing countries. Neither group is
without a diversity of concrete interests, given the factor of uneven development
within. It is worse to maintain the posture of a confrontation between the few
industrialized countries on the one hand and the proposed Authority or "mankind"
on the other. Present-day so-called realities, political and economic; may well be
flattened or destroyed by the crushing wheels of history.
Both developed and developing countries have a common stake in peace through
co-operation and equitable development. The ravages of belligerency and of war are
far more expensive than the lasting benefits which the joint effort of all sectors
of humanity can produce from the new challenges of the oceans' wealth and
advancements in science and technology. The new Convention must ensure that
neither the minority nor the majority can predominate and more to the point it must
lay down a design for a new order of genuine co-operation among nations and peoples.
There is a common ground, as I have observed above, that the need exists for
increasing production of minerals to meet world demands. The Convention must
contain adequate provisions to ensure that whatever discretion rests with the
Authority, mankind as a corporate body will always exercise it in favour of this.
I feel that such provisions could allay any expressed fears of the industrialized
countries.
The Kissinger proposal, taken in its broad aspects, may well represent a
recognition of the need to strengthen the Authority's capacity through the
Enterprise and thus fulfil a crucial need to nourish a growing international
community. Instead of treating the access question as a pre-condition, I believe
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that it can best be regarded as an independent problem for those States which need
to maintain an industrial growth in order to sustain the standard of living of
their peoples.
I am not unaware that the resolution of this problem alone could produce a
Convention with which all sides can live. The real and final solution will lie in
a package. I have discussed the system of exploitation only because it preoccupied
the Committee this session, and, more importantly, because it lies at the delicate
centre of the major political decisions that we must of necessity take at our next
meeting.
We know enough about the processes and complexities of negotiations to realize
that one cannot expect a party involved in the process of bargaining to show his
whole hand at once or perhaps even be prepared to develop his propositions in all
detail. But I am bound to point out that, having as we now have after this session,
a much better understanding of what are the points at issue, we would be derelict
in our responsibility to the international community if on major points of
importance we are obliged to abandon negotiation because of lack of detailed
knowledge of each other's position.
There remains the question: where do we start from in this process of
negotiation? We must have a basis for discussion. What is it to be? The only
texts before us are part I of the Revised Single Negotiating Text and the various
texts circulated at this session both on the question of access and on the Council.
I do not see how, if we are to progress, we can abandon them as elements in our
discussion.
No doubt, we all recognize that even as a basis of discussion these documents
can be improved. I can see no reason why delegates should feel reluctant to offer
additional texts before the next session, modifying, adding to or amalgamating
those already in our possession. If such texts are the product of bilateral or
multilateral discussion amongst regional or interest groups that would be excellent.
It would even be better if they could be the product of discussions which embrace
groups of divergent or even conflicting interests.
Amongst some delegates here the expression "intercessional meeting" has come
almost to sound like a dirty word. I do not personally believe that a formal
meeting of the Committee will be desirable or productive before the next session.
I know also that for practical reasons not all delegates will be able, or will
want, to be involved in a virtual continuous process. But, as we know, some dirty
words describe some very necessary functions. And in our present situation the
maintenance of a level of awareness and of the exchange of ideas which has already
begun is essential. And because of this, I believe that it is best that we should
not formalize these exchanges but should let them take the course which, in the
spirit of my present address to you, the initiators think best. They will have in
mind that as sovereign States we are all equal and have a right to know and to be
consulted. At the same time, we will recognize amongst ourselves that there is a
natural variation in the degree of our interest and commitment; and that the spirit
of constructive realism which must control our activities henceforth cannot be
properly served if we fail to take this variation into account.
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The time has come for the Committee to make a radical departure from its
existing processes. At the heart of our problems lie a number of basic and highly
political questions that have to be answered before any actual drafting of a
compromise text can be undertaken in good faith, and these questions should be
answered at the highest political level.
First, I would ask whether delegations to this Conference are ready to accept
as a basic objective of the Authority the exploitation of sea-bed resources to
meet world demand? I have already given some examples of the kind of technical
measures that would be required to accomplish this objective. If you do not agree
that this is a basic objective, what is?
Secondly, are they ready to accept that the system of exploitation can consist
of different stages over a specific period of time, with a provision for a review
Conference? For example, can they agree on an initial. phase under special
provisions clearly defining the extent and conditions of a right of access, followed
by what might be the permanent system of exploitation. Again, I have already
indicated some possibilities in this respect.
Thirdly, and of equal importance, would they assign to the Authority, as
represented by the Enterprise, a true and meaningful role in the exploitation of
the Area, and how can this be achieved? There appears to be some consensus that the
Enterprise should be viable and must be able to carry out activities in the Area
as of the date the Authority decides that such activities should begin. And, of
course, this is where we must give special attention to the role of those entities
possessing the necessary technological capabilities and managerial skills which can
be employed to strengthen the role of the Authority and to facilitate the rapid and
successful commencement of commercial production.
Assuming that the basic elements of an agreement on the system of exploitation
emerge from this series of questions and answers, it will be possible to agree on
the other main components of the Convention including the respective compositions,
powers and functions of the Assembly and Council of the Authority, and the dispute
settlement system.
I feel it is my duty to impress upon the Conference that only with such
political decisions delivered under a time--limit can the Committee and the
Conference ever hope to complete its work. I can only ask - are delegations at
this Conference ready?
It is my wish and intention as Chairman of the First Committee to do all in
my power to give momentum to our activities. I will consult widely and I shall
seek stimulus and support in all quarters. I shall regard the conduct of the
Committee and of any working groups which it may form as my personal responsibility
and shall, in the discharge of that responsibility, seek to associate with those
who by their imagination, experience, skill and standing, will commend themselves
to you as instruments of our common design.
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We have all pledged our loyalty to a common cause - that of implementing the
Declaration of Principles governing the use of the Sea-bed. We cannot fail
ourselves and our commitment. We must rise above factions. We must avoid wrangles
about procedure. I have proposed a scheme which rests'upon some solid measure of
agreement. In the nature of things I cannot consult you all directly; but I appeal
to you now to join me in implementing this grand design for our next session.
In conclusion, I must emphasize that the ideas expressed here are intended to
advance our real work, and not to provoke new procedural debate. As Chairman, I
must state truths as I see them from the chair, in the hope each time that they will
be productive. For the rest, as I have said, only the dedication and co-operation
of delegations can respond to the supreme necessity for the achievement of success
and a consensus text for part I of the Convention.
