AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050007-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP82S00200$007-2
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
(THROUGH 16 JANUARY 1961)
JANUARY 1967
S?2034/AP?4
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA
CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING, DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050007-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050007-2
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794.
The transmission or revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050007-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050007-2
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
AN APPRAISAL Of THE BOMBING Of NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 16 JANUARY 1961
FOREWORD
This report is prepared on a monthly
basis at the request of the Secretary of
Defense for an evaluation of-,c ertain
effects of the ROLLING THUNDER program.
The report covers three general areas of
concern : Effects on Military Targets;
Leadership and Public Reactions; and
Effects on the NVN Economy. The dis-
cussion of political effects is limited
to those developments within North Vietnam
which relate to Hanoi's attitude toward
continuing the war and the effects the
ROLLING THUNDER attack has on civilian
morale in North Vietnam.
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050007-2
NORTH VIETNAMESE RAILROAD SYSTEM
THAILAND
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIET-NAM
BOMBING APPRAISAL OF
NORTH VIETNAM
16 JAN 67
"W" lrl~ GU 41)
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050007-2
 Approve"%Eef'se_*PQ1~ D9f q0(R j-W"SQD4(ffi6(Pf*0050007-2
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 16 JANUARY 1967
SUMMARY
1. (S/NFD) The ROLLING THUNDER program continued to concentrate
on lines of communications (LOCs) during December and early January.
Although unfavorable weather conditions continued to impede air
operations and to limit the damage inflicted on the North Vietnamese
transportation system, some significant localized disruptions of
transport were obtained.
2. (S/NFD) The bulk of the highway interdiction effort was
against the principal roads south of the 20th parallel with most of
the remaining effort in the northwest sector of the country. The
highest concentration of air strikes was on the main roads from Vinh
south to the DMZ. The mobilization of a large damage repair force
of possibly 50,000 laborers has been required to maintain Route 1A
in serviceable condition south of the 20th parallel.
3. (S/NFD) The railroad system was generally operational
throughout the period and with the exception of the Hanoi to Lao Cai
and Vinh lines appears capable of meeting normal through traffic
performance. The destroyed bridge near Viet Tri continued to be
the primary restriction to the movement of through traffic on the
Lao Cai line.
!. (S/NFD) Recent activities on the waterways in the southern
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Panhandle region near Dong Hoi suggest that the North Vietnamese
are probably increasing their utilization of inland water routes.
This provides an alternate to the heavily interdicted road system
and avoids exposure to US destroyer operations along the coast
south of the 18th parallel.
5. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese took advantage of the Christmas
and New Year's truce periods to move supplies south to the DMZ area.
During the 48-hour Christmas standdown of the ROLLING THUNDER program
there was approximately a 20-fold increase in the normal coastal
water traffic. It appears that the Communists elected to use the
truce periods to maximum advantage in the over-all operation of
their LOCs by using the more expedient and economical sea movement
rather than making an extensive effort on the heavily interdicted
inland routes.
6. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese continue to develop their
air defense system. However, the loss of nine MIG-21s -- over
30 per cent of the total MIG-21 inventory -- in air-to-air engage-
ments during the period was a setback and temporarily reduced
the capabilities of the North Vietnamese Air Force.
7. (S/NFD) The cumulative effects of the air strikes in
North Vietnam have caused multiple management and logistic problems
and have limited North Vietnams capability for substained large
scale conventional military operations against South Vietnam.
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However, the North Vietnamese retain the capability to continue
to support activities in South Vietnam and Laos at present or
increased combat levels and force structures.
8. (S/NFD) Over the past several weeks the North Vietnamese
leadership has attempted to bring home to the North Vietnamese
population the fact that the war against the US is going to create
additional hardships in the months ahead but has assured them that
despite all difficulties "the Vietnamese people will be victorious."
DRV Premier Pham Van Dong warned that they must face "fiercer
battles" in the months ahead.
9. (S/NFD) Direct damage to the economy as a consequence of
the air strikes was at a relatively low level during the reporting
period. The cumulative effects of the bombings have not forced
any radical change in the economic policy of North Vietnam, but
considerable economic loss has been incurred. Nevertheless, the
ability of the economy to supply the basic needs of the population
and to provide support for the war has been made possible by
infusions of foreign economic aid, selective restoration or replace-
ment of destroyed or damaged facilities and equipment, reallocations
within the labor force and more involuntary labor.
