AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING.
OF
NORTH VIETNAM(u)
(THROUGH 19 JUNE 1967)
JUNE 1967
S-2325/AP-4
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING, DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
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docum~ei t contains information affectl fig the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Hopionage taws Title 13 U.S.C. Sections793 and 794.
The transion-_ or, revelation of its contents in any
manner ' to an unauthorized ' person is prohibited by law.
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AN APPRAISAL OF. THE BO IN O NORTH VIETNAM
This report is prepared o a monthly
basis at the request of It- h- Secretary of
Defense = i o an -e valuation of certain
effects of tho _ OL I G TIER program.
The report- o e s threes general areas of
concern: Efecs onI~liary Targets;
Leadership aid Publ c Rea bons; and
Effects on the conom .._ The dis-
cussion of political effets is limited
to those developments within North Vietnam
which relate to Hanoi's atttude toward
continuing the war and t e f cts the
ROLLING THUNDER attack hay ors civil an
morale in North Vietnam.
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SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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THAILAND
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH VIETNAM
BOMBING APPRAISAL OF
NORTH VIETNAM
19 TUNE 1981
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AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 19 JUNE 1967
SUMMARY
1. (S/NFD) Air activity over North Vietnam continued
at the high level of the previous period. The preponderance
of strikes continued to be against lines of communication
(LOC'.s) and those against rail target's reached a new monthly
high. Damage inflicted on transport equipment was signifi-
cantly greater than in any previous month this year. Attacks
were also made on jet supporting airfields, military barracks,
electric power facilities, the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
Combine, and POL storage sites.
2. (S/NFD) The locomotives and rolling stock reported
destroyed and damaged during May reached the highest monthly
total this year. Although the over-all capability of the
rail system has deteriorated somewhat, due to the increased
number of strikes against significant rail targets in the
northern and central parts of the country and heavier
attrition of rolling stock, the massive North Vietnamese
construction and repair efforts continue to offset much of
the effects of air strikes on the LOC's.
3. (S/NFD) The Hanoi-Dong Dang line sustained damage
that probably disrupted through rail service for much of the
period. The Hanoi-Lao Cai line was closed for through rail
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SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
service north of Viet Tri for about two days. The Hanoi-
Haiphong line was not struck and was considered operational
for through traffic during the entire month. The Hanoi-Vinh
line remains heavily interdicted and through traffic is possible
only as far south as Phu Ly. Shuttle operations are possible
south of Phu Ly between major points of interdiction.
4. (S/NFD) The high level of strikes against the high-
way system continued, with the bulk of the effort in the
Panhandle area. Attacks on vehicle traffic increased
significantly, and pilots reported more trucks destroyed
or damaged during May than in any previous month except
August 1966. Vehicle sightings were heaviest on roads serv-
ing the DMZ and the Lao Panhandle; however, convoys of up to
50 trucks were noted moving along principal routes toward
Hanoi from the north. Strikes on several important motor
vehicle repair shops probably seriously disrupted centralized
motor transport repair and may force the North Vietnamese to
rely more on dispersed facilities.
5. (S/NFD) The road network continues adequate
to meet essential transportation requirements. How-
ever, the difficulty and cost of moving a given amount
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of supplies has been greatly increased. The problems
of maintaining road trafficability will increase with the
gradual onset of the southwest monsoon season (May-September
and sufficient rain will have fallen by July to reduce road
capacities to their annual low.
6. (S/NFD) Waterborne transportation continued at a
high level. The majority of air strikes against waterborne
traffic were on inland routes below the 20th Parallel. Report-
ed losses of watercraft in May were higher than for any month
since the start of the Rolling Thunder program. Strikes against
coastal transshipment points and naval bases decreased from
the previous period. No strikes were conducted against
maritime port facilities during May; however, attacks on
supporting installations have affected port operations.
7. (S/NFD) Attacks against airfields continued and
prevented flight operations at Kep, Hoa Lac and Kier :An for
short periods of time following the strikes. By the end of
the reporting period the North Vietnamese air force reactions
appeared to diminish and air engagements decreased, possibly
as a result of aircraft losses and airfield interdictions.
