UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00129R000100080001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 9, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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9 September 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : United States Foreign Intelligence Objectives
Attached is the report of assessment of programs and plans
for action to accomplish the intelligence objectives summarized in
the enclosure to your memorandum of June 17th, 1963.
Successive drafts of the report were furnished the components
of USIB concerned with the intelligence objectives (CIA, DIA, NSA,
and INR).
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Director,
National Security Agency, concur in the report as presented. The
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of Intel-
ligence and Research, Department of State, concur in the basic
report but have submitted supplemental comments which appear
at Tab B and Tab C, respectively.
A copy of this memorandum, together with copies of the
report, has been forwarded to the Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
Dire/tor of Central Intelligence
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I. & II. EARLY WARNING AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 1
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
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I. & II. EARLY WARNING AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Objectives
"That, in view of the transcendent importance of early warning and of
the fullest possible exploitation of indicators, the U. S. intelligence
community seek the improvement and refinement of procedures for
providing adequate early warning of crisis situations and timely
appraisals of current intelligence concerning such situations."
"That concerted efforts be made to devise an effective mechanism for
the integrated assessment (including periodic cumulative assessments)
of early warning and indicator type data, and the prompt transmission
of adequate analyses and appraisals of current intelligence to approp-
riate officials having policy or command responsibilities."
Response
1. We have chosen to treat objectives 1 and 2, concerned with
early warning and with current intelligence, in a single response,
because no clear line can be drawn separating the former from the
latter. The two objectives may be further broken down into four
specific goals:
a. Improvement and refinement of procedures for pro-
viding adequate early warning of crisis situations.
b. Improvement and refinement of procedures for pro-
viding timely appraisals of current intelligence concerning crisis
situations.
c. Devise an effective mechanism for the integrated
assessment (including periodic cumulative assessments) of early
warning and indicator type data.
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d. Prompt transmission of adequate analyses and appraisals
of current intelligence to appropriate officials having policy or command
responsibilities.
3, Additionally, the National Indications Center provides the
24-hour indications watch for the USIB's Watch Committee, which meets
weekly or more often if necessary.
4. Our watch and warning mechanisms are manned by personnel
carefully selected for their dedication and their ability to handle their
assigned responsibilities. However, the highly-trained career indications
specialist is a key commodity in the intelligence labor market, therefore
scarce. Such people are indispensable to the system and more of them
must be found.
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5. The systems are constantly undergoing revision to accom-
modate changing requirements and to incorporate new thoughts for
Improvements.
b. Some months ago, as a result of concern over the gap
between estimates and current intelligence reporting, CIA's Current
Intelligence Weekly Review, DIA's Intelligence Summary and Intelligence
Bulletin, and the Department of States Research Memoranda were
revised to focus intelligence and analysis more directly on specific
topics of interest to the policy-maker. This change, which was accom-
plished within the framework of existing publications, yields cumulative
assessments on individual topics. We think this procedure, now being
followed regularly, provides a needed assessment when a National
Estimate has been overtaken by events as evidenced by current intel-
ligence reporting.
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6. With respect to specific goal "c", devising an effective
mechanism for the integrated assessment of early warning and
indicator type data, the USIB does have a carefully-devised, integrated
mechanism as discussed below; however, if the objective is to provide
precise advance warning of intent to initiate hostilities, we are much
less confident of our ability to reach this goal. The USIB's National
Indications Center constantly reviews intelligence for early warning
indicators. Its Watch Committee, chaired by the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, meets weekly or more frequently when necessary.
The Committee's Watch Reports are reviewed and approved by the
USIB. One deficiency that came to our attention anew in the course
of this reassessment is the fact that the Department of State is not
represented in the National Indications Center. We believe it should
be and urge that a way be found of getting around the budget restrictions
that make it impossible for it to participate now.
7. Despite the effort devoted to the warning process, the con-
clusions reached in the Warning Survey, prepared by the Director of
the National Indications Center and approved by USIB on 21 March 1961
remain valid. The thrust of those conclusions was, that there is
reasonable expectation that the intelligence community will be able
to recognize an increased state of Soviet readiness to initial hostilities,
but that the provision of precise advance warning of an actual intention
to commence hostilities is less likely. Part of this uncertainty stems
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from the extreme difficulty of distinguishing realistic exercises from
actual combat deployments and raising of combat readiness of Soviet
forces. It is likely that Soviet preparations for war would be under-
taken insofar as possible under the guise of exercise activity. More-
over, as the Soviets place greater dependability on missile warfare,
with missiles in place and ready to go, military activity normally
associated with preparation for imminent war is less necessary, hence
less visible.
8. We do not hold that any of our systems is perfect, nor do we
expect that one ever will be. Moreover, we doubt that real progress
can be made through procedural modifications. Real advances in the
quality of early warning can be achieved only through improved ability
to acquire information from within the Communist Bloc (particularly
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III. AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
Objective
"That research be intensified to determine the usefulness of data
processing techniques, including mechanized title or summary
sentence permutation, to facilitate review and assessment of the
great volume of material that must be dealt with in the intelligence
community. "
Response
1. The pursuit of this objective is one of our. most demanding
tasks, affecting as it does our ability to achieve other of the objec-
tives. It has high priority and we intend to continue to expand
present programs to assist the intelligence analysts to effectively
use the voluminous information that must be handled. While the
computer has definite limitations, its capability to store, process,
and deliver increasingly sophisticated correlations of subjects,
titles, names, date and time sequences, commodities, and the
like is well established. We have, therefore, been steadily increas-
ing the uses of equipment, by which means we can extend the
capabilities of the individual analyst.
