DCI BRIEFING FOR HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000800030004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 27, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

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27 February 1967
DCI BRIL:FINI FOR HOUSE
AR"ILD SERVICES COMMITTEE
Before turning to the subject of Communist China,I
want to discuss briefly those elements of the
Soviet political and economic situation which
have a direct bearing on national power, and
then the Sino-Soviet dispute and the situation
along the Sino-Soviet border.
The Soviet Leadership
I. The men who threw out Khrushchev more than two
years ago have now had time to establish their
policies, their relationships, and their method
of operation.
A. What has emerged is essentially a collective
leadership.
1. There has been a steady enlargement in
the position of the Party Ceneral Secre-
tary, Leonid Brezhnev.
2. The present leaders, however, are a blend
of mixed interests and authority. They
have held together remarkably well, but
they have done it with undramatic,
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middle-of-the-road policies. The
guiding principle appears to be: "Don't
rock the boat."
B. Decisions are determined by compromise, and
implemented with caution.
1. This avoids the erratic initiatives of
Khrushchev's time, and minimizes the
risk of major failures.
C. The present leadership has not vet demonstrated,
however, that it has designed a durable
governmental machinery which can make the
hard decisions and still avoid the tendency
toward the one-man rule of the Stalin and
Khrushchev eras.
1. Such highly political problems as economic
reform and resource allocation have not
been resolved.
2. And while the Kremlin outwardly maintains
an image of collective leadership, the subtle
struggle for power and position continues.
Soviet Lconomy
II. The Soviet economy in some ways symbolizes this
temporizing on the part of the leadership. The
same problems are still there; reforms are being
attempted cautiously and gradually. As an example,
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the U.S.S.R. is already in the second year of
a Five-Year Plan period, and the plan has not
yet been put in final form and approved.
A. The Soviet economy is somewhat less than half
the size of ours, and the Soviet Cross National
Product in 1966 was about 45 percent of the
U.S. CNP.
1. The CNP growth rate in Russia last year
was 7 1/2 percent, but this was due to
the largest grain crop in Soviet history.
2. The average growth rate of the preceding
five years was 4 1/2 percent, and the
outlook from now through 1970 is for
about 4 to 5 1/2 percent increase each
year.
B. hhatever the problems, and whatever the
achievements, we expect that the economy
will give the military establishment whatever
is considered necessary by the Kremlin for
national security.
Military Expenditures
III. Soviet spending for military purposes and space
remained fairly stable from 1962 through 1965, but
it increased an estimated 7 percent in 1966. Its
appears that another 4 percent will be piled on top
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of last year's increase in 1967.
A. The Soviets have announced a military
budget for 1967 which is the highest since
l','orld Pear Ti. It amounts to 14.5 billion
rubles--an increase of 1.1 billion over
the published figures for 1966.
1. The announced defense budget, however
includes only about 60 percent of the
actual military expenditures.
2. !;c estimate that total Soviet defense
spending in 1967 will be about 19.8
billion rubles, or about 54 billion
dollars in comparable terms.
13. Soviet spending for advanced military and
space systems--and particularly for Research
and Development--is growing much faster than
the total defense budget.
1. As this chart shows, it more than doubled
between 1958 and 1966.
2. These programs demand the best and
scarcest resources in plant, material,
and skilled technology. The military
demand for these resources highlights
the whole resource allocation problem in
the Soviet Union. But we expect that the
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military and space ; ro,,rai,is will continue
to have first call on available resources.
Soviet Relations with the United States
I1'. I want to touch on just two facets of Soviet
foreign policy--.Soviet relations with the United
States, and the Sino-Soviet dispute.
V. On the question of relations with the United
States, the public stance of the Soviet leaders
at present is that it is difficult to make any
progress in resolving issues with a nation which
is attacking their Communist brethren in North
Vietnam.
A. This position is dictated to a degree by the
role which support of the North Vietnamese
has come to play in the Sino-Sovict dispute.
1. It is also, of course, a handy pretext
by which the Russians can require the
overtures to come from us.
B. In fact, however, there has been some progress
on issues not affecting Vietnam--for instance,
the recent civil air and space agreements, and
the indications that it may be possible to
agree on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
C. In private, Soviet leaders have used numerous
opportunities to emphasize that they want to
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avoid any showdown with Washington over the
Vietnamese issue.