8. (S/NF) Firings of surface-to-air missiles (SAM's)
remained high -- 481 were fired from 15 May to 11 June -- but
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the total declined from the record of the previous reporting
period. There were five confirmed and four probable US air-
craft lost to missiles. Although missile activity in the
area of the DMZ has not been noted since early June, the North
Vietnamese can be expected to make efforts to improve SAM
defenses in the Panhandle and DMZ area.
9. (S/NFD) The cumulative effects of the air strikes
in North Vietnam have caused multiple management and logistic
problems and have degraded North Vietnam's capability for
sustained large-scale conventional military operations against
South Vietnam. Hanoi must devote an increasing amount of man-
power, material, transportation, and time to accomplish the.
movement of supplies to the South. However, the North Vietnamese
still retain the capability to support activities in South Vietnam
and Laos at present or increased combat levels and force structures.
10. (S/NFD) During the past month, residents of North
Vietnam's two major cities have experienced further war related
dislocations and inconveniences.
the capital city is now more than 50 per cent evacuated and
Haiphong, more than 75 per cent. Food is adequate, but there
are shortages of certain items.
ships have not affected popular support for the'war effort.
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The mood of the people is said to continue to be one of
resignation under conditions of considerable difficulty.
11. (S/NFD) The concentrated attacks on North Vietnam's
electric power industry are having widespread effects on
modern industry. Both the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel.Combine
and the Haiphong Cement Plant are inoperative because of
bomb damage and loss of power. In addition, it is estimated
that the operation of North Vietnam's other modern industrial
plants -- chemical, fertilizer, paper, and textile -- is being
seriously hampered by the power shortage. The total amount of
generating capacity out of operation reached a peak in May of
165,000 kilowatts (kw), or 87 per cent of national capacity.
The rapid restoration of capacity -- partially offset by
restrikes -- reduced this figure to a tentative estimate of
150,000 kw out of operation by mid-June, or some 80 per cent
of the national total.
12. (S/NFD) The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine,
one of the most significant of North Vietnam's industrial
facilities, was restruck during the reporting period. Only
one of the three blast furnaces remains undamaged, and it is
highly unlikely that pig iron is being produced. The status
of barge, POL tank, and pontoon fabrication at Thai Nguyen is
unknown. Some fabrication could continue in undamaged portions
of the complex.
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13. (S/NFD) Identified seaborne imports reached a record
high total of 147,400 metric tons during May, nearly twice the
average monthly volume observed in 1966. Imports of foodstuffs
(69,400 metric tons) and petroleum (35,700 metric tons) reached
record volumes. Although the port of Haiphong has substantially
increased its offloading performance, the higher level of seaborne
imports has resulted in a backlog of freighters that appears to
be the worst yet experienced. Foreign exchange earnings from
seaborne exports of coal, apatite, cement, and pig iron were
the lowest on record.
14. (S/NFD) The consumption of petroleum in North Vietnam
during May is estimated to have increased to at least 18,500
metric tons, because of increased transportation demands and
the greater use of diesel powered generating units. Stocks
on hand as of 31 May are estimated to have amounted to at
least 64,000 metric tons, equivalent to about 100 days of
supply.
15. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage attributable
to the Rolling Thunder program through May is estimated to
be $266 million.* In addition to the measurable losses, there
* See footnote page 22.
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continue to be many other losses to the economy and to the
military establishment which cannot be assigned meaningful
values.
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Effects on Military Targets
1. (S/NFD) Air activity over North Vietnam continued
at the high level of the previous period as the southwest
monsoon brought improved flying conditions. Nearly 3,000
sorties, the highest weekly total for the year, were flown
during the third week of May. The preponderance of the
strikes continued to be against lines of communication
(LOC's) and those against rail targets reached a new monthly
high. Damage inflicted on transport equipment was sig-
nificantly greater than in any previous month this
year. Air attacks against the transportation network con-
tinued to disrupt normal operations as well as to force the
North Vietnamese to improvise countermeasures and to expend
substantial amounts of labor and materials in order to keep
traffic moving. Attacks were also made on jet-supporting
airfields, military barracks, electric power facilities,
the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, and POL storage
sites.