2. USIB has for the past year been conducting a study of the
community's information processing systems in an effort to improve
and make compatible the handling of information among the several
agencies. This study, plus further detailed investigations, will
provide the community with essential information concerning the
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objectives, capabilities and common problems of intelligence
information processing systems, which is now lacking. Research
in this field continues at a very high level.
3. Examples of encouraging progress are:
b. NSA has been conducting experiments in capturing
titles of reports automatically and preparing permuted word indexes
(i. e., indexes that may be searched upon any word in the title. )
c. Similar experiments are being conducted by the Air
Force in its Foreign Technology Division and at SAC and NORAD.
d. An operational system based on this principle is in
prospect on a limited scale in the DIA Current Intelligence and
Indications Center.
e. The Department of State is developing a pilot system
covering Cuban affairs based on a computer and designed to produce
permuted subject indexes for the analyst.
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f. In NPIC, a computer-supported system brings all.
pertinent data on each target (what is known and what is needed) to
the elbow of the photo-interpreter as he examines new photography.
4. The Director of Central Intelligence and the members of
USIB are very much concerned over the security aspects of rapid
expansion of automatic data processing techniques in the handling of
intelligence information. Such techniques permit easy and indiscriminate
reproduction and distribution of sensitive intelligence, which could
quickly lead to degrading its security. The hazard is somewhat reduced
by storing only minimum index data in the computer and keeping the
documents themselves in controlled files. Additional security is gained
by strictly compartmenting the machines and persons handling specially
sensitive material.
5. Our problems have largely to do with the processing of
language, while automatic equipment is essentially designed to handle
numbers. The availability of first-rate researchers in automatic
language processing is very limited. We have a considerable capa-
bility in this field and have taken steps to acquire additional in-house
expertise in language processing, but it will be some time before the
full effect is felt. Equipment manufacturers are being encouraged to
assist.
6. The most significant problem in the present period is that
of organization. When the magnitude of the automatic data processing
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problem is considered, with the near certainty that it will continue
to grow, collective efforts within the community will become increas-
ingly important and will call for a coordinated effort under the general
guidance of USIB. Therefore, the USIB will:
a. Consider the feasibility of establishing a national
service of common concern to centrally index all documents now being
processed on a decentralized basis. The index data so developed would
be available to all of the members of the community.
b. Consider organizing a small permanent group of technical
experts from within the community whose sole responsibility would be
to concentrate on technical information processing problems in the
community.
7. The USIB further will undertake to accelerate external
research in perfecting the art of processing language automatically.
Extensive research has been supported in this field for nearly a
decade. This will continue and the support of the Office of Science
and Technology and the National Science Foundation, which has been
solicited, should materially assist our efforts. To assure positive
results, insofar as possible, with this extraordinarily difficult
problem, the community has formed a Joint Advisory Group on
Automatic Language Processing to coordinate Government-supported
research in this field.
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IV. NATIONAL INTE LL.IGENCE. ESTIMATES
Objective
"':Chat the existing methods of arriving at national intelligence estimates
be re-examined to ensure that, in the national intelligence estimative
process: (a) all indicators and other pertinent intelligence data are
available and are utilized; (b) the viewpoints of constituent members of
the intelligence community are given thorough consideration and are
reflected fully in finished estimates in all instances where significantly
divergent conclusions have been reached; (c) every precaution is taken
to guard against adherence to an isolated set of opinions or preconceived
notions; (d) the United States Intelligence Board keep under continuing
review all possibilities for improving estimates and making them more
useful; and (e) members of the United States Intelligence Board guide and
supervise the work of estimating staffs to the end that crucial estimates
are promptly revised and circulated whenever new evidence indicates the
need therefor."
Response
1. The above questions concerning National Intelligence Estimates
has given the Director of Central Intelligence the greatest of concern.
The most important ingredient for the production of an intelligence
estimate is the employment of highly qualified and intelligence-minded
men whose purpose is to present their best objective judgment upon the
complex questions normally involved in the preparation of an estimate.
In this respect we feel that the Director of Central Intelligence and the
United States Intelligence Board are well served for the Board of
National Estimates is well equipped with men of such qualifications and
capabilities. Moreover, USIB itself reviews each and every estimate
in meticulous detail, with each member of USIB preserving and
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exercising his right of dissent and his privilege to express such dissents?
which is frequently done through footnotes to the estimates.
2. A review of a great number of estimates prepared by the Board
of National Estimates, and finally approved by USIB, over a period of
years has proven that the record if good.and that the estimates of a
variety of situations, complex and obscure as they are, have proven
to be remarkably accurate.
