THIRD SESSION FIRST COMMITTEE PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST MEETING HELD AT THE PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, ON MONDAY 28 APRIL 1975, AT 10.35 A.M.

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• Publication Date: May 2, 1975
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2 May 1975
Original: FRENCH
THIRD CONFERENCE
ON. THE LAW OF TIE, SEA
Third Session
FIRST CO114ITTEE
PROVISIONAL S'U 1 RY RECORD Or THE T'IENTY -FIRST MEETIl`1G
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday 28 April 1975, at 10.35 a.m.
Chairman: Mr. ENGO United Republic of-Cameroon
Rc.pporteur: Mr. BAILEY' Australia
CONTENTS
International Machinery: structure, functions, powers
continued)
F.B. Participants wishing to have corrections to this provisional summary record
incorporated in the final. summary record of the meeting are requested to submit
them in writing in quaadraplicate, preferably on a copy of the. record itself, to
the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva,
!'.'1tI fl.'' 1;C2'1:y f? j= of rece]."71ng, the provisional record in their wcrktiing
language. A/CONE .62/C .1//S R . 21
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11 MERPTATIONAL MACHII'TERY: STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS, POWERS (continued)
Mr. BASABE (Argentina) said that, by considering the question of the regime
and the question of the machinery and. economic implications separately, the Committee
~ might be overlooking the conceptual unity of the future convention; it should be
guided in its work by the ideas underlying the Declaration of Principles contained in
a General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV). In order to achieve the aims set forth in the
Declaration, a strong authority which could not relinquish the powers vested in it or
dispose of the resources of the area would have to be established. The same legal
regime should be applied to the whole of the area to be explored and exploited by the
authority either directly or by, means of contracts with third parties.
He wished to emphasise some points in connexion with the machinery which his
delegation considered essential. The assembly, on which all member States would be
represented, should be the supreme organ of the authority. It would meet annually but
could also hold special sessions. The convention should confer on the assembly
regulatory powers, which it would exercise in accordance with rules laid down in the
1 treaty. The council, a body of limited membership, would perform the functions
assigned to it in the convention and. those delegated to it by the assembly, and would
be held responsible by the assembly for implementing that body's instructions and
recommendations. Its membership would. be based essentially-5n the principle of
equitable geographical distribution and also on appropriate representation of all the
interests involved, particularly those associated with activities in the Area. His
delegation was opposed to any form of weighted vote and any system involving a veto;
each delegation should have one vcte. The enterprise would be one of the principal
organs of the authority, as the organ responsible for carrying out all operations in
the area, either itself or by the means described in the second paragraph of article 9
(variant (B)). The enterprise would be responsible to the Council and the assembly.
There were those who held that the authority should be considered as an
entity for promoting exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed. His delegation
thought it should be made very clear that the authority would perform that function
..p only when its own mining policy required it. The-authority's principal function would
be to organize those activities so that the minerals extracted could be absorbed by
the world economy without causing irreparable danage to the economies of developing
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countries which exported the same raw materials. Nearly all the developing countries
were involved, since they were al]. 'potential producers. The adverse effects of
unplanned exploitation of sea-bed resources would be felt in the social as well as in
the economic sphere: Many of the developing- countries had started or intended to
start mining projects in some regions of their territory with a view to speeding up
their development, and those projects. would be frustrated by improper exploitation of
the sea-bed's mineral resources. His country was not opposed to such 'exploitation,
since its mineral imports cost about $400 million a yeai and its economy would benefit
if prices were reducedor stabilized. That was not the issue, however. His delegation
considered that the authority should be given such powers as would enable it to
control and supervise production in order to prevent uncontrolled exploitation by a
few people whose sole motive was profit. That was where the idea, of the new
international economic-order came in: it, as stated in the Dakar Declaration of the
conference of developing countries on raw materials, should be based on equality
and equity; it would require a radical change in current trends in world commodity
trade. Only a change of that kind would enable the developing countries to achieve
true political sovereignty, economic independence and. social justice.
Mr.-SE T LVEDA (Mexico) emphasized the close relationship between the
international regime and the structure, powers and functions of the authority. The
constitutional principles governing exploration of the Area and exploitation of its
resources should give the authority such competence as would enable it to achieve
the main objective of the rsgime, as set forth in the Declaration of Principles. The
first question to consider was the structure of the international authority. There
seemed to be fairly general agreement on the idea of creating a plenary assembly as
the supreme organ of the authority, a., council as the executive organ, an enterprise
as the organ responsible for technical, industrial and commercial activities, and a
secretariat responsible for the administrative services. Of course, the powers
conferred on all those bodies were manifestly interdependent.
