EFFECT OF DESTRUCTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PETROLEUM STORAGE FACILITIES ON THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100070004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 8, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy No. 17
EFFECT OF DESTRUCTION
OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PETROLEUM STORAGE FACILITIES
ON THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
NSA, DIA reviews completed
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Summary
It is estimated that the neutralization of the bulk petroleum storage
facilities in North Vietnam will not in itself preclude Hanoi's continued
support of essential war activities. The immediate impact in North
Vietnam will be felt in the need to convert to an alternative system of
supply and distribution. The conversion program will be costly and
create additional burdens for the regime. It is estimated, however,
that the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam can be sus-
tained. The impact on normal economic activity, however, would be
more severe. New strains on an already burdened economic control
structure and managerial talent would cause further reductions in eco-
nomic activity, compound existing distribution problems, and further
strain manpower resources. The attacks on petroleum storage facili-
ties in conjunction with continuing attacks on transportation targets and
armed reconnaissance against lines of communication will increase the
burden and costs of supporting the war.
Although previous airstrikes have destroyed about 18 percent of
North Vietnam's bulk petroleum storage capacity, the country still has
a capacity to store 190, 000 tons, of petroleum in eleven targeted facili-
ties and in at least 31 untargeted facilities. The two most important
facilities are located at Haiphong and Hanoi. They account for 116, 000
tons, or 60 percent of total bulk storage capacity. There are in addi-
tion nine facilities on the JCS target list, two of which have been pre-
viously attacked. These eleven facilities, which are all vulnerable to
air attack, account for 95 percent of total bulk storage capacity. The
remaining 5 percent is accounted for by the small, dispersed, and un-
targeted facilities with a capacity of about 8, 000 tons.
The import.and consumption of petroleum has increased significantly
in recent months. Monthly imports in the first five months were at a
level equivalent to an annual import of 300, 000 tons, an increase of 58
percent above 1965 levels.
Data on actual consumption of petroleum are less precise. It is
estimated that military and military support activities account for-5-5.
percent of total. consumption. As of 1 April 1966 the consumption of
All tonnages are given in short tons.
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petroleum gad increased by more than 20 percent above 1965 levels to f 206, 000 tons. The higher level of imports, if continued
for the rest of 1966, will be used to satisfy increasing petroleum re-
quirements, both military and civilian, and to implement plans for
dispersed storage of petroleum stocks.
Neutralization of North Vietnam's eleven targeted petroleum storage
sites, according to calculations of the Department of Defense, would re-
quire initially an estimated 540 sorties and the expenditure of 737 tons
of ordnance. Estimated civilian casualties could range from 200 to 300
persons because the facilities in urban areas are in lightly populated.
zones. With provisions to minimize casualties, the number could be
considerably lower.
It is estimated that the successful execution of the planned attack
would leave North Vietnam with enough petroleum stocks to satisfy
normal requirements for a period of 60 days. It is believed that within
that time, with Soviet and Chinese cooperation, North Vietnam could
restore the flow of petroleum supplies. If restoration of the flow,
probably by rail from China, took longer than this, North Vietnam
could extend these supplies to meet essential requirements for a period
of 90 days by eliminating non-essential petroleum requirements.
In a memorandum accompanying copies of this report that were sent
to the Department of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency on
8 June, the following sentence was added to the summary:
A strong and successful interdiction campaign
against these stocks would modify our estimates of
these times.
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I. Availability of Petroleum Storage Capacity in North Vietnam
Airstrikes in 1965-66 have destroyed or rendered useless more than
41, 000 tons of bulk storage capacity in North Vietnam. The country still
has bulk storage capacity for about 190, 000 tons of petroleum products.
The storage facility at Haiphong with a capacity of 79, 000 tons and that at
Hanoi with a capacity of 37, 000 tons, represents nearly 60 percent of total
current bulk capacity. An additional nine targeted installations account
for 64, 000 tons, or about 35 percent of capacity. (The names and loca-
tions of these facilities are shown on Table 1 and the map. ) Small. dis-
persed and untargeted storage facilities account for about 8, 000 tons, or
about 5 percent of the total tonnage. * Approximately 31 such sites in
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Capacity
Thousand
Number Gallons Short Tons Percent
South of 20?N 13 515 2,100 26
Beturcen 20? and 21?N 6 364 1,500 18
North of 21?N 12 1,105 4,600 56
a Total 31 1,984 ("8, ooo il _) 100
~t An additional 7, 000 tons of capacity are available at airbases in North
Vietnam.
