AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP82S00205R00010005000%47/P/~-)Ie `c
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
(THROUGH 15 MARCH 1961)
MARCH 1961
S?2138/AP-4
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING, DOD DIR 5200,10
DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
U)
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050005-4
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050005-4
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794.
The transmission or revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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 ApprovedPdr "lrsl 700iA)/0f: QA9.f d"oDJ (E 50005-4
AN APPRAISAL 0 TNT
ETNAM
2r Pr 7t ,
._ THROUGH 1 .MRCS :195?
OR W O
This report span a monthly
basis at the rep u o h.cretary of
Defense
certain
effects of the ROLLING program.
The r coehe;y general areas of
concern ,,lea o I y Targets;
Leadership b c e ions; and
Effects on the ~5 The dis-
cussion of political of e is limited
to those developments wti North Vietnam
which relate to Hanoi se toward
continuing the war and ~_ the
ROLLING THUNDER attack has' nsciv
morale in North Vietnam.
.,g
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MENnGGTZU
_C V M
( ?DIEN EIE!PHU
:f
THAILAND
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIETNAM
BOMBING APPRAISAL OF
NORTH VIETNAM
15 MAR 67
MINEFIELD
(12 MAR)
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MINEFIELD
(S MAR)
MINEFTELD
/(9 MAR)
MINEFIELDS
(26 FES)
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AN APPRAISAL OF THE BONDING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 15 MARCH 1967
SU,Cih1ARY
1. (S/NFD) The preponderance of air strikes ngal~do
Vietnam during February and early March continued to be against
lines of communications (LOC's). Also struck were the Thai Nguyen
Iron and Steel Combine, military barracks, an explosive storage
area, an ammunition depot, thermal power plants, and FOL sto1?n ge
sites. Generally unfavorable weather conditions hindered ail
operations and in some instances precluded damage assessments.
The aerial mining of the estuaries of several rivers south of the
20th Parallel and naval bombardment of land LOC's and transshipment
areas, introduced new elements into the interdiction campaign.
2. (S/NFD) Rail capabilities remained relatively unchanged.
The Hanoi-Vinh line received the bulk of the air strikes and was
also subjected to naval bombardment. The line may have been
closed for through rail service for about half of the reporting
period. On the Hanoi-Lao Cai line, use of rail ferries continues
to be necessary at the site of the destroyed Viet Ti! bridge.
In spite of the damage to the rail system, new construction
continues to be evident. Several rail bypass bridges are under
construction and several yards are being bypassed. In addition,
there are indications that dual gauge construction on the Hanoi-
Dong Dang line will be extended from Kep toward Hanoi.
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3. (S/NID) The over-all condition of the North Vietnamese
highway system probably improved. slightly. The bulk of the
interdiction effort continued to be against the prin(:i.E)-i.I ro-ids
south of the 20th Parallel. There was a marked incye,ajg in the
number of vehicles destroyed during this period. The damage and
destruction of vehicles in the week following TET was greater
than for the entire month of January but the rate during the
reporting period was considerably lower than the average for the
last half of 1966.
4. (S/NED) Since the beginning of the air campaign the North
Vietnamese have devoted considerable effort to the development and
improvement of their water transport system. During the past
several months there has been a noticeable trend toward increased
use of water transport to supplement or replace other, more vulnerable
modes of transport. Most of the waterborne activity on the inland
waterway routes was concentrated in coastal estuaries. However, the
aerial mining of the waterways and naval bombardment of coastal
routes will provide additional obstacles to the North Vietnamese
in transporting supplies and material to the southern part of the
country, and will also place a heavier burden on the more vulner-
able land transportation networks.
5. (S/NFD) The continued expansion and improvement of
North Vietnam's air defenses has thus far not affected the scope
of US air operations. It does, however, indicate that Hanoi
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SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISS
has the determination and foreign resources to proceed with a
substantial program of air defense development.
6. (S/NFD) The cumulative effects of the a~.r strikes have
limited North Vietnam's capability for sustained large rcalc con-
ventional military operations against South Vietnam. However, the
North Vietnamese still. retain the capability to support activities
in South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased combat levels
and force structures.
