UNITED NATIONS THIRD CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA SECOND SESSION FIRST COMMITTEE PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING

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• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 12, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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yTS+:tXd
THIRD C"ONFERENCE
THE LAVV OF THE SEA
PROVISIONAL
For participants only
A/CONF.62/C.l/SR.13._
12 August 1974
Second Session
FIRST COMIUTTEE
PRO7ISIONAL SUMMARY ~'?'CORD OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING
Held at the Pardue Central, Caracas,
on Thursday, 8 August 1974, at 10.15'a.m.
Chairman: Mr. ENGO
United Republic of Cameroon
Raj?porteur: Mir. MOTT Australia
Economic implications of sea-bcd exploitation: report of the
Secretary--General (continued)
Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the four working languagos
(English, French, Russian or Spanish), preferably in the same language as the text to
which they refer. Corrections should be :one in quadru l_icai e within five warkin _, days
to the Chief, Documents Controls Room 9, Rivet Lecuna, Edif'icio Anauco, and also
incorporated in one copy of the record..
AS THIS RECORD WAS DIST3IDU1` ED ON 12 AUGUST 1974, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS
WILL BE 19 AUGUST 1974.
The co-operation of participants in strictly observing this time-limit would be
greatly appreciated.
C-5385
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ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SEA-BED EXPLOITATION: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
(A/CONF.62/25) (continued)
Mr. OGISO (Japan) said that the question of economic implications was
important not simply because the powers and functions of the international authority
would be determined in the light of the conclusions drawn by the Conference but because
the future economic welfare of the international community depended on it. The
international community must make its decisions on the basis of an understanding of the
consequences those decisions might entail. In his delegation's view the question had
not received the attention it merited in the Sea-Bed Committee, and he thought that the
recent seminar had marked a major step forward.
It had emerged in the seminar that there was clear recognition that the possible
economic effects described in the report of the Secretary-General (A/CONF.62/25) and
those of UNCTAD were merely forecasts based on uncertain assumptions. His delegation
shared the view that forecasting the economic effects of sea-bed production was
particularly difficult because the nodule industry was'not yet an ongoing industry and
because vital information in its possession had not been made generally available.
Experts had pointed out that a nodule mining operation might not be as profitable as
claimed by the representatives of industry, who had other motives for presenting sea-bed
mining as a profitable proposition from the outset. His delegation agreed with that
view and believed that a re-appraisal should be made of the schedule for new nodule
operations.
Particular attention had been paid to preventive and compensatory measures and,
to a lesser degree, commodity arrangements, as means of preventing the adverse effects
of sea-bed production. His delegation agreed with the view that such measures involved
practical difficulties of application and would have a tendency to increase the prices
of the principal metals found in manganese nodules, to the detriment of all consumer
countries.
The most important feature of the seminar had been the growing awareness of the
importance of sea-bed production for the consumer countries as a whole,, the question
of economic implications was now being seen not only from the viewpoint of land-based
producer countries but also from that of consumer countries, especially the developing
countries which did not even have land-based resources to be affected by sea-bed
production. That significant development might be the crux of the whole question.
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(Mr. Ogiso, Ja an)
There had recently been a disruption of the world commodities situation; the
effects of the ensuing confusion had-spread through the world to the detriment of all
countries. His delegation 'did not agree that only the developed States would be
affected either favourably or adversely by a change in the resources situation. The
developing country consumers which lacked resources would be the main victims.
Accordingly, the maintenance of stability in the commodity markets benefited all
countries but in particular the developing country consumers. As one of the largest
consumers of metals and importers of ores., his country was very sensitive with regard
to the supply and demand of minerals. It was concerned about the capacity of
land-based mines to meet the increasing demands for such metals as nickel and copper
so as to keep their prices stable. Its pessimism was based in particular on the
recent behaviour of various commodity markets which were feeling the impact of the
expanding world economy and rapidly growing population.. Commodity markets were
increasingly governed bf :non--economic factors such as producer cartels. Some experts
believed that the price's of some metals would rise even with increased sea-bed
production. Sea-bed production could help to remedy the situation by providing
alternative sources of supply of minerals at present ccncentrated in the hands of a
small number of countries. Accordingly, the regime for sea-bed exploitation should
provide for the protection and promotion of such production in order to ensure
investments from private sources.