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In view of the stage the discussions had reached, his delegation wanted to
outline.its views--on-_the basic: characteristics'of the enterprise and its relationship
with the other two; rain- organs. First,. the..'e was at link betwcon article 9, concerning
the regimet :and the ,poti~ers conferred on the enterprise.. Draft article g. contained.
the fundamentaJ..rule..that all activities of exploration of.the Area anc;of the.
exploitation;,of..,its..resources "shall be. conducted directly by the authority",. on the _
understanding.that?_in. certain cases the authority might delegate.those activities to..
natural or juridical. persons. In order, therefore, to carry its.functions in- the.. ,.
former case,.-Lhe autority.would need an operational instrument -.the enterprise
whereas ,when ii :;exert .sed them. indirectly, it would conclude .oontrac-ts; or set: up joint
ventures. The essential purpose of the enterprise would be to acquire revenue and
distribute it,fairly,,.with due regard to-the interests of the developing countries:
The enterprise would co-exist with two other main organs the assembly and the council.
The assembly-.would lay down policy and conditions of exploration and exploitation,
open areas for-exploration and exploitation, and decide on the quantity of minerals
to be mined,-:..,marketing conditions and the'status of joint ventures. The council would
have competence to consider and approve the enterprise's proposals for. exploring and
exploiting the resources of the Area. In order to operate efficiently, the enterprise
should have some, autonomy and have legal personality. Itould submit periodic
reports to the council, which would transmit them to the assembly with its-own comments
and recommendations.
THOMAS (Trinidad and Tobago) said that he, fully endorsed the views
expressed.at...the previous meeting by the representatives of Peru and other members of
the Group. of 77 concerning the international machinery; he was speaking only in order to
amplify whathad been said on the subject and to stress, on behalf of his own delegation
and as a member of-the Group of 77, the functional connexions: between the organs of the
authoritiy. The key idea was that the international machinery to be set up, should be
strong and effective, making for the type of exploitation that would be universally
beneficial. The activities of the proposed machinery should be governed by five basic
principles: optimum use of resources, optimum sharing of resources, equitable
distribution of revenue, sharing of benefits. so that no State would be placed at an
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undue disadvantage, and supervision.in the international area in order to protect the
environment. It was clear that those functions had political, commercial and technical
aspects, and would ,rive the international s:'.thority the balanced structure it needed.
It might indeed, have a type of balance that was unique among international
organizations. First, there would be a type of hierarchical relationship between a
plenary body and an executive body. The plenary assembly would lay dorm policy
guidelines, and all organs would be ultimately?accountable to it. The council would
carry out the instructions given by the Assembly, but as a permanent organ authorized
to take decisions, it, too, would be very important. Its membership would be
determined on the basis of political considerations. To counterbalance those political
organs, two other principal organs would have commercial and technical functions: the
enterprise and what might for the moment be called the production regulation unit
or planning unit, both of which would be composed of technocrats. The enterprise
would examine the feasibility of proposed projects and negotiate contracts. The
production regulation unit would be an advisory body whose primary function would. be to
evaluate potential commercial production and its likely impact on the objectives of the
authority. Co=-ordination between the production regulation unit and the enterprise,
and between them and the council, would be essential. The two organs would counter-
balance each other, inasmuch as the enterprise, by reas'~n of its functions, might be
tempted to maximize benefits whereas the production regulation unit would be moncerned
with the best use of resources.
In evaluating proposed activities in the international Area the Council should
carry out studies on land resources and a.ct.joiritly with other bodies; it should also
plan and evaluate the use of the resources of the international Area. The
relationships among the organs of the international machinery would therefore be at
.once hierarchical, vertical and lateral. Those organs would form a pyramid, with the
enterprise and the production regulation unit together at the bottom, topped by the
council, which, in turn, would be subordinate to the assembly. Other functional units
might be created according to requirements, but they should cease to exist when they
no longer served a useful purpose.
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With regard to the dispute settlement mechanism, on which the Group of'77 had not
yet taken a decision, his aelegation considered that some such'mechanism was'necessary;
it should be able' to act quickly and should not be a permanent body. A panel of exerts
'::economists, lawyers, labour experts and financial experts -, to be drawn uponas the need
arose, might be the answer.
As amember of the Group of 77, his delegation believed that the international
,,machinery proposed by the Group might lead to the creation of a, viable organization
capable of responding to contemporary needs: in other words, an organization notable for
strength and justice.
Mr. RATINER (United States'of America) said that he would outline briefly the
I views of. his delegation on the questinn of international machinery, having regard to
the fact that they could be regarded as harmonious in most respects with those of a
`'great many industrialized countries. The structure and powers of the organs of the
:international authority and the balance between those organs, besides being of great
.importance to the endeavour to build a.viable international institution, had a bearing
on what nations could accept in the way of article, relating to the regime and the
""basic conditions". There were 12 critical elements which, in the view of his
Idele gation, had to be settled to the satisfaction of all if e unified text which the
Chairman was to prepare by the end of the week was to be regarded by all delegations
as a basis for negotiation.
First, the competence of the authority should be restricted to activities directly
related to the exploration and exploitati n of the resources of the international Area.
