DCI BRIEFING OF CIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS, 2 JUNE 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000700080001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 2, 1966
• Content Type: MFR

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2 June 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: DCI Briefing of CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations,
2 June 1966
1. The Director, accompanied by Colonel White, Dr. Wheelon,
Mr. John Clarke, and Mr. Houston briefed the CIA Subcommittee of
House Appropriations on 2 June 1966 at 10:30 a. m. Present for the
Subcommittee were:
George H. Mahon, Chairman
Frank T. Bow
Glenard P. Lipscomb
Robert L. Michaels, Staff Assistant
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2. The Chairman opened with questions on the research and
development budget submission and asked how the submission tied
in with Dr. Wheelon briefed on the R&D program
and the NRO problem, saying that our share would be unknown until
it was finally set by the Director, NRO. Dr. Wheelon then gave
details on some of the specific R&D projects involved. The Subcom-
mittee expressed special interest in The Director stated 25X1
it might be the biggest intelligence breakthrough since the overhead
camera. Mr. Mahon asked if the Russians knew what we are doing,
and the Director said they will know it is there but probably will not
know what it is for. Mr. Mahon inquired how CIA could have people
who are qualified in these highly sophisticated fields, and Dr. Wheelon
pointed out his own training and background and the type of people he
recruited. Mr. Mahon asked if industry participated, and the Director
said they did a good deal of it and in this connection we were program
managers. He pointed out that both Mr. Flax and Mr. Foster were
complimentary on the competence of our people.
3. Mr. Mahon asked about the cutback on Cuban operations.
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Mr. Mahon sai e
assumed Castro has to raise a fuss as he recently did to persuade the
Russians to help him. The Director said this was part of the act,
but also it was an exercise in mobilization and a move to detect
counterrevolutionaries. Mr. Mahon asked if the President and the
Secretary of State were satisfied on intelligence in Cuba, and the
Director answered in the affirmative. Mr. Mahon asked how much
Russian aid is given to Cuba, and the answer was they had been
given about $350, 000, 000 to $400, 000, 000 a year, which is a fairly
steady total for the last two or three years although the emphasis now
is less on military and more on trade items.
4. Mr. Bow asked further about the Cuban situation, and the
Director said the internal situation was not good, particularly its
economy.
ipscom asked about the Cuban military,
an the .rector said they were at considerable strength and loyal.
He said Castro had drawn back on his earlier efforts to subvert other
Latin American countries from his attempts on some 22 countries a
year ago to concentrate on three countries now. He also noted that
he was attacking President Frei of Chile. Mr. Bow said he did not
think much of Frei, but the Director said comparatively he stood up
pretty well. Mr. Lipscomb asked if we had good information on the
Cuban military, and the Director said we did,
and noted that 85 per cent of the armed forces
now belong to the Communist Party.
5. Mr. Mahon asked about personnel, noting a proposed
increase from nd asked for the cause. Colonel
White noted that had been included in the supplemental request
for Southeast Asia and briefed further on the other increases,
including NPIC. Dr. Wheelon briefed on budget items connected
with operations involving Russian missile ranges. The
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7. Mr. Lipscomb asked why FBIS was not run by State or
the Voice of America, and the Director said its purpose was to
collect intelligence and this was our responsibility. Colonel White
gave the history of FBIS, and Dr. Wheelon noted this was one among
other services of common concern in accordance with the statutory
concept. Colonel White noted how FBIS had reacted in connection
with the Dominican crisis. Mr. Lipscombasked how many copies
were issued, and Colonel White offered to supply the breakdown to
Mr. Lipscomb. (Colonel White furnished this information, and
Mr. Warner will arrange for its delivery to Mr. Lipscomb. )
Mr. Lipscomb asked if the reports were actually used, and Colonel
White said we put out periodic questionnaires and if any customer
did not respond he was automatically cut off. In all cases they had
requested to be put on distribution again. Mr. Lipscomb asked how
many people were involved, and Colonel White said people in 1967
with a budget of The Director emphasized it was a very
'important function, and r. Wheelon ma de the point that if the function
were carried on by a policymaking organization the reports would tend
to follow policy. The Director concurred, saying the objectivity of
CIA must be retained and that he had had considerable experience in
the past of the effect of policy on intelligence and this was why
Mr. McNamara came to CIA rather than DIA for his information.