3. However, in view of the recommendation of the President's
Advisory Board, the Director of Central Intelligence convened a special
panel of highly qualified individuals to comment and to report on the
estimating procedures of USIB. This panel was composed of:
4. The panel's report is attached at Tab A and represents the
acceptable viewpoint on some of the questions raised by this particular
objective.
5. Constant improvement in the estimating process is basic in
the Director of Central Intelligence's consideration of the problem.
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To that end, important additions, have been made to the personnel of
for example), and the use of consultants
on important problems is a continuing practice (the
Soviet long-range striking force, the
panel on
panel on Soviet nuclear
capability, the panel on Chinese Communist nuclear capability,
etc.). However, estimates which must deal with the imponderables
of just what goes on in the minds of the leaders of a foreign power or
the people of a foreign country are extremely difficult to formulate
with precision; hence, those responsible for the intelligence function
must always be sure that: (a) most qualified objective men are engaged
in the preparation and consideration of the estimates, (b) all pertinent
intelligence and other information is considered in the preparation of
the estimate, and (c) the process is kept under constant review for
possible improvement.
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22 July 1963
Dear Mr. McCone:
I enclose the report of the committee of consultants which
you appointed to examine the estimative process in the light of
the Cuban experience and to make recommendations for improving
Sincerely yours,
/ signed/
Contents:
Introduction
Recommendations
Annex A, "Preconceived Notions"
Annex B, Rejected Proposals
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INTRODUCTION
1. On 17 May, 1963, the Director of Central Intelligence asked
to examine the estimative process in the light of the
Cuban experience, and to make recommendations for improving it.
received a form of consultant's contract not compatible
with his other commitments and this mistake was not corrected in time
to make it possible for him to serve on the committee. The other three
members of the committee met for three days (8, 9, and 10 July 1963),
in the office of ONE, exchanged draft proposals during the next week,
and met again on 18 July to discuss the final form of their report.
2. It is obvious that no thorough investigation of the estimative
process could be made in this brief period. A number of estimates
dealing with Cuba and the USSR were read, two development files were
studied, and a few members (or former members) of ONE were inter-
viewed. As consultants, the members of the committee have read, over
the past few years, a number of estimates, both in final and in draft form.
In addition, was a member of the Board of National Estimates
Nevertheless, none of us feels that he
is in any position to make emphatic and final judgments about existing
estimative procedures.
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3. Two of the committee believe that a study in depth of the
estimative process by a small group of informed outsiders (not our-
selves, we hasten to add) might yield valuable results. Such a study
would require access to all constituents of the intelligence community
and knowledge of personnel as well as procedures. It would take
several weeks, if not months. For these reasons the third member of
the committee believes the project is not feasible, and he doubts that
it would be useful.
4. The discussion and suggestions which follow are only opinions
offered by partially informed outsiders. Perhaps we are fairly typical
consumers, and our report might be taken as representing the reactions
of some consumers to estimates. But we should emphasize that we have
not studied the problem in depth, and that therefore many of our sugges-
tions may be superfluous, impractical, or just wrong-headed. We should
also emphasize that our suggestions deal almost entirely with details of
procedure, and that even the best procedure will not guarantee good
estimates. The essential thing is to find and retain men who have wide
knowledge, broad vision and good judgment. As long as the intelligence
community has such men it will do a good job, whatever its procedures.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The best way to remedy any deficiencies which occur in the
estimative process is to have full and careful discussion of each prob-
lem. In theory the present machinery should ensure such a discussion.
In practice, we believe that there are some obstacles and we offer the
following suggestions as means of reducing or removing these obstacles.
1) Cut down the number of coordinated papers.
Men who have too much to do in too short a time may not
see all possibilities or sense the full impact of changed
conditions. Pressure to meet deadlines forces limitation
of discussion. Effort devoted to trivial papers means less
time and energy for major problems. It would require more
knowledge than we possess to determine what papers should
be eliminated, but we suspect that many "country papers"
fall in this category. We also suspect that requests for
coordinated papers are made, and accepted, too easily.
But in any case, there is overloading and it has bad results.
(Note that we do not recommend any increase in
personnel. The number of people now involved in the
estimative prccess is about as large as can be used
efficiently. More people would simply mean more spe-
cialization and more meetings. What is needed is the
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overall view and time in which to develop it and
discuss it. This can be done only by a small group
of carefully selected men).
2) Make sure that there are always men with a
wide variety of views and experience on the Board of
National Estimates. The present distribution of member-
ship on the Board seems well designed to achieve this end.
As we understand it, it includes a core of men with long
experience in intelligence, other men who have worked
in the foreign or armed services, and a younger group who
will move on to other positions after a few years on the Board.
We suggest that it might be helpful when there are vacancies
to add two or three rotating members who would serve for
only a year or so. These men could be borrowed from other
branches of the government or from universities. If
properly selected, they could contribute new ideas and
encourage re-examination of accepted formulae.
3) Make sure that diverse opinions of other members
of the community are fully represented in contributions and
coordination meetings. Here our knowledge is limited and
our recommendations are only tentative. We believe that
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that the problem of overloading is even more serious
outside CIA than inside. Some representatives apparently
have little time to inform themselves or to think about the
problems which they are supposed to discuss. We are
also uneasy about the tendency to concentrate military
contributions in the DIA. There are often sharp differences
of opinion among the armed services. Expression of these
differences can be very helpful in forming sound judgments.