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Table 1
25X1 North Vietnam: Principal Petroleum Storage'Targets and Initial Attack Requirements
Estimated Sorties Ordnance Population Situation
Capacity Requirement in the Immediate
Name (Short Tons) Strike Support Total (Short Tons) Target Area
Haiphong 79,000 58 211 82 131 Urban; relatively light
population
Hanoi (Thank Am) 37,000 36 24 60 54 Urban; relatively light
population
Vinh 2,000 2 2 4 5 Rural; small villages
Nguyen Khe 14,ooo #0 20 60 90 Rural; small villages
Phuc Yen 15,000 50 '24 71. 113 Rural; many small vil-
lages
Bac Giang 7,000 20 16 36 4+5 Urban; relatively light
population
Do Son L.,ooo ,22 12 34 51 Urban; relatively light
population
Viet Tri 4,oo0 20 20 )+0 45 Rural; many small vil-
lages
Thu Qui 2,000 / 4 2 6 9 Rural
Duong Xham 15,000 38 20 58 86 Rural; one village in
Kep
54 32 86 108 Rural; no villages in
area
18o,ooo c/ 344 196 549 737
a. Bath the Vinh and Phu Qui facilities have been bombed a number of times. The capacity of these
facilities is that portion of the initial capacity not destroyed.
b. The capacity at Kep (about 1,000 tons) is included with small dispersed sites.
c. All tonnages have been rounded to the nearest thousand tons and do not add to the totals shown.
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The land mass north of 20? includes Haiphong and Hanoi and the
heavy concentration of the rail net, including the Dong Dang - Hanoi -
Lao Cai system. Of the 18 dispersed sites north of 20?N, only one (Son La)
is not located on or near a rail line. Even the 13 widely scattered small
capacity sites south of 20?N are located at or near the north-south railroad
right-of-way (whatever the condition of the railroad itself).
Eleven sites representing about 46 percent of the total dispersed
storage are located on or near the Dong Dang - Hanoi - Lao Cai rail
system; two sites representing about 7 percent are on or near the Thai
Nguyen - Hanoi rail line.
In addition to the dispersed tank storage facilities, the North Vietna-
mese store a considerable quantity of petroleum in drums. Drummed
storage has been identified at numerous locations. Two large sites have
been located -- one with about 2, 000 drums in the vicinity of Hanoi and
another with 4, 000 drums near Thai Nguyen. It is not known with 25X1
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I I about 70, 000 drums entered supply channels in
North Vietnam in 1965 and possibly 60, 000 more have entered thus far
in 1966. Thus perhaps 130, 000 new drums have been added to the
indeterminate number of drums available in North Vietnam at the end
of 1964. These new drums represent potential storage for at least
29, 000 tons of peetrocum, although an' unknownnumber of them have
undoubtedly been lost through attrition or have been put to other uses.
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II. Use of Storage Capacity and Methods of Distribution
1. Haiphong Bulk Storage
North Vietnam's largest bulk petroleum storage center, located
at Haiphong, accounts for over 40 percent of total storage capacity..
Haiphong is the only bulk ocean import terminal; its capacity was designed
to accommodate incoming tankers and provide an interim storage pending
movement of petroleum to other consumption areas outside of Haiphong.
2. Hanoi Bulk Storage
North Vietnam's second largest bulk petroleum storage center
is located at Hanoi. This storage site is largely rail served and, like that
at Haiphong, was built by oil companies with commercial interests and
distribution practices in mind. It is situated so that it can serve as a
major distribution hub through the use of available rail and road transport
routes for movement of oil to storage and distribution points elsewhere in
the country. It is believed that North Vietnam has continued to use this
storage in the same way as did the oil companies.
3. Other Bulk Storage Facilities
It is estimated that North Vietnam makes maximum possible use
of the nine other targeted storage facilities in order to minimize the
vulnerability inherent in concentrations of inventories in Haiphong and
Hanoi.