His delegation understood the concern of. developing producer countries at the
prospect of losing earnings as a result of price reductions due to sea-bed production,
but it thought that such reductions would not occur in the foreseeable future. It
supported any reasonable measures designed to alleviate the difficulties of developing
country exporters. Howe,Ter, in determining the policy for the exploitation of sea-bed
minerals, the Conference Wets required to take into consideration many,. sometimes
conflicting, objectives. The important thing was to harmonize those objectives so
that the exploitation of sea-bed resources could be translated into real benefits for
the international community. To achieve-that aim his delegation was prepared to
support comprehensive long-term production planning designed to stabilize the prices
of important minerals found in manganese nodules.
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Mr. RATINER (United States of America) recalled-that the head of his delegation
had already stated that means should be sought for accommodating the concerns of
land-based producers in the developing countries if it became clear that the sea-bed
production would harm them, but that consumers must also be protected from artificial
price increases.
It had emerged from the Committee's discussions that it was impossible to verify
that sea-bed production would in fact reduce the output or income of the producers
of nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese in the developing countries from their
present levels.
The working paper submitted by his'delegation to the Committee'.s informal seminar
contained an estimate of the effects of sea-bed production on land-based producers
slightly different from the one in the most recent report of the Secretary-General
on that subject (A/CONF.62/25), which in its turn differed somewhat from the
conclusions in the studies prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat (A/CONF.62/26). Several
delegations had expressed the view that analysis of statistical variations in those
reports was better left to economists and technicians. However, the uncertainty
surrounding economic estimates' had to be taken into account in developing treaty
texts to solve the questions of how to protect both producers and consumers in the
developing countries.
his delegation seriously doubted whether sea-bed production would result in any
decline from present levels of production or in the total revenues of land-based
producers within the forecast period of the Secretary-General's report.. Other
delegations thought that the possibility of such a decline was greater, and had
presented suggestions for the solution of the problem as they saw it. Implementation
of any of those schemes would require comprehensive data concerning market factors,
whose accuracy could never be verified with absolute precision. The authority would
need to predict the behaviour of'four global markets whose present combined value
totalled thousands of millions of dollars. It would need to contend: with production
variables in numerous producer countries and demand factors in over 150 nations. The
margin of error in such data would obviously be substantial, to say nothing of the
problem of extrapolating economic trends into the future. For example, one of the
most commonly discussed means of regulating sea-bed production would be to limit
the sea-bed area open for exploitation in any given year. At the time such a decision
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(Mr. Ratiner, United States)
was made, the authority would be basing its recommendation on projections. concerning
future markets three to 10 years in advance, since approximately that period.was _
needed't.o.bring a deep-sea mining unit into full-scale operation. It would have to
project production not only from present producers. but from potential new,land-based
producers. Given the difficulties regarding market projections, his delegation
questioned whether even the most capable of experts could guarantee a satisfactory
data base for decisions of that nature.
Implementation of those schemes would.also require the ability to take measures
influencing global markets. Most of the proposals had been limited to controls over
sea--bed production,but that production would account for only a small segment of
the world's total for most of the metals in the foreseeable future. Thus, as the
United.States working paper explained, limiting the level of mineral recovery from.
the sea-bed might not appreciably affect global markets. Moreover, production
restrictions on. sea-bed output..would not provide the authority with an effective
tool for selectively protecting individual metal markets. because of the joint product
nature.. of sea-bed operations.
Finally, even if it were possible to implement some of those proposals, there
would still be no acceptable means of protecting onlyproducers..in the developing
countries. Producers from the developed countries accounted for .a large share, of
total world output for the metals in question. Moreover, implementation of any of.
the schemes could result in economic costs to consumers of all countries, both
developed and developing, far in excess of the benefits to land-based producers.
.A solution. to the problem of developing country producers must be found, but it
must maintain a. considered balance among all economic interests,, particularly those of
the consuming countries in order to maximize the benefits of sea-bed exploitation
for all mankind. Given the inadequacy of the information available, it was clearly
impossible to take a decision.on what should be the exact nature of that balance.
his delegation was convinced that no other delegation would wish to agree to treaty
articles purporting. to determine. in advance a solution to a problem whose parameters
were speculative.. The Committee must seek for an accommodation providing a mechanism
for reviewing on,a continental basis whether the problem did in fact exist, what its
true dimensions were, and what measures could most appropriately be taken to solve it
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Pir. KALONDJI TSHIKCtALA (Zaire), speaking on behalf of the African group, said
that the countries of Africa wer:c not opposed to the development of technology
or to new ways of increasing the resources available to mankind. Their concern was
to see that the general wealth was shared fairly among all nations; they would
support the search for new riches only if they were fairly distributed.