D. The Kremlin leaders realize that if there is
going to be any meaningful progress along the
lines of their national interests in such
matters as European security, arms control,
and East-West trade, sooner or later they are
going; to have to resume the dialogue with the
United States.
E. I have no doubt that the Soviet leaders are
delighted to see the United States bogged
down in Southeast Asia, and that they will
continue to give the North Vietnamese any
aid which involves no major risk for the
Soviet Union.
F. They do not, however, wish a direct Soviet-U.S.
confrontation, and it is clear that they want
to keep their lines of communication with
Washington open and working.
The Sino-Soviet Dispute
VI. As for the Sino-Soviet dispute, the dominating
factor in Soviet foreign policy today is that
relations between Moscow and Peking have hit
rock bottom.
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A. The Chinese have done their hest in recent
weeks to goad Moscow into making a full
diplomatic break.
1. In mid-February, Peking eased up a bit
on some of the harassing tactics,
but the Chinese had already demonstrated
that they had it in their power to force
every last Russian out of Peking---and
they can exert that power at a moment's
notice.
2. Each side would prefer not to take the
final step in breaking diplomatic
relations, but the Soviets probably have
the most to lose.
3. A complete break could greatly complicate
Moscow's problems in getting military aid
through China to North Vietnam.
4. Virtually all Russian arms aid has taken
this overland route, largely because of
Soviet reluctance to risk a confrontation
with the U. S. on the high seas.
B. If the Chinese can force the Soviets to break
relations, they can then charge that the Soviets
are to blame for any interruption in the delivery
of military aid to North Vietnam.
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1. China has already tried to exploit Soviet
unwillingness to use the alternate sea
route, charging the Russians with cowardice.
2. The Chinese probably believe that in a pinch
the Soviets would still refuse to ship by sea,
and thus would discredit themselves in Hanoi.
C. Moscow is preparing for the worst, carefully
documenting the record in an effort to blame
Peking if aid to Hanoi is disrupted.
1. An official Soviet statement on February 9
accused Peking of "preventing, the solution
of concrete questions," and Moscow has pub-
lished charges that the Chinese are diverting,
sabotaging, or re-labeling Soviet war materiel
passing through China to North Vietnam.
2. Soviet propaganda media have blamed Chinese
intransigence for the resumption of U.S.
bombing on February 14.
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says Laos has granted
overflight rights for Soviet aircraft to and
from Hanoi as long as they carry no war
materiel. One Soviet IL-18 transport went
home by this route on February 10 when Peking
was harassing Soviet flights, but no air route
would be a feasible substitute for rail ship-
ments through China.
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VII. The Soviets would like to hang on in Peking,
and may still hope to ride out the current crisis.
A. They would prefer, if at all possible, to
keep some representation in China, on the
slim chance that at some point they could
exert some influence on the direction of the
current upheaval.
B. Perhaps more important, Moscow clearly is
unwilling to make it easier for China to deny
it overland access to Hanoi.
C. The USSR has already gone to great lengths
to maintain a presence in China,.
1. When the Soviet embassy in Peking was
placed under virtual siege, most of the
dependents were flown home, but the same
aircraft brought in tons of food, and
tough young guards to patrol the embassy
grounds. The Russians even turned their
swimming pool into a water reservoir in
case the Chinese should cut off utilities.
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I. The situation along the Sino-Soviet border provides
evidence that ^'ioscow considers the dispute with
China a genuine cause for concern.
A. The Soviets have been strengthening their
military positions along the border For the
past 18 months.
1. The build-up has been gradual, and looks
more like a reflection of contingency
planning than a crash effort in reaction
to recent developments.
2. We have no hard evidence of any major
clashes along the frontier, although there
have been persistent reports from both
'loscow and Peking of scattered incidents.
B. The Russians have added as many as 35,000
ground troops and several thousand border guards
to their relatively loan military positions near
China and 11ongolia since 1963. The bull: of the
build-up has taken place since October, 1965.
1. The four military districts bordering on China
now have about 275,000 ground force troops.
C. Opposite Chinese Sinkiang, the Soviets have now
established an army corps headquarters,
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with at least two and possibly three divisions.
One of these divisions was transferred from the
North Caucasus Military District.