4. Distribution from Haiphong
In the absence of firm evidence, a hypothetical pattern of move-
ment of petroleum from Haiphong to other storage sites has been con-
structed* on the basis of the percentage which each site represents of the
No attempt has been made to devise a flow pattern for petroleum moved
from the up-country bulk facilities to ultimate consumers, but it is ex-
pected that after local consumers are supplied, bulk carriers -,- tank
trucks, sampans, and junks mounted with small tanks (perhaps 2, 200-
gallon capacity) -- and cargo trucks carrying packaged petroleum are
used to serve nonlocal consumers.
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total storage capacity outside of Haiphong. About 130, 000 tons of
petroleum were imported into North, Vietnam by tanker through the port
of Haiphong during the first five months of 1966. This quantity corre-
sponds to an average daily rate of about 860 tons. About 60 tons of
petroleum are consumed daily by marine activities, which are considered
to be supplied from Haiphong. After other local consumers in the Haiphong
area are supplied it is probable that not more than about 800 tons of
petroleum per day are shipped from Haiphong to other storage sites. Pro-
rating the movement of this quantity (800 tons) to other bulk storage sites
on the basis of the storage capacity at the sites, the following quantities
would be shipped:
Site Number
Name
Quanti
~Tons
_
1
Hanoi
290
2
Phuc Yen
120
3
Nguyen Khe
110
4
Viet Tr9.
35
5
Bac Giang
50
6
Vinh
20
7
Do Son
35
8
Duong Nham
120
9
Phu Qui
20
Total
800
Sites 1 through 6, representing 80 percent of the total bulk oil
storage outside Haiphong, are served primarily by rail or rail shuttle.
Of these, sites 4, 5, and 6 can be, and probably are, served also by
water. Sites 7 and 8 can be served only by water and to a limited extent
by road. Site 9 is served only by road. The quantities of petroleum to
be shipped to these sites by the transport routes indicated represent only
a nominal part of the estimated total capacity of such routes.
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III. Consumption ofPetroleum Available in North Vietnam
1. -Total Availability
North Vietnam is entirely dependent on imports for the supply
of petroleum products. During 1965 the country imported about 190, 000
tons of products. Ocean tankers delivered more than 165, 000 tons of the
total and dry cargo ships delivered about 12, 000 tons. The remainder
was delivered overland by railroad through Communist China.
Imports of petroleum, almost entirely by tanker, during the
first five months of 1966 amounted to about.130, 000 tons, at least 50
percent more than was imported during the same time period in 1965.
If this higher level of imports is maintained, North Vietnam will re-
ceive about 300, 000 tons of petroleum during 1966.
2. Consumption
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It is not possible to predict with certainty the consumption rates
for 1966. Vehicle imports, which increased the inventory by 20 percent
in 1965, are continuing at a high rate. Deliveries to date plus those known
to be on order represents an increase of 25 percent to the gross inventory
as it stood at the end of 1965. * There i!5, moreover, evidence
crease in intensity over tat o 1965 -- to compensate at least partly for
the interdiction of the railroads and to circumvent bomb-damaged sections
of normal highway routes. Greater reliance is also being placed on water
transport, a significant portion of which is motor-powered long-haul
traffic. In addition, increased activity in the military establishment and
in the economy, particularly the construction sector, confirms the proba-
bility that the consumption of petroleum will be considerably greater in
1966 than in 1965.
I that transport by motor vehicles has in-
On the basis of an estimated inventory of petroleum-using facili-
ties and equipment as of April 1, 1966, a petroleum consumption rate of
206, 000 tons has been estimated for 1966. This amount represents an
increase of almost 20 percent over 1965 but is still about 30 percent less
than the annual rate at which petroleum products (300, 000 tons) are ex-
pected to be received this year. Some of the difference undoubtedly will
* This calculation does not take into account losses resulting from air
attacks in North Vietnam and Laos during 1966.
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be accounted for by the assignment of petroleum to the dispersed tank
and drummed storage sites being 'created to reduce the vulnerability
of the normal storage facilities to aerial attacks. The Communists
may anticipate a further increase in. requirements for 1966, or they
may be attempting to. import as much as possible during the early
months of the year in anticipation of bombing attacks on major storage
facilities.
The use pattern associated with the consumption rate estimated,
as of 1 April 1966, is regarded as reasonably representative of the full
year 1966 in the absence of effective bombin of major storage facilities.
