AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050009-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 14, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R0001000
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
(THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1966)
NOVEMBER 1966
S-0020/AP?4
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA
CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING, DOD DIR 5200,10
DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.'Sections 793 and 794.
The transmission or revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
 Approve fer Irse ICI CJ 0 ft: k14IFt 1N2S 000050009-0
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING =._OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 196.6
FOI iY ORD
This report is prayed `oil "-on t h 1 y
basis at the request of the Secretary of
Defense for an--- 4 on of certain
effects of the 1OLL T D R program.
The report covers three gen?e'ral areas of
concern: Effie is on.Mi itaxy Targets;
Leadership and 'Public Reactions; and Effects
on the NVN E ozomy. The discussion of
political ated to those
developments with n rth etnam which
relate to Hanoi's at tud toward con-
tinuing the war andthe effects of the
ROLLING THUNDER attack has onr-civilian
morale in North Vietnam.
Approv q,rR~le~se ~Q0607b kT-Rl1RR2s5fK9VQ100050009-0
 ApprovSTCTVTase ff V/0 : if t1IF3"2SOPF 00050009-0
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1966
SUMMARY
1. (S/NFD) Interdiction of the lines of communication (LOCs)
continued during the current reporting period as did strikes
against POL facilities and other military targets, although at
a lesser rate than in the last three reporting periods due to
adverse flying weather. Weather conditions improved in early
November with a resultant improvement in the rate of damage
caused by increased strike sorties.
2. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese took advantage of the
adverse weather to strengthen their defenses and shore up the
vital interdicted transportation routes, particularly in the
northern part of the country. As a result, the railroad system
is probably in a better position to carry freight in mid-November
than at any time since the resumption of bombing at the end of
January 1966. Three of the five major rail lines -- from Hanoi
to Dong Dang, Haiphong and Thai Nguyen -- have remained open for
through service almost continually during the current reporting period.
There were significant decreases in the rate of damage to both LOCs and
transport equipment during the period. Construction units
repairing or working on new roads in the southern part of North
Approve f f t f elpmse M01(09(0b 14-RAPf4SOQ j45RQDQ1.00050009-0
RtT-
 Approve 1O"fageNCV/0F/0 "4-GN2D4$,'f i 00050009-0
Vietnam have continued to improve the road network, but are
probably now experiencing additional difficulties because of
the rains in that region. There is some evidence of fuel
shortages in MR IV. This condition has probably resulted
primarily from distribution problems caused by inadequate
planning and allocation rather than a general shortage of POL.
3. (S/NFD) Expansion of the North Vietnamese armed
forces and infiltration of men and supplies into SVN and
Laos continues. However, pursuit of the war effort is be-
coming progressively more costly and difficult for Hanoi.
While it is estimated that NVN's capability for sustained
overt aggression has been limited by the US air efforts, the
North Vietnamese retain the capability to continue to support their
present level of activities in South Vietnam and Laos.
4. (S/NFD) North Vietnam's harshly worded propaganda
response to last month's Manila Conference once again em-
phasized the Hanoi leadership's determination to press on
with the war despite continuing US bombings. Despite press
and diplomatic reports that there will be some move toward
negotiations if the US stops bombing NVN, there has been
no specific guarantee from Hanoi on this nor is there any
indication that Soviet or Eastern European sources are speaking
with the authorization of the NVN regime. There has
2
ApprovS feli f&se-Q60TO : ffifflt SffI28 000050009-0
 ApprovdXLYff-t01P12 N(y09FDO RIE{ S04(36( NV0050009-0
been some decline in popular morale throughout the country due to
the bombing. However, there continues to be no indication that the
regime's resolve has been weakened to any appreciable extent.
5. (S/NFD) The major measurable effects of air strikes on the
North Vietnamese economy are the diversion of substantial amounts of
material and of some 300,000 civilians -- 200,000 on a full-time basis
-- to repair, reconstruction, dispersal programs, and the extensive
physical damage inflicted on selected military and economic targets.
Agricultural production and industrial growth have also been dis-
rupted. However, the reallocation of labor and the greater employ-
ment of women in the labor force have prevented the manpower problem
from reaching critical proportions. Transportation and other basic
services apparently continue to perform at a level adequate for
military and essential civilian needs. Large scale deliveries of
economic aid from the communist countries continue to be instrumental
in maintaining North Vietnam's economic viability in the face of the
bombing. Measurable damage to the military establishment and to the
economy caused by the air strikes now stands at more than $152
million.