Mr. Lipscomb asked if the newspapers know that FBIS is CIA, and
on being answered in the affirmative asked what would happen if
someone wanted to know the cost of the operation. Colonel White
said we simply would not tell them.
8. The Director briefed on the assessment of the troubles
in Red China, particularly the struggle for power and the fact that
this had practically eliminated the propaganda against the United
States and South Vietnam. Mr. Mahon noted that he had met with
Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung with Ambassador Hurley in 1945 and
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was impressed with Chou as a smooth and smart official. The
Director noted the heir apparent is very militant and answered
affirmatively to Mr. Bow's question as to whether he might be the
type that would use the A-Bomb.
9. Mr. Mahon asked if there was a possibility that the
South Vietnamese would sue for peace. The Director said our
judgment was that there would be a minimum of three years and
more likely five years before we could start moving our troops
out of South Vietnam. He felt that the large pattern of bigger
attacks would drop off and they would go back to straight guerrilla
operations but would need U. S. military strength and the political
action teams until the basic structure was strengthened. He noted
that Red China could take stronger action much as the -1 -;-44-4__
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eefed up I I which needs additional 25X1
assistance. He said Sihanouk in Cambodia goes with the wind and
that we had a report that he was possibly on his way out, but with
the long, slow process similar to Sukarno's elimination this might
take five years.
10. Mr. Bow asked about General Larsen's report on
the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in Cambodia, and the Director
said we agree to the extent that they use Cambodia but do not say
that they are based in Cambodia. He said we should hit the situation
in early and noted that U. S. military aid is not going there
as fast as our Ambassador would like. Mr. Mahon noted that
Indonesia seemed to be the only bright spot, and the Director noted
that in the Indonesian-Malaysian situation there was still some hard
bargaining and the status of Singapore would be a sore point between
them. He noted the Indonesian economy was bad and answered
affirmatively Mr. Mahon's question about the killing of some 300, 000
Communists in Indonesia.
11. Mr. Mahon noted that Chinese intelligence must think
the United States is absorbed in a power struggle with the opposition
of Fulbright and Morse, the domination of racial problems in the
news, and similar problems carried by the United States press.
The Director said he felt Chinese intelligence was good. He noted
the Chinese have started up their heavy bomber program, presumably
to achieve a delivery system for the A-Bomb.
12. Mr. Lipscomb expressed considerable concern at the
way the Executive Branch was handling publicity on various items,
such as the question of the shootdown of the plane over China and
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the question of General Larsen's claim of troops in Cambodia,
and pointed out that first we deny then we admit or equivocate and
he wondered if this would not hurt our credibility abroad. The
Director said it did and that the problem is that the people who
make such statements should coordinate more carefully before
they talk. For instance, in the case of General Larsen's statements,
DIA does not believe there is sufficient information to back them
up while CIA believes there is.
13. Mr. Mahon said he felt sorry to have expressed so much
pessimism but he felt we would be in a state of war in one degree or
another for the rest of the century. The Director said his view was
that if we were to try to negotiate with the Communists we must at
the same time intensify our military effort as this is the only type
of negotiation they understand.
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
OGC: LRH: j eb
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SIGNATURE
Remarks: Red: Part of the time you were
discussing manpower with 14x. Mahon,
as noted in paragraph 5, I was on the
telephone getting the figures on Russian
aid to Cuba. If there is anything that should
be added in this connection. I will be glad
of some help from you.
LRHouston
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or Releases&X0 .-
(Information as of /1:30 AM EDT)
I. The cautious compromise worked out between govern-
ment and Buddhist leaders should quiet the crisis
atmosphere in Saigon for at least the next few days.
A. Buddhist leaders in Saigon have generally
restrained excessive reactions by their fol-
lowers to the attack on militant bonze Thien
Minh on 1 June.
B. They have also cautioned their followers to
avoid excessive agitation against the regime
until it is clear how the agreement on expan-
sion of the "war cabinet" leadership bodies will
be carried out.
II. The Buddhists apparently agreed to dampen their
agitation in return for implementation of recently
announced government plans to expand the present
National Leadership Committee (NLC).
A. Ten civilian representatives--presumably in-
cluding spokesmen for the Buddhists--are to be
added before 6 June.
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B. The chairman of the NLC, General Thieu, will
apparently resign as agreed by the members at
yesterday's meeting.