1. Since October, 1965, they have also built
eight new airfields in this area, which
would permit rapid augmentation by airlift.
D. The Transbaykal "lilitarv District is up from two
tank divisions to four, concentrated in the area
near Dauriva where Manchuria, "Mongolia, and the
Soviet Union meet.
1. The Military District Commander is the former
top Soviet armored officer in East fermany.
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E. Since October, 1965, the Soviets have sharply
expanded the deployment of their most modern
air surveillance data network, to provide
better air defense for the Trans-Siberian
Air Defense District, which lies north of
Sinkiang and Mongolia.
1. During 1966, we received good
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evidence that a Mongolian air
defense system is taking shape. It is
very closely supervised by the Soviets.
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the Soviet military intelligence organization--
the so-called G.R.U.--was reorganized about a year
ago, to provide better intelligence on China.
A. We have been interested to observe that
the Soviets are using some of the latest
techniques for covering denied areas to
keep up with what's going on in China.
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has reported that
has recently
managed to obtain a list of Soviet intelli-
gence requirements, as of early 1966, for
information on China.
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 C. We continue to receive reports that there have
been incidents and minor clashes along,; the
border, but there is no confirmation. The
Soviet press has carried accounts of two inci-
dents in February along the "tanchurian border,
naturally blaming the Chinese for starting
both of them.
D. The Soviets have recently tried to increase
the unrest among ethnic minorities in Sinkiang.
1. Soviet hroadcastinc- in llichur has increased
sharply, and is being carried by transmit-
ters closer to the border to increase the
effective range. (The llighurs in Sinkiang
are ethnically related to the Turks. Pekin'
accused the Soviet Union of luring 60,000
of them across the border in 1962.)
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2. Sink i.anc' Province appears to he one of
the trouble spots in the current Chinese
domestic turmoil, and the Soviet press has
been using neki.nR's "cultural revolution"
as a peg for lurid accounts of Chinese
persecution of central Asian minorities.
ITT. The Chinese are extremely uneasy over Soviet inten-
tions--both political and military--along the remote
frontier area. They have done plenty of talking
in public and private about these Soviet activi-
ties, but so far they have done little to boost
their own military capabilities along the border.
A. They tir*htened security controls along the
border during the Ilighur unrest in 1962 and
1963, and these controls apparently are still
being rigidly enforced.
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Z7 February 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
COMMUNIST CHINA
Introduction
I. Before I take up Communist China's advanced weapons
and conventional military forces, I want to discuss
the "cultural revolution" that has been shaking the
country, because it provides a fantastic background
for the continued progress of Peking's military
establishment, and at the same time imposes certain
obvious if temporary limitations on its effectiveness.
A. You have all seen pictures, I'm sure, of
swarms of Chinese teen-agers marching
through the streets or across the country-
side, holding little books .from wnich they
chant quotations from Mao Tse-tung.
B. This is what is known as "Mao's thoughts."
In China today, they are credited with almost
miraculous power, although for the most part
they are a collection of tired old cliches
like "all power comes out of the barrel of a
gun," or "be resolute, fear no sacrifice, and
and surmount every difficulty to win victory."
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C. Even the Russians, who have been known to quote
Marx and Lenin, find Mao's thought a bit silly.
Pravda cited the case of a Chinese who commented
that if a man didn't know how to climb a pole,
studying Mao's thoughts would hardly help
him do it. The man was denounced and purged
because evervbodv in China knows that "a study
of Chairman Mao's work gives immediate results."
1. Chou Fn-lai's wife recently stated that
doctors successfully sewed back a finger
which had been cut off because they had
studied Mao's thought.
2. A forestry conference in Peking concluded
that the study of MIao would enable the
forestry service to grow better trees.
3. Peking Radio says that fighter pilots
shouted quotations from 'tao over the
intercom as they started a dog-fight, and
were therefore able to shoot down a
Chinese Nationalist aircraft.
4. And according to the Chinese Communist
news agency, a Lanchou worker who broke
an arm, a leg, and several ribs in a fall
refused sick leave, because Mao's thought
enabled him to live with his pain.
II. To us, it sounds ridiculous, but for the Chinese it
is in deadly earnest. A street mob recently forced
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the Chinese chief of state, Liu Shao-chi (Lyew
Shako-chee) to recite Mao nuotations from memory,
and ridiculed him when he fluffed a line.
