INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS - - SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100040010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 22, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
1
CONCLUSIONS
1
DISCUSSION
2
I. GENERAL
2
II. SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY
FORCES AND THE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN
SOUTH VIETNAM
5
Internal Organization
5
Internal Sources
6
External Sources
11
Critical Items of Supply
13
III. LAND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM NORTH
VIETNAM
19
Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved
19
Types of Supplies Moved
26
Organizational Control
27
Modes of Transportation and Border Crossing Points ? . ?
28
Infiltration of Personnel
31
IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM NORTH VIETNAM
34
Supply Routes
34
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Forms of Sea Transportation Used
39
Types and Quantities of Supplies Moved
4o
V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA
42
Supply Routes
42
Organizational Control
46
ARMY review(s) completed.
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Types of Supplies Moved.
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Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory 48
Cambodian Government Collusion 48
VI. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES
52
Organizational Control 52
Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas 54
ANNEXES
ANNEX A. TYPES OF COMMUNIST-SUPPLIED AND LOCALLY PRODUCED
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION CAPTURED FROM THE VIET
CONG, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 58
ANNEX B. COMMUNIST TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED BY OBSERVERS ON
SELECTED ROUTES IN SOUTHERN LAOS, DECEMBER 1964-
JUNE 1965 62
ANNEX C. METHODS OF PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTING SUPPLIES . 63
ANNEX D. ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNAL VIET CONG LOGISTICS
NETWORK 65
MAP. INDOCHINA AREAS
MAP. SOUTH VIETNAM: COMMUNIST LOGISTIC SUPPORT
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SUBJECT: INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS -- SOUTH VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
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22 October 1965
The object of this study is to aSsess the nature and amount of the
support being provided to the Communist military forces and the popula-
tion under Communist control in South Vietnam, including the manner in
which supplies and personnel are provided both from inside and from out-
side South Vietnam by land and by water.
CONCLUSIONS
(to follow)
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DISCUSSION
I. GENERAL
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1. The rugged terrain of South Vietnam offers an excellent environ-
ment for the infiltration of supplies from adjoining areas and for clan-
destine movement within the country. South Vietnam is composed of the
Mekong Delta, a coastal lowland, and a highland region. (See the map at
Annex.) The delta area is interlaced with about 2,500 miles 1/ of navigable
canals, rivers, and streams, and more than half of the area is flooded
each summer and autumn. The principal streams are 800 to 1,100 feet wide
in their upper courses and 2,500 feet to over 1 mile wide in their lower
courses. The land adjacent to the streams consists of large areas of
marsh and paddy land. Mangrove swamps also line the lower reaches of
some rivers.
2. The coastal lowland extending northward from the delta plain
varies in width 'from 5 to 30 miles. In some places, spurs of the high-
lands encroach on the lowlands and serve as potential avenues of ingress
to the interior uplands. Where the highlands extend to the sea, many
sheltered landing areas are found between the promontories and the steep
rocky islands offshore. Between the coastal lowlands and the Mekong
Valley lies the highland region, which extends from just northeast of the
Mekong Delta northward into North Vietnam. North of about the 14th
Parallel the highlands consist mainly of steep mountain ridges with inter-
vening deep, narrow valleys. The southern part of the highlands, however,
1/ Mileages are given in statute miles and tonnages in short tons through-
out this report.
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is a complex of mountain ranges and scattered plateaus. The mountains,
some with peaks above 8,000 feet, and the deeply incised parts of the
plateaus make surface transportation difficult.
3. The land boundaries of South Vietnam extend more than 900 miles,
all of which adjoin Communist-controlled or unfriendly territory. On the
east and south, for a distance of about 1,500 miles, the country fronts
on the South China Sea. and the Gulf of Siam. The boundary with Cambodia
extends about 600 miles northeastward from the Gulf of Siam, about 460
miles of which is in the delta area and iS crossed by numerous rivers and
streams that can be used as infiltration routes. The remainder of the
boundary with Cambodia crosses forested plains and the hilly-to-mountain-
ous western edge of the Annam Mountains. Established vehicular roads
cross the Cambodian border in the delta area and in the forested plains
north of Saigon, but the Viet Cong can also use trails to cross the
border in numerous places. The entire border with Cambodia, is an area
of tension because of frequent clashes between the forces of both coun-
tries. The boundary with Laos continues generally northward for about 300
miles along the crest of the Annam Mountains. Passage across this boun-
dary is generally tortuous; the best trail crossings and the ones appar-
ently used most by the Viet Cong are in the northernmost part, where the
border is hilly rather than mountainous. The demarcation line between
North and South Vietnam, about 50 miles long, descends the eastern slope
of the Annam Mountains and crosses hills and a narrow coastal plain
to the South China, Sea. The Demilitarized Zone extends 5 kilometers
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(about 3 miles) on each side of the demarcation line. An inoperable
railroad and a road cross this line but normal traffic on these routes
has been stopped by military outposts on both sides of the border.
4. Within South Vietnam the terrain for the most part enables the
Viet Cong to move supplies about quite freely using primitive transport.
Most of the population of South Vietnam lives in villages, principally
In the Mekong Delta. The few large towns are mainly in the delta, and
along the coast. Settlements in the delta are built along the banks of
rivers and canals. Numerous small inland water craft provide the major
share of transport in this area both for the local populace and for the
Viet Cong. In the highlands, villages are located in scattered clearings
on high ground. A sparse network of mostly one-lane to two-lane bitum-
inous-treated roads links the large settlements and towns. The majority
of the settlements, however, are connected by tracks or, at best, by
one-lane earth roads or roads that have crushed-stone surfaces. Many
villages are linked only by trails. In such terrain the Viet Cong can
use porters, bicycles, carts, and occasionally modern vehicles. Poor
modern transportation, plus the fact that the Viet Cong can mingle with
the local traffic, makes government interception of Viet Cong traffic
very difficult.
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II. SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES AND
THE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Internal Organization
5. The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam -- the southern
branch of the Communist Party in North Vietnam -- is responsible for the
complex task of providing funds for the Viet Cong war effort and of pro-
viding most of the essential, nonmilitary goods for the Viet Cong organi-
zation. Operating through a vertical series of Party committees which
exist on almost all geographical levels from village to the Central
Office, South Vietnam (COSVN) the Party has attempted to develop internal
sources of funds and supplies for the war effort. A wide array of front,
Party, and military elements -- under the overall direction of the
Party -- implement the principal tasks of production, acquisition, and
transportation of supplies. The Finance and Economic Section of the
Party, the Rear Services of the Viet Cong military organization, and the
various units of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
(NFLSV) are the principal instrumentalities in these tasks. The Finance
and Economic Section of the Party is the basic economic organization of
the Viet Cong and the source of almost all supplies provided internally
and some of those provided externally. At the province level and above,
each Finance and Economic Section is headed by a policy level Party cadre
and includes the chief of the Rear Services of the Viet Cong main force
units. It is the responsibility of the various finance and economic
units to supervise the economy of Viet Cong-controlled areas, to acquire
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the money and goods required by the Viet Cong, and to implement economic
programs designed to strengthen Viet Cong economic power and disrupt the
economy of South Vietnam.
6. As a principal unit in the internal Viet Cong logistics net-
work, the Finance and Economic Section -works closely 'With theBear
Services of the Viet Cong military units and with the various NFLSV
organizations. This relationship with the Rear Services provides the
Finance and Economic Section with a channel for supplying military
units with required goods and for calling upon the military for assist-
ance in meeting economic tasks. A similar relationship exists with the
NFLSV organizations. The Finance and Economic Section relies on these
organizations to supply civilian manpower for the economic tasks of the
Party, and, in turn, attempts to meet the requirements of the civilian
population by supplying the necessary goods.