4) Call in a small group Of consultants when diffi-
cult problems are to be discussed. We advance this idea
with some hesitation and we realize that it might cause
more trouble than it was worth. But it might be a way of
getting new points of view and. of avoiding blind spots. Two
or three consultants would probably have a greater impact
than a single outsider who might hesitate to contradict
the insiders.
5) Indicate in some way when earlier estimates
are being quoted or paraphrased. There are many ways
of doing this (footnotes, quotation marks, etc. ) and any
one would be satisfactory. But attention should be called
to repetitions, in the hope that this would lead to
re-examination of accepted positions.
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6) Be somewhat bolder in estimating the impact
of U. S. policy and attitudes on. the rest of the world. This
is a difficult and dangerous task because it can lead to implied
criticisms of U. S. policy. But it seems to us that failure
to do this is one reason why preconceived ideas (which are
still correct) sometimes cause faulty estimates. To be
specific: if the Kremlin in the early months of 1962 had
reason to think that the posture and resolution of the U. S.
were weak, then it should obviously have estimated that the
risks of the Cuban adventure were not unduly high. Thus
the accepted doctrine that the USSR would avoid grave risks
was probably correct; the error was caused by the failure
to estimate that the Kremlin estimate of U. S. policy had
changed.
7) Make more information about attitudes and
methods of foreign intelligence organizations available
to estimators. We believe, for example, that the Kremlin
attaches more importance to certain kinds of evidence, and
less to others, than the U. S. intelligence community would
do. We suspect that what information has been acquired
about Soviet intelligence procedures is not very widely
disseminated. But if the Kremlin does use a peculiar scale
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in weighing evidence and if this is not generally known,
then the result is bound to be a faulty estimate. One
reason for inadequate estimates on Cuba in 1962 was
that the intelligence community, as a whole, believed
that Soviet leaders must realize how dangerous the intro-
duction of IRBM's and MRBM's would be. Better knowledge
of Soviet intelligence procedures might have made it possi-
ble to suggest that the Kremlin was undervaluing the evidence
which should have led it to this conclusion.
8) Keep a constant watch for signs that a mutation_
in an existing pattern is about to take place. This is pro-
bably a superfluous and useless recommendation. Certainly
everyone is on the look-out for such signs and it is much
easier to identify them in retrospect than at the moment
when they occur. Existing patterns can accommodate them-
selves to a large number of new ingredients and gradual
changes bring about only gradual shifts in policy. But
there are some new ingredients so large or so sharp that
they may break the old pattern and it is not entirely
impossible to identify these. Again to be specific, in
1962 the unprecedented situation in Cuba and the Sino-Soviet
dispute were probably such ingredients.
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9) Make a few validity studies in depth. At present,
validity studies usual, y involve only a comparison between
a new estimate and the immediately preceding estimate on
the same topic. Often there has not been enough change in
the interval between the two papers to reveal errors or biases.
Our experience in studying the Cuban series of estimates
leads us to believe that there would be some value in making,
from time to time, a validity study of a whole group of related
papers. This might expose persistent biases, rigidities, and
inconsistencies. We know that one such study of a group of
Soviet estimates was made some years ago. We suggest
that more exercises of this sort would be useful, but with the
caveat that if they became too frequent (say more than one
or two a year) their value would sharply decrease. We also
suggest that some of these studies be made by consultants,
both to reduce the burden on. the ONE Staff and to ensure a
fresh point of view.
Next to the problem of full discussion comes the problem of
communication. It seems to be fairly well agreed that estimates often
leave less impact than they should, and that important ideas are missed
by hasty readers. Nothing can be done to change the fact that everyone
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in. government has too much to read and that hasty readers will always
miss significant points. No one style or form of presentation will be
equally effective with all readers. But perhaps something can be done
to make it easier for most consumers to read estimates with more
understanding.
1) Put key sentences at the beginning of each
section of the estimate, e. g. "'We believe that the food
problem in Cuba is (is not) causing unrest. " Reasons
for the statement should follow. At present many impor-
tant statements are made only after a long list of pro' s
and con's and thus lose their full impact. Conclusions,
as now written., do not always remedy this fault. Perhaps
a string of key sentences at the beginning of an. estimate
would be better.
2) Call attention to possible courses of action
which might have serious consequences, even if the estimate
is that they are highly unlikely. Too many readers think
that "probably not" equals "never, " or that "the possibility
cannot be excluded" actually means that it is excluded.
Positive rather than negative formulae would help, but
we must confess that we are not very good at devising them.
Perhaps a phrase such as "there is at least a twenty per
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cent chance that" approaches what we need. And perhaps
a little more argumentation, showing the advantages which
might result from the adoption of unlikely courses of action
would make the consumer take them more seriously.
3) Emphasize new ideas or facts . Well informed
readers find much that is familiar in estimates, especially
in the larger estimates o This lulls them into missing
useful new rraterial, * Perhaps some typographical device
(eo g. side-lining) could be used to indicate places where
significant new ideas and facts are introduced. Or perhaps
more of the historical and purely descriptive material could
be put in annexes.