Chinese Political Developments
1. Communist China is being racked by the great-
est political convulsions since Mao Tse-tung
took control in 1949.
A. Mao, at 73, is aging, sick, and more and
more inflexible.
1. He is clearly concerned that his Com-
munist Party is losing the revolu-
tionary zeal of its early days, and
cannot be relied on to keep China on
the right track after he is gone.
2. The teen-aged millions of the Red Guard
are supposed to re-kindle that zeal
with their youthful and unbridled en-
thusiasm.
B. To Mao Tse-tung, the cultural revolution
is primarily a drive to re-shape
the Communist Party, or replace it with a
more reliable, more fanatical, and younger
version.
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C. But for the men who aspire to succeed Mao,
it has become a naked struggle for power
and for survival.
II. It is difficult to determine from day to day
where the cultural revolution stands, who is
on which side, or who is going to come out on top.
A. The prime mover for several months was
Defense "sinister Lin Piao (Lin Beeow),
Mao's designated successor.
1. As soon as Lin was proclaimed Mao's
heir-apparent last August, he began
driving to unseat any potential rivals.
2. His immediate targets were the two men
who have been at the top of the party
machinery, Chief of State Liu Shao-chi
(Lyew Shaho-chee) and the general secretary,
Teng Ilsiao-ping (Dung Shecow-ping).
3. Lin appeared to have won a victory when
Madame Mao and other leaders began denoun-
cing Liu and Teng savagely at rallies in
Peking last December.
B. Subsequent developments, however, suggest that
Liu may have lost the initiative to Premier
Chou En-lai (Joe Un-lie).
1. Lin hasn't made a major public speech since
early November, and dropped from public view
in late November.
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2. Lin's name shows up in print much less
now than it did last fall.
3. Lin has been in chronic poor health for years,
and this may have contributed to his apparent
political decline.
C. Chou En-lai, on the other hand, has been the
dominant figure in Peking in recent weeks.
1. lie has been issuing directives on how to
conduct the "cultural revolution," and has
even been ordering Lin's troops around to
settle disputes between Red Guards and local
authorities.
III. Early in January, the leadership struggle entered
a critical phase.
A. Evidence began appearing that the army was
less than monolithic in its loyalty to Mao
and Lin.
1. On January 11, for instance, the cultural
revolution group which was supposed to be
purging the military leadership was itself
purged, and was replaced by a new and
presumably trustworthy group of 18 men.
Within a week, however, two or three members
of this new group were themselves under
attack on ideological grounds.
B. At about the same time, several military commanders
in crucial positions were denounced for having
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plotted a coup. They included the commander and
the political commissar of the Peking garrison,
the commander of armored forces, a member of the
party's powerful Military Affairs Committee, and
a number of key commanders in the provinces.
C. A number of top regional party officials were
accused of having joined in the plot. The most
important was Tao Chu (Taho joo) who was both the
party boss of the Central-South region, in Canton,
and number four man for a while in the inner circle
of Peking leaders. 'l'ao was very active in Pekin
right up to the time of his downfall at the end
of December.
D. We don't know the full story, but we suspect that
?Jao and Lin may in fact have had a very close shave
in December or January.
E. The opposition aligned against then was a formidable
group, and it did not give up without a struggle.
1. For several weeks after the turn of the year,
there were disorders throughout China, as Tao's
opponents incited strikes and riots, and managed
to disrupt transportation and production.
F. It is now evident, however, that the opposition
has been largely suppressed. T1any of its leaders
have been arrested, or are in hiding, and Peking
is working out an accommodation with several
provincial leaders.
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1. Reports of fighting and disorder dropped
off sharply in February.
2. 'lost of the incidents now involve clashes
between groups of unruly Red Cuards.
3. The army has been ordered to bring these
groups under control, and some of the more
militant Red Guard organizations are being;
disbanded.
IV. This return to a more orderly situation indicates that
most key military commanders remained loyal to the
present political leaders in Peking.
A. The course of developments indicates, however,
that their loyalty was secured only after Peking
shifted to more moderate tactics in the power
struggle.
1. It is also significant that in January,
before the army took an effective role, the
major responsibility for running the cultural
revolution shifted to Chou, who is not only
a competent compromiser, but more flexible
and more reasonable than either `lao or Lin.