The African continent, where most of the least developed countries were situated
would feel the harmful effects of sea--bed exploitation most severely. Africa was
the world's largest producer of raw materials, and its attempts to industrialize
depended on their exploitation. If the technology of the extraction of minerals from
the sea--bed brought about low production costs, the economies of the African countries
would immediately be adversely affected. The reports of the Secretary-General and
of UI.JCTAD demonstrated not only that it would soon be possible to exploit the resources
of the sea-bed but that the producers of land-based minerals would suffer. He did
not wish to go into the question of when the exploitation of nod-ales would begin; the
point was that the effects of such exploitation were potentially harmful for the
developing countries - a point brought out clearly at the seminar.
The African countries could not accept the argument that only a few developing
countries would be affected while the majority benefited. that was a biased view
put forward as a palliative for the developing countries. It must be remembered
that all developing countries were potential producers of raw materials; they must
not be stripped of the hope of industrializing and raising their standard of living.
The developed countries were willing to make large investments in the extraction
of minerals from the sea-bed because they would clearly benefit therefrom. The
reports had shown that the oceans were a huge reservoir of resources and that the
conditions for profitable exploitation already existed. Such exploitation would
obviously compete with the more costly land-based production, with harmful effects
on the latter's profitability. Corrective measures must be found to mitigate such
effects and prevent any widening of the gap between developed and developing
countries. Of the two principal methods proposed, the African countries preferred
preventive measures; compensatory measures were impractical, provided'insufficient
guarantees and would be subject to bureaucratic delays. There would never be proper
compensation for the developing countries affected. Compensation should therefore,
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(Ir._ Kalond i T6hikala, Zaire)
be used only as a supplementary measure. Strict control of production and positive
action by the international authority with regard to prices could alone ensure that
the exploitation of maritime resources did not prove fatal for developing country
producers. The system of base prices must be treated with caution because it might
prove unjust. There should be a specific clause in the convention empowering the
international authority to control all economic activities, especially the production
of minerals, and to impose proper price controls, taking into account the interests
of developing country producers and the current state of the development of technology.
The principle of complementarity of the exploitation of land-based and sea-bed resources
must also be clearly established. There was no need to rush to exploit the sea-bed
while land-based resources were still sufficient. Uncontrolled exploitation would
lead to over-consumption and the exhaustion of the resources, to the detriment of
future generations.
The analysis he had given was based on a simple principle. the resources of the
sea-bed were the common heritage of mankind and should be managed for the benefit
of mankind as a whole, special account being taken of the interests of the developing
countries. The exploitation of the resources must be wisely managed: anarchy would
not benefit consumers, but rational exploitation would benefit all mankind. The
international community must defend the right of every country to survival. The
African countries advocated an instrument covering the whole international zone,
which should not establish the right of the strongest or of the first comers but
ensure that the general interest prevailed.
Sir RoL,'er JACKLING (United Kingdom) noted that economic implications
formed-the backdrop for the debates at Caracas, as they had done for the six years
of discussion in the Sea-Bed Committee. During the second of the seminars arranged
by the Chairmen during the previous week many delegations had expressed the fear
that there would be adverse economic implications from sea-bed exploitation not only
for developing country producers but for developing countries as a whole. His
delegation did not believe that that argument had been proved; on the contrary,
it believed that despite the uncertainties of forecasting, the economic implications
would be favourable for as far into the future as predictions could usefully be
made. Only in the most exceptional circumstances w d ~ even
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(Sir Roger Jackling, United Kingdom)
Zaire, which dominated the supply of cobalt, to be affected adversely. However,
his Government was prepared to consider action to safeguard countries. against
any possible adverse effects, however remote. For example, commodity agreements
might be considered, provided that they were not restricted to the resources of.
the sea--bed alone. His delegation did not agree with the spokesman for the African
countries that it would be appropriate for the international authority to assume
responsibility for such arrangements. They would be much better handled in a
forum with less restricted functional and geographical limits. An attempt to
create suitable arrangements within the limited context of marine resources would
face immense practical difficulties.