4) Make sure that the consumer is reminded of
key items in other estimates. This is probably an
*For example, there was a very important change in the Cuban
estimate of 19 September, 1962 (SNIE 85 3 62), Up to that time, all
estimates and memoranda had asserted that, the USSR had little to
gain by placing MRBM's or IRBM's in Cuba. SNIE 85-3-6Z, on the
contrary, pointed out that the Kremlin might see decided advantages
in. such a deployment. But no emphasis was put on the fact that this
was a changed estimate and we suspect that few readers noticed the
shift. One of our group reading the Cuban estimates seriatim
(which few consumers ever have time to do) still failed to observe
the fact that there had been a change on this highly significant point.
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unnecessary caution, but there is some danger that drafters
of an estimate will assume that consumers remember related
estimates as well as they do. For example, in SNIE 85-3-62
a little more emphasis might have been placed on the fact
that the estimate of the number of operational Soviet ICBM's
had recently been sharply reduced.
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In response to one of the requests put before us, we have
examined the estimates on Cuba from January 8 to September 19, 1962.
It is generally acknowledged that there was a failure of intelligence, in
the sense that USIB did not warn the government that the Soviets might
be planning to place offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, and indeed
suggested that such a decision was unlikely, though not impossible.
This failure has been widely attributed to the presence of "preconceived
notions" which prevented ONE, and in fact the entire intelligence community
from making a proper judgment. We therefore find it useful to make some
observations on the function, utility and drawbacks of such preconceived
notions. To do so is in fact indispensable to any search for remedies
designed to minimize these drawbacks.
:[n dealing with a major country, intelligence officers approach
their task with a set of expectations of likely patterns of behavior.
This is especially true in the case of the Soviet Union, the most
frequent target of intelligence. This set of expectations, sometimes
called preconceived notions, is based on a professional knowledge of
political structures, processes and personalities in the country concerned.
It is the distillate of years of experience and has been tested by, and
refined through, repeated intelligence estimates. It must be understood
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that the formulation of such a set of expectations about a country's
likely patterns of behavior is both inevitable and indispensable. It is
inevitable that, in doing their job, professionals will, more or less
deliberately, build up the set. It is indispensable because the set is
a most valuable tool in producing timely, coherent, articulate and, on
a probability basis, accurate intelligence. If no pattern can be estab-
lished, then prediction is almost impossible, and significant variations
can be demonstrated only by comparison with an already accepted norm.
Nevertheless, these sets of expectations have their limitations
and drawbacks. The history of intelligence is full of instances in
which an opponent achieved surprise by adopting a course of. action
that seemed unlikely in view of the set of expectations dominant among
intelligence officers. The Japanese attack in Pearl Harbor is one of
the most conspicious examples. We are not concerned here with what
may be called "technical surprise." A "technical surprise" is not
incompatible with the prevalent set of expectations. The surprise occurs
because the opponent was successful in concealing a particular capability
or in keeping a particular course of action secret. We are concerned
with an opponent's behavior that surprises because it is incompatible,
or seems to be incompatible, with our prevalent set of expectations.
There are three possible causes of this type of surprise.
First, the opponent's basic pattern of behavior may change as
a result of changes in leadership or various other important conditions,
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and our set of expectations may not register this change quickly and
correctly. Our set, in other words, is out-of-date. Intelligence
professionals must obviously be on the alert for such changes and,
generally, take care that their working set of expectations does not
become obsolete, stale or unduly rigid.
Second, the opponent may act irrationally. Irrational behavior
is, of course, very difficult, if not impossible to predict. It may take
all sorts of directions that make no sense to the rational mind. Only
if a country's leadership has a record of frequent lapses into irration-
ality will this observed fact become incorporated into our set of
expectations. But even then the estimate of future behavior will be
extremely difficult.
Third, the opponent may adopt a course of action that seems to
us to be in conflict With our set of expectations, but actually is not.
A set of expectations is based on the attitudes and predispositions that,
we have learned, strongly affect the opponent's behavior. The important
point to note is that attitudes, though they shape behavior, do not determine
it. Behavior also depends upon the information which the opponent possesses.
It is this information which brings his attitudes into play and which gives
him a basis for calculating the advantages and disadvantages of a course
of action. Hence, we may go wrong in an estimate, not because our set
of expectations is faulty, but because we assume that the opponent acts
on approximately the same information that we have. Clearly, to minimize
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this source of possible intelligence failure, we require not only a good
set of expectations but also some idea of the information that the opponent
uses in his cost-gains calculus.
We do not think that the failure of the intelligence community
to predict the Soviet deployment of medium range missiles resulted
essentially from its set of "preconceived notions" about the Soviet Union.
In our opinion, the community's set of expectations was, at that time at
least, sophisticated and realistic. According to the set, the Soviet Union
was considered unlikely to depart from its cautious behavior in the military
field or to undertake actions involving a high risk of war with the United
States. That this expectation about Soviet behavior was basically correct
was, after all, confirmed by the great caution with which Khrushchev acted
when the missile crisis broke in October.