3
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 ApproveffFC1RtjlePse NQ009FIC) RI S(MlIScEl"p0050009-0
Effects on Military Targets
1. (S/NFD) Interdiction of the lines of communication
(LOCs) continued during the current reporting period as did
strikes against POL facilities and other military targets, al-
though at a lesser rate than in the last three reporting periods.
Weather conditions which had been bad for most of October improved
in early November with a resultant improvement in the rate of
damage caused by increased strike sorties. The North Vietnamese
took advantage of the adverse weather to strengthen their
defenses and shore up the vital interdicted transportation routes,
particularly in the northern part of the country. As a result,
the railroad system is probably in a better position to carry
freight in mid-November than at any time since the resumption
of bombing at the end of January 1966. Construction units re-
pairing or working on new roads in the southern part of North
Vietnam have continued to improve the road network there, but
are probably now experiencing additional difficulties because
of the rains in that region. There is some evidence of fuel
shortages in MR IV. This condition has probably resulted pri-
marily from distribution problems caused by inadequate planning
and allocation rather than from a general shortage of POL. The
pattern of petroleum distribution has been distorted by the air
strikes and periodic local shortages of POL will probably continue
to appear in the future.
4
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approveg EIC re WU91F10-f 1UNS0B?P"L0050009-0
2. (S/NFD) In spite of an overall increase in air strikes
against the rail lines during 1966, there has been no significant
increase in the total length of time the rail lines have been
interdicted for through rail service. The Hanoi-Dong Dang and
Hanoi-Haiphong lines, the two most important lines for the move-
ment of both imports and domestic goods, have been interdicted
for a total of only about two months and one month, respectively,
during the year. The volume of traffic moved on these two lines
could easily have been equal to that moved in a comparable period
in 1965. The average monthly volume of rail traffic in North
Vietnam, however, is estimated to have decreased in 1966, primarily
because of the loss of through service on the Hanoi-Lao Cai line for
a proportionately longer time than in 1965. In addition, the Hanoi-
Vinh line has been disrupted for through rail service almost con-
tinually since the resumption of bombing late in January 1966. It
is estimated that the decrease in traffic carried on the Lao Cai and
Vinh rail lines probably has been compensated by an increase in
freight carried by trucks and watercraft.
3. (S/NFD) The railroad system probably is in a better
position to carry freight in mid-November than at any time since
the resumption of bombing in January. Three of the five major rail
lines -- from Hanoi to Dong Dang, Haiphong, and Thai Nguyen -- have
remained open for through service almost continually in the current
reporting period. The Hanoi-Lao Cai line is open for a limited
5
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approve ft ft"je
JW&9f bfftf ff fjSO Fff 0050009-0
amount of through rail traffic, with a rail ferry at Viet Tri
circumventing the only unrepaired bridge on the line. Shuttle
service also appears to be continuing at this point. Through rail
service on the Hanoi-Vinh line has again been interrupted further
to the north by the destruction of the two bridges at Cao Duong, with
shuttle service continuing on open segments of the line. The Duc
Tho to Thuong Phong Trang line is so heavily interdicted as to be
of no practical use for any traffic north of Phuong Dien.
4. (S/NFD) Steadily deteriorating weather conditions over
North Vietnam during the month of October generally resulted in
significant decreases in the rate of damage to both fixed and moving
highway targets. Only minor damage to highway LOCs was recorded north of
the 20th parallel as a result of the limited air strikes. The bulk
of the reported road cuts or cratered segments were located along
the highways south of Thanh Hoa. In this region, Route 1A was
heavily cratered from the DMZ to Ha Tinh and between Dien Chau and
Long Yen. Route 15, the inland north-south artery, was also heavily
cratered from Xom Ve to Linh Cam in Route Packages 1 and 2 and
between Phu Qui and Lam Song in Route Packages 3 and 4. The chart
at Tab A contains the results of strikes on North Vietnamese targets
through 14 November 1966.
5. (S/NFD) During October there was a decrease in the number
of watercraft destroyed or damaged by air strikes. Activity con-
tinued to increase on the Song Con and the Song Ca - waterway
6
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 ApprovS fe Irse ff y3/0 kf 1P0;WSDf "EUM00050009-0
routes offering potential for southward movement - in probable
response to the attacks on craft on the more direct north-south
intra-coastal routes. The usually heavy activity concentrated
on the intra-coastal route between Thanh Hoa and Vinh dropped off
considerably toward the end of the month. The heavy traffic re-
ported in the Thanh Hoa area reflects utilization of a recently
improved north-south connecting waterway route crossing the Song
Ma Delta waterways. Coastal activity in the vicinity of Dong Hoi
remained high and approximately half of all coastal strikes were
in this area. In addition, two US destroyers reportedly damaged
or destroyed about 300 watercraft between the DMZ and 17?30'N.