The main problem now facing mankind in the context of the item under discussion
was to meet the increasing demand for minerals. That challenge had been met successfully
by geologists, mining engineers and mineral technologists since man had first used
minerals. What had once been regarded as hopelessly low--graded deposits of.
certain metals were now, thanks to new technology, an essential source of supplies.
Far from having adverse economic implications for mankind as a whole, or even for
the main producers, the results had been wholly beneficial to consumers and producers
alike.
His country regarded the development of deep--sea resources as an analogous
breakthrough which was likely to have similarly beneficial effects. To achieve
equitable distribution of such benefits, the highly industrialized countries must
contribute the technical and financial capabilities needed for the development of
the resources. In exchange the enterprises concerned'must receive an equitable
return on their investment. His delegation was sure that. if those principles were
accepted, the Committee would be able to embody them in legal drafts. However, before
negotiations could begin there must be an understanding of all the interrelated issues
involved. It was impossible, for example, to negotiate about a regime without
knowing what the applicable conditions might be. For that reason alone his
delegation had misgivings about the kind of programme that had been outlined at
the preti.,,us meeting. It hoped that the informal meetings now being held would
be the occasion for a frank exchange of ideas on the conditions of exploration
and exploitation.
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Air. BAOABE (Argentina) said that there were two aspects to exploitation of
the resources of the international zone. On the one hand, such exploitation. involved
the possibility of obtaining minerals from ,new sources located in the sea-bed:.'beyond
..the limits of national jurisdiction. That could be analysed in'objective economic
terms-, particularly with regard to whether its cost was competitive with=that of
land--based mineral products. On the other hand, one had to consider. the effect-which
obtaining minerals from that new source could have on present world production, both
from emerged territory and from continental shelves.
With regard to.the first aspect, it was necessary to prospect and explore the
international zone systematically in order to determine the extent of reserves and the
quantity and quality of the minerals. It was also necessary to, find the most
appropriate systems for extraction, which would involve taking into account, inter alia,
depth, meteorological and marine conditions-and the position-of the minerals. An
optimum system of transportation had to. be found. It should also be taken into account
that the metallurgical process, if not yet,.wo.rk.ed out, would-be worked out in the near
..:future, since technological obstacles could be-quickly overcome through the refining
or combining of kncwn!'methods or the use of new:ones.' However, environmental effects
would also have to taken into account so that operations could be developed with a
-view to preserving the environment and remaining resources. It was also necessary to
exploit rationally, since the exact 'extent of reserves was not known, otherwise, the
only criterion wuuld be market conditions.
With regard to the effect of exploitation of the international zone on land-based
production, it was 'safe to say that many countries had not et completely explored
most of their emerged territory and that there were good,reasons for expecting new
deposits to be discovered which could be exploited under existing technological and
economic conditions. Moreover, in view of increasing demand, it was improbable that
land-based production would cause a reduction in market prices. On the other hand,
there was' every indication, as the reports of tJ1111CTAB and the Secretary-General showed,
that metals obtained from sea-bed nodules would cost much less than those obtained
on land.
The knowledge gained so far indicated that sea-bed resources would provide mankind
with minerals for a long time to come and that any concern that they would be exhausted
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(Mr. Basabe, Argentina)
or depleted was unwarranted, particularly if it was taken into account that, unlike
land-based resources, sea-bed minerals were to a certain extent renewable.
The difference between the mining of new land deposits and the mining of marine
deposits was that while in the case of the former production in large quantities and
at a lower cost was an uncertain possibility, in the case of sea-bed mining such
production was a strong probability and could be started in the near future.
Thus, seabed mining was truly viable and could be expected to develop and to
influence the world market. Increased production of minerals, probably at lower cost,
would be a positive development for mankind, since it would provide a greater supply.
However, if it caused a lowering of prices or a decline in production in land mining,
it could become a negative development for part of mankind, namely the developing
countries which exported the same products as were found in the sea-bed.
It must be realized that those possible harmful consequences would not be limited
to marketing aspects, such as a lowering in prices or difficulty in disposing of
production, but also might.. involve such direct consequences as cessation of mining in
areas which were or might later become marginal, with resulting unemployment and loss
of essential income for those developing countries.
Argentina's domestic production of metalliferous minerals was grossly inadequate,
and importation of those minerals, of metals and of chemical by-products had risen
to an average of $US 400 million per year. To compensate for that situation,
Argentina had planned a mining development project designed to achieve self-sufficiency
and the establishment of processing industries. In other words, his country would not
be adversely affected by increased production of minerals or by a possible lowering
in prices. On the contrary, its economy could be benefited by a lowering or
stabilization of the prices of raw materials for export.
