AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH 14 JULY 1966*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050015-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: July 14, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH
VIETNAM THROUGH 14 JULY 1966
SUMMARY
1. (S/NFD) The most significant air strikes of June and early
July were conducted against the major bulk POL storage facilities.
Analysis of data available through 9 July indicates that the air
strikes resulted in the loss of about one-half of the preraid
targeted capacity which existed on 28 June.
2. (S) A high level of road interdiction attained nearly four
times as many road cuts and cratered segments as the previous month
with a record number of trucks, ferries, and rolling stock destroyed
or damaged. Through rail service probably is not possible on at
least three and perhaps four of the five major railroad lines in
North Vietnam, although rail shuttle service continues on all lines.
Miscellaneous military targets, including SAM sites and naval craft,
were also struck.
3. (S) The cumulative effects of the bombing since March 1965
have placed some strains on North Vietnam, particularly in the
economic areas, but on the whole the North Vietnamese have been
able to meet their military needs and to support the insurgency in
South Vietnam, although their capability for overt military
aggression has been limited.
* This report is prepared jointly by DIA and CIA.
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
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1. (S/NFD) The recent US air strikes against targets in the I
Hanoi-Haiphong area do not appear to have weakened the North Vietnamese
leadership's resolve to continue to prosecute the war. At the same
time, the Hanoi leadership appears to be taking note of the effects
the bombing raids are having on popular morale and is initiating
steps to prevent or curb, if possible, any decline in the fighting
spirit of the people. -Regime conce-i n-oven the- tutus of -morale -may
ref-lae-t--its realization that the cumulative effects of the bombing
-raids--are--now beginning to be felt by large segments of the..
population.- Presently, however, there continues to be no hard
evidence of real alarm in Hanoi or that morale in North Vietnam has
slipped to the extent that it would force the regime to change its
policy of continuing the war.
5. (S/NFD) The attacks on the petroleum facilities will make
the operation of the economy more difficult and costly. Even before
these attacks, the bombings were causing increasing disruption of
economic activity. Food shortages and rising food prices apparently
are becoming more prevalent throughout North Vietnam. The economy,
nevertheless, is still able to provide the essential needs of the
population. Measurable cumulative direct and indirect losses
caused by the air strikes now amount to about $100 million.*
* US dollars are used throughout this memorandum.
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addition, there are other losses and costs to the economy and the I
military establishment which have developed as a consequence of the
air strikes but to which values cannot be assigned.
Effects on Military Targets
1. (S/NFD) In June and early July 1966, the most significant
air strikes were conducted against the major bulk POL storage facilities.
A high level of road interdiction was also maintained with nearly four
times as many road cuts and cratered segments as.there were last month.
A record number of trucks, ferries, and rolling stock were destroyed or
damaged. Major rail lines were struck during this period and heavy
strikes were made on the intra-coastal waterway between Thanh Hoa and
Vinh. Miscellaneous military facilities, including SAM sites, were
also struck. The cumulative effects of the bombing since March 1965
have placed some strains on North Vietnam, but on the whole the North
Vietnamese have been able to meet their military needs and to support
.the insurgency in South Vietnam, although their capability for overt
military aggression has been limited. Cumulative totals of damaged
and destroyed targets are shown in Tab A.
2. (S/NFD) Preliminary analysis of photography available through
9 July, indicates that the air strikes which began on 29 June against
the principle North Vietnamese petroleum storage facilities resulted
in the loss of about one-half of the preraid JCS targeted capacity of
these facilities existing on 28 June. The bombing has also denied the
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use of certain of the support facilities at Haiphong, the only
important terminal for receiving ocean-going tankers, and all petroleum
support facilities as well as storage capacity, were destroyed in Hanoi,
which serves as the most important center for internal distribution of
petroleum products. As long as the jetties and some storage capacity
remain at Haiphong, some use of this terminal is possible. To the
extent that sufficient supplies cannot be imported through Haiphong,
other means of distribution can be employed including delivery to South
China and transport from there by rail, truck, or coastal shipping to
the remaining storage sites in North Vietnam. These substitute pro-
cedures, however, will increase significantly the unit cost of petroleum
imports; and higher costs of internal distribution of petroleum will
result from the loss of bulk storage facilities and the consequent need
for greater use of drums and other small containers.