2. (S/NFD) Strikes against the rail system reached
a record high for a monthly period. Activity north of Hanoi
was concentrated on yards and sidings, while bridges were
the principal targets south of Hanoi.. The locomotives.and roll-
ing stock reported destroyed and damaged during May reached the
highest monthly total this year. The. over-all capability of
8
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the rail system has deteriorated somewhat due to the increased
number of strikes against significant rail targets in the
northern and central parts of the country and heavier attrition
of rolling stock. The massive North Vietnamese construction
and repair efforts continue, however, to offset much of the
effect of air strikes on the LOC's.
3. (S/NFD) The Hanoi-Dong Dang line, the main rail
connection with China, sustained damage that probably dis-
rupted through rail service for much of the period. Strikes
were mainly against bridges, railroad yards, sidings and
large concentrations of rolling stock. The Bac Giang Rail
and Highway Bridge was struck twice in May, and the western
span was reported destroyed. However, a bypass bridge and
a rail-to-water transshipment facility are available.
4. (S/NFD) The Hanoi-Lao Cai line was closed for
through rail service north of Viet Tri for about two
days. The destruction of the Viet Tri Rail and Highway
Bridge continued to necessitate shuttling over the
Riviere Claire throughout the period. Strikes against
the railroad car ferry and pontoon bridge near the destroyed
bridge probably further disrupted service. The Hanoi-Haiphong
line was not struck and was considered operational for through
traffic during the entire month. The Hanoi-Vinh line remains
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heavily interdicted and through traffic is only possible as
far south as Phu Ly. However, attacks against this line
declined compared to previous months as more strikes were
conducted against rail targets in the north. Shuttle
operations are possible south of Phu Ly between major
points of interdiction.
5. (S/NFD) The rail/highway bridge over the Canal
des Rapides, Hanoi's only rail connection to the Dong Dang
and Lao Cai lines, which was interdicted at the end of
April, was not confirmed to have a rail bypass bridge
completed until 30 May. On the other hand, rail service
across the Bac Giang Railroad/Highway Bridge farther to
the north -- which was attacked at about the same time in
April -- was restored the following day. The leisurely
pace in restoring rail service over the Canal des Rapides
reflects the ability of the North Vietnamese to improvise
alternate road and inland waterway transshipment facilities
to maintain the flow of traffic.
6. (S/NFD) Large concentrations of locomotives and cars
were noted in yards and sidings in the northern and central
parts of the country and may have resulted from the inter-
diction of the rail and road bridge over the Canal des
Rapides near Hanoi in late April. In addition, some of
10
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this equipment may have been idle temporarily because
attacks against major industrial facilities have reduced
requirements for industrial raw materials and products.
Although near record levels of destruction and damage to
rolling stock were reported during the period, there is
still no evidence of equipment shortages.
7. (S/NFD) New construction designed to increase the
capability of the railroad system continues. The detection
of dual-gauge-track on the Hanoi-Thai Nguyen line at four
widely separated locations a4d the recent completion of two
yards in the Hanoi area indicate that standard-gauge equip-
ment may now be able to reach Yen Vien via Thai Nguyen.
When completed, the dual-gauging-will substantially
increase the capacity of the Dong Dang line and eliminate
the need to transload goods. The tempo of activity
associated with the construction of bypasses for the
Doumer Bridge over the Red River increased during the
month in probable anticipation of air strikes. A ferry
site and pontoon bridge have been?completed;about a mile
downstream, and similar bypasses six miles further down-
stream are ready to be put in use. In addition, nearly
six miles of main streets and roads in and around Haiphong
were being repaired and resurfaced with bitumen, perhaps
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to facilitate the use of heavier trucks to expedite the
movement of supplies now stockpiled in Haiphong.
8. (S/NFD) The high level of strikes against the high-
way system continued, with the bulk of the effort in the
Panhandle area. Attacks on vehicle traffic increased
significantly and pilots reported more trucks destroyed
or damaged during May than in any previous month except
August 1966. Vehicle sightings were heaviest on roads
serving the DMZ and the Lao Panhandle; however, convoys
of up to 50 trucks were noted moving along principal routes
toward Hanoi from the north. Truck sightings on Buddha's
birthday (23 May), during which air attacks were suspended,
were not significantly above the average daily number for
the month. The period of this standdown (24 hours) limited
the time of immunity from air attacks and probably was too
short to allow significant exploitation.