10. (S/NFD) Although many planned industrial goals have been
revised downward since the start of the bombing, planned expansion
or improvement of the industrial sector continues in some areas.
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Shipments of machinery and equipment for two coal mines, a mineral
exploration project, and the Gia Lam freight car repair shops have
continued.
11. (S/NFD) There is still no evidence that the loss of
petroleum or petroleum storage facilities resulting from air strikes,
has curtailed economic activity in North Vietnam. Petroleum on
hand in North Vietnam at the end of 1966 probably was at about
80 days of supply. Evidence indicates that localized difficulties
in the distribution of petroleum in Military Region IV were
primarily the result of mismanagement rather than of shortages of
petroleum or trucks in the region.
12. (S/NFD) Recent reports of cuts in staple food rations
suggest that the normally tight food situation has deteriorated some-
what, although there are no indications that the situation has
become critical. Official North Vietnamese statements suggest
that the fall rice crop is below the average of some 2.8 million
metric tons. Air attacks have contributed substantially, though
indirectly, to this short-fall. The air strikes probably also
continue to disrupt fishing activities.
13. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage to economic and
military facilities and equipment in North Vietnam inflicted by
the ROLLING THUNDER program in 1965 and 1966 totals 190 million
dollars of which about 120 million dollars were inflicted during
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1966. There are many other losses and costs to the economy and
the military establishment which cannot be assigned meaningful
values.
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Effects on Military Targets
1. (S/NFD) The ROLLING THUNDER program continued to concentrate
on the lines of communications (LOCs) during December and early January.
Unfavorable weather conditions over North Vietnam, associated
with the southward movement of the northeast monsoon, continued to
impede air operations. The North Vietnamese took advantage of the
complete standdown of ROLLING THUNDER operations during the Christmas
and New Year's truce periods and moved substantial amounts of supplies
south to the DMZ area. Although there was less damage inflicted on
the North Vietnamese transportation system than during the last
reporting period,. some significant localized effects were obtained.
The NVN Air Force received a set back with the loss of nine MIG-21s
in air-to-air combat in early January.
2. (S/NFD) Transport capabilities in North Vietnam during the
reporting period remained at a high level, and are probably even
slightly improved over the previous period. The sortie rate continued
to be relatively low and there was no significant interdiction of
transportation in the central and northeastern parts of the country.
The rail lines between Hanoi and Haiphong, Dong Dang, and Thai
Nguyen have been open continuously for through rail service since mid-
December. Strikes against the railroad yards at Yen Vien and Gia
Lam during the first half of December did not interrupt through
service on these lines for more than a day at a time. Strikes
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against the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line probably disrupted through service
on the line for less than a week; however, the primary restriction
to the movement of through traffic on the Lao Cai line continued
to be the use of rail ferries at the destroyed bridge near Viet Tri.
The Hanoi-Vinh line probably remained open during most of the period
for limited through traffic. South of Duc Tho the greater part of
the rail line remained interdicted; during almost all of 1966 its
use was limited to flanged wheeled. trucks and small flatcars between
interdicted points.
3. (S/NFD) The bulk of the highway interdiction effort was
against the principal roads south of the 20th parallel with most of
the remaining effort in the northwest sector. The highest con-
centration of air strikes was on the main roads from Vinh south to
the DMZ -- Routes 1A, 101, 104. Some measure of the problem of
keeping these roads in useable condition is the estimate that a
labor force of possibly 50,000 is employed in repairing Route 1A,
south of the 20th parallel. While this force is able to accomplish
repairs in relatively short periods (less than 72 hours) within
individual segments of the interdicted highway, the actual movement
of cargoes has been considerably delayed. Many of the approximately
200 bridges along Route ]A have been replaced (some more than once)
with temporary, lower-capacity structures or restricted ferry
facilities, thus compounding the difficulties involved in keeping
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 Approves K EeTSe-4 O)9f?f 1&W MSD1(&fi&)M)0050007-2
this vital artery in operable condition. Strikes in the northwest
sector disrupted traffic on Route 19, and may have kept a short
segment of this road north of Dien Bien Phu closed during the
last week of December.