7. (S/NFD) All signs emanating from North Vietnam appear
to indicate that -- as the propaganda suggests -- the leadership
is as determined as ever to press on with the war despite the
additional military pressures applied by the US in the last
several weeks. The populace in the capital shows no open signs
of demoralization, but the cumulative effect of the growing
hardships and shortages resulting from the bombings may well be
wearing down the resistance of the people. There has in fact
been some recent evidence that certain elements of the DRV
populace do not have blind faith in the regime's propaganda line
on the war. There was no indication, however, that this dis-
illusionment had taken the form of active agitation against the
regime's policies nor has there been any evidence to indicate
that resentment harbored by other elements of the population has
in any way weakened the leadership's policy of prosecuting the war.
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8. (S/NFD) Damage to the North Vietnamese economy during
the reporting period resulted primarily from strikes against three
important electric power plants and the Thai Nguyen T.ron and Steel
Combine, all of which were struck on a large scale for the first
time. The Hon Gai power plant was extensively damaged and probably
is at least temporarily out of operation. The extent of damage to
the power plants at, Bac Giang and Viet Tri cannot be determined at
this time. If all three plants have been put out of operation,
the amount of capacity destroyed to date by the ROLLING TIUNDER
program will have increased from 59,000 kilowatts to 102,000 kilo-
watts -- 55 per cent of the national capacity. Preliminary field
analysis of aerial photography of Thai Nguyen indicates only light
to moderate damage in several areas of the extensive iron and steel
complex.
9. (S/NFL)) The cumulative effects of the bombing have been
such that the 1967 State Plan stresses still further the need for
increased regional self-sufficiency, intended, at least in part, to
offset the disruptive effects of the bombing. Agriculture will
'be the focal point of the 1967 State Plan to develop regional
self-sufficiency. Much of the increased industrial production
at the local level will be in support of agriculture in order
to boost labor productivity.
10. (S/NFD) Although :Food supplies in North Vietnam are not
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critically low, there is increasing evidence that the 1966 short-
fall in rice production has placed an additional strain on the economy.
The North Vietnamese apparently intend to attack the increasingly
tight food situation before it becomes critical by increeasing food
imports and substituting other domestically produced foods for rice.
Seaborne imports of bulk foodstuffs during the first quarter of
1967 alone probably will exceed 60,000 metric tons, more than
three-fourths of the total imported for all of 1966.
11. (S/NFD) There was no significant damage to petroleum bulk
storage facilities during the reporting period. Seaborne imports
of petroleum continued at a high level, totaling 23,800 metric tons
in February. One delivery by tanker and two seaborne deliveries
of petroleum in drums have been made from Shanghai so far in 1961
possibly representing a significant change in import procedures.
It is not yet clear, whether the petroleum delivered is part of
the 34,000 metric tons of petroleum diverted to China in mid-
1966 and thought to have been transshipped by rail or originated
there. If these imports are part of the diverted cargoes,
estimated supplies of petroleum on hand in mid-March are probably
not less than 60,000 metric tons, equivalent to more than 100 days
of supply. If not, then North Vietnamese supplies would be some-
what greater.
1,2. (S/NFD) Seaborne imports of miscellaneous and general
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cargo increased during February but remained well below the
monthly average for 1966. Seaborne exports from North Vietnam
remained at a low level because of the continued absence of
apatite exports and the lag in shipments of cement and coi..l.
Seaborne exports of coal increased in February but remained far
below the leve], for the first quarter of 1966, before air strikes
damaged the coal facilities at Cam Pha.
13. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage to economic and
military facilities and equipment in North Vietnam inflicted by
air strikes through Februa.ry 196'7 is estimated at $220 million.
In addition to these costs, there are many other losses to the
economy and to the military establishment which cannot be
assigned meaningful values.
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Effects on Military Targets
1. (S/NFD) The preponderance of air strikes against North
Vietnam during February and early March continued to be against
lines of communications (LOC's). Also struck were the Thai Nguyen
Iron and Steel Combine, military barracks, an explosive storage area,
an ammunition depot, thermal. power plants, and POL storage sites.