9. (S/NFD) Several important motor-vehicle repair shops
have also been attacked. These include Kinh No, which
represents 10 per cent of North Vietnam's motor vehicle
maintenance and repair capacity, and facilities at Cam Pha,
Bac Mai, Van Dien, and the Ha Dong Army Barracks. The
strikes probably seriously disrupted the centralized motor
transport repair shops and may force the North Vietnamese
to rely more on dispersed facilities.
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10. (S/NFD) The road network continues to be
adequate to meet essential transportation requirements.
However, the difficulty and cost of moving a given amount.
of supplies have been greatly-increased. The large
civilian labor force has been augmented with troops at
critical points, such,as on Route 15 near Mu Gia Pass, and
construction equipment is increasingly evident. The difficul-
ties in maintaining road trafficability will increase with.'
the gradual onset of the southwest monsoon season (May-September).
If normal conditions prevail, sufficient rain will have fallen
by July to reduce road capacities in North Vietnam (outside of
the southern coastal region) to their annual low.
11. (S/NFD) Waterborne transportation continued at a
high level. The majority of air strikes against waterborne
traffic were on inland routes below the 20th Parallel.
Reported losses of watercraft in May were higher than for
any month since the start of the Rolling Thunder program.
The North Vietnamese have recently requested delivery of
numerous waterway transportation and maintenance craft from
the Soviets and other Communist countries.
12. (S/NFD) The five estuaries mined during February
and March were reseeded in May to disrupt any Communist
efforts to ship large quantities of supplies south during
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the standdown in bombing on Buddha's birthday. The shipping
surge never materialized, and the efficacy of these mines
remains undemonstrated. Small craft activity in the area con-
tinued to be normal, but there are. indications that the aerial
mining has interrupted the operation of large coastal vessels.
13. (S/NFD) Strikes against coastal transshipment
points and naval bases decreased from the previous period. The
Hai Yen transshipment point was hit hardest but no report
of damage is available. No strikes were conducted against
maritime port facilities during May; however, attacks on
supporting installations have affected port operations.
Cam Pha reportedly ceased operations from 12 through 16 May
due to a lack of electrical power for cargo loading equip-
ment.
14. (S/NFD) Attacks against North Vietnamese airfields
continued and prevented flight operations at Kep, Hoa Lac
and Kien An for short periods of time following the strikes.
The air defense fighter operations apparently shifted to
Phuc Yen and Gia Lam during the time the damaged airfields
were being repaired. Three to five aircraft were destroyed
on the ground at Kep during a 21 May attack, and additional
aircraft are believed to have been destroyed during later
strikes. Air engagements between 16 May and 13 June resulted
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in the loss of 16 MIG's and an additional two MIG's probably
destroyed. Four of the aircraft lost were MIG-21's. During this
period only one US aircraft, an F-4C, was lost to enemy air-
craft. By the end of the reporting period the North Vietnamese
air force reactions appeared to diminish and air engagements
decreased, possibly as a result of aircraft losses and air-
field interdiction.
15. (S/NFD) Firings of surface-to-air missiles (SAM's)
remained high -- 481 were fired from 15 May to 11 June -- but
the total declined from the record of the previous reporting
period. There were five confirmed and four probable US air-
craft lost to missiles. Missile activity in the area of the
DMZ decreased as a result of vigorous attacks against
occupied SAM sites, and no activity has been noted since
early June. It is estimated that the equivalent of one
firing SAM battalion was destroyed in the area between Dong
Hoi and the DMZ during late May and early June. The North
Vietnamese can be expected to make efforts to improve SAM
defenses in the Panhandle and DMZ area.
16. (S/NFD) The cumulative effects of the air strikes
in North Vietnam have caused multiple management and logistic
problems and have degraded North Vietnam's capability for
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sustained large scale conventional military operations against
South Vietnam. Hanoi must devote an increasing amount of man-
power, material, transportation, and time to accomplish the
movement of a given amount of supplies to the South. However,
the North Vietnamese still retain the capability to support
activities in South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased
combat levels and force structures.