Internal Sources
7. The Viet Cong appear to be largely self-sufficient in regard to
almost all nonmilitary supplies. Nonmilitary supplies available to the
Viet Cong in South Vietnam are indigenous or imported through legal or
illegal trade channels. The Viet Cong have developed a complex system
of economic operations devoted to acquiring financial and material re-
sources in South Vietnam for their military effort. Taxation, self-
initiated economic activities, seizure, and clandestine operations appear
to be the principal means of obtaining financial and material support
for the Viet Cong.
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There is no specific evidence of a Viet Cong shortage
of local currency, and in fact there have been unconfirmed reports that
the Viet Cong are building a fund surplus to meet the costs of
?./ This range is intended to be a rough approximation of internally
acquired Viet Cong resources. In comparison, central government revenues
in 1964 totaled about $175 million, mainly from indirect taxes and cus-
toms duties collected in the Saigonmetropolitan area. South Vietnamese
piasters were converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of 73.5
piasters to US Sl.
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8. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most impor-
tant source of financial and material support for the Viet Cong. The US
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) has estimated that the Viet
Cong collect 50 to 100 million piasters per province annually, or about
US 330 million to 360 million per year in all of South Vietnam. V There
is insufficient evidence to estimate actual tax collections in cash and
in kind, but it is known that the Viet Cong impose agricultural, planta-
tion, transportation, and business taxes on a wide scale throughout the
country. Although tax payments are probably the major source of local
currency, bond drives monetary issues, and clandestine fund drives also
represent significant sources of local currency.
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aaministering additional areas that may come under their control.
9. Agricultural taxation is probably the most important source of
Viet Cong tax receipts. During the past crop year the Viet Cong employed
progressive tax schedules on agricultural income with as many as 25
separate rates in the Mekong delta region alone. If these rates had been
applied only to rice production in Viet Cong-controlled areas of the
delta, the collection of rice would have amounted to nearly 100,000
tons, an amount far in excess of Viet Cong requirements in the delta, or
even on a national basis. -V Because equivalent Viet Cong tax rates are
applied to other agricultural production in the delta, it is estimated
that the Viet Cong collect far in excess of their nationwide requirements
for food in the delta alone. In the central part of the country agricul-
tural tax collections cannot be calculated because the tax has not been
applied as systematically or as comprehensively as in the Mekong delta
area. However, there is little doubt that even in this area the agri-
cultural tax supplies a significant portion of Viet Cong needs for rice,
salt, manioc, fish, and other foodstuffs. In addition, in this area
the Viet Cong often purchase or confiscate rice and salt.
10. Plantation taxes -- either in money or in kind -- also account
2/ During January through August, rice deliveries to Saigon from the
delta totaled about 650,000 tons in 1963, 440,000 tons in 1964, and
340,000 tons in 1965. It is possible that Viet Cong tax collections
account for most of this so-called shortfall of deliveries to Saigon.
There have been persistent reports that the Viet Cong are smuggling
rice into Cambodia to acquire foreign exchange or otherwise generate
funds for their effort. However, the amount of rice actually disposed
of through Cambodia is not known.
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for a significant portion of Viet Cong tax receipts. Rubber plantations
close to War Zones C and D (see map at Annex) provide an important means
of supply for Viet Cong forces in these areas; these plantations possess
large stocks of rice, medicine, POL, and other supplies and have long
been vulnerable to Viet Cong economic pressure. According to a recent
captured document, the annual plantation tax is approximately 1,000
piasters (
13.70) per hectare (2.)-i.7 acres) or a total of about ,
1 million
for the potentially exploitable area of 75,000 hectares if subject to
Viet Cong taxation. Wage taxes on plantation workers and Viet Cong de-
mands for labor service for transportation are also known to exist on a.
wide scale. Most of the internal transportation of the country, both
personal and commercial, is also taxed by the Viet Cong, although it is
impossible to estimate total receipts in cash and kind from this source.
Taxes are also imposed on business establishments and commercial acti-
vities whenever possible. Small rice and sugar mills are taxed in areas
outside of the control of the government of South Vietnam; woodcutters,
charcoal kilns, and sawmills are generally easy prey for'.the Viet Cong.
Import and export taxes are levied against trade between areas controlled
by the Viet Cong and areas controlled by the central government in order
to provide revenue and to promote a favorable trading pattern for the
Viet Cong. Thus the import of medicines, cloth, POL, and printing sup-
plies into areas controlled by the Viet Cong is not taxed at all, but
the export of metal from Viet Cong areas is forbidden completely.
11. Despite the considerable financial and material resources avail-
able to the Viet Cong through tax collection and other financial
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operations such as bond drives, monetary issues, and the use of credit
cooperatives, additional economic activities have been initiated to
support Viet Cong military personnel and the civilian population under
Viet Cong control. For example, major efforts to produce their own
foodstuffs, especially rice and manioc, have been made by the Viet Cong
in the central highlands. Units to produce clothing have been estab-
lished as subordinate elements of the Rear Services of the Viet Cong
military organization. Simple manufacturing units, which produce farm
implements for the civilian population, also produce military goods such
as mines, and grenades. Where materials are not ordinarily available
through other means, they are often seized outright, although it is some-
times difficult to distinguish between seizure through force and enforced
tax collections. However, the Viet Cong do accumulate significant sup-
plies as war booty, including medicines, communications equipment, food-
stuffs, and military equipment.
12. Clandestine front business operations in areas controlled by the
government of South Vietnam and involvement of legitimate enterprises in
Viet Cong procurement operations are considered to be common in many pro-
vinces. These operations procure essential supplies for the Viet Cong
from areas controlled by the central government. Although these clan-
destine operations are used for the acquisition of indigenous goods, they
are probably concerned primarily with the acquisition of manufactured
goods that are imported into South Vietnam through Saigon and coastal
ports. Private firms and individuals import and distribute key items
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such as POL, medicines, textiles, printing supplies, batteries, cement,
and steel products. At the lowest level, the Viet Cong use the civilian
population under their control to make discreet purchases of these goods.
In district and provincial capitals, it is widely suspected that the Viet
Cong operate clandestine front businesses or use legitimate enterprises
as witting or unwitting agencies for procurement.
External Sources
13. The external sources of supplies provided to the Viet Cong are
principally Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and
France. The countries through which most of these supplies pass immedi-
ately before infiltration into South Vietnam are North Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia, although direct shipments to the South Vietnam coast from
other countries are possible. US-produced munitions and supplies have
also reached the Viet Cong through capture or purchase in South Vietnam.
14. Military supplies that are moved via North Vietnam usually are
transported by rail through Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam.
Until early 1965 the International Control Commission (ICC) observers
were permitted to read the manifests but were not permitted to inspect
the contents of the freight cars that moved into North Vietnam from China
through Dong Dang. After the bombing of North Vietnam began and the ICC
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kinds of war materiel moved into North Vietnam. Although this materiel
undoubtedly was destined for the forces of the Peoples Army of Vietnam
(PAVN), supplies for the Viet Cong apparently are taken from PAVN stor-
age areas. Reports are also available indicating that military supplies
have been moved from China by junk or small coastal ships to various
points along the North Vietnamese coast. Although it is possible that
munitions are moved into Haiphong by merchant ship, no such shipments
have been identified.
some
merchant ships have unloaded cargo into junks and other small craft
before entering the port of Haiphong. Such cargo could have been des-
tined for sea infiltration into South Vietnam, much of which seems to
originate in the Haiphong area.
15. For the most part, supplies for the Viet Cong that move from
Cambodia arrive in Cambodia through normal commercial channels, princi-
pally aboard Free World ships. Very few ships from Communist countries
call at Cambodian ports
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observers were pulled
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military trains per day obviously loaded with many
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Critical Items of Supply
16. As mentioned above, the Viet Cong depend on the countryside
and on the rural population for most of their food. Viet Cong taxation
policy permits payments in rice, manioc, fish, salt, and other food
items. Where food is not pltntiful, particularly in the mountainous
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areas, Viet Cong food production units engage directly in farming.