Road transport capabilities probably improved slightly and rail
line capabilities remained relatively unchanged.. There was no
significant interdiction of transportation in the central and
northern parts of the country. In comparison to the very low
destruction rate in January, there was a marked increase in the
number of vehicles destroyed, particularly during the week follow-
ing the TET (Vietnamese Lunar New Year) standdown (8-14 February).
Strikes against coastal watercraft, following TET, were the highest
ever reported for a single week, but on a monthly basis the rate
of destruction was comparatively low. Generally unfavorable weather
conditions hindered air operations and in some instances precluded
damage assessments. The aerial mining of the estuaries of several
rivers south of the 20th Parallel and naval bombardment of land
LOC's and transshipment areas, introduced new elements into the
interdiction campaign.
2. (S/NFD) Attacks against rail facilities decreased from
the previous reporting period, The Hanoi-Vinh line received the
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bulk of the air strikes and was also subjected to naval bombardment
south of Truong Quang Tien. The. line may have been closed for
through rail service for about half of the reporting period. At
the end of the period this line probably was closed for through
traffic south of Ninh Binh. Even when open, through service on the
line was limited by the need to shuttle supplies around or across
bridges which cannot support the weight of a locomotive. On the
Due Tho-DMZ line south of Xom Hoai a 25-mile section of rail line
may be in use by modified (flanged,wheel) vehicles. On the Hanoi-
Lao Cai line, use of rail ferries continues to be necessary at the
site of the destroyed Viet Tri bridge. In addition, the line was
closed for several days between Yen Bai and Boa Ha. The Hai Duong
Railroad Yard on the Hanoi-Haiphong line was struck but no bomb
damage assessment has been reported and the line is considered
operational. This was the first time that this line has been
struck since November 1966.
3. (S/NFD) In spite of the damage to the rail system, new
construction continues to be evident. Several rail bypass bridges
are under construction and several yards are being bypassed. A
standard-gauge rail bypass has recently been completed to the
south around Thai Nguyen and work has started on dual gauging
the meter-gauge Hanoi-Thai Nguyen line. In addition, there are
indications that dual gauge construction on the Hanoi-bong Dang
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line will be extended from Kep toward Hanoi.
+. (S/NFD) The over-all condition of the North Vietnamese
highway system probably improved slightly during the period. The
bulk of the interdiction effort was against the principal roads
south of the 20th Parallel with most of the road cuts on Routes IA
and 15. Although Route :IA was subjected to extensive and continued
cratering which caused some deterioration to certain segments,
sufficient road repair and maintenance forces were available to
return it to a serviceable condition. However, many of these
repairs are increasingly makeshift and of low quality. While this
tends to reduce the capacity of the Route, it is still in a
serviceable condition and sufficient to meet the requirements of
the North Vietnamese. Route 15, near the Mu Gia Pass, was repeatedly
attacked and seeded with delayed action bombs. Vehicle traffic on
this segment of Route 15 was severely limited during most of
early March.
5. (S/NFD) There was a marked increase in the number of
vehicles destroyed during this period. The damage and destruction
to vehicles in the week following TET was greater than for the
entire month of January but the level for the reporting period was
considerably lower than the average for the last half of 1966.
Nearly all the vehicles attacked were traveling or parked along
Routes 1A and 15. The increased vehicle sightings and activity in
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the southern Panhandle of North Vietnam tends to indicate that the
supplies delivered along the coast during the TET standdown are
still being moved.
6. (S/NFD) Since the beginning of the air campaign the North
Vietnamese have devoted considerable effort to the development and
improvement of their water transport system. During the past
several months there has been a noticeable trend toward increased
use of water transport to supplement or replace other, more vulnerable,
modes of transport. The activity during TET provided a vivid
demonstration of the North Vietnamese waterborne logistic capability.
Notable among the coastal craft sighted during the TET standdown
was a class of 120-foot freighters whose cargo-carrying capacity has
been estimated at 200 short tons. Although this class vessel has been
previously noted in North Vietnamese waters, the 19 reported during
TET -- although not firmly identified in the NVN inventory -- exceeds
any previous estimate of their number and significantly enhances
the North Vietnamese coastal transport capability.
