DISCUSSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00527R000100110011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: MISC

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DISCUSSION
i, AS TO THE AT]THOULT2Y OF USCIB-USCIOC 1 ~l Or, T E COC, t,13 1,Jr (+,.sJt ',
GPERkTIONS.
NOTE- To avoid confusion in the following discussion,, it should
be borne in mind that the title of the Communication In-
telligence governing body underwent the following successive
changes as its membership was extended:
1, A.NCIR-ANCICC (original. Army-Navy membership),
2, STANCIIB--STANCICC (extended to include State Dept).
3, USCIB-U,SICCC (as at present constituted:' Army, Navy,
State, FBI, C IG,
1, Paragraphs 1, 2,. and 3 of Appendix A and Annexes C-1 and C-3 set
forth the. functions and objectives of ANCIB-ANCICC as originally stated,.
No actual, joint direction of joint operations appears to have been agreed
upon at that time,
2. The plan submitted by the Army on 9 May 1915 (See Annex D-l,.
Appendix A) provided that; "all reallocations of cryptanalytic responsi-
bilities as between the Army and Navy shall be made by this board" (ANCIB),
It further. provided that "any differences in policy will be reconciled by
ANC IB---_---" a
3. In the Nazy9 s proposed plan for collaboration and coordination of
C, I, .activities, dated 30 May 1945 (See Annex D-2 of Appendix A)., under
the elements of "Operational Control", the, already existing ANCIB was sug-
gested as the "Joint Poiicy.Board" to.be "charged with establishing joint
policies and coordinating the activities of the comiunication intelligence
organizations", It was further suggested that ANCICC be used as the Techni-
cal Coordinating Conraittee to function in accordance with directives of ANCIB,
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APPENDIX I3 - DISCUSSION (C ont r d )
Further. under the heading "Operations", in sub paragraph 39 in referring,
to non-military and non-naval problems it was suggested that other fields
of interest "-.-.-? will be assigned In conformity with policies establish-
ed by the Joint Policy Board (ANCIB )--._,_"o This plan also proposed actual
joint operations at certain points in the scheme of coordination,
L, As indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, both the Arty gnd the
Navy clearly envisaged extending functions specifically set forth in the
joint memorandum of 10 ,March l9k5, which was the original charter of ANCIB.
5. The exchange of memoranda between General Marshall and Admiral
King indicated dissatisfaction with the degree of integration existing un-
der the coordinating arrangements then in effect. The concept of joint
direction of joint effort was introduced in this exchange,.. ANCIB was
directed to study the problem and make recommendations toward improving
these arrangements, The Board on 22 August 19).G5 recommended combining
Az and Navy C. I. activities under joint direction. This was interpreted
by the Army to involve physical consolidation of Army.and Navy technical
facilities.
6. At the ANCICC meeting on 12 September 19)45, the Navy members in-
.dicated opposition to such physical consolidation of technical facilities
but expressed the desire to extend and ino.iove existing coordination and
collaboration between them in all matters of joint interests
7. The recommendations of the Board submitted on 22 August 19)5
were rejected by Admiral King who stated that the Navy must maintain com-
plete and independent control of the production, evaluation, and dissemina-
tion of Naval operational intelligence, and must not consolidate its. technical
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A PPENDD B-DISCUSS ION (Cot g d)
facilities with those of the As' n r This ?o fff.x,ied the principle, laid
down in the 30 May 1;045 plan., that joint operations should not include
purely Naval problems,
8, At a joint ANCIB-qINCICC meeting on 4 October 1945, it.was
brought out that the Army would agree to the maintenance of separate
Army and Navy cryptanalytic units., but that it desired then appointment
of a strong coordinating authority in the person of a director, The
Navy indicated preference for a "coordinator", rather than a "tdirector",
in charge of those C. I. activities to be conducted jointly, pointing
out that a "director" would be confronted with administrative difficulties
regarding funds, personnel., etc, The Navy urged that a "coordinator" be
.appointed to act within the framework of directives issued by ANCIB, These
differences obviously arose over the accepted implications of the two titles.
The Navy was Willing to accept the principle of unified direction oprational?
ly but not administratively,
9. By interchange of memoranda, commencing 28 December 1945, Admiral
Nimitz and General Eisenhower. expressed dissatisfaction over the previous
failure to reach an agreement for effecting full integration and joint
direction of joint effort in the C. I, field., and directed ANCIB to make
a fresh start on this problem,
10. Under date of 29 January l916, the Navy drew up a revision of
its 30 May 2945 plan, which revision proposed the inclusion in the STANCIB_
STANCICC (formerly ANCIB-AI EC) organization.of . a coordinator of joint
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APPENDIX B DISCT-TSSIONN' (Conte.d)
operationsnho would function under the dirrcc hives of ~T&NCLCC t.t coordinate
the Intercept Coverage., Process %7, arid Allocation of those tasks 4lich by
mutual agreement are a joint responsibility. of the, rrn~y and I3,: ,v im. At the
meeting on 13 February I9)46, this plan was discussed and agreement was
reached by the members to include a coordinator or direct(z of joint
operations with aaxthorify and responsibility to be defined by STNNCI? .
