PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00129R000100060003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2005
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• Content Type: PAPER

.0 It
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Evolution and role of "the most
broadly controlling document
in the field of requirements."
PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
Ludwell L. Montague
Clyde Heffter, in the "Fresh Look at Collection Require-
ments" which he takes in a recent issue of the Studies,' notes
the "conspicuous hiatus" between such high-level guidance
documents as Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/3,
Priority National Intelligence Objectives, and the collection
requirements actually produced at the working level, particu-
larly with respect to the question of determining relative
priorities among such requirements. He invites discussion of
the problem of "how to formulate needs and priorities in
such a way as to facilitate the satisfaction of needs in a de-
gree roughly proportionate to their priorities, through the
most effective use of the collection means available."
In the nature of the case, collectors are likely to be more
keenly aware of this problem than people working in other
phases of the intelligence process, but its existence and gravity
should be of concern to researchers and estimators as well,
for it is their work that ultimately suffers from any diffusion
and misdirection of the collection effort. The hiatus be-
tween general guidelines and practical requirements that Mr.
Heffter points out is real, and its consequences are serious.
He has considered it from the collectors' viewpoint. The pur-
pose of this article is to complement his analysis with an ex-
amination from the other side of the gap-specifically, to de-
scribe the development of the PNIO concept and to review
what the PNIO's are and are not intended to be. Conclusions
as to what is wanting for the determination of practical pri-
orities are substantially the same from either point of view.
Evolution of the PNIO's
From the outset it was understood that the responsibility
of the Director of Central Intelligence for the coordination of
MORI
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U.S. foreign intelligence activities included a responsibility to
provide authoritative guidance for intelligence collection and
production from a national (as distinguished from depart-
mental) point of view. To this end, National Security Coun-
cil Intelligence Directive 4, adopted by the NSC in December
1947, prescribed two specific duties:
(1) To prepare "a comprehensive outline of national intelli-
gence objectives [generally] applicable to foreign countries
and areas."
(2) To select, on a current basis, the sections and items of
this outline having priority interest.
By "comprehensive outline" the drafters of NSCID 4 meant
an integration of such then existing departmental docu-
ments as the Army's Index Guide and the Navy's Monograph
Index. What they had in mind has actually been accom-
plished by the preparation of the National Intelligence Survey
outline (NIS Standard Instructions, June 1951). However,
the publication of DCID 1/2 (15 September 1958) was consid-
ered necessary to meet the formal requirement for a "com-
prehensive outline" of national intelligence objectives.
The 1947 directive had the fault of prescribing a method
rather than a mission. Manifestly, national intelligence ob-
jectives have never been determined by the selection of "sec-
tions and items" from a "comprehensive outline." They
are no longer required to be in NSCID 1, of 15 September 1958,
whose subparagraph 3b (1) is the present-day survivor of the
original NSC]:D 4.
The fact is that no priority national intelligence objectives
were formulated until 1950, and that their provenance then
was unrelated to NSCID 4. In May 1950 the Joint Intelli-
gence Committee produced JIC 452/7, "Critical Intelligence
Objectives of the Department of Defense with Respect to the
USSR." This document identified as critical intelligence ob-
jectives five generalized aspects of Soviet military capabilities.
In September its text, with the addition of two highly gen-
eralized references to political warfare, was adopted as DCID
4/2, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives." In June 1952
this DCID was amended to cover explicitly not only the USSR
but also "its Satellites (including Communist China)."
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The preoccupation of DCID 4/2 with Soviet military capa-
bilities was a natural consequence of its origin and of the cir-
cumstances of the time, the shooting war then in progress
in Korea. In August 1953, however, an armistice having
been signed, the adequacy of the 'DCID as priority guidance
for a national intelligence effort was questioned. The Board of
National Estimates was directed to study the problem and to
propose a suitable revision. Its study, in consultation with
research and collection personnel throughout the Agency, ex-
tended over a period of ten months, followed by six months
of inter-agency coordination.