However, his country still advocated an international policy based on justice and
Support for the developing countries. Argentina was convinced that effective
aethods should be applied which would minimize the adverse effects of exploitation
.nd compensate for their consequences, and it was prepared to support such measures
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(Mr. Basabe, Argentina)
as part pf a package deal adopted by the Conferonce,.taking.into account the interests
of both export ~r;i and J.m'p otters. of metals. Some members of the international
community could not be allowed to benefit at the expense 'of others, since that would
mean the perpetuation of a system which must be done away with once and for all.
Hence it was necessary to decide. immediately to establish ,a strong and flexible
organ empowered to regulate,the.entire process, so that any deviation from its
balanced development could be prevented.
'Mr. STEFANO PISSAII (Cuba)' said that although some representatives would
have'one believe otherwise, the interests of the countries which produced commercially
exploitable land-based resources of the same kind as those to be found in the sea-bed
and subsoil, i.e. the developing countries, were, as always, opposed. to the interests
of the consumer-countries which Mould benefit from exploitation of the sea-bed,
ire. the developed capitalist countries. Studies by international bodies confirmed
that even if fees were paid by concessionaires to an international authority, it
would be the developed countries which would benefit commercially from the extraction
of such resources and that by 1980 the income of the developing countries would
be $160 million lower than what it would be if the sea-bed were not exploited. Even
that $160 million figure was modest compared with the detriment that developing
countries would suffer in other ways if measures were-not taken to avoid such
harmful effects.
The imperialist countries were maintaining that exploitation of sea-bed resources
would in the long run have adverse effects on only about a dozen developing countries.
That-'strate was designed to divide and rule, i.e. to divide the developing
.countries, or the Group of 77,,which were united in their interests. Not 'a dozen but
a?hundred countries would be.affected. The eloquent statement of the spokesman
for the African. countries had very effectively answered the imperialist countries'
arguments
Despite what.the representative of Argentina had said, many countriess were
active in exploiting sea-bed resources. The benefits derived from those resources
should be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, especially of the developing
countries, and that required the establishment of an appropriate international
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(iv1r. Stefano Pissani, Cuba)
The representative of:Ghana had correctly analysed on the previous day the position
of those who argued that when mineral prices fell, so did the prices of finished products.
In fact, as studies at both the national and international levels had shown, there was
an increasing disproportion between prices of raw materials and finished products. The
developed countries were to blame for the inflation which affected the developing
countries, and that phenomenon, which had occurred with renard to land.-base' resources,
could also occur with sea-bed resources if steps were not taken to prevent it.
While at an earlier stage the capitalist monopolies had merely taken. advantage of the
lowest prices they could find, today's multinational enterprises, representing the
culmination of a lengthy centralization process, now set prices. They must not be
allowed to use sea-bed resources to strengthen that price-setting position.
Sea-bed resources had to be viewed in the light of three factors: their
consequences for international trade; the benefits t1'ey would bring to consumers,
especially in the developed countries; and their adverse effects on producer countries,
which were mainly developing countries.
It was significant that, at.a meeting the previous week, there had been no adequate
response to his delegation's questions concerning the tendency of some countries to
produce substitutes for the products of developing countries. In particular, no
explanation had been given as to the economic impact of that phenomenon on land-based
resources, and perhaps later on sea-bed resources, or as to why the phenomenon occurred
and how its consequences could be prevented.
Another phenomenon, to which the representative of Trinidad and Tobago had referred,
was the disproportion between the talent available to developed and developing countries.
That was the result not only of structures of dependency but also of the "brain drain',
which was in fact the theft of brains. Experts, trained by the developing countries
at considerable cost, were then stolen by other countries for their own benefit. In
the case of the Latin American countries, the cost of training such experts was much
greater than the aid those countries received from the Power which stole them.
A strateV had to be adopted to put an end to price-setting and to avoid the
harmful consequences of the exploitation of sea-bed resources. Even such measures
would not be enough, however, unless the principle of the common heritage of mankind
was given its-full meaning. The same Powers which had pillaged the land were now ready
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Mr. HARA+iI (Israel) said that the present debate.involved not. only the
implications of deep-sea mining but those of the establishment of an international
regime for the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction.
