NORTH VIETNAM'S OVERLAND ALTERATION TO SEABORNE IMPORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000200060002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 2, 1969
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 October 1969
North Vietnam's Overland Alternative
to Seaborne Imports
Introduction
North Vietnam relies on ocean transport to bring
in about 85 percent of its annual imports, princi-
pally through'the port of Haiphong. A closure of
the port of Haiphong and an imposed denial of sea
access to North Vietnam would seriously disrupt
North Vietnam's seaborne trade and force an extensive
revamping of normal transport arrangements. North
Vietnam would be forced to depend primarily on the
overland route from China for the continued import
of vital war-supporting materiel and economic goods.
This memorandum is a preliminary examination of
the process by which the seaborne import trade
would be transferred to overland routes. The
following assumptions are used in making the
analysis:
1. A US mining program has suc-
cessfully denied access to North
Vietnam's major and minor ports to
both oceangoing and coastal shipping.
2. The North Vietnamese have opted
not to contest the mining program and
to transfer all import trade to the
overland routes from Communist China.
3. There is sufficient Soviet
:aid Chinese cooperation that strains
in their relations are not a limiting
factor in facilitating the overland
movement of traffic.
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I. The Traffic Volum=
1. During the 12 months ending on 30 June 1969,
North Vietnam imported by sea an average of 5,200 tons/day
of economic and war-related materials. Total sea-
borne imports for the period are shown in the following
tabulation:
Goods
Thousand
Tons
Percent
Foodstuffs
890
47
Fertilizer
110
6
Petroleum
330
17
Timber
30
2
General and
miscellaneous
530
28
1,890
100
2. Rail imports during the same period were on
the order of 300,000 tons. Thus if North Vietnam
were to attempt to maintain the normal flow of
imports the total volume of goods to be moved would
be about 2.2 million tons.
The Immediate Diversion Problem
3. Our analysis of 1968 shipping to North
Vietnam indicates that on the average about 16 ships
were on route to North Vietnam at any one time.
These ships would be carrying about 70,000 tons of
goods, including an estimated 7,000 tons of petroleum.
An immediate task, therefore, would be the diversion
of these ships to an alternate port, such as Fort
Bayard, or their recall to home ports where the goods
would be rerouted overland. On the basis of the
probable average disposition of these ships and
assuming a decision not to recall ships that are
beyond the half-way point on their trip, we believe
that the following decisions would be made. Three
ships en route from Black Sea or Baltic ports with
about 17,000 tons of cargo would be recalled; four
ships with an estimated 23,000 tons of cargo would
be diverted to Fort Bayard. Of the ships en route
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from Chinese and Soviet Pacific ports we estimate
that five ships with an estimated 16,000 tons of
cargo would be recalled and four ships with an
estimated 14,000 tons of cargo would be diverted to
Fort Bayard. The total to be diverted to Fort
Bayard would be 37,000 tons. These diversions could
be made very quickly by using shore to ship com-
munications and the added voyage time would be
only 1 to 2 days longer than if the ships had proceeded
to Haiphong.
II. The Normalization of Overland Traffic
4. The normalization of overland traffic would
raise daily traffic flows to North Vietnam to an
average of about 6,000 tons a day of which about
slightly over 3,000 tons a day would be routed by
the Trans-Siberian railroad. Only 1,200 tons of
the traffic to be moved on the Trans-Siberian
would be traffic diverted from normal movement by
sea. This would be a light burden on a rail line
with a capacity estimated roughly to be about
50 trains or 100,000 tons each way per day. The
addition of 1,200 tons a day would in real terms
be the.equivalent of only one additional train per
day. A preliminary judgment indicates that the
reorientation of traffic from Black Sea or Baltic
Sea ports to the Trans-Siberian railroad could,
with the requisite priorities, be accomplished in
about two weeks. By the end of a two-week period,
therefore, overland traffic from North Vietnam via
the Trans-Siberian railroad should be pretty well
normalized. In view of the fact that rail traffic
to China has declined so drastically'in recent
years, and the transshipment facilities have'been
kept intact, it seems unlikely that transshipment
of cargoes from Soviet to Chinese railroads would
delay the movement of this traffic to any signifi-
cant degree.
The Chinese Problem
5. The convergence of all North Vietnamese import
traffic on the Chinese railroads would represent a
daily tonnage of 6,000 tons of goods. This volume
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is equivalent to what can be carried by about 200
standard-gauge freight cars or about 1,800 trucks
a day. The additive burden to the Chinese railroad
system would be something on the order of 5,300 tons
a day including about 1,000 tons a day of petroleum.
