GROUP OF 77 POSITION ON LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 10, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

Report No. 552
P82S00697R00040016002444ust 10, 1976
a
BURR Of
IORLIGEOCt
8111) RESHOCH
State Dept. review complet
For Release
SECRET
2USIAR1152itlikTlaranitna=316341690R-ttrINSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED
BY ORIGINATOR
GROUP OF 77 POSITION ON LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES
Introduction and Summary
Examination of the Group of 77 "position"
toward the Law of the Sea negotiations would
require analysis of the positions of 110 coun-
tries on more than 400 issues. As a result, this
report, based on a review of a number of sources,
provides a tentative assessment of the areas in
which the Group of 77 will most likely attempt to
exert its greatest influence or which may prove
most disruptive to Group solidarity at the session
of the LOS Conference now under way (August 2-
September 7) in New York. These areas include:
--the deep seabed regime, in particular, the
scope and power of the Authority;
--the character of the Exclusive Economic
Zone;
--the question of access for the Land-Locked
and Geographically Disadvantaged States;
--the colonial issue (transitional article);
and
--the regime of scientific research.
In the view of the Group of 77 all of these ele-
ments have basic ideological (if not theological)
implications.
The resolution of outstanding problems dur-
ing the current session will depend on the theology
of the New International Economic Order as it
applies to ocean space, on the one hand, and on
the pragmatic efforts of certain mineral-producing
states to protect national interests, on the other.
SECRET/XGDS-1, 2, 3
WARNING NOTICE
rsKWARIMMELingfflAID
Approved For Release 2002WFCIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
_ii -
The theological aspect of the negotiations will probably
revolve around the deep seabeds negotiations in Committee I.
It is expected that the Croup of 77 will not revert to the
old Single Negotiating Text; it will concentrate on the estab-
lishment of an International Seabed Authority, its powers and
its functions. The Group will most likely assume a hard ideo-
logical stance, maintaining that the Authority's role in the
exploitation of mineral resources for 70 percent of the
world's surface must be paramount to advance the New Economic
Order concept--even if resource revenues prove to be limited.
Mexico and India are seen as the leaders of the effort, while
the metal-producing states, a small group led by Brazil, are
more clearly in line with the US position. Mexican fears of
flag state problems may be justified by the newly multinational
character of the ocean mining industry.
On most issues under consideration in Committee II, the
attitudes of the Group of 77 do not appear to reach the theo-
logical level, as in Committee I. The Exclusive Economic Zone
can be expected to be treated as sui generis by the Group
majority. A split more favorable to the US may be caused by
the Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States denied
access to the seas' resources.
An opening of the Convention to signatories other than
states would hurt the interests of the United States, com-
plicating US efforts either to eliminate the Transitional
Provision or to rework it.
Regarding the activities of Committee III, the US posi-
tion on scientific research in the Economic Zone and on the
Continental Shelf can be expected to encounter strong resist-
ance from the great majority of the G-77 states. For many
nations of the Group, the articles in the Revised Single
Negotiation Text dealing with scientific research have been
accepted without question. These articles enliven the percep-
tion of the Economic Zone as something unto itself, something
beyond that contemplated by US policy.
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
Approved For Release 2002WYTCIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
The Deep Seabed Regime--Committee I
Group of 77 attitudes toward the Committee I portion of
the RSNT (Revised Single Negotiating Text) appear to have
crystallized along several lines that may have important
impact on the US negotiating position in the current session
of the Law of the Sea Conference now under way in New York.
Of primary significance is the fact that the Group of 77 can
be expected to exhibit an outward display of ideological
solidarity. Those nations most loudly espousing a unified
ideological stance comprise the majority. In this group are:
1) states that produce few or no important metals; 2) states
whose metal production is a small factor when compared with
their total GDP; 3) states that are beset by political, social,
or economic problems compared with which the seabed resources
problems pale into insignificance. Given the seabed resources
context, they are generally inimicable to the interests of the
US and the other developed nations.
However, a much smaller group of states which are disposed
to take a more practical view of seabed issues may move closer
to the DC position. This group is generally composed of nations
that derive a substantial portion of their national income from
raw metal production (Brazil, Peru, Chile, Zambia, etc.).
It does not appear that the Group of 77 will attempt to
discard the RSNT (as has been feared). There seems to be no
widespread desire to either revert to the old SNT (Single
Negotiating Text) or attempt to write a new text from scratch.
This stage was not reached without a struggle; at the
close of the May session, a number of the Group of 77
were quite dissatisfied with the RSNT.
