GUIDED MISSILES AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: (GMAIC)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00129R000100070007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

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GUIDED MISSILES AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: (GMAIC)
GMAIC responsibilities include the production.of intelligence,
recommendations for missile and astronautics intelligence objectives
pursuant to the PNIOs, and the identification of deficiencies in
related intelligence production and collection. The Committee's
charter does not, however, state that its activities should be directed
in accordance with PNIOs, although its field of concern is clearly
related to several.
The Committee's analytic and production workload is largely concerned
with current problems, rather than from a studied endeavor to fulfill
PNIOs. Questions and indications,of special interests are received
through the membership from the highest intelligence levels, and
inspiration is obtained fromUSIB's considerations of substantive problems.
Guidance to Committee endeavor is also obtained from the Board of National
Estimates.
GMAIC produces missile and astronautics Priority National Intelli-
gence Objectives based on DCID 1/3 and provides recommendations for the
establishment of the PNIOs during the annual review cycle. The Committee
also refers specifically to PNIOs when considering collection requirements
or when asked to establish priorities for a collection problem or
system.
The Committee has no collection resources, nor does it-have the
responsibility to program or allocate the resources belonging to other
J components of the Community. In addition, GMAIC feels that it does not
have-real influence on its primary collectors (NSA, FTD, AMC, etc.).
GMAIC believes that it would benefit greatly from central direction
and allocation of production and collection resources toward national
rather than departmental interests.
NSA review(s) completed.
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INTERAGENCY CLANDESTINE COLLECTION PRIORITIES COMMITTEE. (IPC)
The PNIOs are used directly for both substantive and priority considera-
tions in the preparation of clandestine collection guidance by the IPC.
The IPC requirements listings are in fact broken down into sections which
correspond directly to the priority categories of PNIOs set forth in DCID 1/3.
The actual listing of intelligence collection requirements within the IPC
sections are prepared by individual member agencies and coordinated with other
IPC representatives. Conflict of agency interests occurs, but.is usually
resolved without need for arbitration by higher authority.
The IPC.in and of itself does not plan collection but it is heavily
involved in long term guidance and planning, often on a time scale.compar?
able to that of the PNIOs. The guidance the Committee prepares is provided
to DD/P/CIA for use in operational, long-range planning by the Clandestine
Services. The IPC does not participate in the allocation of clandestine
resources to collect against priority requirements, nor does it attempt to
influence operations, or to determine the extent to which collection is
satisfying requirements.
The Committee has received little guidance or direction from USIB
(only PNIOs) or from the DCI other than that contained in DCID 5/5.
DDP considers that "central control" of the IPC would threaten the
security of Clandestine Services operations, but feels that it would be
desirable to have a central mechanism to ensure that the production offices
prepare adequate requirements for IPC use.
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SIGINT COMMITTEE:
The SIGINT Committee's efforts to provide guidance to the Director,
NSA, in the collection and production.of SIGINT (as called for in its
charter - DCID 6/1) have in recent years been based directly upon the
PNIOs. Except for the 1960 effort,-USIB COMINT Requirements lists
prepared over the past 8 years have, in. fact, stemmed specifically from
both the substance and the priorities contained in DCID 1/3. At this
time, the Committee is considering establishing both long-term (5 year)
and short-term (1 year) guidance to SIGINT production.
To a large extent guidance provided by the Committee has been
used by DIRNSA as a means of managing the headquarters processing effort
(the selection and publication of messages), rather than for across-the-
board allocation of collection resources.
The SIGINT Committee participates in the allocation of SIGINT
collection resources to a limited extent and on a special-problem basis.
For example, the Committee.may make judgments as to the need for urgent
coverage of a critical situation which could involve the withdrawal of
resources from other targets. It does not, as a Committee, participate
in the over-all programming of interpept assets and resources. This is
done by DIRNSA and the Service Cryptologic Agenciesand without reference
to PNIOs.k
In 1962 the Department of Defense introduced an annual review of
the entire SIGINT program (Combined Cryptologic Program) which involved
a detailed examination of all SIGINT assets, their substantive productivity
and the relative value of the productivity of the various elements
involved. The PNIOs have not been used.in this review. CIA provides an
observer in the review, and the Committee has performed supporting tasks,
but the Committee is not yet officially involved in the program.