4. (S/NFD) The recent waterway activity in the southern
Panhandle region near Dong IIoi suggests that the North Vietnamese are
probably increasing their utilization of inland water routes. This
provides an alternate to using the heavily interdicted roads and
being vulnerable to US destroyer operations along the coast south
of the 18th parallel.
5. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese took advantage of the Christmas
and New Year's truce periods to move supplies south to the DMZ area.
During the I+8-hour Christmas standdown of the ROLLING THUNDER program
there was approximately a 20-fold increase in the normal coastal
water traffic -- indicating a major resupply effort. At least 15
steel hulled ships were included in the approximately 500 sightings.
6. (S/NFD) During the truce periods, the reconnaissance of
North Vietnamese inland routes was greatly reduced -- poor weather
conditions hampered photographic reconnaissance and the standdown
of armed reconnaissance eliminated operational pilot reporting.
Nevertheless the limited reconnaissance did detect trucks moving
in convoys in larger numbers and in daylight hours -- particularly
during the New Year's truce period -- indicating that the North
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 Appro.l a lt.-mJ4( /o6/Q R&IQM82RI44R000100050007-2
Vietnamese took advantage of the bombing pause. To the extent
observed, rail and inland waterway traffic followed normal patterns
during the standdown. It appears that the Communists elected to use
the truce periods to maximum advantage in the over-all operation of
their LOCs by using the more expedient and economical sea movement
rather than making an extensive effort on the heavily interdicted
inland routes.
7. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese continue to develop their
air defense system. In air engagements, the downing of an F-105 by
an air-to-air missile (AAM) was the first confirmed loss of a US
aircraft to this type weapon. On nine other occasions during the
month, AAMs were fired without inflicting damage. Fighter pilot
strength has increased with the presence of the North Korean Air
Force "volunteers." If they are committed to fly active air defense
missions, it is expected that their performance will equal if not
exceed the proficiency so far demonstrated by the North Vietnamese
pilots. The loss of nine MIG-21s -- over 30 per cent of the total
MIG-2l inventory -- in air-to-air engagements during the period was
a setback and temporarily reduced the capabilities of the North
Vietnamese Air Force.
8. (S/NFD) The cumulative effects of the air strikes in
North Vietnam have caused multiple management and logistic problems
and have limited North Vietnams capability for substained large
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scale conventional military operations against South Vietnam. The
North Vietnamese operations in support of the military effort in
South Vietnam and Laos have been made more costly, more difficult,
more complicated, and more time-consuming. However, the North
Vietnamese retain the capability to continue to support activities
in South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased combat levels
and force structures.
Leadership and Public Reactions
9. (S/NFD) One indication of the seriousness with which the
North Vietnamese leadership regards the bombing campaign is their
effort over the past several weeks to bring home to the North
Vietnamese population the fact that the war against the US is
going to create additional hardships in the months ahead. The
leaders, however, have assured them that despite all difficulties
"the Vietnamese people will be victorious." This concept was
heavily underscored in a series of year end pronouncements by
leading regime figures including Party First Secretary Le Duan and
Defense Minister Giap. In addition, at the annual meeting of the
"anti-US, National Salvation Congress" held in early January
similar statements were voiced by members of the leadership.
Their attendance at this propaganda meeting in unusual numbers
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was an obvious effort to bolster the morale of the fighting forces
in both North and South Vietnam. DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, for
example, hailed the Vietnamese Communist's fighting spirit and
their "brilliant victories" but warned that they must face
"fiercer battles" in the months ahead.
10. (S/ID D) The apparent aim of these statements is to prepare
the North Vietnamese for hard times while pointing out to them
that their leaders are as determined as ever to press on with the
war. In addition, such statements offer a further indication that
the difficulties being encountered by the people have not had any
softening effect on the regime's policy. There continues to be
some evidence, however, that shortages of certain commodities and
hardships associated with evacuation and dislocation are affecting
the morale of the NVN populace, although not to any serious extent.