The term "activities", as it was being used in the work of the Committee, needed to be
cl.efined in such a way that other activities to be conducted in the Area, such as
fundamental scientific research, did not fall within the regulatory powers of the
authority. Second, the powers and functions to be conferred on the authority and its
.'organs by the Convention should be specifically set out, - not included by implication,
]in the general provisions of the treaty.
Third., the powers and decision-making procedures of the assembly, the plenary body
;'
of the authority, should be so structured as to ensure that the interests of all States
A
,..ere accommodated, while protecting the es;.,pntial rights of smaller groups :f States
which were members of the authority. To that end, decision by the assembly should be
taken, as fax as possible, by consensus. In the past, his Govcrnment had urged that the
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assembly should be empowered only to make recommendations. While agreeing to give
the assembly general policy-making powers, his delegation held that it was essential
that those powers should be carefully defined and should not overlap with those of the
council. Furthermore, it appeared im~ortazat to devise a procedure whereby decisions
in the assembly could be postponed if a minority of States wished to seek the advice of
the dispute settlement organ on the legality of any measure contemplated by the assembly.
In addition, the assembly should not have competence to over-rule decisions,of the
council on matters that fell within the letter's jurisdiction. Such restrictions on
the plenary power of the assembly were the essence of a sound. constitutional structure
for the international machinery.
Fourth, his delegation attached special importance to a council. structure which
recognized the special interests of certain States, both developed and developing;
criteria for assigning a State to a particular category should be negotiated and
specified in the treaty. Moreover, voting arrangements should protect the critical
interests of States. It should be possible to work out provisicns to that effect
while avoiding procedures which might paralyse decision-making.
Fifth, the fundamental resource policies, as part cf the basic c ndi.tions of
exploration and exploitation, should~be stated in the treaty itself. Sixth, to the
extent that those policies required *further elaboration before they could be implemented,
.his delegation supported a procedure whereby the rules ;should be drafted by a specialized
subsidiary organ, and, after approval by the council, forwarded to States. If after
a period of, say, 90 days, fewer than one third of the members of the authority had
objected, the rules would enter into force. Such an approach would give both the
authority and. Governments an opportunity for expert review and avoid the risk that one
or other of the authority's organs might acquire undue influence.
Seventh, the council should.have the exclusive mandate to exercise the authority's
powers and functions relating to exploration and exploitation. In conformity with the
policies laid down in article 9 of the regime, the council should have over-all.
responsibility for policy and management. Eighth, the council should rely on teclu.ica-
organs, under its sole supervision, which would be composed,of experts arld would each
exercise clearly defined functions.' One commission might prepare rules and
regulations, another might supervise all exploration and exploitation activities, a
third might conclude contracts relating to those activities, and so forth.
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Plinth; an effective dispute settlement procedure was indispensable; for that
'.purpose, only a sea-bed tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to
the sea-bed. would. be effective. There would. have to be a single procedure for
adjudicating such-disputes, and. it should be impossible for the authority to conclude
contracts outside of the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whose decisions should be prompt
and binding. Members of the tribunal should. be appointed. by the. council. Tenth, the
:;secretariat of the authority.. should. inspire confidence in the States and entities with
I which it dealt. To that end, the treaty should. contain provisions prohibiting conflicts
of interests. within the secretariat and. imposing stringent penalties for the
disclosure of any data or information that had been declared. the property of the
authority. Eleventh, his delegation believed. that. the authority should. be. financially
self--sufficient, although it might be necessary to empower it to borrow funds during
1the early years of its existence. Twelfth and.-last, arrangements would have to be.
:mad.e for the provisions of the Convention dealing with the international Area .to.be
applied. provisionally, since only that approach would. enable the new international
_,regime to be applied. immediately .to activities connected. with the. exploitation of
Imarine resources` and. permit the whole international community to share in the benefits.
The Committee should continue its negotiations in order to find. a mechanism which
would. balance both the interests and. needs of minerals importers and. consumers and the
y~-
concerns of certain land.-based. producers of minerals.
Mr. ADEDE (Kenya) said. that his delegation had stated at Caracas that the
authority responsible for sea-bed exploration and exploitation should comprise a
plenary organ (the assembly), an executive organ (the council), an operational organ
(the enterprise), a secretariat to service all the organs of the authority and a
>Itribunal for the settlement of disputes arising from the. interpretation and
application of the relevant provisions of the-Convention.
With regard to the constitution of the tribunal, his delegation considered. that
account should. be taken, on the'one hand., of the question of parties (disputes might
=arise between two or more States, between States and. the authority, between natural and.
4
juridical persons and the authority, or between two or more natural or juridical
,'persons) and., on the other hand., of the nature of. the dispute (disputes might
_:jrelate to questions of fact, questions of law or political, economic or technical
. questions).