According to recently captured documents, prior to June 1963 the Viet
Cong military units and administrative agencies were directed by
COS VN to provide their awn subsistence for a period of 4 months per
year, with the remaining 8 months of subsistence furnithed by COSVN.
From June 1963 to June 1964, all units were required to furnish 100
percent of their own subsistence. Since June 1964, combat units have
provided 50 percent of their own food and all other units 100 percent.
Some reports have indicated that PAVN battalions operating in the
northern part of South Vietnam receive some of their rice supplies
from external sources.
17. The Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile
products, such as hammocks and mosquito nets, are not extensive.
Because of the mild climate, clothing is not a major problem. A num-
ber of items of clothing used by the Viet Cong, such as khaki uniforms,
underwear, winter clothing for the mountain regions, and hammocks, are
produced in North Vietnam. For the most part, these items have been
issued to infiltrators who generally carry an individual supply of two
uniforms, a knapsack, a hammock, and a mosquito net when entering the
country. Clothing production units also exist as elements of the Rear
Services of the Viet Cong military organization. In addition the Viet
Cong obtain cloth internally by discreet purchase and externally from
Cambodian sources.
18. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably effective for the
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present level of fighting. Aid stations, hospitals, and rest centers
are located within South Vietnam and probably have been located tem-
porarily in Cambodia and Laos from time to time. Approximately 48 of
these medical facilities have been identified, some of which are re-
ported to be well-staffed and supplied even with such sophisticated
equipment as x-ray machines, laboratory facilities, and dental chairs.
One major source of medical supplies is the open market in South Viet-
nam. With the exception of opiates and barbiturates, most drugs can
be purchased without difficulty in pharmacies in the larger cities.
Another major source consists of captured South Vietnamese medical sup-
plies. Some Viet Cong military operations have been specifically
directed toward obtaining these supplies from hamlets and supply con-
voys. Finally, medical supplies are procured from various Communist
and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam.
19. North Vietnam in particular appears to be engaged in building
up its supplies of pharmaceuticals. North Vietnamese imports of peni-
cillin and blood plasma -- both of which are widely used in treating
battle casualties -- have risen sharply in 1965.
The actual quantity of pharmaceuticals being shipped from
North Vietnam to the Viet Cong is not known. In addition to equipping
the PAVN forces now fighting in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese
reportedly have used infiltrators to carry small packets of medical
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supplies containing such items as penicillin, sulfa drugs, and quinine
derivatives to the Viet Cong. Because of the relative ease of trans-
porting pharmaceuticals, it would be possible for North Vietnam to deli-
ver substantial quantities of medical supplies by small coastal vessels
and over the land infiltration routes. Once in South Vietnam these
supplies presumably would be stored in central areas near base hospitals.
20. Viet Cong requirements for POL products probably are quite
small. They have some organic vehicles and self-propelled craft, how-
ever, and also payer generators and other power-driven equipment for
which they need fuel. Taxation of the contents of petroleum tank trucks,
outright seizure of petroleum supplies, and discreet purchase from local
gasoline stations throughout the country are known methods of acquisition
from internal sources.
21. The requirements of the Viet Cong for construction materials are
unknown. Simple construction in base areas probably can be accomplished
by the use of locally available materials, mainly timber. Although the
Viet Cong have been known to seize convoys carrying supplies of cement,
their access to other internal and external sources of construction mate-
rials is not known.
22. The Viet Cong supply of weapons, explosives, and ammunition has
been accumulated from various sources: supplies buried or left behind
by retreating government forces in South Vietnam; supplies infiltrated
by land and sea; captured supplies; and locally produced supplies. The
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available quantities are unknown, but it is evident that substantial
quantities of Soviet and Eastern European weapons and Chinese Communist
copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam for use
by the Viet Cong. This flow of weapons from outside South Vietnam has
enabled the Viet Cong to achieve some progress in weapons standardiza-
tion within main force units. Older weapons are being passed on to
guerrilla units. The present emphasis in local manufacture seems to be
on the reloading of ammunition and the fabrication of mines, grenades,
and other explosive devises, rather than on the production of rifles and
more complicated weapons. Some repair work is also carried on. The
majority of the Viet Cong production facilities are located from Viet
Cong Military Region VI south to Ca Mau. Annex A contains a list, by
country of origin, of they types of Communist-supplied and locally-
produced weapons and ammunition captured by central government and US
forces from the Viet Cong.
23. Most of the telecommunications equipment used by the Viet Cong
consists of US-manufactured tactical radio sets captured from the South
Vietnamese.
The types of
radio equipment captured range from handheld, low-power transceivers to
relatively large, vehicle-mounted transmitters having power ratings of
from 300 to 400 watts. This captured equipment has been augmented to a
small extent by comparable equipment of Soviet, Chinese Communist, and
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Japanese manufacture, and by locally manufactured equipment. Spare parts
and batteries are obtained by capture, infiltration, and purchase.
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III. LAND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM
Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved
24. There is a scarcity of information on the overland movement
of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies from North Vietnam
to the northern provinces of South Vietnam. It is apparent, however,
that a major corridor from North Vietnam through Laos serves as a
principal means of transporting supplies. Within this corridor,,
there are at least two distinct land routes. Both of these routes end
in the same series of seasonal roads and trails leading to forward
supply points. From these points in Laos, supplies are moved across
the South Vietnamese border by means of porters, bicycles, ox carts,
and pack animals.
25. The route from Mu Gia Pass via routes 12/23/9/92 is the
higher capacity route. This road network is in part useable only
in the dry season for through motor transport, but it can be used
during the remainder of the year by a combination of methods. Its
maximum use is from about mid-December through May or June to supply
the Communist forces in the southern part of Laos and the Viet Cong
in South Vietnam. Supplies from North Vietnam are trucked in stages
along routes lA and 15 through Mu Gia Pass into Laos and then south
on routes 12 and 23 to supply dumps located along routes 23 and 9.
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Some supplies moving along this route eventually reach Ban Dong at
the junction of routes 9 and 92 and then move down route 92 toward
the South Vietnamese border. Although route 23 is a very important
portion of this supply line, it is a seasonal road on which truck
traffic is restricted from about June through November each year
because of flooding and ground softening caused by the southwest
monsoons. The Communists have nearly finished constructing route 911
as an alternate to parts of routes 23 and 9. When completed this road
will reduce the distance from Mu Gia Pass to SePone (Tchepone) by
about one-third.
26. Before the completion of route 23 in 1962, some supplies for
the Communist forces in southern Laos were moved by air. During
January-June 1963, however, many large truck convoys were observed
moving south on route 23. Although some of these trucks probably
carried troops and supplies for the southern part of Laos, the
remainder of the supplies may have been stockpiled or portered
over the trails into the northern provinces of South Vietnam.
Again in 1964 large convoys moved during the dry season only.
Observation by road-watch teams was so incomplete in both years
that it is impossible to estimate with confidence the volume of
supplies moved into the area, or to establish the amount of materiel
which may have been stockpiled or moved on into South Vietnam. As
a result of considerably improved reporting by the road-watch teams
during the 1965 dry season, however, it is possible to estimate that
the level of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17 trucks
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per day. (See Annex B.) Based on observations of the contents of
about 10 percent of the trucks moving south, it is believed that
they carried at least two tons each. It is also believed that the
road was truckable for through traffic for a total of about 180 days
during the dry season. This volume of traffic from December 1964
to June 1965 is calculated to have moved at least 35 tons of military
supplies each day into the area of Laos served by route 23. Groups
of porters were also observed occasionally moving south on this route.
The traffic moving other than by truck throughout the year, however,
is small in proportion to the truck traffic and intermittent. Its
volume cannot be estimated. Nevertheless, such supplies supplement
the volume moved by trucks and replace consumption to some extent.