B. The steam does seem to be going out of the cul-
tural revolution. Its excesses could be attributed
to a considerable degree to the volatile and unruly
youngsters who made up the Red fuard.
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1. Now a February 19 directive of the Central
Committee has ordered the secondary schools
reopened on March first. What's more, the
schools have been told to concentrate on the
academics and not spend too much time studying
Mao's writings when they do reopen.
C. A word of caution is in order about the day-to-day
reporting of the recent turmoil from Tokyo, from
Hong Kong, and from the handful of foreign
correspondents in China, who are virtually
confined to Peking itself:
1. The Chinese Communists do a great deal of
their talking in metaphor and hyperbole.
Some of the reports of pitched battles may
have arisen from the use of military language
to describe what was essentially a street brawl
between opposing political factions.
2. Much of the reporting has relied on wall
posters. Premier Chou Fn-lai's latest speeches
have described them as irresponsible.
3. A great deal of this reporting can neither
be confirmed nor refuted by the hard intelligence
we get on what is actually happening.
V. There is little doubt, however, that many officials
have fallen victim to the purge.
A. Order is being gradually restored, but it is too
early to conclude that the situation has been
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stabilized,
B. Mao's victory has been won at great cost--if
it has been won. The party apparatus is all but
shattered, and the purge has left a legacy of
mistrust and bitterness among the surviving
leaders,
C. If Chou En-lai manages to consolidate his position,
and emerges as the dominant figure, the trend of
recent weeks toward moderation and reasonableness
will probably continue. It is conceivable that
Chou has already achieved a considerable degree
of control.
D. At this point, however, there is little hard evidence
that Mao has lost his ultimate control to the
more moderate elements.
1. As long as Mao remains the leader of Chinese
Communism, he can be expected at any time
to renew his attempt to reshape society along
radical lines.
2. This would certainly renew the turmoil and
the infighting among top leaders.
VI. Thus the long-range effect of the cultural revolution
remains up in the air, but there are two points which
we can make:
First, until 'lao goes and a new leader has firmly
consolidated his succession, China's leaders
will be divided and in conflict. They will find
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it difficult to agree on any new policy lines,
so we do not expect any radical departure from
existing policies.
Second, whoever wins, we can see no reason to expect
any dilution of Peking's implacable hostility
toward the United States.
For some time to come, however, the Chinese Communists
will probably suffer from a cultural revolution
hangover that could limit their capacity to engage
in foreign adventures.
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I. The Chinese Communists are making a concerted
effort--on their own and with overriding priori-
ties--to develop modern weapons for strategic
attack. They are devoting increasing resources
to missiles and nuclear weapons.
A. In 1966, they conducted their third, fourth
and fifth nuclear tests, apparently deliv-
ering one of the devices by missile.
B. They are, therefore, making progress toward
a nuclear strike capability.
C. We estimate. that they could begin to deploy
a medium-range ballistic missile with a
nuclear warhead this year, and their first
crude ICBMs in the early 1970s.
(~1AP, CHINESE ADVANCED WEAPONS FACILITIES)
Ii. The fourth Chinese nuclear test was a device
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The Chi-
nese claim it was delivered by ballistic missile.
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III. The latest Chinese nuclear test,
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B. The tests indicate that the Chinese
manufacture nuclear bombs which can
ried by their medium bombers--about
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old TU-4 BULLs similar to our B-29, and two
TU-16 BADGER jet bombers.
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2. Their likely immediate goals, however,
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are probably warheads for short- and
medium-range missiles, and possibly a
weapon for the IL-28 BEAGLE light jet
bomber. The Chinese have about 250 of
these aircraft, which have a better chance
of reaching a defended target than the
BULLs.
3. At present, the Chinese have a very
limited supply of fissionable material.
Until the Yumen facility comes into
production, China is in poor position to
carry on an active testing program, and
build any substantial stockpile of weap-
ons at the same time.
C. In the present state of Chinese technology,
any weapons they might make now would be crude
and inefficient by our standards. By Far
Eastern standards, however, they are a
significant addition to Chinese military
prestige.
IV. The Chinese probably started their missile de-
velopment by test-firing Soviet MRBMs given them
before the.Sino-Soviet split in 1960.