Increased sightings of traffic were made periodically in the coastal
approaches to Haiphong. These sightings suggest continued utiliza-
tion of coastal routes in that area.
6. (S) There was no significant change in the rate and
pattern of NVN AAA deployment. The gun counts continue to increase
mainly around Hanoi, Haiphong, and along the major LOCs in the
northern part of the country. Virtually all newly identified equip-
ment has been used to expand previous defenses.
7. (S) Air strikes against EW and GCI type radars have re-
sulted in the destruction of valuable equipment. However, an estimated
5 per cent increase in available equipment, during the last 30 days,
has left the North Vietnam airwarning and ground-controlled intercept
7
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 ft ffNSIA(10050009-0
ApprovgJlfie Rse 094pt) P
system virtually intact. The effect of strikes against radars
supporting AAA and SAM sites is still difficult to evaluate al-
though it has been disruptive. The inventory of SAM associated
radars (FAN SONG) is estimated to have increased eight per cent;
there has been a 22 per cent increase in fire control radars.
8. (S) NVN jet fighter activity during the month of October
was well below that of recent months. A total of only five air
engagements were reported, all in the first nine days of the
month. North Vietnam losses were one MIG-21 and one unidentified
MIG, with an additional unidentified MIG damaged. Reacting MIGs
originated from either Phuc Yen or Hanoi/Gia Lam. NVN fighters
on three occasions in early November attempted to shoot down a
US electronic countermeasure aircraft in the vicinity of Yen Bai.
Covering US fighters shot down two MIG-21s during one of these
attempts on 5 November.
9. (S) SA-2 activity during the first part of the reporting
period was extremely low, with only 25 missile firings having been
reported. This can be attributed in part to the fact that
most US air activity took place in areas not heavily protected by
SA-2s. However, activity returned to a more normal level in early
November with 66 missiles being fired. There is evidence that NVN
may be encountering some shortages in replacement missiles, forcing
the adoption of an austerity program. The
8
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approv ffElr
se U0 ( 9 : kf tRaF 2S~~ EDM00050009-0
southernmost SAM site discovered to date was detected on 12
October approximately 13 nautical miles northwest of Dong Hoi.
This site was attacked on 12 and 13 October, and completely des-
troyed. Additional new sites were discovered in October and
November, raising the current number of sites capable of accepting
missiles to 138.
10. (S/NFD) Expansion of the North Vietnamese armed forces
and infiltration of men and supplies into SVN and Laos continues.
However, pursuit of the war effort is becoming progressively more
costly and difficult for Hanoi. While it is estimated that NVN's
capability for sustained overt aggression has been limited by the
US air efforts, the North Vietnamese retain the capability to continue
to support their present level of activities in SVN and Laos. It is
interesting to note, however, that VC/NVA initiated large-scale military
actions in SVN have remained at a low-level for sometime. In addition,
there are some indications that shortages of supplies and morale problems
are becoming more prevalent in VC/NVA units. It appears that the
continued destruction and damage to North Vietnam coupled with US
operations in SVN are now beginning to have an effect on the enemy
capability to continue the war successfully on the scale his present
organization in SVN would indicate.
9
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approve ft se *609f b%itfjff NSO gF e0 0050009-0
Leadership and Public Reactions
11. (S/NFD) North Vietnam's harshly worded propaganda response
to last month's Manila Conference once again emphasized the Hanoi
leadership's determination to press on with the war despite the con-
tinuing US bombings. This determination was further underscored in
NVN statements regarding the "valuable assistance" recently offered
by bloc countries which will enable the "Vietnamese people" to
achieve "complete victory" in the war against the Americans. There
have been reports from press and diplomatic sources that Hanoi will
make some move toward negotiations if the US stops bombing North
Vietnam. There has been, however, no specific guarantee from Hanoi
on this nor is there any indication that Soviet or Eastern European
sources are speaking with the authorization of the NVN regime.
12. (S/NFD) There has been some decline in popular morale
throughout the country due to the bombing. However, there continues
to be no indication that the regime's resolve has been weakened to
any appreciable extent. The dislocations resulting from the'
evacuations taken together with difficulties in distribution and
food shortages have caused hardships but the best available evidence
continues to suggest that popular resentment is directed more at the
US than at the Government. To enhance this popular anger, the regime
has in the past two weeks published a long list of "war crimes"
allegedly committed by the Americans.