C. The enlarged NLC will "make an effort" to set
up a "civilian and armed forces council" prior
to 19 June to "assist" the Central Executive
Committee, chaired by Ky.
1. It is not clear whether references by gov-
ernment leaders to the "National Leadership
Committee" are synonymous with Buddhist
references to the "Directorate."
III. It appears that the accord to enlarge the NLC was
agreed upon without too much reaction from the Direc-
tOrate generals.
A. It is possible that they feel their positions
as daily executors of Directorate policy will not
be significantly threatened.
IV. Some agitation may occur during the celebration of
Buddha's birthday on 3 June.
A. There are indications that some Buddhist groups
hope to conduct the observances with dignity and
without political overtones.
B. There is other cvidence that efforts are being
made, possibly with some Buddhist connivance, to
organize strikes and demonstrations on 3 June.
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V. In Hue, meanwhile, progovernment troop units
moved in today without any resistance.
A. Government sources said the radio station
and key points of the city have been secured
without a shot being fired so far.
B. It is not clear, however, whether the troops
will obey orders to prevent further violence
by the dissident forces or participate in any
effort to disarm or overpower the rebels.
1. Some "struggle" troops obtained supplies
of heavy caliber automatic weapons during
the violence in the city on 1 June.
VI. Only light contact with the Viet Cong has been
reported during thepast several days.
A. Border surveillance patrols are continuing in
allied Operation PAUL REVERE, a major sweep
operation in western Pleiku Province.
B. All other operations involving US personnel
continue without significant contact with the
enemy,
VII. There are continuing indications that the Com-
munists are moving substantial numbers-of reinforce-
ments into northwestern Pleiku Province.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
(Information as of 0900 1 AM EDT)
in Paragraph V below
I. Only fragmentary returns from yesterday's elec-
tion are available. Vote totals have been
coming in slowly and it may not be possible to
discern any clear trend until late today.
A. With an estimated 50 percent of the expected
Santo Domingo vote of 240,000 reported:
1. Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate
Juan Bosch appears to be leading with
about 59,4 percent of the vote.
2. Reformist Party candidate Balaguer has
38.8 percent of the vote,
3. Bonnelly trails with only 2.2 percent.
B. In 1962, Bosch captured 78 percent of the
capital's vote, and without a similar margin
will have difficulty overcoming the lead
Balaguer is likely to develop elsewhere.
Scattered returns from the interior show
Balaguer doing extremely well.
II. No significant instances of fraud or violence
marred the election, which foreign observers
lauded as "exemplary."
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A. Provisional President Garcia Godoy and the
OAS commission have issued statements
praising the conduct of the electorate.
B. None of the political factions has levied
charges of voting irregularities--which may
help pave the way to popular acceptance of
the outcome.
III. Favorable weather aided in promoting a good-
sized turnout--estimated at 1.2 million, or 65
to 70 percent of the eligible voters.
IV. The turnout and the relatively large number of
women who cast ballots are thought to favor
Balaguer's chances.
V. As of 0900 AM EDT unofficial returns show
Balaguer with 168,366 votes while Bosch is
trailing with 122,078.. The two Santo Domingo
morning papers indicate that a Balaguer sweep
may be in the making.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
(Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
1. Only fragmentary returns from yesterday's elec-
tion are available. Vote torals have been
coming in slowly and it may not be possible to
discern any clear trend until late today.
A. With an estimated 20 percent of the expected
Santo Domingo vote of 240,000 reported:
1. Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate
Juan Bosch appears to be leading with
about 60 percent of the vote.
2. Reformist Party candidate Balaguer has
37 percent of the vote.
3. Bonnelly trails with only 2.1 percent.
B. In 1962, Bosch captured 78 percent of the
capital's vote, and without a similar margin
may have difficulty overcoming the lead
Balaguer is likely to develop elsewhere.
II. No significant instances of fraud or violence
marred the election, which foreign observers
lauded as "exemplary."
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A. Provisional President Garcia Godoy and the
OAS commission have issued statements
praising the conduct of the electorate.
B. None of the political factions have levied
charges of voting irregularities--which may
help pave the way to popular acceptance of
the outcome.
III. Favorable weather aided in promoting a good-
sized turnout--estimated at 1.2 million, or 65
to 70 percent of the eligible voters.
IV. The turnout and the relatively large number of
women who cast ballots are throught to favor
Balaguer's chances.
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