--Tunisia, Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, and Ecuador
expressed negative opinions of varying intensity.
--Kuwait, for example, referred to the draft as "a black
paper."
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
Approved For Release 2002/09WM&-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 2 -
--Tunisia called it a "step backward."
--Algeria was "strongly negative."
--Simultaneously, Mexico and India essentially reserved
comment, although India, Pakistan, and Iran appear to
have joined the opposition to the RSNT after the session
closed.
In contrast, Southeast Asian nations, Liberia, Ivory
Coast, Madagascar, Chile, Singapore, Peru, and Brazil were
inclined to retain the amended draft. In fact, Brazil headed
a "secret" group which provided a number of compromise arti-
cles adopted in the Committee I portion of the RSNT.
It must also be pointed out that when the above discussions
took place, a number of delegations were reported to have muted
their comments on the issue. The most notable of these was
Cuba, presumably on the instructions of the Soviet Union.
The background for the activities which dominated much of
Committee I's time has been reviewed by Norwegian LOS Minister
Jans Evensen. His comments appear as valid today as when he
expounded them in late May:
"Furthermore, a rapprochement between the extreme
standpoints also took place during the negotiations relating
to the international seabed and ocean floor--i.e., the area
falling outside the economic zone and the national conti-
nental shelves. The Geneva draft treaty was mainly based
on the views of the 77-country group. However, during the
New York session, mineral producing countries such as
Brazil, Peru Chile, and Zambia showed themselves ready to
negotiate with the USA and the Soviet Union in order to
reach an arrangement more open to compromise. The reason
for this greater willingness to negotiate is probably due
to the fact that these states fear an unregulated develop-
ment and exploitation of the seabed mineral deposits if an
agreement is not reached. This fear may be justified inso-
far as a bill has been submitted to the American Congress
concerning a unilateral American exploitation of minerals
on the international seabed and ocean floor, contrary to
what the draft Convention envisages as the future regime
for these enormous unexploited mineral reserves.
"As regards the group of raw material producing
countries, a certain modicum of international regulatory
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
(
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 3 -
measures,together with a seabed authority equipped with
rather less extensive powers than that desired by these
countries, might nevertheless be far preferable to a com-
pletely uncontrolled development where the big and
financially strong enterprises may freely exploit these
resources for their own ends. The mineral producing
countries are therefore inclined to accept compromise
solutions.
"However, some leading countries within the 77-country
group maintain that the mineral producing countries have
gone too far in their willingness to achieve a compromise.
For that reason, the 77-country group now seems to be split
between those states, which, seen against the background of
their producer interests are willing to go to considerable
lengths to meet the USA and other developed countries, and
those upholding the demand for an international authority
equipped with very extensive powers."
Analysis of the present stance of the Group of 77 might
best begin by reference to the July 21 Note by the President
of the Conference, Mr. Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka. He recom-
mended that the delegations address themselves to six main
areas, the first of which concerns itself with the structure
of the International Seabed Authority. It is also apparent
that the creation of the Authority is now a foregone conclu-
sion among the Group, and that its proposed structure,
functions, financial base, and power distribution are the main
subjects of concern and contention.
Concerning the composition and powers of the Authority,
the main lines of argument appear to be as follows:
--There are those nations, mostly non-metal producing
LDC's, that want nearly complete control of the
Authority, and seek this control by means of basing
all voting power in the Assembly.
--They are opposed by a smaller group of states, mostly
metal producers, who seek a compromise position which
would vest more power of a specific nature in the Council.
Consequently, the Group of 77 debate on this subject has
focused on the retention or modification and amendment of
Articles 25 through 27.
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 4 -
--Those nations taking a hard-line position appear to be
India, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Yugoslavia, Ecuador,
Tunisia, Senegal, and Iraq.
--Those taking a somewhat softer stance appear to be
Brazil, Cameroon, Cuba, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Trinidad and Tobago, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Singapore,
and, perhaps, Kenya. The Kenyans seem to be primarily
concerned with accelerating the creation of the Enter-
prise itself, the ISA's sea mining entity.
As noted previously, Brazil seems to lead all other states
in the desire to formulate a final document which would offer
sufficient grounds for compromise with the developed nations.
At present, India appears to be the major roadblock to Brazil's
efforts; it seems inclined to revert to the workings of the
old SNT, and in this stance it is often joined by the Arab
states. To complicate matters, Mexico aspires to a leadership
role in the Group, and should have arrived at the meeting well
prepared to discuss matters of a technical, procedural, and
ideological nature.