10
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approved`b IE*gaN1019/g6 A 0(M-Sff 10050009-0
Effects on the Economy
13. (S/NFD) The major measurable effects of air strikes on
the North Vietnamese economy are the diversion of substantial amounts of
material and of some 300,000 civilians -- 200,000 on a full-time basis --
to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs, and the extensive
physical damage inflicted on selected military and economic targets,
principally those associated with transportation and petroleum storage and
distribution. Agricultural production and industrial growth have.also been
disrupted. However, the reallocation of labor and the greater employment
of women in the labor force have prevented the manpower problem from
reaching critical proportions. This is further supported by a
report attributed to Ho Chi Minh, that university and professional
school enrollment in 1966 is at roughly the same level as in 1965.
Moreover, the reallocation of labor has apparently enabled trans-
portation and other functions to perform at a level adequate for
military and essential civilian needs.
14. (S/NFD) Large scale deliveries of economic aid from the
communist countries continue to be instrumental in maintaining North
Vietnam's economic viability in the face of the bombing. In the
first nine months of 1966 deliveries of economic aid from the USSR
alone probably totaled about $200 million, compared with total
economic deliveries of $150 million in 1965 and an annual average
11
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approve E Cft19ese ry V09rb Rle Sj3jQS3(FW0050009-0
of $50-$75 million in 1955-64. An unconfirmed report from Poland
on the recent Warsaw Pact meeting states that the Pact countries
had signed pledges of $1 billion in goods and cash, 80 per cent of
which would be from the USSR, to support the North Vietnamese war
effort. If this report is true, it almost certainly includes long-
term aid to North Vietnam.
15. (S/NFD) There are indications that Hanoi is seeking a
general speed-up of deliveries of machinery and equipment from the
Communist countries in late 1966. The requests are not only limited
to goods that may be related to the military effort -- vehicle spare
parts and railway equipment -- but include a wide variety of durable
goods. The equipment is needed to replace bomb-damaged equipment --
principally transportation equipment -- to supply dispersed industrial
sites, and/or to provide for additional industrial facilities.
16. (S) Dispersal of industry and evacuation of the urban popu-
lation continue to be stressed by the Hanoi regime. Most collateral
reporting, on the other hand, shows little evidence of either extensive
dispersal or permanent evacuation. Recent government attention to the
development of regional markets may be intended to make movement of
industry and personnel more palatable as well as to facilitate dis-
tribution.
17. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese have attempted to lessen the
disruptive effects of the bombing attacks on agriculture by importing
12
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approv5 FLIMITa.uIJ IOTcO:RELF(gg12sDPSEMM 00050009-0
increased amounts of chemical fertilizers and substantial numbers
of diesel generators to power the irrigation systems. The air
strikes, nevertheless, continue to have a disruptive effect on
production, although it is too early to evaluate their effect on
the fall rice crop. Recent information indicates that the air
strikes have seriously interfered with fishing activities in
North Vietnam. Fishing schedules have been interrupted and the
fish catch has been reduced. In addition, at least six facilities
responsible for processing sea products have been damaged and their
activity reduced or in some cases eliminated.
18. (S/NFD) The neutralization of most of the major petroleum
storage facilities has resulted in an expensive dispersal program
and created difficulties in distributing petroleum internally. The
problems appear to be essentially those caused by management and
transportation rather than an overall shortage of petroleum products.
China is currently sending materials to North Vietnam for the con-
struction of two petroleum tank farms -- possibly at Haiphong. The
size of the installations is unknown, but presumably they are re-
quired to ease the receipt and distribution of petroleum products.
Strikes against POL installations were at a lower rate in October than in
September. Five JCS targeted facilities were struck, but less than
75 dispersed sites were hit. The POL facility at Haiphong was not
struck during this period.
13
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approved ?t R "Le IV VO9K)b WQr-f2Ja sb11ff W0050009-0
19. (S) In the period July thru mid-November 1966, only two
large tanker shipments from the Black Sea arrived in North Vietnam.
In addition to the two large tanker movements, three shipments in
small tankers from Vladivostok, increased rail movements, and dry
cargo ships were also used during this period for delivery. The
arrival of the Leningrad-Class tanker, ROVNO (8,229 GRT), scheduled
for December, will mark a resumption of shipments from the Black
Sea. Unless new equipment has been delivered to NVN, the Haiphong
POL facility will probably not be usable for offloading, and the
tanker will have to be discharged into barges.