Leadership and Public Reactions
17. (S/NFD) During the past month, available information
indicates that the residents of North Vietnam's two major
cities have experienced further war related dislocations
and inconveniences.
the capital city is now
more than 50 per cent evacuated and Haiphong more than 75 per
cent. The remaining population is composed almost entirely
of people between the ages of 20 and 40. Food is adequate but
shortages of certain items have been reported. For example, in
the month of June, residents of Hanoi had to accept 40 per
cent of their rice ration in flour - an increase from a 25
per cent substitution the month before.
18. (S/NFD)
the increased
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hardships have not affected popular support for the war effort.
The mood of the people continues to be consistently reported
as one of resignation under conditions of considerable diffi-
culty.
Effects on the Economy
19. (S/NFD) The concentrated attacks on North Vietnam's
electric power industry are having widespread effects on
modern industry. Both the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine
and the Haiphong Cement Plant are inoperative because of
bomb damage and loss of power. In addition, it is estimated
that the operation of North Vietnam's other modern industrial
plants -- chemical, fertilizer, paper, and textile -- is being
seriously hampered by the power shortage.
20. (S/NFD) The powerplants at Hanoi, Bac Giang, Uong Bi,
Haiphong East, Haiphong West, and the Dong Anh substation were
struck during the second half of May; those at Hanoi, Uong Bi,
and Thanh Hoa were struck during the first half of June. The
total amount of generating capacity out of operation reached
a peak in May of 165,000 kilowatts (kw), or 87 per cent of
national capacity. The rapid restoration of capacity --
partially offset by restrikes -- reduced this figure to a
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tentative estimate of 150,000 kw out of operation by mid-June,
or some 80 per cent of the national total.
21. (S/NFD) Over-all damage to the Hanoi powerplant as
a result of strikes on 19 and 21 May probably was moderate.
the Hanoi plant was put back
into partial operation within five days of the 21 May strike,
and it is estimated that some 10,000 kw (of the 32,500 kw
installed) of capacity were restored. An adequate assess-
ment of damage resulting from a later attack on 10 June is
not yet available. Five underground diesel generating
stations in Hanoi are estimated to be supplying around
5,000 kw of power to Hanoi. A combined power supply of
15,000 kw would be equivalent to about 25 to 30 per cent
of Hanoi's normal power requirements.
22. (S/NFD) By the end of May, :five of North Vietnam's
damaged powerplants -- Uong Bi, Ban Thach, Ben Thuy, Nam Dinh,
and Thanh Hoa -- had been restored to partial operation or
were almost ready for partial operation. The most extensive
reconstruction was at Uong Bi, reflecting the importance
of this plant to the Hanoi-Haiphong power network. Photog-
raphy indicates that 24,000 kw probably had been put back
into service'before the 11 June strike.(which probably
rendered the plant inoperable).
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23. (S/NFD) The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, one
of the most significant of North Vietnam's industrial facilities,
was struck during the reporting period. Aerial photography
taken through 24 May indicates that only one of the three
blast furnaces remained undamaged. Additional damage had
been inflicted on the conveyor systems, steam facilities,
and other auxiliary facilities necessary for the production
of pig iron, and it is highly unlikely that pig iron is
being produced. Pig iron production may be discontinued
for an extended period if the two transformers at the on-
site substation of the plant have been removed, as photography
suggests. This substation, the main source of electricity
for the steel plant, was fed by the heavily damaged Thai
Nguyen powerplant several miles away. The status of barge,
POL tank, and pontoon fabrication at Thai Nguyen is unknown
at this time. Through the use of portable generators, some
fabrication could continue in undamaged portions of the complex.