3. (S/NFD) Imports of petroleum products by North Vietnam in
June were some 20,000 tons less than scheduled because of the effects
of air strikes. One Soviet tanker scheduled to arrive at Haiphong was
diverted to Shanghai while en route -- apparently because bomb damaged
transport facilities could not transfer POL from Haiphong to the
interior as rapidly as shipments were received at the port. Another
tanker was diverted to the Communist Chinese port of Fort Bayard
without offloading in Haiphong after the first air strikes eliminated
much of the capacity at Haiphong, Do Son, and Hanoi. A third tanker,
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in North Vietnamese waters at the time of the bombings, had discharged
its cargo.
4. (S) Through rail service probably is not possible'on at least
three and perhaps four of the five major railroad lines in North Vietnam,
although rail shuttle service continues on all lines. Only the Hanoi-
Thai Nguyen line is definitely open for through traffic. Three spans
of the Viet Tri railroad/highway bridge on the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line
and at least one small bridge north of Viet Tri recently have been
destroyed, disrupting through rail service between Hanoi and the important
industrial centers of Lam Thao and Viet Tri as well as between Hanoi and
Lao Cai. The Red River, however, serves as an. alternate line of
communication for these cities. On the Hanoi-Dong Dang line pilots
reported a span destroyed on the Cao Nung railroad bridge on 11 July.
The Bac Giang railroad/highway bridge on this line was restruck on 4 July
but the effects of the strike have not as yet been ascertained. The
status of through rail service on the Hanoi-Haiphong line is uncertain.
The Hai Duong railroad/highway bridge on this line was restruck on
10 July but no assessment of damage has been made. The rail bypass
bridge at Hai Duong is unserviceable. The Hanoi-Vinh rail line is open
to through traffic at least as far south as the Thanh Hoa area, with
rail shuttle service undoubtedly continuing on the southern sections
of the road.
5. (S/NFD) Since the inception of the ROLLING THUNDER Program,
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a total of 47 different railroad bridges and combination rail/highway
bridges have been destroyed, some more than once. Restoration of
bridges or the use of bypasses have largely offset these losses.
Simplicity of construction, improvisation, and mass use of labor have
made it possible to surmount quickly the difficulties and delays
caused by the bombing. However, air strikes against the railroad
system in North Vietnam have made it more difficult and costly for
the Communists to move supplies over the rail lines and caused diversion
of considerable manpower resources and critical construction equipment
and material. Bomb damage to the rail lines has not seriously
curtailed the flow of military supplies into NVN.
6. (S) Heavy attacks against roads and trucks have continued. In
June, the ratio of trucks destroyed or damaged to those sighted decreased
to less than 1 to 4 as compared 1 to 2 in May; however, the number of
vehicles damaged and destroyed was the highest recorded for a one month
period since the commencement of armed reconnaissance. Vehicle con-
centrations in Military Region IV have ranged from 25 to 100 vehicles.
This is the first time concentrations of such size have been sighted in
the,area since early 1966. They reflect a sizeable North Vietnamese
effort to move supplies southward into and throughout Military Region IV.
7. (S/NFD) All significant motorable routes south and west of
the Hanoi complex have been subjected to multiple attacks since the
inception of ROLLING THUNDER missions and all major bridge crossings
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have been struck with varying degrees of damage. The steady flow
of traffic has been prevented by intermittent stoppages at blocked
road segments and damaged stream crossings. The continued inter-
diction of the roads, particularly south of the 20th parallel, has
forced the North Vietnamese government to employ thousands of people
in road maintenance and damage recovery. Massive efforts in new road
development and the expansion of the existing network have been made
to obtain more flexibility for through movements. The continued
addition of new alternate and bypass routes is alleviating
the reduction of route capacity of the original road net caused by
air interdiction. At this point in time, road capacity still exceeds
the demand for logistic support over NVN LOC's. Possibly more dis-
ruptive and retarding to the North Vietnamese effort has been the
cumulative loss of about 2,000 transport vehicles. (including those
destroyed in the Laos corridor) leaving a current estimated North
Vietnamese inventory of between 11,000-12,000.