Speaking in the context of seabed issues, a major Mexican
LOS representative, Castenada, reportedly told Rear Admiral
Morris that Mexico perceives that the benefits to be gained
from the seabed for mankind are not as great as once thought,
or at least are more elusive. Mexico's aims are thus essenti-
ally ideological and political, with a view toward making the
Authority an LDC-dominated organization, and a precedent-
setting organ designed to control the New Economic Order for
the purpose of redistributing the world's wealth among the
LDCs. Mexico therefore intends to:
--place the Authority's main power in the Assembly,
thereby reducing the role and the power of the Council;
--reduce the Tribunal's role to one of an advisory
status, thus permitting the Assembly to be dominant in
policy matters.
Mexico has found support for its position from Tunisia, Egypt,
and Senegal, among others.
It has also been reported that Mexico is concerned that
some seabed contractor or nation might attempt to expand
either its area of operation or its production quota by making
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
Approved For Release 2002/09RFIN-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 5 -
use of a "flag of convenience." Mexico, presumably, will
attempt to plug this loophole.
The reason for this last concern may be caused by changes
in the deepsea mining industry that have occurred in the last
few years. In the early research and development stages of
the mining of manganese nodules and other deepsea minerals, the
scene was dominated by a rather small group of corporations--
most of them US-controlled. They included Tenneco, Interna-
tional Nickel, Hughes Tool, Kennecott Copper, and United States
Steel. They acted independently for a variety of reasons:
--Kennecott was deficient in land-based ore reserves.
--International Nickel perceived a rapidly increasing
demand for stainless and other steel alloys and a
consequent demand for nickel.
--United States Steel was highly dependent on foreign
sources for its manganese, and, secondarily, may have
perceived a future source of income for one of its
?
subsidiaries--Newport News Shipbuilding.
--Tenneco perceived a need to diversify into a more
broadly based conglomerate from being solely an energy-
producing company, which was rather small when compared
with most of its competition.
Deepsea Ventures (probably the corporate name most associated
with the Group of 77-perceived threat toward unilateral action
in seabed mining) was formerly a wholly owned subsidiary of
Tenneco. After several transitional actions it has become a
multinational joint venture comprising: 1) International
Nickel Company of Canada, Ltd.; 2) Deep Ocean Mining Co., Ltd.
(DOMCO), formed by Sumitomo and other leading Japanese indus-
trial groups (thought to be in excess of 30 corporations);
3) Arbeitsgemeinschaft Meerestechnisch Gewinnbare Rohstoffe
(AMR), a group of German companies consisting of Metallgesell-
schaft AG, Preussag AG, Rheinische Braunkohlenwerke AG, and
Salzgitter AG; and 4) SEDCO (formerly ?Southeast Drilling
Company), an offshore drilling company based in Dallas, Texas.
Apparently most of the US corporations that were formerly
involved with Deepsea Ventures have withdrawn.
Not only does this change in the seabed mining industry
signal potential trouble with respect to flags of convenience
and multinational corporation problems, but it may very well
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
Approved For Releaf:WNW/19M rielADRIDPUNIMB7R000400160021-6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 6 -
be read as an indication of the high risk involved and the
massive amounts of capital needed to mount any successful
operation in the deep sea. If these are indeed the LDC per-
ceptions, then it may be safely said that the LDCs will feel
justified in striving for the minesite rotation system.
Therefore, the US can expect the following from the Group
of 77 in the current session on Committee I matters:
1. Outward ideological solidarity directed toward the
establishment of the New Economic Order, probably led by Mexico;
2. No rejection in toto of the Committee I portion of
the RSNT;
3. A concerted and broad-based effort by the LDCs to
shape the Authority to their liking and, by so doing, get a
guaranteed return on any derived wealth--all research, devel-
opment, exploration, and technology transfer costs to be paid
for by the developed countries;
4. Some assistance toward moderating the LDC position on
the ISA by metal producers and, perhaps, the Land-Locked and
Geographically Disadvantaged States (LL/GDS), probably led by
Brazil.
If the majority of the Group of 77 succeeds in most of its aims
with regard to the Committee I text, the developed nations may
see in the outcome the precedent for the development of deposits
of natural resources elsewhere, e.g., the Antarctic.
The Character of the Exclusive Economic Zone
The Group of 77 attitudes toward most issues in Com-
mittee II do not appear to reach the theological level, as in
Committee I. The G-77's major Committee II objective, the
Exclusive Economic Zone, has already been attained through
the negotiations. Coastal members of the Group perceive that
the SNT has already assumed a status beyond that of a mere
"negotiating" text.