24. (S/NFD) Identified seaborne imports reached a record
high total of 147,400 metric tons during May, some 5,300
metric tons greater than the previous record volume observed
in March of this year and nearly twice the average monthly
volume of 77,100 metric tons observed in 1966. Imports of
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foodstuffs (69,400 metric tons) and petroleum (35,700 metric
tons*) reached record volumes. The level of foodstuffs
imported during May represents about a ten-fold increase
over the average monthly volume for 1966. Heavy imports of
food during the first five months of 1967, equivalent to about
five per cent of the annual rice production, should be sufficient
to overcome any shortages until harvesting of the spring rice
crop is completed. Although the port of Haiphong has substantially
increased its offloading performance, the higher level of seaborne
imports has resulted in a backlog of freighters that appears to be
the worst yet experienced. Dry cargo ships were in Haiphong an
average of 17 days during the reporting period, compared with an
average time in port of about 13 days during 1966. Tankers con-
tinue to be offloaded promptly, however.
25. (S/NFD) Foreign exchange earnings from seaborne exports
of coal, apatite, cement, and pig iron were the lowest recorded.
More than 50 per cent of the decrease during May is attributable
to reduced coal shipments from Cam Pha and Hon Gai. There con-
tinued to be no seaborne exports of apatite. Exports of cement
ceased after damage to the Haiphong Cement Plant and its loss
of electric power in late April, and the North Vietnamese have
reportedly cancelled contracts calling for the export of cement.
* See footnote to paragraph 26.
Approve t&&2 pd91f6 C-g
r.Tl $$SOWPAPOOEOa D0050002-7
K U133
 Approved F6r Rdl'esTe 2007/119/Of:9IA-RP82SOOZ0NA'00050002-7
26. (S/NFD) Identified imports of petroleum amounted to
about 35,700 metric tons,* the highest monthly total observed
to date. Average monthly imports for the first.five months
of 1967 were about 25,700 metric tons, considerably greater
than the monthly average of 16,700 metric tons observed
during 1966. The consumption of petroleum during May
is estimated to have increased to at least 18,500 metric
tons, because of increased transportation demands and
the greater use of diesel powered generating units.
Stocks on hand as of 31 May are estimated to have
amounted to at least 64,000 metric tons, equivalent to
about 100 days of supply.
27. (S/NFD) North Vietnam continues to negotiate with
other Communist countries for additional aid projects. During
the current reporting period, the Soviet Union sent 30
specialists to the Vang Danh coal mine. Hungary agreed to
construct a $2 million hand tool and balance factory and
promised delivery within two years. Poland has sent a group
This figure includes 7,000 metric tons believed to have
arrived on 27 May from China on a British flag tanker under
charter to the Chinese Communists. While information on the
actual cargo is not yet.available, on a previous trip in
January the tanker is.known to have transported petroleum
from China to Haiphong.
Approvedgr `F~~7 ase-ZUUOI /0F . PAURNA05RAIM050002-7
`F
 ApprovedgErLRRl(Pfe,_ZCN&/0F (R- NoD1SM05ooo2-7
of coal washing specialists to Hanoi who presumably are
destined for the Cam Pha Coal Washing Plant. France report-
edly sold a textile mill to North Vietnam in January with
a capacity of 20,000 spindles, about two-thirds the size of
the spinning section of the "8 March" Textile Plant in Hanoi.
28. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage attributable
to the Rolling Thunder program through May is estimated to
be $266 million.* (See Tab B.) Of this total, $33 million
was the result of air strikes during May. In addition to the
measurable losses, there continue to be many other losses to
the economy and to the military establishment which cannot be.
assigned meaningful values.
A re-evaluation of damage to SAM sites reveals that the
estimate of damage inflicted during 1965-66, based primarily
on pilot reports, was too high. The value of aircraft and
naval craft destroyed prior to April 1967 also has been
revised. Previous assessments of the value of these items
were calculated on the basis of US production costs for
comparable equipment. The assessment in this report is
made on the basis of Soviet foreign trade prices (prices
charged for similar equipment sold to less developed
countries) as those most closely approximating the true
value of this equipment. If estimates had been continued
on the same basis as used prior to April cumulative damage
to military targets through May would have totaled $123
million and increased the cumulative costs of measurable
damage to North Vietnam's economy and military facilities
to $306 million.