8. (S) Aerial operations against waterway craft were con-
centrated primarily south of the 20th parallel. In June, a total
of 1,065 craft were sighted and 640 were reported struck. The
heaviest waterway strikes were against the intra-coastal waterway
between Vinh and Thanh Hoa, resulting in periodic disruption of
through waterway movement on this important north-south route and
possible diversion and re-routing of transport to coastal routes,
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where a slight increase in traffic was apparent. The cumulative
effect of ROLLING THUNDER to date, however, has not significantly
reduced waterborne transport operations.
9. (S) The sinking of three North Vietnamese Navy Motor Torpedo
Boats (MTBs) by USN aircraft on 1 July, reduced the number of MTBs
in the current naval order of battle to nine and will weaken the
coastal defense force. In addition, the loss of three MTBs plus the
capture of 19 crewmen and the deaths of other crewmen will probably
further damage the North Vietnam Navy's already low morale. Additional
ZcLrr~ v~ ze --e_P2 zu~.c_2
air strikes on 7 July attacked at least four naval craft 'A tentatively
identified as submarine chasers,, of-which -two are believed to have
been sunk. -This would reduce thenumber of submarine chasers by
one-half.
Leadership and Public Reactions
10. (S/NFD) The recent US air strikes against targets'in the
Hanoi-Haiphong area do not appear to have weakened the North Vietnamese
leadership's resolve to continue to prosecute the war. Propaganda
pronouncements coming from Hanoi, including a.27 June interview
granted by Ho Chi Minh to a Soviet correspondent, have declared that
the North Vietnamese are as determined as ever to continue the war --
despite all difficulties -- until a victory on Communist terms can
be achieved. Recent diplomatic reporting on the leadership's resolve
has varied in opinion but, on balance, does not indicate that the
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regime is prepared to change its position.
ll. (S) At the same time, the Hanoi leadership appears to be
taking note of the effects the bombing raids are having on"popular
morale and is initiating steps to prevent or curb, if possible, any
decline in the fighting spirit of the people. Regime propaganda on
the POL strikes has claimed specifically that the raids would not have
any effect on the morale of the people. To bolster popular fighting
spirit and possibly to pave the way for future trials, the leadership
recently staged a parade of a number of captured US pilots through
the streets of Hanoi and gave wide coverage to the angry mood of the
people of the city and their cries for vengeance and the defeat of the
Americans. In addition, since the POL strikes, North Vietnamese
fighter aircraft have been patrolling at low altitude in the Hanoi
area during daylight hours to bolster popular morale and to show
North Vietnamese resolve.
12. (S) Regime concern over the status of morale may reflect
its realization that the cumulative effects of the bombing raids are
now beginning to be felt by large segments of the population. These
effects include shortages of certain foodstuffs, limited quantities
of rationed goods, and sharp rises in the prices of unrationed
products. These elements, coupled with static wages, disruption of
the economy, and diversion to war-associated activities may soon
have a worsening effect on popular morale. In addition to the above,
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there is also the possibility that the reported large scale evacuation
from Hanoi ordered by the regime shortly after the initial POL
strike, coupled with the hardships encountered in relocation may
tend to further undermine morale. Presently, however, there
continues to be no hard evidence of real alarm in Hanoi or that
morale in North Vietnam has slipped to the extent that it would
force the regime to change its policy of continuing the war.
Effects on the Economy
13. (S/NFD) The attacks on the petroleum facilities will make
the operation of the economy more difficult and costly. Even before
these attacks, the bombings were causing increasing disruption of
economic activity. There was growing evidence of delays in trans-
port, local shortages and rising prices of certain foods, shortages
of electricity, and the constant diversion of investment and manpower
to the repair of bomb damage. As early. as May, Politburo member
Pham Hung had admitted.that the economy experienced difficulties in
1965 as a result of the bombing and suggested that many of the same
problems existed in 1966. He particularly emphasized the problems
in the distribution of local products and in the recel.pt of foreign
aid shipments resulting from damage to the transportation system.