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Bearing in mind those two aspects, there were at least two ways of looking at
the tribunal. There was the question of its. competence: it might be a tribunal which
handed down binding decisions not subject fo app:eal or an administrative tribunal
.whose decisions might be subject to appeal in another court. The most important issue
to be decided was whether the tribunal should be considered in isolation or within the
general context of a system for the settlement of disputes established by the
Convention.
His delegation considered that both approaches should be taken into consideration
in the creation of 'the tribunal. In its view, the Conference should retain its
freedom to choose between two options, namely, to establish a tribunal competent to
decide conclusively and without appeal all disputes arising in the international Area
or to establish an administrative tribunal of first instance whose decisions might be
reversed by a higher court and which for that reason could be allowed a margin of
appreciation. The. Conference should also retain its freedom to decide what type of
court should have appellate jurisdiction over the tribunal's decisions.
Mr. ANDRES (Switzerland) said that in its statement at the fifth meeting of
the Conunittee, his delegation had declared its support for a strong but flexible
authority, capable of dealing with the extraordinarily difficult problems awaiting it
and. of adapting to new circumstances. It considered that the arrangements for
electing members of the council should provide for membership to be based rc:)t only on
equitable geographical distribution, but also on equitable geographical ':cation,
thus enabling land-locked and geographically disadvantaged countries to he duly
represented in the council. With regard tc the powers to be conferred on the authority,
his delegation had advocated provisions enabling natural or legal persons, and the
authority itself, to undertake on a non-discriminatory basis, exploration and
exploitation of sea-bed resources, provided such exploration and exploitation was
carried out according to rules which took account of the interests o.-t` all parties,
especially those of the least privileged members of the international community.
His delegation reaffirmed those views, which, in so far as they related to
adequate representation for States in the organs of the future authority, were shared
by the group of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged countries and were based
on the desire to ensure the kind of equitable participation by those countries in a
soundly-structured, effective authority that was contemplated for other special-interest
groups.
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With regard to the composition of the council, his delegation favoured a formula
'hick had been approved by the majority of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged
ountries, the effect of which would be to add the following paragraph to all
provisions relating to that issue: "At least two fifths of the members of the Council
:hall be representatives of land--locked States and of geographically disadvantaged
tates". There should be similar representation of land--locked and geographically
.'isadvantage d States in all other organs of the authority in which not. all member.
states were represented. The proposed formula did not exclude similarly adequate
snd equitable representation of other special-interest groups in the organs of the
uthority,
Mr. LUBAKU_KtfL~_BOUJI (Zaire) said that he strongly believed that the
.stablishment of international machinery should be based on the fundamental principle
Lhat the international sea-bed Area was the common heritage of mankind. The Area
hould therefore be administered in such a manner that no part of it became the
'sroperty of any State and that the benefits derived from exploring and exploiting it
-hould go, in the first instance, to developing countries, in other words, to
;finder-equipped countries whose lack of technology would exclude them from exploration
.:'nd exploitation activities in the Area. In that connexion, he contended that the
'declaration of Principles in General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV) should be observed
o the letter and that the moratorium declared by the General -A-ssembly in
' esolution 2574 D (XXIV) should be respected in order to prevent the emergence of
y fait accompli.
The authority envisaged in the text of draft article 9submitted by the
oup of 77 should have some freedom to conclude contracts and be empowered to
bnclude various types of contracts, not one type only. Nevertheless, the basic
??inciple governing the machinery was direct exploration and exploitation of the Area
. ii
the authority. The organs of the authority should be an assembly, a council, an
:-,;,Zterprise, and a planning and price stabilization body.
The assembly, the supreme organ, would lay down general policy for the authority.
would accordingly consist of all member States and could'consider any problem
,elating to the exploration and exploitation of the Area. Each member State would
r.`ve the right to one vote, in accordance with the principle of the equality of
te.tes. His delegation reserved the right to speak again about the way in which
`.' cisions would be made by the assembly.
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The council would be the executive: organ of the authority and would perform its
functions under the assembly's supervision. Its composition should be governed by the
principle of equitable geographical distribution, with due..regard to the specific
interests of countries which might be affected by exploration and exploitation activities
in the Area, particularly the interests of developing countries-which were potential
producers of raw materials. Such arrangements were not intended solely to protect the
interests of existing producers of raw materials; no developing country could claim to
possess ?a complete geological inventory of its resources and any of them might become a
major. producer of a particular ore.
Zaire, like the other member countries of the Group of 77, could in no
circumstances accept a system which allowed for a veto. It also refused to accept the
establishment, within the council, of a system of permanent membership or weighted votes.
It was convinced that any formula based on the Yalta agreements and allowing certain
powerful. or rich countries greater weight would be incompatible with the Declaration of
Principles. His delegation's position with regard to the powers to be conferred on the
council, would depend on the composition of that-organ.