Genera. CorderirVan indicated that the coordinator must have full authority
and responsibility to accomplish his mission,, "embers agreed that this
authority and responsibility trust be clearly defined. The State Department
representative said that his Department :td an interest in the plan, be-
cause the amount of authority possessed by a or or coordinator would
affect the State Departments s relations with the technical agencies.
llv On the basis of discussions at the foregoing meeting and of sub-
sequent inforn.l conferences between members of ST'ANC]B and STANCICC., the
Navy plan of 29 January 1946 was redrafted to define more clearly the 're-
sponsibilities and authority of the coordinator. In the light of the Array, s
insistence upon adequate and definite authority for the coordinator, it is
significant to note that., whereas the plan of 29 January 1946 provided
specifically that the coordinator would function under directives of S` 1NCICC
to coordinate "thee revised plan specified that the coordinator would function
"under control of STANC.W STANCICC as executor of Tidies and directives for
the allocation of tasks" in the field of joint responsibility., and that he
would be charged with direction of the accomplishment of these joint tasks.
12. Furthermore., at the request of the Chief of ASA.e a stipulation was
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A PPENDL( B - DISCUSSION (C ont' d )
included that :
,,the operating heads of ASA and Op_2O'G wil be responsible. to
the coordinator for accomplishment of the, tasks allocated by
him",,
In reply to a question raised during the 13 February 1946 meeting of
ST? NCICCs as to hove the directives of the coordinator could be enforced,,
General Corderman, then Chief of ASk, stated that:
11.
"in any case where the coordinator had. dif i.culties with an
agency head, he could appeal to the agency head' s chief or
to STANC.Z3"0
At the S`,t'ANCII3-STANCi3C irceeting on 15 February 1946 (See Annex
K-i to Appendix A ), the intent of the plan was thoroughly discussed0
Admiral Stone stated that'
"it is the intent of the proposed plan to retain complete Navy
and ArrV, responsibili t for work on naval and military stems
4 pryctiveiy0 other communication aetiv1 ,es
- M
will be considered a o_n roj ect and will come under the
dire.*ction of the sd coordinator"0 (Urlderscorn supplied)
That both Army members and both Navy members of STANCIB considered
STA.NC7B to be the "governing body" under the plan, and the coordinator
to be under that body' s direction,, is clearly indicated in the minutes
of this meeting,,
]i4., In accordance with provisio.as of the approved plan of 15 February
19L6,. the Chief of ABA and Op-20-'G prepared an.outline of the "Dais:. A and
Responsibilities of they Coordinator of Joint Operations" for sabrn:ssion
to ST NCIB0 This outline was approved by STANCE on 22 April 194.60 (Annex
N to Appendix A )0 With regard to the. responsibilities and authority of
the coordinator and his relation to STANCIB and STINCICC, both this out-
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.-USSION (Cent' d)
line and the basic plan state specifically:
The Coordinator of Joint ati ons shall function, . v . a . o
under the control of STA NCIB-STA.NCICC as executor of policies
and directives formulated by STANCIB-STA.NCICC for the alloca-
tion of tasks for such intercept and. processing capacities as
may be made available for joint use by A and Op-20?G
the operating heads of . ASA and Op-20-G will be responsible to
the Coordinator for the accomplishment of the tasks allocated
by him. The Army will continue to be responsible for work on
military, and
be a, . oint ressonsibilit and shared accordingly, It is ex-
pected that a certain percentage of the intercept and pro-
cessing capacities will be reserved and controlled entirely
by ASt and Op-20?G respectively for the performance of the
strictly military or naval tasks. The remaining capacities
]v[.11 be RLaced at the disposal of the Coordinator for
accomplishing the other tasks as he mz direct. In the
utilization of the joint cities thus made available
to him to a.eca lisp joint tasks directed b S ANCIB-
STANCICC. he, shall be guided by.. DOG., ."(underlie:'.rig supplied)
It should be noted that although this may be construed to provide that
either the Arrvv or Navy may at any time withdraw facilities from the
jurisdiction of the Coordinator for work an strictly militaxyp
stems it does not permit withdrawal
or shift of facilities for work
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- s sy te~ms and the Navy f or work on
astem.sa Work on other systems will
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APPENDIX B. - DISCUSSION (Contw d.