--Mexico and Guatemala recently legislated Exclusive
Economic Zones with provisions virtually identical
to the operative paragraphs of Article 44.
--India and Sri Lanka, two South Asian leaders of the 77,
have similar proposed legislation before their parliaments.
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
Approved For Release 2002/09RAW-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 7 -
--Preliminary reports indicate that Papua New Guinea,
Senegal, and others have adopted similar courses of
action or have them under way.
These events strongly suggest little negotiating flexi-
bility by important leaders of the G-77 on the character of
the Economic Zone. G-77 moves either reflect the belief that
the text has already been finalized or they constitute
an effort to ensure no modifications through the creation of
"determinative" state practice to reinforce the exclusivity
of the Economic Zone. These states have cited, and will con-
tinue to cite, the actions of certain developed states--United
States, Canada, Iceland--as further justification.
This reasoning was utilized by Mexican President
Echeverria on the enactment of the Mexican Economic Zone,
when he stated:
"In proposing that the Economic Zone be put into
force before the international treaty is formalized,
the Executive is firmly convinced that it is not
acting counter to international law, but it is
applying rules of the new law of the sea as they
are inferred from present conclusions of the United
Nations Conferences, which rules have been explicitly
or implicitly accepted by a great majority of the
members of the international community."
Efforts to diminish national authority in the Exclusive
Economic Zone, as a consequence, will be strongly resisted,
partly in national interests, partly in reaction to the well-
orchestrated efforts of the LL/GDS (Land-Locked and Geograph-
ically Disadvantaged States) to gain increased access to the
marine resources of coastal states.
The recognition of the Economic Zone as high seas con-
stitutes a paramount objective of the United States and other
maritime nations. The coastal members of the 77, following
Latin leadership, strongly opposed this objective in the
spring session. Reports from Latin America and South Asia
in the interim clearly show that these elements of the Group
of 77 will continue to resist the designation of the Zone as
high seas. Article 75, in particular, will be most strongly
defended by coastal states of the Group.
Two potential compromises have surfaced:
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 8 -
--The first, unacceptable to the United States, would
define the Economic Zone as sui generis--neither
territorial sea nor high sea.
--The second, the obverse of US desires, would declare
that the Economic Zone does not, per se, constitute
territorial sea.
Available reports provide no evidence of relative support
of these positions although the Committee II chairman favors
the sui generis concept. The actions of Mexico, Guatemala,
India, Sri Lanka, and Senegal would indicate a hard-line
attitude toward any concerted effort to alter the nature of
the Zone.
The Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged Question
The rights of the LL/GDS (Land-Locked and Geographically
Disadvantaged States) to a direct share of marine resources
proved the most divisive Committee II issue in the last session.
Led by Austria, the LL/GDS mounted a concerted attack on the
Exclusive Economic Zone, demanding access rights to living and
non-living resources of coastal states' Economic Zones. The
fifty-odd states in the LL/GDS, i.e., potentially a blocking
third in the G-77, compose a mixed bag, politically and
economically, including the Holy See, Romania, West Germany,
Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Algeria. Cutting across developed/
developing ?state lines, the LL/GDS provoked a strong counter-
reaction from coastal states; the Revised Single Negotiating
Text reflects, in part, this reaction.
The recent Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in
Mauritius attempted, with no success, to establish a common
African position toward the LL/GDS access issue. Since the
hot issue strikes at the heart of the exclusivity of the Eco-
nomic Zone, the lack of success was not unexpected. OAU
leaders referred it to the Organization's LOS experts for
resolution.
Doubts have been expressed over the cohesiveness of the
LL/GDS bloc. Certain Latin states report that Bolivia and
Paraguay, among others, are not as radical as the LL/GDS lead-
ership indicates. Potential fractures within the Group of 77,
however, cannot be identified at this time.
The question of LL/GDS rights of access to non-living
resources of coastal states' Economic Zones appears to be a
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
Approved ForReWAVNIAM/OVc9kNAligagit97R000400160021-6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 9 -
dead issue. Resistance by the coastal states is universal.
However, a continued LL/GDS attack in this direction could
stall Committee II progress. Access to living resources,
perhaps on a preferential basis, appears to be negotiable.
At present the resentment of the coastal states of the
G-77 to the LL/GDS remains high. Since the LL/GDS group
includes leaders of the G-77, e.g., Algeria, internal stresses
on the question should remain high within the 77.
To date, this resentment does not appear to be directed
toward the US, but rather toward the Soviets. Any overt move
of the US, however, in favor of the LL/GDS could cause a change.