The enterprise would be the-operational. organ through which the authority would
carry out the task assigned to it in article 9, namely, the exploration and
exploitation of the Area, either on its own account or through service or partnership
contracts. The enterprise would operate in the Area, and would be subject to the
council and the assembly. It would be an operational organ and would not have power to
conclude service or partnership contracts.
Finally, his delegation considered that there should be a planning and price.
stabilization unit to protect the interests of developing producers of minerals which
might be exploited in the Area. Like.the representative of Morocco, he considered that
that issue was one of substance, not just a point of detail. The unit would come under
the Council; its principal function would be to submit recommendations for safeguarding
the interests of developing countries whose economies were heavily dependent on
minerals exploited on land and on how their needs might be taken into account in order
to prevent the exploration of the Area and the exploitation of its resources from
adversely affecting their economies. His delegation was thinking in particular about
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the disastrous repercussions which the uncontrolled marketing of products from the Area
might have on the fragile economies of developing countries. He drew attention to the
statements made on the subject by his delegation at the ninth, eleventh and thirteenth
meetings of the Committee at Caracas.
In conclusion, he stated that his country was seeking not any kind of market
monopoly, but merely to ensure that States which, through uncontrolled exploitation and
waste, had almost exhausted their raw material resources should not attack the finite
resources of the Area in the same fashion and thereby deprive future generations - in
other words, all mankind - of the raw material resources necessary for survival. The
resources of the sea-bed were the common heritage of mankind and should be administered
in its interests, with due regard for the specia:L interests of the developing countries.
Mr.'ALY (Mauritania) said that his delegation, which had collaborated in the
drafting of document A/CONF.62/C.l/L.7 and stood by that document, attached great
importance to the system of organization and the distribution of powers among the organs
of the future international authority.
The assembly, as the supreme organ of the authority, would lay down the authority's
general policy and the conditions of exploration and exploitation of the Area. Once
that policy was defined, its application would be the responsibility of the council,
which could take decisions. His delegation attached great importance to the
composition of the council, in so far as the important decisions to be taken by that
executive body would affect any activities conducted in the international Area. Its
composition should reflect equitable geographical distribution and also take due
account of the interests of countries concerned and affected by the exploration and
exploitation of the resources of. the Area.
The enterprise would be a technical body whose essential function would be to
enable the authority itself to undertake the timely exploration and exploitation of the
resources of the Area.
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Mauritania was essentially a producer country, and. also attached the greatest
importance to the establishment of a planning body, which should prevent uncon-
trolled and selfish exploration and exploitation of the Area for the benefit of
a few countries. He considered that the producer countries should be represented
on that body, which should not be a small conanittee of experts likely to impose
its views on the council or the enterprise.
Mr. flGJSAIKiTAN (Mongolia). said that the proposed organization - or
authority ?- for the exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed should. certainly
be a universal international organization, but it should not be a supranational
organization; it should be subordinate to the member States, helping them to
exercise.fully their sovereign rights, and encouraging the establishment of a
new international order and the development of the mineral resources of'the sea-
bed so as to enable all peoples to meet their vital requirements. 'It should
ensure that all nations had access to soa-bed resources, without any discri-
mination and on a basis of equality, and that special consideration was given
to the needs of the economically 'less developed States, land-locked States and
geographically :disadvantaged States. Through the co-operation of member States
the.arganica.tion should promote peace and friendly relations among all peoples,
in accordance with the principles of international--.aw and the Charter of the
United Nations.
To achieve these aims, the authority should supervise sea-bed mining
operations,in the international Area and ensure the continuous and orderly
exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed for the benefit of all peoples;
it should enable all-States to explore and exploit the sea-bed in accordance
with the principles of international law; it should foster the exchange of
scientific, technical and technological knowledge between industrially
developed and developing countries; it should encourage co-operation among
member States in the exploration of the Area and make the results obtained-
available to all interested States', particularly the economically less
developed and the land-locked States, and it should see to it that the marine
environment was not adversely affected by exploration or pollution.
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The proposed organization' should have a general assembly, as the supreme organ,
in which all member States should be represented, an executive council of limited
membership but representing all geographical regions and all the different interests,
and such other organs as were needed to fulfil the aims of the Convention.
The assembly, representing all the member States, would lay down general policy
for the organization and make all important decisions on its behalf.
In deciding on the frequency of the plenary sessions of the assembly, it should
be borne in mind that if the intervals between sessions were too long, the assembly's
influence might decline, bringing about a considerable expansion of the council's
competence:
There was no doubt that in the assembly each member State should have one vote.
Decisions on:-procedural questions might be taken by a simple majority of members
present and voting, but recommendations and decisions on questions of substance should
be taken by consensus or near-consensus, or by at least by a two-thirds majority of
members present and voting, provided that that majority included at least a majority
of the member States.