It was represented to the Board that the almost exclusively
military character of DCID 4/2 resulted in claims of priority
for the collection of any desired item of military information
over any other information, no matter how significant the
latter might be in relation to the national security. Such
claims were plainly out of consonance with the current esti-
mate (NIE 99, October 1953) that, for the near term at least,
the Kremlin would probably avoid military action with identi-
fiable Bloc forces, that the active threat to U.S. security was
likely to be a vigorous Communist political warfare campaign
designed to undermine the Western power position, and that
there was danger of a weakening of the unity of the Free
World. They were also plainly out of consonance with NSC
162/2, Basic National Security Policy (October 1953), which
emphasized a need for intelligence on the capabilities and in-
tentions of friendly and neutral states as well as of the Soviet
Bloc.
The Board concluded that the list of priority national in-
telligence objectives must be expanded to cover at least the
most significant of these non-military concerns, and that
there must also be some discrimination between military ob-
jectives of greater and of lesser consequence. This expansion
of the list and need for discrimination within it led to the de-
velopment of three general categories of priority within the
listing. A single list in absolute order of priority was con-
sidered infeasible and also undesirable, as likely to introduce
self-defeating rigidity into the system.
The revised DCID proposed by the Board of National Esti-
mates and adopted by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
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PNIO's
(DCID 4/4, December 1954) was the prototype of the present
DCID 1/3 (4 January 1961). The differences between the two
represent only those adjustments normally to be expected as
responsive to developments in the situation.
Criteria for PNIO Selection
The DCID has an annex that sets forth certain criteria to
govern the selection of priority national intelligence objec-
tives. A gloss on these criteria is in order at this point.
It is stipulated, first, that the PNIO's should be directly re-
lated to the intelligence required in the formulation and exe-
cution of national security policy. Through its role in the
preparation of national intelligence estimates, the Board of
National Estimates is cognizant of the intelligence require-
ments of the NSC and its subordinate policy boards. It is
also cognizant of the most critical problems inherent in the
estimates required to meet their needs. Its identification of
these substantive problems as priority national intelligence
objectives cars provide a basis for identifying priority research
and collection requirements, but of course does not in itself
define such requirements.
Second, since the bulk of the intelligence required in the
formulation and execution of national security policy will
be the product of routine intelligence collection and research,
the PNIO's should be limited to the critical problems which
require special attention and effort. This principle should be
axiomatic. There is, however, constant pressure to make the
listing more inclusive, with a consequent danger of its becom-
ing so nearly all-inclusive as to deprive the word "priority" of
meaning. This pressure, which apparently springs from a de-
sire to get everyone's favorite topic listed as a priority objec-
tive in order to insure that it will not be neglected, has to be
resisted.
Third, in order to afford a stable basis for intelligence
planning, the DCID should be designed to remain valid over
an extended period. This consideration requires the exclusion
of topics of momentarily urgent, but transitory, interest,
which will require and receive ad hoc treatment in any case.
The present practice is to review and revise the DCID annu-
ally, the process sometimes extending the period between re-
visions to as much as eighteen months.
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Fourth, since broad generalities are of little practical use,
the PNIO's should be specific enough to provide discernible
guidance for the allocation of research and collection re-
sources, but not so specific as to constitute in themselves re-
search and collection requirements. The application of this
criterion presents the greatest difficulty in the formulation of
PNIO's and is the source of complaints from those collection
personnel who refuse to accept them, with Mr. Heffter, as "a
constitution which requires both laws and courts to interpret
it." The criterion has served on the one hand to rule out
the kind of generality found in the 1950-52 DCID 4/2, and on
the other to keep the PNIO in rather broad terms, especially
in comparison with specific collection requirements-that is,
to maintain its character as the statement of a critical sub-
stantive intelligence problem rather than an itemizing of the
essential elements of information needed for its solution.
Role of the PNIO's in Guiding Research and Collection
The function of the PNIO's as stated in the DCTD, is to
serve as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection
and production. They are intended to be only the first step
in a process beginning with a need for information felt at the
national policy planning level and extending to the servicing
of specific collection requirements in the field.
In this first step, the Board of National Estimates, with the
advice of other Agency off-ices and in coordination with
USIB representatives, identifies the critical substantive prob-
lems inherent in the general body of intelligence required for
purposes of national security policy. This is as far as esti-
mators can properly go in relation to the total problem. The
identification and formulation of collection requirements re-
lated to these priority national intelligence objectives requires
analysis by research personnel to determine the elements of
information essential to a solution of the problem, the ele-
ments already available or readily obtainable through re-
search, the additional information obtainable through routine
collection and the residual information of such critical im-
portance as to warrant a priority collection effort.