A. They may have begun testing their own native
versions as early as 1963.
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B. Now they are working on a number of
missile programs.
C. The medium-range surface-to-surface
system is the oldest of these programs.
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2. If the Chinese inaugurate a reasonably suc-
cessful flight test program within the next
year or so, they probably could have a few
ICBMs deployed by the early 1970s.
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These would be inferior in reliahi.1i.ty
and accuracy by U. S. standards, but in
Chinese eyes they could consti tote a
limited intcrconti.nental deterrent.
I. 1'%'e think there is a flood chance that the Chinese
will try to orbit a satellite from Shuang-cheng;-tz"
25X1 C
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this year.
dropping hints along this line.
1. A successful launch would add to China's
image as a developing technological nation.
2. The existing Chinese "tRB'1, with a second
stage added, could put a satellite of several
hundred pounds in orbit.
F. The Chinese are also working on missile systems
for short ranges.
1. Complex C at the test center is working on
a missile with a range of several hundred miles.
This could be a weapon to fit the Chinese copy
of the Soviet C-class submarine, armed with
three ballistic missiles of 350-mile range.
2. They have also probably developed their own
supply of missiles for the missile patrol boats
they are building.
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25X1D five years.
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A. before the Sino-Soviet split, the !'tssiaIS gave
the Chinese a limited number of SA-2 launchers
and missiles--taut that was more than six years
ago, and the missile has a shelf li fc of about
Even with a crash program, it would be several years
before the Chinese would have enough operational A"
sites to make a significant contribution to their
over-all air defense system.
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CHINESE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES
I. Despite Chinese progress in advanced weapons,
the military power of Communist China for some
years to come will derive primarily from the
numerical strength of its enormous ground forces---
about 2,300,000 men---and great reserves of manpower.
II. There are more than 100 infantry divisions and
about a dozen armor and artillery divisions in the
Chinese Communist Army, concentrated in the heavily
populated regions of eastern China.
A. The Chinese Army probably has the capability
to overrun any of its mainland neighbors,
provided it does not run into significant
opposition from a major power.
1. It has demonstrated its ability to move
and fight with primitive transportation
and rudimentary logistic support.
2. The Chinese are hampered by shortages
of armor, heavy ordnance, mechanized
transport, and fuel.
III. The Chinese air force and navy are oriented
primarily toward defensive missions.
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 A. The bomber force at present consists of 250
jet light bombers--IL-28 BEAGLES. We believe
the Chinese will start producing BADGER jet
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mediums about 1968.
B. The bulk of the jet fighter force consists of
about 1,900 MIG-15s and MIG-17s, obtained
10 or more years ago.
IV Re-k-ing's -navy is --the-weakest element of the--
-Ghinese acme- forces; even- with the- world's:
f-a h l.a-rges-t s-ubmar ne force.
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C ii.nese are producin
a report that the
the SIJ-7 fror blueprints
which a Chinese technician stole i-:ilile he was
working in a Russian factory. The report is
s".uspect, however, because sore OF the det,nils
don't ~,rrnd up. Also, the ner,,r i.:ircra t ion!,
wore like the 'ITC-19 than the `.;IJ-7.
3. A new native design would require two or three
years c f flight-testing before the aircraft
are ready for series production.
IV. Peking's navy is the weakest clement of the Chinese
Communist armed forces, everi with the w--!orld's
fourth largest submarine Fleet.
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A. There are 34 submarines, most of them
medium-range torpedo attack boats, but
they have had no experience in extended
operations. Most of their training takes
place within 20 miles of the coast.
1. They are turning out two or three medium-
range submarines a year. Their one copy
of the Soviet ballistic-missile C-class
has joined the fleet, but is being used
in a conventional torpedo attack role.
We have seen no evidence that the Chinese
have a ballistic missile for it vet.
B. The major surface units are four obsolete
destroyers, and six relatively modern
destroyer-escorts.
1. Two of the DE's joined the fleet in 1966,
and two sister ships are-in mid-construction.
2. These new escort ships look like the
Soviet 298-foot RICA class, but the
Chinese have made some major changes
above the water line. The Chinese
are building them from keel up to
launching in six months ; the
fitting out process takes another
four to six months.