The assembly could discuss any questions within the competence of the organization
,and make recommendations thereon. His delegation considered that the assembly should
have the power to make recommendations.on the general conditions of exploitation and
exploration of the sea-bed and on questions of promoting international co-operation
in that sphere; it should also be empowered to adopt, on-the recommendation of the
council, general principles, recommendation:; and rules on the prevention of marine
pollution and on international co-operation in the scientific exploration of the
resources of the Area. It should also establish the staff regulations and adopt the
budget of the organization on the recommendation of the council, and should consider
the reports of the council and, if appropriate, of the other organs of the authority.
All member States would be represented in.the assembly, and consequently all
points of view would be heard there. In organs with a limited membership such as the
council, however, some States would not always be able to express their views and
explain their position on the questions under consideration. To be effective,
therefore, the council and other. organs with a limited membership should have an
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equitable representation of all geographical regions and all interests. Land-locked
States and other special-interest groups should be fairly represented in all the
organs of the authority, and have equal rights with other States in decision-making.
For example, two fifths of the members of the council should be representatives of
land--looked and geographically disadvantaged States. However, the organs with
limited membership should not have too many members, which might impair their
effectiveness: his delegation considered that they should have 30 to 50 members.
In the council important decisions should be taken by consensus.
Mr. VARQTMKIS (Greece) said that the practice of international organizations
provided a general model for the structure of the international authority, which
should be both strong and flexible.
The plenary assembly, in which all States would be represented on the basis of
the single vote, would be the supreme organ of the organization. It would meet
periodically and would give the competent organs the necessary instructions to enable
them to carry out their functions. It would be the final court of appeal, and would
decide on any issue in dispute.' It was the assembly which would establish the
necessary subsidiary organs.
The council, with a smaller membership, would be the organization's permanent
executive organ, and would act under the authority of )he assembly. Its membership
should ensure equitable representation of all geographical regions and all interests.
The terms of office of its members should be such as to permit equitable rotation.
There would be neither permanent members nor weighted votes. The assembly could
endow the council with whatever powers it deemed necessary.
An operational organ would be needed to enable the authority to carry out its
functions. That body should be capable of acting at a technical level without any
bureaucratic obstruction. It would be strictly operational and technical, would
have no power of decision and would act on the specific instructions of the organs
.having decision-making power.
The secretariat would be the administrative organ of the authority, in accordance
with the established practice of international organizations.
Lastly, a jurisdiction would have. to be provided for the settlement of disputes.
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Mr. GORALSZYK (Poland) observed that the question of the functions and powers
of the proposed organization or authority was closely linked with the problems of the
basic provisions'governing the conditions of exploration and exploitation of sea-bed
resources,-which were still under discussion within the Working Group. The functions of
the organization would depend to a large degree on the system of exploration and
exploitation that was adopted. In 1971 Poland had submitted a working paper (A/AC.138/44)
to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses.of the Sea-:Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the
Limits.of National Jurisdiction in which it had expressed its views for the first time
on the main questions concerning the organization, and particularly on its.functions
and powers,, but the situation had changed since 1971, and his delegation was.prepared to
modify its position to some extent. For instance,, it was ready to accept wider
functions for the organization, namely, to agree that the organization should be directly
involved in exploration and exploitation activities. in that respect the best system of
exploitation would be a.mixed one, under which exploitation was conducted either
Idirdotly by.the organization, by States or groups of States or by natural or juridical
persons acting under their authority or sponsorship. It should be pointed out in that
connexion that acceptance of the possibility of direct exploration and exploitation of
:sea--bed resources did not exclude the possibility of the organization entrusting certain
',tasks to other entities through service contracts, association or other legal
ti
arrangements. Moreover, as to the exploration and exploitation by States, it should be
;understood that States would be acting under the control of the organization and in
accordance with the rules and regulations concerning such activities. The organization
Iwould therefore have wide operational-functions in the exploration and exploitation of
sea-bed resources.
Moreover, the organization should have powers to deal with the problem of equitable
sharing of benefits derived from the exploration and exploitation of the Area, in
.:particular the power to impose on States and other entities acting under their authority
fees and payments in connexion with their exploration and exploitation activities.
He had mentioned only some of the functions of the organization, but all the
functions and all the powers entrusted to.it'should be clearly defined. On the other
hand, the organization should. not have power to control other activities - for example,
scientific research - which were permitted under the existing rules of general
international law and did not need to be modified.
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As to the nature of the organization, his delegation endorsed the view that it
would be a stz i.eneris organization, different from the specialized agencies of the
United Nations system. It followed from that that the decision-making process should
be different from that applied in the specialized agencies. He would not deal in
detail with the composition of the main organs of the organization or the voting
system to be adopted, but would merely state that a decision-making system should be
devised in which the legitimate interests and needs of all States were taken into
consideration and that that system should be based on an appropriate composition of
the organs and an appropriate voting system. The Assembly would obviously be
composed of all member States. The composition of the Council, on the other hand, gave
rise to problems; the interests of all regional groups should be represented and at
least two fifths of the members of the Council should be representatives of land-locked
and other geographically disadvantaged States. Lastly, his delegation was not in
favour of granting any special privileges to some States or groups of States; it
considered that no State or group of States should be dominated by others. The system
of taking'decisions by simple majority or Bien by a two-thirds majority did not give
sufficient guarantees in that respect, and a different system of voting should be
devised.