27. It is estimated that the approximately 8,000 Communist
troops stationed in the area of Laos south of route 12 during the
1965 dry season probably required an average of about 15 tons per
day of logistic support from outside sources. Since the end of the
dry season additional numbers of troops have been observed moving
south into this area of Laos. The daily requirement for the original
8,000 troops declined during the wet season because of a lower level
of activity, but this decline was probably partially offset by the
requirements of the new troops moving into the area. During the
1965 dry season, truck traffic on route 23 delivered. about 20 tons
per day in excess of troop requirements. The largest amount needed
by these forces during the wet season would be an amount equal to
the requirement for the dry season or 15 tons. If this is the case,
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only 5 tons per day of the total brought in by truck during the dry
season would have been available for infiltration into South Vietnam,
an average of about 3 tons per day throughout the year. 2/ On the
other hand, if the supply requirement for the forces in Laos was
reduced by one-half during the wet season, then about 12 tons would
have been available for infiltration into South Vietnam, or at average
of 6 tons throughout the year.
28. The lower capacity supply route from North Vietnam begins
with a truck route south from Vinh to the area of the Demilitarized
Zone. From this point the route consists of a network of trails,
including a recently developed through route trafficable by light
vehicles, that extend around the end of the Demilitarized Zone and
cross route 9 near Ban Dong. This route provides a shorter, more
secure access to the forward supply dumps in Laos. This route is
probably used for infiltration of some critical items of military
supply and for infiltration of personnel. There have been reports
of the movement of supplies south toward Ban Dong over this trail
system by porters, bicycles, and carts. Although there have not
been enough of these reports to estimate with confidence the amount
of supplies moving by these means, analysis of available data indi-
cates that at least 2 tons per day are actually being delivered over
the trails.
2/ The Communists do not move supplies forward every day of the year,
but, in order to convey an idea of the average amount available, the
total tonnage has been spread throughout the year and expressed on a
daily basis.
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29. Route 92 south of route 9 is the beginning of a supply net-
work that supports Communist activities in the southeastern area of
the Laotian Panhandle and across the border into South Vietnam. This
route acts as a funnel for supplies delivered over both route 23 and
over the system west of the Demilitarized Zone. Route 92 extends south
from Ban Dong for a distance of about 80 miles and ends at the Se Kong
River, about 20 miles east of Saravane. Although the northern section
possibly has a low all-season capability, the southern part is truck-
able only in the dry season. Route 92 south of Ban Dong has been
developed by the Communists into a north-south main supply route from
which at least three partially truckable feeder routes (routes 921,
922, and 923) lead to border-crossing points and forward supply depots.
At least one of these routes (922) is an important supply route to
South Vietnam.
indicated that vehicular activity has occurred on route 922 from its
junction with route 92 to a point about 15 miles east where route 922
divides into two segments. Each of these 1-to-2 mile segments also
showed evidence of recent vehicular activity. Thus it appears that
supplies can be transported by truck over these routes to a point
within about 5 miles of the border of South Vietnam. In the dry
season, these routes would provide for through traffic from North
Vietnam.
30. From the southern end of route 92 some supplies are moved
south in native craft on the Se Kong River to route 165, which is a
seasonably truckable route extending east toward the South Vietnamese
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border through a possible maneuver and training area. An improved
trail also generally parallels the Se Kong River and connects the
southern terminus of route 92 with the recently improved route 165
also leading to the South Vietnamese border. Photographic analysis
showed that the section paralleling the Se Kong was being upgraded
into a road at the end of the 1965 dry season. It is likely that
the entire route paralleling the river will be upgraded after the
present wet season. When this work is completed the Communists
will have a second fair-weather truckable route from route 92 to
the South Vietnamese border.
31. The total quantity of supplies moved south on route 92
during the 1965 dry season cannot be estimated
some trucks leave route 92 north of
the observers and move supplies on the feeder routes toward the
South Vietnamese border. During the period February-June 1965,
that the level of truck traffic moving near the southern end of
route 92 averaged about 1-1/2 trucks moving south per day. (See
Annex B.) If it is estimated that these trucks carried about
2 tons each, a total of about 375 tons could have been moved south
through the terminus of route 92 during the dry season. On an
annual basis this quantity amounts to a daily average of slightly
more than 1 ton that could have been moved forward from the end
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of route 92 toward the border of South Vietnam. Additional tonnage
was moved over the upper access routes (routes 921, 922, and 923).
32. Intelligence indicates that porters are used to carry the
bulk of the supplies from the forward depots in Laos across the
border into South Vietnam. Although it is impossible to estimate
the quantity of supplies actually crossing the border on a daily
basis, about 5 tons per day could be moved over the difficult
terrain in the area if 2,000 porters were engaged in cross-border
delivery,on a continuous basis. Some reports have indicated that
up to 6,000 porters are intermittently engaged in cross-border
delivery. If 6,000 persons were actually being used on a continuous
basis, then approximately 15 tons per day could be moved across the
border. Additional amounts could also be moved by such means of
transport as bicycles, carts, and pack animals which are known to
have been used by the Viet Cong.
33. It appears that the area adjacent to the route 92 main
supply route is a Viet Cong/PAVN advanced communications zone con-
taining an interconnecting land and water transportation system,
troop facilities, maneuver and training areas, and logistic installa-
tions. During the past dry season (December 1964 - June 1965) the
higher capacity route from North Vietnam through Mu Gia Pass could
have delivered 5 to 12 tons per day, or 3 to 6 tons per day on an
annual basis, to this area for use in infiltration to South Vietnam
depending on the amount of consumption within Laos as noted above.
(See paragraph 27.) The lower capacity route around the Demilitarized
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Zone delivers at least 2 tons per day on an annual basis. Therefore,
although it is impossible to estimate with precision the total amount
of supplies available for infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam,
it appears that during the past dry season, the minimum would have been
about 7 tons and the maximum about 14 tons. The daily average through-
out the year would be at least 5 and could be more than 8 tons. These
amounts may be supplemented by the supplies moved by porters and other
means of transport and by local procurement, but this amount cannot be
Quantified. The actual amounts infiltrated into South Vietnam could
also be reduced to the extent that some food may be required from
sources outside of Laos to support the infiltration of personnel,
way station personnel, and porters on the Laotian side of the border.
Types of Supplies Moved
34. The trucks that moved south on route 23 during the 1965 dry
season carried such items as ammunition for small arms, mortars, and
recoilless rifles; explosives; gasoline; clothing; and foodstuffs such
as rice, salt, flour, dried meat, and dried fish. The northbound
trucks reportedly carried lumber, bamboo, and salvage items such as
empty gasoline drums and tires. The contents of about half of the
trucks moving near the southern end of route 92 were not observed,
but almost 30 percent reportedly carried boxes, 15 percent a combina-
tion of arms, ammunition, and food, and the remainder sacks with un-
identified cargo. About a third of the trucks moving north reportedly
were empty. Many of the porters coming over the trails from near the
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western end of the Demilitarized Zone to route 92 or directly to
points along the border of South Vietnam are reported to have carried
weapons, ammunition, equipment, medical supplies, and foodstuffs.
Organizational Control
35. The infiltration routes through Laos and into the three
northern-most provinces of South Vietnam apparently are under North
Vietnamese control. However, Viet Cong Military Region V Headquarters
in South Vietnam appears to share in the control of infiltration routes
in the northern provinces and is probably the major controlling authority
throughout the rest of Military Region V.
indicate that as of mid-1964 the 70th Transportation Group controlled
the porters and infiltrators on the trails through Laos. The 70th
Transportation Group is under direct control of the PAVN High Command
in Hanoi. This group maintains about 17 communications-liaison stations
in Laos, with the first station located near the end, of the Demilitarized
Zone. A company of about 100 able-bodied, men is located at each station
to carry out transportation, security, communications, liaison, and
guidance of infiltrators and locally conscripted porters. It is not
known whether the supplies transported by truck down route 23 are also
the responsibility of the 70th Transportation Group. It is possible
that such supplies are turned over to the 70th Transportation Group at
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the end of the truck route. The list Transportation Group was reported
to control a short segment of the route between A Rum, a village located
near the end of route 922, and some point within Quang Nam Province.
It was said to have at least 12 stations, with approximately one company
at each station. At the border of South Vietnam near the boundary be-
tween Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces the supplies and infiltrators
become the responsibility of both the list and 72nd Transportation
Groups which maintain the communications-liaison route through Quang
Nam to southern Quang Tin Province. The 72nd Transportation Group
is reported to have had. about 24- stations maintained by a total of
1,700 men. I/ Thus, as of mid-1964, about 1,700 to 2,000 men possibly
were maintaining the transportation corridor through Laos and another
3,000 or more were maintaining the routes in the northern part of
South Vietnam, exclusive of road porters.
Modes of TEaaa2Etation and Bollf2_1/12a2InE_ELEIs
36. Trucks, porters, and native craft on the inland rivers are
all used to some extent, depending on the season and location, to
bring supplies to the South Vietnamese border. The staged movement
by truck from North Vietnam into Laos has been described above. Along
the trails the way stations are said to be located about one-half day's
march apart. The short distances, anywhere from 4 to 12 miles, depending
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on terrain and the tactical situation, allow the porters to haul
supplies to the next station and return to their home base within
one working day. The extent to which this porter system is function-
ing at present and the methods and number of men being used are not
known. An infiltrator captured in June 1965 reported that portions
of the trails were being upgraded into roads and that he had seen
trucks being used on portions of the route. Apparently he had
observed route 922. Other infiltrators who crossed the border in
early 1965 observed pack bicycles more often than porters. The use
of bicycles would considerably reduce the number of porters needed.
The porters carry loads of 40 to 6o pounds in back packs or on
shoulder poles, whereas single or dual bicycles can carry loads of
up to 500 pounds. (Annex C lists several additional methods used
for packaging and transporting supplies.)
37. Only one waterway in Laos, the Se Kong River mentioned
above, is known to be used to any extent as part of an infiltration
route, although the alignment of other waterways, the Se Bang Hieng,
Se Pone, and the Song Ben Hai, makes them suspect infiltration routes.
Aerial photography of the Se Kong between the southern end of route 92
and the point where route 165 leaves the river reveals waterway improve-
ments, native craft on the river, and portages of difficult sections.
This waterway is navigable by canoes throughout the year, but its use
during the dry season probably will be reduced when the road being
built parallel to it is completed, possibly the the end of 1965. The
Song Ben Hai/Rao Thanh waterway in the Demilitarized Zone forms the
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border between North and South Vietnam. Although infiltration across
this river by teams of three to four men swimming or using small craft
has been reported, infiltration of supplies across the river has not
been observed. Use by canoes of this waterway throughout the year for
lateral movement within the Demilitarized Zone to interior tracks,
trails, and tributary streams providing access to South Vietnam is
possible, however.
38. Apparently the major border-crossing points (see the map at
Annex), consist of the trail networks east and southeast of routes 921,
922, 923, and 165. However, the entire Laotian border adjoining the
South Vietnamese provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and
Kontum is interlaced with trails, many of which probably are being
used. Pinpointing specific border crossing points is impossible
due to lack of information. Thick forest coverage of the roads and
trails make aerial reconnaissance of these routes difficult.
39. In summary, the Communists have developed major supply routes
in Laos, have provided the logistical troops and organization to control
and operate the routes, and are using them as the primary means of infil-
trating supplies to the Viet Cong/PAVN forces in South Vietnam as well
as to supply Pathet Lao/PAVN forces in Laos. During the pat year the
Communists have continued to construct new routes and improve old ones,
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which will have the effect of substantially increasing the capacity of
the Laotian corridor. (See the map at Annex.) The amount of effort
that the Communists have put into this road network is an indication
of the increasing importance which they attach to this area as a line
of communication to South Vietnam.
Infiltration of Personnel
40. Recent information obtained from interrogation of prisoners
of war and from a summary of information accumulated since 1959,
prepared by MACV, indicates that large numbers of personnel have
infiltrated overland from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam.
The full scope of the personnel infiltration program, however, cannot
be assessed on the basis of the documentary evidence now available.
In 1955, following the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the Communists left
behind several thousand well-trained military and political cadres
when they retreated to the north. This apparatus continued to carry
out low-level covert and overt political activities and to conduct
occasional terrorist and harassing armed actions. This effort was
stepped up in 1957. In 1959, elements of the 70th Transportation
Group of the PAVN were sent into an area in southern Laos contiguous
to the border of South Vietnam to establish relay stations connecting
the southern part of North Vietnam with the northern area of South
Vietnam. Infiltration routes developed over the years from North
Vietnam through Laos have become the primary avenues used for the
movement of personnel into South Vietnam. It is believed that the
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70th Transportation Group remains in control of the infiltration of
both men and material from North Vietnam through Laos into South
Vietnam.
41. From 1959 through 20 September 1965; about 48,000 men are
believed to have infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam as
follows:
Category
1959-60
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Totals
1-2 E/
4,55612/
4,118
5,362
4,726
6,301
3,375
28,438
3 fj
26
516
5,842 Li/
1,227
1,752
1,595
10,958
4 fi
0
1,661
1,653
1,935
2,340
737
8;326
Totals
4,582
6 295
12,857
h88
10,393
5,707
47 722
The infiltrators consisted of military, political, security, economic,
financial, and education specialists. It is significant that, prior
to 1964, essentially all the infiltrators were South Vietnamese who
had been yelOcated in North Vietnam after 1954. Since 1964? about
half the infiltrators are believed to have been native North Vietnamese
the bulk of which remained in the northern provinces. The fact that
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the major elements of a PAVN division are now considered to be south
of the 17th Parallel underscores the change in the character of the
infiltration program. While moving on the trails through Laos, the
infiltrators carried some supplies to South Vietnam. These supplies
included medicines, radios, and various types of weapons, such as
pistols, grenades, carbines, rifles, machineguns, and recoilless
rifles. Sometimes this equipment was not retained by the infiltra-
tion group that carried it into South Vietnam. The infiltration
trip usually required between 45 days and 4 months. However, the
Viet Cong rely primarily on local recruitment to maintain their
regular and guerrilla force strength.
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IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM NORTH VIETNAM
Supply Routes
42. The Communists have used seaborne infiltration to transport
some men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. The
number of personnel infiltrated by sea has been small and the primary
emphasis has been on the infiltration of supplies. These supplies are
believed to have been used principally to build stockpiles in the
coastal areas of South Vietnam for further distribution to the Viet
Cong.
43. Seaborne infiltration operations have originated in two general
areas in North Vietnam -- in the north, near Haiphong and Bai Choy,
and, in the south, along the coast between Ben Thuy and. the 17th Parallel.
Numerous embarkation points and. logistic supply bases have been reported-
The routes used by infiltration craft have varied, according to the type
of mission, the type of craft, and the season of the year. Infiltra-
tion by sea from North Vietnam reportedly has taken place in past years
primarily from December through August because of the rough seas usually
encountered, during the rest of the year. One source, who participated.
in several infiltration missions, mentioned. two routes, a "near-shore"
route, paralleling the coast at about 3 miles offshore, and. a "distant
-
shore" route, ranging from 50 to 100 miles from the coast.
Some of the smaller craft involved in
infiltration from North Vietnam reportedly have left the northern areas
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and stopped at ports in the southern area of the country before con-
tinuing their trip into South Vietnam. Other craft have transited
the Hainan Straits on their way to the south. Some unconfirmed
reports state that seaborne infiltration also has been conducted
from foreign ships which have stopped off the coast of South Vietnam
while cargo was unloaded into lighters that transferred it to shore.
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captured. in 1965 stated that he infiltrated by sea
in October 1964. He boarded. a 70-foot steel-hulled, ship at Haiphong,
passed. through Hainan Straits, sailed. near Poulo Condore, Poulo Obi,
and. then into a stream on the Ca Mau Peninsula. This source indicated.
that the organization that infiltrated, him had, made about 20 deliveries
to South Vietnam between 1961 and. October 1964. In late 1964, an un-
identified. junk was sighted aground and burning off Kien Hoa Province.
Intelligence reports indicated, later that this craft was a Viet Cong
supply junk that had run aground and been blown up by the Viet Cong
to keep it from being captured.
45. Movement of substantial quantities of arms to South Vietnam
by larger craft has also been confirmed, In February 1965, a 120-foot
steel-hulled. ship was discovered and. sunk in Vung Ro Bay and. a nearby
arms cache of about 1,500 weapons and. from 40 to 60 tons of supplies
and ammunition was seized. This material was probably carried there
by ship from North Vietnam. Another large cache was discovered. in
April 1965 during a search and, destroy operation on the Coast of Kien
Hoa Province.
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46. While there is little hard evidence to support many of the
reports received, boats or ships have been reported during past years
to have unloaded in most of the 21 coastal provinces of South Vietnam.
(See the map at Annex.) Most of these landings are reported to have
taken place in the four northern coastal provinces of South Vietnam --
Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin -- and in the southern
part of the country from Binh Tuy Province around the Cape of Ca Mau
to the Cambodian border, including the offshore island of Phu Quoc.
Small junks and sampans have reportedly engaged in infiltration from
North Vietnam to the northern provinces of South Vietnam, whereas
larger craft have reportedly carried supplies to many points along
the southern coast of South Vietnam, roughly south of the 10th
Parallel, with craft waiting offshore until landings could be made
under cover of darkness. In this respect it should be noted that
shallow water extending well offshore is an impediment to sea infil-
tration in the southern delta area of South Vietnam. in some cases
requiring lightering with small craft.
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49. In 1965 an additional method, of sea infiltration has been
noted. This method has consisted of the Viet Cong obtaining South
Vietnamese craft and crews on a temporary basis by either hiring or
coercing owners and, personnel. The .Crews have then taken the craft
to North Vietnam, where supplies were loaded, and. the craft then
returned. to South Vietnam. For example, five Viet Cong were
captured, and ammunition and weapons were recovered from a junk
engaged in this kind, of operation that was scuttled. off Quang Tri
Province in March 1965. The organization responsible for instigating
this type of operation is unknown.
Forms of Sea Transportation Used
50. Many types of ships and small craft have been used in infil-
trating supplies into South Vietnam for the Viet Cong, including
wooden junks and. sampans, small steel-hulled ships, and possibly
oceangoing freighters. Some of the North Vietnamese craft involved
are apparently faster and better armed. than the junks of the South
Vietnamese Junk Fleet. The infiltration ship sunk at Vung No on
16 February 1965, for example, was a 120-fbot, steel-hulled. ship
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with an estimated cargo capacity of 100 tons and a cruising speed
of 8 knots. The motorized craft of the Junk Fleet have a speed of
only 6 to 8 knots.
51. An additional factor which tends to obscure the sea infiltra-
tion situation is the large amount of normal South Vietnamese traffic
operating in the coastal waters off South Vietnam. Because of the
magnitude of this traffic, which consists primarily of fishing and
coastal vessels, it is very difficult to detect North Vietnamese or
Viet Cong craft which might be engaged in infiltrating new supplies
or moving supplies previously landed. Since about 10 percent of the
50,000 commercial craft registered with the South Vietnamese government
are off the coast on any given day, the problems involved, in detecting
any planned infiltration movements are formidable. Although approxi-
mately 500 craft are searched each day, sightings may run as high as
5,000 junks and large sampans per day during good weather. Thus the
potential for infiltration by coastal junks is very large. The pri-
mary problem in detecting infiltration or Viet Cong sea activity
remains identification of craft. Infiltrating junks can cover their
activity by mingling with coastal traffic or remaining well out to
sea and making landfalls with the fishing fleets as they make their
normal daily movements.
Types and Quantities of SuppllLs Moved.
52. The types of military supplies that have entered South
Vietnam by sea have included weapons, ammunition, food, clothing,
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and. medical supplies. It appears that sea infiltration has provided.
an important means of supply to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. How-
ever, the sporadic nature of sea movements, the infrequency of detec-
tion, and, the small number of voyages by anygiven craft in the course
of a year, make it very difficult to establish an order of magnitude
for shipments by sea. It is quite possible also that the pattern of
sea infiltration has changed. during 1965. The absence of any further
incidents involving steel-hulled infiltration ships since the Vung Ro
sinking in February suggests that the Viet Cong may now be using only
smaller craft which are more easily concealed.. Reports of incidents
of sea infiltration involving junks have continued. in 1965. A. small
craft of this type probably could. make one trip a month for 9 months
of the year between North Vietnam and. South Vietnam, and could carry
about 4 or more tons of supplies each trip. (High seas during the
last quarter of the year make it impractical for small craft to be
used for infiltration during that period.) Thus, if only 10 small
craft were directly involved in sea infiltration, a total of 360 tons
could be transported. during the year, or approximately one ton per
day on an annual basis. Normally this amount would be sufficient to
stock or restock several storage areas. Steel-hulled ships or the
larger junks used, for infiltration could, carry 50 to 100 tons per
trip. Even one or two successful deliveries by ships of this type
would. add. substantially to the amount of material infiltrated in any
given year.
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V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES ilEOM CAMBODIA
Supply Routes
53. Some supplies for the Viet Cong have entered South Vietnam
from Cambodia,
Al-
though most of these supplies and materials were either indigenous to
Cambodia, or arrived in Cambodia through normal trade channels, some
supplies have probably moved in clandestine channels. From Cambodia sup-
plies have been moved into South Vietnam by the following routes and
methods: (a) by sampan or junk on the inland waterways; (b) by porters
on the trails that approach or cross the South Vietnamese border; and
(c) by sampan or junk from Cambodian ports to islands in the Gulf of Siam
and to the west coast of South Vietnam. A substantial open but illegal
trade has also been taking place between South Vietnam and Cambodia,
especially in the Mekong delta. The general locations of the major
routes are indicated on the map at Annex. Many points along the border
between Cambodia and South Vietnam have been identified as Viet Cong
border crossings; Tay Ninh and Chau Doc y have been the two provinces
most often cited. The relative importance of each area, route, or
mode cannot be determined from available information. It appears, how-
ever, that the Viet Cong have shifted back and forth from land to water
transport and from one area of entry to another as the need and tactical
situation have changed.
8/ Formerly part of An Giang Province.
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54. Use of inland water transport to cross the border is more
important in the southern and delta area than in the northeastern part
of Cambodia. Four inland water routes -- the Se San, the Srepok, and
its two tributaries -- provide access from Cambodia to Kontum, Pleiku,
and Darlac Provinces in the central area. These waterways can accomo-
date small native craft only, and, although few reports are available
to indicate that the Viet Cong have used these water routes, their
significance is accentuated by the scarcity of roads serving the area.
There are six waterways, including the Mekong, that provide access to
the southern or delta area. For the most part, these southern rivers
could be navigated by craft as large as small oceangoing steamers.
Smaller waterways provide connections to most points in the delta area.
55. Water transport on the Mekong-Bassac River complex was one of
the major means of moving supplies from Cambodia into South Vietnam as
late as 1964. During 1963 a significant quantity of supplies, particu-
larly potassium chlorate, a chemical used in making explosives, was
captured by South Vietnamese patrols on the rivers. One shipment was
seized by a Cambodian river patrol. Since 1963 reported seizures of
supplies on the rivers have practically ceased. This situation may re-
flect the lack of South Vietnamese border control or may mean that the
Viet Cong have developed other water transport routes or are relying
more heavily on land routes. A shift from water to land transport was
revealed in 1964 in a captured document from the Finance and Economic
Section of Chau Thanh District Party Committee of Tay Ninh Province
which stated that its transport units had to use cross-country land
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routes because movements by water were often stopped and searched. The
use of water transport by the Viet Cong undoubtedly has continued, how-
ever, because some areas can be reached only by water transport or by a
combination of land and water transport. A description of a logistic
system on a river route was revealed by a Vietnamese junk crew that was
captured in 1963 on the Mekong River near the border. The chemicals
that they were carrying were smuggled from Phnom Penh by water to a
point within 1 mile of the border. The chemicals were then transferred
to small junks of 2 or 3 tons capacity that were manned by personnel
hired to take the junks downstream at night to about 5 miles below the
border from where other crews took over. The materials were well
camouflaged in sacks under layers of sand, salt, or fruit or in false
bottoms and overheads of the boats.
the
Viet Cong manned the boats themselves when certain materials such as
rifles and ammunition were being transported.
56. Land routes provide access at many points along the Cambodian
border for Viet Cong cadres, supporters, or purchasing agents to obtain
supplies as necessary. Four of the major land routes that enter South
Vietnam through Tay Ninh Province have been used to transport weapons,
ammunition, and other military equipment. Two routes enter the province
from the north, one from the west, and one from the south. The Viet
Cong,
have assembled as many as 300 porters
at one time to carry their supplies across the border. Evidence exists
that before crossing the border the porters have left the roads and
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fanned out onto the complex of trails to portage their loads. In other
cases purchasing aEents have mingled with the local traffic that crosses
the border by vehicle or on foot. Chau Doc Province, located on the
south side of the Mekong, is another area through which supply routes
pass.
Viet Cong crossed the border almost nightly.
the
supplies
were taken to the border and were picked up there by the Viet Cong.
Evidence continues to support the use of this route.
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Organizational Control
58.
the infiltration
of supplies from Cambodia is under the control of the Viet Cong Peoples
Revolutionary Party apparatus in the border area. A component of the
apparatus is the above-mentioned Finance and Economic Section of the
Chau Thanh District Party Committee of Tay Ninh Province. This section
may be only one of many such organizations along the border.
the section was composed of a
section chief with his deputy and five helpers and three units or cells.
One unit consisted of five men who recruited seven Cambodians and four
Vietnamese tradesmen to purchase goods in Cambodia and three other men
who were only in charge of purchases of goods from local markets.
Another unit consisted of a village organized into five water transport
units and twelve land transport units. The third was a motorboat cell.
In May 1964 the section purchased in Cambodia about 15 tons of supplies,
including many types of food, cloth, dry-cell batteries, electric wire,
and medicine. In addition, the list of purchased items included about
90 animals.
Types of Supplies Moved
59;: Most of the supplies procured in or through Cambodia have
generally consisted of materials that can be purchased on the open
market, although arms and ammunition also have been infiltrated from
Cambodia. There is evidence
Viet Cong units
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located in areas adjacent to the Cambodian border north of the Mekong
delta have on occasion in the past purchased substantial quantities of
food in Cambodia. However, Cambodia, is by no means a major source of
food supplies to the Viet Cong who depend primarily on the Vietnamese
countryside and population for their subsistence. There is also
reliable evidence that the Viet Cong clandestine apparatus in Phnom Penh
has regularly purchased drugs and medical supplies in the open market in
Cambodia to be taken into South Vietnam. Also, there are indications
that some radios, batteries, and tubes have been procured in Cambodia.
Although an appreciable amount of Viet Cong medical and other supplies
have been procured in Cambodia, most of these items have apparently
been procured in South Vietnam or have been brought in from North Vietnam.
60. There are reliable reports to the effect that the Viet Cong
apparatus in Phnom Penh has raised some funds for the Viet Cong by
soliciting contributions from Vietnamese minority elements in Cambodia
generally unsympathetic to the government of South Vietnam. However,
these contributions were small in comparison with the large amounts
obtained through the variety of taxes levied on the Vietnamese population
in South Vietnam.
61. The extent to which Cambodia is used either as a transfer area
or as a source of arms and ammunition is difficult to assess
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numerous Viet Cong prisoners who were engaged in supply operations
from Cambodia, indicates that such movements probably are small in
terms of the total amount of such material infiltrated into South
Vietnam.
Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory
62. There is considerable evidenc(
:hat the Viet Cong use Cambodian territory
in some areas along the 600-mile border for sanctuary and bivouac
purposes for varying periods of time. There is also some evidence
that they have established temporary military facilities, such as rest
camps, training areas, hospitals, workshops, and storage depots on
Cambodian soil.
Cambodian Government Collusion
63. There is no question that the Cambodian government has taken
an attitude increasingly favorable to the Communists in the Vietnamese
situation The Cambodian government has expressed its official good-
will diplomatically and politically for the NFLSV, but stated that
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Cambodian neutrality forbids its operational and logistic cooperation.
Sihanouk supports the NFLSV's claim to represent the Vietnamese people,
he has presented medical supplies to North Vietnam, and he has presided
at a ceremony in which medical supplies were presented to a representative
of the NFLSV. He also participated in negotiations concerning the Cam-
bodian/South Vietnamese border with representatives of North Vietnam and
the Front in December 1964, although he was disappointed in these
negotiations as neither the Front nor Hanoi was willing to give him the
border guarantees he desired.
64. There is no hard evidence, however, that the central Cambodian
government has actively provided logistic support to the Viet Cong,
beyond the gift of medical supplies mentioned above. There is no con-
clusive evidence that Communist arms which were brought in openly through
Sihanoukville were intended for other than the Cambodian armed forces,
although it is possible that some may have ultimately gone to the Viet
Cong. It is also possible, however, that the Cambodian Ministry of
Commerce knowingly assisted the Viet Cong by granting licenses to Cam-
bodian firms to import explosives and other materials in excess of
domestic needs for eventual diversion to the Viet Cong. The Cambodian
government did, however, seize a shipment of potassium chlorate moving
down the Mekong in September 1963 and turned the confiscated material
over to the royal palace for the manufacture of fireworks.
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66. There is evidence of cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower
Cambodian government and military levels. In some areas along the
border, the Viet Cong are permitted to take refuge from South Vietna-
mese military forces, at times with the active assistance of Cambodian
armed forces. There have even been some reports of Cambodian and
Viet Cong troops fighting together against South Vietnamese troops, and
Viet Cong prisoners of war in 1964 stated that the Cambodian troops
attempted to cover up their cooperation with the insurgents. Prisoners
have also reported that local Cambodian authorities have made no effort
to interfere with Viet Cong procurement of supplies in Cambodia.
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67. In sum, the Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory is due to
active Cambodian cooperation in some areas, a laissez-faire attitude
in others, and the inability or failure of the Cambodian government
to control or even patrol its frontiers, particularly in isolated
regions. Central government policy, while generally favorable to
the Viet Cong, stops short of military support.
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VI. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES
Organization Control
68. Internal distribution of infiltrated supplies and transportation
of locally procured goods are basic elements of the Viet Cong logistics
network. About 14,000 personnel, exclusive of enforced labor, are used
on a full-time basis. Viet Cong emphasis on the importance of local
self-sufficiency testifies to efforts to reduce the internal logistics
task. On the other hand, the existence of known internal logistics
operations confirms that the requirements for internal distribution and
transportation are substantial.
69. Viet Cong logistics operations are organized at all levels from
COSVN to the village Party chapter. At every major echelon of the Party,
the Viet Cong have a route protection or communications-liaison section
whose mission is to establish, maintain, and supervise safe corridor
routes for the flow of men, materiel, and messages. For security reasons,
the Viet Cong appear to maintain separate routes for these transport tasks
with the organizational subordination of any given task determined by the
nature and importance of the task. The route protection and communications-
liaison section of the Party exercises a crucial role in approving and
safeguarding all types of logistics support operations. An estimated
2,000 or more Party cadre are probably directly associated with the com-
munications-liaison function as guides, security personnel, station atten-
dants, and supervisory personnel. In general, these sections supervise
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the work of the two basic transport organizations -- the Rear Services
transport units and the Finance and Economic transport units.