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C. The Chinese have guided missile patrol boats,
armed with missiles which have an effective
range of about 15 miles. This poses a threat
to conventionally armed destroyers with guns
that can fire less than 10 miles.
1. All but two of these boats were built by
Five
the Chinese in 1966. Fiew of them are
copies of the Soviet Osa-class, which
carries four missiles and has a top speed
Three sever.
of about 40 knots. are *the somewhat
slower Komar-class, carrying two missiles each.
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CHINESE EXPECTATIONS OF WAR
1. Peking's public stance remains as belligerent
as ever, but behind this posturing the Chinese
have been cautious to hold down the risks of a
direct military clash with the United States.
A. This is not to say that Peking has been
bluffing. We believe that there
are three situations in which the. Chinese
would feel obliged to intervene:
1. One of these would arise from U.S..
air strikes against targets in China.
In May 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister
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to pass along a warning to this
effect.
2. The second circumstance which would
trigger Chinese intervention would be
a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam.
Chinese leaders passed this word to a
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3. In addition, if the collapse of the Hanoi
Government should seem imminent, China
would probably move into North Vietnam
to "restore order."
B. It is always dangerous to assume that the
Chinese are going to be guided by rational
decisions, but we believe that Peking is
bound to feel that the domestic political
turmoil and the intensification of the
dispute with Moscow leave China less
ready than it might otherwise be to engage
in direct hostilities with the United States.
C. Another factor which would contribute to
increased Chinese caution would be a growing
conviction in Peking that the United States
is determined to persevere, over the short
run at least, in the Vietnamese war.
D. We think, therefore, that the threshold of
sensitivity--the level at which Peking would
feel forced to fight--has probably been
raised a degree or two.
1. For example, a shallow incursion by US
troops into the DMZ might be less likely
today to trigger an immediate Chinese reac-
tion than it would have been in 1965.
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II. There are no indications that the Chinese regard
a US attack as a likely contingency in the near
future--either as a result of a US initiative,
or by a US reaction to some new Chinese move.
A. Chinese military deployments reflect deliberate
efforts to carry out long-range plans to
strengthen Chinese defenses, rather than
urgent preparation for war.
B. We have also noted that Chinese air defense
preparations do not reflect any of the
"crash" nature they might have if the
Chinese believed war to be imminent.
1. Defenses are being prepared around key
factories, and there have been instances
of relocation to the interior.
2. Some cities, in fact, have implemented
programs aimed at the evacuation of
non-essential residents. This, however,
reflects a continuing campaign to combat
the population movement from the farms
to the cities.
3. By and large, there is no- general and.
concerted civil defense preparation.
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C. Even along the southern border with Vietnam.
Peking has been very cautious in its reaction
to US air operations.
1. On many occasions Chinese aircraft have
not reacted to limited U.S. overflights
of Chinese territory.
2. On May 8, 1966, Chinese MIGs crossed
the border for the first time to attack
US fighter-bombers over Vietnam. Peking
was apparently trying to probe the U.S.
reaction to an extension of the Chinese
air defense umbrella a short distance over
North Vietnam.
3. An inadvertent overflight of Chinese
territory by U.S. aircraft four days
later, during which a Chinese MIG was
shot down, was apparently taken by Peking
as a deliberate U.S. warning that we
would not tolerate Chinese air protection
of North Vietnam. Since that time, the
Chinese have been even more cautious in
their reaction to US flights.
D. Chinese propaganda concerning Vietnam has
decreased in volume over the past twelve
months.
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III.
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1. Chinese statements concerning the
"inevitability" of war with the US
now appear only infrequently.
2. Peking has made no mention of "volunteers"
for Vietnam since the fall of 1965, except
for brief flurries last summer and again in
December. after bombinss in the area of
Hanoi and Haiphong.
3. Peking has always said that the Vietnamese
must bear the primary responsibility for
fighting; in recent months this theme
has been given more emphasis.
In June 1966, Foreign Minister Chen Yi asked the
to pass to the United
States Government the following :four points which
Premier Chou En-lai had made earlier in an interview
with a Pakistani journalist:
A. Peking will never start a war with the US.
B. China will continue to support countries
"threatened" by the US.
C. China is prepared for an escalation of the war.
D. If the US extends the war to China, there will
be a war without limits.
E. We think these four points are probably an
accurate statement of Peking's current position.
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