Approved5ErQRfdTe-2NQ/0F(tR-EbN00 j EMo5OOO2-7
 Approved FSE(R ET 2a( ?O ? F1HFG o SIM50002-7
RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARGETS a/ THRU 10 JUNE 67 TABLE 360
Targets
Total Targets E/ Struck e/ b/
Fixed Targets National JCS d/ d/ No. of Strike
Capacity Targeted Attacks Sorties
(X 1000)
% Of National
Capacity
Destroyed or
inactive because
of air strikes
Barracks
443 men
65
41.08
54
32.3
352
2902
25.44
Amino Depots
112.6 MT
18
1`00
18
100
75
1328
76.5
POL Storage *
133.5 MT
13
100
13
100
85
696
86.6
Supply Depots
10550 SgFt
29
. 42.48
23
44.4
66
745
17.84
Power Plants
187 KW
20
94.5
14
76.1
66
536
80
Maritime Ports
7.8 ST/Dy
8
95
6
44
27
235
12.1
RR Yards
33.7 ST/Dy
4
78
3
54
63
393
23
RR Shops
3
88
2
68
4
33
21.6
Industrial:
Explosive Plt
1 MT
1
100
1
100
3
28
100
Iron & Steel
300MT(PIG)
1
100
1
100
21
241
100
Cement Plant
600 MT
1
100
1
100
1
57
90
Airfields
23
11
6
36
24
532
23
Naval Bases
15
5
3
42
25
231
19.5
Bridges
1,529
61
52
406
3266
55..8(of
those tgtd)
Commo Install
45
5
2
2
15
20
Radar Sites
160
5
5
74
434
37.5
SAM Sites
134
58
112
388
Locks & Dams
43
8
2
10.6
2
10
Ferries
34
11
7
44
* JCS targets only; does not
Total Sorties:
.12,352
Results f/
include dispersed storage.
Armed Recce Sorties
Destroyed
Damaged
130,795 Vessels 6,728 12,383
Vehicles 3,582 3,598
RR Stock 1,029 1,933
a/ Assessments are based on best information received, will be refined as more
accurate information becomes available.
b/ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in
this summary assigned to principal target.
c/ These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted
and struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets (i.e.,
barracks, supply and ammo depots).
d/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
f/ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc., attacked and road and
rail cuts made.
Approved &E GREI 2ecNOo6F Q ebboD* i&EM50002-7 TAB A
 ApproveSP"ll*e.2Nl09/ *I*ODOSSLbM0050002-7
Value of Economic and Military Damage
Attributed to the ROLLING THUNDER Program
1965 Through May 1967
Economic
Military
Direct Losses
Million US$
Direct Losses
Million US$
Railroad/Highway Bridges
25.4
a/ b/
Barracks
23.1
a/
Transportation Equipment
47.1
Ammunition Depots
5.2
a/
Electric Power Plants
23.4
Supply Depots
5.6
Petroleum
7.4
Airfields
0.6
Manufacturing Facilities
15.9
Radar and Communications
Railroad Yards
5.2
a/
Sites
2.8
Maritime Ports
1.4
a/
SAM Sites
3.9
a/ c/
~
Miscellaneous Armed
Naval Bases
1.6
a/
?
Reconnaissance
Aircraft
.28.4 a/
Naval Craft
3.8 d/
SUBTOTAL, Direct Losses
Indirect Losses
127.2
Miscellaneous Armed
Reconnaissance
Exports
21.9
TOTAL, Direct Losses
Agriculture e/
25.5
Fishing
8.3
TOTAL
Million US$
SUBTOTAL, Indirect Losses
55.7
TOTAL, Direct and Indirect 182.9
Economic 183
Military 83 f/
TOTAL 266 L/
a/ Estimate is incomplete because of inadequate post-strike photography.
b/ Of the total, $4.5 million is estimated to have been expended to date on the
repair of damaged and destroyed bridges and $20.9 million is estimated for
complete restoration in the future of bridges damaged or destroyed. In
addition, $1.2 million would be required to make temporary repairs to pre-
sently unrepaired bridges.
c/ Recent extensive analysis reveals that previous estimates of damage inflicted
during 1965-66 were too high.
d/ Previous assessments of the value of aircraft and naval craft destroyed by air
attack were calculated on the basis of US production costs for comparable
equipment. The assessment in this report is made on the basis of Soviet
foreign trade prices (prices charged for similar equipment sold to less
developed countries) as those most closely approximating the true value of
this equipment.
e/ It should be noted that losses of agricultural crops are arbitrarily
attributed entirely to the indirect effects of the bombing. An unknown part
of these losses is in fact due to weather and other natural causes.
f/ If estimates had been continued on the same basis as previously used, see
footnotes c and d, cumulative damage through May would have totaled $123
million.