From time to time the DCI has advised DIRNSA of intelligence problems
requiring extraordinary attention. Neither the DCI nor USIB has provided
continuing substantive guidance or direction to the SIGINT Committee.
In view of he many conflicting demands on SIGINT resources, the
Committee would ~enefit from a centrally managed PNIO system, but would
not be enthusiastic about a central mechanism overseeing its decisions
and,"recommendations.
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JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEEa (JAEIC)
In a fashion similar.to GMAIC, this Committee.uses PNIOs in the
establishment of collection requirements and their priorities, but does
not normally fo]ktdow them in intelligence analysis and, production work.
Substantive guidance to the Committee is received from the Board of
National Estimates, from USIB in specific cases and, through its representa-
tives, from participating agencies. In addition, the Chairman (CIA)
receives spot guidance from the Q/DD/I which stems from the White House
and other high-level sources,
JAEIC engages in long-range planning only to the extent that it
prepares specialized National Intelligence Objectives in pursuance of the
PNIQs in.DCID 1/3; notes particular deficiencies in collection against
Soviet tests; andrecommends on the technical development of collection
apparatus.
The Committee does not have the authority for the allocation of either
production or collection resources.
The Chairman does not feel that additional or central direction.is
required on substantive or technical matters. However, it is felt that
central direction of clandestine collection would be worthwhile.
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The subjects and interests of the Watch Committee are specifically and
directly related to the highest priority PNIOs - those concerned with
Communist armed action against the US, its Allies or other Free World Nations.
The direction of this interest stems from the Committee's mission for the
analysis and production of early warning intelligence, rather than a substan-
tive or administrative attention to the terms of PNIOs.
Substantive. guidance for the Committee is derived on a current and
continuing basis from the USIB and from individual Committee members as
representatives of their respective agencies. Long-range planning is conducted
as part of the regular.warning survey and in response to specific situations
or charges as they arise.
The allocation of collection and production resources in support of
Committee programs is determined and implemented under the authority and
guidance of respective Committee members and their staffs.
The Committee considers that the guidance it receives and the manner
in which it is received is adequate and effective and that there is no need
for further centralization or for a central mechanism for the provision of
guidance and coordination.
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SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: (SIC)
The SIC's principal activity is the preparation of contributions to
NIEs and NISs and is subject to the production schedules in these fields.
Otherwise, the Committee itself determines its program and receives no
direction or guidance from the, outside, although it has direct contact
with the Board of National Estimates.
In the past the SIC has issued Science and Technology PNIOs based
upon DCID 1/3 and is considering such a publication this year. The
Committee's attention to priority areas appears to stem more from a
general awareness.of consumer interest, rather than from guidance stemming
from PNIOs or other outside stimulus.
PNIOs are cited as a justification for collection requirements
prepared by the Committee and its Subcommittees, but it is likely that the
,requirements come first and the PNIO, just happening to fit, comes after.
The SIC has no overall program expressly to translate the PNIOs into
research or collection activity.
The Committee until recently had concerned itself solely with current
prpblems and review of past production. However, it now is considering
the role it should play in the coordination of future research.
No resources are allocated directly by the SIC.
The Chairman feels the Committee is a useable management and
coordination tool, but that operating officials are not making use of
it. Central direction would be desirable. The following possibilities
were suggested:
a. A Committee of USIB Committee Chairmen
b. A stronger USIB Secretariat
c. DD/I direction that DD/I offices support USIB committees
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: (EIC)
The EIC has played a major role in the coordination and direction of
intelligence production and collection guidance concerned with economic
intelligence since its creation in 1951. During the period 195ll960 the
Committee engaged in several comprehensive programs-.
a. a comprehensive survey of information needs and the publication
of interrogation guides, collection manuals and other guidance
material.
c. In addition, the Committee sought to improve and coordinate State's
economic reporting (CERP) and peripheral reporting.
