NORTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY INTENTIONS DURING THE NEXT THREE TO SIX MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000200040032-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: February 7, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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North Vietnam's Military Intentions During
the Next Three to Six Months
overview
Throughout the war in Indochina, research on North Vietnam's
military and economic resources has provided some insight into
the enemy's strategic military intentions. However, such re-
sources have generally been well in excess of actual requirements,
and, therefore, the estimative process has necessarily taken
many factors into account beyond those related to raw military
capability alone. Analysis of capabilities has provided a
reasonable view of what the enemy could do and what the enemy
could not do, but only a limited perspective of what he might do.
In the current very fluid situation, it is possible to make
only the most tenuous judgments about North Vietnam's intended
resource allocation plans, but the traditional bellwethers of
military preparedness -- manpower recruitment, logistical
activity, and economic priorities -- do permit a few conclusions
concerning North Vietnam's military outlook in the very near
term. The following discussion concerns these three aspects of
military capability and what they tell us about North Vietnam's
intentions over the next three to six months.
The overall view expressed in this memorandum is that North
Vietnam has yet to make a clear and unequivocal commitment to
peace. Indeed, there are many signs that Hanoi continues to
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pursue a deliberate (though not frenetic) policy of military
preparedness. None of our evidence points to the kind of
manpower and logistic buildup that we observed prior to the
TET Offensive in 1968 and the Spring Offensive in 1972. Such
activity that we do observe, however, does not preclude the
possibility of resumption of military endeavors by North Vietnam
at an uncomfortably heavy pace. Countering this evidence,
there are certain signs of growing interest in economic recon-
struction and related "peacetime" pursuits (though very little
actual performance). We have yet to see any economic rebuilding
which could be unequivocally read as "peacetime" oriented.
Indeed, we are reminded that a major economic rebuilding program
was underway full tilt during the two years prior to the
massive commitment of North Vietnam's military strength in
South Vietnam.
In a word, Hanoi currently exhibits a wait-and-see attitude.
If opportunities arise for a pursuit of its political objectives
by military means, the resources are in place and ready.
'Whether or not they will be used.depends on a number of
political factors unrelated to the resources situation: notably,
what would be the consequences. At the least, the judgment
must by now be firmly implanted in the minds of North Vietnam's
leaders that any blatant resumption of main force military
activities would lead to prompt and massive retaliation by the
US. In the final analysis, this consideration may be a highly
persuasive one to Hanoi.
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sustained vehicle activity moving into southern
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The Communists' logistic position in South Vietnam, while
strong, has not yet been rebuilt to the peak attained just
before the 1972 Spring Offensive. The current logistic effort,
however, probably is ahead of that achieved by this time last
dry season and, if sustained for the next several months, the
North Vietnamese would be capable of logistically supporting
a major military activity throughout much of the country.
Although postcease-fire reporting has been inconsistent, we
believe that significant supply movements are continuing.
Logistics
Beginning on 28 January detected logistic activity in
the Vinh area was curtailed sharply. By 2 February, however,
vehicle (and rail) activity had returned to significant levels,
and although some supplies previously destined for South
Vietnam have been diverted to northern Laos,
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To date, there
have been no indications that the logistical system built
along the Ho Chi Minh.Trail and its extensions is being
dismantled. In any event, the North Vietnamese probably
could withdraw 75% of their logistic personnel and still maintain
a high level of resupply in a non-bombing environment.
In the North Vietnam border areas,
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Laos -- particularly through the Ban Karai Pass. Inside Laos
there have been sporadic but significant reflections of
activity:
and 5 February, large-scale vehicle activity was detected
in the eastern Panhandle.
There is evidence of Communist supply movements across
South Vietnam's borders farther south.
On 4 February 75 loaded trucks were observed moving south
from Cambodian border'base areas toward the Tay Ninh Province/
GVN MR-3 area. Moreover, in Communist-controlled parts of
Quang Ngai Province, there are recent indications that over-
the-beach infiltration of supplies is occurring. To reduce
the logistics burden from external sources, the Communists
apparently intend to procure more goods internally than in the
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past by improving access to local markets and in manufacturing
small ordnance items in workshops in.southern South Vietnam.
The Communists have undertaken other measures to ensure
the continuing viability of their logistic system. Between
15 and 23 January, they restored through rail service from
the China border to Vinh. Air defenses have been bolstered
by the emplacement of at least three operational SA-3 missile sites
forming a defensive ring around Hanoi -- the first such sites
detected in North Vietnam -- and major redeployments of NVA air
defense elements into and within southern Laos may signal
significantly improved protection for lines of communication there.