7. (S/NFD) Most of the waterborne activity on the inland
waterway routes was concentrated in coastal estuaries. The aerial
mining of the estuaries of the Kien Giang, Song Giang, Song Ca,
Song Ma, and Cua Sot will further harass the principal transshipment
points south of the 20th Parallel. In general, alongside berthing
facilities south of the 20th Parallel have been destroyed or reduced in
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capacity and North Vietnamese coastal vessels have been forced in
many instances to unload "over-the-beach." Using this procedure,
cargo is restricted in size to what can be manually curried ashore.
The recent appearance of Soviet K-61 amphibious tracked vehicles at
the Quang Khe coastal transshipment point may be an attempt by the
North Vietnamese to alleviate this problem. The K-61 is an un-
armored amphibious vehicle with a cargo capacity of 3.2 short tons
overland and 6.0 short tons on water, and, acting as a lighter, will
enable North Vietnamese coastal transports to offload heavy, large
cargo units despite the general lack of alongside berthing facilities.
8. (S/.NFD) In spite of continued damage to the transport
system in North Vietnam, it remains able to support the civilian
economy, military requirements, and the insurgency in South Vietnam
and Laos. However, the aerial mining of the waterways and naval
bombardment of coastal routes will provide additional obstacles to
the North Vietnamese in transporting supplies and material to the
southern part of the country, and will also place a heavier burden
on the more vulnerable land transportation networks.
9. (S/NFD) North Vietnam continues to expand and improve its
air defense system. Photography confirmed a new surface-to-air
missile (SAM) support and assembly area 12-miles west of Haiphong --
the second in the area. A strike against this target on 11 March
resulted in large secondary fires anc. explosions. An unoccupied
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SAM site was detected by photography on 2 March just north of the
DMZ. However, the high volume of SAM firings during the attacks
on the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine on 10 and 12 March under-
scores North Vietnam's desire to maintain most of its SAM units in
the vital regions near Hanoi and Haiphong.
10. (S/NFD) One MIG-17 was shot down and two were reported
damaged during the 10 March strike on Thai Nguyen. During this
attack MIG-21 aircraft fired at least one air-to-air missile with
no damage to US aircraft. The continued expansion and improve-
ment of North Vietnam's air defenses has thus far not affected the
scope of US air operations. It does, however, indicate that Hanoi
has the determination and. foreign resources to proceed with a
substantial program of air defense development.
11. (S/NFD) The cumulative effects of the air strikes in
North Vietnam have caused multiple management and logistic problems
and have limited North Vietnam's capability for sustained large
scale conventional military operations against South Vietnam.
Pursuit of the war effort is becoming progressively more costly,
more difficult and more time-consuming for Hanoi. However, the
North Vietnamese still retain the capability to support activities
in South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased combat levels
and force structures.
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Leadership and Public Reactions
12. (S/NFD) During the past month, North Vietnam played in a
lower key its 28 January offer to talk with the US in return for
a cessation of the bombings. At the same time, in a series of
official statements the regime gave greater stress to the
Vietnamese people's determination to press on with the war despite
the cost. Typical of these latter statements was a commentary in
the party daily Nhan Dan of 14 March written in reaction to the US
air strikes against the industrial complex at Thai Nguyen. The
commentary accused the US of intensified bombing against industrial
and economic establishments as well as densely populated civilian
areas. It concluded by stating that the Vietnamese people "never
fear the threats and challenges of US imperialism. Our clear cut
answer is: we shall fight unremittingly till complete victory."
13. (S/NFD) All signs emanating from North Vietnam appear
to indicate that -- as the propaganda suggests -- the leadership
is as determined as ever to press on with the war despite the
additional military pressures applied by the US in the last
several weeks.
populace in the capital shows no open signs of demoralization.