The issue remains delicate since the LL/GDS constitute potential
allies of the US on the character of the Economic Zone.
Transitional Provision--the Colonial Issue
During the past LOS session the US delegation made it
quite clear that if the Transitional Provision remains as is,
"serious questions would be raised as to whether the United
States would be able to ratify the treaty." In fact, at the
last session the subject of administered "territory" became
the focus of a debate. Group of 77 participants used the
subject as a club to beat the US (regarding Micronesia, Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands), Israel (an Egyptian resolution
demanded the recognition of "liberation organizations"), and
South Africa.
The danger in the Transitional Provision is that it might
become a dumping ground for radical proposals which would
further affect the US Government's ability to secure a ratifi-
able treaty. Thus far, neither France, the Netherlands (with
overseas possessions somewhat analogous to the US), nor Israel,
nor the US has succeeded in watering down the Provision.
It is obvious that the Provision is causing Aguilar, Chair-
man of Committee II, a number of problems. He has just written:
"The article dealing with territories under foreign
occupation or colonial domination resulted in a long
debate in the Committee. After reflecting on the
debate, I did not feel that I should make either major
additions to or deletions from the existing text,
except to redraft Paragraph 2 in less absolute terms.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 10 -
article raises issues which go beyond the scope of the
Law of the Sea. By placing it separately as a transi-
tional provision, I adopted a solution which would not
in any way imply that the matters dealt with in the
provision are permanent and immutable in nature."
The US supports Aguilar's contentions, but the elimina-
tion or abasement of the Provision may be more easily said
than done. In contrast to problems that African nations have
had retaining a unified stance on important LOS matters, OAU
nations seem solidly in favor of the Transitional Provision.
As other recent UN conferences have had great difficulty with
the issue, it should not be expected that the current LOS
session will benefit from the lack of intemperate demands
from the Group of 77.
Since the closing of the last session, other LOS delega-
tions have been extremely quiet on this particular issue, and
thus there have been no significant developments. The Provision
does not seem, however, to be an issue that will disappear in
the current session.
Complicating US efforts eithet to eliminate the Transi-
tional Provision or re-work it, is the role that Micronesia
has played in past LOS conferences. With respect to the
colonial issue the viewpoints of Micronesians (as observers)
are often at variance with positions expressed by the US dele-
gation. Micronesia has allied itself with delegations from
Fiji, New Zealand, Tonga, and Western Samoa, calling for recog-
nition of territories which are not as yet self-governing and for
permission to sign any LOS treaty as a contracting party. The
US delegation is, of course, concerned that the opening of the
Convention to signatories other than states would open up the
question of liberation movements and would have "serious impli-
cations for the internal affairs of the United States." The
US position has been conveyed to the Congress of Micronesia,
but whether Micronesian observers intend to take a maverick
stand is not known. Should they do so, efforts to include
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and other US possessions in
the negotiations are likely, and US interests would be corres-
pondingly hurt.
Scientific Research
An NSC paper of July 13, 1976, succinctly outlines the
negotiating problems that the US faces with respect to marine
scientific research:
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGIUal0B-
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-Kuvozsu0697R000400160021-6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 11 -
"The existing instructions to the United States Law
of the Sea Delegation state that the US objective is
to avoid requiring coastal state consent for marine
scientific research in the Economic Zone and on the
Continental Shelf. Fallback authority is provided
which would authorize acceptance of a regime allowing
the coastal state to prohibit research which does not
meet certain specified criteria, or acceptance of a
regime which accepts coastal state consent but states
that consent must be granted when certain criteria are
met."
In the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), the
question of consent, as outlined in Article 75 relating to
rights within the territorial sea of a coastal state, is
hardly debatable. However, the provisions included in Arti-
cle 58 through Article 69 witness the erosion of the freedom
of scientific research within the Economic Zone of coastal
states. In the existing text, the Economic Zone and Continen-
tal Shelf acquire more of the sovereign and exclusive charac-
teristics of the territorial sea and fewer of the exploitative
and inclusive aspects of the Economic Zone and Continental
Shelf.
Consequently, the articles dealing with scientific
research can be seen as an erosion of the high seas concept and
the sanctification of an Economic Zone cum territorial (patri-
monial or matrimonial) sea. Thus, the Economic Zone gives
the right not only to exploit, but also to exclude, thereby
enlivening the perception that the Economic Zone is, sui
generis, something beyond that contemplated by US poli.
For many nations of the Group of 77, the RSNT Articles
dealing with scientific research have been accepted without
question; therefore, the stated US position, and the fallback
position, should be difficult to negotiate. For example, in
recent months both Guatemala and Mexico have incorporated the
consent provision within laws delineating aspects of their
respective territorial sea and economic zone. Both India and
Sri Lanka have laws pending which will do the same. The ques-
tion of consent to enter contiguous "security zones" exists in
laws promulgated by certain Arab states, and the expansion of
this concept to that of the consent requirement for entering
an Economic Zone would appear to be a foregone conclusion.
Since the close of the last LOS Conference, the US can
take small comfort from pronouncements made concerning the
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 12 -
question of marine scientific research--whether from the
Group of 77, or from other nations that it could usually
expect to call on to support the US position:
--Yankov of Bulgaria, Chairman of Committee III, and who
as surrogate of Soviet interests introduced the RSNT
articles on scientific research, has noted that he
fears the present US position aimed toward the revision
of the articles "is not saleable."
--Jagota, the Indian Government LOS Legal Advisor, and an
important figure in the Group of 77, was not "convinced
that scientific exploration within the Economic Zone
was as critical a problem for the US as the Learson
Delegation had suggested and...did not believe the US
Government would allow the treaty to founder on this
issue."
--In recent discussions with Ambassador Learson in
Caracas, Aguilar, Chairman of Committee II, expressed
complete satisfaction with the scientific research text
as it now stands, and believed that "it is justified."
--Senegal's Foreign Minister recently noted that though
the question of scientific research, among other issues,
remains a problem, Senegal's "legitimate interests are
largely covered by the New York texts."
--A Brazilian official recently noted that "No one could
be absolutely sure whether any scientific research proj-
ect had economic or non-economic purposes." Thus, the
Government of Brazil would be "subjected to severe public
criticism if it agreed to allow scientific research in
the 200-mile zone without prior permission."
--At the US-Mexico fishery discussions held in May 1976,
a Mexican. delegate noted that it was his government's
intention "to follow the revised LOS SNT," and he
specifically referred to articles dealing with scien-
tific research.
Outside the Group of 77 the views of other LOS represent-
atives have been noted:
--Evensen, Norway's LOS representative, stated before
his parliament that the last meeting "had a favorable
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 13 -
effect on the issues relating to research," and that
"the text also includes a provision to the effect
that normally the coastal state shall not fail to
give its consent whenever it is a question of research
projects not involving exploitation of resources." He
added, "There is reason to believe that this rule will
be upheld."
--Spain's LOS delegate, Yturriaga, has "rejected our
strong complaints on the science text as unrealistic,"
and has apparently indicated to US delegates that no
problems would arise "if there are adequate coastal
state rights over scientific research."
--Walkate, an LOS delegate from the Netherlands, "was
very negative on the revised text, and said (the
Netherlands) would oppose it." However, he felt that
coastal state consent for Economic Zone scientific
research was "part of the price necessary to obtain an
LOS treaty."
In conversations that US delegates have had with Canada,
Chile, Sri Lanka, Peru, Norway, Kenya, Australia, Senegal, the
UN Secretariat, and others, most interlocutors were taken
aback by the extent of US criticism of the scientific research
text. Arias Schreiber of Peru (perhaps expressing much the
same sentiment as the majority of the Group of 77) stated in
front of others on one occasion that if that was the US atti-
tude, "Peru will stop all US scientific research off its coast."
US arguments seem to have won few converts in the Group
of 77, and efforts undertaken seem unlikely to change the
scope of Articles 57-69.
--Few African nations seem disposed to back the US point
of view. Kenya, for example, would probably support
the present text,if recent pronouncements are any guide.
As early as February 1976 Kenya was claiming that Soviet
trawlers were not fishing but were spying off its shores
and turning the ocean into a scene of "espionage,
intrigue, and conflict." Kenya and other such nations
are not likely to differentiate between an oceanographic
vessel and an intelligence ship,for both are seen as
serving the same purpose.
--The Arab nations--being very conscious of security
concerns--apparently will not support the US proposal
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
Approved For Release 2002/09?Etlek-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
- 14 -
to revise the RSNT articles on scientific research.
Egypt noted recently that it "cannot accept freedom of
scientific research in the Economic Zone since it does
not know who may want to do research in the area."
--Most Latin American nations have opposed the US policy.
--China has long opposed the policy, considering that it
benefits only technologically advanced nations.
--The OECD nations also seem lukewarm in their support
of the US position, and most recent European Community
announcements concerning LOS issues seem to skirt the
issue of marine scientific research.
As is evident from the above, the question of freedom
of scientific research is complicated by fears of Western
technological superiority, is fought on ideological grounds
having, per se,, little to do with scientific research itself,
and falls prey to intense nationalistic feelings. In sum,
given the present condition of LOS negotiations, both the
Group of 77 and the United States' traditional allies seem
bent on protecting an Economic Zone from foreseen and unfore-
seen scientific activity of other states.
Prepared by R. Hodgson/F. Monroe
x22022 x21988
M. Burr
x21935
Approved by R. Hodgson
x22022
EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE E.O. 11652: 513 1, 2, 3
(Classified by M. ?Packman)
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000400160021-6
AY, OC TU.&
- _
_
ntt''i:ij
elOse 2002/09' - ? ? . _ ;4".
_the filth sessiOn Of the third
fuence on the -1.7aV''Of the Sea
entiO the neWs media reflected an
41:nose-tete of gloom. They said that
the prodeedings were all but grounded.
thjere are a few aspects the public
it not.Ware .-th41 the press has not
_ , _
s trep sed,
,Tirst, the treaty being negotiated is
the most comprehensive and complex
treaty ever negotiated in history. With
the penetration of the Industrial Rev-
olution into the oceans, the law of the
- iS no ledigef What it Used to be.
Evety issue .facing the international
_ Obitttritty today reflects itself in the
oceans: relations between industrial-
- nd developing countrieS; the
the irnp_adt?dir se-feriae-arid
tio,r tri softy,
`Ittie enviriiiiinerit; relations between
Ttlie
-the rntiltinalionar corpcirations;
erier6; "reatinide- ftiallgeffient;
tcati?ns-ithd international
dffi?e-61ifY the most impor -
dtiate a treaty on the new
?a therefOre, is to negoti-
gtit-part "OrWatrld order, includ-
e 'neW itterniitional economic
',-1-artsvm-fs?afirm
-Yel6r-e- the confer-
lire -net clearly circumscribed
icaflss??hat-daii be solved in
ISola.tion. The genzral crisis in inter-
national relations reflects itself also in
the crisis of the conference.
The breakdown of the international
law of the sea is part and parcel of
the breakdown of international law
and order in general. It would not be
fair to blame the delegates to the law
of the Seatriegemeei Per thijA
down, On -flrerbnititley', &?vtfr@LV
conference that the birth pangs of the
new international order are more
By Elisabeth Mann Borgese
Third, and lest we forget among the
daily frustrations: Something has been
acquired in the nine years since the
Maltese Ambassador, Arvid Pardo, drew
the attention of the United Nations to
the economic potential of, and the
ecological perils .to, the oceans and
proposed that the oceans and their
resources be declared to be the com-
mon heritage of mankind, that a
Declaration of Principles be adopted,
and that this conference be called to
embody these principles in a treaty.
These principles are here to stay.
Even should we fail this time around?
which we shall not?they would crop
up again, whether in the context of
the oceans or with regard to the
environment, outer space and satel-
lites, climate and weather modifica-
tion, energy or food. We shall learn
to do together what none of us can
do alone.
With,"EiIitng this process, and lit-
tle as we may 'be aware of it, issues
and obstacles are changing. What seem
to be unsurmountable problems today
may offer easy and unsuspected solu-
tions tomorrow.
To give just one example: The alter-
natives before us in the committee
charged with the responsibility of cre-
ating the international seabed author- _
ity quite likely are not either a system
managed and controlled by the inter-
national community, or free access for
states and companies. Quite likely,
there is a third possibility in a compre-
hensive and flexible system of joint
ventures, acceptable to states and com-
panies, under the financial and admin.
gariarol of the authority and
CIARREIESE800$107
dally the poorer ones.
Dilemmas may tum out to be optical
arid if an annarpnthr incninhlp
rotlem is emir-ditched from a -sriglitli
different angle new solutions may be-
and-dried articles were agreed upon
during this session, such new perspec-
tives have been opened for the next
session, at the United Nations in May.
The effort to build a new interna-
tional order in the oceans may turn
out to be the most important interna-
tional development of this century.
People everywhere are affected directly
by what happens to our oceans. They
have a right to know more about how
decisions are made.
It would not detract frdm the effi-
ciency of the decision-making proc-
esses or of the debates of this great
conference if the press and at least
the representatives of accredited non-
governmental organizations were
admitted to the working sessions of
the committees. Public support is es-
sential if the treaty that will result
from this conference is to be ratified
and observed. This support must be
built now, through the wide sharing
of this knowledge. There would be, I
believe, less gloom if there were more
participation.
Elisabeth Mann Borgese rs chairman
of the planning council of the Inter-
national Ocean Institute, an interdisci-
plinary institution at the University of
Malta, and adviser to the Austrian dele-
gation to the Conference on the Law of
..the Sea.
R000400160021-6
Ana yet tne energy ettriciency ot en-
hanced-recovery processes exceeds
that of other procemprisAnarmplitbiea
duction. It is two to three times greater
than for coal or nuclear routes, Row-
land says.
Moreover, enhanced-recovery proc-
esses have no significant environ-
mental impact.
Period of change. M. E. Pruitt, re-
search director for Dow Chemical
U.S.A., told the symposium that a
time of transition in the Texas petro-
chemical industry has led to stepped-
up research and development efforts
aimed at meeting problems posed by
the energy crisis. -
The transition period stems from
major changes in raw materials and
fuel required by the Texas industry.
It's switching away from natural gas
for raw material and fuel to heavier
dependence on crude oil and naphtha
for raw material and to residual oils
for energy.
As a result, researchers are increas-
ing their efforts to find more efficient
processes for making petrochemicals
from crude. These efforts include
direct cracking to olefins and pro-
duction of olefin and petrochemical
building blocks for synthesis gas.
In addition, more research is un-
der way on the use of solid fuels for
energy production ? gasification and
fluid-bed combustion, for example.
World production outlook. Total
world oil production will near the 100-
million-b/d mark by 1990.
This is a major point in Shell Oil
Co.'s forecast presented by John Ro-
orda at the A&M symposium.
? World production will grow at a
32%/year rate to 97.4 million b/d in
1990 from 56.7 million b/d in 1973.
? OPEC and Communist countries
will account for almost 26 million b/d
of the increase-10.1 million and 15.7
million, respectively. These countries
will then control two-thirds of world
production.
? The Middle East will increase its
contribution to interregionally traded
oil to 82% from 66%. To do this, Saudi
Arabia will have to produce at a rate
of 13 million b/d in 1990.
? U.S. imports must come increas-
ingly from the Middle East, growing
from 1 million b/d in 1973 to about 5
million b/d in 1990.
? U.S. oil imports will grow ?to
about one-third of interregionally
traded oil by P1131proValtN2411Vitgase
come from the Middle East.
e 20
WATCHING
DP82S00697R000400 ,A00/
.
TH: V\6ORLD
with BART COLLINS
from LONDON
World Court thickens the offshore fog
THE Greek Government was stunned by the decision of The
Hague International Court approving operation of a Turkish
seismic vessel in the contested Aegean Sea area. Of the nine
judges hearing the case only one, a Greek appointed to the
panel at Greek request, opposed the decision.
After weeks of tension the court decision may have not
resolved the matter. The Turkish survey vessel has been
poised for some time to leave Istanbul to work in the Aegean.
There were Greek threats that the vessel would be stopped
and turned back. How Was never made clear. Sismik 1 did
venture into the Aegean Sea to be met by a Greek destroyer
which shadowed its movements. It eventually returned to port.
Eventually there were rumors that Greece and Turkey
were to develop the Aegean subsea together. This came to
nothing. Greece eventually referred the matter to the Inter-
national Court in the Hague. Turkey refused to be represented,
claiming the matter, at issue could not be judged by the court.
When the case was heard Turkey was not represented.
After lengthy deliberation, the court held that Turkey's
sending of the seismic vessel into the Aegean had not violated
the sovereign rights of Greece. It gave no decision on the
rights of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean. it was not asked
to. It did confirm that Greece was right to bring the matter
to the court and that examination and judgment of the case
was within its competence.
LEFT IN ABEYANCE is the problem of future exploration
work in the Aegean. What would be the situation if either
Greece or Turkey were to begin operations with an offshore-
drilling unit ih a contested area?
This would surely represent a direct claim on seabed
territory which would have to be settled by law or war. The
court obviously does not believe that the presence of one
seismic vessel in the Aegean area denotes exploration. Further
the court must obviously believe that if the two countries
are disputing sovereignty over Aegean seabed territory that
the court could best settle it.
Since a legal decision has been made, a precedent has been
set. May it now be inferred that surveys of contested seabed
areas can be carried out without the rights of claimants being
hurt? What would be the position in the Aegean of a seismic
vessel other than Greek or Turk?
Outcome of the present decision could be that survey vessels
of contesting coastal states could complete search programs
before negotiations about sharing contested areas were started.
The side with the best survey would then lay claim to the
12??2/8gligrOfA9RFACIPAWN949. CA
p0021-6
? ????? ? e? Trtf /0 AT _AVM". 20. 1976