Finally, the North Vietnamese are resuming maritime activities --
domestic and international. At least four ships already are
lightering their cargo outside the minefields near Haiphong.
Along the southern coast of North Vietnam, a flurry of coastal
watercraft has been detected recently -- reminiscent of the
post-Rolling Thunder period. All of these developments should
enhance North Vietnam's short- and long-term logistic
capabilities.
In summary, the North Vietnamese logistic system has been
operating in high gear for several months, and there does not
appear to have been a marked slowdown coincident with the
cease-fire. Tens of thousands of tons of supplies have been
put in the logistics pipeline along with large amounts of
armor and artillery. The result is that substantial quantities
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of supplies have already filtered into most parts of South
Vietnam, and as the peak dry season months progress, a sustained
effort would place the North Vietnamese in. an extremely strong
logistic position.
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Manpower
Manpower indicators, both in North Vietnam and throughout
Indochina, suggest that North Vietnam intends to maintain a
strong military posture while warily observing cease-fire
developments. Most evidence suggests that Hanoi's likely
path in South Vietnam for the immediate future will be keyed
to defense and consolidation of occupied areas, strengthening
of the infrastructure, command reorganization, and maintenance
of a capability to resume main force offensive activity, should
that decision be taken. The principal constraints under which
North Vietnam operates are not those of manpower availability
or forces in-place but are considerations of possible US
retaliation for serious and protracted cease-fire violations
and a reduced ability to conduct main force warfare in all but
GVN MR-1 -- owing to heavy losses suffered during the 1972
offensive.
Capabilities
In North Vietnam, available evidence suggests a rather
normal pattern of recruiting practices following the cease-fire
agreement. The traditional December-January induction phase
apparently continued through mid-January in some provinces,
with only minor dislocation resulting from LINEBACKER II.
Limited evidence suggests that the spring induction phase --
which normally commences in March-April -- will be held as
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scheduled. For example, a 17 January Hanoi Moi article states
that "youth were making themselves physically fit to be ready
to leave for military service during the spring inductions."
If the North Vietnamese are consistent with past practice,
the spring induction phase will be roughly the same order of
magnitude as that of the December-January phase.. Since raw
manpower availability is not considered a significant constraint
in Hanoi's ability to maintain a high level of military
preparedness, the induction indicator suggests that the enemy
will maintain inductions at a level commensurate with his view
of manpower needs in the south. Currently, there does not
appear to be a "crash" recruitment program, supporting the view
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Given the current Communist order of battle and force
distribution, VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam have a reduced
capability over the next three to six months to initiate the
type of major offensive operations that existed in the spring
of 1972. This appears to be the case throughout South Vietnam,
except for northern MR-1, where enemy combat forces are
estimated to have been brought back up to about peak offensive
strength. This is not to say that the Communists could not
score some temporary gains by seizing additional territory if
they chose to violate the cease-fire, particularly in the more
rural areas held by GVN territorial forces or where ARVN
forces are spread thin. They also have the capability for
temporary LOC interdiction and rocket and sapper attacks on
urban areas. VC/NVA forces probably would not be able to take
and hold any major, well-defended GVN target -- as exemplified
by the recent military confrontation over Tay Ninh City.
Intentions
Military
At the present time, the signs indicating North Vietnam's
possible courses of action in the near future are clearly
mixed. There is evidence of intentions to make use of the
miltiary forces in place in South Vietnam to build a political
base for a struggle in that.sphere; there is equally good
evidence of planning for military contingencies.
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Throughout South Vietnam the VC and NVA forces are
basically in a defensive military posture. What limited
information we have suggests that Communist intentions in
the near term are to strengthen command structures of units
now deployed and to hold onto territory now occupied.
Communist local forces apparently intend to continue to take
advantage of targets of opportunity in populated areas.
Beyond this, there is no current evidence to suggest more
elaborate military plans in the next three to six months.
However, in many parts of South Vietnam - particularly MRs
1 and 2 -- substantial main force offensive activity could be
launched with little or no advanced warning.