The availability of additional resources from sea-bed exploitation was a positive
development which should be welcomed by all who were interested in the material
progress of mankind. However, as the General Assembly had indicated, there had to be
an equitable sharing by all States in the benefits to. be derived from those resources.
In that regard, there were two relevant criteria: the state of development of the
recipient country, and the advantages it would obtain from the establishment of the
new regime.
The sea-bed was not res nuliius but res communis. That referred not only to the
international arc a. Any extension of marine resources jurisdiction providing
additional revenues should. therefore lead to some form of sharing of those revenues
with the international community. Any articles adopted by the Conference on---operations
of the international authority should contain provisions for receipt by that
aua :' :r .' J of such revenues.
It also had to be rom.embered that sea-bed exploitation might produce hardships
to developing countries which produced the same minerals that would be mined in the
international zone. Opinions were divided on the severity of those hardships, but
whatever their extent, their negative effects must be avoided at all costs. The
authority must therefore have special. regard to the problem of the developing
countries, and a draft article, along the lines of the Jamaican proposal, should
certainly be incl.i.ded in the future Convention. Machinery should also be established
to monitor economic development and to decide whether any countervailing action was
called for. In particular, the would have to decide on the "mix" of
actions to-betaken.
In that rega-?d, there.were two types of actions, preventive and compensatory.
Preventive action .in^luded price-fixing and restrictions on output. The latter meant
that the sea-bed area would become a marginal producer of minerals, producing them
if and when world market conditions permitted. His delegation could not agree to that
approach, which ryas contrary to the "common heritage" approach that provided for a
sharing of resou,~Ices.
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Er.3g:lish
Pac i.4
(TV'[r. Haran, Israel)
Another type of preventive, action was comodity agreements which, historically
speaking, had sometimes worked and sometimes not. His delegation was prepared to
leave that matter to the authority, allowing it the right to participate in such
agreements at its discretion. It might also be appropriate to include in the Convention
certain guiding principles as to how the authority should act; those principles should
be in keeping with the standards developed by UNCTAD, such as the principle of stable,
equitable and remunerative prices and. that of maximization of benefits to developing
countries as a whole.
Compensatory measures should not be excluded from the principles of action, since
they were selective and therefore perhaps most effective. They should be financed from
revenues derived from mining activities conducted both within and outside the
international zone.
Mr. BENNOUNA (Morocco) said that the Secretary-General's report on the
economic implications of sea-bed mineral development 'in the international area
(A/CONF.62/25) mentioned that Morocco was one of the countries which would suffer
from exploitation-of the sea-bed mineral development in the international area, in
particular with respect to cobalt and manganese.
The report made it clear that cobalt was an expensive metal with a relatively
limited market. Between. 1970 and 1972, 76 per cent of cobalt output, or 23,000 tons,
came from the developing countries. Projected world demand for 1985 was 60,000 tons
as against nodule production of 30,000 tons. Those figures showed that traditional
producers would keep only half the world market, with probable adverse consequaa es
on their income.
In quoting those facts he did not wish to draw any conservative conclusions,
for the commodity needs of the international community would grow. His delegation
would like to collaborate in working out a method that would reconcile the legitimate
interests of the consuming and the producing countries, although the latter ought to
have a certain priority in view of the terms of paragraph 6 of the Declaration of
Principles (General Assembly resolution 27+9 (XXV)). An. imaginative
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('.'."X. Bonnouna9 Morocco)
for r llu' must bt devised in order to avoid disantLou canaequences to the
producing countries. An answer had to be found to the question of what regulations
were to be imposed on future exploitation in the area, and what the competences and
powers of the future international authority were to be. The institutional and
regulatory aspects were thus closely linked.
In the report of the UNCTAD :vec:,etariat, a number of methods were put forward.
His delegation endorsed the view of the Zaire representative that a preventive method
was needed. The future convention should provide for a committee in charge of planning
and stabilizing prices, with the following powers: (1) to plan nodule exploitation
in accordance with-forecasts of land-based production; (2) to distribute quotas
among the companies with which the international authority had service contracts;
(3) to establish buffer stocks where necessary; (1+) to modify unilaterally service
contracts, with indemnification under the supervision of a tribunal.
Some delegations had proffered reassuring statements that world demand was such
that the economic consequences on the earnings of the developing countries would be
minimal. However, the lawyer's task was to take precautions for the future.