Pham also admitted that the regime has had to scale down its
ambitious plans to develop heavy industry although some new industrial.
construction is continuing. Both agricultural and industrial production
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grew more slowly in 1965 than in 1964 and the prospects now for growth
in 1966 are poor. The economy, nevertheless, is still able to provide
the essential needs of the population. The stepped-up program of
military and economic assistance from other Communist countries has
also enabled Hanoi to proceed with plans for some economic development.
14. (S) Economic assistance to North Vietnam from Communist
countries has averaged some $100 million annually since 1955 and
probably will increase considerably in 1966 as a result of extensions
of emergency aid to support the war effort. Military assistance has
been increasing since the end of 1964, and in 1965 deliveries of
weapons and ammunition reached an estimated value of $250-$350 million,
at least one-half the total of such deliveries since 1955? In addition,
the USSR and Communist China have been providing technical assistance
to North Vietnam and are assisting in the construction of airfields
and other facilities there.
15. (S) Food shortages and rising food prices apparently are
becoming more prevalent throughout North Vietnam. Pham has admitted
that inflation in agricultural prices will be a continuing problem
for the regime and another North Vietnamese official '.as urged the
peasants to produce more and eat less. Although poor weather has
been an important factor in these difficulties, air strikes have
interfered with the distribution of food and fertilizer, interfered
with normal farming schedules, and reduced the availability of
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manpower. The probable shortfall in the spring rice crop together
with other shortages in food could necessitate an increase in food
imports and further complicate the regime's supply difficulties.
16. (S) The value of North Vietnam's seaborne exports of
apatite, coal, and cement was below the monthly pre-strike average
by some $1.5 million in June. The estimated cumulative loss in
exports since the inception of the air strikes is about $9.2 million.*
The volume of coal shipped in June was only 36 per cent of the average
monthly volume for 1965 because of damage inflicted against facilities
at the major coal port of Cam Pha during two air strikes in April 1966.
No apatite has been exported since August 1965 because of repeated
interdiction of the rail line leading from the mines at Lao Cai.
Although this line has been open periodically, North Vietnam apparently
has lost its major customers for apatite because of its inability to
provide a reliable flow of shipments.
17. (S) Reports of power shortages in Hanoi strongly suggest
that there has been inadequate reserve generating capacity to cover all
demands for electricity since the April restrike against the Uong Bi
thermal power plant. Haiphong, which is also served by the Uong Bi
plant, probably is in a similar situation. Rationing of electric
Data revisions resulted in a $0.3 million decrease in last month's
estimate.
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power probably has been necessary with non-essential consumers, such
as private residences, commercial enterprises, and perhaps public
transportation, being denied service in peak load periods. It is
estimated, however, that the power supply to industry and to essential
services has not been curtailed significantly, if at all, and that
the available supply of power is sufficient to meet the demand in both
cities except for peak periods. June 1966 photography shows virtually
no progress in reconstruction of the Nam Dinh power plant since the
last air strike in August 1965. With this plant inoperative and the
probability that Nam Dinh has been denied power from the main trans-
mission network in view of the power restrictions in Hanoi, it is
likely that the Nam Dinh area is suffering a severe power shortage.
This is further supported by the apparent failure to effect repairs
or even to clear away rubble at the large Nam Dinh Textile Mill which
was slightly damaged by air strikes in July 1965.
18. (S/NFD) Direct losses caused by air strikes against economic
and military facilities and equipment continue to increase. Measured
in terms of estimated reconstruction or replacement cost these
cumulative losses are now estimated at some 86 million dollars as
shown in the tabulation below.
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Economic Facilities and Equipment
Military Facilities
and Equipment
Million
Million
Targets
Dollars
Targets
Dollars
Railroad/Highway Bridges
Barracks
16.2
Reconstruction
12.2
Temporary Repairs
2.9
2/
Ammunition Storage
4.5
Transportation Equipment
14.2
Supply Depots
3.1
Railroad Yards and Ports
1.0
Radar and Communicat
ions 1.1
Electric Power Plants
6.3
Naval Bases
0.8
Petroleum Storage
SAM Sites
0.9
Facilities
2.2
4/
Manufacturing Facilities
1.5
Aircraft
10.8
Airfields
0.4
Naval Craft
Miscellaneous Targets of
7.2
5/
Armed Reconnaissance
0.7
Total
40.3
45.7
1/ The estimate in this category is incomplete because of inadequate
post-strike photography.