Effects on the Economy
11. (S/NFD) Direct damage to the economy as a consequence of
the air strikes was at a relatively low level during the reporting
period. The cumulative effects of the bombings have not forced
any radical change in the economic policy of North Vietnam, but
considerable economic loss has been incurred. Nevertheless, the
ability of the economy to supply the basic needs of the population
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and to provide support for the war has been made possible by
infusions of foreign economic aid, selective restoration or replace-
ment of destroyed or damaged facilities and equipment, reallocations
within the labor force and more involuntary labor.
12. (S/NED) The Council of Ministers met in December to review
the accomplishments of the state economic plan for 1966 and to
approve the plan for 1967. No qualitative or quantitative achieve-
ments of the 1966 plan have been announced, but the policies of
the 1967 plan are almost identical with those for 1966. Economic
development and increases in production are to be pressed with a
view toward preserving the lives of the people and defending and
increasing the economic and military capabilities of North Vietnam.
This economic policy has put additional demandsaon much of the
population although the regime has still been able to send several
thousand students, technicians and workers to other Communist
countries for training. The people's involuntary labor contribution
to the State has been enlarged to cope with the wartime situation.
During peacetime, the rural population was annually required to
contribute to the State 25 days of labor, the urban population
12 days, and public servants six days. This involuntary
contribution has now been increased by 20 to 25 per cent, and in
addition these workers have been asked to contribute at least
three more days to the State to help protect communication and
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transportation routes and to construct national defense and economic
projects.
13. (S/NFD) Although many planned industrial goals have been
revised downward since the start of the bombing there is infor-
mation which suggests that planned expansion or improvement of
the industrial sector is continuing in certain areas. A North
Vietnamese delegation was sent to Hungary at the end of December
to discuss resumption of the expansion of the Thanh Hoa power plant
and the construction of a proposed hand tool and weighing equipment
factory. Shipments of machinery and equipment for two coal mines,
a mineral exploration project, and the Gia Lam freight car repair
shops have continued. Although aerial photography indicates that
construction work on the Thac Ba hydroelectric power plant, a
Soviet aid project, has been at least temporarily suspended, both
specialists and equipment have continued to be sent to Thac Ba.
14. (S/NFD) There is no evidence, as of mid-January 1967,
that the loss of petroleum or petroleum storage facilities result-
ing from air strikes, has curtailed economic activity in North
Vietnam. Seaborne imports of petroleum during December were about
2+,000 metric tons, slightly more than the high monthly average
imported during the first half of 1966. Petroleum on hand in
North Vietnam at the end of 1966 probably was at about 80 days of
supply. Evidence indicates that localized difficulties in the
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distribution of petroleum in Military Region IV were primarily
the result of mismanagement rather than of shortages of petroleum
or trucks in the region. More recent evidence also indicates that
at least part of the localized shortages have been alleviated.
15. (S/NFD) There were no strikes or restrikes against
electric power facilities in North Vietnam during the reporting
period, and the estimate of generating capacity out of operation
remains at 59,000 kilowatts. Recent information, however, has
provided a basis for further damage assessment of some of the
power plants which were struck previously. This information
indicates that the Ben Thuy plant probably cannot be put into
partial operation before mid-1967. Aerial photography of
1 November revealed that there had been no attempt to repair the
1965 damage to the Co Dinh power plant.
16. (S/NFD) Recent reports of cuts in staple food rations
suggest that the normally tight food situation has deteriorated some-
what, although there are no indications that the situation has
become critical. Official North Vietnamese statements suggest
that the fall rice crop -- normally about two-thirds of the
annual harvest -- is below the average of some 2.8 million metric
tons. Air attacks have contributed substantially, though indirectly,
to this short-fall through the interruption of normal farming
schedules, although poor growing conditions also were partly
14
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responsible for the short-fall. The air strikes probably also
continue to disrupt fishing activities, particularly in the waters
off the coast of the three southern provinces.
1,(. (S/NFD) Foreign ships calling at North Vietnam in December
delivered the largest monthly volume of cargoes (110,800 metric tons)
recorded to date. Deliveries of fertilizer were extraordinarily
large, totaling 29,700 metric tons, and imports of bulk foodstuffs
remained seasonably heavy (12,300 metric tons) for the second
consecutive month. Deliveries of miscellaneous and general cargoes,
which consist of semi-finished industrial products and other
manufactured goods, totaled 4+4,500 metric tons -- the second
largest monthly volume on record. North Vietnamese exports
continued to be relatively low, however. Coal exports were the
lowest since September 1966 -- possibly as a result of additional
bomb damage inflicted on Cam Pha in November. There continued to
be no export of apatite.
18. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage to economic and
military facilities and equipment in North Vietnam inflicted by
the ROLLING THUNDER program in 1965 and 1966 totals 190 million
dollars. About 120 million dollars were accounted for by air
strikes during 1966. Of the total, damage to the economy amounts
to 120 million dollars and damage to the military establishment
amounts to 70 million dollars. (See Tab B). In addition, there
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continue to be many other losses and costs to the economy and the
military establishment which cannot be assigned meaningful values.
These include defense costs, the loss of production, lower
productivity of labor and time lost from work as a consequence of
civil defense measures.
16
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RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARGETS a/ THRU 9 JANUARY 1967 TABLE 360
Fixed Targets
Total Targets
Targets
Struck
% Of National
Capacity
c/
b/
Destroyed or in-
Capacity
Targeted
No. Strike
active because of
(X 1000)
No(*)
%
No(*)
%
Attacks
Sorties
air strikes.
&/
Barracks
443 men
65
41.22
45
33.0
231
2391
22.68
Ammo Depots
112.6MT
18
100
13
72.2
52
1155
69.3
POL Storage *
133.5 MT
13
100
13
100
75
632
80.9
Supply Depots
10550SgFt
27
40.77
18
18
52
603
13.86
Power Plants
187 KW
20
94.5
8
46.6
34
283
31.6
Maritime Ports
7.8 ST/DY
8
95
6
44
24
231
16.2
Railroad Yards
33.7ST/DY
4
78
3
54
25
213
11.3
Explosive Plant
1 MT
1
100
1
100
3
28
71
Airfields
23
4
12
359
Naval Bases
15
3
20
219
Bridges
61
48
262
2657
Commo Install
45
2
2
15
Radar Sites
50
5
73
430
134
58
112
388
8
2
2
10
34
11
7
44
Total Sorties: 9,868 Results f/
*JCS targets only; does not include Armed Recce Sorties Destroyed Damaged
dispersed storage. 93,208 Vessels 4011 6946
Vehicles 2534 2348
RR Stock 1487 1814
a/ Assessments are based on best information received, will be refined as more accurate
information becomes available.
b/ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in this
summary assigned to principal target.
c/ National capacity in 1,000's where measurement shown.
d/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
f/ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, attacked and road and rail cuts made.
/ Per cent inactive due to dismantling or abandonment of facilities as a result of air
strikes. These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted and
struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets. (i.e., barracks,
supply and ammo depots).
NOTE: For comparative purposes.
US world-wide ammo storage capacity is 6,936,000 metric tons (CONUS 5,719,000 MT).
US world-wide military POL storage capacity is 15,452,000 MT; national US commercial
capacity is 151,325,000 MT; approximate average $ value of 1 MT of POL product is $28.
US world-wide military supply depot covered storage space is 137,100,000 sq. ft.
(CONUS 121,300,000 sq. ft).
Total kilowatt capacity of power plants serving metropolitan areas: New York - 7.6
million; Chicago - 6 million; Washington (DC and Md/suburbs only) - 2.4 million.
TAB A
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0 L0100050007-2
Value of Damage to Economic and Military Facilities and
Equipment Attacked Under The ROLLING THUNDER Program
1965-1966
Economic Facilities and Equipment Military Facilities and Equipment
Direct Losses
Million US
Direct Losses
Million US
Railroad/Highway Bridge
22.6X
Barracks
17.5*
Transportation Equipment
35.7
Ammunition Depots
4.7
Electric Power Plants
12.1
Supply Depots
3.6
Petroleum
6. i*
Airfields
.I+X
Manufacturing Facilities
2.1
Radar and Communications
Railroad Yards
1.3*
Sites
3.6
Maritime Ports
1.5*
SAM Sites
6.4X
Miscellaneous Armed
Naval Bases
1.6*
Reconnaissance
1.2
Aircraft
20.4***
Naval Craft
8.9
Subtotal, Direct Losses
Indirect Losses
82.9
Miscellaneous Armed
Reconnaissance
Total, Direct
70.1
Exports
15.5
Agriculture**
17.0
Fishing
5.0
Total
Million US
Subtotal, Indirect Losses
Economic 120
Total, Direct and Indirect 120.4 Military 70
19o
X Estimate is incomplete because of inadequate post-strike photography.