Nor do we believe, as some experts have suggested, that the
Soviet decision was largely irrational. It is true that the Berlin state-
ment, Chinese criticism, and possible differences of opinion within the
Soviet leadership had put Khrushchev under some pressure to score a
success in foreign policy. It is also true that during the last year he has
seemed somewhat less sure of himself than before and has abruptly
reversed himself on several issues. But while he and other members of
the top leadership may have been perplexed by current difficulties there
is no evidence to suggest that they became reckless gamblers. At the
most, they may have been a little more willing to take a chance than
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they would have been under other circumstances. And a strong case can
be made for arguing that Soviet behavior was entirely compatible with
rational decision-making.
We believe that more important factors in the Soviet decision
were inadequate information and, resulting from this, an erroneous
assessment of the situation. They did not have the fund of information
about the mood and temper of the US government and people which the
intelligence community thought they must possess. They saw the balance
of advantages and disadvantages differently from the way Washington
officials thought they should see it. It is in this area that the intelligence
community failed although we defer for the moment the question of the
extent to which the community can be held accountable for the failure.
It is fairly clear in retrospect that the intelligence community
both underestimated the gains that Moscow believed it could derive from
introducing offensive missiles in Cuba and overestimated the risks which
the Kremlin thought it ran in adopting this course of action. In reading
the various estimates seriatim, we were struck by the fact that, although
the question of the deployment in Cuba of Soviet medium-range missiles
was raised in a Memorandum to the Director of January 8, 1962, it was
concluded repeatedly until early September that the Soviet Union could
not thereby add substantially to its strategic capabilities. The reason
given was that targets in the United States capable of being reached by
medium-range missiles from Cuba were already covered by ICBM's
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deployed on Soviet territory. Only on September 6 were doubts raised
about this conclusion. The Special NIE of September 19, conceded that
Soviet planners might see some advantage in deploying IRBM's and MRBM's
in Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBM's believed to
be operational in the Soviet Union. The delay in coming to this conclusion
is surprising in view of the fact that it had been estimated several months
earlier that the USSR had only a small number of operational ICBM's. In
this situation one obvious way for the Soviet Union to supplement its small
force of ICBM's was to deploy a proportion of its large supply of medium-
range missiles within appropriate striking distance of the United States.
We are not, in fact, sure that such a deployment constituted, objectively,
a substantial improvement of their strategic position, though Soviet planners,
of course, may well have thought so. We are sure, however, that the Soviet
Union would have gained enormously in prestige and, indirectly, greatly in
the military balance of power and deterrence, if it had succeeded in
installing "offensive" missiles in Cuba and maintaining them there. Soviet
leaders, like all rational leaders, must be expected to accept a higher
level of risk for great gains than for small gains. We note that this was
not acknowledged in the estimates we examined.
Even when it was admitted that the Soviet Union might secure
possible strategic advantages by employing IRBM's and MRBM's in
Cuba(SNIE 85--3-62, September 19, 1962), the conclusion remained that
the Soviets were unlikely to do so because the risks would be too great
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and acceptance of so great a risk would represent a sharp departure from
Soviet practice. This was the crucial view that prevented assigning any
high degree of probability to the course of action that the USSR pursued.
However, this view was justified only if the Kremlin assessed the risk
factor approximately as it was assessed in Washington. The intelligence
community thought that the risk was very high. It knew it to be so. Yet
it is fairly clear in retrospect that the Soviet leaders did not share this
knowledge, that they assessed the risk at a lower level and that, given
this assessment, their deployment of "offensive" missiles in Cuba, did
not seem unduly risky to them. In that case, their action did not, as
they saw it, constitute a sharp departure from their normally cautious
military behavior.
The extent to which the intelligence community can be held
accountable for neglecting the possible gap between their information
and our information is not clear to us. Such gaps are a possible source
of intelligence failure to which. the professional should be alert. In
retrospect it would, certainly have been better if the possibility of this
gap, and its possible implications, had been acknowledged in the estimates.
If it had been, it might have qualified the impact of an erroneous
conclusion.
On, the other hand, it is patently very difficult for our intelligence
services to have sufficient knowledge of Soviet intelligence to ascertain
or predict intelligence failures in the Soviet Union. Moreover, there
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is reason to believe that much of the intelligence community, including
ONE, is not provided with such knowledge of Soviet intelligence activities,
and their organization as is available to a part of the community. Yet
this is the kind of knowledge which would have been required for a correct
prediction of the Soviet move in Cuba.
Moreover, the intelligence officer is also handicapped in speculat-
ing about national differences in estimating the risk of particular courses
of action as long as he may not take relevant United States policies fully
into account, and have adequate information about these policies and their
implementation to the extent that they are known, or must be assumed to
be known, to the Soviet Union.
However, even if these handicaps were removed, or at least
appreciably diminished, the consumer of intelligence would be wrong
to expect the intelligence community to be able in all cases to obtain
sufficient information on the opponent's estimates of the advantages and
disadvantages of contemplated courses of action. For this reason alone,
and not necessarily as a result of "preconceived notions," the best
intelligence service cannot help failing from time to time. It vso uld
be unfair and utterly unrealistic, in our opinion, to expect otherwise.