/ Excluding the cost of trucks destroyed and damaged in Laos and economic and
military facilities and equipment destroyed and damaged by US naval operations
along the coast of southern North Vietnam.
Approved rC IFa1ej2AQ/E Q RE I K00A5050002-7 TAB B
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050002-7
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA-CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THE WHITE HOUSE:
Vice President
1 Cy
Gen Maxwell Taylor
1 Cy
Mr. Bromley Smith
5 Cys
DEFENSE:
SECDEF
2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA)
2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis)
2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (PA)
1 Cy
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
1 Cy
TREASURY (Secretary)
1, Cy
USIA
1 Cy
AID
1 Cy
NASA
1 Cy
NSA
5 Cys
STATE
20 Cys
AEC
1 Cy
FBI
1 Cy
NIC
1 Cy
ACDA
1 Cy
CHAIRMAN, JCS
1 Cy
DIRECTOR., JOINT STAFF
1 Cy
J-1
1 Cy
J- 3
2 Cys
J-1+
1 Cy
J-5
J-6
SACSA
NMCC
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
3 Cys
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
DCSOPS 1 Cy
ACSFOR 1 Cy
ACSI 1 Cy
ACSI-CI 1 Cy
ACSI-Eastern 1 Cy
STAG 1 Cy
Approved ~t-tt je 2014/V/0F 6*fWFf 0(0gTScFNV050002-7
 Approved ?tr(fgTle2W&IIPC:RM16WOfyf"EOMO050002-7
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2 Cys
DNI
1 Cy
0P-921E
1 Cy
OP-922Y1
1 Cy
0P-922Y2
1.Cy
0P-92B1
1 Cy
AIR FORCE:
CHIEF OF STAFF
2 Cys
ACS,I/USAF
1 Cy
AFNINDE
6 Cys
AFNIEBB
1 Cy
AFISI (Spec Investigation)
1 Cy
AUL (Air Univ Library)
1 Cy
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT
1 Cy
G-2
1Cy
CINCPAC
2 Cys
CINCPACAF
1 Cy
CINCUSARPAC
1 Cy
CINCPACFLT
1 Cy
COMUSMACV
2 Cys
7AF
2 Cys
COMSEVENTHFLT
1 Cy
COMATKCARSTRIKEFORSEVENTHFLT
(CTF 77)
1 Cy
CINCLANT
1 Cy
CINCSTRIKE
1 Cy
CINCSAC
1 Cy
SAC 544
1 Cy
CINCTAC
1 Cy
AFSTRIKE
1 Cy
CONTIC
1 Cy
CINCALCOM
1 Cy
CINCEUR
1 Cy
CINCUSAREUR
1 Cy
CINCUSAFE
1 Cy
CINCNAVEUR
1 Cy
CINCCONAD
1 Cy
CIA
125 Cys
ApprovecWo"lEle-2NQ9/060CUA&tIS09'1[} &6&40050002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050002-7
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
DIADR 1, Cy
DIADD 1 Cy
DIASC-1 1 Cy
JS 1 Cy
CO-2C 1 Cy
AP 1 Cy
AP-2 1 Cy
AP-2C2 Cys
AP-2D1 1 Cy
AP-2D2 1 Cy
AP-3 1 Cy
AP-l 1 Cy
AP-4A 1 Cy
AP-)+A2 (Pent) 6 Cys
AP-4A2 (AHS) 4 Cys
AP-4B4 2 Cys
AP-4C 3 Cys
AP-7 2 Cys
AP-8 2 Cys
XX 1 Cy
JT 1 Cy
Approve FerJWye 211159/p6OG'A,-TUMSga2ns ft$p0050002-7
 M oS FcC RATsVAQ9/F lQP> 01Ddfd(W
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050002-7
~S,ECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMo~