INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS - SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100040002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 28, 1965
• Content Type: STUDY

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
USIB-D-24.7/4A
Copy N? 346
INFILTRATION D LOGISTICS-SOUTH VIETNAM
USIB MEMORANDUM
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
;UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
as indicated overleaf
28 October 1965
tRrEnGe plSg~M
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this memorandum: The Central Intelligence
Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State, .Defense, and NSA.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 28 October 1965. Concurring were the Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Director of the National
Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre-
sentative to the USIB and the Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being
outside of their jurisdiction.
GloU- I
e.d.d.d t,e...i...,4
j,..,rsdl.q ..d
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
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NOTICE
When removed from the body of this memorandum,
the CONCLUSIONS may be treated as SECRET only.
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CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I. GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY
FORCES AND THE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL
IN SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Internal Organization . . . . . . , , . , , , . , 5
Internal Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
External Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Critical Items of Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
III. LAND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM NORTH
VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved . . . . . 13
Types of Supplies Moved . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Organizational Control ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Modes of Transportation and Border Crossing Points 18
Infiltration of Personnel . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 19
IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM NORTH VIETNAM . . . . 21
Supply Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Forms of Sea Transportation Used . . . . . 23
Types and Quantities of Supplies Moved . . . . . . . . . 23
V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA . . . . . . . . . 25
Supply Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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Page
Types of Supplies Moved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory . . . . . . . . . 28
Cambodian Government Collusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
VI. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES . . . . . . .
31
Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas . . . . . . . . 32
ANNEXES
ANNEX A. TYPES OF COMMUNIST-SUPPLIED AND LOCALLY PRODUCED
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION CAPTURED FROM THE VIET
CONG, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN . . . . . . . . . . 35
ANNEX B. COMMUNIST TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED BY OBSERVERS ON
SELECTED ROUTES IN SOUTHERN LAOS, DECEMBER 1964 -
JUNE 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
ANNEX C. METHODS OF PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTING SUPPLIES . . 41
ANNEX D. ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNAL VIET CONG LOGISTICS 43
NETWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MAP. SOUTH VIETNAM: COMMUNIST LOGISTIC SUPPORT
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INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS -- SOUTH VIETNAM
The object of this study is to assess the nature and. amount of the
support being provided. to the Communist military forces and. the popula-
tion under Communist control in South Vietnam, including the manner in
which supplies and. personnel are provided both from inside and from out-
side South Vietnam by land. and by water.
A. The largest quantities of manpower and. supplies for the Viet
Cong are obtained within South Vietnam. The Viet Cong have developed.
an effective logistic system which procures from internal sources
almost all the supplies used, by the Viet Cong. Important military
materiel unavailable locally is obtained. from external sources.
B. The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam is responsible
for providing funds for the Viet Cong war effort. Taxation, economic
activities, seizure, and. clandestine operations appear to be the prin-
cipal means of obtaining financial and. material support for the Viet
Cong. Funds acquired internally are supplemented.by those obtained
from Communist countries.
C. Within South Vietnam the Viet Cong transportation system and.
network of supply bases are indispensable to the operations of their
forces at anything approaching the present level of military activity.
The volume of supplies moving internally and. the total stockpile in the
supply bases cannot be d.etermined,from present evidence. Internal dis-
tribution of infiltrated. supplies and transportation of locally procured.
goods require about 1+,000 personnel, exclusive of enforced. labor, on
a full-time basis. Supply depots normally have a nominal capacity of
from 5 to 10 tons of supplies and, while usually containing mixed. classes
of supplies, some contain only weapons and, ammunition, and, some handle
food. exclusively. The fragmentation of storage areas is a basic con-
straint on the rapid. initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions.
D. The Viet Cong are increasingly d.epend.ent on outside sources
for arms and. ammunition, certain technical equipment, medical supplies,
cadre personnel, and, trained. technicians. These move into South Vietnam
via three principal routes, as follows:
?
1. The Laotian corridor, which is continuously being improved.,
is the principal route for the movement of personnel and. supplies from
North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Supplies moved. over this route are
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destined primarily for the northern and central highland areas. The
Communists have developed the logistical troops and organization to
control and operate this route. As of mid-1964, an estimated 1,700
to 2,000 men were maintaining the trahsportation corridor through
Laos and another 3,000 or more were maintaining the route in the
northern part of South Vietnam.
2. The sea route from North Vietnam is probably being
used less at this time, although it played an important part in stock-
ing the supply bases in the southern and coastal parts of the country.
The use of alternative routes for maintaining stocks of military materiel
in these areas has not been detected.
3. Some supplies for the Viet Cong have entered South Vietnam
from Cambodia. Most of the supplies are either indigenous to Cambodia
or arrived through normal trade channels, but some have probably moved
in clandestine channels. Cambodia is also used by the Viet Cong as a
sanctuary and for temporary military facilities. The Viet Cong use of
Cambodian territory is due to active Cambodian cooperation in some
areas, a laissez-faire attitude in others, and the inability or failure
of the Cambodian government to control or even patrol its frontiers.
The Cambodian government has taken an attitude increasingly favorable
to the Communists in the Vietnamese situation, but has stopped short of
military support.
E. From 1959 through September 1965, about 48,000 personnel are
believed to have infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, includ-
ing units of regular PAVN forces. Although it is impossible to compute
the total amount of supplies available for infiltration through Laos
into South Vietnam, it appears that the daily average thus far during
1965 has been at least 5 tons and may have been more than 8 tons. These
amounts, primarily delivered by truck into Laos in the past dry season,
may have been supplemented by additional supplies moved by porters and
other means of transport. The additional amounts cannot be quantified.
We have also been.unable to determine comparable figures for the sea
route from North Vietnam and the land and water routes from Cambodia.
However, what evidence there is leads to the conclusion that the ton-
nages moving over these latter routes are significantly less than the
tonnage moving through Laos.
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1. The rugged terrain of South Vietnam offers an excellent
environment for the infiltration of supplies from adjoining areas
and for clandestine movement within the country. South Vietnam is
composed. of the Mekong Delta, a coastal lowland., and a highland.
region. (See the n p at Annex.) The delta area is interlaced with
about 2,500 miles J of navigable canals, rivers, and streams, and
more than half of the area is flooded each summer and autumn. The
principal streams are 800 to 1,100 feet wide in their upper courses
and 2,500 feet to over 1 mile wide in their lower courses. The land
adjacent to the streams consists of large areas of marsh and, paddy
land.. Mangrove swamps also line the lower reaches of some rivers.
2. The coastal lowland, extending northward. from the delta
plain varies in width from 5 to 30 miles. In some places, spurs of
the highlands encroach on the lowlands and. serve as potential avenues
of ingress to the interior uplands. Where the highlands extend to
the sea, many sheltered landing areas are found between the promon-
tories and the steep rocky islands offshore. Between the coastal
lowlands and. the Mekong Valley lies the highland. region, which extends
from just northeast of the Mekong Delta northward into North Vietnam.
North of about the loth Parallel the highlands consist mainly of steep
mountain ridges with intervening deep, narrow valleys. The southern
part of the highlands, however, is a complex of mountain ranges and
scattered. plateaus. The mountains, some with peaks above 8,000 feet,
and. the deeply incised. parts of the plateaus make surface transporta-
tion difficult.
3. The land. boundaries of South Vietnam extend more than 900
miles, all of which adjoin Communist-controlled. or unfriendly territory.
On the east and. south, for a distance of about 1,500 miles, the country
fronts on the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. The boundary with
Cambodia extends about 600 miles northeastward. from the Gulf of Siam,
about 460 miles of which is in the delta area and. is crossed. by numerous
rivers and streams that can be used. as infiltration routes. The re-
mainder of the boundary with Cambodia crosses forested plains and. the
hilly-to-mountainous western edge of the Annam Mountains. Established,
vehicular roads cross the Cambodian border in the delta area and, in
the forested. plains north of Saigon, but the Viet Cong can also use
trails to cross the border in numerous places. The entire border with
Cambodia is an area of tension because of frequent clashes between the
forces of both countries. The boundary with Laos continues generally
northward for about 300 miles along the crest of the Annam Mountains.
1 Mileages are given in statute miles and. tonnages in short tons through-
out this report.
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Passage across this boundary is generally tortuous; the best trail
crossings and the ones apparently used most by the Viet Cong are in
the northernmost part, where the border is hilly rather than mountainous.
The demarcation line between North and South Vietnam, about 50 miles
long, descends the eastern slope of the Annam Mountains and crosses
hills and a narrow coastal plain to the South China Sea. The Demilitar-
ized Zone extends 5 kilometers (about 3 miles) on each side of the demar-
cation line. An inoperable railroad and a road cross this line, but
normal traffic on these routes has been stopped by military outposts on
both sides of the border.
4. Within South Vietnam the terrain for the most part enables
the Viet Cong to move supplies about quite freely using primitive trans-
port. Most of the population of South Vietnam lives in villages, princi-
pally in the Mekong Delta. The few large towns are mainly in the delta
and along the coast. Settlements in the delta are built along the banks
of rivers and canals. Numerous small inland water craft provide the
major share of transport in this area both for the local populace and
for the Viet Cong. In the highlands, villages are located in scattered
clearings on high ground. A sparse network of mostly one-lane to two-
lane bituminous-treated roads links the large settlements and towns.
The majority of the settlements, however, are connected by tracks or,
at best, by one-lane earth roads or roads that have crushed-stone
surfaces. Many villages are linked only by trails. In such terrain
the Viet Cong can use porters, bicycles, carts, and occasionally
modern vehicles. Poor modern transportation, plus the fact that the
Viet Cong can mingle with the local traffic, makes government inter-
ception of Viet Cong traffic very difficult.
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II. SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES AND
THE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Internal Organization
5. The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam -- the
southern branch of the Communist Party In North Vietnam -- is responsible
for the complex task of providing funds for the Viet Cong war effort
and of providing most of the essential, nonmilitary goods for the Viet
Cong organization. Operating through a vertical series of Party com-
mittees which exist on almost all geographical levels from village to
the Central Office, South Vietnam (COSVN),the Party has attempted to
develop internal sources of funds and supplies for the war effort. A.
wide array of front, Party, and military elements -- under the overall
direction of the Party -- implement the principal tasks of production,
acquisition, and transportation of supplies. The Finance and. Economic
Section of the Party, the Rear Services of the Viet Cong military
organization, and the various units of the National Front for the
Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) are the principal instrumentalities
in these tasks. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party is the
basic economic organization of the Viet Cong and. the source of almost
all supplies provided. internally and some of those provided externally.
At the province level and above, each Finance and Economic Section is
headed by a policy level Party cadre and includes the chief of the
Rear Services of the Viet Cong main force units. It is the responsi-
bility of the various finance and economic units to supervise the
economy of Viet Cong-controlled areas, to acquire the money and goods
required by the Viet Cong, and to implement economic programs designed
to strengthen Viet Cong economic power and disrupt the economy of
South Vietnam.
6. As a principal unit in the internal Viet Cong logistics net-
work, the Finance and Economic Section works closely with the Rear
Services of the Viet Cong military units and with the various NFLSV
organizations. This relationship with the Rear Services provides the
Finance and Economic Section with a channel for supplying military
units with required goods and for calling upon the military for assist-
ance in meeting economic tasks. A similar relationship exists with the
NFLSV organizations. The Finance and Economic Section relies on these
organizations to supply civilian manpower for the economic tasks of the
Party, and,, in turn, attempts to meet the requirements of the civilian
population by supplying the necessary goods.
Internal Sources
7. The Viet Cong appear to be largely self-sufficient in regard.
to almost all nonmilitary supplies. Nonmilitary supplies available to
the Viet Cong in South Vietnam are indigenous or imported through legal
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or illegal trade channels. The Viet Cong have developed a complex
system-of economic operations devoted. to acquiring financial and
material resources in South Vietnam for their military effort. Tax-
ation, self-initiated economic activities, seizure, and clandestine
operations appear to be the principal means of obtaining financial
and, material support for the Viet Cong.
8. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most
important source of financial and material support for the Viet Cong.
The US Military Assistance Command. Vietnam (MACV) has estimated that
the Viet Cong collect 50 to 100 million piasters per province annually,
or abort US $30 million to $60 million per year in all of South Viet-
nam. J There is insufficient evidence to estimate actual tax collec-
tions in cash and in kind, but it is known that the Viet Cong impose
agricultural, plantation, transportation, and business taxes on a
wide scale throughout the country. Although tax payments are prob-
ably the major source of local currency, bond drives, monetary issues,
and clandestine fund drives also represent significant sources of
local currency. It is possible that known Chinese Communist purchases
of piaster banknotes in Hong Kong are turned over to the Viet Cong.
These purchases have been about 30 million to 40 million piasters
($250,000 to $350,000 depending on the prevailing Hong Kong exchange
rate) per month. In September 1965, however, Chinese Communist
purchases totaled. 280 million piasters, or about $2.3 million. It
is also possible that the Chinese Communists have been purchasing
piasters for delivery in Saigon by means of so-called telegraphic
transfers. There is no specific evidence of a Viet Cong shortage
of local currency, and in fact there have been unconfirmed reports
that the Viet Cong are building a fund surplus to meet the costs of
administering additional areas that may come under their control.
9. Agricultural taxation is probably the most important source
of Viet Cong tax receipts. During the past crop year the Viet Cong
employed progressive tax schedules on agricultural income with as
many as 25 separate rates in the Mekong Delta region alone. If these
rates had been applied only to rice production in Viet Cong-controlled
areas of the delta, the collection of rice would have amounted to
nearly 100,000 tons, an amount far in excess of Viet Cong requirements
2 This range is intended to be a rough approximation of internally
acquired Viet Cong resources. In comparison, central government revenues
in 1964 totaled about $175 million, mainly from indirect taxes and cus-
toms duties collected in the Saigon metropolitan area. South Vietnamese
piasters were converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of 73.5
piasters to US $1.
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in the delta or even on a national basis. Because equivalent Viet
Cong tax rates are applied to other agricultural production in the
delta, it is estimated that the Viet Cong collect far in excess of
their nationwide requirements for food in the delta alone. In the
central part of the country agricultural tax collections cannot be
calculated because the tax has not been applied as systematically
or as comprehensively as in the Mekong Delta area. However, there
is little doubt that even in this area the agricultural tax supplies
a significant portion of Viet Cong needs for rice, salt, manioc, fish,
and other foodstuffs. In addition, in this area the Viet Cong often
purchase or confiscate rice and salt.
10. Plantation taxes -- either in money or in kind -- also
account for a significant portion of Viet Cong tax receipts. Rubber
plantations close to War Zones C and D (see map at Annex) provide an
important means of supply for Viet Cong forces in these areas; these
plantations possess large stocks of rice, medicine, POL, and other
supplies and have long been vulnerable to Viet Cong economic pressure.
According to a recent captured document, the annual plantation tax
is approximately 1,000 piasters ($13.70) per hectare (2.47 acres), or
a total of about $1 million for the potentially exploitable area of
75,000 hectares if subject to Viet Cong taxation. Wage taxes on
plantation workers and Viet Cong demands for labor service for trans-
portation are also known to exist on a wide scale. Most of the
internal transportation of the country, both personal and commercial,
is also taxed by the Viet Cong, although it is impossible to estimate
total receipts in cash and kind from this source. Taxes are also
imposed on business establishments and commercial activities whenever
possible. Small rice and. sugar mills are taxed. in areas outside of
the control of the government of South Vietnam; woodcutters, charcoal
kilns, and sawmills are generally easy prey for the Viet Cong. Import
and. export taxes are levied against trade between areas controlled by
the Viet Cong and areas controlled by the central government in order
to provide revenue and to promote a favorable trading pattern for the
Viet Cong. Thus the import of medicines, cloth, POL, and printing
supplies into areas controlled by the Viet Cong is not taxed at all,
but the export of metal from Viet Cong areas is forbidden completely.
11. Despite the considerable financial and material resources
available to the Viet Cong through tax collection and other financial
During January through August, rice deliveries to Saigon from the
delta totaled about 650,000 tons in 1963, 440,000 tons in 1964, and
31+0,000 tons in 1965. It is possible that Viet Cong tax collections
account for most of this so-called shortfall of deliveries to Saigon.
There have been persistent reports that the Viet Cong are smuggling
rice into Cambodia to acquire foreign exchange or otherwise generate
funds for their effort. However, the amount of rice actually disposed.
of through Cambodia is not known.
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operations such as bond. drives, monetary issues, and. the use of credit
cooperatives, additional economic activities have been initiated to
support Viet Cong military personnel and the civilian population under
Viet Cong control. For example, major efforts to produce their own
foodstuffs, especially rice and manioc, have been made by the Viet Cong
in the central highlands. Units to produce clothing have been estab-
lished. as subordinate elements of the Rear Services of the Viet Cong
military organization. Simple manufacturing units, which produce farm
implements for the civilian population, also produce military goods such
as mines and.gren_ad.es. Where materials are not ordinarily available
through other means, they are often seized outright, although it is some-
times difficult to distinguish between seizure through force and enforced
tax collections. However, the Viet Cong do accumulate significant sup-
plies as war booty, including medicines, communications equipment, food-
stuffs, and. military equipment.
12. Clandestine front business operations in areas controlled by
the government of South Vietnam and. involvement of legitimate enter-
prises in Viet Cong procurement operations are considered to be common
in many provinces. These operations procure essential supplies for
the Viet Cong from areas controlled by the central government. Although
these clandestine operations are used for the acquisition of indigenous
goods, they are probably concerned primarily with the acquisition of
manufactured. goods that are imported into South Vietnam through Saigon
and coastal ports. Private firms and. individuals import and. d.istri.bute
key items such as POL, medicines, textiles, printing supplies, batteries,
cement, and. steel products. At the lowest level, the Viet Cong use
the civilian population under their control to make discreet purchases
of these goods. In district and. provincial capitals, it is widely sus-
pected, that the Viet Cong operate clandestine front businesses or use
legitimate enterprises as witting or unwitting agencies for procurement.
For example, a French rubber plantation recently purchased a substantial
quantity of medical supplies in Saigon and allowed a prearranged Viet
Cong raid on the plantation to accomplish transfer of these goods.
13. The external sources of supplies provided to the Viet Cong are
principally Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and.
France. The countries through which most of these supplies pass immedi-
ately before infiltration into South Vietnam are North Vietnam, Laos,
and. Cambodia, although direct shipments to the South. Vietnam coast from
other countries are possible. US-produced munitions and. supplies have
also reached the Viet Cong through capture or purchase in South. Vietnam.
1L+. Military supplies that are moved via North Vietnam usually are
transported. by rail through Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam.
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Until early 1965 the International Control Commission (ICC) observers
were permitted to read. the manifests but were not permitted to inspect
the contents of the freight cars that moved into North Vietnam from
China through Dong Dang. After the bombing-of North Vietnam began and,
the ICC observers were pulled back to Hanoi in early 1965, a foreign
observer reported that two military trains per day obviously loaded.
with many kinds of war materiel moved into North Vietnam. Although
this materiel undoubtedly was destined for the forces of the Peoples
Army of Vietnam (PAVN), supplies for the Viet Cong apparently are taken
from PAVN storage areas. Reports are also available indicating that
military supplies have been moved from China by junk or small coastal
ships to various points along the North Vietnamese coast. Although it
is possible that munitions are moved into Haiphong by merchant ship,
no such shipments have been identified. Information on the cargo
carried by the 425 foreign merchant ships that called at Haiphong
during 1964 is not complete. However, about 175 of the ships were
owned by Bloc countries, and. a considerable number of the Free World.
ships calling there were chartered to Bloc countries. Foreign seamen
have reported that some merchant ships have unloaded cargo into junks
and. other small craft before entering the port of Haiphong. Such cargo
could. have been destined for sea infiltration into South Vietnam, much
of which seems to originate in the Haiphong area.
15. For the most part, supplies for the Viet Cong that move from
Cambodia arrive in Cambodia through normal commercial channels, princi-
pally aboard Free World ships. Very few ships from Communist countries
call at Cambodian ports. The total tonnage is relatively small and the
bulk of it consists of commercial supplies. No more than 10,000 tons
of cargo were delivered by Bloc ships to Sihanoukville from the USSR
and Eastern Europe in the first half of 1965. During the same period a
single Chinese Communist ship made three calls. One of these deliveries
included commercial goods only, another commercial goods and material
for a small ordnance plant which China had promised to build for Cambodia,
and the third a significant amount of military equipment -- in partial
fulfillment of China's promise to equip about 27,000 Cambodian troops.
Since 1963 there have been 10 reported Communist military deliveries to
Cambodia. The items delivered have ranged from spare parts and ammuni-
tion to MIG aircraft, but there appears to have been no effort by Cam-
bodia, Communist China, or the USSR to conceal these deliveries, and
Prince Sihanouk has announced some details of the types of weapons
supplied. Although it is impossible to trace the disposition of each
rifle or machinegun delivered to Cambodia, this equipment is used to
rearm Cambodian units, and the units are required to account accurately
for the weapons and ammunition involved. It seems unlikely that any
significant amount of this equipment or ammunition has been supplied
to the Viet Cong, although some of the replaced equipment may have been
turned over to them.
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Critical Items of Supply
16. As mentioned. above, the Viet Cong depend on the countryside
and on the rural population for most of their food. Viet Cong taxation
policy permits payments in rice, manioc, fish, salt, and other food
items. Where food is not plentiful, particularly in the mountainous
areas, Viet Cong food production units engage directly in farming.
According to recently captured documents, prior to June 1963 the Viet
Cong military units and administrative agencies were directed by
COSVN to provide their own subsistence for a period of 4 months per
year, with the remaining 8 months of subsistence furnished by COSVN.
From June 1963 to June 1964, all units were required to furnish 100
percent of their own subsistence. Since June 1964, combat units have
provided 50 percent of their own food and all other units 100 percent.
Some reports have indicated that PAVN battalions operating in the
northern part of South Vietnam receive some of their rice supplies
from external sources.
17. The Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile
products, such as hammocks and mosquito nets, are not extensive.
Because of the mild climate, clothing is not a major problem. A.
number of items of clothing used by the Viet Cong, such as khaki
uniforms, underwear,, winter clothing for the mountain regions, and
hammocks, are produced in North Vietnam. For the most part, these
items have been issued to infiltrators who generally carry an ind.i?-
vidual supply of two uniforms, a knapsack, a hammock, and a mosquito
net when entering the country. Clothing production units also exist
as elements of the Rear Services of the Viet Cong military organization.
in addition the Viet Cong obtain cloth internally by discreet purchase
and externally from Cambodian sources.
18. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably effective for the
present level of fighting. Aid stations, hospitals, and rest centers
are located. within South Vietnam and prGbably have been located tempo-
rarily in Cambodia and Laos from time to time. Approximately 48 of
these medical facilities have been identified, some-of which are re-
ported. to be well-staffed. and supplied. even with such sophisticated
equipment as x-ray machines, laboratory facilities, and dental chairs.
One major source of medical supplies is the open market in South Viet-
nam. With the exception of opiates and barbiturates, most drugs can
be purchased without difficulty in pharmacies in the larger cities.
Another major source consists of captured South Vietnamese medical
supplies. Some Viet Cong military operations have been specifically
directed. toward obtaining these supplies from hamlets and. supply con-
voys. Finally, medical supplies are procured from various Communist
and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam.
19. North Vietnam in particular appears to be engaged in build-
ing up its supplies of pharmaceuticals. North Vietnamese imports of
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penicillin and. blood plasma -- which are widely used in treating
battle casualties -- have risen sharply in 1965. Although Communist
countries have been the predominant suppliers of most pharmaceuticals,
Japan has provided. virtually all the blood plasma imported. by North
Vietnam. The actual quantity of pharmaceuticals being shipped. from
North Vietnam to the Viet Cong is not known. In addition to equipping
the PAVN forces now fighting in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese
reportedly have used. infiltrators to carry small packets of medical
supplies containing such items as penicillin, sulfa drugs, and. quinine
derivatives to the Viet Cong. Because of the relative ease of trans-
porting pharmaceuticals, it would be possible for North Vietnam to de-
liver substantial quantities of medical supplies by small coastal
vessels and. over the land infiltration routes. Once in South Vietnam
these supplies presumably would. be stored. in central areas near base
hospitals.
20. Viet Cong requirements for POL products probably are quite
small. They have some organic vehicles and self-propelled. craft, how-
ever, and also power generators and. other power-driven equipment for
which they need. fuel. Taxation of the contents of petroleum tank trucks,
outright seizure of petroleum supplies, and discreet purchase from local
gasoline stations throughout the country are known methods of acquisi-
tion from internal sources.
21. The requirements of the Viet Cong for construction materials
are unknown. Simple construction in base areas probably can be accom-
plished. by the use of locally available materials, mainly timber.
Although the Viet Cong have been known to seize convoys carrying sup-
plies of cement, their access to other internal and external sources of
construction materials is not known.
22. The Viet Cong supply of weapons, explosives, and. ammunition
has been accumulated from various sources: supplies buried. or left
behind. by retreating government forces in South Vietnam; supplies in-
filtrated. by land. and. sea; captured supplies; and. locally produced.
supplies. The available quantities are unknown, but it is evident that
substantial quantities of Soviet and Eastern European weapons and.
Chinese Communist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into
South Vietnam for use by the Viet Cong. This flow of weapons from
outside South Vietnam has enabled. the Viet Cong to achieve some progress
in weapons standardization within main force units. Older weapons are
being passed. on to guerrilla units. The present emphasis in local
manufacture seems to be on the reloading of ammunition and. the fabrica-
tion of mines, grenades, and other explosive devices, rather than on
the production of rifles and. more complicated. weapons. Some repair
work is also carried on. The majority of the Viet Cong production
facilities are located, from Viet Cong Military Region VI south to Ca Mau.
Annex A. contains a list, by country of origin, of the types of Communist-
supplied, and. locally produced. weapons and. ammunition captured by central
government and. US forces from the Viet Cong.
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23. Most of the telecommunications equipment used by the Viet
Cong consists of US-manufactured tactical radio sets captured from the
South Vietnamese. The importance of this source of supply has been
noted in Viet Cong communications plans and in the North Vietnamese
program of training Viet Cong operators in the use of US equipment.
The types of radio equipment captured range from handheld, low-power
transceivers to relatively large, vehicle-mounted transmitters having
power ratings of from 300 to 400 watts. This captured equipment has
been augmented to a small extent by comparable equipment of Soviet,
Chinese Communist, and Japanese manufacture, and by locally manufactured
equipment. Spare parts and batteries are obtained by capture, infil-
tration, and purchase.
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III. LAND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM
Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies.Moved
24. There is a scarcity of information on the overland movement
of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies from North Vietnam
to the northern provinces of South Vietnam. It is apparent, however,
that a major corridor from North Vietnam through Laos serves as a
principal means of transporting supplies. Within this corridor, there
are at least two distinct land routes. Both of these routes end in
the same series of seasonal roads and trails leading to forward supply
points. From these points in Laos, supplies are moved across the South
Vietnamese border by means of porters, bicycles, ox carts, and pack
animals.
25. The route from Mu Gia Pass via routes 12/23/9/92 is the higher
capacity route. This road network is in part useable only in the dry
season for through motor transport, but it can be used during the
remainder of the year by a combination of methods. Its maximum use is
from about mid-December through May or June to supply the Communist
forces in the southern part of Laos and the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.
Supplies from North Vietnam are trucked in stages along routes lA and
15 through Mu Gia Pass into Laos and then south on routes 12 and 23 to
supply dumps located along routes 23 and 9. J Some supplies moving
along this route eventually reach Ban Dong at the junction of routes 9
and 92 and then move down route 92 toward the South Vietnamese border.
Although route 23 is a very important portion of this supply line, it
is a seasonal road on which truck traffic is restricted from about June
through November each year because of flooding and ground softening
caused by the southwest monsoons. The Communists have nearly finished
constructing route 911 as an alternate to parts of routes 23 and 9.
When completed this road will reduce the distance from Mu Gia Pass to
Sepone (Tchepone) by about one-third.
26. Before the completion of route 23 in 1962, some supplies for
the Communist forces in southern Laos were moved by air. During
January-June 1963, however, many large truck convoys were observed
moving south on route 23. Although some of these trucks probably
carried troops and supplies for the southern part of Laos, the remainder
of the supplies may have been stockpiled or portered over the trails
into the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Again in 1964 large con-
voys moved during the dry season only. Observation by road-watch teams
was so incomplete in both years that it is impossible to estimate with
Reports from road-watch teams located near the southern end of
route 23 close to route 9 have indicated that many convoys do not move
all the way from route 23 to route 9 and that there is a lower level
of traffic in this area than along the northern part of route 23.
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confidence the volume of supplies moved into the area, or to establish
the amount of materiel which may have been stockpiled or moved on into
South Vietnam. As a result of considerably improved reporting by the
road-watch teams during the 1965 dry season, however, it is possible to
estimate that the level of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17
trucks per day. (See Annex B.) Based on observations of the contents
of about 10 percent of the trucks moving south, it is believed that
they carried at least two tons each. It is also believed that the road
was truckable for through traffic for a total of about 180 days during
the dry season. This volume of traffic from December 1964 to June 1965
is calculated to have moved at least 35 tons of military supplies each
day into the area of Laos served by route 23. Groups of porters were
also observed occasionally moving south on this route. The traffic
moving other than by truck throughout the year, however, is small in
proportion to the truck traffic and intermittent. Its volume cannot
be estimated. Nevertheless, such supplies supplement the volume moved
by trucks and replace consumption to some extent.
27. It is estimated that the approximately 8,000 Communist troops
stationed in the area of Laos south of route 12 during the 1965 dry
season probably required an average of about 15 tons per day of logistic
support from outside sources. Since the end of the dry season addi-
tional numbers of troops have been observed moving south into this area
of Laos. The daily requirement for the original 8,000 troops declined
during the wet season because of a lower level of activity, but this
decline was probably partially offset by the requirements of the new
troops moving into the area. During the 1965 dry season, truck traffic
on route 23 delivered about 20 tons per day in excess of troop require-
ments. The largest amount needed by these forces during the wet season
would be an amount equal to the requirement for the dry season,or 15
tons. If this is the case, only 5 tons per day of the total brought in
by truck during the dry season would have been available for infiltra-
tion into South Vietnam, an average of about 3 tons per day throughout
the year. _5/ On the other hand, if the supply requirement for the
forces in Laos was reduced by one-half during the wet season, then
about 12 tons would have been available for infiltration into South
Vietnam, or an average of 6 tons throughout the year.
28. The lower capacity supply route from North Vietnam begins
with a truck route south from Vinh to the area of the Demilitarized
Zone. From this point the route consists of a network of trails,
including a recently developed through route trafficable by light
vehicles, that extend around the end of the Demilitarized Zone and
cross route 9 near Ban Dong. This route provides a shorter, more
secure access to the forward supply dumps in Laos. This route is
5 The Communists do not move supplies forward every day of the year,
but, in order to convey an idea of the average amount available, the
total tonnage has been spread throughout the year and expressed on a
daily basis.
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probably used for infiltration of some critical items of military supply
and for infiltration of personnel. There have been reports of the move-
ment of supplies south toward Ban Dong over this trail system by porters,
bicycles, and carts. Although there have not been enough of these
reports to estimate with confidence the amount of supplies moving by
these means, analysis of available data indicates that at least 2 tons
per day are actually being delivered over the trails.
29. Route 92 south of route 9 is the beginning of a supply network
that supports Communist activities in the southeastern area of the
Laotian Panhandle and across the border into South Vietnam. This route
acts as a funnel for supplies delivered both over route 23 and over the
system west of the Demilitarized Zone. Route 92 extends south from Ban
Dong for a distance of about 80 miles and ends at the Se Kong River,
about 20 miles east of Saravane. Although the northern section possibly
has a low all-season capability, the southern part is truckable only in
the dry season. Route 92 south of Ban Dong has been developed by the
Communists into a north-south main supply route from which at least
three partially truckable feeder routes (routes 921, 922, and 923) lead
to border-crossing points and forward supply depots. At least one of
these routes (922) is an important supply route to South Vietnam.
Analysis of aerial photography of 22 August 1965 indicated. that vehicular
activity has occurred on route 922 from its junction with route 92 to a
point about 15 miles east where route 922 divides into two segments.
Each of these 1-to-2 mile segments also showed evidence of recent ve-
hicular activity. Thus it appears that supplies can be transported by
truck over these routes to a point within about 5 miles of the border
of South Vietnam. In the dry season, these routes would provide for
through traffic from North Vietnam.
30. From the southern end of route 92 some supplies are moved
south in native craft on the Se Kong River to route 165, which is a
seasonably truckable route extending east toward the South Vietnamese
border through a possible maneuver and training area. An improved
trail also generally parallels the Se Kong River and connects the
southern terminus of route .92 with the recently improved route 165 also
leading to the South Vietnamese border. Photographic analysis showed
that the section paralleling the Se Kong was being upgraded into a road
at the end of the 1965 dry season. It is likely that the entire route
paralleling the river will be upgraded after the present wet season.
When this work is completed the Communists will have a second fair-
weather truckable route from route 92 to the South Vietnamese border.
31. The total quantity of supplies moved south on route 92 during
the 1965 dry season cannot be estimated,because traffic on the road has
been observed only near its southern end. Analysis of photography
indicates that some trucks leave route 92 north of the observers and
move supplies on the feeder routes toward the South Vietnamese border.
During the period February-June 1965, trained observers located about
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70 miles south of Ban Dong reported that the level of truck traffic
moving near the southern end of route 92 averaged about 1-1/2 trucks
moving south per day, (See Annex B.) If it is estimated that these
trucks carried about 2 tons each, a total of about 375 tons could have
been moved south through the terminus of route 92 during the dry season.
On an annual basis this quantity amounts to a daily average of slightly
more than 1 ton that could have been moved forward from the end of route
92 toward the border of South Vietnam. Additional tonnage was moved
over the upper access routes (routes 921, 922, and 923).
32. Intelligence indicates that porters are used to carry the
bulk of the supplies from the forward depots in Laos across the border
into South Vietnam. Although it is impossible to estimate the quantity
of supplies actually crossing the border on a daily basis, about 5 tons
per day could be moved over the difficult terrain in the area if 2,000
porters were engaged in cross-border delivery on a continuous basis.
Some reports have indicated that up to 6,000 porters are intermittently
engaged in cross-border delivery. If 6,000 persons were actually being
used on a continuous basis, then approximately 15 tons per day could be
moved across the border. Additional amounts could also be moved by
such means of transport as bicycles, carts, and pack animals which are
known to have been used by the Viet Cong.
33. It appears that the area adjacent to the route 92 main supply
route is a Viet Cong/PAVN advanced communications zone containing an
interconnecting land and water transportation system, troop facilities,
maneuver and training areas, and logistic installations. During the
past dry season (December 1964 - June 1965) the higher capacity route
from North Vietnam through Mu Gia Pass could have delivered 5 to 12 tons
per day, or 3 to 6 tons per day on an annual basis, to this area for use
in infiltration to South Vietnam depending on the amount of consumption
within Laos as noted above. (See paragraph 27.) The lower capacity
route around the Demilitarized Zone delivers at least 2 tons per day on
an annual basis. Therefore, although it is impossible to estimate with
precision the total amount of supplies available for infiltration
through Laos into South Vietnam, it appears that during the past dry
season, the minimum would have been about 7 tons and the maximum about
14 tons. The daily average throughout the year would be at least 5 and
could be more than 8 tons. These amounts may be supplemented by the
supplies moved by porters and other means of transport and by local
procurement, but this amount cannot be quantified. The actual amounts
infiltrated into South Vietnam could also be reduced to the extent that
some food may be required from sources outside of Laos to support the
infiltration of personnel, way station personnel, and porters on the
Laotian side of the border.
Types of Supplies Moved
34. The trucks that moved south on route 23 during the 1965 dry
season carried such items as ammunition for small arms, mortars, and
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recoilless rifles; explosives; gasoline; clothing; and foodstuffs such
as rice, salt, flour, dried meat, and dried fish. The northbound trucks
reportedly carried lumber, bamboo, and salvage items such as empty
gasoline drums and tires. The contents of about half of the trucks
moving near the southern end of route 92 were not observed, but almost
30 percent reportedly carried boxes, 15 percent a combination of arms,
ammunition, and food, and the remainder sacks with unidentified cargo.
About a third of the trucks moving north reportedly were empty. Many
of the porters coming over the trails from near the western end of the
Demilitarized Zone to route 92 or directly to points along the border
of South Vietnam are reported to have carried weapons, ammunition, equip-
ment, medical supplies, and foodstuffs.
Organizational Control
35. The infiltration routes through Laos and into,the three
northernmost provinces of South Vietnam apparently are under North
Vietnamese control. However, Viet Cong Military Region V Headquarters
in South Vietnam appears to share in the control of infiltration routes
in the northern provinces and is probably the major controlling authority
throughout the rest of Military Region V. Several interrogation reports
indicate that as of mid-196+ the 70th Transportation Group controlled the
porters and infiltrators on the trails through Laos. The 70th Trans-
portation Group is under direct control of the.PAVN High Command in
Hanoi.. This group maintains about 17 communications-liaison stations in
Laos, with the first station located near the end of the Demilitarized
Zone. A company of about 100 able-bodied men is located at each station
to carry out transportation, security, communications, liaison, and
guidance of infiltrators and locally conscripted porters. J It is not
known whether the supplies transported by truck down route 23 are also
the responsibility of the 70th Transportation Group. It is possible
that such supplies are turned over to the 70th Transportation Group at
the end of the truck route. The 71st Transportation Group was reported
to control a short segment of the route between A Rum, a village located
near the end of route.922, and some point within Quang Nam Province, It
was said to have at least 12 stations, with approximately one company at
each station. At the border of South Vietnam near the boundary between
Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces the supplies and infiltrators become
the responsibility of both the 71st and 72nd Transportation Groups which
maintain the communications-liaison route through Quang Nam to southern
Quang Tin Province. The 72nd Transportation Group is reported to have
ET_fh__e apparent inconsistency between the reports of 100 men. at each
station and the reports of villagers having observed groups of up to
300 porters on the trails can be explained by the possibility that
porters are recruited locally or are moved from one station to another
whenever needed for unusually large movements.
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had about 24 stations maintained by a total of 1,700 men. V Thus, as
of mid-1964, about 1,700 to 2,000 men possibly were maintaining the trans-
portation corridor through Laos and another 3,000 or more were maintain-
ing the routes in the northern part of South Vietnam, exclusive of road
porters.
Modes of Transportation and Border Crossing Points
36. Trucks, porters, and native craft on the inland rivers are
all used to some extent, depending on the season and location, to bring
supplies to the South Vietnamese border. The staged movement by truck
from North Vietnam into Laos has been described above. Along the trails
the way stations are said to be located about one-half day's march apart.
The short distances, anywhere from 4 to 12 miles, depending on terrain
and the tactical situation, allow the porters to haul supplies to the
next station and return to their home base within one working day. The
extent to which this porter system is functioning at present and the
methods and number of men being used are not known. An infiltrator
captured in June 1965 reported that portions of the trails were being
upgraded into roads and that he had seen trucks being used on portions
of the route. Apparently he had observed route 922. Other infiltrators
who crossed the border in early 1965 observed pack bicycles more often
than porters. The use of bicycles would considerably reduce the number
of porters needed. The porters carry loads of 40 to 60 pounds in back
packs or on shoulder poles, whereas single or dual bicycles can carry
loads of up to 500 pounds. (Annex C lists several additional methods
used for packaging and transporting supplies.)
37. Only one waterway in Laos, the Se Kong River mentioned above,
is known to be used to any extent as part of an infiltration route,
although the alignment of other waterways, the Se Bang Hieng, Se Pone,
and the Song Ben Hai, makes them suspect infiltration routes. Aerial
photography of the Se Kong between the southern end of route 92 and the
point where route 165 leaves the river reveals waterway improvements,
native craft on the river, and portages of difficult sections. This
waterway is navigable by canoes throughout the year, but its use during
the dry season probably will be reduced when the road being built
parallel to it is completed, possibly by the end of 1965. The Song Ben
Hai/Rao Thanh waterway in the Demilitarized Zone forms the border be-
tween North and South Vietnam. Although infiltration across this river
by teams of three to four men swimming or using small craft has been
reported, infiltration of supplies across the river has not been observed.
Use by canoes of this waterway throughout the year for lateral movement
7 Current Order of Battle estimates show two Viet Cong units desig-
nated as the Binh Son and Nam Son Transportation Groups operating in
the northern three provinces. It is possible that these newly reported
units represent a reorganization of the previously reported 71st and
72nd Transportation Groups.
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within the Demilitarized Zone to interior tracks, trails, and tributary
streams providing access to South Vietnam is possible, however.
38. Apparently the major border crossing points (see the map at
Annex) consist of the trail networks east and southeast of routes 921,
922, 923, and 165. However, the entire Laotian border adjoining the
South Vietnamese provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and
Kontum is interlaced with trails, many of which probably are being used.
Pinpointing specific border crossing points is impossible due to lack of
information. Thick forest coverage of the roads and trails makes aerial
reconnaissance of these routes difficult. Captured personnel, even the
communications-liaison personnel who worked on the routes, lack know-
ledge of the routes used because of the strict security system applied
to the infiltration process.
39. In summary, the Communists have developed major supply routes
in Laos, have provided the logistical troops and organization to control
and operate the routes, and are using them as the primary means of infil-
trating supplies to the Viet Cong/PAVN forces in South Vietnam as well
as to supply Pathet Lao/PAVN forces in Laos. During the past year the
Communists have continued to construct new routes and improve old ones,
which will have the effect of substantially increasing the capacity of
the Laotian corridor. (See the map at Annex.) The amount of effort
that the Communists have put into this road network is an indication of
the increasing importance which they attach to this area as a line of
communication to South Vietnam.
Infiltration of Personnel
4+0. Recent information obtained from interrogation of prisoners
of war and from a summary of information accumulated since 1959, pre-
pared by MACV, indicates that large numbers of personnel have infil-
trated overland from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam.
The full scope of the personnel infiltration program, however, cannot
be assessed on the basis of the documentary evidence now available. In
1955, following the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the Communists left
behind several thousand well-trained military and political cadres when
they retreated to the north. This apparatus continued to carry out low-
level covert and overt political activities and to conduct occasional
terrorist and harassing armed actions. This effort was stepped up in
1957. In 1959, elements of the 70th Transportation Group of the PAVN
were sent into an area in southern Laos contiguous to the border of
.South Vietnam to establish relay stations connecting the southern part
of North Vietnam with the northern area of South Vietnam. Infiltration
routes developed over the years from North Vietnam through Laos have
become the primary avenues used for the movement of personnel into South
Vietnam. It is believed that the 70th Transportation Group remains in
control of the infiltration of both men and material from North Vietnam
through Laos into South Vietnam.
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41. From 1959 through 20 September 1965, about 48,000 men are
believed to have infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam as
follows:
Category
1959-60
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Totals
,
1-2 J
4,556 1
4,118
5,362
4,726
6,301
3,375
28,438
3 cJ
26
516
5,842 J
1,227
1,752
1,595
10,958
4 J
0
1,661
1,653
1,935
2,340
737
8,326
Totals
4,582
6,295
12,857
7,888
10,393
5,707
47,722
J Figures for Category 1 were based on information obtained from
two or more sources. Figures for Category 2 were based on statements
of captives, which for the most part were confirmed by other sources.
b Possibly 2,756 infiltrators have been counted twice.
J Figures for Category 3 were derived from statements of captives
interrogated by the Military Intelligence Center or the National
Interrogation Center. Their statements, although probably true, have
not been confirmed by other sources.
Possibly 4,000 infiltrators have been counted twice.
el Figures for Category 4 were derived from statements obtained from
other captives.
The infiltrators consisted of military, political, security, economic,
financial, and education specialists. It is significant that, prior to
1964, essentially all the infiltrators were South Vietnamese who had
been relocated in North Vietnam after 1954. Since 1964, about half the
infiltrators are believed to have been native North Vietnamese the bulk
of which remained in the northern provinces. The fact that the major
elements of a PAVN division are now considered to be south of the 17th
Parallel underscores the change in the character of the infiltration
program. While moving on the trails through Laos, the infiltrators
carried some supplies to South Vietnam. These supplies included medi-
cines, radios, and various types of weapons, such as pistols, grenades,
carbines, rifles, machineguns, and recoilless rifles. Sometimes this
equipment was not retained by the infiltration group that carried it
into South Vietnam. The infiltration trip usually required between 45
days and 4 months. However, the Viet Cong rely primarily on local
recruitment to maintain their regular and guerrilla force strength.
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IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM NORTH VIETNAM
Supply Routes
42. The Communists have used seaborne infiltration to transport
some men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. The
number of personnel infiltrated by sea has been small and the primary
emphasis has been on the infiltration of supplies. These supplies are
believed to have been used principally to build stockpiles in the
coastal areas of South Vietnam for further distribution to the Viet Cong.
43. Seaborne infiltration operations have originated in two general
areas in North Vietnam -- in the north, near Haiphong, and in the south,
along the coast between Ben Thuy and the 17th Parallel. Numerous
embarkation points and logistic supply bases have been reported. The
routes used by infiltration craft have varied according to the type
of mission, the type of craft, and the season of the year. Infiltra-
tion by sea from North Vietnam reportedly has taken place in past years
primarily from December through August because of the rough seas usually
encountered during the rest of the year. One source, who participated
in several infiltration missions, mentioned two routes, a "near-shore"
route, paralleling the coast at about 3 miles offshore, and a "distant-
shore" route, ranging from 50 to 100 miles from the coast. The distant-
shore route has probably been used in past years by the larger-capacity
craft. Some of the smaller craft involved in infiltration from North
Vietnam reportedly have left the northern areas and stopped at ports
in the southern area of the country before continuing their trip into
South Vietnam. Other craft have transited the Hainan Straits on their
way to the south. Some unconfirmed reports state that seaborne infil-
tration also has been conducted from foreign ships which have stopped
off the coast of South Vietnam while cargo was unloaded into lighters
that transferred it to shore.
44. Seaborne infiltration of supplies and personnel into South
Vietnam has taken place at least since 1957. A boat captain, who was
captured in 1963 with members of his crew, reported that since 1957
he had worked for an organization that had been engaged in seaborne
infiltration into South Vietnam. A Viet Cong medical officer captured
in 1965 stated that he infiltrated by sea in October 1964. He boarded
a 70-foot steel-hulled ship at Haiphong, passed through Hainan Straits,
sailed near Poulo Condore, Poulo Obi, and then into a stream on the Ca Mau
Peninsula. This source indicated that the organization that infiltrated
him had made about 20 deliveries to South Vietnam between 1961 and
October 1964. In late 1964, an unidentified junk was sighted aground
and burning off Kien Hoa Province. Intelligence reports indicated
later that this craft was a Viet Cong supply junk that had run aground
and been blown up by the Viet Cong to keep it from being captured.
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45. Movement of substantial quantities of arms to South Vietnam
by larger craft has also been confirmed. In February 1965, a 120-foot
steel-hulled ship was discovered and sunk in Vung Ro Bay and a nearby
arms cache of about 1,500 weapons and from 40 to 60 tons of supplies
and ammunition was seized. This materiel was probably carried there
by ship from North Vietnam. Another large cache was discovered in
April 1965 during a search and destroy operation on the Coast of Kien
Hoa Province.
46. While there is little hard evidence to support many of the
reports received, boats or ships have been reported during past years
to have unloaded in most of the 21 coastal provinces of South Vietnam
(see the map at Annex). Most of the landings are reported to have
taken place in the four northern coastal provinces of South Vietnam --
Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin -- and in the southern
part of the country from Binh Tuy Province around the Cape of Ca Mau
to the Cambodian border, including the offshore island of Phu Quoc,
Small junks and sampans have reportedly engaged in infiltration from
North Vietnam to the northern provinces of South Vietnam, whereas
larger craft have reportedly carried supplies to many points along
the southern coast of South Vietnam, roughly south of the 10th
Parallel, with craft waiting offshore until landings could be made
under cover of darkness. In this respect it should be noted that
shallow water extending well offshore is an impediment to sea infil-
tration in the southern delta area of South Vietnam, in some cases
requiring lightering with small craft.
Organizational Control
47. At least seven North Vietnamese organizations reportedly
have been associated with seaborne infiltration of Viet Cong personnel
and supplies into South Vietnam. These are (1) the Ong-Xa Group,
reportedly a military organization in existence between 1959 and
1960; (2) the 603rd Special Battalion of the PAVN, reportedly a
special maritime infiltration unit stationed south of Gianh River;
(3) the Unification Agency, reportedly in existence from 1956 to at
least 1964; (4) the Central Research Directorate, the chief intel-
ligence authority reportedly involved in the direction and movement
of espionage and intelligence personnel to South Vietnam; (5) Group
125, probably subordinate to the North Vietnamese Naval High Command;
(6) the 103rd Transport Battalion; and (7) the Lao Dong Party/People's
Revolutionary Party. The complete absence of reports since 1963
on the first two organizations makes it probable that they have been
disbanded, reorganized, or merged with other infiltration organizations.
48. In 1965 an additional method of sea infiltration has been
noted. This method has consisted of the Viet Cong obtaining South
Vietnamese craft and crews on a temporary basis by either hiring or
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coercing owners and personnel. The crews have then taken the craft
to North Vietnam, where supplies were loaded, and the craft then
returned to South Vietnam. For example, five Viet Cong were captured
and ammunition and weapons were recovered from a junk engaged in this
kind of operation that was scuttled off Quang Tri Province in March 1965.
The organization responsible for instigating this type of operation
is unknown.
Forms of Sea Transportation Used
49. Many types of ships and small craft have been used in infil-
trating supplies into South Vietnam for the Viet Cong, including
wooden junks and sampans, small steel-hulled ships, and possibly
oceangoing freighters. Some of the North Vietnamese craft involved
are apparently faster.and better armed than the junks of the South
Vietnamese Junk Fleet. The infiltration ship sunk at Vung Ro on
16 February 1965, for example, was a 120-foot, steel-hulled ship
with an estimated cargo capacity of 100 tons and a cruising speed
of 8 knots. The motorized craft of the Junk Fleet have a speed of
only 6 to 8 knots.
50. An additional factor which tends to obscure the sea infiltra-
tion situation is the.large amount of normal South Vietnamese traffic
operating in the coastal waters off South Vietnam. Because of the
magnitude of this traffic, which consists primarily of fishing and
coastal vessels, it is very difficult to detect North Vietnamese or
Viet Cong craft which might be engaged in infiltrating new supplies
or moving supplies previously landed. Since about 10 percent of the
50,000 commercial craft registered with the South Vietnamese government
are off the coast on any given day, the problems involved in detecting
any planned infiltration movements are formidable. Although approxi-
mately 500 craft are searched each day, sightings may run as high as
5,000 junks and large sampans per day during good weather. Thus the
potential for infiltration by coastal junks is very large. The pri-
mary problem in detecting infiltration or Viet Cong sea activity
remains identification of craft. Infiltrating junks can cover their
activity by mingling with coastal traffic or remaining well out to
sea and making landfalls with the fishing fleets as they make their
normal daily movements.
Types and Quantities of Supplies Moved
51. The types of military supplies that have entered South Vietnam
by sea have included weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, and medical
supplies. It appears that sea infiltration has provided an important
means of supply to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. However, the
sporadic nature of sea movements, the infrequency of detection, and
the small number of voyages by any given craft in the course of a
year make it very difficult to establish an order of magnitude for
shipments by sea. It is quite possible also that the pattern of sea
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infiltration has changed during 1965. The absence of any further
incidents involving steel-hulled infiltration ships since the Vung Ro
sinking in February suggests that the Viet Gong may now be using only
smaller craft which are more easily concealed. Reports of incidents
of sea infiltration involving junks have continued in 1965. A small
craft of this type probably could make one trip a month for 9 months
of the year between North Vietnam and South Vietnam and could carry
about 4 or more tons of supplies each trip. (High seas during the
last quarter of the year make it impractical for small craft to be
used for infiltration during that period.) Thus, if only 10 small
craft were directly involved in sea infiltration, a total of 360 tons
could be transported during the year, or approximately one ton per
day on an annual basis. Normally this amount would be sufficient to
stock or restock several storage areas. Steel-hulled ships or the
larger junks used for infiltration could carry 50 to 100 tons per
trip. Even one or two successful deliveries by ships of this type
would add substantially to the amount of material infiltrated in any
given year.
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V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA
Supply Routes
52. Some supplies for the Viet Cong have entered South Vietnam
from Cambodia, according to firm evidence from prisoner interrogations,
captured documents, and the actual capture of supplies in transit.
Other evidence to this effect has been compiled from agent sources. Al-
though most of these supplies and materials were either indigenous to
Cambodia, or arrived in Cambodia through normal trade channels, some
supplies have probably moved in clandestine channels. From Cambodia sup-
plies have been moved into South Vietnam by the following routes and
methods: (a) by sampan or junk on the inland waterways; (b) by porters
on the trails that approach or cross the South Vietnamese border; and
(c) by sampan or junk from Cambodian ports to islands in the Gulf of Siam
and to the west coast of South Vietnam. A substantial open but illegal
trade has also been taking place between South Vietnam and Cambodia,
especially in the Mekong Delta. The general locations of the major
routes are indicated on the map at Annex. Many points along the border
between Cambodia and South Vietnam have been identified as Viet Cong
border crossings; Tay Ninh and Chau Doc J have been the two provinces most
often cited. The relative importance of each area, route, or mode
cannot be determined from available information. It appears, however,
that the Viet Cong have shifted back and forth from land to water
transport and from one area of entry to another as the need and tactical
situation have changed.
53. Use of inland water transport to cross the border is more
important in the southern and delta area than in the northeastern part
of Cambodia. Four inland water routes -- the Se San, the Srepok,
and its two tributaries -- provide access from Cambodia to Kontum,
Pleiku, and Darlac Provinces in the central area. These waterways can
accommodate small native craft only, and, although few reports are
available to indicate that the Viet Cong have used these water routes,
their significance is accentuated by the scarcity ofroads serving the
area. There are six waterways, including the Mekong, that provide
access to the southern or delta area. For the most part, these southern
rivers could be navigated by craft as large as small oceangoing steamers.
Smaller waterways provide connections to most points in the delta area.
54+. Water transport on the Mekong-Bassac River complex was one
of the major means of moving supplies from Cambodia into South Vietnam
as late as 1964. During 1963 a significant quantity of supplies,
particularly potassium chlorate, a chemical used in making explosives,
was captured by South Vietnamese patrols on the rivers. One shipment
was seized by a Cambodian river patrol. Since 1963 reported seizures
Formerly part of An Giang Province.
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of supplies on the rivers have practically ceased. This situation may
reflect the lack of South Vietnamese border control or may mean that
the Viet Cong have developed other water transport routes or are relying
more heavily on land routes. A shift from water to land transport was
revealed in 1961+ in a captured document from the Finance and Economic
Section of the Chau Thanh District Party Committee of Tay Ninh Province
which stated that its transport units had to use cross-country land
routes because movements by water were often stopped and searched. The
use of water transport by the Viet Cong undoubtedly has continued, how-
ever, because some areas can be reached only by water transport or by a
combination of land and water transport. A description of a logistic
system on a river route was revealed by a Vietnamese junk crew that was
captured in 1963 on the Mekong River near the border. The chemicals
that they were carrying were smuggled from Phnom Penh by water to a
point within 1 mile of the border. The chemicals were then transferred
to small junks of 2 or 3 tons capacity that were manned by personnel
hired to take the junks downstream at night to about 5 miles below the
border from where other crews took over. The materials were well
camouflaged in sacks under layers of sand, salt, or fruit or in false
bottoms and overheads of the boats. Another informant stated that the
Viet Cong manned the boats themselves when certain materials such as
rifles and ammunition were being transported.
55. Land routes provide access at many points along the Cambodian
border for Viet Cong cadres, supporters, or purchasing agents to obtain
supplies as necessary. Four of the major land routes that enter South
Vietnam through Tay Ninh Province have been used to transport weapons,
ammunition, and other military equipment. Two routes enter the province
from the north, one from the west, and one from the south. The Viet
Cong, according to one source, have assembled as many as 300 porters
at one time to carry their supplies across the border. Evidence exists
that before crossing the border the porters have left the roads and
fanned out onto the complex of trails to portage their loads. In other
cases purchasing agents have mingled with the local traffic that crosses
the border by vehicle or on foot. Chau Doc Province, located on the
south side of the Mekong, is another area through which supply routes
pass. In March 1963 a Cambodian provincial guard reported that the
Viet Cong crossed the border almost nightly in this area. He stated
that supplies were taken to the border and were picked up there by
.the Viet Cong. Evidence continues to support the use of this route.
There is also probably a route into Phuoc Long Province.
56. Seaborne infiltration operations have been conducted from
Cambodia. Some materials infiltrated from Cambodia have been carried
first to Phu Quoc, Phu Du, or one of the other nearby islands, and
finally to the western coast of South Vietnam. Reports suggest the
continued use of this route, but the amounts infiltrated are unknown.
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Organizational Control
57. The infiltration of supplies from Cambodia is under the control
of the Viet Cong People's Revolutionary Party apparatus in the border
area. A component of the apparatus is the above-mentioned Finance and
Economic Section of the Chau Thanh District Party Committee of Tay Ninh
Province. This section may be only one of many such organizations along
the border. According to a captured document, in May 1964 the section
was composed of a section chief with his deputy and five helpers and three
units or cells. One unit consisted of five men who recruited seven
Cambodians and four Vietnamese tradesmen to purchase goods in Cambodia
and three other men who were only in charge of purchases of goods from
local markets. Another unit consisted of a village organized into five
water transport units and twelve land transport units. The third was a
motorboat cell. In May 1964 the section purchased in Cambodia about
15 tons of supplies, including many types of food, cloth, dry-cell
batteries, electric wire, and medicine. In addition, the list of pur-
chased items included about 90 animals.
Types of Supplies Moved
58. Most of the supplies procured in or through Cambodia have
generally consisted of materials that can be purchased on the open
market, although arms and ammunition also have been infiltrated from
Cambodia. There is evidence from prisoners of war that Viet Cong
units located in areas adjacent to the Cambodian border north of the
Mekong Delta have on occasion in the past purchased substantial
quantities of food in Cambodia. However, Cambodia is by no means a
major source of food supplies to the Viet Cong, who depend primarily
on the Vietnamese countryside and population for their subsistence.
There is also reliable evidence that the Viet Cong clandestine appa-
ratus in Phnom Penh has regularly purchased drugs and medical supplies
in the open market in Cambodia to be taken into South Vietnam. Also,
there are indications that some radios, batteries, and tubes have
been procured in Cambodia. Although an appreciable amount of Viet Cong
medical and other supplies have been procured in Cambodia, most of
these items have apparently been procured in South Vietnam or have
been brought in from North Vietnam.
59. There are reliable reports to the effect that the Viet Cong
apparatus in Phnom Penh has raised some funds for the Viet Cong
by soliciting contributions from Vietnamese minority elements in
Cambodia generally unsympathetic to the government of South Vietnam.
However, these contributions were small in comparison with the large
amounts obtained through the variety of taxes levied on the Vietnamese
population in South Vietnam.
60. The extent to which Cambodia is used either as a transfer area
or as a source of arms and ammunition is difficult to assess. Reports
have indicated that arms have been moved from Cambodia to South Vietnam.
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Evidence, including the testimony of numerous Viet Cong prisoners who
were engaged in supply operations from Cambodia, indicates that such
movements probably are small in terms of the total amount of such material
infiltrated into South Vietnam.
Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory
61. There is considerable evidence, including reports of US
Special Forces advisors, that the Viet Cong use Cambodian territory
in some areas along the 600-mile border for sanctuary and bivouac
purposes for varying periods of time. There is also some evidence
that they have established temporary military facilities, such as rest
camps, training areas, hospitals, workshops, and storage depots on
Cambodian soil. Most reports of such facilities have been obtained
from captured personnel, defectors, In ad-
dition, Viet Cong elements have frequently been located on Cambodian
soil by airborne radio direction finding.
Cambodian Government Collusion
62. There is no question that the Cambodian government has taken
an attitude increasingly favorable to the Communists in the Vietnamese
situation. The Cambodian government has expressed its official good-
will diplomatically and politically for the NFLSV, but stated that
Cambodian neutrality forbids its operational and logistic cooperation.
Sihanouk supports the NFLSV's claim to represent the Vietnamese people,
he has presented medical supplies to North Vietnam, and he has presided
at a ceremony in which medical supplies were presented to a representative
of the NFLSV. He also participated in negotiations concerning the Cam-
bodian/South Vietnamese border with representatives of North Vietnam and
the Front in December 1964, although he was disappointed in these
negotiations as neither the Front nor Hanoi was willing to give him the
border guarantees he desired.
63. There is no hard evidence, however, that the central Cambodian
government has actively provided logistic support to the Viet Cong,
beyond the gift of medical supplies mentioned above. There is no con-
clusive evidence that Communist arms which were brought in openly through
Sihanoukville were intended for other than the Cambodian armed forces,
although it is possible that some may have ultimately gone to the Viet
Cong. It is also possible, however, that the Cambodian Ministry of
Commerce knowingly assisted the Viet Cong by granting licenses to Cam-
bodian firms to import explosives and other materials in excess of
domestic needs for eventual diversion to the Viet Cong. The Cambodian
government did, however, seize a shipment of potassium chlorate moving
down the Mekong in September 1963 and turned the confiscated material
over to the royal palace for the manufacture of fireworks.
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64. There is evidence of cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower
Cambodian government and military levels. In some areas along the
border, the Viet Cong are permitted to take refuge from South Vietna-
mese military forces, at times with the active assistance of Cambodian
armed forces. There have even been some reports of Cambodian and
Viet Cong troops fighting together against South Vietnamese troops, and
Viet Cong prisoners of war in 1964 stated that the Cambodian troops
attempted to cover up their cooperation with the insurgents. Prisoners
have also reported that local Cambodian authorities have made no effort
to interfere with Viet Cong procurement of supplies in Cambodia. Other
reports indicate that in some areas the Cambodians have tried to police
the border against the Viet Cong, and against South Vietnamese troops
with whom they frequently clash.
65. In sum, the Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory is due to
active Cambodian cooperation in some areas, a laissez-faire attitude
in others, and the inability or failure of the Cambodian government
to control or even patrol its frontiers, particularly in isolated
regions. Central government policy, while generally favorable to
the Viet Cong, stops short of military support.
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VI. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES
Organizational Control
66. Internal distribution of infiltrated supplies and transportation
of locally procured goods are basic elements of the Viet Cong logistics
network. About 14,000 personnel, exclusive of enforced labor, are used
on a full-time basis. Viet Cong emphasis on the importance of local
self-sufficiency testifies to efforts to reduce the internal logistics
task. On the other hand, the existence of known internal logistics
operations confirms that the requirements for internal distribution and
transportation are substantial.
67. Viet Cong logistics operations are organized at all levels from
COSVN to the village Party chapter. At every major echelon of the Party,
the Viet Cong have a route protection or communications-liaison section
whose mission is to establish, maintain, and supervise safe corridor
routes for the flow of men, materiel, and messages. For security reasons,
the Viet Cong appear to maintain separate routes for these transport tasks
with the organizational subordination of any given task determined by the
nature and importance of the task. The route protection and communications-
liaison section of the Party exercises a crucial role in approving and
safeguarding all types of logistics support operations. An estimated
2,000 or more Party cadre are probably directly associated with the com-
munications-liaison function as guided, security personnel, station atten-
dants, and supervisory personnel. In general, these sections supervise
the work of the two basic transport organizations -- the Rear Services
transport units and the Finance and Economic transport units.
68. Special and organic transport elements directed by the Rear
Services are found at all military echelons from COSVN to local. (regular)
forces. The military elements of COSVN and the Viet Cong military
regions control special military transport units which appear to be
primarily concerned with the receipt and redistribution of infiltrated
supplies. About 5,800 personnel are associated with these special mili-
tary transport units subject to region or Central Office level control,
according to MACV. In addition, every military echelon of the main and
local forces has an organic transport element under its Rear Services
to provide logistic support for its military and non-military require-
ments. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 personnel are associated with these
organic transport units.
69. The second basic element involved in internal distribution and
transport consists of the transport units of the Finance and Economic
Section of the Party.- These transport units appear to be generally
responsible for transferring goods acquired locally to depots estab-
lished within their area. In most cases, it is believed that the
organized transport element of the Finance and Economic element is rela-
tively small and is primarily responsible for recruiting local civilian
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personnel to accomplish movement of supplies. In some cases, however,
where the movement of civilian-type goods is substantial, nonmilitary
transport units have been permanently established under the Finance and
Economic Section. About 2,000 personnel are probably permanently associ-
ated with transport elements of the Finance and Economic Section.
Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas
70. Personnel, infiltrators, and supplies acquired from both internal
and external sources are moved over a fairly well established network of
protected routes within the Viet Cong-controlled areas of South Vietnam.
The network includes an interconnected system of depots and way stations
all the way from Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces in the north to the
Ca Mau peninsula in the south. There are two roughly-parallel north-south
corridors, one of which closely follows the western border of the country
and is used mainly for personnel. The other corridor is located nearly
midway between the coast and the western border and extends from the
highland region above the Do Xa base area to War Zone D northeast of
Saigon. It is probably used for both personnel and materiel. These two
corridors have several lateral routes leading east and west to and from
infiltration points along the coast- and the Laos and Cambodian borders.
Both internal main corridors connect with COSVN base areas in Tay Ninh
Province north of Saigon. Here COSVN apparently maintains the principal
agency for coordinating operations over the entire system. This has
been identified as the Postal Transportation and Communication Branch.
The Tay Nine base in turn forms the principal connection with at least
three other corridors including the remainder of the network which forms
a loop within the Mekong D'1_ta region. See the map at Annex for location
of the Viet Cong war zones, storage areas, and main redistribution cor-
ridors, and Annex D for organizational chart.
71. Study of the routes, when plotted-in detail on a map, shows
that this logistic network relies heavily on overland movement and that
the principal motorable roads are generally not used. Principal water-
ways are used, however, in the delta region and several land routes
follow streams (probably for guidance at night). It is also noted that
a major portion of the network is located at or near provincial boun-
daries where South Vietnamese surveillance may be least effective.
Comparison of this network with a map of the current status of pacifica-
tion shows that a considerable part of the transport system runs through
unsecured territory which may be controlled by the South Vietnamese in
the daytime but is used by the V:'et Cong at night when most of their
supply movements take place.
72. Supply depots which would normally have a nominal capacity of
from 5 to 10 tons of supplies each are sometimes connected with the way
stations and are controlled by the appropriate logistic organization.
Although classes of supplies in these depots are usually mixed, some
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contain only weapons and ammunition, and some handle food exclusively.
A typical depot may be described as consisting of a small cluster of
huts or shelters surrounded by a security fence and occasionally an auto-
matic weapons emplacement, all well concealed under foliage. A minimum
of traffic is allowed at the depot,, deliveries by transport units being
made at some distance from the depot with final haul and storage made
by the depot cadre. According to Viet Cong documents, supplies are moved
in stages and handled through as many depots as necessary to insure their
security and to build up a reserve for support of an engagement by Viet
Cong forces. In 1963, when Viet Cong forces in the central highlands
were considerably smaller than at present, food depots were limited to
a maximum of 5 tons because of the threat of South Vietnamese government
action. Although the size of these depots has probably been increased,
the fragmentation of storage areas is a basic constraint on the rapid
initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions.
73. Because the communications-liaison routes often run across
open country or over back roads and the Viet Cong do not possess any
sizeable inventory of motor trucks, much of the shipment of supplies is
handled by teams of porters provided by the local village and district
Viet Cong organizations. Other forms of transport have also been
utilized in significant amounts in the lowlands and in the delta region,
including trains of oxcarts, river and coastal water craft, "hired" three-
wheeler Lambretta-type motorcycle carriers, and occasionally com-
mandeered cargo trucks. Movements by the transport units are secured
by route protection forces usually assigned.from local guerrilla units.
These security troops may conduct raids near the routes as a, diversion
to screen movements of supplies over more exposed sectors.
74. It has been impossible to estimate the volume of supplies
handled over internal Viet Cong supply routes. One set of pertinent
figures, however, has become available in documentation concerning the
supply corridor from Kien Hoa to Tay Ninh. Possibly referring to per-
formance in 1964, one Viet Corn official had entered in his notes that
this corridor had handled over 200 tons of "strategic" goods and 31 tons
of "party" goods on shipments from probable coastal delivery points in
Kien Hoa Province to War Zone C over a distance of approximately 120
miles and passing within 30 miles of Saigon.
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a. Weapons:
7.62-mm Carbine, Model m44
7.62-mm Rifle, Model M1891
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model PPSh 41
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model RP46
23-mm Cannon
b. Ammunition:
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P
7.62-mm Cartridge, API, Model B-32
3. Czechoslovakia
a. Weapons:
7.65-mm Pistol, Model M1927, N B46
b. Ammunition (sample of each type exploited)
7.92-mm Cartridge, rifle
7.92-inn Cartridge, Mauser
4. Viet Cong-Produced Materiel
a. Weapons and Explosive Devices:
Skyhorse (VC-Type Bazooka)
Grenade launcher
AA Machinegun (modified from USo50-caliber MG)
AT Parachute hand grenade
Bicycle mine
Mine delay firing device
Shaped charge (2 types)
Shaped mine, short cone type
Hollow cone mine, non-electric
AP mine, cylindrical type
AP fragmentation grenades (2 types)
AT mine, cast iron fragmentation
AT mine (constructed from British 100-mm mortar shell)
AT mine, iron case, cylindrical
AT mine, wooden, box type
Mine, turtle shaped, cement
Mine, turtle shaped, sheet metal
Mine, betel box shaped, cement
Mine, round volume type, sheet metal
Mine, round mound type, cement
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TYPES OF COMMUNIST-SUPPLIED AND LOCALLY PRODUCED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
CAPTURED FROM THE VIET CONG
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
1. Communist China
a. Weapons:
7.62-mm Pistol, Model 54
7.62-mm Semi-automatic carbine, Model 56 (copy of Soviet SKS)
7.62-mm Carbine, Model 53 (copy of Soviet M44)
7.62-mm Assault rifle, Model 56 (copy of Soviet AK)
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model 50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model K50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun (copy of Soviet PPSh) VC modified
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 53 (copy of Soviet DP)
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPD)
7.62-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 58 (copy of Soviet GORYUNOV)
7.92-mm Light machinegun (copy of BRNO)
7.92-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 24 (copy of Soviet MAXIM)
12.7-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 54 (copy of Soviet DShK)
40-mm Grenade launcher, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPG-2)
57-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 36
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 52 (copy of US M20)
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 56
Flame thrower (tentatively CHICOM)
60-mm Mortar, Model 31
82-mm Mortar
90-mm AT Rocket launcher, Model 51
b. Ammunition:
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 50
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 53
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 56
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model L
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model API B32
7.92-mm Cartridge
12.7-mm Cartridge
40-mm Grenade, PG-2
60-mm Shell, mortar
82-mm Shell, mortar
75-mm Shell, Recoilless gun
- 35 -
Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIA-FJDESg O?R000100040002-8
 LAI
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HON KHOAII
Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100040002-8
 Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100040002-8
Mine, 81-mm mortar container
Fixed directional fragmentation mine, Model DH-l0
Incendiary grenade, sodium
Chemical firing device
AP mine, match box size
Antenna detonating device
-37-
Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : 011 - -----WOQNIR000
 Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100040002-8
S-E-C-R-E-T
COMMUNIST TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED BY OBSERVERS ON
SELECTED ROUTES IN SOUTHERN LAOS
DECEMBER 1964 - JUNE 1965
Number of Trucks
Average Number of
Trucks Moving
Reported Moving
Number of Days
Per Day a/
Route Number and Month
South
North
Covered by Reports
South
North
Route 23 b/
December 1964 c/
185
12
5
37
2
January 1965
337
324
22
15
15
February 1965
311.
172
27
12
6
March
1965 d/
-
481
658
30
16
22
April
1965
640
775
30
21
26
May
1965
340
541
24
14
23
Total
2,294
2,482
138
17
18
Route 92
February 1965
13
15
19
0.7
0.8
March
1965
11
12
21
0.5
0.6
April
1965
66
58
20
3.3
2.9
May
1965
27
35
26
1.0
1.3
1-5 June
1965
7
7
5
1.4
1.4
Total
124
127
91
1.4
1.4
a/ Total number of trucks reported during the month divided by the number of
days covered by reports during the month.
b/ Based on reports from a road-watch team located in an area about 30 miles
southeast of the junction with route 12.
c/ Of these trucks, 170 were reported from other points on days when there
was no coverage in this area. Since these 170 trucks would have had to pass
this area, they have been included in this tabulation.
J The direction of an additional 4 trucks was not given.
e/ Based on reports from trained observers located about 10 miles from the
southern terminus of the route at the Se Kong River. Reports are not avail-
able for December 1964 or January 1965.
- 39 -
Approved For Release 2001/05/01: CIA e@2 215R000100040002-8
 Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIA-Ipf.(a2,g5R000100040002-8
ANNEX C
METHODS OF PACKAGING AND
TRANSPORTING SUPPLIES
1. Supplies are packaged in boxes, crates, bags, or other means
normally used for market transactions or in sizes, shapes, and weights
that can be handled by one porter. Listed below are some of the methods
used:.
a. Rice in 220-pound fiber bags or sacks.
b. Rice in 22-pound to 33-pound tubular cloth sacks carried
over the shoulder or across the back.
c. Salt in bags or sacks.
d. Ammunition in squared, wooden boxes or cases, about 50
pounds each.
e. Shoulder weapons wrapped in oil soaked rags or waterproof
paper.
f. Fuel in standard barrels or in cans of about 5 gallons each.
g. Fish in cans or dried and salted in sacks.
h. Meat, usually dried, in sacks.
i. Clothing in sacks.
j. Medicines in bottles or syrettes, in sizes that can be
concealed on a person.
k. Chemicals: Saltpeter in 220-pound units; sulphur in 110-
pound to 220-pound units; acid in less than one-quart bottles;
mercury in containers weighing about 22 pounds.
2. Transportation methods vary but are generally as follows:
a. By vehicles -- car or truck.
b. By human porters with 40-pound to 60-pound loads in back
packs or shoulder poles, traveling in teams of 10 to 100 men.
c. Single or dual bicycles with up to 500-pound loads,
traveling in teams of up to 30 men.
d. Horses and mules (seldom reported) with loads of 150 to
330 pounds.
e. Elephants with loads of 800 pounds.
f. Bull carts with 1,500 pounds.
g. Sampans with up to 1,500 pounds.
h. Motor carts (3-wheel) with 500 pounds.
i. Junks and oceangoing ships.
- 41 -
Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIA- YP?2~062b5R000100040002-8
 Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIAj-RJ 8ASSD 05R000100040002-8
ANNEX D
ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNAL VIET CONG LOGISTICS NETWORK
Central Office
South Vietnam
Communications- Rear Services
Liaison
Section Transport
Element of
Military
Forces
Subordinate to
Communications-
Liaison
Section
hear Services
Transport
Element of
Military Force
Subordinate to
this Level
Transport
Element of
Finance
and
Economic
Transport
Element
Finance
and
Economic
Transport
Element
Special
Military
Transport
Units
Special
Military
Transport
Unite
Rear Services
Transport
Element of
Military Forces
Subordinate to
this _Level
Finance
and
Economic
Transport
Element
Communications-
Liaison
Section
-43-
Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIA--F~DOBIcVU&05R000100040002-8
 Approved For Release 2001/0 05R000100040002-8
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100040002-8