25X1 C I I the cumulative effect
,of the growing hardships and shortages resulting from the bombings
13
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may well be wearing down the resistance of the people. There has
in fact been some recent evidence that certain elements of the DRV
populace do not have blind faith in the regime's propaganda line
on the war. This evidence was obtained from the recent inter-
rogation of over 100 residents of the southern coastal region of
the DRV who were captured while fishing off the coast or after
infiltrating into South Vietnam over the past year. Some of those
questioned felt that if North Vietnam stopped its support of the
war in the South, the bombings would cease. They were skeptical of
the regime's claim that the bombings were in retaliation for sub-
stantial losses inflicted on US forces in the South.
14. (S/NFD) The same individuals doubted Hanoi's claims on the
number of aircraft shot down and. felt that the regime had not been
able to mount a successful air defense. They were generally resent-
ful of the government's forced labor programs for the repair of
bomb damage and of the disruption of their normal activities. There
was no indication, however, that this disillusionment had taken the
form of active agitation against the regime's policies nor has
there been any evidence to indicate that resentment harbored by
other elements of the population has in any way weakened the
leadership's policy of prosecuting the war.
l1F
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Effects on the Economy
15. (S/NFD) Damage to the North Vietnamese economy during
the reporting period resulted primarily from strikes against three
important electric power plants -- at Hon Gai, Bac Giang, and Viet
Tri -- and the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, all of which
were struck on a large scale for the first time. Aerial photo-
graphy of Hon Gai taken on 11 March reveals extensive damage to
this power plant, and it probably is at least temporarily out of
operation. Loss of the plant will deny power to coal mining in the
Hon Gai area and to coal-loading operations at the ports of Cam
Pha and Hon Gai. The extent of damage to the power plants at Bac
Giang and Viet Tri cannot be determined at this time. Loss of the
Bac Giang plant would deny power supply to the adjacent Phu Lang
Thuong chemical fertilizer plant. Loss of the plant at Viet Tri
would be even more significant because it provides the power for
the large Phu Tho fertilizer plant as well as power for an adjacent
chemical plant. In addition, destruction of the Viet Tri power
plant would reduce the power supply to Hanoi by possibly 15 per
cent. If all three plants have been put out of operation, the
amount of capacity destroyed to date by the ROLLING THUNDER
program will have increased from 59,000 kilowatts to 102,000 kilo-
watts -- 55 per cent of the national capacity. Preliminary field
analysis of aerial photography of Thai Nguyen indicates only light
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to moderate damage in several areas of the extensive iron and steel
complex as a result of air strikes.
16. (S/NFD) The cumulative effects of the bombing have been
such that the 1967 State Plan stresses still further the need for
increased regional self-sufficiency, intended, at least in part, to
offset the disruptive effects of the bombing. Furthermore, Deputy
Premier Pham Hung, speaking at a February conference for the
dissemination of the State Plan, admitted that there was a decline
in some sectors of the economy during 1966 and that North Vietnam
would have to forgo even more its aspirations for economic develop-
ment in modern industry.
17. .(S/NFD) The Deputy Premier described the Plan as "changing
the course of economic construction and focusing on the development
of the local economy." In developing the local economy and
emphasizing regional self-sufficiency, the goal of the North
Vietnamese leadership is to make a district, province, or other
logical geographic area capable of supplying its own needs. Each
area would supply its own food requirements and have sufficient
industry -- small power stations and machine shops as well as rice
and textile mills -- to supply the needs of agriculture and
consumers. The continuing threat of the destruction of North
Vietnam's modern industry did not, however, prevent the Deputy
Premier from calling for some investment in modern industry,
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especially when needed to expand foreign trade or to support
decentralized local industry. There is evidence that the Communist
countries are continuing to supply equipment and advisors for
industrial aid projects in North Vietnam.
18. (S/NFD) The 1967 Plan conference was held prior to TET,
much earlier than normal, probably to exhort the party cadres to
improve their leadership in the new year. Many of the difficulties
encountered in 1966, particularly in the evacuation and manpower
mobilization program and in the attending problems of distribution,
were attributed to the inability of the cadres to organize properly
.and to respond to the needs of the people. Low productivity in
agriculture also has been blamed on the poor leadership of the
party cadres. Recent information indicates, however, that some
effective planning is now being done to improve support for the
evacuation and dispersal programs. Purchasing and selling
cooperatives are being expanded to provide food and consumer goods
for evacuated and dispersed persons, greater attention is being
given to overcoming housing shortages at relocation sites, and
organizations providing cooked food and beverages in both rural
and urban areas are being greatly expanded.