XX It should be noted that losses of agricultural crops are axbitarily
attributed entirely to the indirect effects of the bombing. An
unknown paxt of these losses is in fact due to weather and other
natural causes.
XXX The value of the nine MIG-21 fighter aircraft lost in early January
will amount to an additional $10 million.
TAB B
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DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA-CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTI-I VIETNAM
THE WHITE HOUSE:
Vice President 1 Cy
Gen Maxwell Taylor 1 Cy
Mr. Bromley Smith 5 Cys
DEFENSE:
SECDEF 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA) 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis) 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (PA) 1 Cy
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 1 Cy
TREASURY (Secretary) 1 Cy
USIA 1Cy
AID 1 Cy
NASA 1 Cy
NSA 5 Cys
STATE 18 Cys
AEC 1 Cy
FBI 1 Cy
NIC 1 Cy
ACDA 1 Cy
CHAIRMAN, JCS 1 Cy
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF a. Cy
J-1 1 Cy
J-3 2 Cys
j-4 1 Cy
J-5 1 Cy
J-6 1 Cy
SACSA 1 Cy
NMCC 3 Cys
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
DCSOPS 1 Cy
ACSFOR 1 Cy
ACSI 1 Cy
ACSI-CI 1 Cy
ACSI-Eastern 1 Cy
STAG 1 Cy
Approve$ EcE *E,~Tse-*bOD91oeO(R/E l2&NS(MCS OM0050007-2
 ApproP Eck !dremuNo1/ f IP6N84Q(S6*M100050007-2
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2 Cys
DNI
1 Cy
OP-921E
1 Cy
OP-922Y1
1 Cy
OP-922Y2
1 Cy
OP-92B1
1 Cy
AIR FORCE:
CHIEF OF STAFF
2 Cys
ACS,I/USAF
1 Cy
AFNINDE
6 Cys
AFNIEBB
1 Cy
AFISI (Spec Investigation)
1 Cy
AUL (Air Univ Library)
1 Cy
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT
1 Cy
G-2
1 Cy
CINCPAC
2 Cys
CINCPACAF
1 Cy
CINCUSARPAC
1 Cy
CINCPACFLT
1 Cy
COMUSMACV
2 Cys
7AF
2 Cys
COMSEVENTHFLT
1 Cy
COMATKCARSTRIKEFORSEVENTHFLT
(CTF 77)
1 Cy
CINCLANT
1 Cy
CINCSTRIKE
1 Cy
CINCSAC
1 Cy
SAC 51
1 Cy
CINCTAC
1 Cy
AFSTRIKE
1 Cy
CONTIC
1 Cy
CINCALCOM
1 Cy
CINCEUR
1 Cy
CINCUSAREUR
1 Cy
CINCUSAFE
1 Cy
CINCNAVEUR
1 Cy
CINCCONAD
1 Cy
CIA
125 Cys
Appro el tj I~eieas ~1/~ft Ifb[N82Q~5r(W100050007-2
 Approvecsfi
61 G9/F R
&NS(DD
W0050007-2
DZADR
Cy
DIADD
1
Cy
DIABC-1
1
Cy
JS
1
Cy
CO-2C
1
Cy
AT'
1
Cy
('y
A1'-2C,2'_
10
Cy
A1='- a :L
Cy
AP-21M
:l.
Cy
All-3
Cy
(2y
1
Cy
AT'-)IA2 (L'exit)
(1y
A1?-111'.? (.(1. I ]J3 )
Cys
11T'-).L311
2
("Y's
AP-)IC'
3
Cy$
2
(,ys
1U - 8
2
(;ys
xx
1.
Cy
JT
1
E;y
Approve&C*Efse-2bbOD9/ 6O(Rt-PONSCM(S"WV0050007-2
 Approve f or M se 90609JA6 IgjF~P.$2S~O2g pQ01000 ~
Ap=eg f rkVerse Rt(0y(6:if kftWf42!bj2?ffW 00050 007-2