Obviously, not every bit of information somehow related to
a priority national intelligence objective will be required with
equal urgency. Many are procurable by routine means. It is
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PNIO's
therefore necessary that research personnel exercise discrimi-
nation and restraint in formulating collection requirements,
claiming priority for only those aspects of a priority objec-
tive that actually do require a priority collection effort. As
Mr. Heffter has pointed out, the criterion here is not a pos-
sible incidental relationship of the collection requirement to
a PNIO, but the importance (the essentiality) of the desired
information for a solution of the critical problem designated
in the PNIO and its unavailability from other sources. If re-
search analysts present unjustified claims for priority collec-
tion, citing some not cogent relationship to a PNIO, collectors
must exercise their own judgment and authority in rejecting
them.
If a particular system of intelligence collection is unable
to satisfy all of the legitimate requirements levied upon it,
determinations have to be made as to which requirements
will be accorded priority. In this operational context, how-
ever, priority can never be determined solely by reference to
the PNIO's. One requirement related to a PNIO and certi-
fied by a responsible research agency to be a really essential
element of information, being well suited to the particular
mode of collection, may consequently be accorded the desired
priority. Another such requirement may be totally unsuited
to that mode of collection and therefore unworthy of any con-
sideration whatever, no matter what the PNIO to which it
is related. All sorts of gradations are possible between these
two extremes. In these circumstances collection officers
must assume the responsibility for deciding between the im-
portunate claimants for their services. Their decisions may
be informed and guided by the PNIO's and other instruments
that Mr. Herter cites, but they must be made primarily in
terms of the collector's expert professional knowledge.
Problems such as these are inherent in the administration
of intelligence research and collection. No reformulation of
the PNIO's could obviate them-unless, indeed, the PNIO's
were to be transformed into a community-wide listing of coor-
dinated collection requirements in an absolute order of pri-
ority. Even if this were done, something like the present
PNIO's would then have to be reinvented to guide the coordi-
nators of collection requirements. The problem lies, not in
the PNIO's, however imperfect they may be, but in the gap
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between them and the scramble to obtain priority for indi-
vidual collection requirements.
What Can Be Done About It?
In 1954 the Board of National Estimates was keenly aware
that the formulation of PNIO's was only a small part of the
total problem. It recommended that the then Special Assist.-
ant to the Director for Planning and Coordination be directed
to review existing procedures for the development and coordi-
nation of collection requirements in relation to the PNIO's,
and to propose improvements. The Special Assistant made
such a study and. concluded that no action was advisable.
Like Mr. Heffter, he considered that a single community-wide
mechanism for coordinating collection requirements, assign-
ing priorities to them, and allocating particular collection re-
sources to their service would be a Rube Goldberg contrap-
tion, more a hindrance than a help. The Board of National
Estimates would heartily agree. It had not meant to propose
the invention of such a machine, but it had hoped that seri-
ous study of the subject might bear such fruit as a more gen-
eral understanding of mutual responsibilities and more sys-
tematic procedures for cooperation in the common cause.
For six years, however, the gap has remained, and collec-
tors as well as estimators evidently find it to be not a Good
Thing. And now Mr. Heffter comes forward with some con-
structive suggestions and a welcome invitation to profes-
sional discussion of the problem. Rejecting as impractical the
idea of a community-wide coordination of collection require-
ments in priority order, he suggests that the situation could
be alleviated if more systematic use were made of the find-
ings of the several USIB subcommittees under their assigned
authority, in their respective fields, "to recommend ... intel-
ligence objectives within the over-all national intelligence ob-
jectives, establish relative priorities on substantive needs, re-
view the scope and effectiveness of collection and production
efforts to meet these objectives, and make the necessary sub-
stantive recommendations to the departments and agencies
concerned." This would be precisely the kind of implemen-
tation of the PNIO's which the Board of National Estimates
has advocated for many years.
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More important than any procedural proposals, however, is
Mr. Heffter's recognition of the fundamental need for a truly
professional doctrine and discipline in relation to this subject.
The professional discussion which he seeks to stimulate is a
necessary step toward the satisfaction of that need.
It is now time for someone to join the discussion from the
viewpoint of the research components of the community.
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