19. (S/NFD) Agriculture will be the focal point of the 1967
State Plan to develop regional self-sufficiency. Much of the
increased industrial production at the local level will be in
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support of agriculture, primarily by providing simple implements
to boost labor productivity in agriculture. Although food supplies
in North Vietnam are not critically low, there is increasing
evidence that the 1966 short-fall in rice production -- estimated
to have been about 300,000 metric tons below the annual average of
recent years -- has placed an additional strain on the economy. In
addition, cold weather and the cumulative effects of the bombing
have delayed the transplanting of some of the 1967 spring rice
crop -- normally about one-third of the annual harvest. All avail-
able people -- school children, cadres, workers, and evacuated
people -- have been asked to help in the transplanting. Militia
and guerrilla forces also were told to support the agricultural
effort in Military Region 3, located in the area from Hanoi and
Nam Dinh south to Nghe An Province.
20. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese apparently intend to attack
the increasingly tight food situation before it becomes critical by
increasing food imports and substituting other domestically produced
foods for rice. Seaborne imports of bulk foodstuffs during the
first quarter of 1967 alone probably will exceed 60,000 metric tons,
more than three-fourths of the total imported for all of 1966.
Increased emphasis also is being given to the production of sweet
potatoes in the current winter-spring season, partly at the expense
of acreage for spring rice. Sweet potatoes, although less popular
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than rice, will provide a more dependable and higher yielding crop.
Increased regional self-sufficiency also will help alleviate the
problem of food distribution.
21. (S/NFD) There was no significant damage inflicted against
petroleum bulk storage facilities during the reporting period. Sea-
borne imports of petroleum continued at a high level, totaling 23,800
metric tons in February. All but 3,1+00 metric tons of this total
consisted of bulk deliveries from the Soviet Far East. Petroleum
import procedures have undergone a significant change in 1967. One
delivery by tanker and two seaborne deliveries of petroleum in drums
have been made from Shanghai. There are reports that one more bulk
and one packaged delivery by sea from Shanghai are planned. It is
not clear, yet, whether or not the petroleum represented by these
deliveries is part of the 34,000 metric tons of petroleum destined
for North Vietnam but diverted to China in mid-1966. Prior
estimates of supply in North Vietnam assumed the transshipment by
rail of this diverted petroleum. If these imports are in fact
part of the diverted cargoes, Supplies of petroleum on hand in
mid-March probably are not less than 60,000 metric tons, equivalent
to more than 100 days of supply. If these imports are not part
of the diverted cargoes, supplies would be somewhat more.
22. (S/NFD) Seaborne imports of miscellaneous and general
cargo increased during February, totaling 29,000 metric tons, but
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remained well below the monthly average of 34I-,400 metric tons for
1966. Most of these shipments originated, in Soviet ports and
included trucks, tractors, cranes, and other machinery and equip-
ment. Seaborne imports of bulk foodstuffs during February totaled
22,600 metric tons, approximating the large amount imported in
January, and consisted largely of Soviet wheat flour, Chinese rice,
and maize from Rumania. Seaborne exports from North Vietnam
remained at a low level because of the continued absence of apatite
exports and the lag in shipments of cement and coal.
Seaborne exports of coal increased in February to 74,800 metric
tons, but remained far below the level for the first quarter of
1966, before air strikes damaged the coal facilities at Cam Pha.
23. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage to economic and
military facilities and equipment in North Vietnam inflicted by
air strikes through February 1967 is estimated at
(See Tab B) Of the total, more than three-fifths is attributed
to the cost of damage inflicted on the economy and the remaining
to damage inflicted on military facilities and equipment. In
addition to these costs, there are many other losses to the
economy and to the military establishment which cannot be
assigned meaningful values.
* US dollars are used throughout this appraisal.
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