The tabulation, below, prepared by DIA and
data, identifies the principal users of petroleum and provides quantities
at the annual. consumption rate of 206, 000 tons:
Military
Short Tons
Tons Percent
68,000 33
Aircraft 10,200
Naval ships 3,500
Personnel, cargo carriers,
and transport - 33,700
Armored vehicles 900
Generators 19,800
Civilian Transport
111,000
54 a/
Highway
47,300
Inland waterway
39,600
Coastal waterway
23,600
Coastal waterway
11,000
Merchant marine
3,850
Haiphong dredge
4,400
Harbor craft
2,200
Fishing fleet
2,200
Industry and Commerce
12,000
6
Agriculture
4,800
2
Household Use
11,000
5
Total
206,000
100
a. It is estimated that 42 percent
of the
civilian trans-
port consumption is used in support
either directly or indirectly.
of military operations
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3. Requirements for Su port of the War in South Vietnam
end of 1965 the North Vietnamese forces and civilian activities in Mili-
tary Region-IV, which includes the four southern provinces of North
Vietnam, were consuming petroleum at the rate of 1, 500 tons per month.
With the high level of transport activity observed during the latest dry
season, it is estimated that the average level of consumption by Military
Region IV during 1966 will amount to about 2, 000 tons per month, or
70 tons per day. The delivery to Military Region IV of this 2, 000 tons
of petroleum, as well as other supplies (including food), probably re-
quires an additional 500 tons of fuel per month. The 2, 000 tons of fuel
being delivered to Military Region IV supports the following major
activities: (a) the small civilian economy, (b) the maintenance and
construction of lines of communication and transport facilities within
the region, (c) the military establishment in the region, and (d) the
construction and maintenance of roads in Laos and the actual movement
of men and supplies to Laos and through Laos to South Vietnam.
The share of the 2, 000 tons consumed monthly by Military
Region IV for the actual movement of supplies to and through Laos is
estimated to be small. At the end of 1965, it appeared that only about
400 tons of the 1, 500 tons shipped to Military Region IV was being used
in the Laotian Panhandle. At present, this amount has probably in-
creased to between 500 and 600 tons. This amount would support the
estimated 400 to 500 trucks that are being used in the Panhandle of
Laos to construct and repair roads, support the Communist forces in
Laos, and move supplies to the South Vietnamese border area. This
estimate also allows for the loss of some petroleum by aerial attacks
on the truck and fuel dumps in Laos. Petroleum is moved into the
Laotian Panhandle by truck, mostly in drums, although a few tank trucks
have been observed on the roads in the northern part of the supply route.
The trucks that carry supplies destined for South Vietnam are esti-
mated to consume about one fourth of the 500 to 600 tons of fuel moving
into the Panhandle.
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IV. Physical Vulnerability of Petroleum Storage in North Vietnam
1. Target Environment
a. Location
Sites for the bulk storage of petroleum -- commercial
or military -- normally are chosen at transshipment points (such as
ports) or adjacent to major consumption areas. In their local environ-
ment, the tank farms are usually on the fringes of urban areas or in
lightly populated districts, to minimize fire hazards, so that accidental
damage to surrounding properties and casualties to personnel from
such causes will be at a minimum. For defense security, to reduce
vulnerability to possible enemy action, a number of small, dispersed
storage areas are created during military buildup periods. In general,
the target environments for the petroleum storage facilities in North
Vietnam correspond with these traditional considerations. The sites
fall into three broad categories: (1) those in urban areas with relatively
light population density in the immediate target area, (2) facilities in
rural area surrounded by small villages, and (3) tanks in rural areas
with sparse population in the immediate target area.
The Haiphong, Hanoi, Bac Giang, and Do Son petroleum
facilities fall into the first category. They are located on the outskirts
of urban centers within the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. Within the im-
mediate target area the petroleum facilities are surrounded by exten-
sive ricefields and small villages.
The Nguyen Khe, Phuc Yen, and Viet Tri tanks are located
within the delta region of North Vietnam. They are situation in rural
areas and generally surrounded by ricefields and many small villages.