20. (S) North Vietnam's seaborne exports remain far below pre-
bombing averages, with no apatite shipped by sea in October and
shipments of coal and cement down 27 per cent and 55 per cent, respectively,
from base period norms. Coal shipments from Cam Pha in October,
however, were the highest since April indicating that some of the
bomb damage incurred in that month has been repaired.
21. (S/NFD) Restoration of the small Ben Thuy powerplant was
set back by three air strikes in October. The total generating capa-
city in North Vietnam put out of service by the strikes remains at
an estimated 59,000 kilowatts, or 32 per cent of total installed
generating capacity. Despite this destruction, however, there has
been only a minor effect on the economy. Three powerplants which
have not been struck continue to supply the needs of the population
and industry in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
14
Approve ~F3~ use 2QQ ~p9/r6CjW[68 S00 V5RD1 f 0050009-0
 Approve E [e 'se*pCp9/pE0(Ri~IRg~.SOffp ED 0050009-0
22. (S/NFD) Direct losses caused by air strikes against
economic facilities and equipment measured in terms of estimated
reconstruction or replacement cost are now estimated at some
$132 as shown in Table A. Damage to transport equipment in
October was at the lowest level since June reflecting the poor
flying weather and the reduced number of air strikes. Measurable
indirect losses -- principally reduced foreign exchange earnings
and losses in agricultural crops -- total at least 20 million
dollars. In addition, there are many other losses and costs to
the economy and the military establishment which cannot be assigned
values. These include the costs of current operations, increased
defense costs, the loss of production and lower productivity of
labor, time lost from work as a consequence of civil defense
measures, and loss of production caused by shortages of electric
power.
15
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approv f 1E R eTase N4*091bO Ri,[-1 NS(M03 g M0050009-0
TABLE A
Economic Facilities and Equipment
Military Facilities and
Equipment
Targets
Million
Dollars
Targets
Million
Dollars
Railroad/Highway Bridges*
Reconstruction
17.3
Temporary Repairs
3.6**
Ammunition Storage
4.5
Transportation Equipment
Railroad Yards and Ports
33.1***
1.0
Supply Depots
Electric Power Plants
11.5
Petroleum Storage
SAM Sites
2.0
Facilities
Aircraft
20.0
Manufacturing Facilities
2.1
Airfields
0.4
Telecommunications
Facilities
Naval Craft
10.8
Miscellaneous Targets of
Armed Reconnaissance
1.3
Total
71.1
Total
60.7
* The estimate in this category is incomplete because of inadequate
post-strike photography.
** Includes 2.5 million dollars expended to date on temporary repairs
and 1.1 million dollars required to provide temporary repairs for struc-
tures damaged but not yet restored to operable condition.
*** Excludes destruction and damage to trucks in Laos. The estimated
value of damage and destruction to transportation equipment in North
Vietnam is based on pilot reports and may be somewhat overstated.
**** Excludes destruction and damage to support facilities and contents
of petroleum tanks.
16
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050009-0
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
 Approved f gr fl"e 2MI691?161 lqf gUS16i?gVV100050009-0
RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVNC~TARGETTS y a/ -THRU 14 Nov 1966 TABLE 350
Fixed Targets
Total Targets
Tar ets Struck
% National Capacity
Ammo Depots
POL Storage*
Supply Depots
No. c/
443 man
112.6 MT
131.9 MT
10550 SqFt
Targeted d/
No(*: %
62 40.72
18 96.7
13 100.0
26 40.77
d/
No(t) %
45 33.0 -
13 75.7
11 84.6
17 19.0
No.
Atks
-223-
52
67
51
Strike
Sorties
orties
12364
1155
524
601
Destroyed Inactive
22.68
73.4 37.61
85.1
13.48
Power Plants
187 KW
20
94.5
7
46.6
34
`283
31.6
Maritime Ports
Railroad Yards
Explosive Plant
7.8 ST DY
33.7 ST/DY
1 MT
6
4
1
95
78
100
6
2
1
28
19
00
23
18
3
229
139
28
13.0
9.3
71
2.63
Airfields
23
4
12
359
Naval Bases
15
3
19
217
Bridges
61
48
248
2599
Commo Install
45
2
2
15
Radar Sites
50
5
73
430
SAM Sites
130
47
62
338
Locks & Dams
8
2
2
10
Ferries
34
11
7
44
* JCS targets only; ? does not inc
lude
Total
Sortie
s
9538
R
lt
f
.
esu
s
/
dispersed storage. Armed Recce Sorties Destroyed Damaged
Vessels 3782 6336
Vehicles 2438 2319
RR St
k 148
oc
4 1782
a/ Assessments are based on best information received, will be refined as more accurate
information becomes available.
b/ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in this summary
assigned to principal target.
c/ National capacity in 1,000's where measurement shown.
d/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
f/ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, attacked and road and rail cuts made,
g/ Per cent inactive due to dismantling or abandonment of facilities as a result of air
strikes.