70. Special and organic transport elements directed by the Rear
Services are found at all military echelons from COSVN to local (regular)
forces. The military elements of COSVN and the Viet Cong military
regions control special military transport units which appear to be
primarily concerned with the receipt and redistribution of infiltrated
supplies. About 5,800 personnel are associated with these special mili-
tary transport units subject to region or Central Office level control,
according to MACV. In addition, every military echelon of the main and
local forces has an organic transport element under its Rear Services
to provide logistic support for its military and non-military require-
ments. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 personnel are associated with these
organic transport units.
71. The second basic element involved in internal distribution and
transport consists of the transport units of the Finance and Economic
Section of the Party. These transport units appear to be generally
responsible for transferring goods acquired locally to depots estab-
lished within their area. In most cases, it is believed that the
organized transport element of the Finance and Economic element is rela-
tively small and is primarily responsible for recruiting local civilian
personnel to accomplish movement of supplies. In some cases, however,
where the movement of civilian-type goods is substantial, nonmilitary
transport units have been permanently established under the Finance and
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Economic Section. About 2,000 personnel are probably permanently associ-
ated with transport elements of the Finance and Economic Section.
Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas
72. Personnel, infiltrators, and supplies acquired from both internal
and external sources are moved over a fairly well-established network of
protected routes within the Viet Cong-controlled areas of South Vietnam.
The network includes an interconnected system of depots and way stations
all the way from Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces in the north to the
Ca Mau peninsula in the south. There are two roughly parallel north-south
corridors, one of which closely follows the western border of the country
and is used mainly for personnel. The other corridor is located nearly
midway between the coast and the western border and extends from the
highland region above the Do Xa base area to War Zone D northeast of
Saigon. It is probably used for both personnel and materiel. These two
corridors have several lateral routes leading east and west to and from
infiltration points along the coast and the Laos and Cambodian borders.
Both internal main corridors connect with COSVN base areas in Tay Ninh
Province north of Saigon. Here COSVN apparently maintains the principal
agency for coordinating operations over the entire system. This has
been identified as the Postal Transportation and Communication Branch.
The Tay Ninh base in turn forms the principal connection with at least
three other corridors including the remainder of the network which forms
a loop within the Mekong delta region. See the map at Annex for location
of the Viet Cong war zones, storage areas, and main redistribution cor-
ridors, and Annex D for organizational chart.
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73. Study of the routes, when plotted in detail on a map, shows
that this logistic network relies heavily on overland movement and that
the principal motorable roads are generally not used. Principal water-
ways are used, however, in the delta region and several land routes
follow streams (probably for guidance at night). It is also noted that
a major portion of the network is located at or near provincial boun-
daries where South Vietnamese surveillance may be least effective.
Comparison of this network with a map of the current status of pacifica-
tion shows that a considerable part of the transport system runs through
unsecured territory which may be controlled by the South Vietnamese in
the daytime but is used by the Viet Cong at night when most of their
supply movements take place.
74. Supply depots which would normally have a nominal capacity of
from 5 to 10 tons of supplies each are sometimes connected with the way
stations and are controlled by the appropriate logistic organization.
Although classes of supplies in these depots are usually mixed, some
contain only weapons and ammunition, and some handle food exclusively.
A typical depot may be described as consisting of a small cluster of
huts or shelters surrounded by a security fence and occasionally an auto-
matic weapons emplacement, all well concealed under foliage. A minimum
of traffic is allowed at the depot, deliveries by transport units being
made at some distance from the depot with final haul and storage made
by the depot cadre. According to Viet Cong documents, supplies are moved
in stages and handled through as many depots as necessary to insure their
security and to build up a reserve for support of an engagement by Viet
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Cong forces. In 1963, when Viet Cong forces in the central highlands
were considerably smaller than at present, food depots were limited to
a maximum of 5 tons because of the threat of South Vietnamese government
action. Although the size of these depots has probably been increased,
the fragmentation of storage areas is a basic constraint on the rapid
initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions.
75. Because the communications-liaison routes often run across
open country or over back roads and the Viet Cong do not possess any
sizeable inventory of motor trucks, much of the shipment of supplies is
handled by teams of porters provided by the local village and district
Viet Cong organizations. Other forms of transport have also been
utilized in significant amounts in the lowlands and in the delta region,
including trains of oxcarts, river and coastal water craft, "hired"
three-wheeler Lambretta-type motorcycle carriers, and occasionally com-
mandeered cargo trucks. Movements by the transport units are secured
by route protection forces usually assigned from local guerrilla units.
These security troops may conduct raids near the routes as a diversion
to screen movements of supplies over more exposed sectors.
76. It has been impossible to estimate the volume of supplies
handled over internal Viet Cong supply routes. One set of pertinent
figures, however, has become available in documentation concerning the
supply corridor from Kien Hoa to Tay Ninh. Possibly referring to per-
formance in 1964, one Viet Cong official had entered in his notes that
this corridor had handled over 200 tons of "strategic" goods and 31 tons
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of "party" goods on shipments from probable coastal delivery points in
Kien Hoa Province to War Zone C over a distance of approximately 120
miles and passing within 30 miles of Saigon.
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ANNEX A
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TYPES OF COMMUNIST-SUPPLIO AND LOCALLY PRODUCED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
CAPTURED FROM THE VIET CONG
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
1. Communist China
a. Weapons:
7.62-mm Pistol, Model 54
7.62-mm Semi-automatic carbine, Model 56 (copy of Soviet SKS)
7.62-mm Carbine, Model 53 (copy of Soviet M)-i-4)
7.62-mm Assault rifle, Model 56 (copy of Soviet AK)
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model 50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model 1(50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun (copy of Soviet PPSh) VC modified
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 53 (copy of Soviet DP)
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPD)
7.62-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 58 (copy of Soviet GORYUNOV)
7.92-mm Light machinegun (copy of BRNO)
7.92-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 24 (copy of Soviet MAXIM)
12.7-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 54 (copy of Soviet DShK)
40-mm Grenade launcher, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPG-2)
57-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 36
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 52 (copy of US M20)
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 56
Flame thrower (tentatively CHICOM)
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60-mm Mortar, Model 31
82-mm Mortar
90-mm AT Rocket launcher, Model 51
b. Ammunition:
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 50
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 53
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 56
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model L
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model API B32
7.92-mm Cartridge
12.7-mm Cartridge
40-mm Grenade, PG-2
60-mm Shell, mortar
82-mm Shell, mortar
75-mm Shell, Recoilless gun
2. USSR
a. Weapons:
7.62-mm Carbine, Model M44
7.62-mm Rifle, Model M1891
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model PPSh 41
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model RP)-i-6
23-mm Cannon
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b. Ammunition:
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P
7.62-mm Cartridge, API, Model B-32
3. Czechoslovakia
a. Weapons:
7.65-mm Pistol, Model M1927, N B46
b. Ammunition (sample of each type exploited):
7.92-mm Cartridge, rifle
7.92-mm Cartridge, Mauser
4. Viet Cong-Produced Materiel
0100040010-9
a. Weapons and Explosive Devices:
Skyhorse (VC-Type Bazooka)
Grenade launcher
AA Machinegun (modified from US.50-caliber MG)
AT Parachute hand grenade
Bicycle mine
Mine delay firing device
Shaped charge (2 types)
Shaped mine, short cone type
Hollow cone mine, non-electric
AP mine, cylindrical type
AP fragmentation grenades (2 types)
AT mine, cast iron fragmentation
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AT mine (constructed from British 100-mm mortar shell)
AT mine, iron case, cylindrical
AT mine, wooden, box type
Mine, turtle shaped, cement
Mine, turtle shaped, sheet metal
Mine, betel box shaped, cement
Mine, round volume type, sheet metal
Mine, round mound type, cement
Mine, 81-mm mortar container
Fixed directional fragmentation mine, Model DH-10
Incendiary grenade, sodium
Chemical firing device
AP mine, match box size
Antenna detonating device
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