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UNITED NATIONS
THIRD CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
1111,111T F,D
A/CONF.:2/C:.1./'R ? 5
9 September 1976
FIRST COM 4ITTEE
Final report by the Co-Chairmen on the activities
of the Workshop (9 Au use t to 8S tember 91 w
Qr ani-at ion of work
1. At its 26th meeting on 5 August 1976, the First Committee decided to establish
a Workshop in order to conduct its work in an informal ~cttznr. The torkshop iias
co-chaired by Dr. Jagota (India) and Mr. Sondaal (Netherlands). It held 13
meetings from 9 August to 8 September. The Co-ChVi.rmen prepared joint weekly
reports on the Workshop for submission to the Committee (AICO1NF.62/C.3./WR.1,
W.~,.2 and Corr.l, WR.3 and Corr.1, and WR.'+).
2. The Workshop commenced its diseussi&n with the system of exploitation of the
international sea-bed area, particularly article 22 and the related paragraphs in
annex I on the basic conditions of prospecting, exploration and exploitation.
3. At its meetings ca 18 aid 19 August, three papers on the system of
e.p loitstion Here presented and distsi.buted as Workshop Papers Nos. 1, 2 and 3.
Workshop Paper No. I contained t_x~ta on articles 22 nod 23 and on paragraphs 2, 7
end 8 /3 (a) new and 8 bisf of annex I. Workshop Paper N.D. 2 contained tarts on
article 22; Workshop Paper No. 3 contained texts on articles 22 and 23, and
related rare rapha 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of r-ainex I. In the subsequent diucussions,
not all of the subject-matter covered, in these papers was dealt with; the
discussion concentrated on article 22, paragraph 7 of annex I, and some aspects of
its paragraph 8.
4. On 26 August, the Workshop decided to undertake negotiations in a more
informal ad hoc group, open to all delegations, but having a central membership of
26 delegations (see A/C0X '.62/C.l/WR.3). The Philippines replaced Indonesia as a
member in the week of 6 September. The purpose of the ad hoc negotiating group was
to produce such results as could comm=rd a consensus on the syoi,em of exploitation.
5.1 The negotiating group held 12 meetings in all, the Co-Chairmen having
reported orally to the Workshop on the general progress of work in the group.
6. At its meeting held on 8 September, the Workshop decided not to take up the
question of the Assembly and Council in view of the shortage of time which would
not permit a meaningful discussion on the subject. Several delegates noted that
sufficient time should be allocated to this subject at the next session. It was
un.deTEitood that delegations might wish to circulate informally their suggestions
on this question. /...
76-97812
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P,aners presented to the Worksho-o
Wor. k.shop Pater T.'o. 1
7. In this connexion, it was stated that the texts contained in articles 22 and 23
and parag;rarhs 2, 7, ~8 (new) and 8 his of annex I were closely limed and must be
considered tcget}.er. This paper asserted the pre-eminence of the Authority and its
Hall and effective control over activities in the interoatio: al s?a-bed area as a
means of ensuring compl ance with the provisinnz: of thy: Cor:veution. to
this paper it would 'ce mer_.esTa;.y to m4ke the ;_ ^terpxise a concrete and finsrcia.:i.:iy
viable entity. The proponents of this paper did not support a parallel system of
exploitation as set forth in the Revised Single Negotiating Text.
8. According to this paper, activities in the area srouw'ld be conducted
exclusively by the Authority (i) directly through the Enterprise in accordance with
a formal written plan of work, cr (ii) as determined by the Authority, through a
form of association between the Enterprise and the specified entities pursuant to a
contract. The plan of work or the contract would be drammn up or entered into in
accordance with annex I and approved by the Council after review by the Technical
Commission. For the purpose of ,securing compliance at all times with the relevant
provisions and instruments, the Authority should eiercise full'and effective control
o-.=er the activities in the area. States Parties should assist the Authority by
taking all measures necessary to secure such compliance. The paper further provided
the', the Authority should avoid discrimination in the exercise of its powers and
functions and that all rights granted should be fully safeguarded. Special
cansideration for developing countries,?including the conduct of activities by the
Authority in certain parts of the area solely in association with them, should not
be deemed discriminatory.
9. Flexibility was maintai;ecl in the provision as to when title to minerals and
processed substances could be passed from. the Authority. The kuthori.ty wouldk be
required to adopt e propriate administrative procedures, rules and regulations for
malting an application and for the qualifications of an applicant. Such
qualifications included financial standing? technological capability and
satisfactory performance under previous contracts with the Authority, if any. In
assessing the qualifica.ticu? of a Stae Party Ito character as a State should be
taken into account. Every applicant should be treated on an equal footing and. would
be required to fulfill four specific requirements: the undertaking to comply with
and to accept as enforceable all the obligations; acceptance of control by the
Authority; satisfactory assurance of fulfilment of obligations in good faith; the
undertaking to promote the interests of developing countries by association or
other means. In view of the two main methods of operation embodied in article 22
mentioned above, one new paragraph was added to provide that the procedures for the
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hgiish
Papa 3
Enterprise should be governed by such provisions as the Authority might establish in
its sines end regulations =d by the Statute of the Enterprise. Furthernjore, its
activities should be conducted in accordance with tho resource policy a..d the
relevant decisions of the Authority in impLenente.tion thereof.
10. The Authciity should determine as to when to conduct activities it the e:" :a n
association with entities. With respect to selection of applicants, the ku VX tY
would be empowered, on its o` n initiative, or upon receiving an applicall"I3n, to
initiate selection procedures for applicants and to publish and :Hoke knawn a time-
limit for receiving other applications.
11. Subject to the foregoing, the Authority should enter into negotiations iwrith the
applicant on the terms of a contract, provided that the applicant :'ossezsad the
requisite qualifications and complied with the procedures es?tFihlished for
applications, that the application did not relate to those parts of the area
retained solely for the conduct of activities by the Enterprise or by it in
association with the developing countries; and that the contract complied with the
resource policy and the relevant decisions of the Authority. The terms. of a
contract to be negotiated were clearly set out in the text. They included the
respective contributions. of the Authority and the 'Contractor in association,
including the contribution of funds, materials, equipment, skills and know-how as
necessary for the conduct of operations covered by the contract and the e.+tcnt of
the participation of developing countries therein, as well as the proper financial
arrangements. Provisions were also made to cover cases where more then one
application is received, whereby selection would be on a competitive 'basis, and any
preference acid priority would be accorded at a subsequent stage to an applicant who
had previously entered into a contract f.;r a separate stage or stages of operations.
The Authority could.re-initiate the procedure for selection of applicants,, if after
a specified period and after negotiations had been entered into, a contract had not
been concluded.
12. The Authority was empowered to determine that, in certain part$ of the contract
area, activities should only be conducted by it either through the Enterprise or in
association with developing countries, the Enterprise having the first right of
refusal. When considering applications for such area the Authority was required to
ensure that the developing country or countries would obtain substantial. benefits.
Reference to the issue of a'quota or anti-monopoly provision was maintained in the
text of Workshop Paper No. 1.
13. This paper was further supported by other delegations both from developed and
developing countries, some of whom stressed that the activities within the
international sea-bed area should naturally be conducted directly by the Authority
since the Authority would be composed of all countries representing humanity as a
whole. They therefore opposed the provisions of Workshop Papers Nos. 2 and 3
because they ignored the principle that the international sea-bed was the common
heritage of mankind. Some other delegations were prepared to support the general
approach taken in Workshop Paper No.. 1 as the beat basis for working out a more
generally acceptable system. of exploitation. A general agreement would need to
recognize that the Convention must give some assurance of access to the area for
States Parties and other entities, and that its provisions must enable the
Enterprise to establish itself as a viable concern. /.~
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Workshop F r No.
14+. According to th's Paper, the activities in the Area should be conducted both
by States Parties and directly by the Authority. The Authority would determine
the part or parts of the Area in which it would conduct its activities. The.
Authority's area would not exceed that in which activities would be carried out
by States Parties. The activities of States Parties would be conducted on the
basis of contracts with the Authority and they would come under its effective
financial and administrative supervision. States Parties might carry ovt
activities through State enterprises or juridical persons registered in end
sponsored by States. States Parties sponsoring such entities would be
for taking sal necessary measures to ensure that such entities complied with the
Convention, its rules, regulations and procedure adopted by the Authority: All
States Parties would have equal rights to participate in activities in the Area
irrespective of their geographical location? social system and level of industrial
development, and particular consideration would be given to the neecs of developing
countries particularly those which are land-locked or geographically disadvantaged.
It should be noted that while activities would be conducted in accordance with
the basic conditions in Annex #, such conditions were not elaborated in this
Workshop Paper. On this point, it was explained that the present provisions of
Annex I of the Revised Single Negotiating Text. could not be taken as being
totally acceptable. It was stressed that the right of States to conduct
exploration and exploitation activities in the Area followed naturally from the
concept of""co on heritage of mankind' since States are juridical representatives
of mankind under international law, and that these rights should therefore be
guaranteed in the Convention itself and not left to the discretion of the
Authority. Furthermore, the system of exploitation would need to take account of
the legitimate rights and interests of the socialist system, being one of the main
systems in the world; no sea-bed regime and machinery would be viable without
taking this into account. Although the Paper did not contain any quota clause,.
it was stressed that such a clause should none the less be an integral part of the
system of exploitation as presented in this Paper.
15. This Workshop Paper was supported by a number of delegations since they
considered that the system it proposed took into account the positions of all
delegations and could therefore be regarded as a compromise.
Workshop Paper No. 3
16. According to this Paper, there would be a parallel or dual access system. In
introducing this Paper, it was pointed out that a parallel system could be a
method of accommodating the interests of all States and the international
community in general, so as to best reflect the principle of the common heritage
of mankind. States Parties or other entities and the Enterprise would carry out
activities in the Area directly by entering into contracts with the Authority.
All such activities would be in accordance with Annex I and the rules, regulations
and procedures adopted by the Authority. The Authority would have effective
fiscal and administrative supervision over all activities in the Area to secure
effective compliance with Part I of the Convention, Annex I and the rules and
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regulations of the Authority. $tates Parties who sponsor other entities would
assist the Authori--.y by taking all appropriate measures to ensure such compliance.
The Authority should promote and. encotu~age activities in the Area and should avoid
discrimination in granting access sad in implementing its. powers and functions.
The Authority would be forbidden to impair any rights granted under. Part I"of the
Convention and must fully safeguard such rights. Pursuant to specific articies
in P ?t I of the Convention dealing with scientific reasearch, technology transfer
a d the di;1tribution of revenues, the Authority would be empowered to give s ecical
consideration to the iuterests and needs of developing countries, particularly the
land-locked and geographically disadvantaged among them. Such special consid:~ration
Would not be deemed to be discrimination.
17, Title to the resources would be vested in the Contractor at the moment the
resources were recovered from theArea ' pursuant to a contract. A contract would
be entered into by the Authority,if the applicant was qualified by virtue of his
financial standing and technological capability. The Enterprise and States Parties
would be presumed" to" be. so qualified. .An applicant would also be required to
submit a work programme to the Authority which would fully take into account the
Authority's rules and regulations. All contractors would be required to accept the
supervision of the Authority... Subject only to these requirements; the Authority
would award a contract; but if it had received simultaneously an application for a
contract in the same area, the contract would be awarded on a"competitive basis.
If no such competing application were received, a properly qualified applicant
wou:i-"be granted a contract within 90 days and the Authority would not have the
right to refuse to enter.into such a contract if the financial arrangements
criteria set forth in paragraph 9 (d) had been satisfied and the contract was in
all other respects in strict conformity with the Convention and the Authority's
rules and regulations. It would be the obligation of the Contractor to provide
the funds, materials, equipment, skills and know-how as necessary for the conduct
of operations under the contract. The Paper made clear that the procedural and
substantive provisions of Annex I relating to contracts would apply mutatie mutandis
to the Enterprise. It was emphasized that the parallel system could only serve as
the basis for a compromise if the Enterprise were on an equal footing with other
applicants for contracts.
18. When this Paper was introduced it was also indicated that certain matters in
articles 28 and 31 would need to be taken up since they were connected with the
system of exploitation. In that respect the Revised Single Negotiating Text was
not acceptable but a system in which the Authority could disapprove contracts when
an applicant failed to meet objective criteria specified in the Convention could be
acceptable. Under this approach, the Authority would be deemed to have approved
contracts within a stated period of time unless the Council took a decision to
disapprove a contract submitted by the Technical Commission. In those cases, the
Council would be required to state in what particular respect the applicant had
failed to meet the specified objective criteria and the applicant, in turn, would
be given the opportunity to remedy such defects. The contract would then be
resubmitted to the Technical Commission, and consequently to the Council. Although
Workshop Paper No. 3 was presented essentially as a counter proposal to Workshop
Paper No. 1, it was felt that this move was desirable in order to lay the groundwork
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19. Workshop Paper No. 3 was supported by a number of delegations from developed
countries. These dlegations accepted the principle of direct operations by the
Authority provided that the Convention guaranteed access for States Parties and
other entities on equal and acceptable economic terms and that the Convention
specified the conditions for treating favourably the Enterprise and the
developing countries.
Further svrcestions
20. At a later point in the discussions in the Workshop some other concrete
suggestions were presented concerning article 22, particularly as formulated in
Workshop Paper No. 1. This was done in order to give the Workshop an opportunity
to find middle ground between that paper end Workshop Papers Nos.-2 and 3. These
suggestions would have the effect of ensuring firstly, that the exclusive conduct
of activities in the Area by the Authority would take place in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention; secondly, that the manner in which the Authority may
determine a form of association with States Parties or other entities would, again,
be in accordance with the provisions of the Convention; and thirdly, the Authority
would be able to exercise its control over activities in the Area in order to
secure continuous and consistent compliance with the Convention, the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority, and any plans of work and contracts
approved by the Authority.
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UNITED NATIONS
THIRD CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Distr.
LIMITED
A/CONF.62/C.1/WR.5/Add.l
9 September 1976
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
FINAL REPORT BY THE CO-CHAIRMEN ON THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE WORKSHOP (9 AUGUST TO 8 SEPTEMBER 1976)
Addendum
Co-Chairmen's assessment of the discussions
Main features of the discussions
1. The central question to be resolved by article 22 and the related provisions
of annex I would seem to be whether any dual system of exploitation would be
permitted, particularly one in which States Parties and other entities would be
assured of access to the area. A further question would necessarily arise as to
whether that part of the system allowing for activities by States Parties and other
entities would take a higher or lower position compared to the other part of the
system whereby the Authority would directly exploit through the Enterprise, or
whether it would be necessary to ensure that the two systems worked strictly in
parallel. There is the further question of whether such a dual system would be of
a permanent or temporary nature. In relation to this central question,.the concept
of the common heritage of mankind was considered highly important, although there
were variations in the way the concept should be implemented. On the one hand, the
concept would impose the obligation to ensure that the system of exploitation did
not create a monopolistic situation with respect to activities in the area; on the
other hand there would be an obligation to ensure, through a viable system, that
the resources of the sea-bed would be explored and exploited in an efficient manner.
2. On the issue of assured access, one group of countries would prefer to set out
in an exhaustive manner all basic conditions relating to exploration and
exploitation. A qualified applicant would be entitled to a contract and the
Authority would be obliged to enter into a contract with the qualified applicant.
The Authority would have little or no discretionary power in this regard. Another
group of countries, on the other hand, placed great importance on retaining certain
discretionary powers for the Authority, particularly regarding qualifications and
selection of an applicant, and the conclusion of a contract. They regarded this as
an important role to be played by the Authority. However, it is doubtful that any
delegation supports an automatic assurance of access, since there seems to be
general agreement that the Authority will presumably have some degree of discretion
in applying the relevant provisions of annex I. The question is rather the degree
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of allowable discretion and the manner in which that discretion could be used. In
expanding the conditions or criteria for the entry into negotiations and the
conclusion of contracts or in introducing further value judgements, the most
important consideration for the Authority would be to avoid acting in such manner
as could be regarded as inconsistent or even discriminatory. These questions could
conceivably be answered in terms of the purposes of the negotiations, in as much as
the negotiations would be the actual means whereby the Authority would ensure
conformity with the provisions of the Convention and all applicable rules,
regulations and decisions taken by the Authority.
3. Another aspect of the central question raised by article 22 and necessarily
related to the purposes of the annex is the principle of ensuring equal rights for
all States Parties, either to carry out or to participate in activities in the area
in order that the Authority may give equal opportunities to all States. Several
proposals, in this respect, had stressed the need to give special consideration to
the developing, countries, and among them to the particular needs of the land-locked
and geographically disadvantaged States. While there would appear to be no
disagreement on the need to promote the interests of the developing countries in
as much as this subject was discussed, it was cldar from a number of comments that
the Convention would need to specify the circumstances in which that principle
would take effect, in order to eliminate the possibility of discriminatory
treatment. Any special consideratiion for developing country applicants should
be kept separate from the question of the Enterprise, in as much as the Enterprise, ~`
as the operating arm of the Authority,. would serve mankind as a whole. d
4. The Workshop did not discuss in any detail matters relating to the Enterprise,
but it was generally felt that the Enterprise should be a viable institution; in
expressing such views, it was also made clear that a viable Enterprise would be a
component part of a generally acceptable system of exploitation.
Issues relating to application and selection procedures
5. Three main issues were identified: the question of whether an element of
competition should be introduced into the selection process, in order for the
Authority to obtain the best terms from a contract; secondly, the particular
character of States when applying for a contract; and thirdly, the question of
whether or not the conditions of paragraphs 7 and 8 of annex I should be
formulated on the basis of the Authority's right to refuse to enter into
negotiations and conclude contracts.
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6. On the first question which involved selection of applications by the
Authority and the establishment of time-limits for the receipt of competing
applications, the value of this approach could be queried on the grounds that
genuine applicants would be discouraged from conducting activities in the Area
because of this publicity, and access would be denied as the end result. A
response to that query could be that according to the Revised Single Negotiating
Text, prospecting did not confer any exclusive rights on the prospector and that
there would therefore be no question of discouraging activities. However, there
may be no real problem in this respect since more than one application for
virtually the same area and the same minerals might not in fact occur. It must not
be forgotten that since competition was incompatible with the practices of certain
countries, this process might therefore be unacceptable; competition could be
considered as discriminating against these States and as being inconsistent with
the common heritage concept. The objective of optimum benefits for the Authority
could presumably be achieved on the basis of the financial arrangements to be
contained in paragraph 9 (d). Finally, any competitive process through
publication of applications, would need to take account of the genuine interests
of those applicants who had conducted the prospecting involved.
7. On the second question, States applying for contracts could be assumed to
have all the necessary qualifications for entering into negotiations; on the
other hand, the character of States could be taken into account only when
assessing these qualifications.
8. On the third question, various categories were identified: (1) those which
would be evident from the application itself; (2) those which would require
further investigation by the Authority; and (3) those which would entail some
value judgement on the part of the Authority. The specific items which might
belong in each category were not agreed.
9. The following items could fall in the first category: compliance with
procedures, rules and regulations concerning the submission of applications; the
area to which an application relates, assuming that an investigation was not
necessary; compliance with and acceptance as binding of provisions of the
Convention, the rules and regulations adopted by the Authority and the decisions
of its organs; acceptance of control by the Authority at all stages of operations
in accordance with the Convention; the undertaking that the applicant would
fulfil obligations covered by the contract in good faith; compliance with
environmental rules and regulations; and prior prospecting activities.
10. The items which might belong in the second category could be the financial
standing of the applicant, its technological capability, its satisfactory
performance under any previous contracts, its compliance in its work plan with
the rules and policies of the Authority, and its compliance, in general, with the
resource policy of the Authority, and lastly, its bona fide nature.
11. For the third category the following items could be identified: the
respective contributions of the Authority and the applicant including the
contribution of funds, materials, equipment, skills, know-how, necessary for the
conduct of operations covered by the contract; the financial arrangements between
/...
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the Authority and the applicant; the volume of financial and technological
resources which an applicant was willing to place at the disposal of the
Enterprise; and the promotion of the interests of developing countries by
association or other means. On that last item, the particular needs of the
developing land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States could be taken into
account.
12. In relation to the items identified, it could be agreed that the Authority
should not select applicants solely on the basis of financial and economic
considerations but also according to social ,and political considerations.
Furthermore, the selection process could ensure the widest possible
participation among all States.
13. It might not be necessary or possible to list all relevant items in one place,
and it might be better to tackle the issue of what conditions justified a refusal
of a contract by the Authority in the manner already set out in both.the Revised
Single Negotiating Text and Workshop Paper No. 1 which had not attempted to list
all relevant considerations. A more central question might be the actual purpose
of the negotiations, which should be to ensure that a contract concluded with an
applicant was in accordance with the Convention-and with all applicable rules and
regulations, as interpreted by the Authority.. This kind of formulation could be
a possible basis for a compromise particularly given the fact that there was no
agreement on the question of whether such a list should be exhaustive or not.
14. The co-Chairmen wish to point out that the subject of the system of
exploitation was not dealt with in all its aspects, leaving a number of important
issues, for example, the reservation of areas and the financial arrangements, for
future discussion.
15. Although this session does not show any tangible results, the co-Chairmen are
of the opinion that the negotiating process is now under way. It is based on
two important requirements: the need to have the real and effective
participation of all delegations, and the need to have a thorough and detailed
discussion of the issues involved. Only this kind of process can lead to the
necessary appreciation of the various positions held and, finally, to durable
results.
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A
UNITED NATIONS
THIRD CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
A/C0NF.62/C.1/WR.5/Corr.l
16 September ].976
Final report by the Co-Chairmen on the activities
of the Workshop (9 August to 8 September 1976)
Corrigendum
Paragraph 12, the first sentence should read
The Authority was empowered to determine, after exploration, that, in
a certain part of the contract area, activities should only be conducted
by it either through the Enterprise or in association with developing
countries, the Enterprise having the first right of refusal.
2. Page 4
(a) Paragraph 14
(1) Lines 10 and 11 should read
for taking all necessary measures to ensure that such entities complied
with the provisions of Part I of the Convention, Annex I and the rules,
regulations and procedures adopted by the Authority in accordance with
article 28. All
(ii)
Line 15:
for particularly read including
(iii)
Line 22:
delete inverted commas
(b)
Paragraph 16, line 6 should read
activities in the Area directly by entering into contracts with the
Authority.
3. Page 5
Paragraph 18, line 9: for respect read respects
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4. Page 6
Paragraph 20, line 4 should read
to find a middle ground between that, paper and Workshop papers
Nos. 2 and 3. These
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THIRD CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Distr.
LIMITED
A/CONF.62/L.17
16 September 1976
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH
Fifth session
New York, 2 August-17 September 1976
REPORT BY MR. ANDRES AGUILAR M., CHAIRMAN OF THE
.SECOND COMMITTEE, ON THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE
AT THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE
A. INTRODUCTION
1. During this session, the Second Committee held no formal meetings. All its
activities were conducted through informal meetings of the Committee itself and
of negotiating and consultative groups. Consequently, there are no records of these
proceeding or of their outcome, except for the general references contained in the
summary records of the meetings of the General Committee of the Conference. J
2. For that reason I felt it necessary to prepare a report that might provide
the Governments of the States participating in the Conference with an over-all view
of the Committee's work at this session. For the purposes of orderly and clear
presentation, I have divided this report into the following parts: background;
organization and methods of work; work accomplished by the various negotiating
groups set up during the current session and assessment of the results; and
conclusions.
3. At the 98th informal meeting of the Second Committee, held on 15 September,
I had the opportunity to put forward many of the considerations contained in this
report and to hear the observations and comments of a number of delegations with
regard to various items and questions. As I stated on that occasion and would like
to reiterate now, both those considerations and the ones contained in this document
reflect solely my personal opinion and do not therefore bind any delegation.
B. BACKGROUND
)+. The efforts made by the Second Committee during this session should be seen as
a continuation of the process begun at Caracas at the first substantive session of
the Conference. It may be said that the system followed by the Second Committee has
been that of formulating successive versions with a view to preparing a text based
on consensus. It is therefore necessary to recall the stages through which the
work of our Committee has passed in order to have a correct view of what we were
proposing to do and of what has been done at the current session.
1/ See documents A/CONF.62/BUR/SR.22-26.
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5. At Caracas, after a general debate on each of the items assigned to the
Committee, it was possible to identify with accuracy the main trends and to present,
in a systematic way, the formulas which best reflected those trends. The outcome
of that work was document A/CONF.62/C.2/WP.1, entitled "Main trends".
6. At Geneva, after a new reading of the document on the main trends and with the
material derived from meetings of consultative groups on specific questions and from
informal groups outside the framework of the Conference, a single informal
negotiating text was prepared which no longer contains alternative solutions and has
very few blank spaces. That text is contained in part II of document A/CONF.62/WP.8.
7. In New York, at the spring session, a further step in that process was
undertaken. After a reading, article by article, of the single negotiating text
prepared at Geneva and by virtue of the mandate which I received from the Conference,
I prepared a revised text which has served as a basis for our work during the current
session (document A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.l/Part II)..
8. On beginning our work on 2 August 1976, again in New York, we were faced with
various possible courses of action. One possibility was to make a new attempt to
revise the whole of part II of the single negotiating text, article by article, or
chapter by chapter, as suggested by several delegations. The view prevailed,
however, that it was preferable to use the time available for a detailed study of
those few particularly complex and controversial questions that had given rise to
the most difficulties at the previous sessions.
9. The Conference, at its inaugural-meeting of this session, agreed to leave the
Committees free to decide whether to focus their discussions on key questions,
.using document A/CONF.62/L.12 as a guide, and, if so, to decide which those questions
should be, the order in which they would be considered and the way in which to
conduct the negotiations so as to achieve rapid progress with the participation of
all delegations. 2/
C. ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF WORK
10. At its first four informal meetings of this session, the Committee dealt with
the organization of its work and the most appropriate methods for achieving the best
results.
11. The Committee, after lengthy consideration of the various possibilities, took
the decision to concentrate its attention during the first three weeks of its work
on the following questions, which were described as priority questions in view of
the interest which they held for a large number of delegations:
(i) The legal status of the exclusive economic zone. Rights and duties of the
coastal State and of other States in the exclusive economic zone.
(ii) Rights of access of land-locked States to and from the sea and freedom of
transit.
2/ See document A/CONF.62/SR.71.
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(iii) Payments and contributions in respect of the exploitation of the
continental shelf beyond 200 miles.
(iv) Definition of the outer edge of the continental margin.
12. Subsequently, at its 95th informal meeting, held on 20 August, the Committee
decided to continue consideration of those questions and to begin the study of
two more, namely:
(v) Straits used for international navigation, and
(vi) Delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf between adjacent or opposite States.
13. The Committee agreed to consider those questions in negotiating groups open
to all Member States without prejudice to the possibility of later establishing
other consultative and negotiating machinery. In view of the close link between
questions (iii) and (iv), it was decided to assign to a single negotiating group
the task of studying both questions. Accordingly, the following negotiating
groups were finally set up:
Negotiating Group 1, to consider question (i).
Negotiating Group 2, to consider question (ii).
Negotiating Group 3, to consider questions (iii) and (iv).
Negotiating Group 4, to consider question (v).
Negotiating Group 5, to consider question (vi).
14. In addition, the Committee decided to hold a number of informal meetings of
the Committee itself in order to provide an opportunity for all delegations to
present their views or to comment on articles of the revised single negotiating
text relating to questions other than those described as priority questions.
15. As will be explained in greater detail below, in nearly all the negotiating
groups, after a general exchange of views aimed at clarifying the existing
differences, it was agreed to set up smaller consultative groups with a view to
facilitating the negotiating process.
16. The negotiating groups entrusted me with the task of choosing the members of
the small consultative groups. The criterion that I followed in carrying out that
task was to ensure a balanced representation of opposing interests, bearing in
mind at the same time the need for proper geographical representation and the
desirability of including in those groups several delegations which, by virtue of
the position that they have taken vis-a-vis those problems, could contribute to
the search for compromise formulas.
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17. Both in the negotiating groups and in the small consultative groups, I
refrained for several reasons from presenting compromise formulas. In the first
place, I had already indicated in my introductory note to the revised single
negotiating text the path towards possible solutions to some of the questions dealt
with in those groups and I did not consider it justified at that stage to go
further. In the second place, the preparation and circulation of texts of that
kind raider the authority of the Chairman or other members of the Bureau of the
Committee could give rise to misunderstandings with regard to the status of the
revised single negotiating text. In my view, at that stage it was for the
delegations themselves to present compromise formulas and only in the event that
agreements had emerged was it correct to place such agreements on record at a
formal meeting of the Committee.
D. WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY THE NEGOTIATING GROUPS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS
18. During the current session of the Conference, 58 informal meetings of the
Second Committee and of the negotiating groups; were held. Below I give details of
the activities of each of those groups together with, as stated above, my personal
assessment of the results.
(a) Negotiating Group 1
19. Negotiating Group 1 decided, at its lst meeting, to divide the item assigned
to it into two subitems: (1) the legal status of the exclusive economic zones and
(2) the rights and duties of States with respect to the living resources of the
exclusive economic zone.
20. The Group held 10 meetings in all. The first five were devoted, in general
terms, to a discussion of the first subitem. .
21. In the debate held by the Group, one delegation indicated the guidelines which,
in its view, should be followed in order to arrive at a satisfactory formula for
article 53 (Highly migratory species). That view was supported by a number of
delegations. While it has not been possible to go more deeply into that subject
during the current session, I understand that there is a desire on the part of the
States most directly concerned with that problem to proceed with consultations
during the intersessional period, and I hope that such consultations will produce
satisfactory results.
22. With regard to article 56 (Catadromous species), the States most directly
concerned communicated to the Negotiating Group the agreement that they had reached
with regard to the following proposal:
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1. A coastal State in whose waters catadromous species spend the
greater part of -their life cycle shall have responsibility for the management
of these species and shall ensure the ingress and egress of migrating fish.
2. Harvesting of catadromous species shall be conducted only in waters
landwards of the outer limits of exclusive economic zones. When conducted
:in exclusive economic zones, harvesting shall be subject to this article and
the other provisions of the present Convention concerning fishing in the zone.
3. In cases where catadromous fish migrate through the exclusive
economic zone of another State or States, whether as juvenile or maturing
fish, the management, including harvesting, of such fish shall be regulated
by agreement between the State mentioned in paragraph J. and the State or
States concerned. Such agreement shall. ensure the rational management of the
species and take into account the responsibilities of the State mentioned in
paragraph 1 for the maintenance of these species.
23. At the 7th meeting, it was decided to set up a small consultative group to
deal with the first subitem, namely, the legal status of the exclusive economic
zone. On the other hand, a similar consultative group was not set up for the
second subitem because I was informed that the groups of States most directly
concerned with that question had agreed to organize, outside the framework of the
Committee, a consultative group composed of 21 States- 20 designated in equal
proportions by the respective groups, which had chosen by common accord, the
remaining member, who had been given the task of presiding over the group.
24. The small consultative group on the legal status of the exclusive economic
zone held seven meetings. At the first of those meetings, it was decided to focus
the discussion on articles 44, 46, 47 and 75 of part II of the revised single
negotiating text. -
25. Unfortunately, I cannot say that the meetings of that group achieved practical
results. I should like to state, however, that the group was very close to
reaching a generally acceptable solution.
26. I continue to believe that the comments which I made with. regard to this point
in various paragraphs of my introductory note, particularly in paragraphs l'7 and 18,
indicate the appropriate path for a compromise solution in connexion with that
subject.
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27. In that regard, it should be noted that the discussion within the consultative
group in fact centred on articles 44 and 46 with a view to reformulating them in
order to avoid assimilating the exclusive economic zone in any way to the territorial
sea or the high seas. For that purpose, formulas were presented which were
favourably received as a basis for the final settlement of that difference of views.
(b) Negotiating Group 2
28. The Group held six informal meetings. At the first four meetings, there was a
general exchange of views on the articles of chapter VI of part II of the revised
single negotiating text. At the 4th meeting, it was decided to set up an informal
consultative group. The last two meetings of the Negotiating Group were held for
the purpose of receiving the reports on the work carried out in those consultations.
29. The small consultative group held seven meetings in which it conducted two
readings, article by article, of chapter VI, making it possible to determine the
degree of support enjoyed by various proposals for amending some of those articles.
30. At the final informal meeting of the Second Committee, held in the afternoon of
15 September, Mr. Njenga, Under-Secretary of State of Kenya and Vice-Chairman of the
Committee, who had presided over the final meetings of the consultative group,
presented a detailed report on the results of the work of that group, with a clear
indication of the points on which, in his view, the group had reached an agreement
acceptable to the majority of the participants.
31. Unfortunately, at the same informal meeting of the Second Committee the
delegation of one of the transit States and several delegations of land-locked States
expressed reservations - some of them more procedural than substantive in nature -
regarding the observations contained in the aforementioned report. I cannot conceal
my disappointment at this unexpected situation.
32. I personally feel, on the basis of Mr. Njengats report and of my own
observations, that the text of chapter VI represents a good compromise solution and
could, with minor changes, have been the basis for a formal agreement at the present
session.
(c) Negotiating Group 3
33. This Group held seven meetings. At the first five meetings, the two items
assigned to it were discussed simultaneously in general terms.
34. With regard to the question of a definition of the outer edge of the
continental margin, the discussion centred on a proposed formula to complement the
definition of the continental shelf contained in article 64 of part II of the revised
single negotiating text. With regard to the second item, the general aspects of the
system established in article 70 were discussed. At its 5th meeting, the Group
decided to set up a small consultative group. Subsequently, two meetings of the
Negotiating Group were held to hear preliminary reports on the work of the
consultative group.
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35. The consultative group, which held six meetings, spent much of its time
considering various aspects of the question of sharing of the revenue derived from
exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles. In the course of this
discussion, the group was able to identify certain elements which could serve as
a basis for possible agreement on the question.
36. Specifically, the following points were discussed in some detail: the rate
of contributions and the possibility of revising it in the light of the experience
obtained when exploitation of the area began; whether all States with a continental
shelf extending beyond 200 miles had to contribute or whether the developing
countries or some of the relatively less developed among them would be exempt from
the contribution; which States would benefit from the contributions and, finally,
what authority would be responsible for collecting and distributing them.
37. With regard to the question of a definition of the outer edge of the
continental margin, the discussions of the small consultative group centred on a
detailed study of its implications and on the possibility of applying in practice
the formula presented by one delegation to complement the definition contained in
the revised single negotiating text. There was mention of the possibility that
another delegation would present an alternative formula, but no other text was
ever submitted at the meetings.
38. The course of the discussions made it appear that it would be possible to
work out some sort of concrete agreement on these questions at the present session.
I regret to say, however, that these hopes did not materialize. At the final
meeting of the consultative group, some delegations explained that they had taken
part in the deliberations in a constructive spirit but that they were adhering to
their original position that the continental shelf should not extend beyond
200 miles. For their part, the delegations of States with a broad continental
shelf repeated their position that for them the question was one of the most
important bases of the "package deal" and that accordingly a compromise solution
might lie in a system of revenue-sharing, the details of which should be the
subject of negotiation.
39. For my part, I continue to feel, on the basis of the results of the discussions
held in Caracas, in Geneva and particularly in New York at the spring session, that
recognition of the rights invoked by the States with continental shelves extending
beyond 200 miles is in fact one of the main components of the package deal on the
items assigned to the Second Committee.
(d) Negotiating Group 4
40. This Group, which was assigned the item on straits used for international
navigation, held three meetings.
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41. Virtually all the statements were of a general nature and centred on chapter. II
of part II of the revised single negotiating text. The debate showed that
chapter II appears to provide an acceptable negotiating basis for the great majority
of delegations. However, some States bordering straits said that their acceptance
of the text was conditional on the incorporation into it of certain changes aimed
a.t achieving a better balance between their interests and the interests of users of
the straits.
42. Several delegations did in fact propose amendments. Since only a few
delegations took part in this discussion and many of them commented on only certain
of the proposals, it is very difficult to judge the extent to which each of the
proposals gained acceptance.
43. I noted, however, that a number of delegations wished to give careful. study
to some of the proposals and to hold consultations. Tn fact, I have been informed
that consultations on this subject between several interested delegations have
already taken place at this session. I trust that they will make it possible fcr
us to conclude our work on this chapter at the next session.
(e) Negotiating Group 5
44, Negotiating Group 5, which deals with the delimitation of the territorial sea,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, held two meetings. At the
conclusion of the second meeting, it was decided to establish a smaller group for
the purpose of holding informal consultations..
45. This small negotiating group held only one meeting. The debate at this
meeting, which was conducted at a high level, focused on articles 62 and 71
relating respectively to the. delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf, although there were some incidental references to article l4
(Delimitation of the territorial sea).
46. This discussion confirmed the fact that the central point at issue is the
value to be attributed to the method involving the median or equidistant line in
solving the problems connected with the delimitation of these marine areas. Some
delegations felt that this method should be given primary importance, while others
thought that the problems should be solved in accordance with equitable principles.
For my part, I continue to believe, after having listened to this debate, that
paragraph 1 of articles 62 and 71, which already appears in the single negotiating
text drawn up at Geneva, may well be the solution which could bring about general
agreement since it does not overlook the method involving the median or
equidistant line but at the same time restricts its use to those cases in which it
can produce results that are in accordance with equity.
47. It should be borne in mind in this connexion that this paragraph 1 appears to
cause difficulties only for certain delegations, as is clear from the debate held
on the matter at the last session and at the present one.
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48. With regard to paragraph 3 of articles 62 and 7.1, the discussion showed that,
even though opinions were again divided, it was possible to find a compromise
formula. Some proposals were made along those lines, but they all gave rise to
comment and it therefore cannot be said that an a.ltarnative to the wording
contained in the text, has as yet been found on this question.
49. As has been stated earlier in this report, the purpose of these meetings was
to give all delegations an opportunity to make observations or comments on
articles of the revised single negotiating text relating to issues which had not
been dealt with in any of the five negotiating groups established at the present
session.
50. I believe that the Committee's decision to hold several meetings for this
purpose was a wise one since it made it possible to take stock of those issues
which, although of more limited interest, are nevertheless important.
51. It is not easy to sum up these meetings at which widely differing issues were
discussed. It is, however, possible to group in. several categories the
observations and comments made at the meetings.
52. Those issues which affect a very limited number of delegations can be placed
in a first category. Such issues obviously can be solved only by agreement among
the States concerned, and in this connexion i wish to repeat the recommendation
that consultations concerning them should begin or - in some instances - continue.
An example of the fruitful results that can be obtained by this means is the
agreement announced in the Committee by Indonesia and Malaysia concerning a
possible amendment to article 119, paragraph 7.
53. A second category would include those articles that are of interest to a
larger number of delegations but can also be dealt with through consultation among
the States concerned. The articles in chapter `JII (Archipelagic States) and in
chapter IX (Enclosed or semi-enclosed seas) can be placed in this category.
According to information which I received privately from some of the delegations
concerned and which was later confirmed publicly in the Committee, there have
already been consultations at this session on chapter VIU., which still included
provisions containing some blank spaces which at some point will have to be filled
in.
54. It is advisable to employ the same system in connexion with chapter IX,
concerning which a number of proposals were made at these meetings which met with
a favourable .reception from some of the delegations of countries interested in this
problem.
55. In the third category can be placed those proposals which have been presented
from the very beginning of the Conference in the same or similar terms and which
have not won support at any time or have, at best, received negligible or limited
support or very general expressions of sympathy obviously prompted by considerations
of friendship or good neighbourliness.