On the other hand, the inevitability of occasional failure does
not,justify either complacency or resignation. No organization stays
at the same level of performance over a long time my if only because
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of changes in personnel -- and there may always be room for improve-
ment. There are good reasons for reviewing institutional practices
from time to time with a view of raising the batting average by a few
per cent.
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Rejected Proposals
We have considered, and have rejected as impractical, the
following proposals.
1) "Devil's advocates", professional dissenters, etc.
We hope that the intelligence community will always include
tough-minded, skeptical individuals who will advance unpopular
ideas and who will query accepted doctrine. But any attempt
to institutionalize this function would be self -defeating. No
one can be skeptical all the time and the views of a man who
was being paid to act as a professional dissenter would not
carry great weight.
2) Dual or multiple estimates. For example, one
group might make an estimate from the Soviet point of view
while another estimated the same problem from the US point
of view. The difficulty here is what to do in case of disagree-
ment. Either some higher group would reach a final decision,
in which case we would be back where we started, or the
consumer would make a final estimate, in which case the
community would have abdicated its responsibility. Moreover,
there is certain artificiality about this procedure which would
probably erode its value very quickly.
Bl.
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3) Make less effort to reach agreed language in
estimates, and encourage dissents. It is possible that under
pressure of time some dissents which might have been helpful
are never made. But while a few footnotes are useful in alerting
the consumer to the difficulties of a problem a steady diet of
footnotes would blunt his attention. If there were too many
points on which agreement could not be reached the consumer
would have to make his own estimate and the community would
again have abdicated its responsibility. In short, dissents on
minor points should not be encouraged, and it seems unlikely
that dissents on major points are, or could be suppressed.
We note that in the Cuban estimates of 1962 (and in others
which we can remember) the worst mistakes were not caused
by suppressing disagreements or by watering down correct
judgments in order to obtain an agreed text. They were caused
by mistaken judgments which were held almost unanimously
throughout the intelligence community.
4) Make more effort to keep estimates up-to-date by
issuing fre ;nt revisions. Carried to an extreme, this would
obviously lead to a confusion between estimates and current
intelligence. Even a moderate increase in the number of
revisions would probably do more harm than good by forcing
estimators to concentrate on minor fluctuations in policy rather
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than on longer-range problems. When an estimate has been
overtaken by events nothing can be gained by issuing a hasty
revision which simply says that the preceding estimate was
wrong. When a situation has gone operational revision of
earlier estimates should wait until there are some firm indica-
tions of new policies and courses of action. At this point current
intelligence will give policy-makers the flow of information which
they require. To refer once more to our case study, we doubt
that more frequent revisions of the basic estimates on Cuba
between 1 August and 19 September, 1962 would have changed the
opinions held by the intelligence community in any important
way.
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 Approved For Release TPP069 W-1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
~0214004 000100080001-1
5 September 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. Reference your memorandum of 4 September 1963.
2. I concur in the basic report, however, I note paragraph 3,
page R3, in the Committee of Consultants' report, statements
which could lead to an erroneous conclusion. Relative to these
statements the facts are that, although DIA normally submits the
DOD input to NIEs:
a. The Military Services can and frequently do submit
separate contributions to the Board of National Estimates.
b. In the drafting of NIEs the representatives of the
Military Services participate fully with the BNE in considering
and interpreting the evidence. At this time they make additional
relevant contributions and fully express any differences of view
they may have. Similar procedures are followed in the development
of JCS papers.
c. When the NIE is being considered for approval at USIB
any differing views held by an Intelligence Chief of a Military
Service are fully considered and, if unresolved, are published
in the NIE as expressed by the Intelligence Chief concerned.
3. It is requested that this memorandum be attached as an Annex
to your report.
. CARROLL
ieut&iant General, USAF
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MEMORANDUM
September 9, 1963
TO: Mr. John A. McCone
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
FROM: Thomas L. Hughes
Director, Intelligence and Research
I have no trouble in concurring in general with your report
to Mr. Bundy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, or in the responses to the questions raised and objectives
posed by them. However, I do regret that your Steering Committee
1
on this matter has never met, and that INR participation in the
earlier phases was replaced in the last three weeks by successive
CIA redrafts which overran the deadlines allowed for comment.
Under the circumstances, certain language occurs in the
final text on which I should like to comment. Probably the most
expeditious way to note these points now is to follow your suggestion
by submitting this entire memorandum as an annex, including the
following comments on the text:
IandII-
1/ See USIB Minutes for June 26, 1963
(USIB-M-276)? paragraph 10 (b) (1).
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I and II - Early Warning and Current Intelligence
Paragraph 5b (page 3) includes INR's Research Memoranda
among the products of the Intelligence Community which have
been "revised to focus . . . more directly on specific topics
of interest to the policy maker . . . as a result of concern
over the gap between estimates and current intelligence re-
porting . . ." Actually, as noted in each of INR's last
three annual reports to the President's Board, INR Research
Memoranda have been specifically tailored for relevant policy-
oriented objectives from their outset in 1961. This has been
our explicit concept from the beginning, and we are glad to
have pioneered in it. Since we have considered this kind of
research as the core of our entire productive effort, we
have not found it necessary to revise our procedures or our
efforts in this direction.