The Duong Nham and Kep petroleum facilities are situated
to the northeast of Hanoi in a rural, sparsely populated region. The
Phu Qui facility is northwest of Vinh, and is surrounded by rough un-
inhabited terrain.
b. Probability of Civilian Casualties
It is estimated on the basis of currently accepted method-
ologies for estimating casualties that the initial strikes against the
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11 targeted installations could inflict as many as 200 to 300 civilian
casualties. Most of these casualties will be caused by raids directed
against the large storage tanks located in the urban areas of North
Vietnam. However, the airstrikes would be planned to minimize
civilian casualties; thus if the civilian population received effective
early warning, the numbers could be considerably lower. An estimate
of the initial casualties for each facility is shown in Table 2.
2. Force Requirements
On the basis of Department of Defense calculations, about
540 aircraft and 737 tons of ordnance would be expended, on the
average, to achieve a 70 percent destruction during the initial strikes.
Therefore, some reattacks would probably be necessary to neutralize
the major facilities. (The details are shown in Table 1. )
Estimate of Civilian Casualties
from Initial Attacks
on North Vietnam Bulk Petroleum Storage Sites
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Number
of Casualties
Name
Low
High
Haiphong
116
174
Hanoi
15
25
Vinh W
4
6
Nguyen Khe
4
6
Phuc Yen
24
36
Bac Giang
11
17
Do Son
12
17
Viet Tri
13
18
Phu Quia
1
1
Duong Nham
0
0
Kep
0
0
a. Previously struck facilities.
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V. Estimated Effects of Airstrikes
UI
As a result, estimates of the effects of the airstrikes must be presented
as a range, rather than as a single value.
There are a number of gaps in the intelligence base on which esti-
mates of petroleum consumption and reserve stocks have been made.
To make this range meaningful, the question of the degree of success
that the airstrikes achieve -- that is, the level of damage inflicted -- has
.not been considered. This means that the analysis is based on the assump-
tion that the 11 targeted storage facilities are neutralized quickly through
initial and follow-up strikes and that restrikes are laid on as necessary to
keep these facilities from being reactivated.
This assumption is particularly critical in the case of Haiphong,
whose pumping and distribution facilities could be used in a variety of
conceivable partial damage situations. As always, effects are directly
related to the speed and decisiveness with which the entire target system
is taken under attack. At the extreme, an attack program carried out
over a period of months which left key facilities partially operational need
have little effect on either essential military or civilian activities.
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over 30, 000 tons in the immediate post-attack period. This volume rep-
resents about 60 days` supply at the normal daily consumption rate. The
existence of an estimated 60-day stockpile may be illusory. Surplus
quantities of one product may remain while other essential products are
non-existent. Time would be required to inventory the remaining prod-
ucts, and petroleum would have to be expended in moving petroleum
products to the locations where they are needed. The effective stocks
remaining, therefore, would then be less than that indicated above.
Dispersed storage facilities -- tanks and drums -- hold a minimum of at
least 12, 000 tons if not more; there could be 14, 000 tons in the storage
system and additional amounts in the distribution system for a total of
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2. Post-Attack Alternatives
Following the airstrikes, it can be anticipated that the North
Vietnamese regime would make a major effort to repair the Haiphong
facilities to the point where this vital port could be used to restore the
flow of supplies.
If repeated airstrikes virtually eliminate the Haiphong facility,
it would be necessary to unload directly from tankers into lighters,
barges, and coasters or into railroad tank cars. Tankers would then
be required to remain on station for several weeks, and the flow of
petroleum would be sharply reduced as a consequence of a shortage
of equipment and facilities for handling bulk cargoes. Coasters or
oceangoing junks could supply some petroleum to Haiphong and to other
key coastal cities. As an alternative or supplement, tankers could
unload at the Chinese Communist port of Fort Bayard, and subsequent
movement to North Vietnam could be made by rail and by water.
3. Use of Chinese Ports and Transportation Routes
Fort Bayard is the Chinese ocean port most readily accessible
to North Vietnam. Fort Bayard has storage capacity for about 72, 000
tons of petroleum. A standard-gauge, railroad line runs from the port
via Li-tang to Ping-hsiang on the North Vietnamese border, a distance
of 407 miles. The estimated capacity of the railroad for military supplies
is about 5, 600 tons per day; it is considerably higher for civilian goods,
including POL. The estimated military capacity of the railroad is about
seven times the capacity required to transport the current level of petro-
leum imports into North Vietnam. The number of tank cars required in
continuous use to move the tonnage would be about 170, or 1 percent of
the current inventory of tank cars in China.-" At P' ing-hsiang on the
North Vietnamese border, all tonnage must be transloaded from the
Chinese standard-gauge to the North Vietnamese meter-gauge railroad.