16, Paragraph 3 of the joint memorandum of 10 March 1945, which
created ANCrB-ANCICC3defined specifically the status of the AriW and
Navy Memb ers o
17. From the 23 October 19L memorandum of the Secretary of State.,
(Appendix A., Annex 0) it appears ' that the Department of State has a
continuing interest. in the i.rection of C. I. efforts, It "is also
clear that the Departrc nts s representative on LSCIB (formerly STAINCIB
formerly ANCIB) is answerable directly- to the Secretary of State (Ap-
pendix A, Annexes O .and O-3),, This relationship is further supported
by the fact that within the Department of Statethe Special A r A s-t-ants
to the Secretary of State have the same rank as the Assistant Secre-
taries of State.
SECRET
systems under the exclusive direction of either service.
Moreover, the withdrawal of any facilities in complete disregard of
the general, problem and the requirements of other member agencies
obviously would not be in keeping-with the spirit of the plan,
15. The new Organizational Bulletin No. II approved by TJSCIB
(formerly. STANCD) on 31 July 19i6, reaffirms the. responsibility
and authority of the Coonlinator of Joint Operations, and his sub-
ordinate relation to USCIB-USCICC the successor of STANCII3!-STANCICC,
II, AS TO 'STATUS OF JSC -USCICC ,".).ND OF ITS 11EM ERSa
18,. That all members of ANCIB considered the State Department
membership to be unqualified would appear. to be substantiated by
the fact that no limitations are mentioned in the exchange of
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APPENDIX B - DISCUSSION (C ant' ci )
correspondence pertaining to the extension of mertfoership to the Depart-
rent of State and by the Board' s action in revising its organizational
charter and changib its name to STPNCIB,
l9, From the 14 February 19Lt6 letter from the Director of the FBI
(See Appendix A, Annex Q?1) it appears that this Bureau also has a con-
tinuing interest in the direction of C o .1 efforts. It is likewise clear
from the fac-b3 that within the Federal Bureau of Investigations the As-
sistant to the Director ranks second to the Director.. and that the F31
representative on the Board is answerable directly to the Director of
that Bureau, (See para. e -h 29.E Appendix A).
2O, That all members of STANCE considered the membership extended
to the FBI on 13 Jun 1946 to be unqualified appears to be supported by
the fact that no limitations appear in the correspondence leading to
this extension of membership on the Board and by the Board' s action in
revisin:. its charter and changing its designation from, STANCIB (formerly
ANCIB) to LSCIB,
establishing
2io From the President' directive of 22 January 194(
the No Lk, and the C. 1, G, it appears that the Director of Central
Intelligence has a continuing interest in the control of C~ I, efforts.,
(See Apaendix A, Annex T),, From the same directive,, . it is clear that the
Director of Central Intelligence is. answerable directly to the N, I. K.
22, That USCIB members considered the membership extended to the
Director of Central Intelligence to be unqualified appears to be supported
both by the fact that no limitations appear in. the correspondence leading
22 m
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APPENDIX B -, DISCUJ ICN (C onte d )
to this e--..`,,ens-ion of membership on the board and the board s action in re-
vising its Organizational Bu:Lletino
233 An additional. cire-ums .nce Which supports the conclusion that no
discrimination. against the sc cai.led non-prod-acing nt tbers of USCIB was
ever intended is the absolute equality of veto and vote as ia.bed to each
member agency "without reserve as membership incr :ased0 (gee paragraph 5
of Organizational Bulletin Nuoa :1)0
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From the discussion of the.. facts and from a careful study of the
relevant documents appended hereto., the following conclusions clearly
emerge:
L AS TO. TIE, kUTHCRITY CF USCIB-USCICC AND OF `1-J COORDiN! TCR OF JOINT
l.. The original charter of ANCIB as issued on 10 Larch 1945 provided
merely for coordination of the effort of two separately operated and direct-
ed activitiesA primarily with a view avoiding duplication of effort and
effecting full exchange of technical information and resulting intelligence,
2, From this initial concept there g--?pects of these arrangements,
which accomplishments reflect much credit on the present Coordinator.
Now, however, in the light of the conflict described above, the Navy
Members find themselves in the position of having confidently reported
to the Chief of Naval Operations the achievement of a degree of integra
tion which may never have existed.
9. Furthermore,, the jurisdiction of USCIB-ANCICC has been challenged
in regard to an important problem. involving a basic principle of unified
direction of joint effort. As this question strikes at the root of USCIB-
USCICC I s purpose and being., it i;nus't be resolved in order that the organi-
zation for joint operations may function effectively in the national in-
terest.
Ii. AS TO THE STATUS OF USC IB-USC ICC AND or I' SR5
:i. USCIB-USCICC is the successor to STANCIB-STANCICC which was in
turn the successor of ANCIB-ANCICC, each change in name haying followed
an extension of membership. In each case the extension of membership was
expressly approved by the Army and Navy authorities that originally created
the BoArd and Committee, as'well as by appropriate authority in each other
depOLrtment or agency represented. Thus the original charter (See Annex 0-2)
was successively broadened in intent as membership increased.
.20 All USCIB memberships are considered to involve equal rights and duties
in regard to policy matters coming under congnizance of the Board.
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