Paragraph 6 (page 4.) refers to the lack of State Depart-
ment representation in the National Indications Center as a
"deficiency that came to our attention anew." As you know
from our frequent discussions of this matter at USIB during
the past year, we have repeatedly sought authorization and
funds for these positions from the Congress. Despite the
demonstrated need and repeated requests, the receptivity on
Capitol Hill
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Capitol Hill for this proposal is best summed up by the
following exchange from this year's House Appropriation
hearings:
MR. HILSMAN. By a National Security Council
directive this Bureau is required to supply three
people to this function who work and live there on
a 2k-hour basis. We have not had the people to do
this. John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence,
is very insistent that we discharge our responsi-
bilities, so are the JCS. Three of the officer in-
creases are for officers to man the National
Indications Center.
MR. ROONEY. You might tell us about Mr. McCone
and why he would not give you the money out of the
unlimited budget that he has.
Consequently we particularly appreciate your suggestion
in your response to the Board that "a way be found of getting
around the budget restriction" to enable us to finance
National Indications Center participation.
Paragraph 8 (page 5) states that "we doubt that real
progress can be made through procedural modifications." While
this is true, the State Department Operations Center has asked
me specifically to note that in a field where many agencies
share responsibilities and where rapid transmission and ex-
change of intelligence is vital, constant attention must be
given to procedural problems to insure the most effective
functioning of existing machinery.
Paragraph 9 (page 5)
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III - Automatic Data Processing
Paragraph 3e (page 81 directs attention to the fact that
the Department of State is developing a pilot system covering
Cuban affairs
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Cuban affairs based on a computer and designed to produce
permuted subject indexes. Actually, it is designed to pro-
subject
duce these permuted /indexes, document absiracts and extracts,
and political and economic facts as well.
Within the Department, three distinct but interrelated
levels of authority will be served: 1) the desk officer and
office director level; 2) the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
and the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs; and
3) the principal officers of the Department, including the
Secretary, during periods of crises. This effort should
be regarded as an operational prototype system which will be
expanded after the end products have been evaluated on a
trial-and-error basis by the various levels of information
users.
While the lack of funds and lack of time to consolidate
the results of experience are not currently pressing problems
to the community at large, they are serious problems for
State. Doubt exists at the moment as to Congressional approval
of this project's line item in the FY 1964 Department budget,
which already has been reduced from $663,000 to
250,000.
In addition to those problems of interagency organization
and research personnel shortage which are mentioned in the
basic
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basic report, I would also like to mention the high cost of
data inputs. The processing of intelligence in preparation
for input to a computer system is presently accomplished by
people. Depending upon the system requirements, these persons
index, abstract, and/or extract documents. The result is a
high cost product which is generally useable in only that
agency or department of government for which the computer
system was designed.
Within the next five years we foresee technical advances
which will drastically reduce these costs. These improvements
should occur in the areas of: 1) the use of digital computers
to index and abstract automatically electrical communications
traffic; 2) improvements in character recognition devices and
the development of page reading equipment; and 3) source data
automation sub-systems. During the intervening period of
from three to five years, the challenge is one of increasing
the standardization and general compatibility of our intelli-
gence processing and storage and retrieval systems in the
several agencies.
IV -- Natinnal Intelligence Estimates
Paragraph 1 (page.ll) singles out the Board of National
Estimates as being "well equipped" with the "qualifications
and capabilities"
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- 7
and capabilities" which will "well serve" the Director of
Central Intelligence and the USIB. Likewise paragraph 2
pare 12) refers to "estimates prepared by the Board of
National Estimates." While not quarreling with the commenda-
tion, I believe the host of hardworking analysts from INR and
other elements of the Community have a right to be surprised
over the unique and proprietary role attributed in this way
to the coordinating body. It is the essence of national
estimates that they reflect the combined analytical capabili-
ties of the entire Community, among which the admitted talents
of the Board of National Estimates are by no means exclusive.
Indeed we have long believed that the work of writing NIEs
would be expedited if INR drafts on political subjects were
regularly used as the tabled working drafts.
Paragraph 1 (page 12) contains a reassertion of the
importance of each USIB member's "preserving and exercising
his right of dissent and his privilege to express such dissents
which is frequently done through footnotes to the estimates."
We welcome your reaffirmation of USIB practice in this con-
nection and note that the report specifically considers it a
right to be exercised on the responsibility of the individual
USIB member concerned.
Paragraph 4 (page 12)
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Paragraph 4 (page 12) states that the Strayer Report
"represents the acceptable viewpoint on the questions raised
by this particular objective." * To me the report is more than
acceptable. Although to the best of my knowledge neither our
INR personnel nor INR products were reviewed by the Strayer
panel, I believe the report is unusually perceptive and stimulating.
Its recommendations deserve the most serious consideration,
support, and implementation.
* Changed in the final revision, and subsequent to INR review,
to read: "represents the acceptable viewpoint on some of the
questions raised by this particular objective."
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