Mr. (Israel) said that it would be both wise and rational to draw,
in creating the future authority, on experience gained with other international
organizations of a universal character and on the Conference's tacit agreement
concerning the decision-making process in the assembly. The executive organ should
represent the interests of all the contracting States, but as its membership would be
limited, the example of the International Monetary Fund, in which delegations did not
represent their own countries alone, but were also mandated to represent other
countries, might be followed.
It should be remembered'that the concept of the common heritage of mankind did
not apply only to the sea-bed of the. international Area; the tendency to restrict that
concept was a recent development. The fact that a number of States had submitted
proposals concerning sharing of revenues derived from the exploitation of the resources
beyond the international Area clearly proved that not all States were encouraging the
tendency to encroach upon the common heritage of mankind. That seemed to be 'the main
result of the Conference. In that context, he stressed that the geographically
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disadvantaged States would gain nothing from some of the results achieved by the
conference and that the term "geographically disadvantaged State" had been defined
.extremely loosely.
As -far as basic research was concerned, his delegation had made its views known
;luring the debate on the economic implications. The Convention should entrust research
policy to an expert committee whose decisions would be binding once they had been
iccepted by the contracting States; the Chicago Convention on International Civil
aviation could be taken as a model in that respect.
Finally,-effective and compulsory machinery for the settlement of disputes should
)e provided and a permanent independent organ should be created within the framework of
.he authority.
Mr. PERISIC (Yugoslavia) said that he fully shared the views which the
epresentative of Peru, speaking as co-ordinator of the Group of 77, had expressed at
he previous meeting. His delegation considered that in establishing international
achinery three basic elements of the Declaration of Principles should be taken into
account. They were common ownership, common administration and common distribution of
;cnefits. A strong authority should therefore be established.
The assembly, as the supreme and representative organ of the authority, should
j
ave the broadest political and normative powers. It should be empowered to issue
olicy directives to the council and the other organs of the authority. As the
epresentative of Peru had said, it should also have residuary .power. Its decisions
ould be governed by the principle of the sovereignty and equality of States, with each
state having one vote and decisions on questions of substance requiring a two-thirds
Majority.
The council, as the executive body of the authority, should, in its work, follow
he policy directives issued by the assembly. While the principle of geographical
istribution should be observed in its composition, special interests of States should
taken into account within the geographical groups. Financial or economic power
uld not be a criterion for permanent membership or a special position in the council,
cid no system of weighted votes was acceptable. The principle of rotation of membership
,Mould be applied..
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Responsibility for planning the production of minerals from the international
Area should be vested in a special unit of the authority, having regard to the
decisions on raw materials taken at the sixth special session of the General Assembly
and by UNCTAD. The special unit should be responsible for regulating production
so as to avoid adverse effects on land producers of the same raw materials.
The enterprise, the authority's agency responsible for operations, should
undertake all the activities entrusted to it by the Convention, the assembly or
the council. It should engage in such activities either on its own or by entering
into contracts, joint ventures or other forms of association with natural or legal
persons. The assembly, however, should not be precluded from seeking other forms of
participation in exploration and exploitation activities in the Area in accordance
with article 9 of the draft articles presented by the Group of ?7.
His delegation supported the idea of having two subsidiary organs, namely
a planning commission which would advise the council on plans for the exploration
and exploitation'of roscurces, and a unit responsible for supervising, among other
things, the protection of the marine environment and the safety and protection of
human life.
Consideration might be given to setting up two separate bodies for the
settlement of disputes, one responsible for settling disputes on the application
of the Convention, and the other for disputes arising out of exploration and
exploitation activities in the Area. That distinction took into account the fact
that the enterprise and the authority itself might be parties to a dispute.
Mr. WJTJPTSCIIE (German Democratic Republic) said that the only way to solve
development problems was through co-operation among States. That could be achieved,
as experience had shown, only by strict observance of the principle of the
sovereignty and equal rights of States, and non-interference in the internal affairs
of States. Hence, the organization or authority to be set up should observe those
principles and could, not be a supranational body.