The meter-gauge railroad from the border to Hanoi has a daily capacity
of at least 3, 000 tons, or more than three times the daily required
capacity for POL. The capacity of this rail line is not being fully
utilized at present. There is a POL storage facility at Ping-hsiang
with a capacity of about 2, 000 tons, and that installation could be used
to even out the flow of POL traffic on the railroad. North Vietnam has
about 200 tank cars and might have access to at least 150 of the narrow-
gauge Chinese tank cars formerly used in the transit trade through
At an estimated annual rate of 300, 000 tons in 1966.
Twenty-one 40-ton cars arriving daily would equal the current import
level.
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North Vietnam. POL destined to consumers not conveniently served by
the direct railroad route would move in tank trucks or in drums.
In addition to the railroad route from Fort Bayard to Ping-
hsiang, there is an all-weather road leading from Fort Bayard to the
North Vietnamese border at Mong Cai, a distance of 235 miles. This
route has a minimum capacity of 1, 475 tons per day. Coastal water
craft, which are in ample supply in China, could also be employed to
carry petroleum from Fort Bayard to various small ports and con-
sumers in North Vietnam as far south as the Demilitarized Zone.
Assuming that this rail/road system remains uninterdicted or that its
capacity remains high under sporadic attacks, it is believed an effective
alternative to the present system based on Haiphong could be established
within 30 days.
4. Use of Other Inland Transportation Routes
An alternative to the use of Fort Bayard by tankers would be
to import petroleum by the overland rail route from the USSR (perhaps
from the Irkutsk refinery), via Mongolia and China, to North Vietnam.
The railroad distance from Irkutsk via Naushki on the Soviet/Mongolian
border to Erhlien on the Chinese/ Mongolian border and thence to P'ing-
hsiang on the Chinese/North Vietnamesd border is about 3,400 miles.
About 132 40-ton tank cars in continuous use would be required for each
100, 000 tons carried in the USSR and Mongolia, and about 280 40-ton
tank cars would be required for each 100, 000 tons carried in China.
Chinese cooperation with the USSR would be necessary to establish this
alternative route. There could be delays for negotiations and for mar-
shaling equipment and facilities which would require more than 30 days
before this alternative route could be delivering at the required rate.
However, the tanker route to Fort Bayard and the short rail haul from
there to North Vietnam is regarded as the more likely alternative.
5. Elimination of Non-Essential Requirements
The petroleum stocks estimated as the likely supply remaining
after the initial airstrikes would enable North Vietnam to continue most
transport activities for 60 days assuming that the stocks are properly
distributed. It is estimated that an alternative means of resupply would
have been effected within that time. If post-attack emergency arrange-
ments took longer than 60 days, North Vietnam could eliminate or reduce
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certain less essential petroleum uses and sustain essential operations
for a period of 90 days.
a. Military Establishment
Operating reserves of fuel allocated to ground force units
and installations would allow continuation of activities at the present
level for an estimated period of 30 days. Limited naval operations
could be continued for two to three months from stocks on hand and, if
needed, additional refueling could be effected from craft engaged in
coastal trade with Communist China. In the absence of US attacks,
the North Vietnamese Air Force jets could be supported from airfield
stocks for a period of 120 to 150 days, and transport operations could
be supported for 90 days.
The motorized cargo and personnel carriers assigned to
the military establishment are believed to be consuming petroleum at
a rate of 60 tons per day. Not all of this is essential: some of it could
be dispensed with by greater reliance on primitive transport means and
troop movement on foot. While some loss in mobility would result,
essential military activities could proceed on schedule. A cut of 30
tons a day in vehicle activity (50 percent) would reduce over-all military
consumption by 16 percent.
b. The Economy
The North Vietnamese economy accounts for an estimated
67 percent of total petroleum consumption. The components are:
civilian transport, 54 percent; industry and commerce, 5. 7 percent;
agriculture, 2. 1 percent; and hous ehold use, 5. 2 percent. It is esti-
mated that 42 percent of civilian transport is used directly or indirectly
in support of the military establishment. Therefore, in terms of total
consumption, 55 percent is allocated to military uses and 45 percent
for the economy. In the event of a petroleum shortage, there are certain
nonmilitary functions, such as the distribution of food, that the North
Vietnamese would seek to maintain unimpaired. Other distribution
activities now dependent on petroleum would be shifted to other trans-
port media or dispensed with.