2/ Includes 2.0 million dollars expended to date on temporary repairs
and 0.9 million dollars required to provide temporary repairs for
structures damaged but not yet restored to operable condition.
3/ Excludes destruction and damage to trucks in Laos.
Excludes destruction and damage to support facilities.
Includes only destruction of and heavy damage to North Vietnamese
naval craft in May-July 1966.
14
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Measurable indirect losses-amount to about $12.7 million made up I
principally of losses of foreign exchange earnings of $9.2 million
and losses in the 1966 fall rice crop of $3.5 million. In addition
to these measurable indirect losses, there are many other losses
and costs to the economy and the military establishment which have
developed as a consequence of the air strikes, but which cannot be
assigned values. These would include the loss of production and the
lower productivity of labor resulting from the dispersal of industry,
time lost from work as a consequence of civil defense measures, and
loss of production caused by temporary shortages of electric power.
15
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57- 0 01-6 l1, ISO D IA 1 SULTS OF ST1II S Cla1 NVNT'A rT / TIUIIJ 13 JUR. PIA
LY 1966 TABLE 350 (HOTEL)
Targ
ets
Fixed Targets
No.
a n? ted
No,
Strike
1;
7
,Io S'
t
4
M..
=--W ALL E
B ar ra c ks
A rno Depots
3 man
12.6 Mme'
1
(i
mm
9.
~9 7
( 13
23
75
9 7
5l.
2
48
1143
5 6
1
35. 6 37.51
POL Stora e
.
202.8 MT
13
.0
-
11
.
8 .
22
31
65.5
2, 0
d c~3pi fir.
M.I..t
a 9
,: F? KL1
.8 -ST/ky-
ST
1
4
4
9 x-
9
79
5
S .
~
~ 28
9
1L
~ 1 3
~
Z 5_x- o a _.
10 3,Z~~.. _ 2.63
9. ..~ ._
Ex , ok,~~zst
MT
~?.-n?m..a:
1
L a~c~--
100
Trw .ms~.*
1
~
100
?
t
Y
3
.m~t~.~ ~.n.o~..
28
~ evE . ~?~h
71.
- a.ec.m+sze+wrs.~. n........re w.wr..
Airfields
23
4
12
359
Naval Bases
15
2
15
1 6
Bridges
46
Comma Install
45
2
2
15
Radar Sites
50
15
61
404
SAM Sites
115
Locks & Dams
91
2
2
10
Ferries
34
44
Tota Sort es: 8, 724
Armwd Recce Sorties
b/
41,221
Vessels
Vehicles
RR Stock
RUIERv_~d Damaged
1,794 2,970
1,081 1,108
797 1,056
Assessments are based on beat information received, will be refined as more
information becomes available.
Strike plus flak suppression sorties.
summary assigned to principal target.
Some applied
to multiple targets; in
c/ National capacity in 1,000's where measurement'shown.
d/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
T/ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, attacked'and road and rail cuts made
g/ Per cent inactive due to dismantling or abandonment of facilities as a result of air
strikes.
(-~) These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted and
struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets. (i.e., barracks,
supply and ammo depots).
NOTE: For comparative purposes.
US worldwide ammo storage capacity in 6,936,000 metric tons.(CONUS 5,719.,000 MT).
US worldwide military POL storage capacity is 15,452,000 MT; national US commercial
capacity is 151,325,000 MT; approximate average $ value of 1 MT of POL products is$28.
US worldwide military supply depot covered storage space is 137,100,000 sq. ft.
(CONUS 121,300,000 sq. ft.).
In is serv n metropolitan area ? New York - 7 6
Total ilowatt capacity oflpower i UM I
milli~ip b 1 5-32. million.
1 c~~? . ~ k (D
170'1
SOURCE: D IA
TAB A