Political
Throughout South Vietnam there have been indications that
the Communists are devoting a substantial portion of their
efforts to rebuilding the VC political apparatus, and the North
Vietnamese are assisting in this effort. In Phu Yen Province,
for example, the VC are selecting their most trusted "hard-core"
cadre to become permanent residents of a particular hamlet
or village primarily to ensure a greater degree of VC political
control during the cease-fire period. In Quang Ngai Province,
the Communists have created a new organization tasked with
the responsibility for waging a political struggle during the
early stages of the cease-fire period. Entitled the
"Vietnamese People's United Committee in South Vietnam," this
apparatus is to encompass a number of previously established
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sections of the VC political organization at the district
level and below, such as those for security, military
proselyting, and propaganda, as well as a province-level
committee for administrative purposes. Efforts such as these
are undoubtedly being launched in other provinces of the
country and probably will intensify in coming months.
A COSVN resolution issued late in January has focused on
the importance of the political struggle, emphasizing such
political activities as local proselyting and subverting the
GVN's local militia forces. However, the resolution also
emphasizes the continued development of the Communist combat
forces in case hostilities resume or clashes with ARVN occur.
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Economic
In inspecting economic factors that might provide evidence
of North Vietnam's intentions, it is important to remember
that the Vietnam cease-fire is a new learning experience for
Hanoi. The sorts of contingencies for which Hanoi will plan
over the next 3 to 6 months will be constantly sifted and re-
evaluated in the light of the emerging new relationships with
Washington and Saigon and a better understanding of their
respective positions.
At the present time, the most that can be said is that
North Vietnam has yet to get a large-scale industrial
reconstruction program off the ground. We have seen some
evidence of the return of a few technicians from other
Communist countries and the makeshift repair of vital electric
power facilities, but as yet no signs that major rebuilding
is underway. This circumstance could simply reflect the
delays associated with the sheer complexities of deciding on
long-range industrial policies, Hanoi's uncertainty as to the
risk which would be involved in such an undertaking, and such
retarding factors as a relative shortage of skilled planners
and engineers. Unfortunately, from the point of view of
judging North Vietnam's intentions, Hanoi's "hesitancy" could
equally reflect a determination to resume military action that
might risk US bombing reprisal.
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Whether or not the North Vietnamese intend to work
generally within the frame of the peace. settlement, they will
probably begin their reconstruction efforts by surveying
damage and determining what machinery has been saved or can
be salvaged. Should they conclude that consolidating the
currently dispersed industry is an acceptable risk, they would
then need to choose sites for the use of the surviving equip-
ment, assemble work forces for both cleanup and subsequent
plant operation, and relocate some transportation equipment for
factory supply and distribution. Such a major program would,
at a minimum, take 3 or 4 months, even if done hastily.
As the North Vietnamese develop a longer experience with
freedom from bombing and mining, certain more clearly defined
courses of action reflecting a commitment to peacetime planning
may emerge. For example, if the DRV intends to adhere to the
broad terms of the cease-fire, they would likely feel it safe to
redevelop extractive industries for mineral exports. This
could entail inviting Japanese and other non-Communist raw
material buyers to discuss seriously repair and expansion of
existing facilities. Other projects that might at least get
underway in the next 6 months should the North Vietnamese feel
they probably had a final surcease from US bombing and/or
mining would include: resuming work on the Bac Giang Chemical
Fertilizer Plant, which was at an advanced stage of construction
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in 1965 but has since lain idle; repairing damage at the Viet
Tri Chemical Complex, the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine,
and textile plants at Nam Dinh and Hanoi; going ahead with
plans to build a new capital city, on which work was initiated
in 1971. At this point, none of the above steps has been
observed.
We should, of course, bear in mind that the North Vietnamese
officialdom and press have already commenced speaking in
glowing terms.of reconstruction. Similarly, Hanoi has already
begun to solicit economic aid for reconstruction. This sort
of activity will, by itself, demonstrate very little, however,
for much of the machinery and equipment needs in a recon-
struction period are consistent with remobilization of new
warfare, and there is no serious domestic cost to broad
discussion of reconstruction.
The evidence on Viet Cong actions in the economic field
in the postcease-fire period is becoming a bit clearer, but it
says relatively little about military intentions per se. The
temptation is strong to suggest that current VC plans for an
economic "offensive" represent a channeling of the conflict
into new lines. However, the reported plans of the VC to offer
loans, land, and free food and tools to lure South Vietnamese
into their areas and to disrupt commodity sales in GVN-held areas
could as well neatly complement a continued pattern of
purposeful and well-planned cease-fire violations.
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