(*)These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted and
struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets. (i.e., barracks, supply
and ammo depots).
NOTE: For comparative purposes.
US worldwide ammo storage capacity is 6,936,000 metric tons (CONUS 5,719,000 MT).
US worldwide military POL storage capacity is 15,452,000 MT; national US Commercial capa-
city is 151,325,000 MT; approximate average $ value of 1 MT of POL products is $28.
US worldwide military supply depot covered storage space is 137,100,000 sq. ft.,
(CONUS 121,300,000 sq. ft).
Total kilowatt capacity of power plants serving metropolitan areas: New York - 7.6
million; Chicago 6 million; Washington (DC and Md/suburbs only) - 2.4 million.
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM TAB A
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050009-0
 Approve UFRkJse-NG9/ [9d501)6 6)050009-0
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA-CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THE WHITE HOUSE:
Vice President 1 cy
Gen Maxwell Taylor 1 cy
Mr. Bromley Smith 5 cys
DEFENSE:
SECDEF 2 cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA) 2 cys
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis) 2 cys
ASST SECDEF (PA) 1 cy
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
TREASURY (Secretary)
USIA
AID
NASA
NSA
STATE
AEC
FBI
NIC
ACDA
CHAIRMAN, JCS
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
J-1
J-3
J-4
J-5
J-6
SACSA
NMCC
1 cy
1 cy
1 cy
1 cy
1 cy
5 cy
15 cys
1 cy
1 cy
1 cy
1 cy
1 cy
1 cy
I cy
2 cys
1 cy
1 cy
1 cy
1 cy
3 cys
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 cys
DCSOPS 1 cy
ACSFOR 1 cy
ACSI 1 cy
ACSI-CI 1 cy
ACSI-Eastern 1 cy
STAG 1 cy
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2 cys
DNI 1 cy
OP-921E 1 cy
OP-922Y1 1 cy
OP-922Y2 1 cy
OP-92B1 1 cy
ApprOV Fe 0, 1aseN O/09/06 CIA I G N2SD I SS E M 00050009-0
 Approved $ rRJLEsT-2flN/Q/0f:OR.IIF1b2N0J1F#0&M50009-0
AIR FORCE :
CHIEF OF STAFF
ACS,I/USAF
AFNINDE
AFNIEBB
2 cys
1 cy
6 cys
1 cy
AFISI (Spec Investigation)
1 cy
AUL (Air Univ Library)
1 cy
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT
G-2
1 cy
1 cy
CINCPAC
2 cys
CINCPACAF
1 cy
CINCUSARPAC
1 cy
CINCPACFLT
1 cy
COMUSMACV
2 cys
7AF
2 cys
COMSEVENTHFLT
1 cy
COMATKCARSTRIKEFORSEVENTHFLT
(CTF 77)
1 cy
CINCLANT
1 cy
CINCSTRIKE
1 cy
CINCSAC
1 cy
SAC 544
1 cy
CINCTAC
1 cy
AFSTRIKE
1 cy
CONTIC
1 cy
CINCALCOM
1 cy
CINCEUR
1 cy
CINCUSAREUR
1 cy
CINCUSAFE
1 cy
CINCNAVEUR
1 cy
CINCCONAD
1 cy
CIA
125 cys
DIADR
1 cy
DIADD
1 cy
DIASC-1
1 cy
JS
1 cy
CO-2C
1 cy
AP
1 cy
AP-2
1 cy
AP-2D2
1 cy
AP-2E1
1 cy
AP-2E2
1 cy
AP-3
1 cy
AP-4
1 cy
AP-4A
1 cy
AP-4A2
6 cys
AP-4B4
2 cys
AP-4C
3 cys
xx
1 cy
JT
1 cy
Approved ?f R se 140609/ R E I G NSOD I S S EoMoo50009-0
 wmmwftS ICE R em N009F O RlE r G s1 T C Mnnnnan-n
wpp&& RfrlRaleNO00FF/?/ FoflDPb? OOl00050009-0