Intr. FRANGOULIS (Greece) said that despite the documents produced by the
United Nations and UNCTAD secretariats, and the illuminating discussions at the
seminar, his delegation did not think it possible to judge with certainty what effects
on the economy of the developing countries exploitation of the-sea.-bed area would have.
Statistics could have no bearing on the. long-term planning being envisaged. At the
same time, he was gratified that no delegation had flatly rejected the suggestion
that there might be adverse effects on the economy of the developing countries. He
concluded that treaty articles should be drafted to meet any future contingency.
His delegation was in full sympathy with the suggestions put forward that the
interests of both the consumers and the producers should. be protected, but felt that
it was a general problem which could probably be better treated in other fora.
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(Mr. TF'rangoulis, Greece)
The Committee must give expression to the idea that in exploiting the common
heritage of mankind special*:attention should be paid to the interests of the developing
countries. It was hardly possible to envisage how that principle could be given concrete
form unless treaty articles were drafted to guard against the adverse effects of sea-bed
exploitation on the economy of the developing countries.
in his delegation's view an appropriate mechanism should be devised to prevent
and/or compensate for any negative effects on the economy of the developing countries.
Many international. instruments had been drawn up in recent years, some of which it had
not found necessary to apply. His delegation hoped that the treaty articles under
discussion might eventually fall into that category.
The CHAIRMAN recalled that at a previous meeting the representative of Chile
had asked the Chairman to repeat his summing up of the seminar on the economic
implications of sea-bed exploitation.
Mr. RATINER (United States of America) said'that his delegation had some
reservations about including that summing up in the summary record: it might give a
misleading impression in view of developments in the Committee's discussions since the
seminar. He would therefore prefer the Chairman to give an up-dated version of his
summary.
After a discussion in which Mr. KEITA (Kenya), Mr. KALONDJI TSHIKA A (Zaire),
Mr. KACHURENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), Mr. RATINER (United States of
America), Mr. BARNES (Liberia) and Mr. PRIETO (Chile) took part, the CHAIR:MMMAN suggested
that he should read out his summary at the present meeting, and at the next meeting of the
Committee give his personal impressions of the Committee's discussions.
It was so decided.
The C111_II .1Ai read out the following suramary:
"'As we conclude this two-day seminar on the important question of the impact
of sea-bed mining, I think I ought briefly to summarize the proceedings.
We set out to examine two major questions, The first relates to the adverse
effects of exploitation of sea-bed resources on the developing countries, whether
producers or not, The second is the steps which the international community,
notably the present Conference on the Law of the Sea, should take to meet any such
adverse effects.
/..?
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Page 17
(The Chairman)
'There appears to-be a. consensus even among experts, that, in the nature of
things, no available figures are in fact entirely reliable in. reflecting the current
realities, let alone future ones.
"With regard to the first.guestion, therefore, it is not surprising that no
direct answer was forthcoming. My impression is that the experts have been cautious
not to mare definite.positive comments on the subject because they cannot endorse
the fact by figures. They agree on the uncertainty about the type and volume of
untapped sea-bed resources; the future course, , of, technological developments; the
nature of future global needs and demands, seen in terms of the.rat.e.of development.
"It is clear, that the'all.egation that there will be adverse effects, remains
in principle unchallenged.: If.any,chall.enge exists, it is with respect to the
extent of it, This high uncertainty can only go to' increase the concerns of a large
section of the international community represented by the developing nations.
"This leads to the second question posed before us: what should the
international community -.'i.ea this Conference on the Law of the Sea - do in the
circumstances? It is coznmon''ground, I bel~eve, that the'state.,of affairs is
untenable and that our progranate for organizing the common heritage for the benefit
of mankind must ensure that adequate safeguards exist in the institutions we seek
to establish to cater for it.
"On the one hand, conditions must not be created to cripple completely the
profitable exploitation of the wealth of the area and the benefits deriving therefrom.
Mankind needs the type of rccsou~'ces and other benefits available in the area.
On the other hand, we cannot permit situations where such exploitation is
counter-productive - that is, that they produce adverse effects on producers of
land-based resources of the same kind.
"A fundamental question is: can this Conference produce detailed solutions in
terms of the models produced by experts? Can we agree on a formula to resolve the
problems posed, especially while experts find it difficult to submit a reliable one?
Are those participating in this Conference in a position to produce such solution
in 0-4-ail?
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/ .. .