For example, export industries, such as coal mining could
be drastically curtailed in a period of petroleum shortage. Pig iron
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production at the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant, most of which is
for export, is not essential for continuing the war effort. The dispersal
activity itself and the stockpiling of construction and repair materials
along principal rail and road routes probably does not require contin-
uous expansion although it would have to be maintained. Materials to
expand industrial facilities, which now come into North Vietnam
through Haiphong or by rail from China and ultimately result in truck
traffic for local hauls, are not essential to continuing the military
effort or to the minimum functioning of the economy. This conclusion
assumes that the USSR and Communist China would be willing to con-
tinue to supply essential civilian goods and military supplies without
repayment -- a judgment that is supported by past practices by both
countries.
In estimating the ability of North Vietnam to curtail the
use of motor transport, it is important to remember that the railroads
provide long-haul transportation for both military and economic sup-
port. Similarly, primitive transport means always play an important
role in subsistence agricultural economies. The major use of petro-
leum is in short,-haul motor transport.
A precise quantification of present POL uses that would
be regarded as non-essential in time of serious supply stringency was
not possible in the time period available to us. Past experience in
other war situations and an analysis of North Vietnam's current petro-
leum uses serve to permit a rough estimate of order of magnitude.
It is believed that, with a reasonable priority control program, the
petroleum stocks considered as being available after attack could be
stretched to 90 days (instead of 60 days at normal consumption rates)
without interfering with essential military and economic activities.
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There is little doubt that neutralization of the bulk POL storage
facilities in North Vietnam would present the Hanoi regime and its
allies with an immediate problem in improvising an adequate flow of
petroleum products. This problem would be made more difficult i?f
the auxiliary pumping, piping, and primary distribution facilities p v,
4
1
were to be kept inoperable. Because Hanoi has already gone to con-
siderable lengths to reduce the vulnerability of its bulk petroleum
storage centers by dispersal. and other passive defense measures,
including burying tanks, there probably exists an emergency plan for
an alternative system of supply. Logically, the alternative system
would be based on China's Fort Bayard and port facilities and connect-
ing rail links. It is concluded that this alternate system could be put
into operation prior to the exhaustion of stocks in North Vietnam.
Following neutralization of targeted storage, it s11~d~T-ae po"s'sire to
restrict the flow of essential military supplies if dispersed storage,
in tanks and drums, were subject to attack by armed reconnaissance
missions. The increased activity associated with these sites following
attacks on bulk storage sites should facilitate identification of such
sites and may make it possible to eliminate some of the small depots.
The burden of a petroleum shortage would. fall on less essential or
non-essential military and civilian uses. The immediate impact in
North Vietnam will be felt in the need to convert to a new system of
supply and distribution. This conversion will necessitate costly measures
and create significant problems in adapting to a new situation. It is esti-
mated, however, that the maintenance (or indeed some increase) of the
flow of supplies to the insurgent forces in South Vietnam could be sus-
tained. The cost to Hanoi, through the destruction of facilities and the
need to divert additional manpower to emergency logistic activities,
would not be insignificant, but the ability to continue the war would
remain.
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/08 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100070004-3
North Vietnam: Petroleum Facilities
VIENT #1* 4.111* Khai
Mu~ng Nakhon Phano
Wang Sakon Nakff on,J`\_ f
NORTH VIETNAM
0 Buried petroleum tanks
0 JCS target sites
Petroleum drum concentrations
a" Railroad Road Track or tr@i14
0 25 50 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilomelers
62551
Ir ~~r ~dgng Ha
pppnnn BO Ho Su
ne ',.Quang Tri
SOUTH
ser g No g7--7-,?VIETNAM 7ti
TEA O S
5P r, r' 1 ~ cJ ',_
~Saravanet
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