The EIC concluded after several years experience that the PNIOs and
the PNEIO,.while generally useful, were so broad that judgment as to
specific collection priorities had to be left to experts. Additionally,
the Committee determined that the guidance and cgordination efforts it was
undertaking were inordinately time consuming and often duplicative of agency
efforts.
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In 1959 USIB agreed that the production of specialized PNIOs, such as
PNEIOs, were authorized but not required. The EIC then agreed that USIB
agencies would each review PNIOs in terms of their own missions and establish
necespary economic research and collection priorities, rather than produce
PNEIOs. At this time, member agencies place their priority economic
intelligence collection requirements directly on the component or agency
managing the guidance to collection resources (e.g., COMOR, SIGINT Committee,
IPC).
The EIC believes that individual agencies are aware of PNIOs and under-
stand the concepts involved in translating objectives into agency collection
guidance programs and that central direction and guidance by the Committee
is no longer necessary.
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COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE. (COMOR)
COMOR seldom refers specifically to the PNIOs as a basis for
substantive justification or for the determination of priority for
reconnaissance.requirements. COMOR assumes that in view of the level
and qualifications of its membership, it is fully capable of judging the
validity, priority and suitability of each requirement brought before
it. However, PNIOs are a governing factor on long-range planning and, when
necessary, are studied to assist in resolving conflicts between requirements.
Guidance and direction to the Committee comes from the White House,
the DCI and from Committee membership. Requirements originating from
the membership are thoroughly checked out with production elements
within the agencies before submission to COMOR. The establishment of
"community needs" is virtually essential to approval of any requirement,
since new projects require preliminary USIB approval, and requirements
on existing projects normally require Special Group approval.
Reconnaissance collection resources are allocated and tasked by
the NRO and not by COMOR. COMOR must therefore, consider the impact of
its requirements on existing and projected NRO collection programs.
In view of the close direction by the DCI and USIB and its community
membership, COMOR can see no need for additional central direction or
for a central mechanism for providing guidance and direction.
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CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS COMMITTEE: (CCPC)
According to its charter (DCID 2/2), the CCPC concerns itself with
collection problems of community interest referred to it by USIB, a
USIB committee or agency, or by the Committee itself, subject to prior
approval by the DCI of the nature and scope.of the study to be undertaken
by the Committee. DIA and Defense agencies have requested deletion of
the clause requiring DCI approval. In the past two years the Committee
has reviewed fourteen major problems, eleven assigned by USIB or the DCI
and three at the request of a tTSIB agency.
The Committee concerns itself with the collection of intelligence on
critical problems. Each problem so far considered has related to one or
another of the top PNIOs. This relationship is inherent in the Committee's
work, but is also the result of active.consideration by the Committee of
gaps in information relating to the highest priority PNIOs.
The CCPC has maintained a very close. relationship with GMAIC and has
been briefed on a number.of occasions on missile matters. With the
expansion.of the CCPC charter in 1962 (to include subjects other than
missiles) the Committee has when necessary obtained the participation
and consultation of analytic elements in its deliberations.
The CCPC does not actually allocate collection resources. However,
in a few instances it has set up a working group,or has itself dealt with
the collection agency concerned in order to allocate assets e. .
Project In
addition, the Committee in effect managed Project It has 25X1
not, however, managed any programs, with.the exception of 25X1
involving an aircraft built at the expense.of millions, which the Committee
and GMAIC concluded was being poorly-run.. In this case, the DDCI charged
the two committees with setting up a panel of experts to review the
entire. management and operation of the program.
The Chairman feels, with respect; to the question of increased central
direction and guidance, that USIB seems to have been derelict in that
it has not followed up on approved projects or on the performance of
executive agents appointed to carry out programs and projects, or in many
cases has failed to assess the quantity, quality or value of resultant
intelligence products.
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