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His delegation agreed with the representative of Poland on the functions and
.iat-ure of the organization. It should consist of an assembly, a council, a
Secretariat, an exploitation commission and an operations commission. The assembly
could set up the subsidiary bodies it needed to perform its. functions; every member
State would be represented in it, and it would have regular annual sessions. It
could decide, by means of recommendations, on matters of substance. The council, as
the executive organ, would be set up by the assembly. The principle of equitable
..ographical distribution should be observed in_its composition, having due regard
or the special interests of some States$ His delegation was prepared to consider the
proposal on the composition of the council made by the delegation of Kenya at the
brevious meeting. -
The exploitation commission should comply with the council's decisions and be
responsible for the exploration and exploitation of the international Area. It would
recruit the staff it needed, purchase and install the necessary equipment, and put
raw materials on the world market. It might conclude agreements on behalf of the
organization and would spend the funds allocated to it. The exploration and
exploitation plans it prepared would have to be approved by the council before
implementation. Moreover, an operations commission., acting under the council's
authority, would have to be set up to co-prdinate the exploration and exploitation
Finally, the organization should promote the pacific settlement of disputes
'``:among member States or between the organization and its members, in accordance with
the Charter, the Convention, and other rules of international law. If necessary,
the organization should have legal personality in international law, and the requisite
legal capacity for the performance of its functions in the territory of its members.
Miss MARTIN SA2IF (France) said that she agreed with most of the views
expressed by the representative of the United States. Her delegation considered it
essential that the scope of the authority's competence should be clearly defined and
that it should not be allowed to exceed it. A balance should be established between
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the developing and the industrialized countries, and it was important that no situation
should be allowed to arise in which one group of States could automatically impose
its will on another. On the contrary, the interests of all States should be
safeguarded. V
The Conference was endeavouring to set up an or.ganization.of a completely
new type. It was a matter for regret, therefore, that the tendency within the
United Nations was to invoke precedents, to cling to the past and to, ignore the
future. In her view, action must be taken to remedy that defect.
Her delegation considered that no agreement on machinery could be reached until
the basic conditions governing the exploration and exploitation of the Area's
resources were known. .
Mr. VELLA (Malta) said that other speakers had concentrated less on the
structure, functions and powers of the authority than on the necessity for the
authority to take account in the exercise of its functions of special interests.
His delegation had no objection to the management of the common heritage in such a
way as to benefit all countries.- In order to achieve that, however, account had to
be taken of interests other than those most frequently mentioned. In fact, the
'exchange of views on -the question might well give the impression that there was a
.conflict of interests between the industrialized countries and the land-based
producers of raw materials. A large number of developing countries fell into neither
category; they took the view that the minerals produced from the international area
could, be a stabilizing force, protecting their economies from fluctuations that
affected their economic development plans. In that context it was necessary, in
defining which of the developing countries were major importers of land-based minerals
that could also be produced from the Area, to take into account the needs of the
economy of the country in question rather than some global criterion that would be
meaningless in that country's particular circumstances; otherwise, the participation
of many small developing countries in the work of the authority, particularly that
of its executive organs, would be seriously jeopardized. .
With regard to the structure of the authority, he had been particularly impressed
by the way in which the representative of Trinidad and Tobago had analysed the
relationship of the various organs of the authority. Whatever structure was ultimately
agreed upon, however, it should be sufficiently flexible to enable the authority to
respond to needs as they arose.
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The authority would also be interested in scientific research to be conducted
in the area and that interest, as well as any others, would be better served if
the authority was able to supervise, on beh if of the international 'community as a
whole, the activities undertaken in the area.
Mr. W ZZLU (Romania) considered that all States should be represented in
the assembly, which should have wide powers. The council - the executive organ of
the authority -, should have only limited powers, which it would exercise under the
control of the assembly. Moreover, one organ should be specifically responsible for
direct exploration and exploitation in the international Area under the control of
9
" the assembly. The States parti?-s to the future Convention :should undertake to promote
the transfer of technology and the exchange of scientific knowledge through programmles
for the benefit of the developing countries. The authority could establish pe:c.anent
machinery for the acquisition, dissemination and transfer of scientific and
technological knowledge and for training nationals of developing countries so as to
ensure that those countries participated fully in the activities carried on in the
Area
The members of the executive orc;ans should be elected by the assembly on the
bass; of equitable geographical distribution and representation of the various
interest groups, no country or group of countries havirZ any preponderance of power.
The members of the executive organs should be replaced periodically, and the..
executive posts should change hands from time. to time so that all States were
`represented equitably.
The assembly should have policy-malting powers and be able to give directions
to the council and to the operational body., It would elect the members of the
council, approve the budget of the Authority, consider reports from the council
the operational body, Promote scientific research in the Area and adopt criteria fc,r
' , .,.
the equitable sharinf, of ,.lie benefits s deri cd from the Area and its s reso,,-r.~cos. `-Ph e
council and the operational body should have only executive powers. In conclusion,
his delegation considered that the assembly y should have all t. powers :e ry reqt.lre c,4. ' far the manag;einent, exploration, e:cpioitation and control of the international
The principle that the sea-bed and its :resources were the common heritage of n,enkind
and should be exploited in the interests of mankind.. with club rn;rr--rd,. to the needs
and interests of the developing countries, should be reflected in the structure,
functions and powers of the authority.
The meetinfr rose at ]..10 p.m.
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