DCI BRIEFING FOR HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000800030009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 6, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

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6 February 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
CUBA
Military Situation
I. Cuba may have dropped out of the headlines in
recent months, but I want to assure you that we
maintain a close intelligence watch on what the
Cubans are up to both at home and in trouble spots
around Latin America.
A. We are continuing regular photographic
reconnaissance.
B. A joint intelligence team from CIA and the
Defense Intelligence Agency meets regularly,
to examine all intelligence from all sources
on Cuba. The primary concern of this team
is whether there is any evidence of strategic
weapons or nuclear warheads on the island.
C. The latest report remains negative.
II. There has, however, been.a substantial increase
in Soviet military shipments to Cuba.
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III. We believe the increased shipments reflect a new
military aid agreement reached when Raul Castro
was in Moscow last spring. Most of the shipments
over the past three years have consisted of re-
placements, spare parts, maintenance equipment,
and ammunition.
A. We have observed no major addition to the
Cuban military potential.
B. The recent shipments have included surface-
to-air missiles to replace the present in-
ventory, which has reached the end of its
storage life.
C. Recent deliveries--some arriving as deck
cargo on otherwise commercial shipments--
have included six additional Komar guided
missile boats, and five to seven MIG-2].
aircraft.
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IV. The Cuban military establishment is one of the
largest and best equipped in Latin America. Morale
is good--especially among the officers. The troops
are loyal to the regime. The armed forces are
fully capable of maintaining internal order and
defending the island from anything short of a
large-scale external assault supported by the
United States.
(MAP, CUBAN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS)
A. Cuban air defense has 23 surface-to-air
missile installations, about 135 4et fighters
ranging from the MIG-15 to the supersonic
MIG-21, and almost 1,500 antiaircraft guns,
some of them radar-controlled.
1. You may recall that when the Soviets
first brought the surface-to-air missile
batteries to Cuba, they were spread out
to cover as much of the island as possible.
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2. The Cubans have now relocated them
to give concentrated point defense to
critical areas, as the map shows.
B. The Cubans also have three versions of the
same basic surface-to-surface cruise missile.
1. One version is a ground-to-ground
tactical missile on a mobile launcher.
2. A second version was deployed on eight
launchers at four coastal defense
missile sites, but during late 1966,
all four sites were vacated. The equip-
ment has been assembled with the ground
forces version at a storage facility
near Havana.
3. The third version is the weapon of the
Komar guided missile patrol boat. Cuba
now has 18 of these boats, There is
speculation that the six additional
boats were meant to take the place of
the fixed and outdated coastal defense
system.
Foreign Policy
V. Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders are talking
and taking a hard line on revolution elsewhere in
Latin America,
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A. The old Havana agreement, to work through
orthodox Communist parties rather than more
militant groups, apparently no longer binds
Castro.
B. In Venezuela, Cuban funds, training, and
propaganda support--and probably weapons
as well--are going to the dissident militants
led by Douglas Bravo. The orthodox Commu-
nists are without funds, and disorganized.
C. In Guatemala, the Communist guerrillas have
been receiving arms smuggled through Mexico
with the assistance of Cuban diplomats. We
have a report that additional shipments are
expected by sea.
D. In Colombia, a guerrilla movement sponsored,
financed, and trained by Cuba has begun op-
erations in an area which has been relatively
free from the depradations of the pro-Com-
munist bandit gangs.
Vi. Castro has shown a certain amount of independence
abroad in his support of militant guerrilla splinter
groups, and at home by cracking down on some of the
veteran Communists in his government, but he remains
on good terms with Moscow.
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A. The Soviet Union has continued its large-
scale economic support of Cuba. It helped
Castro offset the economic impact of last
year's poor sugar crop
B. As for Communist China, Castro has been
exchanging public insults with the Peking
leaders for almost a year now, ever since
the Chinese cut back on planned rice de-
liveries. The coolness ~r expected to stop
short of a complete diplomatic break.
C. There are indications of some limited Cuban
manpower in North Vietnam, largely symbolic.
D. There is a large Cuban training mission in
Brazzaville Congo, and Cuban instructors at
one time worked with the rebel forces in
the other Congo.
Domestic Situation
VII. At home, Fidel Castro remains firmly in control.
A. His power position is based on tight security
controls, and on the loyalty of key military
officers and security officials.
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B. There were some reports early in 1966 that
Castro was ill or slipping, because he was
not making his usual public appearances.
Since June, however, he has been as active
as ever.
VIII. The economic situation is still Castro's biggest
problem.
A. Troubles arising from mismanagement, inef-
ficiency, and low labor productivity have
been aggravated by a series of natural
disasters--mainly hurricanes.
1. Some of the recent Caribbean hur-
ricanes have been taking not just one,
but two or three cuts at Cuba.
2. The missing Che Guevara, put too much
influence on industrial expansion.
3. Now the main emphasis is back on sugar
production, and a series of reorganiza-
tions and personnel shakeups is improving
management.
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B. The 1966 sugar harvest, at four and a half
million tons, was two million tons below the
planned goal, principally because of the
drought.
1. In 1967, however, barring adverse
weather Cuba should have one of its
best sugar harvests in history--prob-
ably between 6 and 7 million tons.
C. Nevertheless, per capita income will remain
below the pre-Castro levels.
1. Basic foods are still rationed, and
food distribution is poor.
D. Castro's bellicose foreign policy actions
and statements of the past six months prob-
ably reflect frustration over the continuing
critical economic and administrative problems.
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