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56. Finally, the fourth category consists of articles of the revised single
negotiating text concerning which no comments or observations of any kind were made
at this stage. Although T would not presume to interpret this silence as an
expression of agreement with all these articles, it may be inferred that they
command broad support.
57. Generally speaking, this category can be said to include more than 50 articles
of the 131 comprising part II of the revised. single negotiating text, the
transitional provision - concerning which some delegations have expressed
reservations - not being one of them.
58. As is clear from what has been said above, the Committee worked very hard at
the present session. A sound selection was made of questions which called for
priority consideration, and a serious negotiating process was begun in connexion
with them. 1 believe that we have seen the timely, and fortunate development of a
spirit of negotiation, which, of course, calls for recognition of the fact that a
solution to controversial problems must be sought through mutual concessions. This
spirit was apparent in the work of the Negotiating Groups and, particularly, in the
small consultative groups. On the whole, the discussions held by these groups
avoided a repetition of arguments that were already all too well known, and
attention was focused on the consideration of specific proposals.
59. I believe that success was also achieved with the method that consisted in
dealing with the various questions in plenary meetings as a first stage for the
purpose of determining how much interest delegations showed in each one of them and
establishing as accurately as possible the existing differences of opinibn, after
which meetings with a limited membership were held in an appropriate setting to
conduct intensive, fruitful negotiations.
60. No concrete results were achieved at this session regarding any of the questions
considered by the various Negotiating Groups. However, the process of negotiating
on these complex and controversial issues is under way, and the work that has been
done serves to afford Governments a very clear idea, at least in some cases, of the
road to follow in seeking a final agreed formula.
61. In fact, it might have been possible to work out and even to formalize an
agreement on certain matters if the general atmosphere at this session had been more
favourable. There is no question that the difficulties relating to other items
before the Conference, some of which have begun to receive detailed study only
recently, have made it difficult to complete the work of the Committee in certain
areas.
62. All these considerations lead me to believe that at the next session our
organization and methods of work should be similar to those adopted at the present
session. I do not, however, believe that we can foresee at this time what may prove
most appropriate next year. I have therefore not thought it advisable to propose to
the Committee that the present organization of work should be maintained at the next
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session. The most prudent course is to await the outcome of whatever work is done
between the two sessions and, in the meantime, give some thought to other possible
formulas for the organization and methods of work which will permit more intensive
and fruitful efforts to be made.
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UNITED NATIONS
THIRD CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
.Distr.
LIMITED
A/CONF.62/L.18
16 September 1976
Fifth session
New York, 2 August to 17 September 1976
REPORT OF MR. A. YANKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE, ON THE WORK
OF THE COMMITTEE AT THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE
1. The Third Committee worked according to the organization of work as suggested
by me in my proposals to the Committee made at the 26th meeting of the Committee
held on 6 May 1976 1/ and further expanded at the 28th meeting of the Committee
held on 3 August 1976. 2/ This procedure was.determined by the understanding
that part III of the Revised Single Negotiating Text was a relatively well.-balanced
document and as such could be used as the starting point for all the negotiations
conducted in the Third Committee. This, of course, did not preclude other
proposals which supplemented the Revised Single Negotiating Text to be taken into
consideration. As agreed upon in the 26th meeting of the Committee, there were no
general discussions on any item but ' negotiations, were concentrated on particular
key issues, without closing the door to delegations who wished to bring up matters
of special interest to them.
2. I have endeavoured to discharge my responsibilities as Chairman in the most
flexible and legitimate manner. I have always adhered to the principle of complete
and open participation of all interested members of the Committee and I have
emphasized throughout the whole history of the Committee, that adherence to this
principle of full participation and openness will ensure the effectiveness and
legitimacy of our work. At the same time, I have stressed that it was important
to follow a selective and restrictive approach, thereby enabling us to achieve
greater efficiency. Throughout the present session, my primary intention has been
to harmonize and to seek improvement in the clarity and presentation of critical
areas in the Revised Single Negotiating Text wherever necessary. It gives me great
personal satisfaction to-report that the Third Committee has made important progress
towards the elaboration of draft articles on the three items allocated to the
Committee, namely: the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
marine scientific research, and the transfer of technology.
if A/CONF.62/C.3/SR.26.
2/ A/CONF.62/C.3/SR.28.
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3. This progress can clearly be seen when one considers that following the
Caracfs session, the Committee had before it numerous proposals presented by
dele(,;,O,ions. During the Geneva cession, I was entrusted with the responsibility
to draft a single negotiating text which took into consideration, as far as possihle,
all these proposals. During the spring session in New York, I endeavoured to refine
and revi;E.. the Single Negotiating Text with the outcome that the articles cont.ainecl
in the Revised Single idegot:iatirg Text were considered by many delegation? to
conotit?uf;e -,, v.i ublcr basis for negotiations and compromise. The efforts of the
present ee izn have result_3d in the drafting of several articles which numerous
delegations parti,ipating in the negotiations have provisionally accepted.
4. Besides the '8th meeting which was held on 3 August 1976, the Committee held
five other formal meetings, namely, the 29th., 30th, 31st, 32nd, and 33rd ine.tinge
on 10, 11G and 15 September during which T made comprehensive oral reports on the
negotiations conducted during the session both at the Committee level and at the
level of the negotiating groups -n all three items before the Committee. These
reports reflect my personal assessment. During these meetings, .314 delegations
made statements on the items of the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, 50 delegations on marine scientific research and a smaller number on
transfer of technology. Most of the statements expressed the view that the
Chairman's reports were comprehensive, accurate and objective and reflected a lucid
picture of the debate and negotiations that took place during the current session.
What is conta.ine-1 i... these reports takes into consideration the views expressed by
delegations as well as my own assessment of what transpired during the last seven
weeks. Fallowing is a report on the negotiations held during the present session
on the three items before the Committee.
I. PROTECTirp AND PRESEnVATION OF MARINE ENVIRONMENT
5. In acs>rdance with the organization of work as agreed upon by the Third
Committee at its 28th meeting on 3 August 1976, the Committee concentrated its
efforts no key issueo related to vessel source pollution.
6. The Committee was, however, sensitive to the paramount need to improve all
aspect;; of the Revised Single Negotiating Text wherever doubts or objections
remained, and was flexible enough to receive and take adequate note of such
suggestions and comments as delegations deemed appropriate with regard to other
aspect:: of marine pollution.
7. In the course of 13 informal plenary meetings held from 10 August to
9 September 1976, the Committee examined primarily the provisions of those articles
relating to protection and preservation of marine environment in which delegations
ire,ntifJ.cd crucic:l