This traffic would require the allocation of about
1,700 freight cars in constant operation and about
350 petroleum tank cars. In each case these allo-
cations are only 1 to 2 percent of China's inventories
of freight and tank cars. Although we cannot judge
precisely how long it would take to reallocate this
traffic to Chinese railroads, it would seem that
the adjustments could be made well before any
shortages would develop in North Vietnam because
of the cessation of sea imports.
The North Vietnamese Problem
6. The total overland input of about 6,000 tons
a day from China to North Vietnam could be moved on
overland routes with a traffic handling capacity
of 16,000 tons a day during the dry season and
13,000 tons a day during the wet season, as shown
below:
Daily Average
Route Capacities
Tons per Day
Railroads
9,000
Roads
5,400
(2,300) a/
Red River
1,500
Total
15,900
(12, 800) a/
a. Wet season capacity from June
through-September.
7. The capacity of the rail connections alone
is 9,000 tons, 50 percent greater than the volume of
goods that must be imported. Further, the capacity
of these routes, 'particularly the roads, could be
improved by relatively simple expedients involving
mostly labor and basic construction materials.
4 -
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8. North Vietnam has adequate inventories of
railroad rolling stock and motor vehicles. The
rolling stock inventory is estimated at 115-130
locomotives and 2,000-2,300 meter-gauge freight cars.
In addition, the dual-gauged Dong Dang line could
be operated with inputs from China's large inventories
of some 6,000 locomotives and 160,300 freight cars.
9. The North Vietnamese truck inventory is esti-
mated to range between 6,500 and 11,500 vehicles.
There has been no evidence of a shortage of trucks,
and vehicle imports during 1969 have been high.
Photography also reveals that North Vietnam is
maintaining large vehicle stockpiles.
10. With sizable inventories of transport equip-
ment and Chinese cooperation, the time required to
reorganize traffic movements within North Vietnam
would probably range from two to three months.
Given the priorities that would be attached to the
task, and the considerable experience gained in
keeping traffic moving during the bombings, it seems
unlikely that disruption of traffic would continue
for long periods. In all probability the North
Vietnamese already have well-developed and detailed
contingency plans to cope with the possibility of a
mining program.
11. In any event the North Vietnamese appear to
have stockpiles more than adequate to cope with
disruptions even if they should last more than
2-3 months. .Petroleum stockpiles already in-
country are adequate for 100 days of operation
at current consumption rates. Localized shortages
would probably appear during the readjustment
period, but stocks could be stretched out by stringent
rationing and Communist China could give first
priority to emergency petroleum shipments within
a period of a few weeks at most.
12. Food stocks currently are probably at their
annual low level prior to the major 10th-month
harvest. Assuming a harvest at least equal to
that of recent years, the stocks will reach a peak
in December. Serious food shortages could not then
be expected to develop until next sprin and only
if all food imports were continuously cut off.
13. Military :.Mocks appear to be maintained at hi h
levels. A variety of evidence, 25X1DOa
indicates that North Vietnam has a deep
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cushion of military supplies. We estimate that
North Vietnam has military supplies adequate for a
period of at least 6 months at the 1968 level of
combat.
Conclusions
14. The diversion of North Vietnam's seaborne
import traffic to overland routes via China is well
within the capabilities of the transport systems of
China, the USSR, and North Vietnam. The immediate
diversion of seaborne traffic would involve only
70,000 tons of supplies. About half of this would
be diverted to-Fort Bayard in China for overland
.movement to North Vietnam. The remaining tonnage
would be recalled to Soviet ports to make the long
overland transit of China.
15. A preliminary judgment indicates that the
reorientation of traffic from the USSR and Eastern
Europe to the Trans-Siberian railroad could probably.
be accomplished in two weeks.
16. The added burden on the Chinese rail-:oads is
well within their traffic capacities and would re-
quire only 1 to 2 percent of China's inventories of
transport equipment.
17. Although the necessary adjustments to a mining
program would probably be most disruptive in North
Vietnam, the disruption should not exceed 2-3 months.
Stockpiles of essential economic and military goods
in North Vietnam are more than adequate to weather
this period, particularly if the Chinese cooperate
by making emergency shipments of some goods such
as petroleum which could become in relatively
short supply.
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